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**SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE**

UNITED STATES SENATE



**Additional Pre-Hearing Questions for
Aaron Lukas upon his nomination to be
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence**

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Responsibilities of the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence

QUESTION 1: Please explain your understanding of the responsibility of the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) in the following capacities:

- A. To assist the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in carrying out the DNI's duties and responsibilities; and
- B. To act in the DNI's place in the DNI's absence.

The PDDNI is legally obligated to aid the DNI in performing the DNI's tasks and duties, and to step into the DNI's role and exercise her authority when she is unavailable or incapacitated. In practical terms, the DNI and PDDNI jointly oversee the day-to-day operations of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, focusing on its role in integrating, supervising, and supporting the Intelligence Community. Through this collaboration, the PDDNI provides guidance, support, and reinforcement to the DNI's objectives, ensuring the execution of her strategic goals and vision for both the ODNI and the broader IC. While not statutorily directed, I believe the PDDNI should also play a meaningful role building foreign partnerships and meeting with senior liaison officials as this task is too demanding for the DNI to effectively manage alone. In all duties, the PDDNI must act with integrity and in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

QUESTION 2: Have you discussed with Director Gabbard her specific expectations of you, if confirmed as PDDNI? If so, please describe these expectations.

In my discussions with Director Gabbard to date, she has expressed an intention to lean into her role as the president's principal intelligence advisor and to pursue common-sense reforms that mitigate against the politicization and weaponization of intelligence. If confirmed, I would expect to support the DNI as required and directed, but especially by managing ODNI's day-to-day business and working with ODNI leadership to ensure the organization is conducting its core functions of deconflicting and harmonizing intelligence efforts and budgets across the community, by conducting partner engagements as directed by the DNI, and by driving responsiveness to congressional oversight. All these duties would be carried out in close consultation with and under the direction of the DNI.

QUESTION 3: Is your understanding that you and the DNI will divide responsibilities and that you will have a specific portfolio as PDDNI? If so, please describe this portfolio as you understand it. If not, please describe what you believe your primary responsibilities and activities will be, and on what areas you will concentrate.

Beyond the duties of the PDDNI as defined by law, regulation, and policy, I have learned from DNI Gabbard that, if I am confirmed, she would expect me to draw on my professional experience to review IC programs and policies with an eye to assessing how each contributes to (or doesn't) the IC's core front-line missions: collection, analysis, and covert action. She has made clear her expectation that the IC refocus on these activities and question programs that do not meaningfully advance them. If confirmed, I would play a role in advising the DNI in this area. Additionally, I would expect to support the DNI in her commitment to build up the expertise, professionalism, and morale of our workforce – reestablishing a culture of nonpartisanship. All this would require working to foster greater alignment and coordination within the IC, acting as a responsible manager of national resources in administering the annual budget for the National Intelligence Program, and prioritizing transparency with the public and collaboration with Congressional oversight. If confirmed, I aim to embody these principles.

QUESTION 4: What do you expect to be your specific management responsibilities within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)? Is it your understanding that anyone will report to you directly, if you are confirmed?

If confirmed, I will support the DNI in guiding the IC and overseeing the ODNI workforce. Currently, 17 of the 19 deputy directors who lead ODNI components report to the PDDNI. This represents all of the deputy directors except for the IC Inspector General and OEEO, which statutorily report directly to the DNI. Via oversight of these deputy directors, the PDDNI works to execute the vision and directives of the DNI. I would not expect major changes to this arrangement; however, the number of deputy directors may rise or fall in response to organizational changes over time.

QUESTION 5: What will your role and responsibilities be in relation to the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration (DDNI/MI)?

The DDNI/MI is concerned with aligning mission capabilities, shaping enterprise resource and policy decisions, and overseeing the provision of timely, objective, and relevant intelligence. Like other deputy directors, the DDNI/MI would report to me

if I am confirmed as PDDNI. The DDNI/MI in particular would assist the PDDNI with intelligence support in advance of leading Deputies Committees meetings, before engagements with foreign liaison services, and on those occasions when the DNI is away or unavailable for Oval Office support.

QUESTION 6: What issues have you discovered through your general observation, professional experience, or through your preparation for your confirmation, with respect to the DNI's role in overseeing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)?

As a career CIA officer and a former DNI representative overseas, I have been involved in ODNI-led coordination efforts. However, I cannot honestly say that ODNI has major visible impacts on CIA operations. ODNI plays a more obvious role in the coordination of analysis and production of the PDB. Nevertheless, for the most part, rank-and-file CIA officers rarely interact with ODNI and many do not understand its role.

In principle, the DNI supervises the CIA in the same way it oversees the other components of the IC; but culturally, many CIA officers see their agency, not ODNI, as the leader of the IC. I believe the close relationship between Director Gabbard and Director Ratcliffe will lead to more clear differentiation between these two roles and a more productive ODNI/CIA relationship.

QUESTION 7: What issues have you discovered through your general observation, professional experience, or through your preparation for your confirmation, with respect to the DNI's role in overseeing intelligence elements of the Department of Defense (DoD)?

I understand that ODNI and the Department of Defense, via the USD(I&S), collaborate fairly well in managing the DoD's intelligence elements. That said, there likely is potential to enhance coordination in the realm of the intelligence budget and funding framework between the Military Intelligence Program and the National Intelligence Program. Additionally, there is room to further explore and align on collection platforms and strategies to better meet the needs of decision-makers, military personnel, and policy leaders.

QUESTION 8: What issues have you discovered through your general observation, professional experience, or through your preparation for your confirmation, with respect to the DNI's role in overseeing intelligence elements of other departments of the United States Government?

I do not yet have great insight into how the DNI manages some of the smaller intelligence components across various U.S. Government departments. However, drawing from my experience as both a collector and consumer of intelligence, I believe there may be potential to improve the ODNI's utilization of expertise within these elements. While most IC elements produce finished intelligence, the products produced by the larger organizations often dominate conversations. Bringing the full experience and resources of the IC to bear can help combat group think and contribute to more robust, objective intelligence.

QUESTION 9: Do you believe additional legislation is needed to clarify or strengthen the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI with respect to the IC?

I do not think I currently have the necessary information to determine if new legislation would be warranted to enhance or clarify the DNI's authorities and responsibilities within the IC. If confirmed, I will work with the oversight committees to assess whether the ODNI faces difficulties in executing its duties and identify areas of potential concern. Ongoing evaluation of existing authorities is crucial, particularly given the rapid advancements in technology and evolving threats.

Keeping the Congressional Intelligence Committees Fully and Currently Informed

QUESTION 10: Please explain your understanding of the DNI's obligations under Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. §§ 3092-93).

Section 502 of the National Security Act charges the DNI with a responsibility to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities other than covert actions, to furnish the congressional intelligence committees with any information or material concerning intelligence activities other than covert actions requested by the committees to carry out their responsibilities, and to report significant anticipated intelligence activities or significant intelligence failures other than covert action.

Section 503(b) of the National Security Act charges the DNI with keeping the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions under her responsibility, including significant failures, and to furnish to the congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning covert actions which is in ODNI's possession, custody, or control and which is

requested by either of the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.

QUESTION 11: Does the PDDNI have any responsibilities to ensure that all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved in intelligence activities in general, and covert action in particular, comply with the reporting requirements in Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. §§ 3092-93)?

The PDDNI assists the DNI in her critical role in ensuring that all USG departments, agencies, and other entities involved in intelligence activities – including covert actions – comply with reporting requirements and applicable laws, including the National Security Act of 1947.

QUESTION 12: Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe notification should be limited to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of the congressional intelligence committees?

Notification should be limited to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of the congressional intelligence committees ONLY in circumstances where the President determines that it is essential to limit access to a covert action finding to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, as authorized by Section 503 of the National Security Act.

SSCI and HPSCI consist entirely of cleared Members who have the duty to oversee the activities of the IC. Barring the circumstances described in statute above, I pledge to inform ALL Members of the congressional intelligence committees equally.

National Security Threats

QUESTION 13: What do you view as the principal threats to national security with which the IC must concern itself in the coming years? Please explain the basis for your views.

The recent Annual Threat Assessment of the IC, as approved by DNI Gabbard, informs my perspectives on the threats to the US in the near term and looking ahead. The most pressing threats come from terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, and cartels, which are directly threatening and harming our citizens. A range of cyber and intelligence actors are targeting our wealth, critical

infrastructure, telecom, and media. State adversaries and their proxies are also trying to weaken and displace US economic and military power in their regions and across the globe, and both state and nonstate actors pose multiple immediate threats to the Homeland and US national interest. State adversaries have weapons that can strike US territory, or disable vital US systems in space, for coercive aims or actual war. Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea – individually, and collectively – are challenging the US interests in the world by attacking or threatening others in their spheres of influence, with both asymmetric and conventional hard power tactics, and promoting alternative systems to compete with the US, primarily in trade, finance, and security. They seek to challenge the US and other countries through deliberate campaigns to gain an advantage, while also trying to avoid direct war. Growing cooperation between and among these adversaries is increasing their fortitude against the US, the potential for hostilities with any one of them to draw in another, and pressure on other global actors to choose sides.

QUESTION 14: Based on your experience, how has the IC performed in adjusting its policies, resource allocations, planning, training, and programs to address these threats?

Most IC officers are dedicated, patriotic Americans, but the institutions in which they work too often have been slow to adjust to changing threats and new technological realities. Examples include the shift of focus to counter Chinese aggression and espionage, which came years later that it should have, and the current slowness in adopting AI to the intelligence business. The IC currently lags far behind the private sector, and increasingly behind America's adversaries, in adopting this game-changing technology. As the head of the intelligence community and as the President's principal intelligence advisor, the Director of National Intelligence should be a critical link in translating U.S. national security priorities into action inside the IC.

QUESTION 15: Apart from national security threats discussed in your prior responses, and based on your experience in the IC, what do you consider to be the highest priority management challenges facing the ODNI and the broader IC?

Based on my experiences and on discussions with officers across the community, I expect the following two related areas may be high priority management challenges:

-Emerging technology: The convergence of emerging and disruptive tech—like AI, quantum computing, and autonomous systems—will shape the future of intelligence. Integrating these technologies in ways that advance the IC's ability to stay ahead of our adversaries represents a major challenge that will require ODNI leadership.

-Data: Intelligence is information and America's intelligence agencies collect vast quantities of it. The challenge is no longer simply about managing volume. Intelligence services that can collect, access, exploit, and generate actionable insights the fastest will have a strategic advantage. Since data is fundamental to everything the IC does, ensuring the integrity of data throughout its lifecycle, while also adopting rapid improvements to these capabilities on pace with our adversaries, will be critical to the IC's future success.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

There has been considerable debate in Congress concerning the appropriate size and function of the ODNI since the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Congress has considered various proposals and reforms to address these issues. In answering the questions that follow, please address the ODNI's staff functions and the specific ODNI components.

QUESTION 16: What is your view of the ODNI's size, organization, and function?

The DNI was created by Congress to supervise and harmonize the operations of the various components of the IC. ODNI sets goals and priorities for collection, analysis, production, and distribution of national intelligence; brings together streams of intelligence and law enforcement information in the NCTC; formulates and manages the implementation of the annual budget for the National Intelligence Program; helps bolster partnerships with foreign intelligence services; and more. Some of these are critical functions that are not duplicated elsewhere. Historically, however, as with all bureaucracies, ODNI has suffered from mission creep, lack of focus, and duplication of effort. If confirmed as PDDNI, I would support the DNI's stated goal of ensuring ODNI is laser-focused on its core missions and sized appropriately to accomplish them.

QUESTION 17: Do you believe that the ODNI has sufficient personnel resources or more personnel than required (including ODNI cadre and IC detailee personnel) to effectively carry out its statutory responsibilities? If not, where does ODNI require additional personnel resources? If so, where should ODNI streamline its personnel?

Under Director Gabbard, ODNI is conducting a mission-focused review of the ODNI components. This includes a review of each component's statutory

functions, the roles and functions it performs that have a strong Community demand signal and a customer base that relies on them, and other activities that reflect previous Administration priorities and/or tasks that are not deemed as providing value-add for partners. If confirmed as PDDNI, I would consult closely with career ODNI leadership to form an opinion on what is the optimal size and structure of the organization.

QUESTION 18: What are your views on the intelligence budget in the short-, medium-, and long-term? In what areas should the intelligence budget be modified, and how?

If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to make sure the intelligence budget is adequate to the threats we face and is responsibly used. There will always be some tension between spending on the current threat landscape and long-term strategic investments that position the IC for the future. There is also a need to balance transparency with the American people about IC spending with the secrecy inherent in classified national security work.

QUESTION 19: What reforms are required to ensure that ODNI's personnel and resources are in line with ODNI's value to the IC?

I do not want to prejudge what personnel/resource reforms ODNI may need. If confirmed, I would look to conduct mission reviews of each ODNI component to gain a clearer picture of the value-added various ODNI elements provide to IC partners. Past reviews have highlighted that some products and services have a clear demand signal from customers, including those beyond the IC -- like the NT-50 agencies and state/local/private sector partners. Mission reviews also can help identify areas of duplication, or where ODNI-driven data calls and requirements are placing an undue burden on IC elements without delivering any clear value to the IC.

QUESTION 20: Describe your understanding of the role played by National Intelligence Managers (NIMs) under ODNI's current structure and organization.

As the principal advisors to the DNI on all aspects of intelligence, NIMs provide IC wide integrated mission input to support the DNI in managing the various mission and programmatic activities of the IC. In partnership with the National Intelligence Council, NIMs are responsible for ensuring the integration and coordination of analytic and collection efforts and serve as mission managers to ensure integration among IC elements and across IC functions, disciplines, and activities for the

purpose of achieving unity of effort and effect. NIMs advise the DNI on the development of the NIPF and provide both strategic direction and guidance to the IC for mission areas across specified regional and functional portfolios. NIMs advise the DNI, and serve as her proxy, on budget planning and programming efforts, and provide recommendations to the DNI on whether IC activities sufficiently address policymaker priorities, developing and implementing Unifying Intelligence Strategies which inform the ICs planning and budgetary processes. Furthermore, when an event or situation threatens US national security interests and requires an expedited shift in national intelligence posture priorities, or emphasis, the DNI may designate a NIM as National Intelligence Crisis Manager, which offers a temporary expansion of resources, responsibilities, and authorities.

QUESTION 21: If confirmed, what goals do you have for the IC?

If confirmed, my goals for the IC would center around sharpening our collection against evolving threats, producing useful objective analysis, integrating new technologies, strengthening trust with the American people, and ensuring intelligence work aligns with both national security priorities and constitutional values. In other words, my objective is to promote an IC that is well-positioned to protect the American people.

QUESTION 22: What in your view is the appropriate balance between the ODNI's community-management responsibilities and providing flexibility to the daily decision-making authorities of individual IC agency directors?

The role of ODNI should be to serve as a coordinating body while the DNI sets broad priorities for the IC. Under such a system, IC agency directors exercise most decision-making authority for their organizations even as they respond to the DNI's directional guidance. In my view, the ODNI should be seen as a sort of National Security Council for the IC – a relatively lean organization that ensures information is shared, projects and budgets are deconflicted, administration policy is communicated, and results are measured. What community management should not mean is duplicating functions at ODNI that are properly carried out by other IC elements.

QUESTION 23: What do you believe is the appropriate balance between government employees and contractor employees in the ODNI?

Under DNI Gabbard's direction, ODNI is focused on continuing to reduce core contractors, in keeping with Congressional and OMB direction. The overall mission

review will also focus on ensuring that ODNI has the right mix of government and contract staff. Just to note--This was also a priority for DNI Ratcliffe, and since 2020, ODNI has reduced from more than 900 core contractors to the mid-300s by embracing Performance Work Statement contracting, vice Line of Effort.

QUESTION 24: What do you believe is the appropriate balance between ODNI cadre employees and those on detail or assigned from other government agencies?

This appropriate balance between cadre and detailees is a shifting target and one appropriately determined in consultation with Congress and the IC agencies. If confirmed, I would look streamline the overall workforce while keeping core, necessary ODNI capabilities intact. As part of this, some shifting of responsibilities from detailees to core cadre employees might be necessary. The overall goal would be to make ODNI more efficient, freeing skilled officers to be tasked against more urgent mission requirements throughout the IC.

QUESTION 25: What is your view of the principles that should guide the IC in its use of contractors, rather than full-time government employees, to fulfill intelligence-related functions?

Following on the previous question, I believe the core functions of the ODNI should be run by ODNI cadre employees, not contractors or detailees, both of which serve a purpose in the organization, but not for core ODNI tasks.

QUESTION 26: What do you believe is the appropriate proportionality in the ODNI between cadre employees and detailees from other government entities?

See answers to questions 24-25.

QUESTION 27: What is your assessment of the personnel accountability system presently in place both at the ODNI and within the other IC elements?

Accountability is essential to uphold the integrity of the Intelligence Community. If confirmed as PDDNI, I am committed to conducting a review to assess personnel accountability systems within the ODNI and the broader IC.

QUESTION 28: What actions, if any, should be considered to strengthen personnel accountability as well as ensure fair process in the IC, including matters related to allegations of serious misconduct?

If confirmed as PDDNI, I am committed to reviewing personnel accountability systems within the ODNI and the IC to determine if any improvements need to be made to strengthen them, and to ensure a fair process to adjudicate allegations of misconduct is in place. Under no circumstances should unprofessional conduct be tolerated at ODNI or within the IC agencies it leads.

Cybersecurity

QUESTION 29: The ODNI has a central role to play in coordinating cybersecurity efforts, particularly with the respective roles of the Director of the National Security Agency and the head of U.S. Cyber Command.

- A.** Are there any changes that you would recommend for the DNI's and IC's roles within the nation's cybersecurity authorities and responsibilities?

The IC is responsible for collecting, analyzing, producing, and disseminating intelligence on foreign cyber threats at the appropriate level of classification. The DNI has a responsibility to establish and oversee common cybersecurity standards across the IC, approve all IT architecture purchases, and develop the IC IT architecture to ensure the maximum protection and availability of intelligence under both the National Security Act and FISMA. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the DNI to reviewing in detail the ODNI's and IC's roles within the national cybersecurity mission and identifying any changes that might be beneficial.

- B.** What is your view regarding the proposals to end the "dual-hat" relationship between the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command?

If confirmed, I will work with DoD to review the current status of the relationship between US Cyber Command and NSA, with a particular focus on understanding how a termination of the "dual-hatting" arrangement might affect the overall effectiveness of both organizations and any associated operational risks.

- C.** What should be the IC's role in helping to protect U.S. commercial computer networks? What cyber threat information (classified or unclassified) should be shared with U.S. private sector critical

infrastructure entities to enable them to protect their networks from possible cyber-attack?

Robust data sharing and information exchange between the IC and the private sector is vital to protecting critical infrastructure that depends on secure cyber networks. This imperative has gained increasing importance as sophisticated foreign actors continue to target our critical infrastructure. My goal would be to engage with IC experts to determine what information is currently being shared and received, the guidelines that are used to determine that, and identify areas where improvements can be made to optimize the public-private cybersecurity partnership.

Science & Technology and Research & Development

QUESTION 30: How do you assess the state of research and development (R&D) activities within the IC?

The IC has an active ecosystem of R&D activities that seeks to advance the nation's intelligence capabilities. The R&D enterprise consists of both efforts within individual agencies, focused on their unique mission sets, as well as a capability within ODNI that crosses agency boundaries and aims to look over the horizon to identify emerging technologies and critical needs. This model has yielded many successes over the years, but is facing increasing challenges in sustaining US technology leadership due to the rapid emergence of new technologies, the increasingly dominant role of private sector innovation, the need for capital-intensive infrastructure to sustain innovation, and because of increasing competition from China and other near peer nations -- particularly in the areas of AI, microelectronics, and quantum computing.

QUESTION 31: What changes, if any, need to be made in the IC regarding R&D?

Despite various successes, the IC R&D enterprise faces a rapidly expanding set of challenges. Foreign competition is such that the IC no longer has the luxury of time, particularly in the rapidly developing areas of microelectronics, AI, and quantum computing. To maintain the IC's technological edge, the IC R&D enterprise must be increasingly fast, flexible, and agile. It needs to improve its collaboration with the private sector. The IC must build on existing efforts to streamline its R&D acquisitions processes including the recent approval of Other Transaction

Authorities (OTA) and continue to evolve its procedures for transitioning new technologies into operational use.

IC Missions and Capabilities

QUESTION 32: Please explain your views of the current quality of the IC's intelligence analysis.

The IC often produces high-quality, impactful analysis. But this varies based on many factors, most notably on the quality of the collection that informs the analysis.

QUESTION 33: If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve the IC's intelligence analysis?

If confirmed, I would work closely with the DDNI/MI to ensure that analytic products incorporate views from across the IC, that the views of dissenting agencies are clearly communicated to intelligence consumers, and that the analytic ombudsman process is robust and readily available. I further would charge the DDNI/MI to review analytic training courses with the goal of reinforcing a culture of objectivity and free from politicization. Finally, I would advise the DNI to order a review of compartmentation procedures to examine whether key raw reporting is getting to the analysts who need it.

QUESTION 34: Please explain your views of the current quality of the IC's intelligence collection.

I believe IC collection generally reflects NIPF priorities and thus largely is aimed at the country's most challenging intelligence problems. I would be happy to provide additional thoughts on the state of collection in a classified setting.

QUESTION 35: What are your recommendations for improving the quality of the IC's intelligence collection?

I would be happy to discuss this question in a classified setting.

QUESTION 36: If confirmed, what role would you have with regard to intelligence collection, and what steps would you take to improve the IC's intelligence collection?

If confirmed, my role would be to support the DNI in ensuring IC operational elements have the resources, personnel, technology, and policy guidance they need to successfully accomplish their collection mission. I would use formal coordination mechanisms, such as the DEXCOM, as well as informal communications with IC counterparts responsible for managing collection programs to make sure I understand the unique challenges and needs of each agency.

QUESTION 37: If confirmed, would you recommend changes to the security clearance process regarding IC contractors and/or Federal employees?

From what I have seen, the process of granting security clearances has meaningfully improved since I joined the CIA more than two decades ago, when stories of applicants waiting a year or more for a clearance were common. But there is still room for improvement and the long wait times for onboarding new employees in the IC is a deterrent to attracting new talent. If confirmed, I would explore whether new technologies, employed under the IC's continual vetting concept, might add further efficiencies while maintaining a high standard of security.

QUESTION 38: Please explain what your responsibilities would be, if confirmed, in making decisions or recommendations concerning IC officials' accountability with respect to matters of misconduct or noncompliance with federal laws, regulations, Intelligence Community Directives, or other IC-issued guidance.

If confirmed, I would share responsibility for ensuring legal and ethical conduct by IC officials, a critical component of maintaining public trust. I would ensure adequate policies and processes are in place and exercised to address misconduct and noncompliance with applicable law and policy. This would include engagement with appropriate legal advisors when addressing potential violations of law.

QUESTION 39: Please explain your responsibilities, if confirmed, to ensure that performance and rewards systems across the IC agencies are fair and equitable.

If confirmed, I am committed to working with DNI Gabbard to support and enable personnel performance systems, including rewards, that base decisions solely on

professional qualifications, performance, and the operational needs of the IC and reflect the objectivity and integrity we expect of intelligence professionals.

Financial Management and Acquisitions

QUESTION 40: If confirmed, what role do you expect to have in reviewing business system investments in the IC?

If confirmed, I would oversee the IC CIO, whose office serves as the IC Business Transformation Office. In that role, my approach to reviewing IC business system investments would be strategic, oversight-driven, and focused on ensuring these investments align with mission, enhance efficiency, and deliver value to national security. Under the National Security Act, the DNI has authority to coordinate and oversee IC-wide resources, including budget and systems. The National Security Act also makes the DNI responsible for the entire life cycle of IC business systems and mandates that the DNI establish a board that advises her on policies and procedures needed to effectively integrate all IC business activities and certifies that IC business systems comply with policy priorities. I would advise the DNI to lean into those authorities and mandate.

QUESTION 41: What is your assessment of the IC's current acquisitions capability?

The IC has a long history of delivering extraordinary capabilities and rapidly adopting emerging technology, leveraging unique acquisition and procurement authorities. Based on my conversations with specialists, I believe today's IC acquisition program execution has improved significantly compared to ten years ago, when more than half of the IC major systems acquisitions were assessed as not meeting goals for cost, schedule, security risks, performance, or milestone criteria achievement. According to ODNI's most recent annual program management plan submitted to Congress, major system acquisitions are consistently achieving their baselined cost, schedule, and performance goals.

To achieve the pace of development required to maintain competitive advantage with competitors and adversaries, the IC will need to leverage new acquisition processes and emerging technology. It must strengthen private sector partnerships, support organizations like In-Q-Tel, and rethink organizational structures to be both deliberate and strategic in how technology is employed.

QUESTION 42: Do you believe the space industrial base specifically, and the intelligence industrial base more generally, are capable of producing the number of complex systems the IC and the DoD demand of them on time and within budget?

The intelligence industrial base has demonstrated its ability to produce complex systems to meet the demands of the IC and DoD. While challenges exist, I am confident it can adapt to increasing demands for quantity and complexity. To ensure long term health and viability, ODNI must regularly assess industry capabilities and identify opportunities for investment and improvement. It needs to deepen private sector partnerships and find ways to expand the cleared, software development base.

With regards specifically to the space industrial base, the growth of commercial space and the emphasis on proliferated architectures are presenting some unique opportunities and stressors, particularly with the supply chain. DoD, IC, and NASA are jointly leading an effort to assess emerging supply chain risks and coordinate mitigation strategies across government agencies. Based on my conversation with ODNI staff, I understand initial assessments indicate additional strategic investments may be needed to support national security as well as the expanding commercial sector.

Department of Defense

QUESTION 43: Please explain your understanding of the need to balance the requirements of national and tactical consumers, specifically between establishing a unified intelligence effort that includes DoD intelligence elements with the continuing requirement that combat support agencies be able to respond to the needs of military commanders.

There is a need to balance the requirements of national and tactical consumers of intelligence. As I understand it, ODNI, in partnership with OUSD I&S, constantly evaluates both national and tactical intelligence requirements to balance resources against priorities. ODNI has a number of touch points into this process:

- *The various NIMs IC wide strategy boards have representatives from each of the IC elements and non-IC organizations with a stake in that NIMs respective area of responsibility.*

- *The DNI's Advisor for Military Affairs, a 3 star officer, advises and assists on integration efforts across the DoD with ODNI, including engagement with OUSD I&S, the Joint Staff, military services, combat support agencies, and combatant commands.*
- *ODNI directorate for Mission Integration leadership and the head of the Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence have a weekly synch to ensure the DoD and IC coordinate on both national and military intelligence needs to the warfighter.*

QUESTION 44: What concerns to you have, if any, as to the IC's ability to support war zones while still retaining its full capabilities to conduct missions outside of war zones?

The IC has a long and successful history of providing intelligence support to war zones, which has been a core mission since the creation of the first service-based intel services in the 19th century. IC personnel support, and are usually forward deployed to, nearly every military operation – including current operations in numerous combat locations. Closer to home, the IC has supported both NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM for decades, and over the last few months has ramped up capabilities against cartels and human traffickers. Overall, I do not see a reduction in support to the warfighter, inside or outside of warzones.

Covert Action

QUESTION 45: What is your view of the DNI's responsibility to supervise, direct, or control the conduct of covert action by the CIA?

My perspective is quite similar to how Director Gabbard described the matter during her confirmation process. By law, the President is the sole authority responsible for deciding whether to use covert action to advance national security goals. According to Executive Order 12333, the DNI is tasked with supervising and advising the President and the National Security Council on all current and proposed covert action initiatives. This responsibility dictates the DNI should receive a steady stream of updates about ongoing covert action programs and remain actively involved in the national security process for approving and evaluating covert action decisions. The DNI collaborates with the CIA and the Office of Management and Budget to secure funding for new initiatives and ensures Congress receives proper written notice about any additional resources

needed. Within the boundaries of this notification, the DNI also strives to ensure all relevant departments and agencies involved in a specific covert action understand their roles and adhere to the legal reporting obligations.

QUESTION 46: Do you believe that any additional authorities are necessary to ensure that covert action programs are lawful, meet the public policy goals of the United States, or for any other purpose?

Covert action programs are subject to a rigorous set of approvals and requirements – including but not limited to the DNI’s oversight, advisory, and coordination role – to ensure that they are lawful, meet the public policy goals of the United States, and otherwise align with the President’s directives, national security priorities, and the overall intelligence strategy. These approvals and requirements are grounded in numerous authorities, including the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, and executive branch policy issuances.

QUESTION 47: What in your view is the appropriate role for the CIA Inspector General in auditing covert action programs?

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 lists the CIA Inspector General’s duties and responsibilities as including conducting and supervising audits relating to “the programs and operations of the Agency,” which would include covert actions. I defer to CIA as to how best to facilitate the CIA IG’s performance of this duty and responsibility with respect to covert action programs.

QUESTION 48: If confirmed, what role will you have regarding covert actions?

I have been involved in multiple covert action findings over the course of my career and, if confirmed, would stand ready to advise the DNI as requested. I also would expect to engage in regular coordination with the NSC and the executing agencies to track ongoing actions and ensure IC responsiveness to policy maker requirements in this area, leading deputies coordination meetings as needed. I would be prepared to brief oversight committees on covert action as requested.

Privacy and Civil Liberties

QUESTION 49: Please describe the IC’s efforts to protect privacy and civil liberties, and what, if any, challenges face the IC in these areas.

The IC has robust oversight and compliance programs that aim to ensure it exercises its authorities in a way that protects the privacy and civil liberties of Americans. These programs implement requirements from FISA, the Privacy Act, EO 12333, and its implementing Attorney General approved guidelines, as well as ODNI and departmental requirements that ensure IC leadership, the President, Congress, and the Judiciary have appropriate oversight into intelligence activities. Of course, a large enterprise that seeks to continually incorporate emerging technologies, such as the IC, can always integrate new oversight methods. If confirmed, I am committed to continually seek to implement such methods to ensure that intelligence is objective and non-politicized.

QUESTION 50: Section 102A(f)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 3024(f)(4)) provides that “[t]he Director of National Intelligence shall ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency and shall ensure such compliance by other elements of the intelligence community through the host executive departments that manage the programs and activities that are part of the National Intelligence Program.” What are the most important subjects concerning compliance with the Constitution and laws that the DNI should address in fulfilling this responsibility?

The DNI must ensure compliance with the Constitution and all laws of the United States. Safeguarding civil liberties is paramount, particularly in the context of intelligence activities and other collection authorities. Ensuring that surveillance programs are conducted with robust oversight, adhere to statutory and constitutional protections, and respect privacy rights is essential. Compliance with minimization and targeting procedures as well as proper handling of US person information, must remain a top priority.

If confirmed, I will support the DNI’s commitments to transparency, rigorous oversight, and collaboration with Congress to uphold these principles and maintain public trust in the IC.

QUESTION 51: What methods, and through what officials, should the DNI use to ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws, including, but not limited to, the Office of the General Counsel, the ODNI Inspector General, and the Civil Liberties Protection Officers?

If confirmed, I would promote individual responsibility for compliance with the Constitution, consistent with each official’s Oath of Office. I would support the DNI by empowering the General Counsel, the IGIC, the Civil Liberties Protection

Officer, and their offices, to fully execute the responsibilities assigned in the National Security Act. I understand the General Counsel, as chief legal advisor, provides advice on the application of the Constitution and other law and policy to the complex, novel issues faced by ODNI. I understand the ICIG promotes the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness while independent audits, inspections, reviews, and investigations of IC activities. The Civil Liberties and Protection Officer ensures the protection of civil liberties and privacy, including through compliance reviews, investigations, privacy impact assessments, and transparency efforts.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) permits the government to conduct targeted surveillance of terrorists and other foreign adversaries who are located outside the United States. Unless Congress acts, Title VII of FISA, including Section 702, will expire on April 20, 2026.

QUESTION 52: Please describe your understanding of the value of Section 702, including to the President's Daily Brief.

FISA Section 702-acquired intelligence is a critical mission enabler for the IC. I understand that nearly 60 percent of articles in the President's Daily Brief contain 702 information. As a CIA operations officer, I often relied on 702 information to inform targeting of human sources, meaning 702 directly supports other methods of collection.

QUESTION 53: Do you support the reauthorization of Section 702?

Yes.

QUESTION 54: What amendments, if any, to Section 702 or other provisions of FISA do you believe are necessary?

I defer to Congress to determine whether the American people believe additional FISA reforms are necessary and, if confirmed, I would work to ensure the IC comply with all statutory requirements. My personal view is that any amendments to Section 702 or other provisions of FISA should focus on enhancing transparency, oversight, and accountability, while maintaining the IC's ability to protect national security

effectively. My goal is to work closely with DNI Gabbard, Congress, and other oversight bodies to support the implementation of reforms that balance operational effectiveness with accountability, civil liberties protection, and public trust.

QUESTION 55: The *Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act* (RISAA) amended FISA to enhance the collection of foreign intelligence concerning the “international production, distribution, or financing of illicit synthetic drugs, opioids, cocaine, or other drugs driving overdose deaths, or precursors of any aforementioned.”. Do you support this amendment? What are your views on how this amendment will support IC’s counternarcotics mission?

I endorse the modification to FISA, introduced via RISAA, which bolsters the Intelligence Community's (IC) capacity to gather foreign intelligence concerning the global manufacture, trafficking, and funding of illegal narcotics. I also applaud Director Gabbard’s pledge to ensure this authority is exercised prudently, with strong oversight, to protect privacy and civil rights.

This change tackles the escalating and critical danger posed by synthetic drugs, opioids, and other substances driving overdose fatalities across the United States. By empowering the IC to pinpoint and dismantle international drug syndicates, this measure enhances our capability to address one of the country’s most urgent public health and safety challenges. It will strengthen the IC’s efforts against narcotics by equipping us with essential resources to monitor and interrupt the worldwide supply chains of drug cartels and their financial systems. Improved foreign intelligence gathering can deepen our insight into the origins of precursor chemicals, manufacturing sites, and distribution pathways, while fostering better collaboration with domestic law enforcement and global allies. It also should aid in detecting and countering the influence of state and non-state entities that enable or benefit from these operations.

QUESTION 56: The FBI’s use of U.S Person queries was the subject of debate during RISAA’s drafting and reauthorization. As a result, RISAA enacted many reforms on query procedures and requirements. What is your position on whether warrants should be required before an agency undertakes a U.S. Person query?

While I am sensitive to potential abuses of FISA, I also am concerned that a firm warrant requirement for all U.S. person queries under Section 702 would be incompatible with time-sensitive national security actions. I believe the existing framework, with RISAA reforms, provides largely sufficient safeguards against

abuse, though I would support working with Congress to consider additional measures when RISAA authorities are reauthorized.

QUESTION 57: If a U.S. Person's selector is queried against FISA Section 702 information, and it reveals terrorist connections, what additional steps do the Intelligence Community and Department of Justice need to take before they can target the U.S. Person's communications?

As I understand it, a US Person may only be targeted by the USG as permitted by FISA. Any such targeting includes the following additional steps that ensure compliance with US law and constitutional protections before targeting the US Persons communications:

- *Probable cause determination: Under FISA, the IC and DOJ must establish probable cause that the US person is an agent of a foreign power, for example as a member of an international terrorist group or as someone knowingly engaged in international terrorism. This determination must be supported by credible and detailed evidence.*
- *FISA court approval: DOJ must submit an application to the FISC, to include affidavits detailing the probable cause and the specific justification for targeting the US person. The FISC must approve the application before any targeting can occur (absent an emergency, which would permit the Attorney General to approve targeting for no more than 7 days before the FISC has approved the application).*
- *Compliance with minimization procedures: The IC must ensure that that collection resulting from the targeting is handled in a manner that complies with FISA's minimization procedures to limit the retention, dissemination, and use of non-relevant information about the US person.*
- *Coordination and oversight: All targeting actions must involve close coordination between the IC, DOJ, and oversight bodies to ensure the proposed targeting is lawful, narrowly tailored, and proportionate to the threat.*

QUESTION 58: There is a lot of misinformation about incidental collection as it pertains to FISA Section 702. Please clarify this term and discuss its importance to national security.

Under FISA, Section 702, incidental collection refers to the unintentional acquisition of communications involving US persons or entities during the lawful surveillance of non US persons reasonably believed to be located outside the US. Incidental collection can occur when a US person communicates with a foreign individual who is the intended target of the surveillance. Notably, targeting a foreign individual for the purpose of indirectly collecting on a US person is prohibited.

QUESTION 59: Please describe the extent of oversight mandated to ensure that the Intelligence Community is compliant with FISA procedures and requirements.

Pursuant to FISA, robust oversight must be conducted by relevant IC agencies, ODNI, DOJ, the FISC, and Congress to ensure that Americans' civil liberties are protected. ONDI and DOJ must conduct regular and comprehensive joint oversight over Section 702 and hold accountable those who are not in compliance. Every identified incident of noncompliance must be reported to Congress.

Potential Politicization of Intelligence

QUESTION 60: How do you define the politicizing of intelligence?

Politicization of intelligence is the manipulation or distortion of intelligence gathering, analysis, or dissemination to serve political agendas, biases, or interests other than conveying objective truth as best it can be ascertained. It occurs when intelligence is shaped—whether through selective presentation, omission of key facts, or pressure on analysts—to align with the goals of a particular administration, party, or individual. It can happen intentionally or unintentionally. This undermines the credibility of the intelligence and, ultimately, of the intelligence community. Politicization can take various forms, such as exaggerating threats to justify policy decisions, downplaying evidence that contradicts a preferred narrative, or using intelligence as a tool to target political opponents. It directly undermines the IC's fundamental duty to provide unbiased, fact-based insights to inform decision making.

QUESTION 61: What responsibilities does the PDDNI role entail, relative to ensuring the IC's analysis remains objective and free from political consideration?

The PDDNI has the same responsibility as the DNI to uphold standards of objectivity and encourage/protect an analytical culture and tradecraft that rejects politicization and bias, whether intentional or not. Safeguarding and enhancing the caliber of IC analysis is essential to fulfilling the IC's mission of delivering precise, prompt, and impartial intelligence to decision-makers. If confirmed, I would uphold the strict application of Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 and ICD 206, which set benchmarks for analytic objectivity, precision, and timeliness. I have been happy to see that some IC elements have prioritized training in recent years to maintain standards of quality and accountability throughout their organizations. Building on this, I would advocate for a review training standards across the IC to ensure the values of objectivity and integrity are being uniformly taught.

QUESTION 62: In your view, how significant a concern is the risk of politicized intelligence?

Because intelligence products are written by humans, and humans have preferences and biases, politicization is a constant professional hazard in the intelligence business. I believe we should go to great lengths to mitigate against it. As Director Gabbard said in her testimony, reaffirming the IC's apolitical role in furtherance of national security is imperative to ensuring our national security.

Politics has no role in any stage of the intelligence cycle—whether it's gathering, processing, analyzing, producing, or sharing intelligence. Even minor infusions of bias, political leanings, or agency-specific agendas at different points can accumulate and skew the final intelligence outputs. To reinforce the IC's nonpartisan nature, leaders need to foster a culture of impartiality throughout their organizations, from the highest levels to the lowest. Reward systems should encourage diverse perspectives and independent analysis, free from pressure to align with preset conclusions or beliefs. Leaders need to challenge and address any subtle biases that emerge, ensuring that the organization's methods align with the IC's core duty to deliver precise, evidence-driven assessments and analysis, objectively and without prejudice.

Whistleblowers & The IC Inspector General

QUESTION 63: Do you support a strong Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (ICIG) to provide independent oversight for the IC? Will you ensure that the Office of the ICIG is resourced and staffed in accordance with the ICIG's requests?

Yes for both questions. I believe strongly in meaningful, independent oversight of intelligence activities.

QUESTION 64: If confirmed, how would you ensure the IC's IGs maintain their independence?

The independence of the Intelligence Community's Inspector General is crucial for maintaining oversight and accountability within the IC. If confirmed, I will support and strengthen the IG's role, ensuring all ODNI officers recognize that full cooperation is both required and important, irrespective of any political or organizational consequences stemming from audits or investigations.

QUESTION 65: Do you support the statutory rights of whistleblowers and intend to honor the anonymity of whistleblowers who come forward? Are there aspects of the IC whistleblower statute with which you disagree?

I support the statutory rights of whistleblowers and, if confirmed, I will honor their anonymity. There are no aspects of the whistleblower statute with which I disagree.

QUESTION 66: If a whistleblower follows the law in seeking to report a matter to Congress under the IC Whistleblower Protection Act, will you commit to ensuring his or her submission is delivered to Congress within seven days, as the law requires?

Yes.

QUESTION 67: Will you commit, if confirmed, to protect the identity of IC whistleblowers who seek to remain anonymous?

Yes.

QUESTION 68: IC whistleblowers have the statutory right to provide their complaints directly to Congress. The law states that whistleblowers must obtain from the DNI, through the IC IG, "direction on how to contact the congressional intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate security practices." Do you agree that this provision does not permit the DNI to deny that direct access to Congress altogether?

Yes, I agree. Whistleblowers have the right to provide information directly to oversight committees.

FBI Background Investigations

QUESTION 69: Should the FBI conduct background investigations of all Presidential nominees for positions within the executive branch of the federal government to ensure that those under consideration for positions of significant authority and responsibility will not misuse the power of their offices and do not have vulnerabilities that make them susceptible to coercion by our adversaries?

Yes.

QUESTION 70: Have you undergone, or will you undergo, an FBI background investigation as part of the process associated with your nomination?

Yes.

QUESTION 71: Do you agree to provide the results of your FBI background investigation to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of this Committee for review?

Yes, I agree.

Workforce Protection

QUESTION 72: Will you commit that, if confirmed, you will seek to recruit, attract, and retain a workforce based on principles of fairness and merit, and without consideration of personal political preferences?

Yes.

QUESTION 73: Do you commit to consider professional qualifications in personnel decisions exclusively, without consideration of partisan or political factors?

Yes.

QUESTION 74: Would you ever consider an individual's personal political preferences, to include "loyalty" to the President, in making personnel decisions, such as to hire, fire, or promote an individual?

No.

QUESTION 75: If confirmed, what assurances will you provide to the IC workforce that personnel decisions will be based exclusively on professional qualifications, performance, and needs and not on personal political preferences?

If confirmed, I can assure the IC workforce that personnel decisions over which I have influence would be based exclusively on professional qualifications, performance, and needs of the service. NOT on personal political preferences. I have deployed side-by-side with hundreds of talented officers and in most cases never knew, nor wanted to know, their political views. The IC can only accomplish its mission when we see ourselves as one team engaged in the same fight; politics should play no role.

QUESTION 76: If you receive credible allegations that IC employees or others in the executive branch are seeking to fire or force out IC employees because of their perceived political views or loyalty to the President, will you commit to informing the congressional intelligence committees and immediately stopping such efforts?

Yes.

QUESTION 77: Will you impose a political litmus test for IC employees? Is a political litmus test ever appropriate in determining who can or should work in the IC?

I would never impose, or tolerate, a political litmus test for IC officers.

Questions from Senator Warner

Legal Compliance

QUESTION 78: If confirmed, will you commit to expend the funds authorized and appropriated by Congress for the ODNI and to formally notify Congress and obtain approval for any recessions or deferrals, in accordance with the law?

If confirmed, I commit to following the law and I commit to complying with applicable legal requirements regarding responding to requests from Congress.

QUESTION 79: If confirmed, will you commit to ensure that all personnel actions taken by the ODNI are carried out in strict accordance with the law?

If confirmed, I commit to following the law.

QUESTION 80: If confirmed, will you commit to comply with all duly issued court orders or other rulings, even if you disagree with the court's decision?

Generally, if there is a court order that directly binds a federal official who is a party to the case and subject to the court's jurisdiction, the official should follow it.

Department of Government Efficiency

QUESTION 81: If confirmed, will you commit not to accept direction from the Department of Government Efficiency on any personnel or other matters relating to ODNI?

Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure personnel and other matters follow the direction of the Director of National Intelligence and not outside entities.

QUESTION 82: If confirmed, will you commit to prevent DOGE from accessing ODNI systems?

If confirmed, I would follow the law and any applicable judicial decisions regarding access to ODNI systems, with the presumption being no outside organization is granted access.

Protecting Classified Information

QUESTION 83: Should any employee of the Intelligence Community be granted access to classified information if they have not been determined to be eligible for access under Executive Order 12968 based upon a favorable adjudication of an appropriate investigation of the employee's background?

Generally, no. EO 12968 does not permit access to classified information prior to a completed background investigation and adjudication. However, the President has broad authority to grant individuals access to classified information, and under the EO certain policy exceptions exist to account for exigent circumstances.

QUESTION 84: Do you agree that all personnel granted access to classified information have a lifetime obligation to protect that information, including after they leave government service?

Yes, this is a life-long duty shared by all persons granted access to classified USG information.

Ethics

QUESTION 85: Federal ethics laws, to include 10 U.S.C. §208, prohibit government employees from participating in matters where they, or certain family members or organizations with which they have certain relationships, have a financial interest. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to disclose any potential conflicts of interest, including investments, business ties, family relationships, or other connections that could be perceived as influencing your decision making?

Yes, I agree with these prohibitions.

QUESTION 86: Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, that if a conflict of interest arises, you will recuse yourself from participating in any relevant decisions regarding that specific matter?

Yes. If confirmed, I would commit to recuse myself from any matters involving a conflict of interest.

QUESTION 87: Do you commit, without qualification, if confirmed, to decision-making on the merits and exclusively in the public interest, without regard to private gain or personal benefit?

Yes.

Questions from Senator Wyden

FISA

QUESTION 88: During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote: “Warrants should generally be required before an agency undertakes a U.S. Person query of FISA Section 702 data, except in exigent circumstances, such as imminent threats to life or national security.” Do you agree?

Yes.

QUESTION 89: During his confirmation process, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Demers was asked about the prohibition on reverse targeting in Section 702 of FISA. He responded: “As I understand it, determining whether a particular known U.S. person has been reverse-targeted through the targeting of a Section 702 target necessitates a fact specific inquiry that would involve consideration of a variety of factors. For example, as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board noted in its 2014 report, if a Section 702 tasking resulted in substantial reporting by the Intelligence Community regarding a U.S. person, but little reporting about the Section 702 target, that might be an indication that reverse targeting may have occurred.” How would you ensure that this fact specific analysis is applied to the nomination of Section 702 targets?

My understanding is that, consistent with Assistant Attorney General Demer’s statement, IC elements make fact-specific determinations and consider a variety of factors to ensure that Section 702 is not used for reverse-targeting of U.S. Persons. Such determinations are also reviewed by the Department of Justice. If confirmed I will ensure that any instance of reverse targeting through Section 702 is reported to the FISC and Congress and will collaborate with the Department of Justice to determine the cause, implement solutions, and ensure such an incident does not re-occur.

QUESTION 90: During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote that she would oppose any effort to re-codify Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Do you agree?

Yes. I oppose re-codifying Section 215 as it previously stood—especially the bulk collection version. It was a blunt tool that presented major privacy concerns without a security gain that might justify it. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board found in 2014 that it yielded no unique, critical counterterrorism

wins. Meanwhile, it alienated the public and the courts, increasing suspicion of the IC.

QUESTION 91: Do you agree with Director Gabbard that Section 215 “raised significant constitutional concerns”?

Yes.

Other Surveillance

QUESTION 92: During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote that Section 213 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which permits delayed notice of search warrants, “raised significant constitutional concerns.” Do you agree?

I do not think Section 213 is inherently unconstitutional given the requirement of court approval and the showing of “adverse results,” and courts have upheld it, but its breadth and lax guardrails spark legitimate concerns, as expressed by Director Gabbard. My view is that IC use of delayed-notice warrants stays narrow: tied to imminent threats, documented rigorously, and reported to Congress per the Intelligence Oversight Act.

QUESTION 93: Do you believe the Intelligence Community can or should collect U.S. location information pursuant to EO 12333 authorities? If no, how should the IC ensure that it is not collecting the information through incidental collection? If yes, should there be any limitations on the Intelligence Community’s use, retention, or dissemination of the information?.

U.S. location information has intelligence value. That said, under EO 12333, IC elements must operate in accordance with Attorney General-approved procedures that set for the circumstances and limits under which elements may lawfully collect, retain, and disseminate U.S. Person information, to include their location information. Moreover, if that information is commercial acquired, IC elements are required to implement the May 2024 IC Policy Framework for Commercially Available Information to determine whether U.S. location information datasets capture personal attributes, conditions, or identifiers that are traceable to one or more specific U.S. persons, either through the dataset itself or by correlating the dataset with other available information. If so, IC elements apply enhanced safeguards to protect that information.

If confirmed, I would support the DNI's engagements with the Department of Justice, the IC elements, our legal counsels, and this committee to ensure that the IC elements comply with these oversight mechanisms and maintain the trust of the American people.

QUESTION 94: Do you agree that the Intelligence Community cannot request that a foreign entity conduct any activity that it is not authorized to undertake itself? If yes, do you agree that this prohibition also applies to requests from Executive Branch officials outside the Intelligence Community?

Yes, and yes.

Commercially Available Information

QUESTION 95: Do you support the Intelligence Community's May 2024 Policy Framework for Commercially Available Information? Please elaborate on any aspects you do or do not support.

I support the IC's May 2024 Policy Framework for Commercially Available Information (CAI). I back the framework's recognition of CAI as "invaluable" to our mission. The IC's ability to tap into vast, legally available datasets—for example, shipping logs to spot sanctions evasion or online chatter to preempt terrorism—gives us valuable intelligence without resorting to intrusive methods. The May 2024 document lays out sound baseline principles: use CAI for validated missions, comply with laws, and consider privacy upfront. I agree with requiring agencies to assess risks before acquiring "sensitive CAI"—data heavy with U.S. persons' personal details like location or health info. Weighing mission value against privacy harm, as outlined, is a sound starting point to keep us focused on threats.

QUESTION 96: Do you commit, as Director Gabbard did, to keeping the Committee fully and currently informed of the Intelligence Community's procurement of, access to, or collection of Sensitive Commercially Available Information?

Yes.

QUESTION 97: Section G(2) of the Framework requires the ODNI, in coordination with relevant Intelligence Community elements, to provide a report to the public every two years regarding the Intelligence Community’s access to and collection, processing, and safeguarding of Sensitive Commercially Available Information. During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote that she supported this requirement and committed to implementing it. Is that also your position?

I subscribe to DNI Gabbard’s position on this issue.

Cybersecurity

QUESTION 98: During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote that she would use her position as DNI to advocate for policies, practices or legislation to strengthen cyber protections in the telecommunications sector. Will you make the same commitment?

Yes, if confirmed, I would commit to advocate for such policies.

QUESTION 99: During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote that: “Any cybersecurity legislation should ensure that data sharing between the private sector and government or other entities is done in a way that respects privacy and avoids unnecessary exposure of personal information.” Do you agree with this view and, if so, how would you go about ensuring those privacy protections?

I concur with Director Gabbard’s stance: Cybersecurity legislation should balance data sharing—between private companies, the government, or other parties—with robust privacy protections to prevent unwarranted exposure of personal information. This aligns with the Fourth Amendment’s spirit and the IC obligation to safeguard both security and civil liberties. Her view reflects a practical reality: effective cybersecurity demands collaboration, such as when tech firms share breach data with the IC, but it can’t come at the cost of turning Americans’ private lives into an open book. I’d argue this isn’t just a legal necessity; it’s a trust issue. If people fear unchecked data grabs, cooperation collapses, and our mission suffers. For the IC, there need to be clear rules on what information can be shared, strict controls on who can access it for what purposes, guidelines on storage and encryption, and regular consultation with businesses to ensure alignment on these policies. Finally, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) and IC Inspectors General should monitor our practices.

Transparency

QUESTION 100: Attorney General-approved procedures and guidelines for Executive Order 12333 are currently posted online. Do you commit to continuing to post these procedures and to make public any modifications, superseding policies and procedures, or significant interpretations?

Yes.

QUESTION 101: Will you support the declassification and public release of any interpretation of law that provides a basis for intelligence activities, but is inconsistent with the public's understanding of the law?

Yes, to the extent it is consistent with the protection of sources and methods.

QUESTION 102: What would you do if an employee of the Intelligence Community or any other Executive Branch official made a misrepresentation to Congress or to the public related to intelligence matters. If that person refused to correct the public record, would you do so personally?

I share DNI Gabbard's commitment that all IC personnel will be truthful and transparent with Congress and the American people. Consistent with the protection of classified information, I am committed to correcting any inaccuracies represented to Congress by IC personnel and will ensure the IC is transparent and responsive.

Chief of Mission Authorities

QUESTION 103: 22 U.S. C. § 3927 states that: "Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country... shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country..." Absent direct intervention from the President or the National Security Council, is the Intelligence Community obligated to cease intelligence activities (including, but not limited to collection activities, covert action and liaison relationships) that do not have the approval of the chief of mission?

All overseas IC collection activities must follow U.S. law, which includes 22 U.S.C. § 3927.

Encryption

QUESTION 104: During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote: “From a civil liberties perspective, there are serious constitutional concerns about the government being granted unrestricted access to America’s private digital property. Mandating mechanisms to bypass encryption or privacy technologies undermines user security, privacy, and trust, and poses significant risks of exploitation by malicious actors.” She reiterated that position during her confirmation hearing, saying, “these back doors lead down a dangerous path that can undermine Americans’ Fourth Amendment rights and civil liberties.” Do you agree?

I agree. The Fourth Amendment shields Americans from "unreasonable searches and seizures," meaning the government—including the intelligence agencies—can't rummage through a citizen's life without clear justification and subject to strict legal safeguards. If confirmed, I would support Director Gabbard in ensuring the IC respects this: no fishing expeditions, no warrantless overreach into Americans' lives. The IC will target foreign threats with precision, keeping privacy intact where the Constitution and the law demand it. I consider both security and liberty to be non-negotiable.

Whistleblowers

QUESTION 105: During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote: “Whistleblowers are essential to ensuring accountability and oversight within the IC, and they must have clear, protected channels to report concerns, including the unauthorized transmittal of classified information to appropriate entities such as Members of Congress, Inspectors General (IGs), and other authorized recipients.” During her confirmation hearing, Director Gabbard was asked if she agreed “that IC whistleblowers must have a clear path to this committee and that that they don’t need permission from agencies to talk to [the committee],” to which Director Gabbard responded, “the answer is clearly yes.” Do you agree?

Yes, I do agree. All IC officers should have a well-defined path to speak to the intelligence oversight committees without fear of reprisal.

Security Clearances

QUESTION 106: Private attorneys with security clearances play a critical role in intelligence oversight, representing providers who are issued FISA orders and directives and serving as FISA Court amicus curiae. They also protect Americans' liberties, including by representing criminal defendants in Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) cases. The Director of National Intelligence serves as the Security Executive Agency responsible for security clearances. Do you agree with this general principle and, as deputy to the Security Executive Agency responsible for security clearances, would you support a policy to protect it?

Yes.

QUESTION 107: Do you agree with the current DNI policy that past marijuana use should not be determinative in the adjudication of security clearances? Do you believe that ongoing marijuana use should likewise not be determinative and should be treated like alcohol use?

I agree with current ODNI policy that past marijuana use, in and of itself, should not be determinative in the adjudication of security clearances. While I am unaware of DNI policy regarding ongoing use, I am not convinced that relaxing drug-use restrictions for IC officers is in the best interest of national security.

Watchlisting

QUESTION 108: During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote:

“Ensuring fairness and protecting civil liberties in watchlisting programs is critical to maintaining public trust while safeguarding national security. To prevent misuse, I would advocate for clear, evidence-based criteria for watchlisting American citizens, robust oversight mechanisms, and regular audits to ensure no one is listed based on First Amendment-protected activities like free speech or political affiliation. Additionally, I would work to enhance the redress process by improving the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) to ensure timely and transparent resolution of complaints and exploring independent review panels to provide impartial oversight and due process.”

Will you make the same commitments as Director Gabbard?

Yes, I agree fully with Director Gabbard on this issue and echo her commitments.

Classification and Declassification

QUESTION 109: Executive Order 13526 provides that: “In no case shall information be classified, continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be declassified in order to: (1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; (2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization or agency; (3) restrain competition; or (4) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.” Do you commit to fulfilling both the letter and spirit of these prohibitions, as did Director Gabbard?

Yes, if confirmed, I would commit to fulfilling both the letter and spirit of these prohibitions.

QUESTION 110: What process do you believe should accompany the declassification of information? For example, do you believe there should be a written record of declassifications? When should the Committee be notified?

I believe the declassification of information must follow a structured, transparent, and accountable process to balance national security with public interest, consistent with laws like the Freedom of Information Act and Executive Order 13526, which governs classification as of March 30, 2025. If confirmed, I would assist DNI Gabbard in developing straightforward and uniform guidelines both for classifying and declassifying information, which could include rules for documenting declassifications and timelines for congressional notifications. To strengthen accountability, I would champion thorough oversight tools, such as routine reviews of classification habits, and tackle any recurring misuse with targeted fixes. Actively declassifying information that no longer needs protection would boost openness and confidence in the Intelligence Community. Furthermore, working with other agencies to align declassification methods would enhance uniformity and cooperation throughout the IC.

QUESTION 111: Please review the article “Here Are the Attack Plans That Trump’s Advisors Shared on Signal” (*The Atlantic*, March 26, 2025) and the “Houthi PC small group” Signal chat messages included in the article.

- A. Do you believe that any of the messages were or should have been classified, based on your experience with classification and on the Security Classification Guides of the relevant agencies and departments? If yes, which messages?

Based on my experience, the information presented in the media related to the Atlantic article could reasonably have been deemed unclassified based on Security Classification Guides. I note a key factor in determining classification is harm from disclosure, with timing being a factor in any potential damage. Regardless of the classification question, I would support ODNI 1) issuing clear guidance on the use of commercial messaging applications for potentially sensitive discussions, and 2) directing officers to employ a two-person review rule when setting up group chats to mitigate against the inadvertent inclusion of outside parties.

- B. Do you believe that any of the messages included any national defense information, as codified pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 793 - 798? If yes, which ones?

Based on my understanding of the circumstances and the law, it is not clear that any national defense information was transmitted in this instance. No specific sources, methods, or war plans were disclosed. Furthermore, much of the information contained in the Signal chat apparently had been shared with some international partners and most of it was reported by the press shortly thereafter.

- C. Regardless of classification, do you believe that the information included in the messages was appropriate for an unclassified channel, particularly given the timing?

This situation described in the Atlantic article was a mistake. That said, according to guidance I have received from IC technical experts over the years, Signal is a relatively secure encrypted chat application that can at times be appropriate for sensitive information. For example, it is routinely used by U.S. diplomats abroad to conduct sometimes sensitive communications with foreign officials that later is classified when put into a cable and disseminated in official channels. The issue in this case appears to have been human error, not any inherent vulnerability of the communications application.

D. Do you agree that unclassified phones used by national security officials are likely targets of foreign adversaries and that, as such, should not be used to convey classified information?

All communications by national security officials are potential targets for foreign adversaries, whether conducted on systems labeled as classified or unclassified. Both types of systems have faced compromises over the years and no system of electronic communications can ever be completely trusted. Regarding Signal specifically, its use continues to be permitted by the White House and it is used throughout the Administration. As various commentators have noted, it comes preloaded on devices at ODNI, CIA, and at other agencies.

Espionage Act and Journalists

QUESTION 112: During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote:

“In my book, I expressed concerns about aspects of the Espionage Act that could be interpreted as overly broad or vague, potentially infringing on First Amendment rights and due process protections under the Constitution. These concerns primarily relate to its application in cases involving whistleblowers and journalists, where the Act may criminalize the dissemination of information in ways that could suppress legitimate public discourse or accountability. The Espionage Act also does not allow for due process and the right of an American to defend themselves against such charges in a court of law.”

Do you agree with Director Gabbard’s concerns?

I agree with Director Gabbard that these are legitimate concerns.

QUESTION 113: During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote that she supports the October 2022 Department of Justice policy restricting use of compulsory process to obtain reporter information, calling the policy “essential to protecting press freedoms and maintaining the critical balance between national security and upholding the First Amendment.” Do you agree?

I agree with Director Gabbard’s position on this issue.

Defending the U.S. Judicial Process

QUESTION 114: A declassified August 2019 FBI Intelligence Bulletin concluded that “Saudi Officials Almost Certainly Assist Saudi Citizens Flee the United States to Avoid Legal Issues, Undermining the US Judicial Process.”

A. If confirmed, will you make any efforts to undermine the U.S. judicial process a collection and analytical priority?

Foreign efforts to undermine the U.S. judicial system are a legitimate priority for collection and analysis. If confirmed as PDDNI, I would support this prioritization of this type of intelligence.

B. Would you prioritize the declassification of any reporting on this topic?

I would support declassification of any material of significant public interest that does not threaten sensitive collection sources or methods.

Interrogation, Detention and Rendition

QUESTION 115: Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 prohibits the use of any interrogation technique or approach or any treatment related to interrogation that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual. Is this provision absolutely binding on the Intelligence Community and the President?

In my view, Section 1045 is binding and it is consistent with core American principles, such as upholding human rights and the rule of law. Upholding this standard is essential to preserving American ideals, ensuring operational success, and maintaining the trustworthiness of the Intelligence Community.

QUESTION 116: The statutory prohibition on interrogations not consistent with the Army Field Manual applies to any individual “in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government; or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States, in any armed conflict.”

A. Please describe the factors that would indicate whether a detainee is in the “effective control” of any officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government.

My understanding is that “effective control” hinges on the degree of authority and influence a U.S. officer, employee, or agent exercises over a detainee’s circumstances. Factors determining this would include: physical custody or restraint, decision-making authority, and operational oversight.

B. Please describe how you would define whether a detainee is “detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States.

Each situation would have unique facts that determine when the threshold for detention is met. It would be critical consult with legal counsel in each instance.

QUESTION 117: Section 1045 states that: “The head of any department or agency of the United States Government shall provide the International Committee of the Red Cross with notification of, and prompt access to, any individual detained in any armed conflict in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or other agent of the United States Government or detained within a facility owned, operated, or effectively controlled by a department, agency, contractor, or subcontractor of the United States Government, consistent with Department of Defense regulations and policies. Is this provision of law absolutely binding on the Intelligence Community and the President?

Yes

QUESTION 118: Executive Order 13491 prohibits the CIA from operating any detention facility except to hold people “on a short-term, transitory basis.” Do you support this provision? How would you define “short-term” and “transitory”?

In my view, the CIA is an intelligence organization and should not be in the business of holding prisoners. I would defer to legal experts as to the definition of “short-term” and “transitory.”

QUESTION 119: Do you agree that Intelligence Community officers should not participate in interrogations of detainees in liaison custody when those officers witness, know of, or otherwise suspect the torture or mistreatment of detainees?

Yes, I agree with this statement.

QUESTION 120: The United States recognizes its obligations under the Convention Against Torture, not to “expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he [or she] would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”

A. To what extent should written “diplomatic assurances” be required for extraditions and renditions?

If confirmed as PDDNI, in the case of a potential rendition, I would support the DNI’s decision making through consultation with ODNI’s OGC, with the Department of State, and with other relevant agencies to determine whether diplomatic assurances could be reasonably relied upon.

B. Should such assurances be accepted from countries with established records of committing torture?

While the rule of thumb answer to that question is “no,” each case would involve a unique set of circumstances and so would require expert consultation to assess the likelihood of a particular government abiding by its assurances.

C. What responsibility does the Intelligence Community have not to provide support to operations conducted by other elements of the United States Government that violate this obligation?

The IC should follow the law and the U.S. Constitution when providing support to any U.S. Government operation. If an element of the USG requests intelligence support to conduct an illegal operation, the IC has a duty to report this activity to the relevant leadership, to the Department of Justice, and to the appropriate oversight committee.

Lethal Operations

QUESTION 121: Please describe your view of the legal and policy implications of targeting or otherwise knowingly killing a U.S. person in a U.S. Government lethal operation. What additional public transparency do you believe would be warranted in that situation?

In those rare circumstances where a U.S. person takes up arms against the United States, the already extremely serious decision to use force is exceptionally heightened. If confirmed, I will partner with the ODNI General Counsel, the Department of Defense, and lawyers from across the U.S. government to ensure any such action is justified and lawful. I will also advocate for maximizing public transparency regarding the use of lethal force in relation to U.S. Persons.

Competitive Advantage

QUESTION 122: The October 7, 2022, Executive Order 14086 on Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities states: “It is not a legitimate objective to collect foreign private commercial information or trade secrets to afford a competitive advantage to United States companies and United States business sectors commercially. The collection of such information is authorized only to protect the national security of the United States.”

A. Do you agree with these limitations and should they apply to non-SIGINT activities?

I view safeguarding the IC’s capabilities from being exploited for the benefit of specific companies as a fundamental responsibility. The IC’s mission is to protect national security, not to tilt the playing field to advantage any particular company or sector. Doing so would risk undermining the IC’s credibility, break public trust, and violate legal mandates. This principle is not dependent on how the information is collected.

B. Since this is public policy, will you commit to informing the public of any modifications to the policy?

Yes; in accordance with direction from the President.

QUESTION 123: How would you guard against the use of the Intelligence Community’s collection or analytical capabilities to afford a competitive advantage to particular companies or business sectors?

If confirmed as PDDNI, I would take steps to guard against the misuse of intelligence for commercial advantage. First, I would reinforce a culture of integrity through clear policy and training, ensuring every IC employee understands that our collection is for countering threats and understanding the world, not to advantage

private businesses. The National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333 set boundaries and I would make compliance non-negotiable. Second, I would advocate for a policy that any questionable tasking be escalated to legal counsel for assessment of intent and legality, ensuring no tasking crosses into domestic economic favoritism without a clear national security justification tied to a foreign threat. Finally, I would leverage oversight. The IC IG would have my full backing to audit taskings and flag misuse. I'd also keep the congressional intelligence committees in the loop, reporting any questionable requests as required by law.

QUESTION 124: What would you do if the Intelligence Community received an explicit or implicit request from a member or political ally of the administration to direct IC capabilities against commercial competitors? Will you inform the Committee of any such request?

If the Intelligence Community (IC) encountered a direct or subtle suggestion from an administration official or political supporter to shift IC resources toward targeting commercial rivals, my approach would emphasize upholding the IC's mission integrity and following the law. The IC's purpose is to safeguard national security, not to advance personal or partisan agendas. Deploying its capabilities—such as monitoring, assessments, or clandestine operations—against businesses for competitive gain would constitute a blatant abuse of power and breach statutes like the National Security Act of 1947, which outlines the IC's role, and Executive Order 12333, which forbids domestic intelligence activities without a clear foreign connection. Were I the PDDNI in such a situation, I would advise the DNI, the Office of General Counsel, and congressional oversight committees.

QUESTION 125: How will you ensure that authorized economic intelligence activities (e.g. to identify trade or sanctions violations or government influence or direction) are not undertaken in such a way as to advantage certain companies over others?

The collection and dissemination of economic intelligence should tie directly to threats defined by the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (e.g., countering adversarial economic coercion). If the task drifts toward benefiting one U.S. company over another—like handing Company A insights to outbid Company B—the reporting should be turned off or restricted in its dissemination. As part of this process, analysts need clear directives to focus on the foreign actor, not domestic winners. Collection and analysis must stay agnostic about U.S. corporate outcomes and should, as always, afford them the appropriate U.S. person protections .

Personnel Matters

QUESTION 126: Do you agree that a diverse workforce is necessary if the IC is going to effectively spy on, translate, understand, engage with, and analyze a diverse world? If yes, what institutional changes would you make to ensure that diverse workforce?

I am committed to a merit-based hiring process that attracts high-integrity individuals with the talents, skills, backgrounds, languages, and other qualities the IC requires to succeed. To accomplish this, IC agencies need robust recruiting programs that get the word out nationwide about opportunities for intelligence careers. If confirmed, I would advocate for a review of recruiting practices to make sure the IC does not limit itself by geography, schools, or industries that historically have yielded more applicants.

National Intelligence Priorities Framework

QUESTION 127: Do you commit to providing the Committee the National Intelligence Priorities Framework?

Yes.

Congress

QUESTION 128: In December 2024, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General released “A Review of the Department of Justice’s Issuance of Compulsory Process to Obtain Records of Members of Congress, Congressional staffers, and Members of the News Media.” During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote the following with regard to the OIG review:

“The collection of communications records of congressional Members and staff, particularly when based solely on their constitutionally authorized oversight duties, is a significant breach of the constitution and separation of powers. Such actions risk chilling legitimate oversight and creating the appearance of executive branch interference in legislative activities.

Safeguards must ensure that intelligence and investigative activities respect the independence of co-equal branches of government.

I support the policy changes outlined in the OIG Review that aim to address these concerns and ensure appropriate checks are in place. Further policy adjustments, such as heightened internal review and oversight, may be necessary to strengthen protections for congressional communications.

Any effort to collect such records should undergo the most rigorous scrutiny, including notifying Congress when appropriate, balancing security and transparency concerns, and informing the issuing judge that the targets are congressional Members or staff so constitutional implications can be fully considered. If confirmed, I would work to uphold these principles while safeguarding national security and civil liberties.”

Do you agree with Director Gabbard’s concerns and would you likewise work to uphold these principles?

I fully align myself with Director Gabbard’s comments on this issue and would work to uphold these principles.

Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB)

QUESTION 129: During her confirmation process, Director Gabbard wrote that she supported the work of the PIDB, would push for it to be fully resourced to fulfill its statutorily mandated mission, and would ensure that it would have a separate line item in the President’s budget request, as required by law. Do you agree?

While each declassification case is unique and should be considered as such, as a general matter I believe the U.S. Government tends to over classify information that has nothing to do with protecting sources, methods, or sensitive foreign relationships. Congress established the Public Interest Declassification Board to promote transparency by advising on ways to improve public access to a comprehensive, accurate, and reliable record of significant U.S. national security decisions and activities. I agree this is a worthy goal and would support Director Gabbard’s aims in this area.

Canada

QUESTION 130: Do you believe that U.S. annexation of Canada is in the national security interests of the United States?

The U.S. approach to relations with Canada is a foreign policy question that it is inappropriate for intelligence officers to weigh in on. That said, if confirmed, my job as PDDNI would be to ensure the IC provides the most accurate and relevant intelligence to the policy makers charged with answering such questions.

NATO

QUESTION 131: Do you believe that the U.S. giving up NATO command is in the national security interests of the United States?

In my view, NATO is an important component of the U.S. national security strategy. I would leave the question of the optimal command structure to the Pentagon and to civilian policy makers. The role of the IC would be to support the decision process by providing current intelligence, helping predict possible reactions by allies and adversaries, and ensuring intelligence relationships continue undisturbed during any transition periods.

Cuba

QUESTION 132: In 2001, you authored an article entitled “It’s Time, Finally, to End the Cuban Embargo.” Does the view expressed in the title and the arguments included in the article reflect your current position?

The main point of that piece was to observe that one of the most common arguments for the Cuban embargo -- that it would hasten regime change and democratization -- did not appear factually correct given the embargo had been in place for more than 40 years. Nearly a quarter century later, Cuba remains a communist dictatorship despite the embargo, so I would argue this particular point proved correct. However, I recognize there are other defensible arguments in favor of continuing the embargo, such as using it to limit the influence of a historically adversarial regime that seeks to build ties with nations like Russia, China, Venezuela, and Iran.

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