SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE



Additional Prehearing Questions for

Tulsi Gabbard

Upon her nomination to be

Director of National Intelligence

Responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence

QUESTION 1: The role of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) can differ from administration to administration.

A. What guidance has President-elect Trump provided you for the role of DNI?

President-elect Trump expects me to lead the ODNI with integrity and in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States. If confirmed to serve as the Director of National Intelligence, I am committed to providing the President and policymakers with timely, independent, unbiased intelligence integrated and drawn from across the Intelligence Community (IC), to support informed decision-making.

B. Do you anticipate your role to be a director, coordinator, or something else?

In the wake of 9/11, the DNI was created to serve as the leader of the IC responsible for integrating foreign, domestic, and military intelligence across all IC elements, identifying critical intelligence deficiencies, and ensuring intelligence priorities reflect the Administration's national security priorities. The duties of the DNI are to serve as the head of the IC; to serve as the principal advisor to the President on intelligence issues; and to oversee the budget of the IC. The DNI must ensure that the right resources, both human and technical, are appropriately allocated to the right operations and activities to meet national security requirements. and that the various leaders throughout the IC are executing their respective missions.

C. How will you reaffirm the Intelligence Community's (IC's) apolitical role in furtherance of national security?

There is no place for politics in the IC. Injections of personal or political bias or institutional parochialism undermine the IC's ability to execute its national security mission and undermines trust in the IC, creating risk for our nation and undermining our republic. If confirmed as DNI, I am committed to reaffirming and working to restore the IC's apolitical role by setting clear expectations and creating a culture that incentivizes unbiased inputs and analysis without deference for pre-determined outcomes or ideologies. Leaders at every level will be expected to identify and take corrective action when explicit/implicit biases are detected to ensure that all

elements of the IC fulfill their responsibility to provide the most accurate and evidence-based assessments and analysis, free from bias.

D. How do you see the DNI's relationship with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S))?

The DNI must work closely with the Director of CIA and USD(I&S) to ensure that efforts are aligned with the President's National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) and ensure those priorities inform the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and Military Intelligence Program (MIP) budgets. The DNI plays a critical role in coordinating and integrating these efforts to minimize/prevent duplication of efforts.

E. What do you see as the DNI's role in covert action vis-à-vis the CIA and the White House?

My understanding aligns closely with the way former Director Ratcliffe characterized the issue during his confirmation. Any decision to employ covert action as a tool of national security strategy will, by law, be made by the President. E.O. 12333 states that the DNI "shall oversee and provide advice to the President and the NSC with respect to all ongoing and proposed covert action programs." The flow of information to the DNI on covert action programs should be driven by this role. The DNI must be kept informed of existing covert action programs and the DNI should continue to participate in the national security process of approving and reviewing covert action findings. The DNI engages with CIA and OMB in identifying funds for new findings and ensures appropriate written notification is provided to Congress regarding any additional resources required. Within the limits of the notification, the DNI also works to ensure that all departments and agencies that have equities in a particular covert action understand their respective roles and comply with their reporting requirements as laid out in the law.

- **F.** Please describe your understanding of the following responsibilities of the DNI:
 - 1. Serving as the principal adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security.

As the principal adviser to the President, NSC, and Homeland Security Council, the DNI is responsible for ensuring that policy makers receive timely, accurate, and objective intelligence to best inform their critical national security decisions.

2. Overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program (NIP).

Overseeing and directing the implementation of the NIP is a core responsibility of the DNI. The DNI is responsible for managing IC budgets, priorities, and activities to ensure that resources are allocated effectively and aligned with national security objectives. The DNI provides oversight to ensure that the NIP supports intelligence collection, analysis, and operational capabilities that address current and emerging threats. Together with the Secretary of Defense, the DNI works closely to develop the Military Intelligence Program to prevent redundancy and ensure Defense intelligence capabilities are complementary. The DNI works with Congress to justify budget requests, ensure accountability, and report on the execution of NIP resources.

3. Managing the Office of the DNI (ODNI).

The DNI is responsible for ensuring the ODNI is fulfilling its core mission: driving integration, collaboration, and innovation under a shared vision that advances national security priorities, upholding our nation's constitution, democratic principles, and values. The DNI must ensure that the IC is apolitical, focused on its core national security mission, and ensure that operators and analysts have the tools they need. The ODNI serves as the central coordinating body for the IC, and its management involves ensuring the organization functions efficiently, supports the DNI's mission, and facilitates collaboration across IC elements. Effective management of the ODNI ensures it provides the leadership, integration, and support needed to enhance the IC's overall effectiveness in addressing national security challenges.

QUESTION 2: What is your view of the role and responsibilities of the DNI in overseeing IC agencies and integrating them into an effective intelligence enterprise? Please answer separately for each of the following:

A. The Office of the USD(I&S) (OUSD(I&S)) and the Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence components.

The DNI works closely with the Secretary of Defense and primarily through the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) on proper guidance on IC priorities to inform DoD's budgetary decisions within the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). Coordinating closely to make sure our efforts are integrated to meet the IC's needs is a fundamental role of the DNI in this relationship.

With respect to acquisitions, the DNI is the primary decision authority if NIP needs are involved. This helps ensure that IC and DoD systems are complementary and non-duplicative. The DNI also consults on possible nominations of some DoD IC element heads in the event of vacancies.

B. The CIA.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) focuses specifically on gathering and analyzing foreign intelligence. Essentially, the DNI has a broader role in managing intelligence efforts, whereas the CIA is more operational and analytical in nature. The CIA provides national security intelligence to policymakers, while the DNI integrates and directs the efforts of the CIA and other intelligence agencies to enhance national security. The CIA is also charged with conducting covert action, the DNI has a role in overseeing the CIA's covert action to ensure it is in support of the President's national security objectives and consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

C. The intelligence agencies that reside in other departments of the federal government.

Traditionally the DNI integrates non-defense intelligence agencies by coordinating key intelligence activities and ensuring collaboration among the 18 agencies within the U.S. Intelligence Community. This integration helps provide timely and accurate intelligence to support national security and foreign relations. The National Security Act requires the head of the department or agency containing an IC element to consult with the DNI, and in many cases, obtain the DNI's concurrence, before appointing an individual to be nominated for such a position. Addressing IC-wide

problems in conjunction with the other department heads within the NIP is fundamental to the responsibilities of the DNI.

QUESTION 3: If confirmed as DNI, what steps will you take to improve the integration, coordination, and collaboration among IC agencies?

Communication, transparency, and focus are the essential elements of a truly integrated, efficient, and effective enterprise. If confirmed as DNI, I will ensure that national intelligence priorities and policies are clearly communicated, and understood by, all IC elements. I look forward to working with the IC elements to achieve greater transparency, particularly in budgeting, enabling more effective decision-making and more efficient alignment of resources. I also look forward to working with IC leadership to review ongoing substantive and administrative programs to identify efforts or expenses which are unnecessarily duplicative, do not align with national or departmental priorities, or which do not directly contribute to national security decision advantage. Eliminating or transferring these programs will enable IC elements to focus more effectively on those issues most closely aligned with their core missions. Finally, I will reinvigorate the mechanisms for information sharing, policy development, and mission integration across the IC to ensure that elements are working together to achieve the best intelligence outcomes in the most efficient way.

QUESTION 4: The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) was an effort intended to improve the management and coordination of the IC to meet current and future national security challenges.

A. Does the DNI have sufficient legal authorities, budgetary and otherwise, to effectively execute the DNI's IC management role? If not, what are your recommended enhancements or changes to IRTPA's authorities?

It appears that the ODNI has the legal and budgetary authorities required to execute its core functions. If confirmed, I will employ those current authorities to maximize mission effectiveness and resolve the challenges the IC faces. If in my initial review or at any time thereafter I identify a lack of authority or legislation as an important factor that hampers IC effectiveness, I would work with the appropriate organizations to achieve the changes required.

B. Do you believe that granting the DNI more control over the intelligence agencies' personnel, training programs, and business systems would

accelerate the integration of the IC? What would be the downside to such a step?

If and until I am confirmed, I will not have the opportunity to review fully the different personnel, training, and business system challenges of the IC's various elements. I believe the DNI has sufficient authorities needed to continue to integrate the IC but if, after review, I realize that changes are needed to properly execute ODNI's mission, I will work to support those changes.

C. What do you consider the highest priority leadership and management challenges facing the IC at this time? If confirmed, what will you do to address these challenges?

The Intelligence Community has a unique and vital role to play in defending our country and ensuring the prosperity of its citizens. It is a challenge running secret intelligence organizations in a democracy. To do that effectively over the long term, the IC needs to not only be competent but trusted by the citizens. Thus, the single greatest leadership challenge in the IC right now is restoring faith in the Community so that it can continue to operate with the unique trust we place in it.

The American people must trust that intelligence assessments and operations are not tainted by political partisanship or ideology. They must trust that their rights, guaranteed by the Constitution, are upheld and protected.

If confirmed as DNI, I will ensure that intelligence is objectively produced and honestly presented. I will encourage diversity of perspective and dissenting views. I will be candid about failure with a plan to address it. I will rigorously enforce IC policies safeguarding our nation's secrets and safeguarding the civil liberties of Americans. I will expect and require all IC leaders to do likewise. Building and maintaining trust is a function of committed leadership and persistent focus and must be the top priority for all IC leaders.

Qualifications

The 2004 IRTPA requires that, "Any individual nominated for appointment as Director of National Intelligence shall have extensive national security expertise." 50 U.S.C. § 3023(a)(1).

QUESTION 5: Please describe the specific experiences you have had in your professional career that will enable you to serve effectively as the head of the IC.

Throughout my professional career, I have gained extensive experience that equips me to lead the IC effectively. Key aspects of my background include:

1. Congressional Experience on National Security Committees

- As a member of the House Armed Services Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Homeland Security Committee, I worked directly on issues involving national defense, intelligence oversight, and counterterrorism strategies.
- I developed a deep understanding of the IC's role in informing U.S. policy and provided legislative support to enhance the IC's capabilities.

2. Military Service

- My deployments to combat zones in the Middle East and Africa as an Army officer gave me firsthand experience with the importance of actionable, reliable intelligence in high-stakes environments. I worked closely with intelligence teams and Special Operations teams to assess threats and inform operational decisions and benefited greatly from the same types of early warning indicator and threat intelligence that the IC excels at collecting and disseminating.
- This experience also taught me the value of timely and accurate intelligence in protecting lives and achieving strategic objectives.
- In my deployments to the Middle East, I worked closely with our foreign partners and allies on a daily basis to accomplish my mission. This included training, information sharing and coordinating operations. These experiences taught me the importance of building relationships with our partners and allies.

3. Advocacy for Ethical Foreign Policy

- I have consistently advocated for evidence-based informed policymaking, standing up against intelligence manipulation or politicization.
- 4. Leadership and Crisis Management

- My leadership roles as a policymaker and in the military have honed my ability to manage complex organizations, prioritize competing demands, and foster collaboration among diverse stakeholders.
- I am experienced in navigating high-pressure environments where sound decision-making and clear communication are essential.
- 5. Commitment to Transparency and Accountability
 - I have consistently championed oversight and accountability within the national security apparatus to ensure that intelligence activities remain aligned with constitutional principles and the public good.
 - As a former legislator, I understand the importance of the Legislative Branch and pledge to work closely with Congress to advance our shared interests as Americans.

These experiences have provided me with the skills necessary to lead the IC effectively, ensuring it operates with integrity, independence, and advancing U.S. national security.

QUESTION 6: Please explain how your background fulfills the requirement that a DNI nominee have "extensive national security expertise."

As a Member of Congress, I represented Hawaii's second congressional district for eight years serving on the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs and Homeland Security committees during my tenure. My work on all three of these committees, and our placement in the middle of the Pacific in a state that is home to INDOPACOM, and major headquarters for every branch of the military, and IC elements, provided me with a depth of exposure and experience to American's national security needs that many members of the House of Representatives don't typically enjoy. I traveled extensively, had substantive and lengthy engagements with heads of state and military leaders from nearly every region in the world. Throughout this period, as a customer of products and briefs delivered by the IC to Congress, I understand how important their role is, and the trusted partnership the IC must have with policymakers in Congress so the American people are best served.

I enlisted in our armed services as a direct result of the terrorist attacks on 9/11, have three deployments to different combat zones, and most recently deployed in 2021 to East Africa as part of a Joint Special Operations Task Force. I'm currently a Lieutenant Colonel serving in my second Battalion Command, with an active TS/SCI security clearance.

From being a junior enlisted soldier on the frontlines in the wake of the intelligence failures around 9/11 and the Iraq WMDs, I understand in a visceral way the cost of intelligence failures and how we cannot allow politicization of the IC and its intelligence products to occur. Trust within the IC has eroded dangerously over the last 20 years and it must be restored for the sake of our nation's security and our republic. Throughout my nearly 22 years of service in uniform, I have been a customer of IC products to support our warfighters and execution of our collective national security imperative.

If confirmed as DNI, I will bring the breadth and depth of my national security experience that allows me to bring fresh eyes to the IC to ensure that the original intent of ODNI's creation is fulfilled, we can begin to restore trust in the eyes of the American people, and the patriots who volunteer to serve in the IC are supported to fulfill their critical intelligence function to ensure the President and policymakers are receiving timely, accurate, objective reporting to ensure their decisions are best-informed.

QUESTION 7: The DNI is one of the most important national security jobs in the U.S. government, overseeing 18 agencies with disparate capabilities, authorities, and workforces across six federal departments and two independent agencies, deployed around the globe, accountable to multiple committees of Congress.

A. What experience do you have running a federated enterprise?

I have served as a military officer and commander at every level from platoon to battalion, currently serving as a Lieutenant Colonel assigned to my second battalion command in the US Army Reserve, in units located across the country and, when on deployment, around the globe, including the Middle East and Africa. In these units, I have been tasked with executing differing mission objectives in various operating environments with unique resourcing constraints. I have successfully led units overseas with teams operating in multiple countries, with challenging coordinating efforts. During all of my deployments I not only led our troops but I also worked with our partners and allies. This was not always easy in places like Kuwait, due to our cultural difference simple issues like accessing a military bases can be impossible for women, but by building rapport and demonstrating competence to our Kuwaiti partners I became the first woman allowed on a Kuwaiti military base. Further, having served as an elected representative at the federal level representing the interests of a state

located thousands of miles away from the nation's capital, with multiple islands in my district. I have dealt with considerable leadership challenges including operating offices and teams in multiple locations and engaging with federal, state and local leaders. Strong leadership is critical when dealing with complex and challenging organizations and environments. I've experienced in multiple settings the success derived from effective leadership, building a strong team with a diverse set of complimentary experience and skills, empowering leaders to lead to executive your vision, and executing decentralized control with standardized systems, standards and coordination.

ODNI is a large-scale enterprise, but strong leadership principles executed well remain the same, no matter the size.

B. What experience do you have leading and managing intelligence activities?

As a member of Congress, I served on the Homeland Security Committee, Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Armed Services Committee. In those roles, I was a regular consumer of intelligence products and understood its role in driving prudent and timely decisions by leaders.

As a soldier for nearly 22 years, deploying to the Middle East and East Africa, and serving in command of operational units at every level from platoon to battalion, I have been a consumer of tactical intelligence, and a contributor of information to our command and IC partners in remote locations like Somalia. Intelligence is one of the seven warfighting functions that military leaders must value and understand as they integrate it into all operations.

From my time in Congress and as an Army Officer, I know firsthand the importance of our core national security imperative, and ensuring intelligence production is aligned with national security priorities. I also know how essential it is that the President and policymakers in Congress are receiving timely, objective, and accurate reporting to make best informed decisions to serve U.S. security interests. When aligned, I have witnessed the power of timely and accurate intelligence, but I have also seen the serious cost when it misses the mark.

Shape, Size, and Function of the ODNI

The DNI has three core responsibilities: serving as the President's principal intelligence adviser, leading the IC, and overseeing and directing implementation of the NIP. The National Security Act of 1947 also prescribes a number of other responsibilities, including with respect to budget requests and appropriations for the NIP, IC personnel, intelligence information sharing, and coordination of intelligence relationships with foreign governments. The Act also specifies a number of offices, officials, and centers, including the National Intelligence Council; National Counterintelligence and Security Center; National Counterterrorism Center; and National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.

QUESTION 8: Do you commit to executing these responsibilities and maintaining operation of all these functions and offices as prescribed in law?

Yes. With a quickly evolving threat landscape, I would work with Congress to conduct a review of ODNI's organizational structure, its missions, functions, and priorities to ensure they are fulfilling the intent of the ODNI and meeting our national security needs.

QUESTION 9: If confirmed, what goals do you have for the IC as its leader?

If confirmed as DNI, I commit myself and the Office of Director of National Intelligence to the highest standards of moral, ethical, and legal conduct in all aspects, closely following the Constitution and the laws of the United States.

First, I will work with my counterparts across the IC to restore and enhance trust in the IC at all levels of government and with the American people, rooted in our shared mission of ensuring the safety, security and freedom of the American people and upholding the Constitution. Second, I will work to ensure that the IC is optimally aligned, resourced, and integrated for mission effectiveness, thereby providing the intelligence needed for decision and operational advantage across the full spectrum of national security challenges, consistent with administration priorities. Third, the IC must be efficient as well as effective, being faithful stewards of the American taxpayers' money. We must review ongoing programs and efforts across the IC to identify and eliminate or transfer functions which are redundant, non-performing, misaligned, or which do not directly support an IC core mission. Fourth, I will work to set a strategic vision for the work of the Intelligence Community, consistent with the President-elect's priorities, that looks beyond the immediate horizon to ensure we are prepared and well postured to address developing threats and take advantage of new opportunities.

QUESTION 10: Will you commit to appearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for its annual Worldwide Threats hearing?

Yes.

QUESTION 11: There has been considerable debate in the past concerning the appropriate size, organization, and function of the ODNI.

A. What is your view of the ODNI's size, organization, and function?

ODNI plays a critical role in coordinating and integrating the efforts of the IC, and its size, organization, and function must be optimized to fulfill this mission effectively. If confirmed, I would prioritize maintaining the ODNI's effectiveness by aligning its structure and resources with its mission of enhancing the IC's collective impact on national security. The ODNI should be streamlined, avoiding unnecessary duplication of efforts with IC elements, while serving as a central hub for intelligence integration, strategic guidance, and oversight. Periodic reviews of each office and element are necessary to ensure it remains agile and capable of addressing emerging threats.

B. If confirmed, what changes, would you make to the size, organization, or function of the ODNI?

If confirmed as DNI, I look forward to conducting a thorough review of ODNI roles and functions to ensure that ODNI is appropriately sized and focused to perform its statutory functions. Any proposed changes to ODNI will be informed by this review.

C. Do you believe that the ODNI has sufficient personnel resources or more personnel than required (including ODNI cadre and IC detailee personnel) to effectively carry out its statutory responsibilities?

ODNI is assigned a variety of diverse functions, whether by the President or by Congress. In order to effectively carry out those functions, the Office requires appropriate staffing to carry out these missions. The majority of the staffing at ODNI is resident in the mission centers like NCSC, NCTC, and the Mission Integration function. If confirmed, I will work to conduct a thorough review of each office and component to accurately assess the

personnel requirements needed to fulfill their respective duties and find opportunities to improve efficiency, as appropriate.

D. What in your view is the appropriate balance between the ODNI's community-management responsibilities and providing flexibility to the daily decision-making authorities of individual IC agency directors?

If confirmed as the next DNI, I am committed to reviewing the Office's role in the IC holistically and striking the right balance between community management and agency autonomy. The DNI must not micromanage individual IC agency directors. The goal of this review will be to determine how best to deliver on ODNI's statutory duties while empowering leaders within the IC to fulfill their vital role in providing for our national security.

ODNI's role is best achieved when its mission focuses on extensive integration of the various IC elements, rather than in the daily decision-making of individual IC agencies. Thus, I will respect the authority of each IC element's leadership while executing the DNI's mission of effective integration and oversight.

QUESTION 12: What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the following officers, and for each of them, how would you ensure that each officer is performing the mission required by law?

A. The General Counsel of the ODNI.

50 USC Section 3028 sets forth powers and authorities of the General Counsel. As the chief legal officer of the ODNI, I believe the General Counsel provides his or her insights and advice on the complex, difficult, and often novel legal issues impacting the ODNI and the IC as a whole—many of which raise important constitutional questions. If confirmed, I will work closely with the General Counsel to ensure the ODNI and the IC are executing their statutory duties as required by law and consistent with the law.

B. The Inspector General of the IC.

50 USC Section 3033 sets forth powers and authorities of the IC Inspector General. The IG's office is housed within the ODNI, but it is otherwise independent and has statutory authority to conduct broad oversight of all

elements of the IC community. As part of his or her duties, the IG directly helps DNI prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in the IC.

The IG conducts their business via independent audits, inspections, reviews, and investigations to provide insight on how the community is operating as an enterprise. If confirmed, I will seek to establish a strong working relationship with the IC IG to ensure they have adequate resources and support to conduct their important work.

C. The ODNI Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Transparency Officer.

The ODNI Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Transparency Officer manages the Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency (CLPT) and reports directly to the DNI on such matters to help ensure that the IC protects civil liberties and privacy as it carries out its important intelligence mission. CLPT also helps perform the vital balancing act of transparency while also protecting our sources and methods. The role is vital to showing the American people that the IC is committed to lawfully and responsibly using the tools and authorities provided to keep our country safe, while also safeguarding their civil liberties. If confirmed, I will partner with CLPT to restore trust in the IC.

D. The individual assigned responsibilities for analytic integrity under Section 1019 of IRTPA (50 U.S.C. § 3024).

Analytic integrity is invaluable and critical to the IC's credibility. Consistent with Section 1019 of IRTPA, the individual or entity assigned responsibility for analytic integrity works to improve the quality of analysis by promoting analytic standards across the IC and facilitates an integrated analytic enterprise by evaluating adherence to the analytic tradecraft standards in IC products. As mandated by IRTPA, this individual provides an important annual report to Congress as well as briefing agency heads on the annual findings from its studies. The individual may also draft lessons learned, identify best practices, or make recommendations for improvement to the analytic tradecraft employed in the production of the reviewed product or products.

E. The individual assigned responsibilities for safeguarding the objectivity of intelligence analysis under Section 1020 of IRTPA (50 U.S.C. § 3024).

The integrity of intelligence analysis – that it is produced objectively under rigorous tradecraft standards, fully considers all source material and analytic perspectives, and is not politically influenced – is the foundation of the trust people have in the Intelligence Community. The Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS) office is charged with ensuring that IC all-source analysis meets the standards and fulfills the requirements set forth in section 1019 of IRTPA. Consistent with Section 1020 of IRTPA, the individual assigned responsibilities for safeguarding the objectivity of intelligence analysis (the "Analytic Ombudsman") shall counsel, conduct arbitration, offer recommendations, and, as appropriate, initiate inquiries into real or perceived problems of analytic tradecraft or politicization.

If confirmed, I am committed to protecting the integrity of intelligence analysis and will work closely with AIS and the Ombudsman to support and enhance it.

Management of the ODNI

QUESTION 13: What do you believe is the appropriate balance between government employees and contractor employees in the ODNI?

The mix of government intelligence officers and contractors at ODNI provides for a diverse workforce to address the Office's broad statutory responsibilities. While the majority of those working in the ODNI should be government employees to ensure that the core team is comprised of professional intelligence officers, contractors can add great value in the field of innovation, technology and logistical support. The decision to use one or the other depends on the nature of the task. Enduring and inherently governmental functions, for example, should be performed by full-time government employees. Functions that are not inherently governmental, particularly those which are temporary or for which there is likely to be a fluctuation in capacity requirements over time, may be better suited for contract work. Contractors may also be the best source for niche technical capabilities which are difficult to develop and maintain in the civil service workforce.

If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the mix of government and contractor employees in the Office as part of a broader ODNI staffing review.

QUESTION 14: What do you believe is the appropriate balance between ODNI cadre employees and those on detail or assigned from other government agencies?

The DNI has a wide spectrum of responsibilities ranging from policy and budget management to the coordination of IC response to ongoing and emerging events. The ODNI staff requires an equally wide-ranging breadth of expertise to support those DNI responsibilities. ODNI relies on detailees, through the Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) program, to contribute expertise which can only be developed within their parent organizations. This is particularly the case within the Mission Integration Directorate, which draws heavily on collection and analysis expertise from the IC production elements. This is, in my view, a mutually beneficial arrangement wherein ODNI benefits from expertise and perspective from across the IC, and JDA detailees gain a broader understanding of, and appreciation for, the IC than would otherwise have been the case. At this point, I cannot say whether there is an appropriate proportionality between cadre and detailee within ODNI but, if confirmed, I look forward, as part of a broader ODNI review, to optimizing the distribution of cadre and detailee personnel.

QUESTION 15: What is your view of the principles that should guide the IC in its use of contractors, rather than full-time government employees, to fulfill intelligence-related functions?

The guiding principle for contractor use within the IC is whether a task is inherently governmental and whether there is an enduring requirement for it. Enduring and inherently governmental functions should be performed by full-time government employees. Non-inherently governmental functions, particularly those which are non-enduring or for which there is likely to be a fluctuation in capacity requirements over time, may be better suited for contract work. Contractors may also be the best source for technical capabilities which are difficult to develop and maintain in the civil service workforce. If confirmed as DNI, I look forward to working to ensure employees and contractors are optimally employed to fulfill essential IC related functions.

QUESTION 16: What do you believe is the appropriate proportionality in the ODNI between cadre employees and detailees from other government entities?

The DNI has a wide spectrum of responsibilities ranging from policy and budget management to the coordination of IC response to ongoing and emerging events. The ODNI staff requires an equally wide-ranging breadth of expertise to support those DNI responsibilities. ODNI relies on detailees, through the Joint Duty

Assignment (JDA) program, to contribute expertise which can only be developed within their parent organizations. This is particularly the case within the Mission Integration Directorate, which draws heavily on collection and analysis expertise from the IC production elements. This is, in my view, a mutually beneficial arrangement wherein ODNI benefits from expertise and perspective from across the IC, and JDA detailees gain a broader understanding of, and appreciation for, the IC than would otherwise have been the case. At this point, I cannot say whether there is an appropriate proportionality between cadre and detailee within ODNI but, if confirmed, I look forward to assessing and optimizing the distribution of cadre and detailee personnel.

QUESTION 17: What is your assessment of the personnel accountability system presently in place both at the ODNI and within the other IC elements? What actions, if any, should be considered to strengthen personnel accountability as well as ensure fair process in the IC, including matters related to allegations of serious misconduct?

If confirmed as DNI, I am committed to reviewing personnel accountability systems within the ODNI and the Intelligence Community to determine what improvements need to be made to strengthen them, and ensure a fair process is in place. Accountability is essential to uphold the integrity of the IC.

Relationship with the Congressional Intelligence Committees

QUESTION 18: What is your understanding of the obligations of the DNI under Title V of the National Security Act of 1947?

Under Title V, the DNI serves as a critical link between the IC and Congress, ensuring that intelligence activities are transparent, accountable, and aligned with U.S. law. If confirmed as DNI, I would prioritize a collaborative relationship with Congress, emphasizing timely, comprehensive, and honest communication to uphold the IC's integrity and facilitate effective oversight. The DNI's obligations to keep Congress fully and currently informed include reporting significant intelligence activities and failures, providing written notification of presidential findings for covert actions and budget matters, ensuring compliance with oversight requests, and ensuring accountability for legal and ethical conduct.

A. What steps should the DNI take to ensure that all departments, agencies, and other entities of the U.S. government involved in intelligence activities in

general, and covert action in particular, comply with the reporting requirements?

The DNI plays a critical role in ensuring that all U.S. government departments, agencies, and other entities involved in intelligence activities – including covert actions – comply with reporting requirements under applicable laws, including the National Security Act of 1947. The DNI should ensure compliance with reporting requirements by establishing and enforcing clear guidelines and robust oversight mechanisms across all entities involved in intelligence activities and covert action. This includes working closely with IC elements, the NSC, and the CIA to confirm that reporting to Congress, as mandated by the National Security Act and related statutes, is timely, accurate, and comprehensive. The DNI must provide clear directives through the ODNI, outlining expectations for reporting on significant intelligence activities, ensuring that the HPSCI and SSCI are fully and currently informed, as required by law. In addition, the DNI should support periodic audits and reviews of IC compliance with reporting obligations, leveraging the IC IG and relevant oversight bodies. Enhanced coordination between the ODNI and executive departments with intelligence responsibilities, such as DoD, DoS, and DOJ, ensures that covert action reporting aligns with legal standards and national priorities. By fostering transparency and maintaining regular communication with congressional committees, the DNI upholds the integrity of the reporting process while ensuring oversight responsibilities are met.

B. Under what circumstances do you believe notification may and should be limited to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of the congressional intelligence committees? In those circumstances, if any, what is the obligation of the DNI to subsequently notify the full membership of the committees as expeditiously as possible?

The decision to limit notification must be made judiciously, balancing the need to protect national security with the imperative of maintaining congressional oversight. Overuse or misuse of limited notification undermines trust between the Intelligence Community and Congress, which can erode the IC's credibility. The DNI must ensure that such measures are applied narrowly, justified transparently, and followed by full notification to uphold the principles of oversight and accountability fundamental to the democratic process. Specific circumstances in which notification may and should be limited to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member

include: protection of sensitive sources and methods; protection of an ongoing operation; in-extremis or emergency situations, where immediate action is required to address a crisis and there is insufficient time to notify the full committees; and, Presidential decision to limit notification, where the President, under statutory authority, may direct limited notification when it is determined that broader dissemination poses an extraordinary risk to national security.

In the circumstances outlined above where limited notification is provided, the DNI retains an obligation to notify the full membership of the congressional intelligence committees as expeditiously as possible. This obligation ensures accountability, transparency, and the ability of Congress to perform its oversight role effectively.

C. The law establishes a separate category of notification for covert action. Given the specificity of the law, do you believe the Executive Branch could ever limit notification on matters other than covert action?

While there may be exceptional circumstances where the Executive Branch seeks to limit notification for activities other than covert action, such actions must be rare, justified by compelling national security interests, and in compliance with the law's requirements. If confirmed as the DNI, my position would be clear: limited notification should primarily apply to covert actions, as explicitly allowed by law. Any broader application must be carefully justified and communicated. If the Executive Branch believes limited notification is necessary for non-covert actions, the rationale must be documented and Congress informed as soon as the risk diminishes. If confirmed, I commit to proactive engagement with congressional intelligence committees to address concerns and to maintain a collaborative relationship, ensuring that oversight obligations are met.

QUESTION 19: The IC can perform its mission properly only with close partnership with and accountability to Congress.

A. What is the DNI's role in ensuring Congress is kept fully and currently informed, as required by law, including 50 U.S.C. § 3091 and Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 112? How do you intend to fulfill those duties?

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has a statutory obligation under 50 U.S.C. § 3091 and Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 112 to ensure

Congress, specifically the congressional intelligence committees, is <u>fully and currently informed</u> of intelligence activities, including significant intelligence failures and covert actions. This ensures proper oversight and accountability of the IC. If confirmed, I will fulfill these obligations.

B. Are there circumstances that would justify delaying notification of Congress of important intelligence assessments, or not notifying Congress at all? Do you believe the National Security Council (NSC) should play a role in these decisions? If so, what should that role be?

Limited justifications exist for highly specific and unusual activities that may preclude a delay in delivery of the statutory notification to Congress. These could include: (1) Operational security, where immediate notification would compromise an ongoing operation or endanger the lives of intelligence sources or methods; (2) Emergency circumstances, where intelligence activities are evolving rapidly, and timely notification is impractical due to the immediacy of the threat; or, (3) Presidential determination, whereby the President may determine that delaying notification is necessary to protect national security, though this must align with statutory obligations.

Bypassing notification entirely is extremely rare and would require extraordinary justification, such as a direct and imminent threat to national security. Even in such cases, the expectation is that Congress would be informed as soon as the justification for withholding the information no longer applies.

The NSC may serve in a consultative role for the President but should not otherwise override statutory requirements for congressional notification. The NSC's role in these decisions historically included assessing the risks and benefits of notification timing, especially regarding sensitive or time-critical matters; supporting interagency coordination by ensuring consistency in messaging and decision-making among IC agencies, the ODNI, and the White House; and, serving as a facilitator of Presidential decisions, providing the President with recommendations when operational or security considerations necessitate delayed or limited notification.

C. Under what circumstances do you believe notification of Congress can or should be limited to the Gang of Eight? What should the role of the NSC be in determining what information should be limited?

The National Security Act of 1947 establishes specific provisions for covert actions that allow for limited notification to the congressional intelligence committees (e.g., the "Gang of Eight"). This reflects the extraordinary sensitivity often associated with covert actions. In addition, The National Security Act requires the IC to keep the congressional intelligence committees "fully and currently informed" of all intelligence activities. Any decision to limit notification for activities outside covert action risks violating this obligation unless exceptional circumstances justify it.

The DNI's role is to ensure transparency, facilitate oversight, and uphold the trust between the IC, Congress, and the American people. As listed above, it may be necessary for the Executive Branch to limit notification to the "Gang of Eight" for activities other than covert action in certain extraordinary circumstances. In all cases, it is my expectation that Congress would be informed as soon as the justification for withholding the information no longer applies. Limiting notification risks undermining Congress's constitutional role in overseeing intelligence activities. Such limitations should only be invoked when absolutely necessary and with clear justification. Overuse or unjustified reliance on limited notification could erode trust between the Executive Branch and Congress, damaging the oversight process and the IC's credibility.

Ultimately, the NSC's role in this process should be consultative, as final responsibility for compliance with statutory requirements rests with the DNI and the President. The President may wish to leverage the NSC to assist in evaluating whether limiting notification to the Gang of Eight is warranted based on the sensitivity of the information, or to facilitate communication between the IC, ODNI, and the President to ensure a unified decision-making process.

D. If confirmed, do you commit to complying with statutory deadlines set forth in the Committee's legislation, specifically the Intelligence Authorization Act for each fiscal year?

Yes, I commit to complying with all statutory deadlines set forth in the Intelligence Authorization Act and other relevant legislation and to informing the Committee of the reasons for any delays. Timely compliance is essential to maintaining trust, transparency, and accountability with Congress. Meeting these obligations is not just a matter of legal

compliance, it is fundamental to preserving the trust and integrity of the DNI's relationship with Congress and the American people.

QUESTION 20: Will you commit to ensuring that all Committee staff are read into IC programs and assessments consistent with protecting sources and methods?

Having served in Congress, I know how important it is to be able to rely on staff to provide meaningful oversight through the various committees on which members serve. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Committee to ensure that the Committee and its members are read in to the greatest extent possible to facilitate the Committee's vital oversight role.

QUESTION 21: Would you consider a finished intelligence product to be "privileged" in any way such that you would not provide it to Congress? Please explain.

Finished intelligence is, by definition, meant to be broadly consumed by those with a need-to-know. I see no reason finished intelligence to be privileged unless there is some other factor such as compartmentalized collection capabilities or sources and methods which would be revealed by it being made available. But even in these cases there are members of the intelligence committees in the House and the Senate who would likely have the necessary accesses and need-to-know.

If confirmed as DNI, I look forward to ensuring that Congress benefits from the important work of the Intelligence Community workforce, including through finished intelligence products.

QUESTION 22: Will you commit to provide the Committee intelligence reports, such as Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DoD Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs), National Security Agency (NSA) reports, and CIA Telegraphic Dissemination (TD) reports, in support of the Committee's intelligence oversight duties, upon request? Will you commit to provide the congressional intelligence committees National Intelligence Council products, e.g., Major Issue Studies or National Intelligence Estimates, in support of their oversight duties?

I am committed to partnering with the Committee to help facilitate its vital oversight role. If confirmed, I will ensure that Congress is provided intelligence reports to the maximum extent possible while safeguarding the confidentiality interests of the Executive Branch, including the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence sources and methods.

QUESTION 23: If confirmed, will you fully support the Committee's Audits and Projects Team, and enable their access to the people and information throughout the IC that is required for their functions, upon the Committee's request?

If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Audits and Projects Team to the maximum extent possible to ensure the Committee is able to perform its vital oversight work.

QUESTION 24: If confirmed, will you fully support the Committee's Technical Advisory Group (TAG) studies and allow the TAG members to have access to the people and information throughout the IC that is required for their studies upon the Committee's request?

If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the TAG to the maximum extent possible to ensure the Committee is able to perform its vital oversight work.

QUESTION 25: Will you keep the Committee fully and currently informed of the personnel, resources, facilities and authorities from the NIP and MIP that are necessary to implement the DNI and Secretary of Defense memorandum designating the Space Force as the 18th member of the IC?

Yes.

QUESTION 26: How would you approach communicating IC analytic conclusions to the public if the analysis and conclusions did not align with the President's views and political objectives?

The IC provides the President and senior policymakers with analysis that is objective, apolitical, and meets IC standards of analytic integrity. If confirmed, any public disclosure decisions must consider national security interests and the need to protect sensitive sources and methods.

IC Information Technology Environment

QUESTION 27: The IC Information Technology Environment (IC-ITE) is a significant accomplishment, intended to better integrate the IC and reduce long-term costs by sharing services. With IC-ITE operation, it may be time to consider a larger role for ODNI in other "back office" support activities, such as financial

management, human resources, asset management, and procurement to force increased integration and efficiencies.

A. What are your thoughts on integrating these activities?

IC-ITE is, indeed, a significant accomplishment and could serve as a model for other IC-wide common activities. In many ways, the IC-ITE accomplishment demonstrates one of the primary values of ODNI in that the Office is uniquely situated to solve certain cross-community problems. The IC uses the Service of Common Concern (SoCC) model for other collective functions, as well. If confirmed as DNI, I look forward to working with IC leadership to identify additional areas where Services of Common Concern may improve IC effectiveness and efficiency.

B. Does the DNI have the authority to manage these functions as a shared service for the entire IC?

Yes. The DNI has the authority to manage these functions via the Service of Common Concern (SoCC) designation. SoCCs are an established mechanism to drive efficiency and more integrated approaches across the IC.

Intelligence Information Sharing

QUESTION 28: What is your view of the IC's current efforts to enable the IC to operate like a true "information enterprise," where information is accessible by all IC elements? If confirmed, how would you pursue this goal?

IC effectiveness relies on responsible, and rapid, sharing of information both within the IC and with external stakeholders as directed in ICD 501. While the IC has made significant progress over the years in improving information sharing, developments in technology and the growth in the volume and variety of data require constant attention to ensure that Community practices remain fit for purpose. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing and optimizing current processes.

QUESTION 29: What in your view are the appropriate steps that should be taken to allow for increased interagency access to sensitive intelligence information? If confirmed, how would you pursue these efforts?

The need to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods must be carefully balanced against the need to ensure that the correct mix of IC personnel and interagency stakeholders have access to sensitive information sufficient to achieve a coherent national security outcome. To ensure that we best achieve that balance, if confirmed as DNI, I will conduct a review of current IC procedures for managing Controlled Access Programs and a review of extant ODNI guidance in ICD 906.

QUESTION 30: Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 3032) establishes the authorities of the Chief Information Officer of the IC (IC CIO), including procurement approval authority over all information technology items related to the enterprise architectures of all IC components.

A. What is your view of the authority of the IC CIO to create an integrated national intelligence and military intelligence information sharing enterprise?

The IC CIO has explicit authorities and mission guidance as detailed in 50 U.S.C. Section 3032. If confirmed, I will review in detail the authority and work of the IC CIO to assess existing efforts and technology being used to integrate national intelligence and military intelligence information sharing enterprises, and whether or not the existing authorities are sufficient and effective.

B. If confirmed, how do you intend to achieve true integration of national intelligence and military intelligence information sharing enterprises?

Timely and accurate intelligence is a key enabler of successful military operations. Intelligence only has value, though, if it is accessible where and when it is needed. Enhancing information sharing and interoperability between the IC and defense intelligence enterprises is therefore essential. Given the differences between national and military intelligence architectures and practices, achieving closer integration has historically been challenging. Closer integration must be a priority for both communities. If confirmed, I will work closely with leaders across the IC elements to determine what tools and actions are necessary to ensure that intelligence is available when and where it is needed.

Cybersecurity

QUESTION 31: The National Security Agency and United States Cyber Command are currently led by a single uniformed military officer in a "dual-hat" arrangement, due to their intertwined missions, which has allowed them to share many of the same resources and capabilities. Do you believe that the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command should be dual-hatted?

If confirmed as DNI, I will work with DoD to review the current status of the relationship between U.S. Cyber Command and the NSA, with a particular focus on understanding how a termination of the "dual-hatting" arrangement might affect the overall effectiveness of both organizations and any associated operational risks.

QUESTION 32: The ODNI has a central role to play in coordinating cybersecurity efforts, particularly with the respective roles of the Director of the NSA and the head of U.S. Cyber Command.

A. Are there any changes that you would recommend for the DNI's and IC's roles within the nation's cybersecurity infrastructure?

The IC is responsible for collecting, analyzing, producing and disseminating intelligence on foreign cyber threats at the appropriate level of classification. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing in detail the DNI and IC's roles within the national cybersecurity infrastructure and identifying any changes that might be beneficial. I look forward to presenting my findings to the President and consulting with the Committee on any recommended changes.

B. What should be the IC's role in helping to protect U.S. commercial computer networks? What cyber threat information (classified or unclassified) should be shared with U.S. private sector critical infrastructure entities to enable them to protect their networks from possible cyber-attack?

Robust data sharing and information exchange between the IC and the private sector is vital to protecting critical infrastructure that depends on secure cyber networks. If confirmed as DNI, I will engage with IC experts to determine what information is currently being shared and received, the guidelines that are used to determine that, and identify areas where improvements can be made to optimize the public-private cybersecurity partnership.

C. What is your view of the role of the ODNI's Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center within the national cybersecurity efforts?

If confirmed, I look forward to assessing the role currently played by ODNI's Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) within the greater national cybersecurity efforts to determine the best approach for CTIIC to be effective in tackling our quickly evolving cybersecurity threats and challenges.

QUESTION 33: Do you agree that the communications of IC and other U.S. government personnel, including through their own devices and accounts, poses a target for foreign cyber adversaries and should be protected?

Without a doubt the communications of IC and other U.S. government personnel pose a target for foreign adversaries. I do believe we should endeavor to protect them, consistent with Americans' civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.

QUESTION 34: Do you agree that the hacking of databases with large amounts of information on Americans, either controlled by the government or the private sector, poses a national security threat to the United States? If yes, how should the U.S. seek to strengthen the security of those databases?

Yes. If confirmed, I will examine the current data infrastructure and seek to address any vulnerabilities. Potential measures include ensuring that government databases are secured by the government and not outsourced to the private sector; reducing the amount of PII stored by government agencies and implementing end-to-end encryption for the PII that is stored; and incentivizing private sector data holders and database controllers to safeguard the data they are entrusted with.

QUESTION 35: How do you intend to improve information sharing – in both directions – between the IC and the private sector?

As global networks become more interconnected, information sharing between the IC and the private sector is increasingly important to ensure that our data systems and networks remain secure. Latency is a major area for improvement. Too often, intelligence shared by the IC is stale by the time it goes through the declassification process, denying the private sector an opportunity to prevent attacks. The converse can also be true, as many private sector partners fail to share what they know about foreign cyber threats in a timely manner.

If confirmed as DNI, I will undertake a review of the IC's data sharing relationship with the private sector and identify opportunities for improvement.

QUESTION 36: What types of cybersecurity intelligence information should be transmitted from the private sector to the government?

If confirmed as DNI, I anticipate supporting a robust data sharing and information exchange relationship between the IC and the private sector. Cybersecurity intelligence information that can enhance the government's ability to detect, prevent, and respond to cyber threats while maintaining privacy and proprietary information will greatly enhance the IC's knowledge of and ability to respond to cyber incidents. Key categories of this information include threat indicators and signatures, adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures, incident reports, vulnerability information, supply chain risks, and sector-specific trends. I anticipate that both the IC and the private sector will need to rely on clear legal frameworks and secure communication channels to ensure that shared information is protected and used responsibly. If confirmed, I would work to strengthen these partnerships to enhance the IC's understanding of the cyber threat landscape while respecting privacy, civil liberty, and proprietary concerns.

QUESTION 37: The private sector often has unique insights about network infrastructure and software that are potential targets of interest for foreign adversaries.

- **A.** Do you think that the IC should improve communications channels with the private sector in order to receive inputs that can help with foreign intelligence collection?
- **B.** If so, how will you do so?

Yes, I believe the IC should enhance its communication channels with the private sector to better leverage the insights, expertise, and data that can contribute to foreign intelligence collection. Many private sector entities operate globally and possess unique knowledge, technologies, and opensource information that can help the IC understand foreign economic, technological, and geopolitical developments. Strengthening these partnerships can provide the IC with valuable inputs to address emerging threats and opportunities.

If confirmed, I would prioritize the implementation and expansion of secure and transparent mechanisms for the private sector to share information with the IC while safeguarding proprietary and sensitive data. This includes fostering relationships with industries such as technology, finance, energy, and telecommunications, which are often on the frontlines of foreign influence and cyber threats. Enhanced collaboration with private sector partners, combined with clear legal and ethical guidelines, can ensure that such inputs are effectively integrated into the IC's mission while maintaining trust and accountability.

Science & Technology and Research & Development

QUESTION 38: How do you assess the state of science and technology (S&T) activities within the IC? If confirmed, how would you improve S&T activities in the IC?

In this time of rapid and dramatic technological changes, a strong and vibrant S&T community is essential in ensuring that the IC can fulfill its responsibilities against ever more challenging targets and environments. The IC has made significant strides in fields like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and cybersecurity, but adversaries are aggressively investing in these and other emerging technologies. An agile and coordinated approach is needed to ensure the IC maintains its technological edge. If confirmed, I look forward to working with leaders within the IC S&T/R&D establishments to understand their capabilities and challenges.

QUESTION 39: If confirmed, what would be your top priorities with respect to research and development in the IC? What should be the appropriate size of the research and development budgets as a percentage of the total NIP?

If confirmed as DNI, my priorities for IC research and development will focus on creating and implementing technologies that enhance intelligence collection and analysis. The IC exists to provide exquisite insight into hard targets. That cannot be done without a highly capable, tightly focused, and efficient R&D effort. At this point, I cannot judge what the appropriate R&D budget should be as a percentage of the total NIP. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing current IC R&D programs and funding, and to taking any action necessary to right-size the budgets in consultation with Congress.

Financial Intelligence

QUESTION 40: The IC's ability to investigate and disrupt the illicit financial and commercial networks that enable nefarious actors is central to addressing national and international security threats. Please describe your strategy for improving the IC's collection and analysis efforts regarding financial intelligence, including the use of open source and proprietary commercial information, and obtaining the cooperation of other countries.

Improving IC financial intelligence requires a combination of focused analytic expertise, broad access to financial data, and effective analytic toolsets. Given the globally distributed and largely unclassified nature of financial data, close partnership with allies and the commercial sector is vital. If confirmed as DNI, I look forward to reviewing the IC financial intelligence posture and, if necessary, strengthening it where appropriate.

ODNI Relationship with the Department of Defense

QUESTION 41: Please explain your understanding of the need to balance the requirements of national and military intelligence consumers, specifically between establishing a unified national intelligence effort that includes intelligence elements housed within DoD with the continuing requirement that combat support agencies be able to respond to the needs of military commanders.

A. What is your assessment of the national intelligence effort to satisfy the needs of military commanders for human intelligence collection, and what steps would you take to address any deficiencies?

If confirmed, I look forward to working with USD(I&S), and the IC Functional Manager for HUMINT, to ensure that national and defense HUMINT capabilities are optimally employed. If confirmed, I intend to review the national intelligence efforts to satisfy the needs of military commanders for human intelligence collection.

B. What is your assessment of the military intelligence gathering effort, and what role do you see for the DNI in addressing programs funded by the MIP?

Given the overlapping and mutually supportive nature of the IC and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE), effectively satisfying both national and defense-specific intelligence requirements requires a close and enduring partnership between the DNI and the USD(I&S). The National and Military Intelligence Programs must be complementary and integrated to the extent possible, ensuring the most efficient and effective intelligence coverage from the aggregate NIP and MIP. The MIP is developed by DoD in consultation with the DNI. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the USD(I&S) to ensure that national and military programs deliver the greatest effectiveness for the best taxpayer value.

C. What should be the relationship between the ODNI and the OUSD(I&S) in the management and coordination between the NIP and the MIP resources?

The relationship of the ODNI and the OUSD(I&S) should be one of close collaboration and coordination to ensure effective alignment of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and Military Intelligence Program (MIP). The ODNI is responsible for managing and overseeing NIP resources to address national-level intelligence priorities, while the OUSD(I&S) manages MIP resources to support operational and tactical military needs. Both offices must work together to avoid duplication, ensure efficient use of resources, and ensure optimal alignment between national and military intelligence efforts. If confirmed, I look forward to building and sustaining a close relationship with USD(I&S) and ensuring that the IC CFO and ODNI staff do likewise with their I&S counterparts.

D. What is your understanding of the different roles that the DNI and the Secretary of Defense should play with respect to intelligence elements within DoD?

The DNI and the Secretary of Defense have complementary roles with respect to the intelligence elements within the DOD. The DNI provides strategic oversight, integration, and direction for intelligence activities conducted under the National Intelligence Program (NIP), ensuring these activities align with national priorities and broader IC objectives. In contrast, the Secretary of Defense oversees the operational, tactical, and military intelligence functions within the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) and ensures DoD intelligence elements, such as the NSA, NGA, and DIA, support defense-specific missions. While the Secretary of Defense manages day-to-day operations and resource allocation for defense

intelligence, the DNI ensures these efforts are coordinated across the IC, avoiding duplication and promoting effective collaboration. Together, these roles ensure defense intelligence supports both national and military objectives while adhering to U.S. laws and policies. A close alignment between the DNI and the Secretary is essential. If confirmed I look forward to working with the Secretary of Defense on major alignment issues, and with his Principal Staff Assistant, USD(I&S) for routine coordination.

E. What is the relationship between the DNI and the heads of the individual intelligence agencies residing within DoD?

The heads of DoD intelligence organizations which are members of the IC are key leaders within both the USD(I&S)-led Defense Intelligence Enterprise and within the Intelligence Community. As IC members, the heads of defense agencies are fully integrated into DNI-led decision making structures. They participate in IC senior fora on intelligence strategy, priorities, policy, and budget, and are essential voices in addressing substantive issues in intelligence mission operations.

F. Does the DNI now have visibility over the full range of intelligence activities conducted by DoD?

At this point, I cannot judge whether the DNI has visibility over the full range of DoD intelligence activities. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary of Defense and USD(I&S) to ensure that the DNI has visibility into all DoD intelligence activities.

G. Are there additional authorities that the DNI should have regarding the full range of intelligence activities conducted by DoD?

If confirmed as DNI, as part of an overall review of DNI authorities, I will consider whether any additional authorities are needed to ensure visibility into defense intelligence activities. If warranted, I will seek additional authorities in full coordination with Congress and the Executive Branch.

H. Is the USD(I&S) subject to the authority of the DNI? If so, to what extent?

The relationship between the DNI and the USD(I) is among the most critical relationships in national intelligence. The NIP and the MIP must be optimally aligned, defense intelligence elements must be synchronized and

aligned with IC programs and priorities, and IC intelligence must be able to support defense operations. All this requires a close and continuous partnership between the DNI and USD(I&S). To facilitate this synchronization, USD(I&S) is designated as the Director for Defense Intelligence (DDI) and serves as the principal advisor to the DNI on all matters relating to defense intelligence. If confirmed, I look forward to strengthening the connection between USD(I&S) and ODNI staffs, and reinvigorating the Undersecretary's role as DDI.

QUESTION 42: What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the USD(I&S) regarding the different intelligence elements within the DoD?

My understanding is that the USD(I&S) is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters. The USD(I&S) oversees the defense intelligence elements within the DoD, exercising the Secretary of Defense's authority, direction, and control over Combat Support Agencies, Defense Agencies, and DoD Field Activities regarding defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components. The USD(I&S) also fulfills the Secretary's statutory requirements related to the National Intelligence Program and serves as the Program Manager for the MIP.

QUESTION 43: If confirmed as DNI, what issues do you believe require the attention of the DNI and the Secretary of Defense regarding the role of the Office of the USD(I&S)?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense on strategies for addressing critical national security issues involving both the IC and DoD. I will also collaborate with The Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense on cost sharing issues transcending the MIP. Further, if confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary to strengthen and invigorate the connection between DNI and USD(I&S) in its capacity as DDI to further integration between the IC and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

ODNI Relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency

QUESTION 44: What is your view of the DNI's responsibility to supervise, direct, or control the activities of the CIA?

A. What do you see as the DNI's role in the supervision, direction, or control of the conduct of covert actions by the CIA?

The DNI plays an essential oversight and coordination role in the conduct of covert actions directed by the President and conducted by the CIA but does not have direct operational control. The DNI ensures that covert actions align with the President's directives, national security priorities, and the overall intelligence strategy. This involves reviewing the objectives and scope of covert actions to confirm they are consistent with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework and U.S. law.

In addition, the DNI, together with OMB, engages with CIA to budget new findings and to ensure timely notification to Congress of both the activity and any requirement for additional resources.

E.O. 12333 defines the DNI as "shall oversee and provide advice to the President and the NSC with respect to all ongoing and proposed covert action programs."

B. What level of notification about covert action activities should the DNI receive?

The DNI participates in existing national security processes related to the approval or review of covert action findings and engages CIA and OMB in the intelligence budgeting and execution processes to maintain awareness of the finding and resource requirements. While the CIA typically conducts covert actions, the DNI's role is to maintain oversight, ensure that these activities comply with U.S. laws and policies, and provide the President and NSC with a comprehensive understanding of how covert actions fit into the overall intelligence and security strategy. The DNI should receive notification any time there is a new activity or there has been a significant change to a covert action activity, to include developments related to funding, operational, or the potential for negative outcomes.

C. What role should the DNI have with respect to the Director of the CIA's responsibilities to coordinate the relationships between IC elements and the intelligence and security services of foreign governments or international organizations?

By statute, the DNI provides strategic oversight and ensures coordination of the IC's relationships with foreign intelligence and security services, while respecting the Director of the CIA's operational responsibilities in managing these relationships. As the primary point of contact for foreign intelligence services, the CIA plays a central role in fostering and maintaining these partnerships. However, the DNI, as head of the IC, ensures that these engagements align with national intelligence priorities and broader U.S. foreign policy objectives, avoiding duplication or conflicting efforts across IC elements.

The DNI should establish policies and guidelines to ensure that all IC interactions with foreign partners are consistent, transparent, and effectively support the NIPF. Additionally, the DNI facilitates coordination between the CIA and other IC elements to leverage foreign partnerships for maximum intelligence benefit while maintaining oversight to ensure compliance with U.S. laws and policies. This balance ensures that foreign relationships are managed effectively and in a way that supports the IC's collective mission.

D. What role should the DNI have with respect to the CIA's management of its national human intelligence responsibilities?

The DNI should provide strategic oversight and guidance to the CIA's management of its national HUMINT responsibilities to ensure alignment with overall intelligence priorities and compliance with legal and policy standards. The DNI, as head of the IC, is responsible for integrating the CIA's HUMINT efforts with other IC elements to avoid duplication, enhance coordination, and address national intelligence priorities as outlined in the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). While the CIA retains operational control over its HUMINT activities, the DNI should ensure these efforts are effectively resourced, meet mission needs, and are conducted in accordance with U.S. laws, policies, and ethical standards. This oversight helps maximize the effectiveness of HUMINT collection while supporting the IC's broader goals.

ODNI Relationship with the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation

QUESTION 45: What is your view of the role of the FBI within the IC?

The FBI plays a unique and essential role within the IC as the primary federal agency for domestic intelligence and counterintelligence, bridging law enforcement and intelligence operations. Its dual responsibilities allow it to address threats that intersect national security and criminal activity, such as terrorism, espionage, cybercrime, and transnational organized crime.

The FBI's integration into the IC enables it to share domestically collected intelligence with other IC elements while benefiting from national-level intelligence to inform its operations. This collaboration ensures that domestic threats are understood in their global context, supporting a comprehensive approach to national security. The FBI's responsibility to adhere to constitutional protections and legal standards while conducting intelligence activities further ensures that its work aligns with the broader IC mission while safeguarding civil liberties. Its role is indispensable in protecting the homeland and contributing to the IC's understanding of emerging threats.

QUESTION 46: What is your understanding of the relationship between the FBI and the DNI, particularly regarding collection priorities and information sharing?

The relationship between the FBI and the DNI is rooted in collaboration to ensure that domestic intelligence activities align with national priorities and are effectively integrated into the broader IC. The DNI provides strategic guidance on collection priorities through the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which informs the FBI's domestic intelligence and counterintelligence efforts. The FBI, as the primary federal agency for domestic intelligence, contributes its unique insights and operational data to the IC, enabling a holistic understanding of threats that cross domestic and international boundaries.

Information sharing between the FBI and the DNI is critical for aligning efforts and ensuring timely dissemination of intelligence. The FBI provides domestically collected intelligence to the ODNI for analysis and integration into IC-wide products while receiving national-level intelligence to enhance its domestic operations. This bidirectional flow is essential for addressing threats such as terrorism, cyberattacks, and espionage. The DNI ensures that the FBI's activities comply with applicable laws and IC priorities while fostering interagency collaboration to prevent silos and improve the effectiveness of intelligence efforts.

QUESTION 47: What is your understanding of the different roles and responsibilities of the FBI, the Attorney General, and the DNI, with respect to U.S. counterterrorism efforts?

The FBI, AG, and DNI have distinct but complementary roles in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The FBI serves as the lead federal agency for domestic counterterrorism operations, conducting investigations, gathering intelligence, and disrupting threats within the U.S. The AG oversees the DOJ's legal and prosecutorial aspects, ensuring counterterrorism activities comply with U.S. laws and constitutional protections. The DNI provides strategic oversight, integrates intelligence from across the IC, and ensures that counterterrorism efforts align with national priorities under the National Intelligence Program (NIP). In addition, the National Counterterrorism Center, an integral part of the ODNI, has a statutory responsibility to, among other things, integrate all intelligence possessed or acquired by the federal government and provide all source intelligence analysis on terrorism threats to its customers. Together, these roles ensure a coordinated approach to identifying, mitigating, and responding to terrorist threats while safeguarding civil liberties and adhering to legal frameworks.

QUESTION 48: What is your understanding of the different roles and responsibilities of the FBI, the Attorney General, and the DNI, with respect to U.S. counterintelligence efforts?

The roles of the FBI, the Attorney General (AG), and the DNI in counterintelligence are distinct yet interdependent. The FBI serves as the operational lead for investigating and mitigating threats, the AG ensures legal compliance and prosecutions, and the DNI provides strategic coordination and integration of counterintelligence efforts across the IC. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that these roles are executed collaboratively, effectively, and in full alignment with U.S. laws and national security priorities.

The FBI is the lead agency for counterintelligence within the United States and is responsible for investigating, detecting, and neutralizing threats posed by foreign intelligence activities. The AG has oversight responsibilities for ensuring counterintelligence activities comply with U.S. laws and constitutional protections, certifying that all counterintelligence activities, including surveillance and investigative techniques, are conducted in accordance with U.S. law.

The DNI has overarching responsibility for coordinating and integrating the counterintelligence efforts of the entire IC. Key pillars of the DNI's role include strategic oversight, coordination and integration, advising policymakers, resource allocation, and protecting IC integrity.

ODNI Relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and other Departments of the United States Government

QUESTION 49: What is your view of how well the intelligence elements of the Departments of Homeland Security, Treasury, State, and Energy are integrated within the IC? Do you believe that there are changes that should be made to the organization, mission, or resource level of any of these agencies?

The intelligence elements of the Departments of Homeland Security, Treasury, State, and Energy play critical roles in supporting the broader IC. There is room for improvement in integration, organization, and resourcing to fully leverage their unique capabilities. My understanding is that these elements often face challenges in aligning their missions with IC priorities while addressing their departmental mandates, leading to potential gaps in coordination and resource allocation. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging quickly with the elements under my authority to determine how to strengthen integration.

QUESTION 50: Please describe your understanding of the different roles and responsibilities of the DNI and the following officials, regarding the IC elements within their departments:

A. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget

The DNI and OMB have distinct but complementary roles in overseeing the resources and activities of the IC. The DNI provides intelligence-specific expertise and priorities, while OMB assesses those priorities within the context of the federal budget. This collaboration ensures that the IC is appropriately funded to meet its mission while maintaining accountability and alignment with broader government objectives.

B. The Secretary of Energy

The DNI and the Secretary of Energy have distinct roles in overseeing IC elements within the DOE. The DNI provides strategic guidance, sets

priorities, and ensures that DOE intelligence activities align with the broader goals of the National Intelligence Program (NIP). Meanwhile, the Secretary of Energy manages the DOE's operational activities, including those related to intelligence, focusing on issues like nuclear security, energy infrastructure, and counterproliferation. The DNI works with the Secretary to ensure compliance with constitutional and legal requirements and that DOE intelligence efforts contribute effectively to national security priorities, particularly in areas such as nuclear weapons proliferation and energy-related threats.

C. The Secretary of Homeland Security

The DNI and the Secretary of Homeland Security have complementary roles in overseeing intelligence activities within DHS. The DNI provides strategic direction, ensures integration of DHS intelligence efforts into the broader NIP, and monitors compliance with national security priorities and legal requirements. The Secretary of Homeland Security oversees operational intelligence activities that address threats such as terrorism, cybersecurity, and border security, focusing on protecting the homeland and responding to emerging challenges. The DNI works closely with the Secretary to ensure that intelligence collected and analyzed by the DHS is effectively integrated into national efforts while adhering to constitutional and legal standards.

D. The Secretary of State

The DNI and the Secretary of State collaborate to ensure that intelligence activities within the Department of State (DOS), particularly through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), align with national security priorities. The DNI provides strategic oversight, integrates INR's contributions into the NIP, and ensures compliance with applicable laws and policies. Meanwhile, the Secretary of State oversees INR's operational activities, leveraging its analytical expertise to support foreign policy objectives. The DNI ensures INR's intelligence efforts are effectively coordinated with other IC elements, enhancing the IC's ability to address global threats and support U.S. diplomatic initiatives.

E. The Secretary of the Treasury

The DNI and the Secretary of the Treasury collaborate to align the intelligence activities of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) with

national security priorities within the NIP. The DNI provides strategic guidance, integrates OIA's efforts into broader IC initiatives, and ensures compliance with applicable laws and standards. The Secretary of the Treasury oversees OIA's operational role in addressing threats such as illicit finance, sanctions enforcement, and counterterrorism financing. The DNI ensures OIA's contributions are effectively coordinated with the IC to enhance the U.S. government's ability to counter financial threats and protect the integrity of the global financial system.

Defense Intelligence Agency

QUESTION 51: The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is the "Defense HUMINT Manager" under DoD directives, with the responsibility for managing human intelligence activities across the DoD, including those activities undertaken by the military intelligence agencies. Do you believe that DIA should, in both its Title 10 and Title 50 roles, have the authority and ability to manage, direct, and oversee all DoD human intelligence and counterintelligence activities?

Yes. I believe that current DIA authorities are sufficient to allow the agency to manage the Defense HUMINT Enterprise, in both its Title 10 and Title 50 roles. Working with the Secretary of Defense, I look forward to ensuring that our warfighters have what they need in resources, manpower, and training to achieve their mission.

Privacy and Civil Liberties

QUESTION 52: Section 102A(f)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 3024(f)(4)) provides that the DNI "shall ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States by the [CIA] and shall ensure such compliance by other elements of the [IC] through the host executive departments that manage the programs and activities that are part of the National Intelligence Program."

A. What are the most important subjects concerning compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States that the DNI should address in fulfilling this responsibility?

The DNI's responsibility to ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States involves addressing several critical areas. First, safeguarding civil liberties is paramount, particularly in the context of intelligence activities and other collection authorities. Ensuring that surveillance programs are conducted with robust oversight, adhere to statutory and constitutional protections, and respect privacy rights is essential. Compliance with minimization and targeting procedures, as well as proper handling of U.S. Person information, must remain a top priority.

Second, the DNI must focus on preventing and addressing unauthorized disclosures, improper classification, or misuse of intelligence authorities. This includes ensuring lawful whistleblower protections and fostering a culture of accountability within the IC. Additionally, the DNI must prioritize adherence to laws governing covert actions, counterterrorism, and cybersecurity, ensuring that all activities are consistent with domestic and international legal obligations. If confirmed, I will emphasize transparency, rigorous oversight, and collaboration with Congress to uphold these principles and maintain public trust in the IC.

B. What do you understand to be the obligation of the DNI to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed about matters relating to compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States?

The DNI has a clear statutory obligation under the National Security Act of 1947 to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed about all significant intelligence activities and matters, including compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States. This responsibility includes providing timely notification of significant intelligence activities, such as covert actions, compliance incidents, or violations of laws, policies, or civil liberties. This obligation is critical to maintaining accountability, fostering trust, and ensuring that the IC operates lawfully and transparently.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB)

QUESTION 53: If confirmed, will you ensure that the IC fully cooperates with the PCLOB, both with regard to the Board's formal reviews and its informal exchanges with the IC? Will you commit to ensuring that the PCLOB is provided

full access to any information it requests?

Yes. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board provides a critical oversight function to advise on and review the efforts of the IC and law enforcement to combat terrorism while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of every American. If confirmed, I will ensure the PCLOB gets the support it needs to execute its critical oversight functions consistent with the law.

Security Executive Agent

The DNI is designated by law to serve as the U.S. government's Security Executive Agent.

QUESTION 54: What is your view of the effectiveness of the governance framework for personnel and credentialing vetting reform established by the OMB-led Performance Accountability Council?

The governance framework for personnel and credentialing vetting reform established by the OMB-led Performance Accountability Council (PAC) has been an important step in modernizing and improving the security clearance process. Its focus on integrating personnel vetting across the federal government through the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative has made progress in streamlining clearance procedures, reducing backlogs, and introducing continuous vetting mechanisms.

However, there is room for improvement. The PAC's effectiveness could be enhanced by increasing interagency collaboration to address persistent issues like clearance reciprocity and standardization of adjudication criteria. Additionally, the framework could benefit from a greater emphasis on leveraging advanced technologies to further modernize and automate the process. If confirmed, I would work within this governance structure to ensure that reforms continue to prioritize efficiency, fairness, and adaptability, while safeguarding national security.

QUESTION 55: Do you believe the Trusted Workforce 2.0 personnel vetting reforms are prudently scoped? Would you seek to modify them? How would you accelerate reforms?

If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the current state of Trusted Workforce 2.0 to determine whether it is prudently scoped or if additional modifications are required.

QUESTION 56: How would you improve reciprocity in the recognition of clearances across the government?

If confirmed, I look forward to assessing the current process to determine what and where improvements need to be made. Standardized clearance policies and procedures, streamlined data sharing, continuous vetting, and accountability are essential tenets of an efficient system.

QUESTION 57: What are your views on the interagency security clearance process? If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you seek to make to this process?

The interagency security clearance process is essential for safeguarding national security, but it faces challenges related to efficiency, reciprocity, and adapting to evolving workforce needs. While significant progress has been made with initiatives like Trusted Workforce 2.0, further reforms are needed to streamline the process and ensure timely and consistent adjudications across agencies.

If confirmed, I would prioritize greater reciprocity to reduce duplicative investigations for individuals moving between agencies, accelerating onboarding and retaining talent. I would also focus on expanding the use of continuous vetting and leveraging advanced technologies to modernize and automate the process.

QUESTION 58: If confirmed, what steps will you take to reduce the time it takes to process security clearances for new hires?

If confirmed, I will prioritize reducing security clearance processing times by accelerating the adoption of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 framework, which incorporates continuous vetting and automated tools to streamline investigations. Leveraging advanced technologies to automate routine checks, improving clearance reciprocity across agencies, and ensuring adequate resources for investigative agencies will be central to these efforts. Additionally, I commit to establishing clear metrics to monitor progress, identify bottlenecks, and enhance accountability.

QUESTION 59: What priority will you give to security clearance reform, and how will that be reflected in ODNI's efforts as a whole?

If confirmed, security clearance reform will be a top priority, as an efficient, fair, and modernized clearance process is essential to ensuring the IC attracts and retains the best talent while safeguarding national security. Reform efforts will focus on improving timeliness, reducing backlogs, enhancing reciprocity among agencies, and aligning clearance policies with evolving societal norms and workforce needs.

QUESTION 60: Do you believe that cannabis use should ever be the basis for denying an individual eligibility for access to classified information?

Decisions regarding security clearances must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the individual's overall judgment, reliability, and ability to safeguard classified information.

As cannabis laws evolve at the state level, the IC must balance adherence to federal law with an understanding of societal changes. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that security clearance determinations are fair, consistent, and aligned with national security needs while appropriately considering individual circumstances.

National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF)

QUESTION 61: The NIPF guides priorities for the IC. Do you believe there is adequate interagency participation in the development of the President's Intelligence Priorities? How would you change or update the current procedures?

If confirmed, I look forward to overseeing development of the NIPF. I am not aware of any specific concerns regarding the functioning of the process and commit to ensuring that the system is effective and responsive in accordance with E.O. 12333 and ICD 204 as written.

Whistleblowers & The IC Inspector General

QUESTION 62: Do you support a strong Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (ICIG) to provide independent oversight for the IC? Will you ensure that the Office of the ICIG is resourced and staffed in accordance with the ICIG's requests?

Yes.

QUESTION 63: If confirmed, how would you ensure the IC's IGs maintain their independence?

The IC's IGs independence is essential to ensure oversight and accountability in the IC. I will empower the IG and ensure that all subordinate leaders understand that cooperation is mandatory and essential, regardless of the political or institutional implications of any audits or investigations. I will have the IG lead training and outreach to the workforce to ensure they are aware of the options and services available to them through the IG.

QUESTION 64: Do you support the statutory rights of whistleblowers and intend to honor the anonymity of whistleblowers who come forward? Are there aspects of the IC whistleblower statute with which you disagree?

The protection of whistleblowers is essential in ensuring an ethical and accountable IC and any perceived lack thereof will have detrimental impacts on the willingness of others to step forward. If confirmed, I intend to ensure compliance with all legal protections for whistleblowers.

QUESTION 65: If a whistleblower follows the law in seeking to report a matter to Congress under the IC Whistleblower Protection Act, will you commit to ensuring his or her submission is delivered to Congress within seven days, as the law requires?

Yes.

QUESTION 66: Will you commit, if confirmed, to protect the identity of IC whistleblowers who seek to remain anonymous?

Yes, if confirmed, I will prioritize strict adherence to statutory protections for whistleblowers and ensure robust policies and practices are in place to prevent unauthorized disclosures of their identities.

QUESTION 67: IC whistleblowers have the statutory right to provide their complaints directly to Congress. The law states that whistleblowers must obtain from the DNI, through the IC IG, "direction on how to contact the congressional intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate security practices." Do you agree that this provision does not permit the DNI to deny that direct access to

Congress altogether?

I agree. If confirmed, I commit the Office of Director of National Intelligence and myself to the highest standards of moral, ethical, and legal conduct in all aspects. I will not deny the IC IG or whistleblowers direct access to Congress.

QUESTION 68: Do you believe the subject of a complaint, even if the subject is the President, should be told about the complaint? If so, under what circumstances?

If confirmed, I would work to uphold a fair, secure, and transparent whistleblower process to balance the need for accountability with the protection of individuals and processes. There may be circumstances where the subject of the complaint must be informed, such as when it becomes necessary for due process during an official inquiry or investigation. In such cases, the disclosure should occur only at an appropriate stage, under strict safeguards to protect the whistleblower, maintain the integrity of the investigation, and ensure accountability.

QUESTION 69: Do you believe Edward Snowden is a lawful whistleblower whose disclosures were in the public interest?

The DNI must be apolitical and has no role in determining whether or not Edward Snowden is a lawful whistleblower. As DNI, I will defer to the policymakers and the Department of Justice to make these determinations.

QUESTION 70: In 2020 you introduced a resolution, H. Res. 1162, calling for the government to drop all charges against Edward Snowden. Do you still support dropping all charges against Edward Snowden? Have your views changed? Please explain.

The DNI is an apolitical role that has no place in determining Edward Snowden's legal future. If confirmed, the Department of Justice will be responsible for determining whether or not Snowden's charges will be dropped.

QUESTION 71: Do you support IC employees disclosing classified information outside the process established by the IC Whistleblower Protection Act or other authorized means?

No. My understanding is that existing protections provided by IC Whistleblower Protection Act provide the means for IC employees and IC contractors to address legal and ethical concerns they have been unable to resolve internally.

Anomalous Health Incidents

QUESTION 72: Do you commit to taking a fresh look and an objective approach to the question of whether anomalous health incidents (AHIs) can be attributed to a foreign actor and deliberate external mechanism?

If confirmed, I would prioritize a renewed coordination of efforts across the IC, scientific community, and relevant government agencies to thoroughly assess the causes of AHIs. The great Americans within the IC who have been impacted by AHIs deserve nothing less. This includes reviewing existing findings, addressing gaps in knowledge, and pursuing innovative methods to identify potential external mechanisms. Transparency with Congress and affected personnel will also be a priority, ensuring accountability and support for those impacted while maintaining national security.

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate intelligence Committee reports released in December of 2024 shed light on potentially troubling issues associated with the IC's analytical integrity regarding AHIs. If confirmed, I am committed to conducting a full review of the IC's approach towards investigating AHIs and providing a subsequent analysis to this committee.

QUESTION 73: Do you commit to providing the congressional intelligence committees with ongoing and timely written and verbal updates on any IC analysis concerning AHIs as well as any specific inquiries on the topic from this Committee?

Yes, If confirmed I am committed to ensuring you have the most accurate and up to date information.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) permits the government to conduct targeted surveillance of terrorists and other foreign

adversaries who are located outside the United States. Unless Congress acts, Title VII of FISA, including Section 702, will expire on April 20, 2026.

QUESTION 74: Please describe your understanding of the value of Section 702, including to the President's Daily Brief.

Collection of foreign intelligence on non-US persons in foreign countries under 702 is used as a basis for a significant amount of reporting included in the President's Daily Brief. It is an essential national security tool that cannot be replicated elsewhere. Its use and implementation must continue to be carefully balanced to ensure protections of Americans' civil liberties.

QUESTION 75: Do you support the reauthorization of Section 702?

Section 702 provides unique and essential capabilities for gathering foreign intelligence of non-US persons in foreign countries that cannot be replicated by other means. Reauthorization must be accompanied by an assessment of existing civil liberties protections, and any additional reforms needed to ensure privacy, transparency, and oversight to maintain public trust and ensure compliance with constitutional principles.

QUESTION 76: What amendments, if any, to Section 702 or other provisions of FISA do you believe are necessary?

Amendments to Section 702 or other provisions of FISA should focus on enhancing transparency, oversight, and accountability while maintaining the IC's ability to protect national security effectively. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with Congress and oversight bodies to support implementation and reforms that balance operational effectiveness with accountability, civil liberties protection and public trust.

QUESTION 77: The Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA) amended FISA to enhance the collection of foreign intelligence concerning the "international production, distribution, or financing of illicit synthetic drugs, opioids, cocaine, or other drugs driving overdose deaths, or precursors of any aforementioned." Do you support this amendment? What are your views on how this amendment will support the IC's counternarcotics mission?

Yes. This amendment addresses the urgent and growing threat posed by synthetic drugs, opioids, and other substances that are fueling the unprecedented number of

overdose deaths in the United States. This provision strengthens our ability to combat one of the nation's most pressing public health and security crises.

This amendment will significantly bolster the IC's counternarcotics mission by providing the necessary tools to track and disrupt the global supply chains of drug cartels and their financial networks. It will improve our understanding of the sources of precursors, production facilities, and distribution channels, enabling more effective coordination with domestic law enforcement and international partners. If confirmed, I would ensure this authority is implemented responsibly, with rigorous oversight, to maximize its effectiveness while safeguarding privacy and civil liberties.

QUESTION 78: The FBI's use of U.S. Person queries was the subject of debate during RISAA's drafting and reauthorization. As a result, RISAA enacted many reforms on query procedures and requirements. What is your position on whether warrants should be required before an agency undertakes a U.S. Person query?

U.S. Person queries should be conducted in a manner that balances the need to protect national security with safeguarding the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens. Warrants should generally be required before an agency undertakes a U.S. Person query of FISA Section 702 data, except in exigent circumstances, such as imminent threats to life or national security. This warrant requirement strengthens the IC by ensuring queries are targeted and justified.

If confirmed as DNI, I will fulfill my oversight responsibilities and assess the implementation of RISAA reforms on query procedures and requirements, and report to Congress with any questions, concerns, or inputs that arise.

QUESTION 79: If a U.S. Person's selector is queried against FISA Section 702 information, and it reveals terrorist connections, what additional steps do the IC and Department of Justice need to take before they can target the U.S. Person's communications?

Additional steps that ensure compliance with U.S. law and constitutional protections before targeting the U.S. Person's communications include:

1. Probable Cause Determination: Under FISA, the IC and DOJ must establish probable cause that the U.S. Person is an agent of a foreign power or engaged in international terrorism. This determination must be supported by credible and detailed evidence.

- 2. FISA Court Approval: The DOJ must submit an application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), including affidavits detailing the probable cause and the specific justification for targeting the U.S. Person. The Court must approve the application before any targeting can occur.
- 3. Compliance with Minimization Procedures: The IC must ensure that targeting complies with FISA's minimization procedures to limit the retention, dissemination, and use of non-relevant information about the U.S. Person.
- 4. Coordination and Oversight: All actions must involve close coordination between the IC, DOJ, and oversight bodies to ensure the proposed targeting is lawful, narrowly tailored, and proportionate to the threat.

QUESTION 80: There is a lot of misinformation about incidental collection as it pertains to FISA Section 702. Please clarify this term and discuss its importance to national security.

Under FISA Section 702, incidental collection refers to the unintentional acquisition of communications involving U.S. Persons or entities during the lawful surveillance of non-U.S. Persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. This can occur when a U.S. Person communicates with a foreign individual who is the intended target of the surveillance.

QUESTION 81: Please describe the extent of oversight mandated to ensure that the IC is compliant with FISA procedures and requirements.

In short, robust oversight of compliance must be conducted by relevant IC agencies, ODNI, DOJ, the FISC and Congress to ensure that Americans civil liberties are protected. ODNI and DOJ must conduct regular and comprehensive joint oversight over Section 702, and hold accountable those who not in compliance. Every identified incident of noncompliance must be reported to Congress.

QUESTION 82: When you were a member of the House of Representatives you voted against reauthorization of Section 702. You also introduced legislation, H.R. 8970 (Protect Our Civil Liberties Act), which would have repealed Section 702. As recently as last year you have expressed opposition to the statute. Do you still

oppose the reauthorization of Section 702 of FISA? Have your views changed? Please explain.

My views and legislative record reflect my longstanding commitment to both national security and the protection of Americans' civil liberties, and drawing attention to the importance of protecting Americans Fourth Amendment rights. My concerns have consistently focused on the actual or potential for abuse and insufficient safeguards to protect Americans' constitutionally guaranteed rights. I understand that significant reforms and safeguards have since been put in place with the intent of protecting Americans civil liberties.

Section 702 is a critical tool to collect foreign intelligence on non-US persons overseas to identify foreign threats and support its continued use to secure our country. If confirmed as DNI, I would ensure that Section 702 is implemented with the highest degree of accountability, transparency, and compliance with legal and ethical standards, and ensure that the safeguards and reforms in place are being implemented effectively, upholding the Constitution and maintaining the trust of the American people. I would prioritize working with Congress to implement these reforms and oversee their enforcement within the IC. This approach would balance the IC's operational needs with the fundamental rights of U.S. citizens, ensuring both national security and constitutional principles are upheld.

QUESTION 83: If confirmed as DNI, you will be required to submit annual certifications to the FISA Court under Section 702 or collection pursuant to that statute will cease. If confirmed, will you submit these certifications?

Yes.

QUESTION 84: You have previously described the FISA Court as a "rubber stamp." Do you still believe the FISA Court is a rubber stamp? Have your views changed? Please explain.

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the FISA process operates with the highest degree of integrity, balancing the IC's operational needs with the protection of American's constitutional rights and civil liberties.

My previous statements were a reflection of deep concerns about transparency, accountability, and oversight in the FISA process, particularly in light of documented abuses. At the time, I was troubled by revelations of systemic issues,

including improper applications and insufficient safeguards to protect civil liberties.

Historically, the FISA Court has approved the vast majority of surveillance applications submitted by the government, without a civil liberties advocate or amicus presence/input, leading to concerns that it lacked sufficient rigor in scrutinizing those requests. Investigations such as the 2019 Department of Justice Inspector General Report, revealed significant errors and omissions in FISA applications, including instances where critical exculpatory information was withheld. These issues highlighted vulnerabilities in the process that could allow government overreach or abuse of surveillance authorities. The classified nature of the FISA Court's proceedings made it difficult for Congress and the public to assess its effectiveness as a check on government surveillance.

I understand that reforms and improvements have since been implemented to try to address concerns about civil liberties protections. Measures enacted following the DOJ Inspector General's findings have enhanced the FISA process by increasing transparency and accountability. Ongoing vigilance to ensure we maintain our national security intelligence collection tools while also upholding Americans constitutional rights is essential.

Referenced Report Source: https://oig.justice.gov/press/2019/2019-12-09.pdf

FBI Background Investigations

QUESTION 85: Should the FBI conduct background investigations of all Presidential nominees for positions within the executive branch of the federal government to ensure that those under consideration for positions of significant authority and responsibility will not misuse the power of their offices and do not have vulnerabilities that make them susceptible to coercion by our adversaries?

My understanding aligns closely with how former Director Ratcliffe has characterized the issue during his confirmation for CIA Director. I believe there should be appropriate vetting of cabinet nominees, but I am not in a position to comment on the necessity of background investigations for all presidential nominees across the executive branch.

QUESTION 86: Have you undergone, or will you undergo, an FBI background investigation as part of the process associated with your nomination?

Yes, I am undergoing an FBI background investigation as part of my nomination process.

QUESTION 87: Do you agree to provide the results of your FBI background investigation to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of this Committee for review?

I have no objection to providing the results of my FBI background investigation to the Chair and Vice Chairman of this Committee for review, however, the ultimate decision to do so will be made by the incoming White House.

Workforce Protection

QUESTION 88: Will you commit that, if confirmed, you will seek to recruit, attract, and retain a workforce based on principles of fairness and merit, and without consideration of personal political preferences?

Yes. This commitment is fundamental to upholding the integrity, professionalism, and nonpartisan nature of the IC.

QUESTION 89: Do you commit to consider professional qualifications in personnel decisions exclusively, without consideration of partisan or political factors?

Yes.

QUESTION 90: Would you ever consider an individual's personal political preferences, to include "loyalty" to the President, in making personnel decisions, such as to hire, fire, or promote an individual?

No.

QUESTION 91: If confirmed, what assurances will you provide to the IC workforce that personnel decisions will be based exclusively on professional qualifications, performance, and needs and not on personal political preferences?

If confirmed, I will provide clear and unequivocal assurances to the IC workforce that all personnel decisions will be based solely on <u>professional qualifications</u>, <u>performance</u>, <u>and the operational needs of the IC</u>, without regard to personal

political preferences or perceived loyalty to any individual or administration. The IC operates on the principles of objectivity, integrity, and independence, and ensuring that personnel decisions are free from political influence is essential to upholding these values. The IC must function as a trusted, nonpartisan entity dedicated to advancing U.S. national security interests, and this trust starts with the individuals who serve within it.

QUESTION 92: If you receive credible allegations that IC employees or others in the executive branch are seeking to fire or force out IC employees because of their perceived political views or loyalty to the President, will you commit to informing the congressional intelligence committees and immediately stopping such efforts?

Yes. Targeting IC employees for their political views fundamentally undermines the integrity, independence, and professionalism of the IC and threaten its ability to carry out its mission objectively and effectively.

QUESTION 93: Will you impose a political litmus test for IC employees? Is a political litmus test ever appropriate in determining who can or should work in the IC?

No. The IC must be apolitical to fulfill its essential national security function. Violating these principles would contravene ethical obligations and erode the foundational values of the IC. In addition, the DNI and IC leadership are bound by laws and regulations that prohibit discrimination based on political beliefs.

Classification & Declassification

QUESTION 94: In a May 2020 report the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) found that "[t]here is widespread, bipartisan recognition that the Government classifies too much information for too long, at great and unnecessary cost to taxpayers. This problem is getting worse, as the volume of classified information grows at an increasing rate. Current policies, practices, and technologies for managing classified information must be modernized for the digital age." Do you agree with the PIDB's findings? If confirmed, what steps will you take to reform the classification system?

I agree with the PIDB's findings. Overclassification undermines transparency, burdens taxpayers, and complicates information sharing within the government. If

confirmed, I would prioritize reforms to modernize classification policies, practices, and technologies to reflect the realities of the digital age.

Classification guidelines must be updated to reduce ambiguity, declassification processes need to be streamlined, and advanced technologies like artificial intelligence must be leveraged to manage, review, and declassify information more efficiently. I would also mandate initial and periodic training programs to ensure guidelines are clearly understood and implemented to prevent overclassification, implement stronger oversight mechanisms to audit classification practices, and enhance public trust through proactive and timely declassification of historically or publicly significant materials. By taking these steps, we can balance national security requirements with the need for transparency and accountability.

QUESTION 95: Please explain your understanding of Section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 3024(g)(1)(G)), which directs the DNI to establish and implement guidelines for the classification of information, and for other purposes.

A. If confirmed, how would you implement this section of the law?

If confirmed, I would ensure clear and consistent guidelines for the classification of information to ensure it protects national security without promoting overclassification or misuse. This would ensure classification standards align with statutory requirements, providing detailed criteria for each classification level, and require clear justification for classification decisions. I would also mandate regular training for personnel with classification authority, emphasizing the importance of avoiding overclassification and ensuring proper declassification procedures are followed.

I would ensure robust oversight mechanisms are in place, including audits of classification practices, and address patterns of misuse through corrective actions. Proactive declassification of information no longer requiring protection would enhance transparency and public trust in the IC. Collaboration with other agencies to standardize classification practices would further improve consistency and coordination across the IC.

B. What approach would you take to the systematic review and declassification of information in a manner consistent with national security, including the annual disclosure of aggregate intelligence appropriations?

If confirmed, I would take a systematic and proactive approach to the review and declassification of information, prioritizing public trust and transparency while safeguarding national security. This would include establishing clear criteria and guidelines for declassification decisions, prioritizing materials of significant public or historical relevance. Leveraging advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence, could streamline the review process and assist in managing the large volume of classified information efficiently, ensuring timely and consistent decisions. Additionally, I would prioritize the annual disclosure of aggregate intelligence appropriations, providing clear explanations to enhance accountability while protecting sensitive budgetary details.

Collaboration with other government agencies would ensure a unified approach to declassification, particularly for information involving multiple stakeholders. Engaging with historians, academics, and civil society would help identify areas of high public interest or historical value, fostering greater trust in the IC's efforts. By combining transparency with rigorous safeguards, this approach would reinforce public confidence in the IC while protecting the nation's most sensitive information.

QUESTION 96: How would you work to prevent the abuse of classification authorities?

Preventing the abuse of classification authorities is essential to maintaining transparency, accountability, and public trust in the IC. E.O. 12958 provides clear direction for classification prohibitions and limitations that, if confirmed, I commit to enforcing to the full extent of my authorities. I would support strengthened oversight and accountability mechanisms to ensure oversight of classification decisions, to ensure classified information meets the criteria of protecting national security and considering the public interest per the Principles of Intelligence Transparency.

National Security Threats and Challenges Facing the IC

QUESTION 97: What in your view are the principal threats to national security with which the IC must concern itself in the next five years? In the next twenty years?

The IC must be prepared to address an array of challenges in the next five years, the most pressing of which includes: domestic threats of Islamist terrorism, sleeper cells, and the effects of the influx of millions of unknown illegal immigrants on our domestic security; strategic competition with countries like China and Russia; global economic challenges; cybersecurity threats from state and non-state actors; nuclear weapons development by North Korea and Iran getting closer to nuclear capability; and persistent threats posed by international organized crime and narcotic syndicates — exacerbated by the ongoing border crisis. Emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology, afford both opportunities and challenges, necessitating robust innovation and regulation.

Over the next two decades, the global race for technological supremacy will become a defining feature of international security. Advancements in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, autonomous systems, and space exploration will reshape the geopolitical landscape. Concurrently, the proliferation of advanced weapons, including hypersonics and bioweapons, will test traditional deterrence and defense strategies. Space and cyber domains will emerge as key battlegrounds, demanding innovative strategies to secure U.S. interests. The continued spread of radical Islamist ideology around the world and threats from Islamist terrorists who seek to establish a global caliphate continues to threaten security and freedom.

To address these challenges, the IC must remain agile, proactive, and forward-looking. Investments in cutting-edge technology, deep regional expertise, and strong partnerships with allies, partners and private-sector stakeholders will be critical. By focusing on innovation, resilience, and adaptability, the IC can ensure it remains prepared to fulfill its core function in providing timely, accurate, objective reporting to the President and policy makers to ensure the safety, security and freedom of the American people today and in the future.

QUESTION 98: What are the highest priority questions that the IC should address in its intelligence collection activities and analytic assessments?

The highest priority questions that the IC should address in its collection activities and assessments focus on safeguarding national security, supporting informed policymaking, and addressing emerging and long-term threats. If confirmed as DNI, I will assess where gaps in our intelligence exist and begin to deploy assets to address them. I will further review IC policies, resource allocations, planning, training, and programs and make changes where appropriate.

QUESTION 99: In your opinion, how has the IC performed in adjusting its policies, resource allocations, planning, training, and programs to address these threats? How will you further adjust?

If confirmed, I will assess current policies, resources, planning, training, and program's ability to address evolving near and long-term threats. I will assess where adjustments are needed to ensure resources are aligned with the most pressing threats, expand expertise in existing and emerging domains where gaps exist, and maintain flexibility to respond to unexpected developments. I would prioritize restoring public trust in the IC by ensuring mission focus on our core national security task and our oath to uphold the Constitution, empowering our collectors and analysts to support the President and policymakers' national security priorities. I will strengthen collaboration and integration across agencies, continually evaluating the IC's posture and performance to ensure it remains proactive and effective in safeguarding national security.

The People's Republic of China

QUESTION 100: How do you view the threat from the People's Republic of China (PRC)?

The U.S.-China relationship is complex and multifaceted encompassing military, economic, technological, and ideological dimensions that create challenges, threats, and opportunities to advance U.S. interests and global stability. One of the most concerning threats is China's recent Salt Typhoon cyberattack, and recent hacking of the U.S. Treasury Department. Both highlight the vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructure that must be urgently addressed, as well as China's sophisticated cyber capabilities and efforts to gather sensitive government data. Addressing this threat requires enhanced cybersecurity measures, strengthened intelligence collection, and closer collaboration with the private sector and international partners to counter these threats and protect our national security. If confirmed as DNI, I would prioritize providing timely, relevant, and objective intelligence that will provide the President and policymakers with the information necessary to make best informed decisions that prioritize what is best for the American people and U.S. security.

QUESTION 101: What do you believe U.S. policy priorities should be toward the PRC?

As nominee for Director of National Intelligence, my role is not to dictate specific policy terms or priorities, but to ensure the President and policymakers have access to the most timely, accurate and objective intelligence to inform their decisions. If confirmed, I will assess where gaps in the operational environment exist, and ensure the IC is appropriately utilizing resources to fill said gaps. I believe China is and will continue to be the greatest national security threat and policymakers need to have a full, comprehensive picture of the environment, and potential effects of proposed U.S. policies and actions.

QUESTION 102: On April 24, 2024 the President signed the bipartisan Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act into law. The Act prohibits the distribution or maintenance of "foreign adversary controlled applications" and effectively requires PRC divestment from TikTok. The law was recently upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

In connection with that litigation, the ODNI assessed that "TikTok pose[s] a potential threat to U.S. national security." Do you agree with ODNI's assessment? Why or why not?

I will withhold any statement until reviewing the raw intelligence and analysis ODNI used as the basis for its assessment. If confirmed as DNI, I would ensure the IC provides ongoing intelligence assessments of foreign adversary-controlled technologies to inform balanced and effective policymaking.

QUESTION 103: Last year, you expressed opposition to the bipartisan Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act. Do you still oppose this legislation? Have your views changed? Please explain.

My statements from last year on the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act were rooted in balancing security concerns with the preservation of American citizen's constitutional rights, innovation, and economic competitiveness. The Act, as introduced, granted sweeping authority to allow the government to inhibit Americans First Amendment rights by restricting or banning applications and technologies without clear criteria or robust safeguards to ensure transparency and accountability. My concern was this could lead to unintended consequences, including negative impacts on American businesses, restrictions on

Americans' free expression, and overreach in targeting applications without sufficient definition of or evidence of harm.

If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to provide unbiased evidence-based assessments to ensure the President and policymakers are best informed to make decisions that fulfill our collective responsibility of safeguarding our country and upholding the constitutional rights and freedoms of all Americans.

QUESTION 104: How would you allocate staff and budget resources to support the effort to counter PRC influence, both globally and inside the United States?

If confirmed, I will ensure that the Intelligence Community has the resources necessary to provide with the President and policymakers with timely, accurate and relevant reporting on China's influence efforts to best inform decisions to protect the safety, security and freedom of the American people.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict

QUESTION 105: Should the U.S. continue to provide weapons and other lethal and non-lethal support to Ukraine?

As nominee for Director of National Intelligence, my role is not to dictate specific policy terms but to ensure the President and policymakers have access to the most accurate and most objective intelligence to guide their decisions. If confirmed as DNI, my focus will be on providing the President and decision-makers with clear, actionable intelligence to assess the feasibility and risks of any proposed actions.

QUESTION 106: What do you believe U.S. policy priorities should be toward Russia?

President Trump has stated that one of his top foreign policy priorities is to end the dangerous and disastrous war between Russia and Ukraine. If confirmed as DNI, my priority would be to ensure that the President has the critical information he needs to support his efforts to get Russia and Ukraine to end the war and get to the negotiating table. My role as DNI would be to arm the President and other national security policy makers with critical information and analysis that accurately illuminates the plans and intentions of Russia so the President can effectively carry out his agenda.

QUESTION 107: What is your view of the reliability of information published on the Russian state-news site, Russia Today (RT)?

RT News is a propaganda arm of the Russian state government and is not a reliable source of objective news reporting.

QUESTION 108: You have made statements calling to end the conflict between Russia and Ukraine through a negotiated agreement. Please describe the terms of the agreement you envision that would bring an end to the conflict.

President Trump campaigned on the promise of conducting negotiations that will finally end this bloody, costly war and has stated this is one of his top priorities. As nominee for Director of National Intelligence, my role is not to dictate specific policy terms but to ensure the President and policymakers have access to the most timely, accurate and objective intelligence to best guide their negotiations and decisions and assess the feasibility and risks of any proposed terms.

Syria

QUESTION 109: Following the ouster of Bashar al-Assad, a number of factions are vying for control of Syria. What do you believe U.S. policy priorities should be toward Syria?

As nominee for Director of National Intelligence, my role is not to dictate specific policy terms or priorities, but to ensure policymakers have access to the most timely, accurate, and objective intelligence to inform their decisions.

However, President Trump was elected largely because of his America First vision, and policy priorities toward Syria should focus on U.S. national security interests. If confirmed, I would prioritize our intelligence capabilities in Syria to ensure President Trump is well armed with accurate, on-the-ground intelligence to help him inform his policies.

QUESTION 110: Do you support the continued presence of U.S. forces in Syria?

If confirmed, I would prioritize providing the President and policymakers with accurate and timely intelligence on conditions in Syria to support informed decision-making regarding the U.S. role in the region. The presence of U.S. forces

in Syria or any country should be driven by whether their presence serves U.S. national security interests.

QUESTION 111: In 2018 the Trump Administration put out a statement that that "The United States assesses with confidence that the Syrian regime used chemical weapons in the eastern Damascus suburb of Duma on April 7, 2018, killing dozens of men, women, and children, and severely injuring hundreds more." As recently as 2024, the IC continued to assess that Syria, under Bashar al-Assad, used chemical weapons. Do you believe these assessments? Why or why not?

As the nominee for Director of National Intelligence, I place significant weight on the rigorous analytic processes and tradecraft employed by the IC, and recognize the importance of creating a culture within ODNI where differing or dissenting views on assessments are welcomed to ensure the highest level of confidence in IC reporting to the President and policymakers.

To my knowledge, there have been five OPCW investigations/reports on Chemical Attacks in Syria. I previously questioned the findings of two specific attacks, one of which was in Duma on April 7, 2018. The IC's assessment at the time was high confidence-low information and warranted further examination. The evidence released at that time by world-renowned expert at MIT, Dr. Theodore Postol, suggested that the Duma attack may have been staged by anti-regime forces in the hopes it would draw the US and West deeper into the war against the regime. Looking at the totality of the limited information available, calling for more evidence and further investigation was the prudent thing to do.

Like many Americans, I enlisted in the Army because the attack on 9/11 and deployed to Iraq in 2005. At that time, I had faith in our leaders and intel agencies, believing their claims and "intelligence" that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and that he was supporting al-Qaeda who could potentially access those WMDs. We later learned that the so-called intelligence they referenced was manufactured to support a war that President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney were trying to sell to the American people and the world. This led to the deaths of thousands of my brothers and sisters in uniform, the deaths of millions of Iraqis, millions of refugees, the rise of ISIS, and Iran's current dominating presence and influence in Iraq.

These failures were formative for me and for many who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. It caused us to have a healthy skepticism, not accept what we are told at face value, and to ask tough questions in the pursuit of facts and the truth,

especially when what we are being told is being used to justify an act of war. The question was never about whether I "believe" the IC assessment of the Douma chemical attack. Instead, it is about ensuring the President and policymakers have access to a thorough examination of the intelligence, evidence and assessments available so they are equipped to make best informed decisions.

If confirmed as DNI, I would encourage a culture where tough questions, scrutiny, and challenging of assumptions is welcome, to uphold confidence in the assessments being provided to the President and policymakers, ensuring the highest standards of accuracy and integrity in reporting.

Iran

QUESTION 112: What do you believe U.S. policy priorities should be toward Iran?

As DNI-designate, U.S. policy priorities toward Iran should focus on preventing its nuclear weapons development, countering its regional activities that threaten U.S. national security interests, and deterring Iranian aggression and proxy attacks on U.S. forces. If confirmed, the Intelligence Community will provide timely, accurate, objective analysis to support the President and policymakers' decision-making to accomplish U.S. objectives.

Israel, HAMAS, and Hezbollah

QUESTION 113: What do you believe U.S. policy priorities should be with respect to the conflicts between Israel and HAMAS and Israel and Hezbollah?

As DNI-designate, U.S. policy priorities regarding the conflicts between Israel and HAMAS and Israel and Hezbollah should focus on supporting Israel's right to self-defense, supporting the defeat of Islamist terrorists, and promoting long-term conflict resolution. Both HAMAS and Hizballah are US designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. If confirmed, the Intelligence Community will provide timely, accurate, objective analysis to support the President and policymakers decision-making.

North Korea

QUESTION 114: What do you believe U.S. policy priorities should be toward North Korea?

As DNI-designate, U.S. policy priorities towards North Korea should center on our national security interests of reducing the threat posed by its nuclear weapons and missile programs. The U.S. should aim to reduce tensions, prevent conflict, and foster conditions for long-term resolution to the security challenges posed by North Korea. If confirmed, the Intelligence Community will provide timely, accurate, objective analysis to support the President and policymakers national security objectives.

QUESTION 115: North Korea continues to take provocative steps like missile testing, despite U.S. efforts to convince them to stop. Please describe your assessment of the threat North Korea presents to U.S. national security.

Having spent most of my life in the Asia-Pacific region, I have a unique understanding of the national security threat posed by North Korea's increasing missile and nuclear weapons capabilities, given my home state of Hawaii is well within their strike capabilities. The IC must provide the President and policymakers with accurate, timely, and objective assessments of North Korea's capabilities and intentions.

<u>Venezuela</u>

QUESTION 116: What do you believe U.S. policy priorities should be toward Venezuela?

As DNI-designate, I view U.S. policy priorities toward Venezuela center around ensuring that the IC provides accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence to inform and support the President and policymakers in addressing this complex and evolving crisis with a focus on safeguarding U.S. national security interests.

If confirmed, I would ensure the IC provides intelligence-based insights to policymakers on the political, economic, and security dynamics in Venezuela to inform their decision-making. The ongoing instability in Venezuela has resulted in increased illegal migration into the United States. This intelligence-driven approach will enable U.S. policymakers to make best-informed decisions around one of the Western Hemisphere's most pressing challenges.

Election Security

QUESTION 117: Do you commit to maintain detecting and preventing foreign interference in U.S. elections as a top priority for the IC?

Yes. Election-interference efforts that seek to undermine the integrity of our elections target a core Constitutional function. It is the IC's duty to provide timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence to the departments and agencies whose responsibility it is to secure our elections.

QUESTION 118: How would you ensure efforts to detect and prevent foreign interference in U.S. elections are appropriately resourced?

If confirmed, I will work with relevant counterparts across federal, state, and local agencies to detect and assess foreign interference efforts and will ensure that IC activities related to this are resourced consistent with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework. Resource sharing agreements and collaborative initiatives between the IC and relevant government organizations can amplify efforts without increasing costs.

QUESTION 119: How would you ensure our intelligence efforts on election security remain apolitical, and avoid the perception or reality of political influence?

Ensuring the integrity of our elections is a critical national priority. All intelligence efforts, including those focused on election integrity, must be apolitical. It is essential that the IC provide accurate, timely, transparent nonpartisan reporting to the President and policymakers, regardless of political party, being careful to avoid any actions that could be perceived as influencing or interfering with domestic political dynamics. All reports and assessments must be grounded in evidence and subject to rigorous peer review to ensure objectivity.

Collaboration with nonpartisan agencies and partnerships with state and local election officials would further reinforce the focus on securing the election process itself, rather than political outcomes. By upholding these principles, we can protect the integrity of our elections and bolster public trust in the intelligence community's role.

QUESTION 120: Do you commit to provide the congressional intelligence committees with complete and timely information regarding foreign threats to U.S. elections?

Yes.

QUESTION 121: Do you believe Russia, the PRC, or other foreign adversaries interfered, or attempted to interfere, in the 2016, 2020, or 2024 U.S. presidential elections in any way? If so, how?

Recent reporting released by the ODNI assesses that foreign actors have and will continue to attempt to interfere with or influence U.S. presidential elections. For example, recent reporting highlighted cyber operations targeting the campaign of President Trump in 2024.

QUESTION 122: Do you believe Russia, the PRC, or other foreign adversaries presents a continuing interference threat with respect to the U.S. political system?

Foreign efforts to interfere with or influence the U.S. political system persist. Recent unclassified intelligence assessments from the ODNI assess that foreign threat actors engage in a variety of actions in an attempt to disrupt the U.S. political process.

QUESTION 123: Do you commit to immediately notifying policymakers and the public of foreign attempts to meddle in U.S. democratic processes, to include our elections?

Yes. If confirmed, I will follow all statutory requirements to notify Congress of significant active measures or campaigns to influence American democratic processes by any foreign entity or nation.

Detention, Interrogation and Rendition

QUESTION 124: Will you commit, if confirmed, not to permit the CIA to use any interrogation technique or approach or treatment related to interrogation that is not authorized by the U.S. Army Field Manual?

Yes. If confirmed as DNI, I will commit to exercising the DNI's oversight authorities to ensure all IC elements, including the CIA, adheres strictly to the

interrogation techniques and approaches authorized by the Army Field Manual (AFM), which is aligned with U.S. law, policy, and values.

Analytic Integrity

QUESTION 125: How would you protect and improve the quality of IC analytic products?

Protecting and improving the objectivity and quality of IC analytic products is vital to the IC's mission of providing accurate, timely, and objective intelligence to the President and policymakers. Unfortunately, recent IC reports reflect that analytic objectivity is trending downward. If confirmed, I commit to identifying and working to address the cause of the downward trend and ensuring rigorous implementation of Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 and ICD 206 standards for analytic objectivity, accuracy, and timeliness, and maximizing the utility of analytic products, respectively.

QUESTION 126: Do you believe 50 U.S.C. § 3024(h) and ICD 203 (regarding analysis and analytic standards) need to be strengthened and its implementation made more vigorous? In what ways?

Not at this time. If confirmed, I look forward to examining the implementation of current statutory provisions and ICDs to determine if additional authorities are required. I believe that the foundational principles outlined in 50 U.S.C. § 3024(h) and ICD 203 remain critical to ensuring the quality, rigor, and integrity of intelligence analysis.

QUESTION 127: How do you view the importance of intelligence analysts' freedom to present their assessments objectively to decision makers in both the executive and legislative branches, regardless of what a particular policy might be, even if their assessments may be unwelcome or inconvenient?

As someone who has faithfully served in the U.S. Armed Forces for over 20 years, I have always believed in the importance of maintaining objectivity and independence in intelligence analysis, leaving politics at the door. Analytic objectivity is the cornerstone of effective intelligence. Analysts must be empowered to provide their assessments without fear of reprisal or pressure to align with policy preferences. This objectivity ensures decision-makers in both the executive and legislative branches are equipped with unvarnished facts and well-reasoned assessments. While assessments may sometimes conflict with prevailing

policies or be politically inconvenient, they serve as a critical and necessary check, fostering informed and balanced decision-making. Protecting analysts' ability to speak truth to power is fundamental to the IC's credibility and mission success.

QUESTION 128: What is your view of the place and importance of challenging existing assessments, especially when new intelligence reporting is inconsistent with such assessments?

Challenging existing assessments, especially when new intelligence reporting is presented is vital to maintaining the IC's analytic rigor, relevancy, and adaptability. Intelligence is dynamic, and as new information becomes available, it is imperative to reassess and, if necessary, revise prior judgments. If confirmed as DNI, I will foster a culture that values intellectual integrity and objectivity over groupthink and deference to consensus; a culture where constructive debate and questioning prevailing assumptions is encouraged. Structured mechanisms, such as red-teaming and peer review, can institutionalize this critical aspect of analysis while maintaining high standards of professionalism and respect.

QUESTION 129: How do you propose enhancing the IC's objectivity and independence to maintain its insulation from political influence? How would you ensure that bias among the analytic cadre does not impair their analysis?

If confirmed as DNI, I would reinforce a culture of apolitical professionalism by emphasizing that intelligence must be grounded in facts and free from political or ideological influence. This includes mandating robust training on analytic tradecraft standards in line with requirements outlined in The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) and ICD 203, such as transparency in sourcing, acknowledgment of assumptions, and rigorous exploration of alternative viewpoints. I also would ensure there are clear, trusted channels for analysts to report any perceived political interference, without fear of retaliation.

To mitigate bias among analysts, I would prioritize fostering intellectual diversity and structured debate within analytic teams. This includes implementing redteaming processes to challenge prevailing assumptions and encourage consideration of alternative hypotheses. Additionally, I would continue to support mechanisms for peer review and external oversight like the Analytic Ombuds to ensure that all analysis is scrutinized for objectivity and methodological rigor. By embedding these practices within the IC's framework, we can uphold the integrity of its assessments and provide policymakers with the unbiased intelligence needed for sound decision-making.

QUESTION 130: If confirmed, would you ever request, encourage, or support an intelligence professional's adjusting his/her assessment to avoid criticism from the White House or political appointees? Would you ever change or remove content in an intelligence assessment for political reasons, or at the behest of political leadership? Would you ever condone such actions by anyone on your staff?

No. Any attempt, by anyone in the IC, to manipulate intelligence for political purposes undermines the IC's mission, credibility, and the trust placed in it by the American people and policymakers. As I continue to do as a military officer, I would lead from the top down, ensuring that the integrity of intelligence analysis is upheld and that all personnel feel empowered to provide their assessments without political interference. I would continue to leave politics at the door and focus solely on protecting and advancing U.S. national security.

QUESTION 131: If intelligence agencies or analysts are discouraged from providing objective foreign intelligence reporting or analytic assessments, how would this harm national security?

Discouraging objective foreign intelligence reporting or analysis undermines the integrity of the IC and therefore our national security. History provides many examples of how manipulating intelligence and threat assessments can lead to misinformed policy decisions and strategic failures. It erodes trust in the intelligence community, both domestically and with allies, while fostering a culture vulnerable to politicization, groupthink, and bias. The President and policymakers depend on the IC for objective and unbiased assessments and expect that all analysis will adhere to ICD 203 and IRTPA tradecraft standards. Ensuring objectivity is essential to providing policymakers with accurate, actionable insights and maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of national security operations.

QUESTION 132: What recourse should intelligence analysts have if they believe their objective assessments have been downplayed, diminished, or overruled? How would you ensure that career IC professionals have protected channels to address their concerns that objective assessments may have been downplayed, diminished, or overruled?

Intelligence analysts must have clear, protected, and confidential channels to raise concerns when they believe their assessments have been mishandled or unduly influenced. Such recourse is critical to upholding the IC's integrity and ensuring decision-makers receive unvarnished intelligence. My understanding is that the

ODNI Analytic Ombudsman that provides this confidential, protected channel and access to counsel, arbitration, initiate inquiries into real or perceived problems of analytic tradecraft or politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objectivity in intelligence analysis. The ODNI Ombudsman works closely with the IC Inspector General who also provides protected channels where such concerns can be addressed. These Ombuds (or similarly defined individual or office) exist in every IC element.

QUESTION 133: Do you believe the DNI has an obligation to address analysts' concerns that objective assessments may have been downplayed, diminished, or overruled, because a peer or a policy maker may disagree with the analysis or conclusions being presented? Please provide examples from your career of times when you have told the truth, even when that position was uncomfortable or unpopular.

Yes. The DNI has an obligation to address analysts' concerns if objective assessments are being dismissed or altered due to disagreement or external pressures.

Throughout my years of public service in the state legislature, Honolulu City Council, eight years in Congress, and as a presidential candidate, there were many instances where I spoke the truth on domestic and foreign policy, criticizing the President and party leadership of my own party, based on principle. These statements and positions were not popular amongst my peers or the media, and many characterized my actions as "political suicide." I did not waver. Throughout my almost 22 years of service in the Army, I took actions that challenged senior leaders in my direct command when confronted with decisions that would needlessly put my troops at risk, instances of waste/fraud, or a toxic command climate that mistreated soldiers. This was not popular. While attempts to retaliate against me were made, I did not waver.

If confirmed as DNI, I would foster a culture where career intelligence professionals are supported in delivering their assessments objectively, where finding the truth and telling the truth is always the standard and mission.

QUESTION 134: How would you approach communicating IC analytic conclusions to the public if the analysis and conclusions did not align with the President's views and political objectives?

The IC provides the President and senior policymakers with analysis that is objective, apolitical, and meets IC standards of analytic integrity. If confirmed, any public disclosure decisions must consider national security interests and the need to protect sensitive sources and methods.

QUESTION 135: If confirmed, do you intend to provide, and do you intend for the IC to provide, timely and objective analysis that is independent of political considerations, based on all available sources of intelligence and implemented in accordance with analytic tradecraft standards?

Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that the IC provides timely, objective, and apolitical analysis grounded in all available intelligence sources and executed in strict adherence to analytic tradecraft standards. These principles are foundational to the IC's mission, its role in safeguarding national security, and its credibility with policymakers and the public. Upholding these standards is non-negotiable.

QUESTION 136: Is it ever appropriate for the DNI, or senior leaders in the IC, to substitute their own analytic assessments for those of career analysts? Why or why not?

No. Career analysts possess the expertise, tradecraft training, and access to intelligence necessary to produce objective, high-quality assessments. Their work undergoes rigorous peer review and is guided by standards such as ICD 203. The DNI and senior leaders play an important role in framing intelligence for policymakers and providing intelligence-based strategic guidance to support Executive decision-making, but that must not substitute the products provided by career analysts. Such actions undermine the IC's credibility, compromises decision-making, and risks politicizing intelligence. As DNI, I will uphold the standard of excellence for independent, timely, unbiased, relevant assessments that are central to the IC's mission.

QUESTION 137: Do you commit, if confirmed, to notifying the congressional intelligence committees if you, or senior leaders who are not career analysts, substitute their own analytic assessments for those of career analysts?

Yes, however, substituting senior leaders' analytic assessments over those of career analysts should not occur. If confirmed, I will ensure that it does not, and commit the Office of Director of National Intelligence, myself and all leaders in the IC to the highest standards of moral, ethical, and legal conduct in all aspects,

upholding the U.S. Constitution, working closely with the U.S. Congress, the Intelligence Community, and for the President.

Questions from Senator Warner

Political Activities

QUESTION 138: For each political action committee listed in your response to Question 15 of the Initial Questionnaire, please provide the total receipts, total disbursements for operating expenses, and total disbursements (if any) made to you personally for the years 2019-2023.

INFORMATION REDACTED

INFORMATION REDACTED

Charitable Activities

QUESTION 139: Please provide a copy of the 2023 Form 990 for We Must Protect (TIN: 86-1735485). Please list, for 2023, the total receipts, total disbursements for operating expenses, total disbursements (if any) made to you personally

INFORMATION REDACTED

Russia

QUESTION 140: Since 2005, the United States has openly provided support to Ukraine to improve biosecurity and biosafety, including to address the risks posed by the former Soviet Union's biological weapons program, which left Soviet successor states with unsecured biological materials. Following its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has spread disinformation falsely claiming that this support is used to develop biological weapons. In March 2022, you posted a video on Twitter expressing concerns about the potential compromise of U.S.-supported biolabs in

Ukraine. In that video you said, "Instead of trying to cover this up, the Biden-Harris administration needs to work with Russia, Ukraine, NATO, the U.N. to immediately implement a ceasefire for all military action in the vicinity of these labs until they're secured." What basis did you have for accusing the Biden-Harris administration of a "cover . . . up"?

My statement of concern about U.S. funded biological labs in Ukraine potentially being compromised due to the war were based on the <u>Fact Sheet released by the DoD on March 11, 2022</u> and <u>US Embassy in Ukraine's website</u> (see attached) which detail the DOD's Biological Threat Reduction Program's priorities in Ukraine "are to consolidate and secure pathogens and toxins of security concern and to continue to ensure Ukraine can detect and report outbreaks caused by dangerous pathogens before they pose security or stability threats" and "has invested approximately \$200 million in Ukraine since 2005, supporting 46 Ukrainian laboratories, health facilities, and diagnostic sites."

On <u>March 8, 2022 Senator Marco Rubio asked then Biden administration's deputy secretary of state for political affairs, Victoria Nuland,</u> in a Senate committee hearing, "Does Ukraine have chemical or biological weapons?" Ms. Nuland responded, "Ukraine has biological research facilities which, in fact, we're now quite concerned Russian troops, Russian forces may be seeking to gain control of, so we are working with the Ukrainians on how we can prevent any of those research materials from falling into the hands of Russian forces should they approach."

The existence of such bio labs was confirmed by <u>Washington Post</u>, <u>Wall Street</u> <u>Journal</u>, <u>CBS</u>, <u>CNN</u>, <u>FOX</u>, and others.

The Biden/Harris Administration knew about the existence of such labs but they did not inform the American people, likely out of concern that the American people would view their actions as irresponsible and potentially dangerous. We had just suffered through a global pandemic quite possibly caused by pathogens accidentally released from a US-funded biological lab. Rather than expressing concern for what the effect of a biological or chemical breach would have on the people, not only of Ukraine, but of the world, they chose to try to cover it up.

India

QUESTION 141: According to an October 2024 U.S. federal indictment, an "Indian government employee" directed an assassination attempt against a Sikh activist, who is U.S. citizen, in New York City in the spring of 2023, a plot foiled by U.S. law enforcement. Separately, Canadian officials have accused the Indian government of assassinating a Canadian citizen and Sikh activist, Hardeep Singh Niijar, in Canada in June 2003. What are your views on these allegations that the Indian government is targeting Sikh activists in Canada and the United States? Given these allegations, what are your views on the U.S.-India bilateral relationship, including security cooperation between the U.S. and India?

India is a vital economic and security partner in the IndoPacific. Credible allegations of any foreign country directing assassinations against U.S. citizens, especially on American soil, is a grave concern and must be investigated. The results of the investigation and intelligence must be provided to the President and policymakers so they can make the best informed decisions related to the alleged incident as well as the bilateral relationship.

Syria

QUESTION 142: In 2018, the State Department assessed publicly that the Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad was holding Austin Tice. Prior to its fall, the Syrian regime repeatedly denied this. Do you agree with the Trump Administration's assessment or with the Assad regime's denial? On what basis do you make this judgment? If confirmed, would you commit to doing everything in your power to bringing home Austin Tice and all U.S. persons wrongfully detained or held hostage abroad?

Without having any direct information or intelligence on this issue, I defer to the former Trump Administration's assessment. If confirmed as the DNI, US persons held by any foreign government illegally will be a top priority. I commit to

ensuring the IC provides the President with the tools to bring Austin Tice and every American home who has been wrongfully detained or is being held hostage abroad.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

QUESTION 143: You introduced H.R. 8970, the Protect Our Civil Liberties Act. The bill would have repealed the USA PATRIOT Act. Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act has expired.

A. Would you oppose any effort to re-codify Section 215? If not, why not?

Yes. The bulk collection of data under Section 215 raised significant concerns regarding the privacy rights of Americans and the Fourth Amendment. On March 7, 2015 a federal appeals court ruled that the bulk phone-records program created under Section 215 was illegal and "likely unconstitutional." The ruling should be upheld.

B. What other provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act would you repeal?

If confirmed, I would review current collection programs and evaluate whether other provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act pose an unacceptable risk to the civil liberties of Americans

C. The bill would have repealed the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which established Section 702 of FISA. Is it still your position that Section 702 should be repealed? If not, why not?

Section 702 of FISA should not be repealed, as it authorizes foreign surveillance of non-US persons outside of the United States. This is a critical tool for addressing national security threats. There must be oversight and safeguards in place to ensure the civil liberties and constitutional Fourth Amendment rights of American citizens are protected. If confirmed, I look forward to studying possible reforms, including requiring warrants for U.S. person queries of information collected under Section 702, to evaluate how they can be implemented without harming the IC's ability to detect foreign threats.

D. The bill included the following provision: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act [FISA], no information relating to a United States person may be acquired pursuant to this Act without a valid warrant based on probable cause." Is that still your position? If yes, please detail how this prohibition applies to incidental collection and non-content targeted collection? If this is not your current position, please explain why.

As previously answered, I believe there must be oversight and reforms of the FISA process to ensure the civil liberties and constitutional Fourth Amendment rights of American citizens are protected, such as requiring warrants for U.S. person queries of information collected through Section 702, and robust oversight mechanisms to prevent abuses and protect privacy rights.

QUESTION 144: In your book ("For Love of Country," p. 40), you wrote: "[t]hroughout the eight years I served in Congress, I worked with colleagues on both sides of the aisle on legislation to reform the Patriot Act and repeal the most egregiously unconstitutional provisions of the law." Please detail which provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act you believe are unconstitutional. What would you do if asked to conduct intelligence operations based on authorities you believe are unconstitutional?

In my view, several provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act raised significant constitutional concerns, particularly those related to Section 215, which allowed for the bulk collection of telephone metadata, and Section 213, which permitted delayed notice of search warrants. These provisions raised concerns regarding the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and the potential for overreach.

If confirmed, I would ensure that IC operations are in compliance with the Constitution and applicable laws. If asked to conduct operations based on authorities I believe to be unconstitutional, I would raise concerns with the appropriate legal advisors and seek to rectify any such issues through legal means, including working with Congress to ensure that intelligence authorities are both effective and uphold constitutional rights.

QUESTION 145: You introduced H.R. 2588, the Preventing Unconstitutional Collection Act. The bill would have limited collection under Section 702 of FISA to communications sent or received by a target, thereby prohibiting the collection of communications "about" a target. On April 28, 2017, the NSA announced that it would stop "abouts" collection under Section 702. Is it still your position that legislation is needed to formally prohibit "abouts" collection and preclude its return?

Yes. While the NSA's decision to stop "abouts" collection in 2017 was a positive step, a clear statutory prohibition would provide greater transparency, accountability, and legal certainty, ensuring that such collection practices do not resume without proper legislative oversight and safeguards.

While I recognize the importance of Section 702 as a critical tool for national security, prohibiting "abouts" collection does not diminish its effectiveness. The IC can continue to use 702 authorities – as it has since 2017 – to target the

communications of foreigners outside of the U.S. while respecting the privacy of U.S. citizens and adhering to constitutional principles.

QUESTION 146: On January 11, 2018, you gave a floor statement in which you urged colleagues to vote for the USA RIGHTS Act, an amendment to FISA Section 702 reauthorization (Amash amendment to S. 139). You stated that the amendment "maintains necessary authorities to keep the American people safe while also, simultaneously, protecting our civil liberties." The amendment would, with certain emergency and other exceptions, require a warrant for queries for U.S. persons and persons inside the United States of Section 702 data.

A. Did you support that provision and, if yes, is that still your position? It not, please explain.

If confirmed, I look forward to studying possible reforms of Section 702 to enhance the civil liberties protections of Americans, including requiring warrants for U.S. person queries of information collected under Section 702, to evaluate how they can be implemented without harming the IC's ability to detect foreign threats.

B. The amendment would have prevented reverse targeting under Section 702 by requiring a warrant when a significant purpose of the acquisition is to acquire the communication of a particular, known person reasonably believed to be located in the United States. Did you support that provision and, if yes, is that still your position? It not, please explain.

The reverse targeting of U.S. persons is prohibited under Section 702. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about how the prohibition on reverse targeting is implemented to ensure that the constitutional rights of U.S. persons are protected.

C. The amendment would have prevented the acquisition under Section 702 of communications known to be entirely domestic. Did you support that provision and, if yes, is that still your position? It not, please explain.

Yes, Section 702 only permits the targeting of the communications of foreigners outside of the United States.

D. The amendment would have prevented the introduction as evidence Section 702 collection unless related to terrorism, espionage, WMD proliferation, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure or force protection. Did you support that provision and, if yes, is that still your position? It not, please explain.

I understand that in April 2024, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA) made certain changes to how the FBI can use information obtained through Section 702. If confirmed, I look forward to studying the changes made by RISAA and evaluating whether additional reforms are necessary.

E. The amendment included reform to the FISA Court (FISC) amicus curiae, including by expanding their access to FISC records. Did you support that provision and, if yes, is that still your position? It not, please explain.

The amicus plays a critical role to improve the decision making of the FISC. I understand that in April 2024, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA) made certain changes to the use of amici in FISC proceedings. If confirmed, I look forward to studying the changes made by RISAA and evaluating whether additional reforms are necessary.

F. The amendment defined "injury in fact" for purposes of establishing standing to change Section 702. Did you support that provision and, if yes, is that still your position? It not, please explain.

I understand that in April 2024, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA) made certain changes to strengthen the penalties for misuse of FISA authorities. If confirmed, I look forward to studying the changes made by RISAA and evaluating whether additional reforms are necessary.

G. The amendment would have made it more difficult to engage in "parallel construction" for purposes of not disclosing the use of Section 702 in a criminal case. Did you support that provision and, if yes, is that still your position? It not, please explain.

I understand that in April 2024, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA) made certain changes to how the FBI can use information obtained through Section 702. If confirmed, I look forward to studying the changes made by RISAA and evaluating whether additional reforms are necessary.

G. The amendment would have established FISA Court oversight of the nature of assistance provided to the government under Section 702. It would also have required the assistance to be necessary, narrowly tailored for the necessary surveillance, and not pose an undue burden on the provider or its customers. Did you support that provision and, if yes, is that still your position? It not, please explain.

I understand that in April 2024, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA) made certain changes to the FISC's procedures. If confirmed, I look forward to studying the changes made by RISAA and evaluating whether additional reforms are necessary.

H. The amendment would have required the government to produce an estimate of the number of communications of persons inside the United States collected under Section 702. Did you support that provision and, if yes, is that still your position? It not, please explain.

I understand that in April 2024, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA) required additional reporting to Congress on Section 702, including reporting on U.S. person queries by the FBI. If confirmed, I look forward to studying the changes made by RISAA and evaluating whether additional reforms are necessary.

QUESTION 147: During his confirmation process, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers was asked about the prohibition on reverse targeting in Section 702 of FISA. He responded: "As I understand it, determining whether a particular known U.S. person has been reverse-targeted through the targeting of a Section 702 target necessitates a fact specific inquiry that would involve consideration of a variety of factors. For example, as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board noted in its 2014 report, if a Section 702 tasking resulted in substantial reporting by the Intelligence Community regarding a U.S. person, but little reporting about the Section 702 target, that might be an indication that reverse targeting may have occurred." If confirmed, how will you ensure that this fact specific analysis is applied to the nomination of Section 702 targets?

If confirmed, I will foster a culture in the IC that makes safeguarding Americans' civil liberties a top priority. When reviewing any intelligence program, I will ensure that there are serious penalties for anyone who violates the law by engaging in reverse targeting.

Executive Order 12333

QUESTION 148: You introduced H.R. 8970, the Protect Our Civil Liberties Act, which prohibits the targeting of a U.S. person for acquisition under Executive Order 12333 without a valid warrant based on probable cause. Is this still your position? If not, please explain your change in position.

I understand that EO 12333 imposes many limitations on the targeting of U.S. persons, and that FISA imposes additional restrictions on the ability of the IC to target a U.S. person under EO 12333. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the implementation of EO 12333 to ensure that privacy and civil liberties of Americans is a top priority for the IC.

QUESTION 149: Your bill, H.R. 8970, directs the Comptroller General to conduct an annual audit of intelligence collection conducted under EO 12333 to ensure compliance with the prohibition on the targeting of U.S. persons, as well as the submission to Congress of the results of those audits. Is that still your position? If not, please explain your change in position.

Yes. Keeping Congress informed is essential to protecting Americans rights and rebuilding trust after past abuses. I have not yet been briefed on GAO's current capabilities, but if I am confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the appropriate role for GAO in oversight of intelligence activities.

QUESTION 150: Attorney General approved procedures and guidelines for Executive Order 12333 are currently posted online. Do you commit to continuing to post these procedures and to making public any modifications, superseding policies and procedures, or significant interpretations?

I commit to ensuring that the IC provides appropriate transparency that enhances the public's understanding of the IC's mission; the laws, directives, authorities, and policies that govern the IC's activities; and the framework that ensures intelligence activities are conducted in accordance with applicable law.

QUESTION 151: Former NSA Director Nakasone has stated that, absent consent of the U.S. person or certain emergency situations, U.S. person queries of communications collected under Executive Order 12333 "normally must be approved by the Attorney General on a case-by-case basis after a finding of probable cause." Should the same requirement apply to the U.S. person queries of other data collected and retained under the Executive Order by other elements of the Intelligence Community? If not, why not?

I understand that the Attorney General-approved guidelines for different IC elements may vary based on the missions of those elements and the particular facts and circumstances of their activities. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Attorney General to review each IC's elements guidelines to ensure they provide robust protection for the civil liberties of Americans.

QUESTION 152: Do you believe that the Intelligence Community can or should collect U.S. location information pursuant to EO 12333 authorities? If no, how should the IC ensure that it is not collecting the information through incidental collection? If yes, should there be any limitations on the Intelligence Community's use, retention, or dissemination of the information?

The IC must comply with all applicable U.S. laws and policies regarding the collection, retention, dissemination, and use of information regarding U.S. persons. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the current laws and policies regarding location information.

QUESTION 153: Do you agree that the Intelligence Community cannot request that a foreign entity conduct any activity that it is not authorized to undertake itself? If yes, do you agree that this prohibition applies to requests from administration officials outside the Intelligence Community as well as implicit or indirect (including via public statement) requests?

Yes, I agree that the IC cannot request a foreign entity conduct an activity that the IC is prohibited to conduct itself by U.S. law.

Data purchases

QUESTION 154: Do you support the Intelligence Community's May 2024 Policy Framework for Commercially Available Information? Please elaborate on any aspects you do or not support.

If confirmed, I looked forward to reviewing the implementation of the IC's Policy Framework for Commercially Available Information.

QUESTION 156: Do you commit to keeping the Committee fully and currently informed of the Intelligence Community's procurement of, access to, or collection of Sensitive Commercially Available Information?

Yes.

QUESTION 157: Section G(2) of the Framework requires the ODNI, in coordination with relevant Intelligence Community elements, to provide a report to the public every two years regarding the Intelligence Community's access to and collection, processing, and safeguarding of Sensitive Commercially Available

Information. Do you support this requirement and do you commit to implementing it?

Yes.

Cybersecurity and privacy

QUESTION 158: In 2013, you voted against the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA). You stated at the time that, while the legislation was a "first step toward improved cyber-defense," you had "serious concerns about its lack of privacy protections." Specifically:

"The legislation did not require the private sector to remove or even minimize irrelevant personal information from the data it shares with our government or other businesses. Removing personally identifiable information must occur before it is shared with other stakeholders in the private or public sectors."

Is that still your position? In not, please explain your change in position.

Any cybersecurity legislation should ensure that data sharing between the private sector and government or other entities is done in a way that respects privacy and avoids unnecessary exposure of personal information. If confirmed, I would advocate for policies that strike an appropriate balance between enhancing cybersecurity and protecting civil liberties.

ECPA reform

QUESTION 159: In 2016, you co-sponsored, voted for and released a statement expressing strong support for H.R. 699, the Email Privacy Act. The bill would have amended the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to ensure that a warrant is required to collect the content of stored electronic communications. Is that still your position? If not, please explain your change in position.

If confirmed, I will defer to the Department of Justice regarding this issue as the legislation governs law enforcement, not the IC.

Chief of Mission authorities

QUESTION 160: 22 U.S.C. 3927 states that "Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country ... shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country...." Absent direct intervention from the President or the National Security Council, is the Intelligence Community obligated to cease intelligence activities (including, but not limited to collection activities, covert action and liaison relationships) that do not have the approval of the chief of mission?

The IC operates under strict legal and policy frameworks, including coordination with chiefs of mission as outlined in 22 U.S.C. 3927. Any intelligence activities conducted in a foreign country are subject to the Chief of Mission's oversight, except where specific exceptions are authorized by the President or National Security Council. If confirmed, I would ensure the IC adheres to these frameworks while addressing any necessary exceptions in coordination with appropriate authorities.

Encryption

QUESTION 161: You introduced H.R. 8970, the Protect Our Civil Liberties Act, which states that:

"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Federal Government shall not mandate that the manufacturer of an electronic device or software for an electronic device build into such device or software a mechanism that allows the Federal Government to bypass the encryption or privacy technology of such device or software."

Is that still your position? If not, why has your position changed?

My position has not changed. From a civil liberties perspective, there are serious constitutional concerns about the government being granted unrestricted access to American's private digital property. Mandating mechanisms to bypass encryption or privacy technologies undermines user security, privacy, and trust, and poses significant risks of exploitation by malicious actors. If confirmed, I will work with the DOJ to ensure robust security measures while addressing legitimate national security and law enforcement needs through lawful, targeted means that respect constitutional rights.

War Powers

QUESTION 162: You introduced H.R. 8336, the Unplug the Internet Kill Switch Act of 2020. The bill would repeal Sections (c) through (g) of 47 U.S.C. 606 governing the war powers of the President, specifically the authority to suspend or amend rules and regulations related to radio communication, electromagnetic

radiations, and wire communications. Is that still your position? If not, please explain your change in position.

If confirmed, I would advocate for a framework that balances the need for emergency powers with robust safeguards to prevent overreach. This could include ensuring that any actions taken under such authorities are narrowly tailored, subject to oversight, and transparent to Congress and the public. While I remain concerns about the scope of these powers, I remain open to exploring reforms that modernize the law and address current security challenges without compromising constitutional rights or essential communication networks.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board

QUESTION 163: You introduced H.R. 2305, the Strengthening Privacy, Oversight and Transparency (SPOT) Act.

A. The bill would expand the PCLOB's mandate to cover all foreign intelligence activities. Is that still your position? If not, please explain your change in position.

I am not familiar with the PCLOB's more recent efforts. If confirmed, I look forward to studying its work and evaluating how it can best enhance the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.

B. The bill allows IC whistleblowers to submit complaints related to privacy or civil liberties concerns to the PCLOB. Is that still your position? If not, please explain your change in position. Is it your position that such submissions should constitute a protected communication and that such whistleblowers should be protected from

reprisal, as is explicit in Section 7 of the January 2017 USA RIGHTS amendment that you endorsed and voted for?

If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the issue further with the Office of General Counsel at ODNI and the Intelligence Community Inspector General and working with Congress to examine potential reforms to the whistleblower process.

C. The bill grants subpoena power to the PCLOB. Is that still your position? If not, please explain your change in position.

I am not familiar with the PCLOB's more recent efforts or any difficulties it may have accessing information. If confirmed, I look forward to studying its work and evaluating how it can best enhance the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.

D. The bill establishes that PCLOB members shall serve full-time and raises the pay of the members. Is that still your position? If not, please explain your change in position.

I am not familiar with the PCLOB's more recent efforts. If confirmed, I look forward to studying its work and evaluating how it can best enhance the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.

E. The bill directs the Attorney General to submit to the PCLOB any FISA-related report submitted to Congress and copies of each decision, order, and opinion of the FISA Court and FISA Court of Review submitted pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1871(g). Is that still your position? If not, please explain your change in position.

I am not familiar with the PCLOB's more recent efforts. If confirmed, I look forward to studying its work and evaluating how it can best enhance the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.

Whistleblowers

QUESTION 164: You introduced H.R. 8452, the "Protect Brave Whistleblowers Act of 2020." The bill would have ensured that no person can be prosecuted for unauthorized transmittal of classified information to any Member of the Senate or U.S. House of Representatives, an Inspector General of an element of the IC, any member or designated employee of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, the Chairman or commissioner or designated employee of either the Federal Trade Commission or the Federal Communications Commission, and "any other person or entity authorized to receive disclosures containing classified information pursuant to any applicable law, regulation, or executive order regarding the protection of whistleblowers." Is that still your position? If not, why has your position changed?

Yes, my position remains consistent with the principles outlined in H.R. 8452, the Protect Brave Whistleblowers Act of 2020. Whistleblowers are essential to ensuring accountability and oversight within the IC, and they must have clear, protected channels to report concerns, including the unauthorized transmittal of classified information, to appropriate entities such as Members of Congress, Inspectors General (IGs), and other authorized recipients. The bill reinforced the importance of lawful whistleblowing by safeguarding individuals from prosecution when they follow established procedures for raising concerns about potential misconduct or abuses. If confirmed, I would uphold and strengthen legal protections to ensure whistleblowers can come forward without fear of retaliation while maintaining the balance between transparency, accountability, and national security.

QUESTION 165: You introduced H.R. 8970, the Protect Our Civil Liberties Act, which states that an Intelligence Community employee or contractor may submit a complaint related to FISA to the Comptroller General of the United States or the congressional intelligence committees.

- A. Is that still your position? If not, why has your position changed?
- B. Your bill allows Intelligence Community employees and contractors to submit complaints to the GAO or the congressional intelligence committees "or" in accordance with 50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5). Is it still your position that IC employees and contractors can submit FISA-related complaints to the GAO or the congressional intelligence committees as an alternative to the procedures set forth in that provision of the U.S. Code? If not, why has your position changed? If yes, does the prohibition on reprisal set forth in Section 10 of your bill protect individuals submitting complaints to the GAO or the committees outside the process set forth in 50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)?

Whistleblowers are essential to ensuring accountability and oversight within the IC, and they must have clear, protected channels to report concerns, including the unauthorized transmittal of classified information, to appropriate entities such as Members of Congress, Inspectors General (IGs), and other authorized recipients.. If confirmed, I would uphold and strengthen legal protections to ensure whistleblowers can come forward without fear of retaliation while maintaining the balance between transparency, accountability, and national security.

QUESTION 166: 50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)(D) states that a whistleblower who wishes to contact the intelligence committees directly shall furnish to the Director, through the Inspector General, the complaint and follow, through the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the committees directly. How will you ensure that this process: (1) does not compromise the anonymity of the whistleblower; (2)

result in reprisal; (3) result in the complaint being delivered to a subject of the complaint; or (4) delay the whistleblower's provision of the complaint to the committees by more than 7 days?

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the IC IG to review the IC's policies and procedures implementing this statute in more detail and to make any necessary improvements. I will rigorously protect whistleblowers from reprisal in accordance with the law.

QUESTION 167: Do you agree that any monitoring of CIA personnel for purposes of detecting insider threats must protect the confidentiality of protected whistleblower communications? If so, how should that protection be assured?

Ensuring the confidentiality of protected disclosures by whistleblowers should be a priority for the IC. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Director of CIA to review how the Agency manages whistleblower procedures and protections in order to determine whether any changes are necessary or appropriate.

QUESTION 168: Do you believe that appropriately cleared attorneys representing Intelligence Community whistleblowers should have access to classified information related to the complaint and that, as a general matter, whistleblowers should have access to cleared attorneys?

I agree that whistleblowers should have access to cleared attorneys where appropriate and consistent with applicable law. The extent to which cleared counsel may receive classified information related to their clients' complaints will be fact-specific.

Inspector General

QUESTION 169: Will you ensure that the Intelligence Community Inspector General (ICIG) has full access to the activities, programs and operations of the Intelligence Community? Will you ensure that the ICIG is notified of new programs and policies or significant changes in existing programs and policies?

Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure that the IC IG has access to all information required by law

Workforce protections

QUESTION 170: Will you commit to submitting to the Committee all ODNI guidelines and regulations relating to employment status and protections and any modifications thereto, as well as any CIA guidelines and regulations that apply to ODNI personnel pursuant to 50 USC 3024(m)? Do you believe the DNI can take adverse actions against personnel without regard to such guidelines and regulations? If yes, do you commit to notifying the Committee whenever doing so?

Yes, I will commit to keeping the Committee fully and currently informed of intelligence activities as required by law.

QUESTION 171: Will you commit to notifying the Committee when exercising authorities to convert positions in the competitive service to the excepted service or create new excepted service positions under 50 U.S.C. 3024(v)?

Yes

QUESTION 172: In 2023, now President-elect Donald Trump stated: "We will clean out all of the corrupt actors in our National Security and Intelligence apparatus, and there are plenty of them... The departments and agencies that have been weaponized will be completely overhauled so that faceless bureaucrats will never again be able to target and persecute conservatives, Christians, or the left's political enemies." Do you believe there are individuals in the Intelligence Community who have "target[ed] and persecute[d] conservatives, Christians, or the left's political enemies"?

A. Do you believe there are "corrupt actors" in the Intelligence Community? If yes, do you believe there are "plenty of them"?

As the nominee for the position of DNI, I must approach these questions objectively, ensuring that my responses are grounded in facts, transparency, and a commitment to the principles of law, accountability, and nonpartisanship that guide the IC. The IC is bound by strict legal and ethical standards, including oversight from Congress, Inspectors General, and other mechanisms designed to prevent misuse of its authorities. If confirmed, I will ensure that the IC operates in a manner that is apolitical, impartial, and fully compliant with the Constitution and the laws of the United States. I will also support and strengthen oversight systems to address any allegations of corruption or misconduct swiftly and transparently. Maintaining the public's trust in the IC's integrity and commitment to national security is paramount to its mission.

B. Do you believe the Intelligence Community has been "weaponized"? If yes, please elaborate.

The IC plays a vital role in protecting national security and operates within a framework of strict laws, policies, and oversight mechanisms to ensure its activities are conducted lawfully and apolitically. It is essential for the IC to

maintain the trust of the public by being transparent, accountable, and focused on its mission to safeguard the nation from threats. If confirmed, I would work to uphold these principles, address any misconduct swiftly, and ensure that the IC operates in full compliance with the Constitution and the laws of the United States while remaining impartial and apolitical in its actions.

C. Do you believe there are "corrupt actors" in the Intelligence Community who should be "clean[ed] out." If yes, please elaborate on how you believe that would be done.

As in any large organization, the potential for individual misconduct or wrongdoing exists within the IC. The IC operates under stringent legal frameworks, ethical standards, and oversight mechanisms designed to detect, address, and prevent such issues. If there are individuals acting outside the bounds of their duties, established processes such as investigations by Inspectors General, and congressional oversight are in place to address those instances.

If confirmed, I would ensure that accountability mechanisms are robust, transparent, and consistently applied to maintain the IC's integrity and effectiveness. Any individual found to be engaging in misconduct, corruption, or abuse of authority should face appropriate consequences in accordance with the law. My focus would be on accountability, professionalism, and adherence to the highest standards of conduct to ensure the IC continues to fulfill its critical mission of protecting national security while upholding public trust.

D. Do you believe the Intelligence Community should be "completely overhauled"? If yes, please explain how you believe that would be done.

The IC plays an essential role in protecting national security and addressing evolving global threats. It operates under a robust framework of laws, policies, and oversight mechanisms designed to ensure accountability, transparency, and alignment with constitutional principles. Like any complex organization, the IC must continuously adapt to new challenges, modernize its practices, and improve its efficiency to meet the needs of policymakers and the public.

If confirmed, I would prioritize targeted improvements to ensure the IC remains effective, innovative, and aligned with national security priorities. This includes enhancing interagency collaboration, advancing technology and data sharing systems, and reinforcing oversight to maintain public trust. By focusing on continuous evolution and refinement, the IC can address emerging challenges while upholding its critical mission and the values that define its work.

Watchlisting

QUESTION 173: You have stated that you were placed on the TSA's Quiet Skies list and that this was done for political reasons. Please describe how you would reform watchlisting programs to ensure that: (1) no one is watchlisted based on First Amendment-protected activities, and (2) watchlisted individuals have access to a fair and effective redress process?

Ensuring fairness and protecting civil liberties in watchlisting programs is critical to maintaining public trust while safeguarding national security. To prevent misuse, I would advocate for clear, evidence-based criteria for watchlisting American citizens, robust oversight mechanisms, and regular audits to ensure no one is listed based on First Amendment-protected activities like free speech or political affiliation. Additionally, I would work to enhance the redress process by

improving the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) to ensure timely and transparent resolution of complaints and exploring independent review panels to provide impartial oversight and due process. These measures would ensure watchlisting programs balance national security concerns with the protection of individual rights and provide fair avenues for redress.

Classification and declassification

QUESTION 174: Executive Order 13526 states, "In no case shall information be classified, continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be declassified in order to: (1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; (2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; (3) restrain competition; or (4) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security"

A. Do you commit to fulfilling both the letter and spirit of these prohibitions?

Yes. Classification should always be used to protect national security, not to conceal wrongdoing, avoid embarrassment, or impede transparency.

B. What role do you believe IC Inspectors General should play in investigating possible violations of these prohibitions?

IGs play a crucial role in investigating potential violations of these prohibitions by conducting independent reviews and audits, ensuring that classification decisions are made lawfully and appropriately.

C. What accountability do you believe is appropriate for violations of these prohibitions?

Appropriate accountability for violations should include disciplinary actions, ranging from corrective training to more severe measures, including termination or legal action for intentional misuse of classification authorities. Transparency and a clear process for addressing violations are essential to maintaining trust in the classification system.

Espionage Act and journalists

QUESTION 175: In your book (For Love of Country," pp. 48-49), you describe the Espionage Act as unconstitutional. Please detail what aspects of the Act you believe are unconstitutional. If confirmed as DNI, how would you respond if the Intelligence Community were asked for intelligence to support an Espionage Act prosecution?

In my book, I expressed concerns about aspects of the Espionage Act that could be interpreted as overly broad or vague, potentially infringing on First Amendment rights and due process protections under the Constitution. These concerns primarily relate to its application in cases involving whistleblowers and journalists, where the Act may criminalize the dissemination of information in ways that could suppress legitimate public discourse or accountability. The Espionage Act also does not allow for due process and the right of an American to defend themselves against such charges in a court of law. If confirmed as DNI, I would ensure that the IC provides intelligence in support of Espionage Act prosecutions strictly within the bounds of the law, focusing solely on national security considerations. Any support would adhere to established legal

frameworks, respecting constitutional rights and the IC's commitment to impartiality and apolitical conduct.

QUESTION 176: Do you believe there are any circumstances in which a journalist should be prosecuted under the Espionage Act?

The prosecution of journalists under the Espionage Act should be exceedingly rare and approached with the utmost caution, as it raises serious concerns about First Amendment protections and the fundamental role of a free press in a democracy. Journalists play a critical role in informing the public and holding institutions accountable, and prosecuting them for their work risks chilling legitimate reporting and undermining press freedoms.

However, there may be extreme circumstances where prosecution could be considered – for example, if a journalist knowingly and intentionally engages in activities that go beyond reporting, such as conspiring with foreign adversaries or directly aiding espionage efforts in a way that endangers national security. Even in such cases, the legal standard must be extraordinarily high, and any prosecution should be carefully weighed to ensure it does not erode constitutional protections or the public's trust in the government's commitment to transparency and accountability. If confirmed, I would ensure the IC's actions remain consistent with these principles, focusing on protecting national security while upholding constitutional rights.

QUESTION 177: In your book ("For Love of Country," pp. 49-50), you are highly critical of the practice of the government obtaining phone and email records of journalists. In July 2021, the Department of Justice announced a policy restricting use of compulsory process to obtain reporter information. In October 2022, the Department formalized and expanded those protections.

I support the DOJ's policy and I believe that protections for journalists should be codified into law.

- **A**. Do you support this policy? Do you believe it should be modified in any way?
- **B**. Do you believe protections for journalists should be codified in law and, if so, how?
- **C**. How would you respond if the Intelligence Community were asked to support the collection of journalists' records?

I support the DOJ policy restricting the use of compulsory process to obtain journalist records and its expansion in 2022, as it is essential to protecting press freedoms and maintaining the critical balance between national security and upholding the First Amendment. These protections help ensure that journalists can perform their vital role without fear of undue government intrusion. While the current policy is a significant step forward, codification would formalize the standards under which government agencies, including the IC, can seek information from journalists, incorporating clear thresholds for national security risks and judicial oversight to prevent misuse.

If the IC were asked to support the collection of journalists' records, if confirmed as DNI, I commit to ensuring that such actions are taken only in strict compliance with applicable laws, constitutional protections, and established DOJ policies. This would include a rigorous review process to confirm the necessity and proportionality of the request, focusing on preserving the integrity of press freedoms while safeguarding national security. As DNI, I would prioritize

transparency, accountability, and adherence to the highest ethical and legal standards in such sensitive matters.

Interrogation, Detention and Rendition

QUESTION 178: Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 prohibits the use of any interrogation technique or approach or any treatment related to interrogation that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual. Is this provision of law absolutely binding on the Intelligence Community and the President?

Yes.

QUESTION 179: The statutory prohibition on interrogations not consistent with the Army Field Manual applies to any individual "in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government; or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States, in any armed conflict."

- A. Please describe the factors that would indicate whether a detainee is in the "effective control" of any officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government.
- B. Please describe how you would define whether a detainee is "detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department of agency of the United States."

The terms "effective control" and "owned, operated, or controlled" involve complex legal and operational considerations that are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account factors such as the degree of authority or influence exercised by U.S. personnel and the nature of the facility's management. These

determinations require careful legal analysis to ensure compliance with statutory requirements and international obligations. If confirmed, I would work closely with legal experts and relevant agencies to ensure any actions involving detainees align with U.S. laws, policies, and ethical standards.

QUESTION 180: Section 1045 states that "[t]he head of any department or agency of the United States Government shall provide the International Committee of the Red Cross with notification of, and prompt access to, any individual detained in any armed conflict in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or other agent of the United States Government or detained within a facility owned, operated, or effectively controlled by a department, agency, contractor, or subcontractor of the United States Government, consistent with Department of Defense regulations and policies." Is this provision of law absolutely binding on the Intelligence Community and the President?

This provision of law establishes a clear legal requirement for notification and access, is binding on the IC and the President. Any determinations about its applicability in specific circumstances would require careful legal analysis and consultation with relevant legal and policy advisors.

QUESTION 181: Executive Order 13491 prohibits the CIA from operating any detention facility except to hold people "on a short-term, transitory basis." Do you support this prohibition? If yes, how would you define "short-term" and "transitory"?

Executive Order 13491 reflects the United States' commitment to lawful and ethical detention practices. The specific definitions of "short-term" and

"transitory" would require careful consultation with legal and policy experts to ensure compliance with the Executive Order and alignment with national security objectives.

QUESTION 182: Do you agree that Intelligence Community officers should not participate in interrogations of detainees in liaison custody when those officers witness, know of, or otherwise suspect the torture or mistreatment of detainees?

Yes.

QUESTION 183: The United States recognizes its obligations under the Convention Against Torture, not to "expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he [or she] would be in danger of being subjected to torture."

- A. To what extent should written "diplomatic assurances" be required for extraditions and renditions?
- B. Should such assurances be accepted from countries with established records of committing torture?

The necessity and reliability of written "diplomatic assurances" must be carefully evaluated on a case-by-case basis, particularly when dealing with countries with records of torture. If accepted, such assurances should be subject to rigorous verification and monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance with U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture.

QUESTION 184: In an October 29, 2022, Substack article "Our Civil Liberties are Under Attack" you wrote:

"Bush, Cheney and the warmongers of both parties who enabled them normalized this idea that as long as a president claims to be acting in the interest of national security, they can trample all over our God-given freedoms. The Bush administration insisted that a president has the power to designate American citizens suspected of being terrorists as 'enemy combatants.' This classification means they can be imprisoned indefinitely and denied all of their constitutional rights without even a conviction—mere suspicion will suffice. The Bush administration established a precedent that the principles of due process could be suspended in the name of national security."

What is your view of the detention of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants?

The detention of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants raises significant constitutional concerns, particularly regarding due process rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Any such actions must strictly adhere to constitutional protections and be subject to judicial oversight to ensure they do not violate fundamental civil liberties, even in the context of national security.

Lethal Operations

QUESTION 185: Please describe your view of the legal and policy implications of targeting or otherwise knowingly killing a U.S. person in a U.S. Government lethal operation. What additional public transparency do you believe would be warranted in that situation?

Targeting or knowingly killing a U.S. person in a U.S. Government lethal operation is a grave action that raises serious constitutional, legal, and policy implications. It must strictly adhere to due process protections under the

Constitution, including a rigorous review to establish an imminent threat and ensure compliance with the principles of necessity, distinction, and proportionality.

In such situations, additional public transparency may include providing a clear legal basis for the operation, post-action accountability through oversight mechanisms, and, where possible, declassification of information to build public trust while safeguarding national security.

Competitive advantage

QUESTION 186: The October 7, 2022, Executive Order 14086 on Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities states:

"It is not a legitimate objective to collect foreign private commercial information or trade secrets to afford a competitive advantage to United States companies and United States business sectors commercially. The collection of such information is authorized only to protect the national security of the United States or of its allies or partners."

- A. Do you agree with these limitations and should they apply to non-SIGINT activities?
- B. Since this is a public policy, will you commit to informing the public of any modifications to the policy?

I support the general principle of focusing intelligence activities on national security objectives, and believe there could be circumstances where broader flexibility in certain collection activities, including non-SIGINT, may be necessary to protect U.S. economic security. Modifications to this policy, if warranted, should be carefully assessed and communicated to Congress, with public transparency considered when consistent with national security interests.

QUESTION 187: How would you guard against the use of the Intelligence Community's collection or analytic capabilities to afford a competitive advantage to particular companies or business sectors?

If confirmed, I would enforce strict adherence to legal frameworks, such as Executive Order 12333 and Executive Order 14086, which limit collection to national security objectives. Robust oversight mechanisms, including audits and regular reviews by Inspectors General and congressional committees, ensure compliance. Additionally, clear internal policies and rigorous training would reinforce the IC's apolitical mission, preventing any activities that could unfairly benefit specific companies or sectors.

QUESTION 188: What would you do if the Intelligence Community received an explicit or implicit request from a member or political ally of the administration to direct IC capabilities against commercial competitors? Will you inform the Committee of any such request?

The IC operates within a strict legal and ethical framework designed to ensure its activities are conducted in alignment with national security priorities and free from improper influence. Any concerns about the use of IC capabilities would

require careful review in consultation with legal advisors and appropriate oversight bodies to ensure compliance with established policies and standards.

QUESTION 189: How will you ensure that authorized economic intelligence activities (e.g., identifying trade or sanctions violations or government influence or direction) are not undertaken in such a way as to advantage certain companies over others?

Economic intelligence activities must strictly adhere to national security objectives and established legal frameworks, ensuring they are conducted in an impartial and apolitical manner. If confirmed, I would enforce rigorous oversight mechanisms, including internal reviews, audits, and adherence to guidelines prohibiting favoritism or competitive advantages, to maintain the integrity and neutrality of such operations.

Transparency

QUESTION 190: Will you support the declassification and public release of any interpretation of law that provides a basis for intelligence activities, but is inconsistent with the public's understanding of the law?

Declassification and public release of legal interpretations underpinning intelligence activities should be considered carefully to balance transparency with the need to protect national security. Where feasible and consistent with safeguarding sensitive methods or operations, I would support the release of such interpretations to enhance public trust and understanding while ensuring the IC operates within the bounds of law.

FBI

QUESTION 191: In your book ("For Love of Country," p. 44), you are critical of the abuses of the FBI under former Director Hoover and the lack of oversight at the time. What is your view of the role of the Committee in overseeing FBI investigations to ensure they are not politically motivated?

Congressional oversight is essential to ensuring that the FBI conducts its investigations impartially and without political motivation. The Committee plays a critical role in this process by reviewing FBI activities, policies, and compliance with laws to uphold accountability and prevent abuses. If confirmed, I would fully support the Committee's oversight function, including its efforts to ensure that the FBI operates within its mandate and remains apolitical in its investigations.

Congress

QUESTION 192: In December 2024, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General released "A Review of the Department of Justice's Issuance of Compulsory Process to Obtain Records of Members of Congress, Congressional Staffers, and Members of the News Media." The OIG concluded that the Department's actions "implicated the constitutional rights and authorities of a coequal branch of government." It further stated:

"[W]e believe that using compulsory process to obtain such records when based solely on the close proximity in time between access to the classified information and subsequent publication of the information—which was the case with most of the process issued for non-content communications records of congressional staff in the investigations we examined—risks chilling Congress's ability to conduct oversight of the executive branch

because it exposes congressional officials to having their records reviewed by the Department solely for conducting Congress's constitutionally authorized oversight duties and creating, at a minimum, the appearance of inappropriate interference by the executive branch in legitimate oversight activity by the legislative branch. Moreover, even non-content communications records—such as those predominantly sought here—can reveal the fact of sensitive communications of Members of Congress and staffers, including with executive branch whistleblowers and with interest groups engaging in First Amendment activity."

- A. Do you agree with the OIG's concerns that the collection of communications records of congressional Members and staff raises constitutional concerns, particularly when, as in this case, the collection was based solely on those Members' and staff's exercise of their constitutionally authorized oversight duties? If yes, how would you respond to an effort to collect such records in a similar situation?
- B. Do you support the policy changes described in the OIG Review? Do you believe further policy changes should be made?
- C. Do you agree that Congress should be notified prior to any such collection? If yes, who in Congress should be notified?
- D. Do you agree that the government should inform the judge issuing an order for compulsory process or a non-disclosure order that the targets are congressional Members and staff so that the judge can consider the constitutional implications?

The collection of communications records of congressional Members and staff, particularly when based solely on their constitutionally authorized oversight duties, is a significant breach of the constitution and separation of powers. Such actions risk chilling legitimate oversight and creating the appearance of executive branch interference in legislative activities. Safeguards must ensure that intelligence and investigative activities respect the independence of co-equal branches of government.

I support the policy changes outlined in the OIG Review that aim to address these concerns and ensure appropriate checks are in place. Further policy adjustments, such as heightened internal review and oversight, may be necessary to strengthen protections for congressional communications.

Any effort to collect such records should undergo the most rigorous scrutiny, including notifying Congress when appropriate, balancing security and transparency concerns, and informing the issuing judge that the targets are congressional Members or staff so constitutional implications can be fully considered. If confirmed, I would work to uphold these principles while safeguarding national security and civil liberties.

<u>Russia</u>

QUESTION 193: The January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) judged that Russian President Vladimir Putin's goals in influencing the 2016 U.S. presidential election included "denigrat[ing] Secretary Clinton, and harm[ing] her electability and potential presidency." The ICA further assessed that "Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump." The IC had high confidence in these judgments. After a thorough review of the underlying intelligence, the Committee unanimously supported these judgments.

You were, at the time, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives with access to classified information. Do you agree with the ICA's judgments? If not, why not?

While I recognize the ICA's findings were based on intelligence analysis, I also acknowledge concerns that the conclusions were strongly influenced by the broader political context at that time. While I did not question the ICA's judgment of Russia's preference (in 2012 their preference was Obama), I felt there was insufficient evidence that their efforts played a significant role in influencing the outcome of the 2016 election. Intelligence assessments must remain objective, free from political influence, and focused solely on national security. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring the IC reporting is apolitical, grounded in evidence, upholding the integrity of its assessments.

Saudi Arabia

QUESTION 194: On December 8, 2019, you tweeted: "Why is Trump acting as the spokesperson for Saudi Arabia? It is a disgrace that the office of the presidency is being used for the interests of the theocratic extremist Saudi Arabian Kingdom, the #1 exporter of the radical Islamist ideology that fuels jihadists like al-Qaeda/ISIS" What is your view of the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia?

The U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia is complex, involving both critical strategic cooperation and significant challenges. My statement reflected concerns about Saudi Arabia's longstanding support for Islamist terrorism and the spread of the radical Salafist Wahabbi Islamist ideology. Since then, Saudi Arabia's leadership has changed significantly. Saudi Arabia is now an important partner in counterterrorism efforts, combating Islamist extremism, regional stability, and

energy security. The U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia remains complex, involving both critical strategic cooperation and significant challenges. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Intelligence Community provides objective analysis to inform a U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia that advances national security interests.

QUESTION 195: A declassified August 2019 FBI Intelligence Bulletin concluded that "Saudi Officials Almost Certainly Assist Saudi Citizens Flee the United States to Avoid Legal Issues, Undermining the US Judicial Process." If confirmed, will you make Saudi efforts to undermine the U.S. judicial process a collection and analytic priority?

If confirmed, I will ensure that any foreign government activities that undermine the U.S. judicial process are appropriately prioritized for collection and analysis within the National Intelligence Priorities Framework. Decisions on prioritization would align with the NIPF and reflect the importance of safeguarding U.S. sovereignty and the integrity of our legal system.

<u>Iran</u>

QUESTION 196: On October 12, 2017, you published an op-ed in The Hill entitled "President Trump must uphold America's commitment to the Iran Nuclear Deal." Is that still your position? If not, please explain your change in position.

It is not. My position has always been that a nuclear-capable Iran poses a significant threat to regional and global security. In 2017, in spite of my longstanding concerns about the limitations and problems with the Iran nuclear deal, it appeared to be the only means available to contain the threat. Since then,

the geopolitical landscape has evolved, and the U.S. has taken a different approach under the previous administration. President Trump's decision to withdraw reflected valid concerns, such as the deal's lack of provisions addressing missile technology and weaknesses in inspection mechanisms.

President-elect Trump has emphasized that preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons is a top priority. If confirmed, my role would be to provide accurate and objective intelligence to inform his decisions and offer options to support his strategy in addressing the challenges posed by Iran, ensuring that U.S. national security interests are protected.

Marijuana

QUESTION 197: Do you agree with the current DNI policy that past marijuana use should not be determinative in the adjudication of security clearances? Do you believe that ongoing marijuana use should likewise not be determinative and should be treated like alcohol use?

I agree with the current DNI policy that past marijuana use should not be determinative in the adjudication of security clearances, provided it does not indicate broader issues with judgment or reliability. However, ongoing marijuana use is more complex, as it remains illegal under federal law. It must be carefully evaluated within the context of the applicant's overall behavior, consistency with legal obligations, and ability to safeguard classified information.

Anti-discrimination

QUESTION 198: Your book ("For Love of Country," chapters 7 and 8) devotes one chapter, and much of a second chapter, to your views on transgender people.

Given these views, how will you protect the rights of LGBTQ people, including transgender people, in the Intelligence Community workforce?

I support the rights of all Americans regardless of their race, sex, religion, sexual orientation, political persuasion, or any other superficial factor. I have deployed with, employed, and have lasting friendships with members of LGBTQ community. I am committed to abiding by and enforcing federal laws and policies that protect employees' rights. I will foster a culture of professionalism and respect within the IC, supporting programs and initiatives that ensure equal opportunities, and addressing any instances of bias or discrimination swiftly and decisively.