Calendar No. 97
116th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 116-47
======================================================================
DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020
_______
June 11, 2019.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Burr, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. 1589]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an
original bill (S. 1589) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
years 2018, 2019, and 2020 for intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the United States Government, the
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that the
bill do pass.
Classified Annexes to the Committee Report
Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on June 12,
2017, that the President's aggregate request for the National
Intelligence Program (NIP) for Fiscal Year 2018 was $57.7
billion; on February 27, 2018, that the request for the NIP for
Fiscal Year 2019 was $59.9 billion; and on March 18, 2019, that
the request for the NIP for Fiscal Year 2020 was $62.8 billion.
Other than for limited unclassified appropriations--primarily
the Intelligence Community Management Account--the classified
nature of United States intelligence activities precludes any
further disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details
of its budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee
has prepared classified annexes to this report for Fiscal Years
2018, 2019 and 2020, with Schedules of Authorizations for
Fiscal Years 2019 and 2020. Funding for Fiscal Year 2018 is
deemed authorized, without a specific Schedule of
Authorization.
The classified Schedules of Authorizations for Fiscal Years
2019 and 2020 are incorporated by reference in the Damon Paul
Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 and have the legal status
of public law. The classified annexes are made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and to the President. The classified annexes
are also available for review by any Member of the Senate
subject to Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020 (the ``Act'') that was reported by the Committee.
DIVISION A--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the United States Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for Fiscal Year 2020.
Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2020 are
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Intelligence community management account
Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the ODNI for Fiscal Year
2020.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$514,000,000 for the CIA Retirement and Disability Fund for
Fiscal Year 2020.
Section 202. Modification of amount of Central Intelligence Agency
voluntary separation pay
Section 202 provides the DNI and the Director of the CIA
with authorities to increase voluntary separation payments to
$40,000, with future automatic adjustments according to the
Consumer Price Index.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SUBTITLE A--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Section 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 301 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
Section 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 302 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 303. Improving the onboarding methodology for certain
intelligence personnel
Section 303 requires the Secretary of Defense and the DNI
to report on common methodology for onboarding in the
Intelligence Community (IC), as well as metrics, collaboration,
and automation throughout the process. Section 303 further
requires IC surveys regarding the onboarding process.
Section 304. Intelligence community public-private talent exchange
Section 304 requires the DNI to develop policies,
processes, and procedures to facilitate IC personnel rotations
to the private sector and vice versa, to bolster skill
development and collaboration. Section 304 further sets forth
the employment detail requirements for such agreement terms and
conditions, termination, duration, employment status, pay, and
benefits.
Section 305. Expansion of scope of protections for identities of covert
agents
Section 305 amends the definition of ``covert agent'' in
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3126(4)) to
protect the identities of all undercover intelligence officers,
and United States citizens whose relationship to the United
States is classified, regardless of the location of the
individuals' government service or time since separation of
government service.
Section 306. Inclusion of security risks in program management plans
required for acquisition of major systems in National
Intelligence Program
Section 306 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3024(q)(1)(A)) to require that the annual program
management plans on major system acquisitions that the DNI
submits to Congress address security risks, in addition to
cost, schedule, performance goals, and program milestone
criteria.
Section 307. Paid parental leave
Section 307 requires the DNI to issue a policy to make
available 12 weeks of paid administrative leave for the IC
personnel in the event of the birth of a child, including
adoptive and foster parents. Section 307 further requires ODNI
to submit a plan for implementation to the congressional
intelligence committees within one year after enactment, and
directs implementation within 90 days thereafter.
SUBTITLE B--OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Section 311. Exclusivity, consistency, and transparency in security
clearance procedures and right to appeal
Section 311 requires the Executive Branch to publish
adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility to access
classified information and makes these guidelines the exclusive
basis for granting, denying, and revoking clearances in order
to increase transparency, accountability, and due process.
Section 311 further codifies the right of government employees
to appeal unfavorable eligibility determinations to an agency-
level panel. Section 311 also creates a higher level review by
a government-wide appeals panel, chaired by the DNI as the
government's Security Executive Agent, to review certain
agency-level panel determinations involving allegations of
constitutional violations or discrimination. This DNI-led panel
can remand decisions to the employing agency for reevaluation
if they find valid cause.
Section 312. Limitation on transfer of National Intelligence University
Section 312 prohibits the DNI and the Secretary of Defense
from undertaking any activity to transfer the National
Intelligence University (NIU) out of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) until the DNI and the Secretary jointly certify
that: the NIU has had its regional academic accreditation
restored to full standing; the NIU has exclusivity for
providing advanced intelligence education for Department of
Defense (DoD) personnel; military personnel will receive joint
professional military education credit; ODNI has degree-
granting authority; and a joint governance model between ODNI
and DoD is in place. Section 312 further requires the DNI and
Secretary of Defense to submit to appropriate congressional
committees cost estimates for NIU's operation, and for
transferring the NIU to another agency.
Section 313. Improving visibility into the security clearance process
Section 313 requires the DNI, acting as the Security
Executive Agent, to issue a policy requiring the head of each
Federal agency to create an electronic portal whereby the
agency and its workforce applicants can review the status of
their security clearance processing.
Section 314. Making certain policies and execution plans relating to
personnel clearances available to industry partners
Section 314 requires each head of a Federal agency to share
security clearance policies and plans with directly affected
industry partners, consistent with national security and with
National Industrial Security Program (NISP) goals. Section 314
further requires the DNI, acting as the Security Executive
Agent, jointly with the Director of the NISP, to develop
policies and procedures for sharing this information.
SUBTITLE C--INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Section 321. Definitions
Section 321 provides definitions for terminology used
throughout this Subtitle.
Section 322. Inspector General external review panel
Section 322 codifies the whistleblower protections
contained in Part C of Presidential Policy Directive-19 to
ensure an effective appeals process through external review
panels and the reporting of waste, fraud, and abuse. Section
322 further requires the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community (IC IG) to submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a recommendation on how to ensure that a
whistleblower with a complaint against an Inspector General of
an IC agency has equal access to adjudication, appellate
review, and external review panels.
Section 323. Harmonization of whistleblower processes and procedures
Section 323 requires the IC IG, in coordination with the IC
Inspectors General Forum, to develop recommendations applicable
to Inspectors Generals for all IC elements regarding the
harmonization of policies and directives related to
whistleblower claims and appeals processes and procedures.
Section 323 further requires the IC IG to maximize transparency
regarding these processes and procedures.
Section 324. Intelligence community oversight of agency whistleblower
actions
Section 324 requires the IC IG, in consultation with the IC
Inspectors General Forum, to complete a feasibility study on
establishing a hotline whereby whistleblower complaints
relating to the IC are automatically referred to the IC IG.
Section 324 further requires that the IC IG establish a system
whereby the IC IG is provided in near real-time all information
relating to whistleblower complaints relating to the programs
and activities under the DNI's jurisdiction, as well as any IG
actions relating to such complaints.
Section 325. Report on cleared whistleblower attorneys
Section 325 requires the IC IG to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on access to
cleared attorneys by whistleblowers in the IC, including any
recommended improvements to the limited security agreement
process and such other options as the IC IG considers
appropriate.
TITLE IV--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Section 401. Study on foreign employment of former personnel of
intelligence community
Section 401 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State, to conduct a study
of issues pertaining to former IC employees working with, or in
support of, foreign governments; to provide a report to the
appropriate committees on the study's findings, including
necessary legislative or administrative action; and to assess
how requirements could be imposed for compliance reporting.
Section 402. Comprehensive economic assessment of investment in key
United States technologies by companies or organizations linked
to China
Section 402 requires the DNI, in coordination with other
designated agencies, to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a comprehensive economic assessment of
investment in key United States technologies, by companies or
organizations linked to China, as well as the national security
implications of Chinese-backed investments to the United
States.
Section 403. Analysis and periodic briefings on major initiatives of
intelligence community in artificial intelligence and machine
learning
Section 403 requires the DNI, in coordination with other
appropriate IC elements, to provide to the congressional
intelligence committees an analysis of the IC's major
initiatives in artificial intelligence and machine learning.
Section 403 further requires semiannual briefings for two
years, followed by annual briefings for the five years
thereafter.
Section 404. Encouraging cooperative actions to detect and counter
foreign influence operations
Section 404 provides the DNI, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, with the necessary authorities and
ability to use up to $30 million of NIP funds, to establish an
independent, non-profit Social Media Data Analysis Center
(``Center''). Section 404 further provides that this Center
shall establish a central portal for social media data
analysis, enabling: (1) social media companies to voluntarily
share data on foreign influence operations; (2) researchers to
analyze that data; and (3) information-sharing between and
among government and private companies. Section 404 also
requires the Director of the Center to produce quarterly public
reports on trends in foreign influence and disinformation
operations, including any threats to campaigns and elections,
as well as an annual report to Congress on the degree of
cooperation and commitment from the social media companies.
Section 405. Oversight of foreign influence in academia
Section 405 requires the DNI, in consultation with other
appropriate IC elements, to submit a report on the risks to
sensitive research subjects posed by foreign entities. Section
405 further requires the report to identify specific national
security-related threats to research conducted at higher
education institutions.
Section 406. Director of National Intelligence report on fifth-
generation wireless network technology
Section 406 requires the DNI to submit a report on the
threats to United States national security posed by 5G wireless
network technology built by foreign companies. Section 406
further requires the report to include threats to cybersecurity
and cyber collection capabilities, as well as potential threat
mitigation efforts, such as encryption and open-source
technology. Section 406 requires the DNI to submit the report
in unclassified form, with a classified appendix, if necessary.
Section 407. Annual report by Comptroller General of the United States
on cybersecurity and surveillance threats to Congress
Section 407 requires the Comptroller General, in
consultation with the DNI, Secretary of Homeland Security, and
the Sergeant at Arms, to submit a report on cybersecurity and
surveillance threats to Congress that includes statistics on
targeted attacks or other incidents against United States
Senators or their immediate families and staff.
Section 408. Director of National Intelligence assessments of foreign
interference in elections
Section 408 requires the DNI, in consultation with other
appropriate agencies, to conduct an assessment within 45 days
following a United States election of any foreign government
interference. Section 408 requires the assessment to include
the nature, methods, persons involved, and responsible foreign
entities. Section 408 further requires the DNI to submit the
assessment to Congress and certain executive officials, and to
make the assessment public (consistent with the protection of
sources and methods) within 60 days after the election.
Section 409. Study on feasibility and advisability of establishing
Geospatial-Intelligence Museum and learning center
Section 409 requires the Director of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) to complete a study and
report the findings on the feasibility and advisability of
establishing a Geospatial-Intelligence Museum and learning
center.
Section 410. Report on death of Jamal Khashoggi
Section 410 requires the DNI, within 30 days of enactment,
to submit to Congress an unclassified report on the death of
Jamal Khashoggi, consistent with protecting sources and
methods. Section 410 requires the report to include
identification of those who carried out, participated in,
ordered, or were otherwise complicit in, or responsible for,
Mr. Khashoggi's death.
DIVISION B--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND 2019
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the United States Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for Fiscal Year 2019. The bill deems authorized the
funds already appropriated for Fiscal Year 2018.
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2019 are
contained in classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the
classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available
to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the ODNI for Fiscal Year
2019.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$514,000,000 for the CIA Retirement and Disability Fund for
Fiscal Year 2019.
Section 202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency
Section 202 makes technical changes to the CIA Retirement
Act to conform with various statutes governing the Civil
Service Retirement System.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Section 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 301 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the
United States.
Section 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 302 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 303. Modification of special pay authority for science,
technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and addition
of special pay authority for cyber positions
Section 303 provides an increased yearly cap for Science,
Technology, Engineering, or Mathematics (STEM) employee
positions in the IC that support critical cyber missions.
Section 303 also permits the National Security Agency (NSA) to
establish a special rate of pay for positions that perform
functions that execute the agency's cyber mission.
Section 304. Modification of appointment of Chief Information Officer
of the Intelligence Community
Section 304 changes the position of IC Chief Information
Officer from being subject to presidential appointment to being
subject to appointment by the DNI.
Section 305. Director of National Intelligence review of placement of
positions within the intelligence community on the Executive
Schedule
Section 305 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Office of Personnel Management, to conduct a review of the
positions within the IC that may be appropriate for inclusion
on the Executive Schedule, and the appropriate levels for
inclusion.
Section 306. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task
Force
Section 306 requires the DNI to establish a task force to
standardize information sharing between the IC and the United
States Government acquisition community with respect to supply
chain and counterintelligence risks. Section 306 further
provides requirements for membership, security clearances, and
annual reports.
Section 307. Consideration of adversarial telecommunications and
cybersecurity infrastructure when sharing intelligence with
foreign governments and entities
Section 307 requires the IC, when entering into foreign
intelligence sharing agreements, to consider the pervasiveness
of telecommunications and cybersecurity infrastructure,
equipment, and services provided by United States adversaries
or entities thereof.
Section 308. Cyber protection support for the personnel of the
intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable to cyber
attack
Section 308 permits the DNI to provide cyber protection
support for the personal technology devices and personal
accounts of IC personnel whom the DNI determines to be highly
vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile information collection
activities.
Section 309. Modification of authority relating to management of
supply-chain risk
Section 309 extends certain IC procurement authorities to
manage and protect against supply chain risks. Section 309
further requires annual reporting on the IC's determinations
and notifications made in executing these authorities.
Section 310. Limitations on determinations regarding certain security
classifications
Section 310 prohibits an officer of the IC who is nominated
to a Senate-confirmed position from making certain
classification determinations posing potential conflicts of
interest regarding that nominee.
Section 311. Joint Intelligence Community Council
Section 311 amends Section 101A of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3022(d)) as to the Joint Intelligence
Community Council meetings and to require a report on its
activities.
Section 312. Intelligence community information technology environment
Section 312 defines the roles and responsibilities for the
performance of the Intelligence Community Information
Technology Environment (IC ITE). Section 312 requires certain
reporting and briefing requirements to the congressional
intelligence committees regarding the IC's ongoing
implementation of IC ITE.
Section 313. Report on development of secure mobile voice solution for
intelligence community
Section 313 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Directors of the CIA and NSA, provide the congressional
intelligence committees with a classified report on the
feasibility, desirability, cost, and required schedule
associated with the implementation of a secure mobile voice
solution for the IC.
Section 314. Policy on minimum insider threat standards
Section 314 requires the DNI to develop minimum insider
threat standards to be followed by each element of the IC,
consistent with the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum
Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs.
Section 315. Submission of intelligence community policies
Section 315 requires the DNI to make all ODNI policies and
procedures available to the congressional intelligence
committees. Section 315 also requires ODNI to notify the
congressional committees of any new or rescinded policies.
Section 316. Expansion of intelligence community recruitment efforts
Section 316 requires the DNI, in consultation with IC
elements, to submit a plan to the congressional intelligence
committees as to each element's efforts in recruitment from
rural and underrepresented regions.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
SUBTITLE A--OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Section 401. Authority for protection of current and former employees
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 401 amends Title 50, section 3506, to provide
protection for current and former ODNI personnel and designated
immediate family members, if there is a national security
threat that warrants such protection.
Section 402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing
environment
Section 402 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Protection Act of 2004 so that the Program Manager-Information
Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) is subject to appointment by the
DNI, not the President.
Section 403. Technical modification to the executive schedule
Section 403 amends the Executive Schedule to make the
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center a Level IV position on the Executive Schedule.
Section 404. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community
Section 404 amends the National Security Act of 1947 by
requiring the Chief Financial Officer of the IC to directly
report to the DNI.
Section 405. Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community
Section 405 amends the National Security Act of 1947 by
requiring the Chief Information Officer of the IC to directly
report to the DNI.
SUBTITLE B--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Section 411. Central Intelligence Agency subsistence for personnel
assigned to austere locations
Section 411 authorizes the Director of the CIA to approve,
with or without reimbursement, subsistence to personnel
assigned to an austere overseas location.
Section 412. Expansion of security protective service jurisdiction of
the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 412 expands the security perimeter jurisdiction at
CIA facilities from 500 feet to 500 yards.
Section 413. Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for
certain senior level positions in the Central Intelligence
Agency
Section 413 repeals Title 50, section 3036(g), with
conforming amendments to section 611 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487).
SUBTITLE C--OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Section 421. Consolidation of Department of Energy Offices of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Section 421 amends the Department of Energy Organization
Act to consolidate the offices of intelligence and
counterintelligence into the DOE Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence.
Section 422. Establishment of Energy Infrastructure Security Center
Section 422 establishes the Energy Infrastructure Security
Center under the Department of Energy Office of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence that will be responsible for
coordinating intelligence regarding the to the protection of
U.S. energy infrastructure.
Section 423. Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence Executive
Committee and budget reporting requirement
Section 423 amends the Department of Energy Organization
Act by repealing the Department of Energy Intelligence
Executive Committee, as well as certain budgetary reporting
requirements.
SUBTITLE D--OTHER ELEMENTS
Section 431. Plan for designation of counterintelligence component of
the Defense Security Service as an element of intelligence
community
Section 431 directs the DNI and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of
the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, to
provide the congressional intelligence and defense committees
with an implementation plan to make the Defense Security
Service's (DSS's) Counterintelligence component an element of
the IC as defined in paragraph (4) of section 3 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)), by January 1, 2020.
Section 431 further mandates that the plan shall not address
the DSS's personnel security functions.
Section 432. Notice not required for private entities
Section 432 provides a Rule of Construction that the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not
required to provide notice to private entities before issuing
directives on agency information security policies and
practices.
Section 433. Framework for roles, missions, and functions of Defense
Intelligence Agency
Section 433 requires the Secretary of Defense and DNI to
jointly develop a framework for the roles, missions, and
functions of the DIA as an IC element and combat support
agency.
Section 434. Establishment of advisory board for National
Reconnaissance Office
Section 434 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
authorize the Director of the NRO to establish an advisory
board to study matters related to space, overhead
reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters. Section 435
provides that the board shall terminate three years after the
Director declares the board's first meeting.
Section 435. Collocation of certain Department of Homeland Security
personnel at field locations
Section 435 requires the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence & Analysis (DHS I&A) to identify
opportunities for collocation of I&A field officers and to
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan for
deployment.
TITLE V--ELECTION MATTERS
Section 501. Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments against
United States election infrastructure
Section 501 directs the DHS Under Secretary for I&A to
submit a report on cyber attacks and attempted cyber attacks by
foreign governments on United States election infrastructure,
in connection with the 2016 presidential election. Section 501
further requires this report to include identification of the
States and localities affected and include efforts to attack
voter registration databases, voting machines, voting-related
computer networks, and the networks of Secretaries of State and
other election officials.
Section 502. Review of intelligence community's posture to collect
against and analyze Russian efforts to influence the
Presidential election
Section 502 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, within one year of enactment of the
Act, a report on the Director's review of the IC's posture to
collect against and analyze Russian efforts to interfere with
the 2016 United States presidential election. Section 502
further requires the review to include assessments of IC
resources, information sharing, and legal authorities.
Section 503. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal
elections
Section 503 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Director of the CIA, Director of the NSA, Director of the FBI,
Secretary of DHS, and heads of other relevant IC elements, to
commence assessments of security vulnerabilities of State
election systems one year before regularly scheduled Federal
elections. Section 503 further requires the DNI to submit a
report on such assessments 180 days before regularly scheduled
Federal elections, and an updated assessment 90 days before
regularly scheduled Federal elections.
Section 504. Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats to United
States elections
Section 504 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Secretary of DHS, Director of the FBI, Director of the CIA,
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of the
Treasury, to develop a whole-of-government strategy for
countering Russian cyber threats against United States
electoral systems and processes. Section 504 further requires
this strategy to include input from solicited Secretaries of
State and chief election officials.
Section 505. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns
directed at foreign elections and referenda
Section 505 requires the DNI to provide a report assessing
past and ongoing Russian influence campaigns against foreign
elections and referenda, to include a summary of the means by
which such influence campaigns have been or are likely to be
conducted, a summary of defenses against or responses to such
Russian influence campaigns, a summary of IC activities to
assist foreign governments against such campaigns, and an
assessment of the effectiveness of such foreign defenses and
responses.
Section 506. Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to
Federal election campaigns
Section 506 requires the DNI, in coordination with the DHS
Under Secretary for I&A and the Director of the FBI, to publish
regular public advisory reports on foreign counterintelligence
and cybersecurity threats to federal election campaigns before
those elections take place. Additional information may be
provided to the appropriate representatives of campaigns if the
FBI Director and the DHS Under Secretary for I&A jointly
determine that an election campaign for federal office is
subject to a heightened foreign counterintelligence or
cybersecurity threat.
Section 507. Information sharing with State election officials
Section 507 requires the DNI, within 30 days of enactment
of the Act, to support security clearances for each eligible
chief election official of a State, territory, or the District
of Columbia (and additional eligible designees), up to the Top
Secret level. Section 507 also requires the DNI to assist with
sharing appropriate classified information about threats to
election systems.
Section 508. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and
active measure campaigns directed at elections for Federal
offices
Section 508 requires the Director of the FBI, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security to brief the congressional
intelligence committees, congressional leadership, the armed
services committees, the appropriations committees, and the
homeland security committees (consistent with sources and
methods) not later than 14 days after a determination has been
made with moderate or high confidence that a significant
foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign intended to
influence an upcoming election for any Federal office has taken
place by a foreign state or foreign nonstate person, group, or
other entity. The briefing shall provide a description of the
significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures
campaign, including an identification of the foreign state or
foreign nonstate person or group.
Section 509. Designation of counterintelligence officer to lead
election security matters
Section 509 requires the DNI to designate a national
counterintelligence officer within the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, manage, and
coordinate election security-related counterintelligence
matters, including certain risks from foreign power
interference.
TITLE VI--SECURITY CLEARANCES
Section 601. Definitions
Section 601 provides definitions for terminology used
throughout this Title.
Section 602. Reports and plans relating to security clearances and
background investigations
Section 602 requires the interagency Performance
Accountability Council (Council) to provide plans to reduce the
background investigation inventory and best align the
investigation function between the Department of Defense and
the National Background Investigation Bureau. Section 602
further requires the Council to report on the future of the
clearance process and requires the DNI to notify the
appropriate committees upon determining requests to change
clearance standards, and the status of those requests'
disposition.
Section 603. Improving the process for security clearances
Section 603 requires the DNI to review the Questionnaire
for National Security positions (SF-86) and the Federal
Investigative Standards to determine potential unnecessary
information required and assess whether revisions are necessary
to account for insider threats. Section 603 further requires
the DNI, in coordination with the Council, to establish
policies on interim clearances and consistency between the
clearance process for contract and government personnel.
Section 604. Goals for promptness of determinations regarding security
clearances
Section 604 requires the Council to implement a plan to be
able to process 90 percent of clearance requests at the Secret
level in thirty days, and at the Top Secret level in 90 days.
The plan shall also address how to recognize reciprocity in
accepting clearances among agencies within two weeks, and to
require that ninety percent of clearance holders not be subject
to a time-based periodic investigation.
Section 605. Security Executive Agent
Section 605 establishes the DNI as the government's
Security Executive Agent, consistent with Executive Order
13467, and sets forth relevant authorities.
Section 606. Report on unified, simplified, Governmentwide standards
for positions of trust and security clearances
Section 606 directs the DNI and the Director of the Office
of Personnel Management to report on the advisability and
implications of consolidating the tiers for positions of trust
and security clearances from five to three tiers.
Section 607. Report on clearance in person concept
Section 607 requires the DNI to submit a report on a
concept whereby an individual can maintain eligibility for
access to classified information for up to three years after
access may lapse.
Section 608. Budget request documentation on funding for background
investigations
Section 608 requires the President to submit to Congress
with the Fiscal Year 2020 budget request exhibits that identify
resources allocated by each agency for processing background
investigations and continuous evaluation initiatives,
identified by each respective tier, exclusive of costs for
adjudications.
Section 609. Reports on reciprocity for security clearances inside of
departments and agencies
Section 609 requires each federal agency to submit a report
to the DNI that identifies the number of clearances that take
more than two weeks to reciprocally recognize and set forth the
reason for any delays. Section 609 further requires the DNI to
submit an annual report summarizing reciprocity.
Section 610. Intelligence community reports on security clearances
Section 610 requires the DNI to submit a report on each IC
element's security clearance metrics, segregated by Federal
employees and contractor employees.
Section 611. Periodic report on positions in the intelligence community
that can be conducted without access to classified information,
networks, or facilities
Section 611 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on positions that can be
conducted without access to classified information, networks,
or facilities, or may require only a Secret-level clearance.
Section 612. Information sharing program for positions of trust and
security clearances
Section 612 requires the Security Executive Agent and the
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agents to establish a
program to share information between and among government
agencies and industry partners to inform decisions about
positions of trust and security clearances.
Section 613. Report on protections for confidentiality of
whistleblower-related communications
Section 613 requires the Security Executive Agent, in
coordination with the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community, to submit a report detailing the IC's controls used
to ensure continuous evaluation programs protect the
confidentiality of whistleblower-related communications.
TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
SUBTITLE A--MATTERS RELATING TO RUSSIA AND OTHER FOREIGN POWERS
Section 701. Limitation relating to establishment or support of
cybersecurity unit with the Russian Federation
Section 701 prohibits the Federal government from expending
any funds to establish or support a cybersecurity unit or other
cyber agreement that is jointly established or otherwise
implemented by the United States Government and the Russian
Federation, unless the DNI submits a report to the appropriate
congressional committees at least 30 days prior to any such
agreement. The report shall include the agreement's purpose,
intended shared intelligence, value to national security,
counterintelligence concerns, and any measures taken to
mitigate such concerns.
Section 702. Report on returning Russian compounds
Section 702 requires the IC to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, within 180 days of enactment of the
Act, both classified and unclassified reports on the
intelligence risks of returning the diplomatic compounds-in New
York, Maryland, and California-taken from Russia as a reprisal
for Russian meddling in the 2016 United States presidential
election. Section 702 also establishes an ongoing requirement
for producing similar assessments for future assignment of
diplomatic compounds within the United States.
Section 703. Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia
Section 703 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and
Analysis, to submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, within 60 days of enactment of the Act, an
assessment of Russian threat finance, based on all-source
intelligence from both the IC and the Office of Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence of the Treasury Department. Section 703
further requires the assessment to include global nodes and
entry points for Russian money laundering; United States
vulnerabilities; connections between Russian individuals
involved in money laundering and the Russian Government;
counterintelligence threats to the United States posed by
Russian money laundering and other forms of threat finance; and
challenges to United States Government efforts to enforce
sanctions and combat organized crime.
Section 704. Notification of an active measures campaign
Section 704 requires the DNI to notify congressional
leadership, and the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking
Member of the appropriate congressional committees, each time
the DNI has determined there is credible information that a
foreign power has attempted, is attempting, or will attempt to
employ a covert influence or active measures campaign with
regard to the modernization, employment, doctrine, or force
posture of the United States' nuclear deterrent or missile
defense. Section 704 further requires that such notification
must include information on any actions that the United States
has taken to expose or halt such attempts.
Section 705. Notification of travel by accredited diplomatic and
consular personnel of the Russian Federation in the United
States
Section 705 requires the Secretary of State to ensure that
the Russian Federation provides notification at least two
business days in advance of all travel that is subject to such
requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of
the Russian Federation in the United States, and take necessary
action to secure full compliance by Russian personnel and
address any noncompliance.
Section 706. Report on outreach strategy addressing threats from United
States adversaries to the United States technology sector
Section 706 requires the DNI to submit a report to
appropriate committees on the IC's and the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise's outreach to United States non-government entities
(including private businesses and academia), regarding the
United States' adversaries' efforts to acquire critical United
States infrastructure technology, intellectual property, and
research and development information.
Section 707. Report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and
Lebanon
Section 707 requires the DNI to submit a report to
appropriate congressional committees on Iranian support of
proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon and the threat posed to
Israel and other United States regional allies and interests.
Section 708. Annual report on Iranian expenditures supporting foreign
military and terrorist activities
Section 708 requires the DNI to submit a report to Congress
describing Iranian expenditures on military and terrorist
activities outside the country.
Section 709. Expansion of scope of committee to counter active measures
and report on establishment of Foreign Malign Influence Center
Section 709 amends a provision in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 to expand the scope of
the Committee to Counter Active Measures to add China, Iran,
North Korea, and other nation states. Section 709 further
requires DNI, in coordination with relevant IC elements, to
submit to congressional intelligence committees a report on
establishing a center to assess and disseminate foreign
influence activities, including the desirability and barriers
to such establishment.
SUBTITLE B--REPORTS
Section 711. Technical correction to Inspector General study
Section 711 amends Title 50, section 11001(d), by replacing
the IC IG's ``audit'' requirement for Inspectors General with
employees having classified material access, with a ``review''
requirement.
Section 712. Reports on authorities of the Chief Intelligence Officer
of the Department of Homeland Security
Section 712 requires the Secretary of DHS, in consultation
with the Under Secretary for I&A, to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the adequacy
of the Under Secretary's authorities required as the Chief
Intelligence Officer to organize the Homeland Security
Intelligence Enterprise, and the legal and policy changes
necessary to coordinate, organize, and lead DHS intelligence
activities.
Section 713. Report on cyber exchange program
Section 713 directs the DNI to submit a report, within 90
days of enactment of the Act, on the potential establishment of
a voluntary cyber exchange program between the IC and private
technology companies.
Section 714. Review of intelligence community whistleblower matters
Section 714 directs the Inspector General of the IC (IC
IG), in consultations with the IGs of other IC agencies, to
conduct a review of practices and procedures relating to IC
whistleblower matters.
Section 715. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with
respect to certain foreign investments
Section 715 directs the DNI to submit a report on ODNI's
role in preparing analytic materials in connection with the
United States Government's evaluation of national security
risks associated with potential foreign investments.
Section 716. Report on surveillance by foreign governments against
United States telecommunications networks
Section 716 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Director of the CIA, Director of the NSA, Director of the FBI,
and Secretary of DHS, to submit to the congressional
intelligence, judiciary, and homeland security committees,
within 180 days of enactment of the Act, a report on known
attempts by foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity
vulnerabilities in United States telecommunications networks to
surveil United States persons, and any actions that the IC has
taken to protect United States Government agencies and
personnel from such surveillance.
Section 717. Biennial report on foreign investment risks
Section 717 requires the DNI to establish an IC working
group on foreign investment risks and prepare a biennial report
that includes an identification, analysis, and explanation of
national security vulnerabilities, foreign investment trends,
foreign countries' strategies to exploit vulnerabilities
through the acquisition of either critical technologies
(including components or items essential to national defense),
critical materials (including physical materials essential to
national security), or critical infrastructure (including
physical or virtual systems and assets whose destruction or
incapacity would have a debilitating impact on national
security), and market distortions caused by foreign countries.
Technologies, materials, and infrastructure are deemed to be
``critical'' under this provision if their exploitation by a
foreign government could cause severe harm to the national
security of the United States.
Section 718. Modification of certain reporting requirement on travel of
foreign diplomats
Section 718 amends a provision in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, to require reporting of
``a best estimate'' of known or suspected violations of certain
travel requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular
personnel of the Russian Federation.
Section 719. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized
disclosures of classified information
Section 719 requires the Assistant Attorney General for
National Security at the Department of Justice, in consultation
with the Director of the FBI, to submit to the congressional
intelligence and judiciary committees a semiannual report on
the status of IC referrals to the Department of Justice
regarding unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
Section 719 also directs IC elements to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a semiannual report on
the number of investigations opened and completed by each
agency regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information to the media, and the number of
completed investigations referred to the Attorney General.
Section 720. Congressional notification of designation of covered
intelligence officer as persona non grata
Section 720 requires, not later than 72 hours after a
covered intelligence officer is designated as persona non
grata, that the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, submit to the designated committees a notification of
that designation, to include the basis for the designation and
justification for the expulsion.
Section 721. Reports on intelligence community participation in
vulnerabilities equities process of Federal Government
Section 721 requires the DNI to submit, within 90 days of
enactment of the Act, to the congressional intelligence
committees a report describing the Vulnerabilities Equities
Process (VEP) roles and responsibilities for each IC element.
Section 721 further requires each IC element to report to the
congressional intelligence committees within 30 days of a
significant change to that respective IC element's VEP process
and criteria. Section 721 also requires the DNI to submit an
annual report to the congressional intelligence committees with
specified information on certain VEP metrics.
Section 722. Inspectors General reports on classification
Section 722 requires each designated IG to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the accuracy
in the application of classification and handling markings on a
representative sample of finished products, to include those
with compartments. Section 722 also directs analyses of
compliance with declassification procedures and a review of the
effectiveness of processes for identifying topics of public or
historical importance that merit prioritization for
declassification review.
Section 723. Reports on global water insecurity and national security
implications and briefing on emerging infectious disease and
pandemics
Section 723 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report every five years on the
implications of global water insecurity on the United States'
national security interests. Section 723 further requires the
DNI to provide a briefing to appropriate congressional
committees on the geopolitical effects of emerging infectious
disease and pandemics, and their implications on the United
States' national security.
Section 724. Annual report on memoranda of understanding between
elements of intelligence community and other entities of the
United States Government regarding significant operational
activities or policy
Section 724 amends a provision in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, instead requiring each
IC element to submit an annual report to the congressional
intelligence committees that lists each significant memorandum
of understanding or other agreement entered into during the
preceding fiscal year. Section 724 further requires each IC
element to provide such documents if an intelligence committee
so requests.
Section 725. Study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified
wireline and wireless telephone calls
Section 725 requires the DNI to complete a study and report
on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline and
wireless telephone calls between personnel in the IC.
Section 726. Modification of requirement for annual report on hiring
and retention of minority employees
Section 726 expands and clarifies current IC reporting
requirements on diversity of IC personnel to include five prior
fiscal years and to disaggregate data by IC element.
Section 727. Reports on intelligence community loan repayment and
related programs
Section 727 requires the DNI, in cooperation with the heads
of the elements of the IC, to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on potentially establishing an
IC-wide program for student loan repayment and forgiveness.
Section 728. Repeal of certain reporting requirements
Section 728 repeals certain intelligence community
reporting requirements.
Section 729. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community report on
senior executives of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence
Section 729 directs the IC IG to submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees regarding senior
executive service staffing at the ODNI.
Section 730. Briefing on Federal Bureau of Investigation offering
permanent residence to sources and cooperators
Section 730 directs the FBI within 30 days of enactment of
this Act to provide a briefing to the congressional
intelligence committees regarding the FBI's ability to provide
permanent U.S. residence to foreign individuals who serve as
cooperators in national security-related investigations.
Section 731. Intelligence assessment of North Korea revenue sources
Section 731 requires the DNI, in coordination with other
relevant IC elements, to produce to the congressional
intelligence committees an intelligence assessment of the North
Korean regime's revenue sources.
Section 732. Report on possible exploitations of virtual currencies by
terrorist actors
Section 732 requires the DNI, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury, to submit to Congress a report on
the possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist
actors.
SUBTITLE C--OTHER MATTERS
Section 741. Public Interest Declassification Board
Section 741 reauthorizes the Public Interest
Declassification Board administered by the National Archives
for a term of ten years, expiring on December 31, 2028.
Section 742. Securing energy infrastructure
Section 742 requires the Secretary of Energy, within 180
days of enactment of the Act, to establish a two-year control
systems implementation pilot program within the National
Laboratories. This pilot program will partner with covered
entities in the energy sector to identify new security
vulnerabilities, and for purposes of researching, developing,
testing, and implementing technology platforms and standards in
partnership with such entities. Section 742 also requires the
Secretary to establish a working group composed of identified
private and public sector entities to evaluate the technology
platforms and standards for the pilot program, and develop a
national cyber-informed engineering strategy to isolate and
defend covered entities from security vulnerabilities. Section
742 requires the Secretary, within 180 days after the date on
which funds are first disbursed, to submit to specified
committees an interim report that describes the pilot program's
results, provides a feasibility analysis, and describes the
working group's evaluations. Section 742 further requires the
Secretary, within two years of funding, to submit to the
aforementioned committees a progress report on the pilot
program and an analysis of the feasibility of the methods
studied, and a description of the working group's evaluation
results.
Section 743. Bug bounty programs
Section 743 directs the Secretary of DHS, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense, to submit a strategic plan to
implement bug bounty programs at appropriate agencies and
departments of the United States Government. Section 743
further requires the plan to include an assessment of the
``Hack the Pentagon'' pilot program and subsequent bug bounty
programs. Section 743 also requires the plan to provide
recommendations on the feasibility of initiating bug bounty
programs across the United States Government.
Section 744. Modification of authorities relating to the National
Intelligence University
Section 744 provides the National Intelligence University
with authorities that certain other Department of Defense
educational institutions have regarding hiring faculty and
accepting research grants, as well as establishing a pilot
program for admission of private sector individuals.
Section 745. Technical and clerical amendments to the National Security
Act of 1947
Section 745 makes certain edits to the National Security
Act of 1947 as amended for technical or clerical purposes.
Section 746. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy
Section 746 provides technical corrections to certain
provisions regarding the Department of Energy's Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
Section 747. Sense of Congress on notification of certain disclosures
of classified information
Section 747 expresses the sense of Congress that, pursuant
to the requirement for the IC to keep the congressional
intelligence committees ``fully and currently informed'' in
Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, IC agencies
must submit prompt written notification after becoming aware
that an individual in the executive branch has disclosed
certain classified information outside established intelligence
channels to foreign adversaries--North Korea, Iran, China,
Russia, or Cuba.
Section 748. Sense of Congress on consideration of espionage activities
when considering whether or not to provide visas to foreign
individuals to be accredited to a United Nations mission in the
United States
Section 748 provides a Sense of Congress that, as to
foreign individuals to be accredited to a United Nations
mission, the Secretary of State should consider known and
suspected intelligence and espionage activities, including
activities constituting precursors to espionage, carried out by
such individuals against the United States, or against foreign
allies or partners of the United States. Section 748 further
provides that the Secretary of State should consider an
individual's status as a known or suspected intelligence
officer for a foreign adversary.
Section 749. Sense of Congress on WikiLeaks
Section 749 provides a Sense of Congress that WikiLeaks and
its senior leadership resemble a non-state hostile intelligence
service, often abetted by state actors, and should be treated
as such.
Comments Related to Division A
Comments related to Division A of the Damon Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 relate to Fiscal Year 2020 and
reflect the position of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI). Use of the term ``Committee'' refers to
the SSCI.
Plans for Operations During Government Shutdowns by All Elements of the
Intelligence Community
The Committee has an active interest in the impact of
government shutdowns on the intelligence mission. Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11, Section 124,
outlines how agencies are supposed to plan for operations
during government shutdowns, and Section 124.2 provides that
agencies must share those plans with OMB. Additionally, Section
323 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014
requires the ODNI, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and
IC elements within the DOD to share those same plans with
specified congressional committees, including the congressional
intelligence committees.
These requirements, however, omit IC elements that are not
separate ``agencies'' for the purposes of OMB Circular A-11,
Section 124, and are not ODNI, CIA, or elements within the DOD
for the purposes of the IAA for Fiscal Year 2014. As a result,
no such reporting requirement currently exists for IC elements
within the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Energy, State, and
Homeland Security. For that reason, when portions of the
federal government were shut down between December 2018 and
February 2019, the Committee had little to no insight into the
effects of the shutdown on these and other important segments
of the IC.
Therefore, the Committee directs IC elements within the
Departments of Justice, Treasury, Energy, State, and Homeland
Security to submit to the congressional intelligence
committees--on the same day as the host department's issuance
of any plan for a government shutdown--the number of personnel
in their respective elements that will be furloughed.
Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment Review
Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Protection Act of 2004 (IRTPA) created a Program Manager-
Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), administered from
within the ODNI, to better facilitate the interagency sharing
of terrorism-related information. Section 1016 also designated
the PM-ISE as a presidentially-appointed position. Section 402
of Division B of the Act would amend IRTPA, so that the PM-ISE
is subject to appointment by the DNI, not the President. Since
the establishment of the PM-ISE, the Federal government has
created entities, procedures, and processes to address directly
the mandate for improved terrorism information sharing.
Accordingly, the Committee finds it appropriate to reconsider
the future of the PM-ISE's mission.
Therefore, the Committee directs the ODNI, in consultation
with appropriate Federal departments, agencies, and components,
within 180 days of enactment of this Act, to conduct a review
of the PM-ISE's terrorism information sharing mission,
associated functions, and organizational role within the ODNI
and provide findings and recommendations on the future of the
PM-ISE to Congress.
Leveraging Academic Institutions in the Intelligence Community
The Committee encourages the DNI and the Director of the
DIA to ensure that IC elements continue to forge tighter
partnerships with leading universities and their affiliated
research centers in order to enhance mutual awareness of
domestic and international challenges, leverage subject matter
experts from higher education in a manner that uses cutting
edge technologies and methods, and bolsters the recruitment of
top-notch, diverse, and technically proficient talent into the
IC's workforce.
The Committee further believes that IC-sponsored academic
programs such as the Intelligence Community Centers for
Academic Excellence (IC-CAE) should work closely with
educational institutions that offer interdisciplinary courses
of study and learning opportunities in national and
international security; geopolitical affairs, international
relations and national security; interdisciplinary courses of
study in the culture, history, languages, politics, and
religions of major world regions; foreign language instruction;
computer and data science; or cybersecurity.
The DNI shall ensure that such programs are facilitated via
the streamlining of the security clearance process for
graduating students from such universities who receive offers
of employment from IC elements, provide for the temporary
exchange of faculty and IC professionals, including as visiting
fellows, and technical training opportunities for faculty,
students, and IC personnel.
Therefore, the Committee directs all IC agencies to support
the IC-CAE effort by tracking recruits and new hires who have
graduated from IC-CAE-designated institutions, promptly
reporting these numbers to the office in charge of IC-CAE
implementation, and increasing all IC agencies' efforts to
recruit from such institutions.
Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities
The Committee remains concerned as to impediments for
companies with appropriately cleared personnel to perform work
for government entities and the effects of these impediments on
IC access to innovation. For example, businesses without access
to a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), which
includes many small businesses and non-traditional contractors,
find it difficult to perform classified work for the IC.
Construction and accreditation of SCIF spaces may be cost-
prohibitive for small business and non-traditional government
contractors.
Additionally, SCIF construction timelines often exceed the
period of performance of a contract. A modern trend for
innovative and non-traditional government contractors is the
use of co-working space environments. Additionally, public and
private entities are partnering to create emerging regional
innovation hubs to help identify technology solutions and
products in the private-sector that can be utilized by the DoD
and IC. These innovation hubs currently produce an agile,
neutral, but largely unclassified development environment.
Therefore, the Committee directs the ODNI to submit a
report to the congressional intelligence committees on:
1. Processes and procedures necessary to build,
certify, and maintain certifications for multi-use
sensitive compartmented facilities not tied to a single
contract and where multiple companies can securely work
on multiple projects at different security levels;
2. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of
issuing DoD Contract Security Specification (DD Form
254s) to ``Facilities'' as opposed to ``Contracts'';
3. Options for classified co-use and shared workspace
environments such as: innovation, incubation, catalyst,
and accelerator environments;
4. Pros and cons for public, private, government, or
combination owned classified neutral facilities; and
5. Any other opportunities to support companies with
appropriately cleared personnel but without effective
access to a neutral SCIF.
Inclusion of Security Risks in Program Management Plans Required for
Acquisition of Major Systems in National Intelligence Program
Section 306 of Division A of the Act adds security risk as
a factor for the DNI to include in the annual Program
Management Plans for major system acquisitions submitted to the
congressional intelligence committees pursuant to Section
102A(q)(1)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3024(q)(1)(A)). The Committee is increasingly concerned with
the security risks to IC acquisitions. The Joint Explanatory
Statement accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 directed updates to Intelligence Community
Directive 731, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Committee
leadership has engaged senior industry representatives about
the threats to the national security industrial base posed by
adversaries and competitors, including China. Over the past few
years, the Department of Defense has been elevating security as
a ``fourth pillar'' (to complement cost, schedule, and
performance) in reviewing defense acquisitions, embodied in the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence's ``Deliver
Uncompromised'' initiative.
Section 306 of Division A of the Act extends that focus to
the IC, requiring the annual Program Management Plans to
include security risks in major system acquisitions, in
addition to cost, schedule, and performance. The Committee
recognizes that security can be interpreted across a number of
areas (facilities, personnel, information, and supply chain)
and may vary by program, to appropriately ensure system
integrity and mission assurance.
Therefore, for the purposes of implementing section 306 of
the Act, the Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence, with the Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center, to develop parameters
for including security risks (and risk management measures) in
the annual Program Management Plans to assist congressional
oversight.
Intelligence Community Cooperation with the Government Accountability
Office
The Committee believes the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) adds significant value to the Committee's oversight
efforts. For example, the GAO's designation in 2018 of the
government-wide Personnel Security Clearance process to its
high-risk list of federal areas needing reform to prevent
waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement, was important to the
Committee's own efforts to legislate on security clearance
reform, including in this Act. The Committee expects that all
IC elements will fully and promptly comply with requests from
the GAO made to support studies requested by, or of interest
to, the Committee.
Security Clearance Procedures and Rights to Appeal
Section 311 of Division A of the Act provides appeal rights
and procedures for security clearance eligibility
determinations. The Committee recognizes that, in the most
exceptional circumstances, national security considerations may
still require denial of access and has set forth waivers
accordingly. The Committee will closely monitor compliance with
this provision, through the applicable reporting requirements,
and consider a legislative remedy if abuses are found. This
provision is not intended to impede agency decisions regarding
access to classified information for a limited purpose or
duration (e.g., regarding an election or one-time read-ins for
a specific event or threat). The Committee does, however,
expect agencies to keep Congress fully and currently informed
of any limited purpose or duration uses. Finally, the Committee
expects the DNI-level appeals panel to exercise judgment and
review only those appeals for which the panel concludes have
evidentiary and jurisdictional merit.
National Intelligence University
Section 312 of Division A of the Act prohibits the DNI and
the Secretary of Defense from undertaking any activity to
transfer the National Intelligence (NIU) out of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) until certain criteria are met. The
Committee has been closely watching the evolution of how the IC
provides for advanced intelligence education. DIA has hosted an
intelligence college since 1962, which has been regionally
academically accredited since 1983. When the ODNI was created
in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, it created a separate NIU under its auspices as a
complement to DIA's intelligence effort. As a response to
report from the President's Intelligence Advisory Board that
accused the ODNI of being inadequately focused, the ODNI in
2011 transferred the NIU to DIA's intelligence college and
rebranded the new combined institution as NIU.
Pursuant to the Joint Explanatory Statement to the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, an
independent panel offered alternative governance models to
enhance NIU, to include a more prominent role for ODNI. In
parallel, recent analyses of DIA by the Secretary of Defense
and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
concluded that DIA would benefit from moving NIU elsewhere in
the IC. The Committee believes transferring NIU now may be
premature. It does not oppose transferring NIU to ODNI, but
expects for NIU's academic health to be sound before a transfer
occurs; that DoD remains intimately involved in NIU's
governance; and that DoD personnel will readily attend and
serve as faculty at an ODNI-led university. The Committee also
intends for DoD to embrace NIU under ODNI and for it not to
seek out recreation of an intelligence college.
Associate Degree Program Eligibility
The Committee is concerned that students enrolled in or who
have graduated from Associate Degree programs have insufficient
opportunities to gain employment in the IC. Therefore, the
Committee directs the ODNI to submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees on how to expand the
number of opportunities for students pursuing or having earned
an Associate Degree eligible for IC academic programs. The
Committee also directs the ODNI to make information about these
academic programs publicly available.
Exposing Predatory and Anticompetitive Foreign Economic Influence
The Committee is concerned about the significant threat
posed by foreign governments that engage in predatory and
anticompetitive behaviors aimed to undercut critical sectors of
the United States economy. Therefore, the Committee directs the
DNI, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report identifying top
countries that pose a substantial threat to the United States
economy regarding technology transfer issues, predatory
investment practices, economic espionage, and other
anticompetitive behaviors. The report shall be submitted in
unclassified form to the greatest extent possible, but may
include a classified annex.
Furthermore, the DNI, in consultation with the Department
of the Treasury and other agencies that the Director deems
appropriate, shall submit a report to the congressional
intelligence committees assessing the national security-related
value of requiring a person or entity that invests in the
United States (and is subject to the jurisdiction of a country
that poses a substantial threat to the United States economy)
to submit annual disclosures to the Federal Government. Such
disclosures would include all investments that the entity or
person in the United States made during the preceding year; the
ownership structure of the entity; and any affiliation of the
entity with a foreign government. The report should detail how
such information could be used by the IC and other elements of
the Federal government working to identify and combat foreign
threats to the United States economy, and the appropriate scope
and thresholds for such disclosures. The report shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
Comments Related to Division B
Division B of this Act is the result of SSCI's negotiations
with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(HPSCI) and takes the form of a Joint Explanatory Statement
(JES). As such, reference to ``committees'' refers to the SSCI
and the HPSCI. The ``Agreement'' refers to the JES.
Management of Intelligence Community Workforce
The Committees repeat direction from the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 that Intelligence
Community (IC) elements should build, develop, and maintain a
workforce appropriately balanced among its civilian, military,
and contractor workforce sectors to meet the missions assigned
to it in law and by the president. Starting in Fiscal Year
2019, the Committees no longer authorize position ceiling
levels in the annual Schedule of Authorizations.
The Committees look forward to working with the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) as it develops an
implementation strategy and sets standards for workforce cost
analysis tools.
Countering Russian Propaganda
The Committees support the IC's role in countering Russian
propaganda and other active measures. The Committees are
committed to providing the appropriate legal authorities,
financial resources, and personnel necessary to address these
hostile acts. The Committees specifically find that language
capabilities are important to the IC's efforts in countering
Russia's hostile acts. The Committees encourage the IC to
commit considerable resources in the future to bolstering
officers' existing Russian language skills, recruiting Russian
language speakers, and training officers in Russian, in
particular key technical language skills. This effort will
require strategic planning both in recruiting and rotating
officers through language training. The Committees expect to
see these priorities reflected in future IC budget requests.
Protection of the Supply Chain in Intelligence Community Acquisition
Decisions
The Committees continue to have significant concerns about
risks to the supply chain in IC acquisitions. The report to
accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 directed the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to
review and consider changes to Intelligence Community Directive
(ICD) 801 (``Acquisition'') to reflect issuance in 2013 of ICD
731 (``Supply Chain Risk Management'') and issues associated
with cybersecurity. It specifically recommended the review
examine whether to: expand risk management criteria in the
acquisition process to include cyber and supply chain threats;
require counterintelligence and security assessments as part of
the acquisition and procurement process; propose and adopt new
education requirements for acquisition professionals on cyber
and supply chain threats; and factor in the cost of cyber and
supply chain security. This review was due in November 2017,
with a report on the process for updating ICD 801 in December
2017. The report was completed on June 18, 2018.
As a follow-on to this review, the Committees direct DNI to
address three other considerations: changes in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation that may be necessary; how changes
should apply to all acquisition programs; and how security
risks must be addressed across development, procurement, and
operational phases of acquisition. The Committees further
direct the DNI to submit a plan to implement necessary changes
within 60 days of completion of this review.
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency use of VERA and VSIP
Authorities
The Committees encourage the use by the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) of Voluntary Early
Retirement Authority (VERA) and Voluntary Separation Incentive
Program (VSIP) offers to meet future goals of building a
workforce more attuned to automation of data production,
automation of analytic processes, and establishment of
development and operations (``DevOps'') software development
processes.
Therefore, the Committees direct the NGA to report to the
congressional intelligence committees, within 120 days of
enactment of the Act, on its use to date of VERA and VSIP
incentives, to include how they have been used to develop an
acquisition cadre skilled in ``DevOps'' software development
processes, as well as a plan for further use of these
incentives. The report should specify metrics for retooling its
workforce, including how it measures data literacy and
computational skills in potential hires, and an accounting of
the numbers of new hires who have met these higher standards.
Report on Engagement of National Reconnaissance Office with University
Community
The Committees recognize that the survivability and
resiliency of United States satellites is critically important
to the United States intelligence and defense communities.
While the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) engages with the
university community in support of basic research and
developing an education workforce pipeline to help advance new
technologies and produce skilled professionals, it can do more
in this regard to focus on space survivability.
Therefore, the Committees direct the NRO to report, within
120 days of enactment of the Act, on NRO's current efforts and
future strategies to engage with university partners that are
strategically located, host secure information facilities, and
offer a strong engineering curriculum, with a particular focus
on space survivability and resiliency. This report should
provide a summary of NRO's current and planned university
engagement programs, levels of funding, and program research
and workforce objectives and metrics. The report should also
include an assessment of the strategic utility of chartering a
University Affiliated Research Center in this domain.
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Facilities
Consistent with Section 2401 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, the Committees
authorize the President's request for $447.8 million in Fiscal
Year 2019 for phase two construction activities of the Next
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency West (N2W) facility in
St. Louis, Missouri. The Committees are pleased that the second
phase of this $837.2 million project was included in the Fiscal
Year 2019 President's budget.
Clarification of Oversight Responsibilities
The Committees reinforce the requirement for all IC
agencies funded by the NIP to respond in a full, complete, and
timely manner to any request for information made by a member
of the congressional intelligence committees. In addition, the
Committees direct the DNI to issue guidelines, within 90 days
of enactment of the Act, to ensure that the intent of Section
501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091) is
carried out.
Clarification on Cooperation with Investigation on Russian Influence in
the 2016 Election
The Committees continue to reinforce the obligation for all
IC agencies to cooperate in a full, complete, and timely manner
with the Committees' ongoing investigation into Russian
meddling in the 2016 Presidential election and cooperation with
the declassification process.
Supervisory Feedback as Part of Continuous Evaluation Program
The Committees direct the DNI to review the results of
ongoing pilot programs regarding the use of supervisory
feedback as part of the periodic reinvestigation and continuous
evaluation process and report, within 180 days of enactment of
the Act, on the establishment of a policy for its use across
the IC.
National Security Threats to Critical Infrastructure
The Committees are aware of significant threats to our
critical infrastructure and industrial control systems posed by
foreign adversaries. The sensitive nature of the information
related to these threats make the role of the IC of vital
importance to United States defensive efforts. The Committees
have grave concerns that current IC resources dedicated to
analyzing and countering these threats are neither sufficient
nor closely coordinated. The Committees include provisions
within this legislation to address these concerns.
Framework for Cybersecurity and Intelligence Collection Doctrine
The Committees direct the ODNI, in coordination with
appropriate IC elements, to develop an analytic framework that
could support the eventual creation and execution of a
Government-wide cybersecurity and intelligence collection
doctrine. The ODNI shall provide this framework, which may
contain a classified annex, to the congressional intelligence
committees, within 180 days of enactment of the Act.
This framework shall include:
1. An assessment of the current and medium-term cyber
threats to the protection of the United States'
national security systems and critical infrastructure;
2. IC definitions of key cybersecurity concepts, to
include cyberespionage, cyber theft, cyber acts of
aggression, and cyber deterrence;
3. Intelligence collection requirements to ensure
identification of cyber actors targeting U.S. national
security interests, and to inform policy responses to
cyber attacks and computer network operations directed
against the United States;
4. The IC's methodology for assessing the impacts of
cyber attacks and computer network operations incidents
directed against the United States, taking into account
differing levels of severity of incidents;
5. Capabilities that the IC could employ in response
to cyber attacks and computer network operations
incidents, taking into account differing levels of
severity of incidents;
6. A policy and architecture for sharing
cybersecurity-related intelligence with government,
private sector, and international partners, including
existing statutory and other authorities which may be
exercised in pursuit of that goal; and
7. Any necessary changes in IC authorities,
governance, technology, resources, and policy to
provide more capable and agile cybersecurity.
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Role and
Responsibilities
The position of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community (IC IG) was codified by the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 to ``conduct independent
reviews investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews on
programs and activities within the responsibility and authority
of the Director of National Intelligence'' and to lead the IC's
IG community in its activities. The Committees are concerned
that this intent is not fully exercised by the IC IG and
reiterates the Congress's intent that the IC IG's role be over
all IC-wide activities in addition to the ODNI. To support this
intent, the Committees have directed a number of requirements
to strengthen the IC IG's role and expects full cooperation
from all Offices of Inspector General across the IC.
The Committees also remain concerned about the level of
protection afforded to whistleblowers within the IC and the
level of insight congressional committees have into their
disclosures. It is the Committees' expectation that all Offices
of IG across the IC will fully cooperate with the direction
provided elsewhere in the bill to ensure both the DNI and the
congressional committees have more complete awareness of the
disclosures made to any IG about any National Intelligence
Program-funded activity.
Space Launch Facilities
The Committees continue to believe it is critical to
preserve a variety of launch range capabilities to support
national security space missions, and encourages planned
launches such as the U.S. Air Force Orbital/Sub-Orbital Program
(OSP)-3 NRO-111 mission, to be launched in 2019 on a Minotaur 1
from the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport at Wallops Flight
Facility. In the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017, the Committees directed a brief from the ODNI, in
consultation with the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S.
Air Force, on their plans to utilize state-owned and operated
spaceports, which leverage non-federal public and private
investments to bolster United States launch capabilities and
provide access to mid-to-low or polar-to-high inclination
orbits for national security missions.
The Committees direct that the ODNI supplement this brief
with how state investments in these spaceports may support
infrastructure improvements, such as payload integration and
launch capabilities, for national security launches.
Acquisition Research Center Postings
The Committees support a flexible NRO acquisition process
that allows the NRO to choose the most appropriate contracting
mechanism, whether for small research and development efforts
or large acquisitions. The NRO's Acquisition Research Center
(ARC), a classified contracting and solicitation marketplace
that NRO and other agencies use, enables this flexible
acquisition process for classified efforts.
The Committees direct the NRO, within 60 days of enactment
of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence and defense
committees on options for modifying ARC posting procedures to
ensure fair and open competition. Those options should include
ensuring that unclassified NRO solicitations are posted on the
unclassified FEDBIZOPS site, and identifying ways to better
utilize the ARC to encourage contract opportunities for a more
diverse industrial base that includes smaller and non-
traditional companies.
Ensuring Strong Strategic Analytical Tradecraft
The DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has
taken steps to improve the quality of its analysis, to identify
its core customers, and to tailor its production to meet
customer needs. The Committees concur with I&A's implementation
of analytic standards and review mechanisms that have improved
the tradecraft behind I&A productions. The bedrock of these
efforts has been the development of a yearly program of
analysis (POA) and key intelligence questions, which are
essential tools for providing a roadmap and boundaries for the
office's production efforts.
Therefore, the Committees direct the Office of I&A to
continue to prioritize, develop and hone its strategic
intelligence capabilities and production, including the annual
development of a POA. Within 90 day of enactment of the Act,
and on an annual basis thereafter for two years, I&A shall
brief the congressional intelligence committees on the
development and execution of its POA. These briefings should
provide an overview of the POA, how customer needs have been
incorporated into the POA, and an update on execution against
the POA.
Cyber/Counterintelligence Analysis
DHS's Office of I&A's Counterintelligence Mission Center
analysis focuses on counterintelligence threats posed by
foreign technology companies and fills a gap in IC intelligence
production. Advanced technologies are increasingly ubiquitous
and necessary to the function of modern society. Consequently,
the scope of the threats from countries intent on using these
technologies as a vector for collecting intelligence from
within the United States will continue to expand. The Office of
I&A is well positioned to conduct a niche analysis critical to
national security that combines foreign intelligence with
domestic threat information.
The Committees strongly support I&A's Counterintelligence
Mission Center's continued focus on these topics and the
increased resources the Fiscal Year 2019 dedicated to this
analysis. Therefore, the Committees direct the I&A, in
coordination with ODNI, to provide an update within 90 days of
enactment of the Act on its recent analytic production related
to counterintelligence threats posed by foreign technology
companies, including a review of the countries and companies
that present the greatest risks in this regard.
Intelligence Support to the Export Control Process
The Committees have significant concerns that China poses a
growing threat to United States national security, due in part
to its relentless efforts to acquire United States technology.
China purposely blurs the distinction between its military and
civilian activities through its policy of ``military-civilian
fusion,'' which compounds the risks of diversion of United
States technology to the Chinese military.
The Committees conclude that the United States Government
currently lacks a comprehensive policy and the tools needed to
address this problem. China exploits weaknesses in existing
U.S. mechanisms aimed at preventing dangerous technology
transfers, including the U.S. export control system, which is
run by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and
Security (BIS). The Committees have specific concerns about the
lack of adequate and effective IC support to BIS's export
license application review process and believes more robust IC
support could have prevented many of the ill-advised technology
transfers that have occurred in recent years.
Therefore, the Committees directs the DNI to submit a plan,
within 120 days of enactment of the Act, to describe how the IC
will provide BIS with, at a minimum, basic but timely analysis
of any threat to U.S. national security posed by any proposed
export, re-export, or transfer of export-controlled technology.
The plan shall include detailed information on the appropriate
organizational structure, including how many IC personnel would
be required, where they would be located (including whether
they would be embedded at BIS to coordinate IC support), and
the amounts of necessary funding. In formulating the plan, the
DNI should study the ``National Security Threat Assessment''
process that the National Intelligence Council uses to inform
the actions of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States. The DNI shall submit the plan to the
congressional intelligence committees in classified form.
Social Media
The Committees encourage the IC, notably the FBI, to both
continue and enhance its efforts to assist in detecting,
understanding, and warning about foreign influence operations
using social media tools to target the United States.
Additionally, within the scope of the IC's authorities, and
with all necessary protections for U.S. person information, the
Committees encourage the IC to augment and prioritize these
ongoing efforts.
Trade-Based Money Laundering
Threats to our national security posed by trade-based money
laundering are concerning. Therefore, the Committees direct the
DNI, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, to submit a report
to the congressional intelligence committees on these threats,
including an assessment of the severity of the threats posed to
the United States' national security by trade-based money
laundering conducted inside and outside the United States; an
assessment of the scope of the financial threats to the U.S.
economy and financial systems posed by trade-based money
laundering; a description of how terrorist financing and drug
trafficking organizations are advancing their illicit
activities through the use of licit trade channels; an
assessment of the adequacy of the systems and tools available
to the Federal Government for combating trade-based money
laundering; and a description and assessment of the current
structure and coordination between Federal agencies, as well as
with foreign governments, to combat trade-based money
laundering. The report shall be submitted in classified form
with an unclassified summary to be made available to the
public.
Expansions of Security Protective Service Jurisdiction of the Central
Intelligence Agency
The Committees direct the CIA, in connection with the
expansion of its security protective service jurisdiction as
set forth in Section 413 of Division B of the Act, to engage
with Virginia state and local law enforcement authorities to
ensure that a memorandum of understanding, akin to those in
place at other agencies setting forth the appropriate
allocation of duties and responsibilities, is in effect.
Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information
The Committees are concerned by the recent widespread media
reports that purport to contain unauthorized disclosures of
classified information. Protecting the nation's secrets from
unauthorized disclosure is essential to safeguarding our
nation's intelligence sources and methods. An unlawful
disclosure of classified information can destroy sensitive
collection capabilities and endanger American lives, including
those individuals who take great personal risks to assist the
United States in collecting vital foreign intelligence.
Federal law prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information, but enforcement is often lacking or
inconsistent. Accordingly, the Committees desire to better
understand the number of potential unauthorized disclosures
discovered and investigated on a routine basis. Moreover, the
Committees have little visibility into the number of
investigations initiated by each IC agency or the number of
criminal referrals to the Department of Justice. Accordingly,
Section 719 of Division B of the Act requires all IC agencies
to provide the congressional intelligence committees with a
semi-annual report of the number of investigations of
unauthorized disclosures to journalists or media organizations,
including subsequent referrals made to the United States
Attorney General.
Additionally, the Committees wish to better understand the
role of IGs within elements of the IC, with respect to
unauthorized disclosures of classified information at those
elements.
Therefore, the Committees direct the IC IG, within 180 days
of enactment of the Act, to provide the congressional
intelligence committees with a report regarding the role of IGs
with respect to investigating unauthorized disclosures. The
report shall address: the roles of IC elements' security
personnel and law enforcement regarding unauthorized
disclosures; the current role of IGs within IC elements
regarding such disclosures; what, if any, specific actions
could be taken by such IGs to increase their involvement in the
investigation of such matters; any laws, rules or procedures
that currently prevent IGs from increasing their involvement;
and the benefits and drawbacks of increased IG involvement, to
include potential impacts to IG's roles and missions.
Presidential Policy Guidance
The Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) dated May 22, 2013,
and entitled ``Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against
Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas
of Active Hostilities''' provides for the participation by
elements of the IC in reviews of certain proposed
counterterrorism operations. The Committees expect to remain
fully and currently informed about the status of the PPG and
its implementation.
Therefore, the Committees direct ODNI, within five days of
any change to the PPG, or to any successor policy guidance, to
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written
notification thereof, that shall include a summary of the
change and the specific legal and policy justification(s) for
the change.
Centers for Academic Excellence
The Committees commend the commitment demonstrated by
ODNI's Centers for Academic Excellence (CAE) program managers,
IC agencies that sponsored CAE interns, and all other personnel
who contributed to the inaugural edition of the CAE Internship
Program in summer 2017.
The Committees expect the CAE Program to build on this
foundation by showing measurable, swift progress, and
ultimately fulfilling Congress's intent that the Program serve
as a pipeline of the next generation of IC professionals.
Therefore, the Committees direct that the IC take all
viable action to expand the CAE Program by increasing, to the
fullest extent possible:
1. The number and racial and gender diversity of CAE
interns;
2. The number of CAE academic institutions and their
qualified internship candidates participating in the
CAE Program; and
3. The number of IC elements that sponsor CAE
interns.
Report on Violent Extremist Groups
Violent extremist groups like ISIS continue to exploit the
Internet for nefarious purposes: to inspire lone wolves; to
spread propaganda; to recruit foreign fighters; and to plan and
publicize atrocities. As a former Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has stated publicly:
[W]e need to counter our adversaries' successful use
of social media platforms to advance their propaganda
goals, raise funds, recruit, coordinate travel and
attack plans, and facilitate operations. . . . Our
future work must focus on denying our adversaries the
capability to spread their messages to at-risk
populations that they can reach through the use of
these platforms.
Section 403 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 required the DNI, consistent with the
protection of sources and methods, to assist public and private
sector entities in recognizing online violent extremist
content--specifically, by making publicly available a list of
insignias and logos associated with foreign extremist groups
designated by the Secretary of State. The Committees believe
the IC can take additional steps.
Therefore, the Committees direct the Director of NCTC, in
coordination with other appropriate officials designated by the
DNI, within 180 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the
congressional intelligence committees on options for a pilot
program to develop and continually update best practices for
private technology companies to quickly recognize and lawfully
take down violent extremist content online. Such briefing shall
address:
1. The feasibility, risks, costs, and benefits of
such a program;
2. The U.S. Government agencies and private sector
entities that would participate; and
3. Any additional authorities that would be required
by the program's establishment.
South China Sea
The South China Sea is an area of great geostrategic
importance to the United States and its allies. However,
China's controversial territorial claims and other actions
stand to undercut international norms and erode the region's
stability. It is thus imperative the United States uphold
respect for international law in the South China Sea.
Fulfilling that objective in turn will require an optimal
intelligence collection posture.
Therefore, the Committees direct the DoD, in coordination
with DNI, within 30 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the
congressional intelligence and defense committees on known
intelligence collection gaps, if any, with respect to adversary
operations and aims in the South China Sea. The briefing shall
identify the gaps and whether those gaps are driven by lack of
access, lack of necessary collection capabilities or legal or
policy authorities, or by other factors. The briefing shall
also identify IC judgments that assess which intelligence
disciplines would be best-suited to answer the existing gaps,
and current plans to address the gaps over the Future Years
Defense Program.
Improving Analytic Automation
The Committees continue to support IC and DoD efforts to
gather, analyze, manage, and store large amounts of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data from
remote sources. One such effort is the NGA program called
Expeditionary Large Data Object Repository for Analytics in
Deployed Operations. Managing data by making information
discoverable to analysts across the globe while reducing
storage and analytical access costs are critical steps in the
IC and DoD's efforts to leverage commercial best practices in
big data analytics. While NGA is at the forefront of such
efforts, the Committees are concerned by DoD and IC's slow pace
in developing formal requirements for big data analytic
capabilities.
The Committees understand DoD faces significant challenges
in addressing combatant commanders' intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements, and DoD is investing in
new collection capabilities that are producing growing volumes
of data. However, investments in ground processing, automation,
and alert functions have not kept pace. For example, wide area
motion imagery collection capabilities have evolved with
technology and are producing extremely valuable ISR data, but
processing and integration of this data is labor intensive. DoD
continues to struggle to apply commercially-available data
analysis and machine learning capabilities. The Committees
recognize that DoD's processing, exploitation and dissemination
(PED) shortfalls cannot be addressed without integrating
commercial data processing and access techniques, and
automating as much of the PED workflow as possible.
Therefore, the Committees direct the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), in coordination with the
Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of
the Navy, and the DNI, within 90 days of enactment of the Act,
to brief the congressional intelligence and defense committees
on efforts that allow for rapid adoption of data storage,
access, and automated processing and machine learning
technologies and techniques.
Project MAVEN
There has been exponential growth in the volume of data
available for DoD intelligence professionals to manage,
process, exploit, and disseminate. Analysts are in dire need of
tools that will support simultaneous access to, and analysis
of, data from a multitude of sources and disciplines.
The massive quantities of available digital data hold
significant promise for improving data analytics, producing
more actionable intelligence, and contributing to the
employment of a more lethal force. It is critical that DoD
invest in new technologies that will bring artificial
intelligence, deep learning, and computer vision to streamline
the process of object detection, identification, and tracking--
and allow analysts to focus their valuable cognitive capacity
on the hardest and highest priority problems.
The Committees believe Project MAVEN provides DoD with a
critical path to the integration of big data, artificial
intelligence, and machine learning across the full spectrum of
military intelligence to ensure our warfighters maintain
advantages over increasingly capable adversaries. Although DoD
has taken tentative steps to explore the potential of
artificial intelligence, big data, deep learning, and machine
learning, the Committees believe Project MAVEN will accelerate
DoD's efforts to turn the enormous volume of data available to
analysts into actionable intelligence.
Therefore, the Committees direct the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with NGA and other relevant IC and DoD
agencies, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the
congressional intelligence and defense committees on Project
MAVEN. Such briefing shall address:
1. Schedule and strategy for labeling classified and
unclassified data;
2. Algorithm development, production, and deployment
strategy;
3. Coordination of integration efforts with other DoD
and IC elements;
4. Plan to implement the technologies developed by
Project MAVEN technology throughout the defense
intelligence enterprise;
5. Additional areas this technological advance can be
implemented; and
6. Validated funding requirements and efforts that
ensure spending practices are focused and efficient.
Report on Geospatial Commercial Activities for Basic and Applied
Research and Development
The Committees direct the Director of NGA, in coordination
with the DNI, the Director of the CIA, and the Director of the
NRO, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, to submit to the
congressional intelligence and defense committees a briefing on
the feasibility, risks, costs, and benefits of providing the
private sector and academia, on a need-driven and limited
basis--consistent with the protection of sources and methods,
as well as privacy and civil liberties--access to data in the
possession of the NGA for the purpose of assisting the efforts
of the private sector and academia in basic research, applied
research, data transfers, and the development of automation,
artificial intelligence, and associated algorithms. Such
briefing shall include:
1. Identification of any additional authorities the
Director of NGA would require to provide the private
sector and academia with access to relevant data on a
need-driven and limited basis, consistent with
applicable laws and procedures relating to the
protection of sources, methods, privacy and civil
liberties; and
2. Market research to assess the commercial and
academic interest in such data and determine likely
private-sector entities and institutions of higher
education interested in public-private partnerships
relating to such data.
Military Occupational Specialty-to-Degree Program
The Committees support the Military Occupational Specialty
(MOS)-to-Degree program, which is an innovative framework that
enables enlisted Marines to receive credits towards an
associate's or a bachelor's degree while earning required MOS
credentials. The program partners with colleges and
universities to map a Marine's experience and training to
equivalent credit, and provides Marines with an awareness of
tuition assistance and scholarship programs to enable them to
complete the remaining credits towards their degree. The
Committees encourage the Marine Corps to expand the MOS-to-
Degree program through further curriculum development and
enhanced management of the program.
Therefore, the Committees direct the Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity (MCIA), within 90 days of the enactment
of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence and defense
committees on the Marine Corps' progress towards expanding the
MOS-to-Degree program.
Unmanned Aircraft System Pilot Retention
The Committees support the Marine Corps' vision to grow a
more diverse, lethal, amphibious, and middleweight
expeditionary force by leveraging emerging technologies,
particularly in the area of unmanned and manned-unmanned
teaming. Additionally, the Committees are enthusiastic about
the Marine Corps' efforts to equip operating forces down to the
squad level with a Small Unit Remote Scouting System Family of
Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) capable of operating in all
weather conditions across the full spectrum of conflict. The
Committees are also aware of the service's concept for a Marine
Air Ground Task Force Unmanned Expeditionary (MUX) capability.
However, the Committees are concerned with the projected
cost and delays associated with developing this new technology
and believe the Marine Corps is ill-prepared to address the
growing deficiency in expertise and the manpower challenges
that will accompany expansion of the unmanned fleet. Based on
observations of the Air Force's and Army's efforts, the
Committees believe the Marine Corps' UAS programs will
experience pilot and maintainer shortages based on inadequate
training, lack of reliable equipment, and the absence of
incentive.
Therefore, the Committees direct the Deputy Commandant of
Aviation, within 120 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the
congressional intelligence and defense committees on potential
interim solutions to the gap exposed by the long development
time for MUX. Such briefing should also address the Marine
Corps' UAS talent management plan, including a strategy for
pilot retention and a plan to unify unmanned training that will
build a base of instructors and encourage the professionalism
of the community.
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Training Strategy
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC)-reported FY 2018 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) (H. Rept. 115-200), the Committees
direct the Secretary of the Air Force, no later than 30 days
after enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional
intelligence and defense committees on the Air Force's approach
to remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) aircrew training, with a
particular focus on how the Air Force plans to field simulator
capability and training capacity among active and reserve
component units supporting RPA operations.
Wide-area Motion Imagery Intelligence Capability
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the HASC-reported FY 2018 NDAA
(H. Rept. 115-200), the Committees direct the Secretary of the
Air Force no later than March 1, 2019, to provide to the
congressional intelligence and defense committees a report that
describes in detail the lifecycle weapon system sustainment and
modernization strategy for maintaining an enduring wide-area
motion imagery capability for the geographic combatant
commanders.
MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aircraft System
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the HASC-reported FY 2018 NDAA
(H. Rept. 115-200), the Committees direct the Secretary of the
Navy, no later than 45 days after enactment of the Act, to
brief the congressional intelligence and defense committees on
MQ-4C mission execution and tasking, collection, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (TCPED) processes. The briefing
shall include or explain:
1. A framework description of the manning, equipping,
and training requirements for the MQ-4C system;
2. A description of the baseline architecture of the
mission support infrastructure required to support MQ-
4C operations;
3. How the Navy plans to support and execute the
TCPED processes;
4. How the Navy plans to support flying operations
from either line-of-sight or beyond-line-of-sight
locations;
5. How many aircraft the Navy plans to dedicate
annually to the ISR Global Force Management Allocation
Process of the DoD; and
6. How many hours of collection the MQ-4C will be
able to provide annually in each of the intelligence
disciplines for combatant commanders.
E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the HASC-reported FY 2018 NDAA
(H. Rept. 115-200), the Committees direct the Secretary of the
Air Force, no later than March 1, 2019, to provide to the
congressional intelligence and defense committees a report that
explains in detail all aspects of how and when the Air Force
will transition from legacy Joint Surveillance and Target
Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft capability to JSTARS
recapitalization aircraft capability.
Acceleration of Increment 2 of Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
Program
Referring to Section 111 of H.R. 2810, the HASC-reported FY
2018 NDAA, the Committees direct the Secretary of the Army, no
later than January 30, 2019, to submit to the congressional
intelligence and defense committees a report detailing
potential options for the acceleration of procurement and
fielding of the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
Increment 2 program.
Cost-benefit Analysis of Upgrades to MQ-9
Referring to Section 134 of H.R. 2810, the HASC-reported FY
2018 NDAA, the Committees direct the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force, within 180
days of enactment of the Act, to provide the congressional
intelligence and defense committees an analysis that compares
the costs and benefits of the following:
1. Upgrading fielded MQ-9 Reaper aircraft to a Block
5 configuration; and
2. Proceeding with the procurement of MQ-9B aircraft
instead of upgrading fielded MQ-9 Reaper aircraft to a
Block 5 configuration.
Limitation on Divestment of U-2 or RQ-4 Aircraft
The Committees recognize that both piloted U-2 Dragon Lady
and the remotely piloted RQ-4 Global Hawk fleets of aircraft
provide essential and extremely sought after high-altitude
airborne ISR capabilities for geographic combatant commanders.
These platforms have been viewed as competitors for resources,
with stakeholders trying to decide which should remain within
the Air Force inventory for the long-term.
Although the U-2 and RQ-4 have differing attributes that
may make one platform preferable depending on requirements,
maintaining both platforms provides critical, complementary
capabilities within DoD's portfolio of high-altitude ISR
assets. Furthermore, retiring either aircraft would exacerbate
an existing and significant capability shortfall in meeting
combatant commanders' requirements.
The Committees expect the Secretary of the Air Force to
continue current and future modernization efforts and upgrades
for the U-2 and RQ-4 to increase capability, generate synergy,
and foster commonality within the high-altitude airborne ISR
portfolio. The Committees discourage the Secretary of the Air
Force or the Chief of Staff of the Air Force from planning in
the future or proposing to Congress any aircraft retirement
that would create an ISR capability deficit or capacity
shortfalls from existing levels until a sufficient replacement
reaches full operational capability.
Therefore, referring to Section 1034 of H.R. 2810, the
HASC-reported FY 2018 NDAA, the Committees direct that none of
the funds authorized to be appropriated by the Act, or
otherwise made available for the DoD for any fiscal year before
Fiscal Year 2024, may be obligated or expended to prepare to
divest, place in storage, or place in a status awaiting further
disposition of the possessing commander any U-2 or RQ-4
aircraft for the DoD. This prohibition shall not apply to an
individual U-2 or RQ-4 aircraft that the Secretary of the Air
Force determines, on a case-by-case basis, to be non-returnable
to flying service due to any mishap, other damage, or being
uneconomical to repair.
Nonconventional Assisted Recovery
Referring to Section 1053 of H.R. 2810, the HASC-reported
FY 2018 NDAA, the Committees direct the Secretary of Defense,
no later than March 1, 2019, to submit to the congressional
intelligence and defense committees the written review and
assessment of personnel recovery and nonconventional assisted
recovery programs. The assessment shall include:
1. An overall strategy defining personnel recovery
and nonconventional assisted recovery programs and
activities, including how such programs and activities
support the requirements of the geographic combatant
commanders;
2. A comprehensive review and assessment of statutory
authorities, policies, and interagency coordination
mechanisms, including limitations and shortfalls, for
personnel recovery and nonconventional assisted
recovery programs and activities;
3. A comprehensive description of current and
anticipated future personnel recovery and
nonconventional assisted recovery requirements across
the Future Years Defense Program, as validated by the
Joint Staff; and
4. An overview of validated current and expected
future force structure requirements necessary to meet
near-, mid-, and long-term personnel recovery and
nonconventional assisted recovery programs and
activities of the geographic combatant commanders.
The Committees further direct the Comptroller General of
the United States, within 90 days of the date on which the
assessment is submitted, to submit to the congressional
intelligence and defense committees a review of such
assessment.
Policy on Minimum Insider Threat Standards
Executive Order 13587 and the National Insider Threat Task
Force established minimum insider threat standards. Such
standards are required for the sharing and safeguarding of
classified information on computer networks while ensuring
consistent, appropriate protections for privacy and civil
liberties. The Committees understand there are policies in
place to attempt implementation of such standards; however, the
Committees have found that several elements of the IC have not
fully implemented such standards. Therefore, given the several
high-profile insider threat issues, the Committees emphasize
the importance of such minimums by statutorily requiring the
DNI to establish a policy on minimum insider threat standards,
consistent with the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum
Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs, and IC
elements should expeditiously establish their own policies and
implement the DNI guidance.
Further, referring to the directive language found in the
committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY
2019 NDAA, the Committees direct the Chief Management Officer
to provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence
committees and the congressional armed services committees, no
later than 90 days after enactment of the Act, on the outcomes
of its cost and technical analyses required by this report, and
the Department's efforts to implement enterprise-wide programs
and policies for insider threat detection, user activity
monitoring, and cyber-attack detection and remediation.
Intelligence Community Information Technology Environment
The Committees remain supportive of the goals of
Intelligence Community Information Technology Environment (IC
ITE) and the importance of the common, secure sharing
infrastructure it creates. The Committees further understand
that the path to implement a complex, technical environment
such as IC ITE needs to be sufficiently flexible and agile.
However, the Committees remain concerned with the lack of
consistency and substance in previous reports and briefings on
IC ITE. Therefore, Section 312 of Division B of the Act
requires a long-term roadmap, business plan, and security plan
that shall be reported to the congressional intelligence
committees at least quarterly with additional notifications as
necessary.
Intelligence Community Chief Financial Officer
The Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 mandated
best practices for decision-making and accountability, as well
as improved decision-makers' access to reliable and timely
financial and performance information. The CFO Act, as amended,
requires that the chief financial officers of 24 departments
and agencies ``report directly to the head of the agency
regarding financial management matters.'' Section 404 of
Division B of the Act brings the ODNI in line with the best
practices implemented in the CFO Act.
Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer
As codified in 44 U.S.C. 3506(a)(1)(A), each federal agency
head is responsible for `carrying out the information resources
management activities to improve agency productivity,
efficiency, and effectiveness.' Accordingly, Section 405 of
Division B of the Act expresses the Committee's intent to
emphasize the importance of the IC Chief Information Officer
(CIO), as defined in 50 U.S.C. 3032(a), in assisting the DNI
with information resource management by requiring the IC CIO to
report directly to the DNI.
Central Intelligence Agency Subsistence for Personnel Assigned to
Austere Locations
Section 411 of Division B of the Act permits the Director
of the CIA to allow subsistence for personnel assigned to
austere locations. Although the statute does not define
``austere,'' the Committees believe that utilization of this
authority should be minimal. Therefore, within 180 days after
the enactment of the Act, the CIA shall brief the congressional
intelligence committees on the CIA's definition of ``austere''
and the CIA regulations in place governing this authority.
Collocation of Certain Department of Homeland Security Personnel at
Field Locations
The Committees support DHS I&A's intent to integrate into
operations across the broader DHS enterprise. Accordingly,
Section 435 of Division B of the Act requires I&A to identify
opportunities for collocation of I&A field officers and to
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan for
deployment.
Framework for Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Defense
Intelligence Agency
The Committees commend the work of the USD(I) to answer a
request in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 (division N of Public Law 115-31) to review the roles and
missions of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The
Committees agree with the Under Secretary's finding identifying
a gap in DoD coordination of the functions of the DIA, as a
combat support agency (CSA) that is a member of the IC. The
Director of the DIA reports to both the Secretary of Defense
and the DNI; however, the agency lacks a framework to balance
the resourcing and mission conflicts this bifurcated chain of
command may occasionally cause.
Therefore, referring to directive language found in the
committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY
2019 NDAA, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, the
Committees direct the Secretary of Defense, in collaboration
with the DNI, to develop policies that outline the process to
balance the missions under DIA's CSA role with the missions and
functions assigned by the intelligence community. These
policies must address a process for assigning and integrating
any new missions assigned by the DoD or the IC. The Committees
further direct the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with
the DNI, to provide a briefing to the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional armed services
committees not later than 60 days of enactment of the Act, on
the plan to develop these policies.
Limitations on Intelligence Community Elements' Communications with
Congress
Effective oversight of the IC requires unencumbered
communications between representatives of the agencies, members
of Congress, and congressional staff. The Committees direct the
DNI not to limit any element of the IC from having interactions
with the congressional intelligence committees, including but
not limited to, preclearance by the DNI of remarks, briefings,
discussions of agency resources or authorities requirements, or
mandatory reports to the DNI on conversations with the
congressional intelligence committees.
National Reconnaissance Office Contracting Restrictions
The Committees are concerned that NRO imposes unnecessary
contractual restrictions that prohibit or discourage a
contractor from contacting, meeting with, or providing
information to the members or staff of the congressional
intelligence committees. Therefore, the Committees direct NRO
to eliminate any restrictions prohibiting or discouraging
contractors from contacting, meeting with, or providing
information to the congressional intelligence committees in all
current and future contracts. Furthermore, the Committees
direct the NRO to provide a briefing to the congressional
intelligence committees, within 60 days of enactment of the
Act, regarding completion of the aforementioned direction.
Intelligence Community Support to the National Vetting Center
On February 6, 2018, the President issued National Security
Policy Memorandum (NSPM)-9, ``Presidential Memorandum on
Optimizing the Use of Federal Government Information in Support
of National Vetting Enterprise.'' The memorandum directs the
DHS, in coordination with the ODNI and other agencies, to
establish the National Vetting Center. The memorandum also
requires agencies to ``provide the Center access to relevant
biographic, biometric, and related derogatory information.'' It
further directs DNI, in coordination with the heads of relevant
IC elements, to ``establish a support element to facilitate,
guide, and coordinate all IC efforts to use classified
intelligence and other relevant information within the IC
holdings in support of the center.'' The Committees wish to
obtain regular updates and the most current information about
the activities of that support element.
Therefore, no later than 180 days after the enactment of
the Act and annually thereafter, the Committees direct the DNI
and the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at DHS to
brief the congressional intelligence committees on the status
of IC support to the National Vetting Center, as established by
NSPM-9.
Update on Status of Attorney General-approved U.S. Person Procedures
under Executive Order 12333
The Committees acknowledge the difficult, labor-intensive
work undertaken by certain IC elements, to ensure the current
effectiveness of, and in some cases to substantially revise,
final Attorney General-approved procedures regarding the
collection, dissemination, and retention of United States
persons information. The Committees wish to better understand
the status of this project, throughout the IC.
Therefore, the Committees direct that, not later than 60
days after enactment of the Act, the DNI and the Attorney
General shall brief the congressional intelligence committees
on the issuance of final, Attorney General-approved procedures
by elements of the IC. Specifically, the briefing shall
identify (1) any such elements that have not yet issued final
procedures; and (2) with respect to such elements, the status
of the procedures' development, and any interim guidance or
procedures on which those elements currently rely.
Homegrown Violent Extremists Imprisoned in Department of Defense
Facilities
The Committees are concerned about an evident gap in
information sharing about individuals imprisoned in DoD
facilities who are categorized by the FBI as homegrown violent
extremists (HVEs). A recent FBI report underscores this gap,
highlighting the case of an individual who has been convicted
and sentenced to death by a U.S. military court martial and
remains incarcerated in a U.S. military facility. The Committee
understands that, despite his incarceration, this inmate openly
communicates with the outside world through written
correspondence and has continued to inspire extremists
throughout the world. The Committee further understands that
the FBI is unable to determine the full scope of this inmate's
contacts with the outside world because only a portion of his
communications have been provided by the DoD.
Therefore, no later than 180 days after the enactment of
the Act, the Committee directs the FBI to work with the DoD to
create a process by which the DoD provides to the FBI the
complete communications of individuals imprisoned in DoD
facilities and who are categorized by the FBI as HVEs.
Naming of Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters
According to statute enacted in 1972, the current FBI
headquarters building in Washington, D.C. must be ``known and
designated'' as the ``J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building.'' That
tribute has aged poorly. It should be reconsidered, in view of
Hoover's record on civil liberties--including the effort to
disparage and undermine Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Even today,
Hoover's name evokes the Bureau's sordid ``COINTELPRO''
activities.
The Committees believe Congress should consider repealing
the provision requiring the existing Pennsylvania Avenue
building to be known as the ``J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building.'' A
new name should be determined, through a joint dialogue among
Bureau leadership, law enforcement personnel, elected
officials, and civil rights leaders.
Foundational Intelligence Analysis Modernization
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY 2019 NDAA,
the Committees direct the Joint Staff Director for
Intelligence, in coordination with the USD(I) and the Director
of the DIA, to develop a plan within 60 days of enactment of
the Act, to modernize systems used to provide foundational
intelligence.
Further, the Committees direct the Joint Staff Director for
Intelligence, in coordination with the DIA Director, to provide
a briefing to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional armed services committees, within 90 days after
enactment of the Act, on such plan to modernize foundational
intelligence systems. If a determination is made that a new
system is required, the Committees expect the Battlespace
Awareness Functional Capabilities Board to validate the
requirements for any new system, and that the acquisition plan
will follow best practices for the rapid acquisition and
improvement of technology dependent systems.
Intelligence Support to Cyber Operations
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY 2019 NDAA,
the Committees direct the USD(I), in coordination with the DIA
and the military services, to provide a briefing to the
congressional intelligence committees and the congressional
armed services committees, within 90 days after enactment of
the Act, on intelligence support to cyber operations.
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math careers in Defense
Intelligence
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY 2019 NDAA,
the Committees direct the Director of DIA to provide a briefing
to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional armed services committees, within 90 days after
enactment of the Act, on a plan to develop a Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Math career program that attracts
and maintains the defense intelligence cadre of Science and
Technical Intelligence analysts to meet tomorrow's threats.
Security and Intelligence Role in Export Control
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY 2019 NDAA,
the Committees direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, in coordination with the USD(I), within 60 days of
enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence
committees and the congressional armed services committees, on
security support to export control.
Security Clearance Background Investigation Reciprocity
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY 2019 NDAA,
the Committees direct the Secretary of Defense, in coordination
with the DNI and the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management, within 60 days of enactment of the Act, to brief
the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional
armed services committees on efforts to ensure seamless
transition of investigations between authorized investigative
agencies, as required by law.
Further, referring to the directive language found in the
committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY
2019 NDAA, the Committees direct the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the DNI and the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management, within 90 days of enactment of the Act,
to brief the congressional intelligence committees on efforts
to ensure reciprocity is a consideration for implementation of
continuous evaluation and continuous vetting across the federal
government.
Strengthening Oversight of the Military Intelligence Program Budget
In directive language found in the committee accompanying
H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported FY 2019 NDAA, the House Committee
on Armed Services directed the USD(I) to ``review all of the
Department's intelligence, counterintelligence, and related
intelligence programs, projects, and activities supporting the
Secretary's responsibilities and requirements.'' Regarding this
review, the report expressed the House Committee on Armed
Services' expectation that USD(I) would note that the House
Committee on Armed Services believes resources for sensors
integral to the function of weapon systems, sensors and systems
developed for space and missile defense, and resources for
activities and programs associated with Operational Preparation
of the Environment and Nonconventional Assisted Recovery are in
support of operational requirements, and should be excluded
from designation to the MIP.
The Committees expect that USD(I), in addition to noting
the belief of the House Committee on Armed Services, also will
note the Committees' belief that:
1. Merely deeming certain resources to be ``in
support of operational requirements'' is insufficient
to exclude such resources from designation to the MIP;
and that
2. The determination of whether to designate
resources to the MIP involves a substantive
examination, of whether such resources will be used for
activities that are substantially similar, if not
equivalent to, intelligence and intelligence
activities.
Additionally, and referring to the directive language found
in the committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-
reported FY 2019 NDAA, the Committees direct USD(I) to provide
a briefing to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional armed services committees, within 180 days of
enactment of the Act, on the results of the USD(I) review
directed by H.R. 5515, including how the review will result in
clear guidance on designation of programs, projects, and
activities to the MIP.
Intelligence Community Leave Policies
It is imperative that the federal government recruit, hire,
and retain a highly qualified workforce. That depends in part
on offering federal personnel a competitive benefits package--
including with respect to parental leave and related benefits.
Toward that end, the Committees strongly believe the federal
government, including elements of the IC, must align such
benefits to the fullest extent possible with those of leading
U.S. private sector companies and other industrialized
countries.
The Committees are concerned that IC elements may not have
fully implemented revised advanced sick leave policies as
outlined in the Presidential Memorandum Modernizing Federal
Leave Policies for Childbirth, Adoption and Foster Care to
Recruit and Retain Talent and Improve Productivity, dated
January 15, 2015, or implemented them only partially. Among
other things, the memorandum directs that, to the extent
permitted by law, agencies shall offer 240 hours of advanced
sick leave, at the request of an employee and in appropriate
circumstances, in connection with the birth or adoption of a
child or for other sick leave eligible uses.
Additionally, beyond the memorandum's requirements, the
Committees also believe IC elements should actively be
exploring ways to enhance their parental leave policies, to
include paid parental leave.
Therefore, not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of the Act, the DNI shall submit a written report to
the congressional intelligence committees on each IC element's
implementation of the Memorandum's requirements with respect to
parental leave. The report should be unclassified, but may
contain a classified annex if necessary. At a minimum, such
report shall:
1. Summarize each element's policies with respect to
parental leave and related benefits;
2. Identify those elements fully in compliance with
the Memorandum's requirements with respect to parental
leave and other benefits described by the Memorandum;
3. Identify elements not in compliance with such
requirements;
4. As applicable, note and evaluate the sufficiency
of any claimed explanation from an IC element, as to
why its policies do not yet fully comply with such
requirements;
5. As applicable, identify a projected date, no later
than 180 days after the report's submission, by which
the Memorandum will be fully implemented by all IC
elements; and
6. Describe any barriers identified by the Director
or an element of the IC--including any legal and
resource barriers--to the establishment, for each
element of the IC, of a paid parental leave policy.
Section 307 of Division A of the Act includes a related
provision, requiring the DNI to set a policy for the IC to make
available 12 weeks of paid administrative leave in the event of
birth of a child, including adoptive and foster parents.
Section 307 of Division A further requires ODNI to submit a
plan for implementation to the congressional intelligence
committees within one year after enactment and directs
implementation within 90 days thereafter.
Foreign Influence Task Force
The IC has warned of active measures taken by foreign
actors to interfere with and undermine the U.S. democratic
process, most recently and brazenly by the Russian Federation.
The Committees appreciate FBI efforts to confront this
challenge in part through creation of its Foreign Influence
Task Force. The Committees believes that confronting foreign
influence directed at the United States is of fundamental
importance, and thus desires to engage in a close and regular
dialogue with the FBI about the task force's activities.
Therefore, the Committees directs the FBI to provide
detailed, quarterly briefings to the congressional intelligence
committees, regarding the task force's activities, to include
its progress and any significant challenges.
Joint System Integration Lab Annual Briefing
The Joint System Integration Lab (JSIL) at Redstone
Arsenal, Alabama enables testing of critical military
intelligence capabilities, including unmanned aerial system
(UAS) sensors, modeling and simulation, and integration between
and among service UASs. The Committees seek to remain fully and
currently informed about this important work.
Therefore, the Committees direct the JSIL, within 180 days
of enactment and annually for two years thereafter, to brief
the congressional intelligence and defense committees, on
intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted by
the JSIL.
Management of the Centers of Academic Excellence in National Security
Studies
The IC's CAE in National Security Studies program was
established in 2004 to serve the mission-critical objectives of
educating highly qualified students of diverse backgrounds and
encouraging them to pursue careers in the IC. The ODNI has
designated the DIA as the Executive Agent of the program.
In the past, the ODNI collected information about
involvement in the CAE program by IC elements and educational
institutions, as well as demographic (gender, minority,
disability), educational, employment, and other data on the
participating students. The ODNI reported this information to
Congress in 2010 regarding the period covering 2004-2009.
However, despite continuing Congressional interest in this
program, the IC has apparently ceased collection and analysis
of such data. More critically, ODNI and DIA informed the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that the IC
currently cannot provide statistical evidence as to whether, or
to what extent, the CAE program is fulfilling its objectives.
Congress directed in Fiscal Year 2016 that ODNI establish a
dedicated CAE summer internship program, but the first effort
in summer 2017 did not yield the anticipated diversity of
summer interns or robust participation of IC elements. The
summer 2018 internship program also did not appear to be
postured to demonstrate significant progress.
Accordingly, the Committees direct ODNI to serve as the
Executive Agent for CAE on a permanent and non-delegable basis
no later than six months into Fiscal Year 2019. In addition,
the Committees direct ODNI to immediately resume collection and
analysis of data necessary to evaluate the IC CAE's
performance, to include educational, employment, diversity, and
other data that was used to produce ODNI's 2010 report. Within
180 days of enactment of the Act, the Committees direct ODNI to
submit a written report to the congressional intelligence
committees containing this data from the 2016-2018 academic
years, as well as metrics about the total number of students
who participated in CAE courses, seminars, internships, or
other events; the number of students designated as CAE scholars
pursuing a certificate; and the number of CAE certificates
awarded during this timeframe, with a demographic breakdown
regarding diversity.
The Committees believe that the IC CAE program should
undergo a fundamental review to determine what changes can be
made to allow the program to achieve its intended objectives
and has requested a review be conducted by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO). Therefore, the Committees also
direct the IC to fully cooperate with the GAO review.
Enhancing Automation at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
The Committees strongly support efforts to leverage
commercial advances in automation of imagery, Wide Area Motion
Imagery (WAMI), Full Motion Video (FMV), and Synthetic Aperture
Radar (SAR) products to reduce manual processing and improve
information flow to users. However, the Committees are
concerned that NGA does not dedicate adequate resources to
integrate new automation techniques that have resulted in years
of research into the issue, but limited operational gains
during day to day imagery processing.
Therefore, the Committees direct NGA, in coordination with
ODNI, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, to provide the
congressional intelligence and defense committees with an
updated plan to reduce manual processing of imagery, WAMI, FMV,
and SAR to improve information flow to users. The report shall
also address:
1. NGA's strategy to leverage commercial advances;
2. The various geospatial intelligence automated
exploitation development programs across the National
System for Geospatial-Intelligence, and the associated
funding and specific purpose of said programs;
3. Any similar efforts by government entities outside
the National System for Geospatial-Intelligence of
which NGA is aware; and
4. Which of these efforts are duplicative.
Redundant Organic Software Development
The Committees are concerned that NGA is developing
software solutions that are otherwise available for purchase on
the commercial market. This practice almost always increases
the time it takes to deliver new capabilities to the
warfighter; increases the overall cost of the solution through
expensive operational and maintenance costs; and undermines the
U.S. software industrial base.
Therefore, the Committees direct NGA, within 60 days of
enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence
committees, on its identification of all NGA developed software
programs and explain why such programs are developed
organically instead of leveraging commercially available
products.
Critical Skills Recruiting for Automation
Although cutting edge sensors have provided the IC and DoD
with exquisite imagery, WAMI, and FMV, intelligence analysts
are unable to keep pace with the volume of data being
generated. This demands a transformation in the way the
intelligence enterprise processes, organizes, and presents
data. For that reason, the Committees fully support the NGA's
efforts to attract, recruit, and retain a highly competent
workforce that can acquire and integrate new data automation
tools.
Therefore, the Committees direct NGA, within 60 days of
enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence
and defense committees on NGA's efforts to recruit critical
skills such as mathematicians, data scientists, and software
engineers that possess critical skills needed to support NGA's
objectives in automation.
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities
The Committees have become aware of several major
impediments for companies with appropriately cleared personnel
to perform work for agencies and organizations like the NRO and
NGA. For example, businesses without ownership of a Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), which includes many
small businesses, find it very difficult to perform classified
work. Construction and accreditation of SCIF spaces may be
cost-prohibitive for small business and non-traditional
government contractors. Additionally, construction timelines
often exceed the period of performance of a contract.
A modern trend for innovative and non-traditional
government contractors is the increase use of co-working space
environments. Additionally, public and private entities are
partnering to create emerging regional innovation hubs to help
identify technology solutions and products in the private
sector that can be utilized by the DoD and IC. These innovation
hubs currently produce an agile, neutral, but largely
unclassified development environment.
Therefore, the Committees direct NRO and NGA, within 90
days of enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional
intelligence committees on:
1. Potential approaches to allow for SCIF spaces to
be certified and accredited outside of a traditional
contractual arrangement;
2. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of
issuing DoD Contract Security Specification (DD Form
254s) to ``Facilities'' as opposed to ``Contracts'';
3. Options for classified co-use and shared workspace
environments such as: innovation, incubation, catalyst,
and accelerator environments;
4. Pros and cons for public, private, government, or
combination owned classified neutral facilities; and
5. Any other opportunities to support companies with
appropriately cleared personnel but without ownership
of a SCIF effective access to a neutral SCIF.
Encouraging Innovation
The Committees are aware of and supports the NRO as it
continues to pursue innovation and incorporate innovative
technologies into many programs of record (POR). However, while
the NRO is one of the more innovative leaders regarding
government satellite matters, the NRO also struggles to
leverage commercial and government research and development
efforts and incorporate them in an effective and timely manner
into PORs.
Therefore, the Committees direct NRO, within 90 days of
enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence
committees on the following:
1. Opportunities that could expand innovation;
2. Any challenges for innovation; and
3. How innovative or new technologies are
incorporated to support critical milestones for PORs.
Improving Use of the Unclassified Marketplaces
The Committees have become aware that a major impediment
for companies to perform work for agencies and organizations
like the NRO is the lack of postings on unclassified
marketplaces, such as the unclassified ARC. Instead of posting
data to unclassified marketplaces, NRO unclassified postings
often refer to classified systems for critical, yet
unclassified information. If the NRO is serious about embracing
commercial innovation, unclassified marketplace postings should
remain on unclassified systems.
Therefore, the Committees direct NRO, within 90 days of
enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence
committees on options for improving the unclassified
marketplace process.
Satellite Servicing
No later than one year after the date of the enactment of
the Act, the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, shall jointly provide the congressional intelligence
and armed services committees upon request, a briefing
detailing the costs, risks, and operation benefits of
leveraging commercial satellite servicing capabilities for
national security satellite systems. The briefing shall
include:
1. A prioritized list (with a rationale) of the
operational and planned assets of the IC that could be
enhanced by satellite servicing missions;
2. The costs, risks, and benefits of integrating
satellite servicing capabilities as part of operational
resilience; and
3. Potential strategies that could allow future
national security space systems to leverage commercial
in-orbit servicing capabilities where appropriate and
feasible.
Enhanced Oversight of IC Contractors
A topic of sustained congressional intelligence committee
interest has been improving the federal government's oversight
of IC acquisition and procurement practices, including
activities by poorly performing IC contractors.
A framework exists to ensure that IC elements do not award
IC contracts to businesses that engage in negligence or even
gross negligence, consistently fail to appropriately safeguard
classified information, maintain poor financial practices, or
other issues. For example, an IC element may maintain a list of
contractors of concern, in order to ensure that proposals from
such contractors are rejected or subjected to additional
scrutiny. The Committees wish to build on these practices and
are concerned about the existing framework's adequacy.
Therefore, the Committees direct all elements of the IC, to
the fullest extent consistent with applicable law and policy,
to share with one another information about contractors with
track records of concern--such as the commission of negligence
or gross negligence in the performance of IC contracts, or the
repeated failure to appropriately safeguard classified
information in a fashion that the contractor reasonably could
have been expected to prevent.
Additionally, no later than 30 days after enactment of the
Act, the DNI shall brief the Committees on the authorities of
IC elements with respect to contractors with track records of
concern--before, during, and after procurement. An objective of
the briefing will be to discuss information sharing practices
in this regard, and to identify specific areas where the
oversight framework can be strengthened.
Security Clearance Reporting Requirements
The Agreement encourages efficiencies and transparency in
government reporting requirements related to security
clearances to ensure appropriate accountability. Therefore, the
Agreement directs the Office of Management and Budget, in
coordination with members of the Performance Accountability
Council, to report to Congress, within 90 days of enactment of
the Act, on recommendations for harmonizing and streamlining
reporting requirements related to security clearances that have
been set forth in legislation.
Committee Action
On May 14, 2019, a quorum being present, the Committee met
to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the
following actions:
Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex
By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and
Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for
Fiscal Year 2020, the base text for purposes of amendment.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc twelve
amendments to the classified annex, as follows: (1) four
amendments by Chairman Burr, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman
Warner; (2) two amendments by Senator Feinstein; (3) two
amendments by Senator Rubio (4) one amendment by Senator King;
(5) one amendment by Senator Cotton; (6) one amendment by
Senator Sasse; and (7) one amendment by Senator Bennet.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc ten amendments
to the bill, as follows: (1) an amendment by Chairman Burr, and
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to incorporate the Damon
Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019; (2) an
amendment by Chairman Burr, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman
Warner, to modify the amount of CIA Voluntary Separation Pay;
(3) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner to implement paid
parental leave for IC agencies; (4) an amendment by Vice
Chairman Warner to establish a social media center for data
sharing and analysis; (5) an amendment by Senator Rubio to
provide oversight of foreign influence in academia; (6) an
amendment by Senator Wyden, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman
Warner, Senator Rubio, and Senator Bennet, to require a report
on fifth-generation wireless network technology; (7) an
amendment by Senator Wyden, and cosponsored by Senator Cotton,
to require an annual GAO report regarding cybersecurity and
surveillance threats to Congress; (8) an amendment by Senator
Heinrich, and cosponsored by Senator Wyden and Senator Harris,
to require DNI assessments of foreign interference in
elections; (9) an amendment by Senator Heinrich to require
periodic briefings on artificial intelligence and machine
learning; and (10) an amendment by Senator Blunt, and
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to require a study on
establishing a geospatial-intelligence museum and learning
center.
Senator Harris offered an amendment to the classified
annex, and Vice Chairman Warner offered a second-degree
amendment to Senator Harris's amendment. Both were withdrawn,
pending future Committee consideration. On May 21, 2019, the
Committee considered a revised second-degree amendment by Vice
Chairman Warner to Senator Harris's amendment to the classified
annex. By voice vote, the Committee adopted Vice Chairman
Warner's second-degree amendment. By voice vote, the Committee
adopted Senator Harris's amendment to the classified annex, as
modified by Vice Chairman Warner's second-degree amendment.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted a second-degree
amendment by Senator Collins to an amendment by Senator Wyden
that required an unclassified report on the death of Jamal
Khashoggi. The second-degree amendment included the phrase
``consistent with protecting sources and methods.'' By a vote
of 15 ayes and zero noes, the Committee adopted the amendment
by Senator Wyden, as modified by the second-degree amendment by
Senator Collins. The votes in person were as follows: Chairman
Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Rubio--aye; Senator
Collins--aye; Senator Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator
Cornyn--aye; Senator Sasse--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--aye;
Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--
aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Harris--aye; and Senator
Bennet--aye.
Votes to report the committee bill
On May 14, 2019, the Committee voted to report the bill, as
amended, by a vote of 15 ayes and zero noes. The votes in
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr--aye; Senator
Risch--aye; Senator Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator
Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator
Sasse--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye;
Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye;
Senator Harris--aye; and Senator Bennet--aye. By voice vote on
May 21, 2019, the Committee unanimously voted to report the
bill as further amended by Senator Harris's amendment to the
classified annex, as modified by Vice Chairman Warner's second-
degree amendment.
By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and
classified annex.
Compliance With Rule XLIV
Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule also
contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits.
Estimate of Costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On May 23,
2019, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing
the provisions of this legislation.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN
The Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020 includes four new provisions I added with the help of Vice
Chairman Warner that represent an important step forward in
assisting and protecting Intelligence Community whistleblowers.
The first codifies an appeals process for Intelligence
Community whistleblowers who have been the subject of
reprisals. The second addresses what is currently a confusing
set of disparate whistleblower processes and procedures across
the Intelligence Community. This provision will assist
whistleblowers by harmonizing those processes and procedures
with an aim to maximizing transparency and whistleblower
protections. The third allows the Intelligence Community
Inspector General to track whistleblower complaints across the
Intelligence Community, which will improve oversight and inform
policies to ensure that investigations are conducted in a
timely fashion and that whistleblowers are protected from
reprisals. Finally, the bill includes a provision requiring a
report and recommendations to ensure that Intelligence
Community whistleblowers have access to attorneys with security
clearances.
The bill also includes two important new amendments I
introduced related to the security of communications. The
first, which was co-sponsored by Senators Rubio, Warner, and
Bennet, requires the DNI to provide an unclassified report on
the national security implications of fifth-generation (5G)
wireless technology built by foreign companies. I am
particularly pleased that the report will include an assessment
of possible mitigation approaches, including U.S. Government
support for strong end-to-end encryption and open-source
technology. This report will inform the Congress and the public
as the country considers policy responses to this extremely
serious and complicated national security challenge.
The bill also includes a new amendment I introduced with
Senator Cotton to require the GAO to report annually on
cybersecurity and surveillance threats against the U.S. Senate,
including Senators and their staff and immediate family. This
provision is part of a broader bipartisan effort to protect
U.S. Senators' communication that is included in S. 890.
Finally, the bill includes a new amendment I offered with
the support of Senators Heinrich, Harris, Feinstein, and
Bennet. It requires the DNI to provide a public report
identifying those who carried out, participated in, ordered, or
were otherwise complicit in or responsible for the death of
Jamal Khashoggi. This amendment, modified to add ``consistent
with protecting sources and methods'' and passed by a unanimous
vote, is intended to ensure that there is transparency and
accountability for the Saudi murder of a U.S. resident and
journalist.
I am concerned about a new provision related to the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act (IIPA). In 2010, I
worked to pass legislation to increase the penalties for
violations of the IIPA. This bill, however, expands the bill so
that it applies indefinitely, including to individuals who have
been in the United States for decades and have become senior
management or have retired. I am not yet convinced this
expansion is necessary and am concerned that it will be
employed to avoid accountability. The CIA's request that the
Committee include this provision, which invoked ``incidents
related to past Agency programs, such as the RDI [Rendition,
Detention and Interrogation] investigation,'' underscores my
concerns.
The Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 (S. 3153, 115th Cong., 2d
Sess.), which the Committee incorporated into this bill,
includes eight additional provisions I offered. A description
of those provisions, as well as my concerns about one provision
in that bill, are included in S. Rept. 115-298.
Changes to Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is
necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to
expedite the business of the Senate.
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