

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS  
ON THE  
CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES TO  
MONITOR THE SALT II TREATY

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REPORT  
OF THE  
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE  
UNITED STATES SENATE



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## PRINCIPAL FINDINGS BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ON THE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES TO MONITOR THE SALT II TREATY

In approaching the duty given to us by the Senate to examine the ability of the intelligence community to monitor Soviet compliance with the SALT II Treaty, the Committee has kept in mind that our reconnaissance system cannot provide absolute certainty. In the past our monitoring system has, in some instances, *underestimated* the rate of deployment of some strategic weapon systems of the Soviet Union. In other instances it has *overestimated* the deployment of some strategic weapon systems.

Since 1970, the estimating record has improved as a direct consequence of improvements in the technical capabilities of the U.S. reconnaissance systems and in the intelligence community's analysis of that data. These improved technical collection and analytical capabilities have resulted in a reduction in uncertainties about the state of development, testing, and deployment of Soviet strategic weapons. Because we are forced by history to bear in mind the analytic error of the "missile gap," as well as the underestimating of the rate of deployment of some strategic weapons systems, the Committee has conducted an independent review and assessment of U.S. monitoring capabilities. As a result of this review, the Committee has made findings with respect to the following issues:

A. Implications of SALT I record for monitoring SALT II Accords;

B. The degree to which U.S. SALT II negotiating positions were based on monitoring capabilities;

C. Providing the necessary resources for the U.S. monitoring system;

D. Improved analysis;

E. Congressional oversight; and

F. Evaluation of the ability of the United States to monitor the SALT II Treaty.

The subject of U.S. monitoring capabilities is so complex that Senators are strongly encouraged to read and study the full text of the classified report and its accompanying attachments, in order to fully understand these brief findings.

### A. IMPLICATIONS OF SALT I RECORD FOR MONITORING SALT II ACCORDS

On the basis of the SALT I record, the Committee believes that the Soviet Union will push to the greatest extent possible any advantages which the provisions or ambiguities of the SALT II Treaty might permit. Further, the Soviet Union will probably continue nearly all its

present concealment and deception practices, and additional concealment and deception practices may be attempted. The record also indicates, however, that the Standing Consultative Commission is a valuable forum for resolving compliance issues, and possible ambiguities in intelligence information and Treaty interpretation, when the United States aggressively pursues them. For example, in the case of the expanded pattern of Soviet concealment activities, vigorous pursuit by the United States of this issue in the Standing Consultative Commission halted the expansion.

Therefore, the United States must expect that unanticipated Soviet activities may occur during the course of the SALT II Treaty and be willing to raise and aggressively pursue questions of Soviet compliance with the Treaty in the Standing Consultative Commission, which will play an even more significant role during SALT II.

#### B. THE DEGREE TO WHICH UNITED STATES SALT II NEGOTIATING POSITIONS WERE BASED ON MONITORING CAPABILITIES

The Committee has also reviewed in detail the substance and process of SALT II diplomatic negotiations to see how the need for effective monitoring was factored into the actual negotiations in Geneva and elsewhere. Members of the Committee have gone to Geneva repeatedly to observe firsthand the negotiation process paying particular attention to monitoring questions. We have also examined the diplomatic record of these negotiations, the historical record of the SALT I and ABM Treaties, and the Proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission in order better to understand Soviet SALT behavior and the monitoring record concerning those agreements. We have also studied the specific verification provisions of the SALT II Treaty and Protocol and have made our own judgments as to the monitoring requirements of these provisions.

The Committee has reviewed the extent to which the provisions of the SALT II accords contribute to monitoring compliance. There are provisions which enhance our monitoring capability; there are other provisions which reduce monitoring difficulties but retain substantial ambiguities; and there are provisions which impose very difficult monitoring burdens.

The Committee believes that, in most cases, monitoring requirements were given high priority during Treaty negotiations, and that monitoring necessities were reflected in the Treaty provisions. In some cases, however, Treaty provisions were not drawn precisely because of negotiated trade-offs and United States and Soviet interest in not impairing the flexibility of some of their respective weapons development programs.

#### C. PROVIDING THE NECESSARY RESOURCES FOR THE UNITED STATES MONITORING SYSTEM

Although our national reconnaissance system is complex and comprehensive, some of its components are fragile. In order for the reconnaissance system to be effective, sufficient back-up and redundancy must be provided during the period of SALT II.

In order to provide these resources a very high budget priority must be given to the intelligence collection-systems, as well as to processing and analysis functions.

The Committee finds that continued improvement and investment will be required during this period to ensure that U.S. monitoring systems keep pace with the monitoring tasks they must perform. Arbitrary resource constraints must not curtail these needed improvements and investment.

The Committee also recommends that increased analytic attention to SALT monitoring should be accompanied by the intelligence community's full and careful attention to other areas of Soviet military, political, and economic activity and to military, political, social and economic developments in other countries. It is for this reason that we recommend a very high budget priority for processing and analysis, as well as for intelligence collection systems.

#### D. IMPROVED ANALYSIS

The Soviets unanticipated ability to emplace the much larger SS-19 in a slightly enlarged SS-11 silo circumvented the safeguards the United States thought it had obtained in SALT I against the substitution of heavy for light ICBMs. Similarly, the range of the SS-N-8 missile on the Delta class Soviet ballistic missile submarine was greater than expected. This reduced the significance of the Soviet "geographical disadvantage" on the basis of which we conceded to the Soviets in SALT I the right to build a larger number of ballistic missile submarines than were permitted to the United States. The Committee is of the view that the intelligence community should make every effort to minimize intelligence surprises. Recognizing that predicting the future is a very difficult, if not impossible task, the Committee recommends the following:

Soviet SALT negotiating strategy and tactics should be exhaustively studied for hints about future developments which the Soviets may have been trying to protect. On the basis of this analysis, "warning signs" should be formulated whose appearance would alert the analyst to the possibility the Soviets are taking unexpected steps in their weapons development program.

Various possible Soviet "cheating scenarios" should be developed, using technical experts outside the intelligence community who have been given briefings containing information about U.S. intelligence sources and methods roughly comparable to what the Soviets may be expected to possess. On the basis of these scenarios, similar "warning signs" should be formulated.

Competitive analysis, reflecting a full range of expert points of view, should be conducted periodically on important topics in Soviet strategic weapons developments. The results should be analyzed to provide "warning signs" and to suggest collection strategies which would minimize the differences and uncertainties.

#### E. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

It is clear from the SALT I record that intelligence of possible Soviet violation of the Treaty was, in some cases, and for a time, with-

held from Executive branch officials who had a need for such information. Lacking an oversight committee for intelligence matters, the Congress was not supplied the intelligence information on SALT I monitoring.

In the course of the hearings held by the Committee on the SALT I monitoring record, the responsible officials in the intelligence community were asked if they would "fully and currently" supply to the Committee intelligence on the monitoring of SALT II Treaty provisions, as required by S. Res. 400 and by Executive Order 12036. The Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of DIA have said they understood it was their duty to do so. Procedures for handling such reporting have already been established by the Committee.

Other committees of the Senate with the task of SALT II oversight are the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee. Under S. Res. 400, the Select Committee on Intelligence is obliged to keep these committees informed of any intelligence information that might be of significance in carrying out their mandated duties.

The Committee wishes to point out that monitoring compliance with the new strategic arms agreement is only the first step in the SALT process. The capability to determine whether the Soviets had violated the SALT II agreement would be of little consequence if at the same time the United States did not have the will and determination to pursue an aggressive verification policy.

In order to assure effective oversight of monitoring of SALT II, the Committee finds that the Select Committee on Intelligence should be kept fully and currently informed on all intelligence concerned with the monitoring of the SALT II Treaty. The Committee undertakes to keep the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee informed of any significant information affecting their mandated duties. Further, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence should receive a detailed intelligence annex, to be maintained under the security provisions of S. Res. 400, along with the semi-annual monitoring report supplied by ACDA to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee.

#### F. EVALUATION OF THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO MONITOR THE SALT II TREATY

The Committee's examination of the U.S. monitoring capabilities show that, under current Soviet practices, most counting provisions can be monitored with high or high-moderate confidence. Monitoring qualitative limitations on weapons systems is a far more difficult task and is dependent on the collective capability of a large number of systems. In general, these qualitative limitations present some problems but most can, on balance, be monitored with high to moderate confidence. There are some provisions of the Treaty which can be monitored with only a low level of confidence.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The terms "high," "high moderate," "moderate," and "low" refer to the monitoring uncertainties (in terms of quantitative measures or probabilities of detection) and do not suggest the military significance of the resulting monitoring uncertainties.

The Committee also finds that the present capabilities of the national reconnaissance system could be degraded by the use of changed practices on the part of the Soviet Union and through concealment and deception. Some of these changed practices would be permitted under the Treaty; other changed practices which involve deliberate concealment and deception would constitute serious violations of the Treaty. The impact of those changed practices permitted under the Treaty may decrease our confidence in our ability to monitor counting provisions, and a combination of such changed practices could greatly complicate our task of monitoring those provisions involving qualitative limitations.

Overall, the Committee finds that the SALT II Treaty enhances the ability of the United States to monitor those components of Soviet strategic weapons forces which are subject to the limitations of the Treaty. The Treaty permits measures short of "deliberate concealment" which could impede monitoring, and does not indicate what types of collection systems are to be considered national technical means. In the absence of the SALT II Treaty, however, the Soviets would be free to take more sweeping measures, such as unrestrained concealment and deception, which could make monitoring these strategic forces still more difficult.

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