

119TH CONGRESS }
1st Session }

SENATE

{ REPORT
119-1

R E P O R T
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
COVERING THE PERIOD
JANUARY 3, 2023
TO
JANUARY 3, 2025



FEBRUARY 20, 2025.—Ordered to be printed

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

59-010

WASHINGTON : 2025

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PREFACE

The Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate this report on its activities from January 3, 2023, to January 3, 2025. This report also includes references to activities underway at the conclusion of the 118th Congress that the Committee expects to continue into the future.

Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress, the Committee is charged with the responsibility of carrying out oversight of the programs and activities of the Intelligence Community (IC) of the United States (U.S.). Most of the Committee's oversight work is conducted in secret and cannot be discussed publicly to protect sensitive IC sources and methods. Nevertheless, the Select Committee on Intelligence has submitted activities reports on a biennial basis since 1977 to provide the American public with information about its intelligence oversight activities. We submit this report to the Senate, in observance of this practice.

We also take this opportunity to thank all of the members of the Committee in the 118th Congress. In particular, we take special note of Senator Feinstein, who passed away on September 29, 2023. Senator Feinstein served on the Committee since the 107th Congress, and served as Chair of the Committee from 2009 to 2015. Her commitment to the important work of the Committee has helped to ensure a strong IC and a secure nation. We are grateful for her contributions. The Committee also notes the extensive contributions of Senator Marco Rubio, who served on the Committee since the 112th Congress, as Acting Chairman during the 116th Congress, and as Vice Chairman during the 117th and 118th Congresses. His efforts resulted in improvements to congressional oversight of national security, IC authorities and personnel, and, importantly, legal and operational authorities to counter our foreign adversaries. Finally, the Committee notes Senator Robert Casey, Jr.'s important contributions during the 117th and 118th Congresses.

We also express our deep gratitude for the work of all Committee staff during the 118th Congress. Their vigilance, professionalism, and perseverance were essential to the Committee's fulfillment of its oversight obligations.

TOM COTTON,
Chairman.
MARK R. WARNER,
Vice Chairman.

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COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES

FEBRUARY 20, 2025.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. COTTON, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following

R E P O R T

I. INTRODUCTION

The activities of the Committee during the 118th Congress included passage of critical enabling legislation, confirmation of appointees to key IC leadership posts, and inquiries on the performance and activities of the IC.

As detailed in Part II of this report, the Committee's paramount legislative priority and achievement in the 118th Congress was the successful enactment of Intelligence Authorization Acts for both Fiscal Year 2024 and Fiscal Year 2025.

Throughout the 118th Congress, the Committee's oversight activities focused on the national security threats posed by The People's Republic of China (PRC or China) and the Russian Federation (Russia), including China's military, economic, and political activities around the world, and Russia's unjustified and illegal invasion of Ukraine. In addition, the Committee devoted considerable attention to the ongoing conflicts involving The State of Israel (Israel), Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran). The Committee maintained continued focus on the malign activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), as well as strategically significant political, military, and economic developments in Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South America. The Committee also conducted vigorous oversight of covert action, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence programs carried out by the IC during the 118th Congress. The Committee closely examined the Executive Branch's use of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, particularly with respect to the implementation of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Finally, the Committee sustained its emphasis on overseeing the national security implications of certain technological advancements and advancing integration of emerging technologies

into the IC, including in the areas of artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, and energy.

II. LEGISLATION

A. INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024

In the 118th Congress, the Committee focused its efforts on enacting annual intelligence authorization acts as its primary means of carrying out its oversight responsibility. In early 2023, the Committee began consideration of the President’s request for funding levels and legislative authority for Fiscal Year 2024. The Committee evaluated the funding and legislative requests submitted by the Executive Branch and conducted numerous topical and regional briefings and hearings, including classified budget hearings.

The Committee reported the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024* (S. 2103) on June 22, 2023, and subsequently filed an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 118–59) on July 13, 2023.

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence passed its version of the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024* (H.R. 3932) on July 13, 2023, and then reported the bill to the full House and filed an accompanying report (H. Rpt. 118–162) on August 18, 2023. The Committee proceeded to work with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and other congressional committees on a final version of the legislation.

The product of the committees’ efforts, the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024*, was incorporated as Division G of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024* (P.L. 118–31). The *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024* passed the Senate on December 13, 2023 by a vote of 87–13, and passed the House on December 14, 2023 by a vote of 310–118. The President signed the bill into law on December 22, 2023.

The *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024* authorized funding for intelligence and intelligence-related activities across the U.S. Government and was accompanied by a classified schedule of authorizations and a classified annex. The Act ensures accountability and integrity from IC agencies, which undertake the Nation’s most sensitive intelligence programs and activities, and included significant legislative provisions to strengthen national security by:

- Increasing oversight of the national security threats posed by the PRC, including its economic practices, foreign malign influence operations, and military capabilities;
- Establishing an IC atrocities coordinator to increase collection, analysis, and intelligence support to government-wide efforts to hold China accountable for its human rights abuses, including the Uyghur genocide;
- Improving the IC’s procurement, adoption, and integration of emerging technologies;
- Enhancing insight into the Maduro regime’s imprisonment of U.S. persons in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Venezuela);
- Improving workforce mobility among IC agencies to meet national security needs;

- Establishing new requirements for reporting and investigating allegations of sexual assault and sexual harassment within the CIA;
- Promoting reform of the nation’s security classification system;
- Continuing to drive improvement in the security clearance process;
- Requiring intelligence assessments of the strategic competition in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as assessments of certain cartels; and,
- Ensuring continued support to the victims of anomalous health incidents (AHIs or “Havana Syndrome”).

B. INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025

In early 2024, the Committee began consideration of the President’s request for funding levels and legislative authority for Fiscal Year 2025. The Committee evaluated the funding and legislative requests submitted by the Executive Branch and conducted numerous topical and regional briefings and hearings, including classified budget hearings, and official oversight travel.

The Committee reported the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024* (S. 4443) on June 3, 2024, and subsequently filed an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 118–181) on June 12, 2024.

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence passed its version of the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025* (H.R. 8512) on June 11, 2024, and then reported the bill to the full House and issued an accompanying report (H. Rpt. 118–662) on September 11, 2024. The Committee proceeded to work with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and other congressional committees on a final version of the legislation.

The product of the committees’ efforts, the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025*, was incorporated as Division F of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025* (P.L. 118–159). The *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025* passed the House on December 11, 2024, by a vote of 281–140, and passed the Senate on December 18, 2024, by a vote of 85–14. The President signed the bill into law on December 23, 2024.

The *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025* authorized funding for intelligence and intelligence-related activities across the U.S. Government and was accompanied by a classified schedule of authorizations and a classified annex. The Act, as incorporated in the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025*, ensures accountability and integrity from IC agencies and contained a number of legislative provisions, including:

- Increasing oversight of the national security threats posed by the PRC including its attempts to evade sanctions, as well as its military capabilities, and investments in, and attempts to dominate, supply chains;
- Enhancing the IC’s ability to identify and counter adversary threats relating to biotechnologies, including by improving and modernizing the roles, missions, and objectives of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center and by standardizing the IC’s processes for collecting and analyzing biological data;

- Improving the IC’s response to foreign ransomware organizations, including by promoting the designation of leading ransomware groups as hostile foreign cyber actors;
- Enhancing policies relating to AI, including by establishing an AI Security Center within the National Security Agency (NSA) to advance AI security research;
- Expanding the IC’s ability to procure, transition, and incorporate emerging technologies, including by enhancing public-private talent exchanges;
- Increasing the IC’s focus on the growing threats to the U.S. by the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and affiliated terrorist organizations;
- Requiring the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy to advise National Laboratories regarding visitors and assignees who pose counterintelligence risks;
- Requiring a strategy to improve information sharing between the Federal government and the private sector regarding foreign adversary-based threats to U.S. critical minerals and other energy-related projects abroad;
- Requiring the IC to conduct an assessment of the likely course of Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the effects of Western support to Ukraine;
- Requiring the IC to conduct an assessment of the lessons learned by the IC with respect to the Israel-Hamas war;
- Improving oversight related to the Western Hemisphere, specifically related to national security implications of visa-free travel by certain foreign nationals;
- Enhancing insight into the Maduro regime’s relationship with state sponsors of terrorism and foreign terrorist organizations;
- Increasing support for IC recruitment and integration;
- Extending the requirement for annual reports on strikes against terrorist targets;
- Requiring a Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena reporting and Federal agency coordination;
- Reforming management of controlled access programs to improve congressional oversight; and
- Maintaining strong congressional oversight of and enhancing protections for IC whistleblowers.

III. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

A. WORLDWIDE THREATS HEARINGS

Since 1994, the Committee has held annual open hearings to review the IC’s assessment of the current and projected national security threats to the U.S. There have been only two years (1999 and 2020) when the Committee did not hold a “Worldwide Threats” hearing. It is one of the few open hearings that the Committee has regularly conducted to share the work of the IC with the public. These Worldwide Threats hearings cover national security assessments pertaining to all geographic regions, as well as transnational

threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

On March 8, 2023 and March 11, 2024, the Committee held open Worldwide Threats hearings on the current and projected threats to the U.S. The lead witness before the Committee at both hearings was Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines. During the March 8, 2023 hearing, she was joined at the witness table by the Honorable William J. Burns, Director of the CIA; the Honorable Christopher Wray, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); General Paul Nakasone, U.S. Army, Director of the NSA; and Lieutenant General Scott Berrier, U.S. Army, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). During the March 11, 2024 hearing, she was joined at the witness table by the Honorable William J. Burns, Director of the CIA; the Honorable Christopher Wray, Director of the FBI; General Timothy D. Haugh, U.S. Air Force, Director of the NSA; Lieutenant General Jeffrey A. Kruse, U.S. Air Force Director of the DIA; and Brett M. Holmgren, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. Both open (public) hearings were followed by closed, classified sessions. Video recordings of the open hearings are available on the Committee's website, along with Director Haines's unclassified statements for the record.

B. RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

During the 118th Congress, the Committee focused extensively on the threat to U.S. national security from Russia, including its continuing unjustified and illegal invasion of Ukraine that began on February 24, 2022. The Committee conducted at least 16 formal hearings and briefings on issues specifically focusing on the threat from Russia, including its war against Ukraine, as well as numerous other briefings and hearings where the threat from Russia was a key topic.

In addition to the Committee's focus on the threat from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it also examined the threat posed by Russia's other malign activities around the world. These include Russia's traditional and cyber espionage, ransomware, malign influence activities, sabotage operations, and asymmetric threats, including threats to U.S. and global space and undersea architecture.

The Committee held hearings and briefings on Russia's continued reliance on misinformation and disinformation to target global audiences and interfere with elections and democratic processes in the United States and around the world, as well as Russia's use of corruption and criminal networks to further its strategic goals.

The Committee further examined Russia's economic and industrial capacity to rebuild its conventional, strategic, and asymmetric arsenals, often in contravention of the international sanctions and the export control regime imposed after its invasion of its sovereign neighbor. Key to Russia's capacity has been a convergence among previously disparate authoritarian countries, including China, Iran, and North Korea, all of which have enabled Russia to continue its war in Ukraine, including through military and economic support.

The Committee's activities regarding these issues were designed to provide oversight and assess the IC's capabilities to collect against, analyze, provide warning of, and counter these and other malign activities of Russia under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.

In its Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, the Committee enacted legislation relating to Russia that directs the IC to provide an assessment of the likely course of the war in Ukraine, depending upon whether the United States maintains or withdraws military and economic assistance; directs the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense to establish a working group to identify lessons learned from the war in Ukraine; and directs the DNI to submit a report on Russia's support to foreign terrorist organizations.

C. CHINA AND TAIWAN

The Committee prioritized the PRC as the greatest national and economic security threat to the U.S. throughout the 118th Congress. The Committee dedicated a significant number of both classified and open hearings and briefings to threats posed by China, including the threat to Taiwan.

Through oversight briefings and hearings, the Committee continued to evaluate the IC's budget and programs to ensure its capabilities, collection posture, and analysis relating to the PRC were sufficient to defend our national security. In addition, the Committee focused its attention on the PRC's military, intelligence, and economic activities around the world, including its efforts to obtain, dominate, and leverage for political and economic influence specific technologies, including relating to energy and biotechnologies.

D. IRAN

The Committee held hearings, briefings, and roundtables focused on Iran's outsized role in creating instability and supporting terrorist activity in the Middle East and beyond, with special attention paid to Iranian proxies and its so-called "Axis of Resistance" following the onset of hostilities in October 2023, the Iranian nuclear program, and ongoing Iranian support to Russian aggression in Ukraine. The Committee focused on intelligence collection to better ascertain Iranian plans and intentions and held hearings to explore Iran's role in regional instability and its contribution to global tension through its loose alliance with other American adversaries, such as Russia, China, and North Korea. The Committee also identified opportunities for partnerships with regional allies to combat Iranian malign influence and supported efforts to identify and disrupt Iranian threats to former U.S. government officials involved in the 2020 strike that killed Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.

E. NORTH KOREA

During the 118th Congress, the Committee continued to monitor the threat posed by North Korea, including holding two hearings and conducting multiple engagements with the IC. In particular, the Committee's efforts focused on the regime's escalatory rhetoric and military actions aimed at the Republic of Korea (South Korea), growing weapons programs, illicit cyber activities, and sanctions violations. The Committee also conducted oversight of North Korea's cooperation and coordination with foreign adversaries, including Russia.

F. MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The Committee conducted briefings, roundtables, and extensive official travel to the Middle East and North Africa to conduct oversight, especially following the HAMAS terrorist attack on Israel in October of 2023 and associated disruption to regional norms. The Committee held several hearings examining the role of intelligence in the run up and conduct of the conflict, the U.S. intelligence relationship with Israel, and the reaction of regional partners and adversaries. The Committee examined the role the region and the ongoing conflicts play in the broader global realignment, with the U.S. and its allies on one side and Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea on the other. The Committee also focused on U.S. intelligence support to operations targeting the Huthis in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Yemen) following their attacks on Red Sea shipping, the U.S. footprint in Iraq and Syria, and the stability of countries such as Iraq and Lebanon. Finally, the Committee closely monitored the partnerships and alliances across the region, including with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman, through several oversight visits focused on intelligence and national security priorities regarding these critical relationships.

G. WESTERN HEMISPHERE/LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN

The Committee focused its efforts on monitoring key elections across the region in the Argentine Republic (Argentina), Dominican Republic, the Republic of El Salvador (El Salvador), the Republic of Guatemala (Guatemala), the United Mexican States (Mexico), the Republic of Panama (Panama), the Republic of Paraguay (Paraguay), the Oriental Republic of Uruguay (Uruguay), and Venezuela. The Committee also tracked developments in the authoritarian regimes in the Republic of Cuba (Cuba), the Republic of Nicaragua (Nicaragua), and Venezuela; and tracked instability in the Plurinational State of Bolivia (Bolivia) and the Republic of Haiti (Haiti).

The Committee continued to monitor the supply chain, production, and trafficking of illicit narcotics, with increased focus on synthetic opioids; the threat posed by violent transnational criminal organizations to the U.S. and the stability of the region; and the military and intelligence activities of U.S. adversaries in Latin America and the Caribbean, including escalation in PRC and Russian activity.

H. AFRICA

During the 118th Congress, the Committee remained steadfastly focused on Africa, including the Sahel, Sudan, and the Sub-Saharan region.

The Committee conducted close oversight on the humanitarian crisis and escalating violence in the Republic of Sudan, which has displaced millions of civilians, resulted in thousands of deaths, and left over half the population with substantial food insecurities. The Committee also sustained its focus on the role of foreign external actors in supporting the atrocities occurring on both sides of the Sudan conflict, and holding those external actors to account.

The Committee further focused closely on U.S. adversaries' malicious activities across the region. Russia and its military and political proxies intensified disinformation efforts, especially in the Sahel region and other politically fragile areas, to sow discord and secure support for Russia's own military and economic agendas.

Likewise, China continues to attempt to secure influence and military footprints under the auspices of economic investment. The Committee renewed focus, in particular, on China's nefarious attempts to control critical material supply chains and other energy resources across the continent as part of China's ongoing efforts to dominate power generation for economic and geo-political gain.

Finally, the Committee continued to conduct oversight on the growing terrorist threat emanating from the Sahel, particularly in the wake of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Republic of Niger (Niger), as well as amid the rise of foreign-sown anti-U.S. sentiment in West Africa and increasing political violence and instability across the continent.

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT

The Committee, since its inception in 1976, has considered oversight of the Executive Branch's use of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes to be one of its most important responsibilities. This oversight has covered both collection activities conducted pursuant to FISA and activities that fall outside of FISA and are governed by Executive Order 12333. During the 118th Congress, a central focus of these oversight efforts included the implementation of Section 702 of FISA, as established in the *FISA Amendments Act of 2008*, which provided procedures for intelligence collection activities targeting non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S. In particular, the Committee conducted extensive oversight of non-compliance with applicable statutory or procedural requirements, especially incidents involving U.S. person queries of information acquired pursuant to Section 702 of FISA and performed by the FBI. This oversight resulted in enactment of the *Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act* (H.R. 7888, P.L. 118-49) (RISAA) on April 20, 2024. RISAA imposed new restrictions and limitations on queries performed by the FBI. The Act also reauthorized for two years the critical intelligence authorities against foreign targets, as set forth in Title VII of FISA, while providing enhanced transparency and privacy protections for Americans and individuals in the U.S., among other reforms.

J. COVERT ACTION

The Committee conducted vigorous oversight of covert action programs throughout the 118th Congress. The Committee's rules require the Committee's Staff Director to "ensure that covert action programs of the United States government receive appropriate consideration once a quarter." In accordance with this rule, the Committee receives a written report every quarter on each covert action program that is being carried out under a presidential finding. Committee staff reviews these reports and meet with IC personnel to discuss their substance and pose additional questions. The Com-

mittee also holds periodic hearings and briefings on covert action programs, conducts official oversight travel, and receives written reviews of covert actions from the CIA Inspector General, which are often the basis for additional staff inquiries.

Further, under section 503 of the *National Security Act* (50 U.S.C. § 3093), the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all departments, agencies, and entities of the U.S. Government involved in a covert action are required to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions that are the responsibility of, are engaged in, by, or are carried out for, or on behalf of any department or agency of the U.S. Upon receiving such notifications, the Committee reviews the details of each and receives briefings to fully understand the issues.

The Committee seeks to ensure that covert action programs are consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals, and are conducted in accordance with all applicable U.S. laws.

K. COUNTERTERRORISM

In the 118th Congress, the Committee conducted oversight of the IC's counterterrorism programs and activities, through hearings, briefings, roundtables, and official overseas travel. The Committee reviewed the IC's response to the threat posed to the U.S. from foreign terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, including ISIS Khorasan, and its activities related to a series of overseas attacks and the threat they posed to the U.S. homeland. Specifically, the Committee focused on examining how counterterrorism resources are directed against the most pressing threats, the role of the IC in combatting domestic violent extremism, ensuring the proper use of intelligence resources and protection of Americans' civil liberties, and clarifying the respective responsibilities of the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and the FBI. As part of the Committee's official oversight travel overseas, the Committee reviewed on-the-ground IC counterterrorism activities, as well as liaison relationships with foreign partners.

L. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

During the 118th Congress, the Committee continued its work defining counterintelligence roles and responsibilities within the IC, while ensuring that the counterintelligence enterprise remained equipped with the authorities and resources to stay apace of adversaries, particularly the PRC, Iran, Cuba, and Russia. In response to direction in the Report to Accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, the Director of National Intelligence provided definitions of "strategic counterintelligence" and "offensive counterintelligence," both of which will help to clarify interagency counterintelligence operations. Notably, this effort stems from the Committee's non-partisan Audits and Projects Team's comprehensive 18-month study in 2021–22 on the role of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) and the report's recommendations to improve NCSC and strengthen integration. The Committee ensured timely updates from NCSC as well as the FBI on a number of ongoing threat streams. Topics of oversight included the guilty pleas of a former FBI official and a former State

Department employee for working for a sanctioned Russian oligarch and for Cuba, respectively; the threat posed by Iran against U.S. government officials; risks posed by PRC telecommunications technology; and the counterintelligence implications of adversarial cyber-attacks.

M. COUNTERNARCOTICS

In the 118th Congress, the Committee conducted oversight over the IC's counternarcotics programs and activities through hearings, briefings, and official oversight overseas travel. The Committee supported an amendment to FISA, enacted as part of RISAA, to enhance the collection of foreign intelligence concerning the "international production, distribution, or financing of illicit synthetic drugs, opioids, cocaine, or other drugs driving overdose deaths, or precursors of any aforementioned." Furthermore, the Committee continued to monitor the supply chain, production, and trafficking of illicit narcotics, with a focus on synthetic opioids; the threat posed by violent transnational criminal organizations to the U.S.; and the need for increased intelligence sharing between law enforcement and the IC to better map and target drug trafficking networks. As part of its overseas oversight travel, the Committee reviewed on-the-ground IC counternarcotics activities, as well as liaison relationships with foreign partners.

N. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

The Committee elevated efforts to address the national security implications of AI in the 118th Congress. Through multiple Committee hearings, including a public hearing with one of the world's leading AI innovators and prominent thought leaders, the Committee sought to identify advantages of AI to the IC's mission, challenges and legal implications to the IC's adoption of AI, and growing threats posed by foreign adversaries' embrace of AI tools. The Committee engaged closely with private sector and academic experts to understand research development and commercial trends, as well as examine opportunities for adversarial use of AI and machine learning-based technologies. In addition, the Chairman and Vice Chairman convened meetings with industry-leading executives and national security leaders to improve public-private collaboration in AI.

Building on efforts initiated as part of the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023*, the Committee enacted legislation in the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024* to require the Director of National Intelligence to establish governance policies applicable to development, purchase, and adoption of AI by the IC, including promoting testing, evaluation, and documentation of capabilities developed or acquired by the IC. As part of the *Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2025*, the Committee also established the NSA's AI Security Center, directing it to develop guidance to prevent counter-AI techniques for public and private sector users, as well as promote secure AI adoption practices for managers of national security systems. The Committee further sought to advance legislation in the Senate that promoted authenticity and provenance measures for synthetic media, promoted broader federal efforts to address AI security, and established a

clear inter-agency process by which national security risks directed—or emanating from—AI systems could be communicated to the private sector.

O. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

During the 118th Congress, the Committee continued its oversight of foundational and emerging technologies that have significant implications for national security and national competitiveness. The Committee pushed the IC to meet the challenge of identifying and publishing intelligence relating to emerging and disruptive technologies that can support policymakers outside of the traditional defense realm.

Committee staff continued to work with the IC to identify the intelligence needs of federal agencies responsible for monitoring and countering efforts related to those technologies, and formulate strategies to promote U.S. and allied alternatives to counter adversary efforts. The Committee focused on identifying technologies and related supply chains that may confer military, political, and economic leverage for foreign adversaries, including enhancing the ability of foreign adversaries to shape wider technology ecosystems for strategic objectives and geopolitical influence.

The Committee continued to provide oversight of critical emerging technology areas such as semiconductors, biotechnologies, and energy (described in further detail separately in this report), and advocated for the national security needs that are unique to IC and defense customers for critical emerging technologies. The Committee engaged closely with private sector experts, the IC, and other departments and agencies to understand the unique needs of national security customers with respect to these technologies, as well as critical supply chain dependencies and other impacts of global, strategic competition that could have implications for U.S. national security. The Committee also worked to craft legislation to ensure that the IC's acquisition and integration of emerging technologies are streamlined and efficient, and that the IC continues to lead in the innovation and adoption of emerging technologies, including through public-private cooperation.

P. BIOLOGICAL SECURITY THREATS

As part of the Committee's focus on technologies that might confer military, economic, or political leverage for foreign adversaries, the Committee expanded its oversight efforts of biological security threats, including bioweapons, biotechnologies, and use of synthetic biology to create advanced weapons.

In particular, the Committee conducted oversight by convening Senate Committees and IC experts, hosting public-private roundtables, holding briefings, conducting official oversight travel, and proposing legislation, to ensure that the IC is postured to identify, counter, and respond to biological security threats posed by foreign adversaries. The Committee also worked to ensure the IC supports the needs of federal agencies responsible for responding to biological security threats to our country and private sector companies that may be targets for foreign adversaries attempting to steal or otherwise threaten U.S. innovations.

Q. ENERGY SECURITY

The Committee remained focused on emerging technologies and related supply chains critical to energy security and resiliency. The Committee held briefings, convened public-private roundtables, conducted official travel, and met with experts across industry, academia, and government, to counter foreign adversary efforts to control emerging energy technologies, and to ensure that the IC is postured to support U.S. and allied leadership in innovating, securing, and deploying energy technologies.

In particular, the Committee focused on efforts by the PRC to monopolize supply chains for next-generation batteries, including critical material inputs, equipment, and chemistries for battery technologies. The Committee also focused on adversary efforts by the PRC and Russia to commercialize and deploy energy generation technologies, especially small modular and advanced nuclear reactors, across Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America, in order to gain global geopolitical and economic leverage, aiming to undermine U.S. national and economic security.

R. CYBER

During the 118th Congress, the Committee continued to monitor the IC's efforts to identify and track foreign cyber actors that pose significant threats to the U.S. and its allies, including foreign threats to government networks. The Committee closely tracked the threats posed by the PRC cyber actors referred to publicly as Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon which pose serious threats to U.S. critical and telecommunications infrastructure. In addition, the Committee performed vigorous oversight of the IC's posture to warn of cyber threats leading up to the 2024 U.S. federal elections, holding both open and closed hearings with government officials and relevant private sector stakeholders.

The Committee focused on the growing risk to U.S. national security interests posed by foreign ransomware actors. As part of the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025*, the Committee advanced legislation that promoted deeming ransomware threats to U.S. critical infrastructure as an intelligence priority and encouraged the designation of leading ransomware groups as hostile foreign cyber actors.

The Committee continued its oversight over IC cyber activities, to include the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center and the NSA's Cybersecurity Directorate. As noted in previous biennial reports, the Committee continues to be hampered in conducting effective oversight of joint cyber activities involving the IC and U.S. Cyber Command.

S. AUDITS AND PROJECTS

The Committee's rules stipulate that within its staff there "shall be an element with the capability to perform audits of programs and activities undertaken by departments and agencies with intelligence functions. Such element shall be comprised of persons qualified by training and/or experience to carry out such functions in accordance with accepted auditing standards." This capability resides within the Committee's "Audits and Projects Team." The Committee charges the Audits and Projects Team to conduct in-

depth reviews of IC-related matters and assist the Committee with its oversight obligations. The Committee has also assigned the Audits and Projects Team responsibility for managing the Committee's relationship with the GAO, to include overseeing the development and execution of reviews that the Committee assigns to GAO, and for managing the Committee relationship with IC Inspectors General. In addition, the Audits and Projects Team works with Committee Counsel to manage the whistleblower and complainant intake and review process.

During the 118th Congress, the Audits and Projects Team conducted an in-depth review of the CIA's efforts to facilitate medical care, financial compensation, and other benefits to CIA-affiliated personnel who reported AHIs. This work supports the Committee's broader and continued oversight of this important topic. The Audits and Projects Team's review culminated in a classified report that offered 11 recommendations to CIA and three potential actions for congressional consideration to address challenges the Committee identified during its review. The Audits and Projects Team also produced an unclassified summary of the classified report, which is available on the Committee's website.

Additionally, the Audits and Projects Team continued to support Committee oversight of the counterintelligence enterprise by working with the NCSC on implementation of the Committee's 17 recommendations from its prior organizational assessment of the NCSC.

T. ANOMOLOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS

Throughout the 118th Congress, the Committee has continued its oversight of the IC's response to reported AHIs through hearings, briefings, and meetings with individuals who have been affected by such incidents. The foci of this oversight have included the IC's implementation of the authorities provided by *Helping American Victims Affected by Neurologic Attacks Act of 2021*, investigations into the potential causes of anomalous health incidents, and related research. As noted above, the Audits and Projects Team completed a review of the CIA's efforts to facilitate medical care, financial compensation, and other benefits to CIA affiliates affected by such incidents. Members of the Committee remain committed to supporting individuals affected by these health incidents and overseeing the IC's investigations into their causes.

U. PERSONNEL VETTING REFORM

During the 118th Congress, the Committee continued its rigorous oversight of the Executive Branch's efforts to reform a personnel vetting model that had remained largely unchanged for more than 70 years. Since 2016, the Committee has sponsored quarterly briefings from the Performance Accountability Council, led by the Office of Management and Budget, to keep all congressional committees in the House and Senate apprised of reforms to address problems surfaced by the Navy Yard shooting in 2013; the government's public admission in 2015 of China's breach of personnel data held by the Office of Personnel Management; and the introduction of the new Trusted Workforce 2.0 paradigm. The Director of National Intelligence bears particular responsibility in leading these reforms

as the government's statutory Security Executive Agent. The Committee has taken specific interest in efforts to vet government and contract personnel employed in the IC.

The Committee held hearings on Trusted Workforce 2.0 and on the remediation plan to get the National Background Investigation System (NBIS) on track following significant technical and program management issues. With renewed oversight and governance mechanisms put in place by the Department of Defense, the program is on track to deliver capabilities to investigative service providers and sunset legacy systems. Following a longstanding tradition of legislating in this area, both the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024* and the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025* contained provisions on personnel vetting. These Acts established expectations regarding shared IT infrastructure and tools in support of personnel vetting, timeliness standards and reporting requirements to increase accountability, transparency and performance metrics related to personnel vetting, among other things. The Committee's sustained, bipartisan pressure has yielded results: the backlog in background investigations that once topped 725,000, has reached a reasonable steady state. There have been significant improvements in timelines for adjudications of clearances to levels established in the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, reciprocity across agencies, and the Executive Branch's adoption of Trusted Workforce 2.0.

V. FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE

During the 118th Congress, the Committee continued its longstanding efforts to monitor foreign malign influence activity and evaluate the IC's ability to identify, analyze, and disrupt such activity. With the increased availability of powerful generative AI tools, the Committee engaged leading private sector and civil society experts to identify risks of foreign misuse of these tools for foreign malign influence applications, as well as evaluate policy interventions and responses to mitigate such impacts.

As it has in previous U.S. federal elections in 2018, 2020, and 2022, the Committee maintained its oversight on the posture of the IC towards foreign malign influence activity directed at U.S. federal elections. Pursuant to this effort, the Committee held briefings with IC agencies throughout 2024 to evaluate intelligence collection and analysis and assess the federal government's ability to expose and counter foreign efforts to undermine or interfere with U.S. democratic processes. In September 2024, the Committee held a public hearing with leading American technology companies to assess their posture towards foreign exploitation of their services.

W. SPACE

During the 118th Congress, the Committee continued to oversee the IC's critical role in the space domain and monitor the growing space and counterspace threats posed by China and Russia. Consistent with efforts during the previous Congress, the Committee focused on ensuring the IC has reliable and resilient access to, and an ability to operate in, space to provide intelligence support.

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is focused on the ongoing build-out of its proliferated overhead architecture, growing

the number of NRO satellites from dozens on orbit to hundreds, which will result in the largest government constellation in history. The success of this architecture depends on effective collaboration and unity of effort between NRO and the range of stakeholders in the Department of Defense and the IC, for which the Committee continues to advocate. Committee oversight is focused on acquisition and budget challenges, as well as ensuring that NRO and its partners are taking advantage of AI, automation, and other advanced technologies, which is critical to improve the speed and quality of data delivered to the warfighter and other government customers.

The Committee held hearings and briefings on NRO's approach to resilience in an increasingly contested domain, the expanding role of commercial space within the IC, and adversary threats to U.S. space infrastructure. After the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) took over the Maven program from the Department of Defense, the Committee also focused on ensuring that NGA effectively integrates Maven—which applies AI to process and analyze large volumes of geospatial data more efficiently—into NGA operations. The Committee continues to advocate for increased use of AI and other advanced technologies, and to encourage the NRO and NGA to capitalize on the ongoing revolution in the commercial space sector, which has yielded reductions in the cost of launch, new sensor technologies, smaller satellites, and sophisticated data analytics and services.

In addition to hearings, briefings, and regular committee staff interactions with the NRO and NGA, the Committee has been active in ensuring NRO and NGA work to meet increasing intelligence demands from U.S. warfighters, partners, and allies. The Committee and its staff also engaged frequently on overhead architecture topics with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other IC and Department of Defense government officials and conducted site visits to government facilities and commercial companies to meet with government officials and industry leaders. The Committee also continued to monitor the establishment of the U.S. Space Force as the eighteenth and newest element of the IC to ensure it meets the standards set for all IC elements.

X. WHISTLEBLOWERS AND OTHER COMPLAINANTS

The Committee annually receives hundreds of phone calls, letters, and email communications from self-identified whistleblowers and other complainants on matters they believe constitute a violation of law, rule, or regulation; gross mismanagement; waste of resources; abuse of authority; or a substantial danger to public health and safety. Committee staff reviewed and, where warranted, investigated those complaints, often working closely with the Inspectors General of agencies in the IC. During the 118th Congress, the Committee received a significant number of complaints specific to the CIA's handling of allegations of sexual assault and harassment among its work force. The Committee met with numerous individuals who wanted to share their experience, resulting in Committee legislative action, additional and ongoing oversight efforts, and a request for an Inspector General investigation.

Y. INSPECTORS GENERAL

The Committee continued its strong relationship with, and oversight of, the Inspectors General of agencies in the IC. During the 118th Congress, this oversight consisted of reviews of Inspectors General semiannual reports and annual work plans, commissioning specific audits and reviews, and regular engagements with leadership and staff from the Offices of the Inspectors General. During this Congress, the Committee has taken special interest in ensuring that the Inspectors General have the independence necessary to carry out their critical missions. To that end, the Committee commissioned a report by the Intelligence Community Inspector General on the independence of all Inspectors General in the IC and took legislative actions to protect their budgetary resources.

IV. NOMINATIONS

During the 118th Congress, the Committee received four nominations from President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

Section 17 of S. Res. 400 of the 94th Congress (as amended) and a 2009 unanimous consent agreement govern referrals of nominations to the Committee. S. Res. 445, which amended S. Res. 400 in 2004, required all nominations to positions in the IC requiring the Senate's advice and consent be reported by the Select Committee on Intelligence, even when they are positions within departments that are primarily under the jurisdiction of other Senate committees, though the committee overseeing the given department or agency may hold hearings and interviews on the nomination. Notwithstanding that general guidance, the resolution directed the Assistant Attorney General for National Security be reported by the Committee on the Judiciary, but referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence. In the wake of the *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014*, which made the directors and Inspectors General of the NRO and the NSA Senate-confirmed positions, the Senate adopted S. Res. 470 on July 7, 2014. This resolution directed that if the nominee were a civilian, the Select Committee on Intelligence would report the nomination and refer it to the Committee on Armed Services, and if the nominee were a member of the Armed Forces on active duty, the reverse.

A unanimous consent agreement of January 7, 2009, refers all nominations for Inspectors General to the committees of primary jurisdiction and then sequentially to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Under this consent agreement, the nominations for the NRO and NSA Inspectors General are also referred to the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. The exception to this consent agreement is the Inspector General for the CIA, which is considered exclusively by the Select Committee on Intelligence.

The following nominations were referred to the Committee during the 118th Congress:

A. TIMOTHY D. HAUGH, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

On May 30, 2023, President Biden nominated Lieutenant General Timothy D. Haugh, U.S. Air Force, to be the Director of the NSA. Pursuant to S. Res. 400, the nomination was initially referred

to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, which favorably reported the nomination on June 13, 2023. Upon sequential referral, the Committee held a hearing on July 12, 2023. The Committee reported the nomination favorably on July 13, 2023, and the Senate confirmed Director Haugh by voice vote on December 19, 2023.

B. MICHAEL COLIN CASEY, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER

On June 8, 2023, President Biden nominated Michael Colin Casey to be the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center. The Committee held a hearing on July 12, 2023, and reported the nomination favorably on July 26, 2023. The Senate confirmed Director Casey by voice vote on September 19, 2023.

C. JOHN BRADFORD WIEGMANN, GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE OFFICE
OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

On April 18, 2024, President Biden nominated John Bradford Wiegmann to be General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The Committee held a hearing on June 5, 2024, and reported the nomination favorably on September 11, 2024.

D. KRISTI ZULEIKA LANE SCOTT, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

On July 31, 2024, President Biden nominated Kristi Zuleika Lane Scott to be Inspector General of the NSA. The nomination was referred to the Committee but no further action was taken before the 118th Congress adjourned *sine die*.

V. SUPPORT TO SENATE

Under Senate Resolution 400, which established the Committee in 1976, the Select Committee on Intelligence has an important role in assuring that the IC provides “informed and timely intelligence necessary for the executive and legislative branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and vital interests of the Nation.” The Committee fulfills this responsibility by providing access to IC information and officials to the U.S. Senate.

The Committee facilitated access to IC information for members and staff outside the Committee by inviting them to participate in briefings and hearings on issues of shared jurisdiction or interest. The Committee also provided intelligence briefings by its professional staff to Members outside the Committee and assisted Members in resolving issues with intelligence agencies.

VI. SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTIONS

A. NUMBER OF MEETINGS

During the 118th Congress, the Committee held a total of 102 on-the-record interviews, meetings, briefings, and hearings, as well as numerous off-the-record briefings. There were 25 oversight hearings, including 11 hearings on the IC budget. Of these 25 hearings, 10 were open to the public, including open confirmation hearings for 3 administration nominees, while the remainder were closed to

protect classified information pursuant to Senate rules. The Committee also held seven business meetings including mark-ups of legislation.

B. BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS ORIGINATED BY THE COMMITTEE

S. Res. 40—An original resolution authorizing expenditures by the Select Committee on Intelligence.

S. 2103—Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024.

S. 4443—Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025.

C. BILLS REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE

S. 1048—Ending the NARCOS Act of 2023.

S. 1541—Classification Reform Act of 2023.

S. 1791—China Defense Spending Transparency Act.

S. 1903—CCP Act.

S. 1981—Iranian Enrichment Monitoring Act of 2023.

S. 3047—Air America Act of 2023.

S. 3957—A bill to require the Director of National Intelligence to develop a strategy to improve the sharing of information and intelligence on foreign adversary tactics and illicit activities affecting the ability of United States persons to compete in foreign jurisdictions on projects relating to energy generation and storage, and for other purposes.

S. 4366—Enable IC Acquisitions Act of 2024.

S. 4369—Secure Smartports Act of 2024.

S. 4520—Confronting Chinese Communist Party Malign Influence Act of 2024.

S. 4790—Trump Assassination Attempt Transparency Act.

S. 4883—Unmasking Networks of Virtual Election Interference and Lies Act of 2024.

S. 4956—CLEARED Act of 2024.

S. 5444—A bill to enhance the authority of the intelligence community to enter into public-private talent exchanges, and for other purposes.

D. COMMITTEE PUBLICATIONS

Report 118–5—Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence covering the period January 3, 2021–January 3, 2023.

Report 118–59—Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024.

Report 118–181—Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025.