[Senate Report 113-233]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
Calendar No. 519
113th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 113-233
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
_______
July 31, 2014.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mrs. Feinstein, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. 2741]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an
original bill (S. 2741) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2015 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government, the Community Management
Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System, and for other purposes, reports favorably
thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.
Classified Annex to the Committee Report
On June 30, 2014, acting pursuant to Section 364 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law
111-259), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) publicly
disclosed that the President's aggregate request for the
National Intelligence Program (NIP) for Fiscal Year 2015 is
$49.4 billion. Other than for limited unclassified
appropriations, primarily the Intelligence Community Management
Account, the classified nature of United States intelligence
activities precludes any further disclosure, including by the
Committee, of the details of its budgetary recommendations.
Accordingly, the Committee has prepared a classified annex to
this report that contains a classified Schedule of
Authorizations. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is
incorporated by reference in the Act and has the legal status
of public law. The classified annex is made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2015 that is being reported by the Committee.
Title I--Budget and Personnel Authorizations
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the United States Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for Fiscal Year 2015.
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel
levels by program for Fiscal Year 2015 are contained in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 is intended to provide additional flexibility
to the DNI in managing the civilian personnel of the
Intelligence Community (IC). Section 103 provides that the DNI
may authorize employment of civilian personnel in Fiscal Year
2015 in excess of the number of authorized positions by an
amount not exceeding three percent of the total limit
applicable to each IC element under Section 102. The DNI may do
so only if necessary to the performance of important
intelligence functions.
Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the DNI and sets the
authorized personnel levels for the elements within the ICMA
for Fiscal Year 2015.
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2015 for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
TITLE III--General Intelligence Community Matters
SUBTITLE A--GENERAL MATTERS
Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
Section 303. Quadrennial Intelligence Strategic Review
Section 303 requires the DNI to perform a quadrennial
intelligence strategic review of the intelligence strategy,
capabilities, structure, policies, infrastructure, budget
plans, and other relevant aspects of intelligence programs and
activities of the United States to meet national security
objectives for the next ten years and to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on each such
review.
Given the IC's size, scope and complexity, the Committee
believes that the IC would benefit from a structured strategic
review effort--similar to the statutory Quadrennial Defense
Review conducted by the Department of Defense and the statutory
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review conducted by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--to ensure that the IC is
operating in an integrated and effective manner.
Section 304. Management and oversight of financial intelligence
Section 304 requires the DNI to prepare a plan for
management of the elements of the IC that carry out financial
intelligence activities.
Section 305. Plan for applying private sector best practices to
improving insider threat detection
Section 305 directs the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a plan for applying private sector best
practices for employee access and monitoring systems to certain
positions within the IC.
Section 306. Procedures for the retention of incidentally acquired
communications
Section 306 requires the head of each element of the IC to
adopt Attorney General-approved procedures that govern the
retention of nonpublic telephone or electronic communications
acquired without consent of a person who is a party to the
communications, including communications in electronic storage.
The procedures required under this section shall apply to
any intelligence activity that is reasonably anticipated to
result in the acquisition of such telephone or electronic
communications to or from a United States person not otherwise
authorized by court order, subpoena, or similar legal process,
regardless of the location where the collection occurs. The
procedures shall prohibit the retention of such telephone or
electronic communications for a period in excess of five years,
unless the communications are determined to fall within one of
several categories, enumerated in subsection (b)(3)(A), for
which retention in excess of five years is authorized, to
include communications that have been affirmatively determined
to constitute foreign intelligence or counterintelligence,
communications that are reasonably believed to constitute
evidence of a crime and are retained by a law enforcement
agency, and communications that are enciphered or reasonably
believed to have a secret meaning.
The Committee recognizes that it may be necessary in
certain instances for IC elements to retain communications
covered by this section for a period in excess of five years
that do not fall into the categories specifically enumerated in
subsection (b)(3)(A). Therefore, subsection (b)(3)(A)(vii)
provides flexibility for the head of each element of the
intelligence community to authorize such extended retention
where the head of the element determines that it is necessary
to protect the national security of the United States. In the
absence of such a determination, the Committee intends Section
306 to establish a default rule for intelligence collection
activities, not otherwise authorized by legal process, that
requires agencies to delete communications covered by this
section after five years, unless a determination is made that
the communications constitute foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence or otherwise meet the retention
requirements set forth in this section.
Section 307. Feasibility study on consolidating classified cyber threat
indicator and malware databases
Section 307 requires the DNI to conduct a feasibility study
on consolidating classified cyber threat indicator and malware
sample databases in the IC and to provide a report to the
congressional intelligence committees summarizing the
feasibility study.
Section 308. Sense of Congress on cybersecurity threat and cybercrime
cooperation with Ukraine
Section 308 expresses the sense of Congress concerning
cybersecurity threat and cybercrime cooperation between the
United States and Ukraine.
Section 309. Replacement of locally employed staff serving at United
States diplomatic facilities in the Russian Federation
Section 309 requires the Secretary of State to ensure that
every supervisory position at a U.S. diplomatic facility in the
Russian Federation is occupied by a citizen of the United
States who has passed a background check and to provide
Congress with a plan to further reduce reliance on locally
employed staff.
Section 310. Inclusion of restricted access spaces in United States
diplomatic facilities in the Russian Federation and adjacent
countries
Section 310 requires that each U.S. diplomatic facility
that is constructed in, or undergoes a construction upgrade in,
the Russian Federation, any country that shares a land border
with the Russian Federation, or any country that is a former
member of the Soviet Union shall be constructed to include
restricted access spaces. The Secretary of State may waive the
requirements of this section upon a determination that it is in
the national security interest of the United States.
SUBTITLE B--REPORTING
Section 311. Report on declassification process
Section 311 requires the DNI to submit a report to Congress
describing proposals to improve the declassification process
and steps the IC could take or legislation that may be
necessary, to enable the National Declassification Center to
better accomplish the missions assigned to the Center by
Executive Order 13526.
Section 312. Report on intelligence community efficient spending
targets
Section 312 requires the DNI to submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees on the status and
effectiveness of efforts to reduce administrative costs for the
IC during the preceding year.
Section 313. Annual report on violations of law or executive order
Section 313 requires the DNI to report annually to the
congressional intelligence committees on violations of law or
Executive order by personnel of an element of the IC that were
identified during the previous calendar year. Under the
National Security Act, the President is required to keep the
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently
informed of the intelligence activities of the United States
government. Nonetheless, the Committee has determined that this
annual reporting requirement is necessary to better ensure that
the intelligence oversight committees of the House and Senate
are made aware of violations of law or Executive order,
including, in particular, violations of Executive order 12333
for activities not otherwise subject to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Section 314. Annual report on intelligence activities of the Department
of Homeland Security
Section 314 requires the Under Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis of the DHS to provide the congressional
intelligence committees with a report on each intelligence
activity of each intelligence component of the Department that
includes, among other things, the amount of funding requested,
the number of full-time employees, and the number of full-time
contractor employees. In addition, Section 314 requires the
Secretary of Homeland Security, to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report that examines the feasibility
and advisability of consolidating the planning, programming,
and resourcing of such activities within the Homeland Security
Intelligence Program (HSIP).
The HSIP budget was established to fund those intelligence
activities that principally support missions of the DHS
separately from those of the NIP. To date, however, this
mechanism has only been used to supplement the budget for the
office of Intelligence and Analysis. It has not been used to
fund the activities of the non-IC components in the DHS that
conduct intelligence-related activities. As a result, there is
no comprehensive reporting to Congress regarding the overall
resources and personnel required in support of the Department's
intelligence activities.
Section 315. Report on intelligence sharing with Ukraine
Section 315 expresses the sense of Congress that the
President should provide the Government and armed forces of
Ukraine with appropriate intelligence sharing support. Section
315 also requires the DNI and the Secretary of Defense to
conduct an assessment of U.S. intelligence sharing with the
Government of Ukraine and to submit a report on the assessment
to the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 316. Report on political prison camps in North Korea
Section 316 requires the DNI to submit a report on
political prison camps in North Korea to the congressional
intelligence committees.
Committee Comments
Preventing surprise
In the last several years, the Nation has been caught off
guard by ``surprises''--the Arab Spring, Russia's incursion in
Crimea, and the implosion of Iraq. None are of the scale of
attacks on September 11, 2001, but suggest that the IC can
improve performance of a core function of warning policymakers
of important shifts in the security environment.
After every perceived intelligence ``failure,'' there are
calls to instill greater ``imagination'' in analytic thinking--
to surface the low-risk, high-impact contingencies that
intelligence analysts may overlook. The IC has pursued this
agenda over the decades through dedicated ``warning'' offices,
tradecraft requirements to employ certain structured analytic
techniques, and alternative methodologies. The latest effort in
this vein is described as ``anticipatory intelligence.''
Given the dynamism of the security environment and the new
analytic tools available to the IC, the Committee believes
greater IC-wide focus to this indispensable intelligence
function is required.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in coordination
with the heads of analysis of several IC elements, to develop a
plan for implementing the IC-wide adoption of alternative
analysis methodologies. While conceived through DNI leadership,
the Committee envisions this plan may be executed through
multiple IC elements as executive agents. This plan shall be
provided to the committees within 90 days of enactment of this
act.
Evaluation of demonstration programs
Various elements across the IC develop and acquire
demonstration programs to evaluate and test new technologies.
These experimental efforts may have multiple outcomes, such as
deployment as a new stand-alone system, integration into
another IC program of record, extension into another test
phase, or termination. To support these decisions, it is
critical to have an objective, data-driven assessment of the
programs' demonstrated capabilities, benefits to users, cost
and risk. The Committee believes the IC would benefit from a
more structured, rigorous and transparent process to support
this goal.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI to brief the
Committee within 90 days of enactment of this Act on a more
effective process to evaluate demonstration programs and
provide recommendations for future acquisition decisions.
Financial Exchange and Intelligence Integration (FIX-IIT)
The Committee commends the Office of the DNI for its recent
efforts to enhance coordination and integration in the
collection and analysis of financial intelligence across the
IC. In particular, the Committee applauds the recent initiative
by the National Intelligence Manager for Threat Finance and
Transnational Organized Crime known as Financial Exchange and
Intelligence Integration (FIX-IIT).
Successful cross-community collaboration on financial
intelligence holds significant promise as a force multiplier in
the government's efforts to understand, map, and disrupt
terrorist organizations, narco-trafficking networks,
proliferation networks, organized crime, and other threats.
However, FIX-ITT will only be as valuable as the information
and intelligence shared through it by members of the IC. To
support that objective, the Committee expects members of the
Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities to share
intelligence through FIX-IIT to the greatest extent possible,
under existing laws and regulations.
The Committee understands that FIX-ITT will be deployed in
July 2014 and that its success over time will be contingent on
properly assessing its performance against stated objectives.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI to provide an
assessment to the Committee of FIX-ITT's performance against
key performance metrics, to include the degree to which
relevant stakeholders are participating, within six months of
its deployment. This assessment should include recommendations
for any changes in authorities, funding, policy, or personnel
to ensure the success of FIX-ITT.
Space launch range services and capability
The Committee believes it is critical to preserve a variety
of launch range capabilities to support national security space
missions. Spaceports or launch and range complexes may provide
capabilities to reach mid-to-low inclination orbits or polar-
to-high inclination orbits. The Committee believes an important
component of this effort may be spaceports and launch and range
complexes that are commercially licensed by the Federal
Aviation Administration and operate in partnership with a local
or state government. Therefore, the Committee encourages the
IC, in partnership with the U.S. Air Force, to brief the
Committee on the relative role and contribution of spaceports
or launch and range complexes to our national security space
launch capacity.
Committee Action
On July 29, 2014, a quorum being present, the Committee met
to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the
following actions:
Votes on amendments to committee bill, this report and the classified
annex
By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and
Vice Chairman's bill the base text for purposes of amendment.
The Committee moved to consideration of a manager's
amendment by the Chairman that made changes throughout the bill
and this report. By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to
a second degree amendment to the manager's amendment to require
that every supervisory position at a United States diplomatic
facility in the Russian Federation be occupied by a citizen of
the United States who has passed a background check and to
require that any diplomatic facility that undergoes
construction in the Russian Federation, or an adjacent country,
includes a restricted access space. By unanimous consent, the
Committee agreed to the manager's amendment.
The Committee moved to consideration en bloc of an
amendment by Senator Udall that made changes to the classified
annex, an amendment by Senator Warner that made changes to the
classified annex, an amendment by Senator King that required a
report on intelligence community spending, an amendment by
Senator King that made changes to the classified annex, an
amendment by Senator Risch that made changes to the classified
annex, an amendment by Senator Rubio that required a report on
intelligence sharing with Ukraine, an amendment by Senator
Rubio that made changes to the classified annex, and an
amendment by Senator Wyden that made changes to the classified
annex. By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed en bloc to
second degree amendments that made modifications to each of
these amendments. By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed en
bloc to the amendments, as modified.
The Committee moved to consideration of an amendment by
Senator Rubio that required a report on political prison camps
in North Korea. By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to
the amendment.
The Committee moved to consideration of an amendment by
Senator Warner that made changes to the classified annex. By
unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to a second degree
amendments that made modifications to the amendment. By
unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to the amendment.
The Committee moved to consideration of an amendment by
Senator Warner that made changes to the classified annex. By
unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to a second degree
amendments that made modifications the amendment. By unanimous
consent, the Committee agreed to the amendment.
The Committee authorized the staff to make technical and
conforming changes in the bill, report, and classified annex,
following the completion of the mark-up.
Vote to report the committee bill
The Committee voted to report the bill, as amended, by a
vote of 15 ayes to 0 noes. The votes in person or by proxy were
as follows: Chairman Feinstein--aye; Senator Rockefeller--aye;
Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator Udall--aye;
Senator Warner--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye;
Vice Chairman Chambliss--aye; Senator Burr--aye; Senator
Risch--aye; Senator Coats--aye; Senator Rubio--aye; Senator
Collins-- aye; Senator Coburn--aye.
Compliance With Rule XLIV
Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule also
contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits.
Estimate of Costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On July 31,
2014, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing
the provisions of this legislation.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WARNER
I strongly believe that America's intelligence agencies
must be second-to-none. We live in an increasingly complex
world and rely upon our intelligence community to provide our
policymakers and military leaders with ample warning--so the
United States can make smart decisions and avoid strategic
surprise. Our intelligence professionals need the tools and
resources to keep the country secure. This bill provides for
these resources. But we must also be second-to-none in ensuring
that Americans' civil liberties and constitutional freedoms are
strongly protected. This bill provides improvements to
protecting civil liberties as well. And it is my intention to
ensure that the Senate Intelligence Committee continues to
provide robust oversight of the nation's intelligence
activities.
In this year's bill--as in previous years'--I have been a
strong advocate of ensuring that America's space architecture,
systems and technology remain second-to-none. As computing
power increases and technology becomes more powerful and more
sophisticated, it is vital that our nation's reconnaissance
systems maintain their technical edge. At a time when
commercial satellite companies and foreign nations are
launching smaller and more powerful satellites--including so-
called ``small-sats''--I want to ensure that the innovation and
revolution we see in the commercial sector does not leave our
intelligence agencies behind.
As potential adversaries rush to blunt our advantage in
space by developing ever more sophisticated practices and
countermeasures, I want to ensure our intelligence agencies can
embrace the advantages, efficiencies, cost-savings, innovative
acquisition practices, resiliency and burden- and risk-sharing
of working more closely with the commercial sector. As we make
serious decisions about investment priorities that will be felt
decades in the future, I firmly believe the intelligence
community cannot afford to ignore the innovation and cost-
savings that adopting successful commercial-like practices can
bring. As intelligence budgets decline due to budgetary
constraints, it is critical that strong oversight and
persistence on the part of this Committee guarantee that these
expensive systems are the best they can be, and provide the
best deal to the taxpayer. I will continue to work hard to
ensure that this is so.
I am proud to say that several amendments I offered on this
issue--with help from my colleagues--especially Senators Udall,
Mikulski and King, as well as the Chairman and Vice Chairman--
were accepted into the bill. While most of these amendments are
classified, I am also pleased to note that my unclassified
amendment supporting commercial space launch facilities that
operate in partnership with state and local government was
agreed to. Such facilities provide the promise of cost savings,
innovation, and flexibility in space launch--an area that has
otherwise become increasingly expensive.
While we sometimes hear about intelligence failures in the
press, we seldom hear of their successes--of which there are
many--and even more rarely do we say ``thank you'' to the men
and women who, often at great personal sacrifice to themselves
and their families, work tirelessly every day to keep us safe.
That is why I have worked with Senators Mikulski, Chambliss,
Feinstein, Burr, Udall, King and many others to give a small
token of thanks to the thousands of men and women of the
Intelligence Community who give their best to the nation--but
who do so in secrecy. We have designated July 26 as
Intelligence Professionals Day, and I am proud to note that for
the second year in a row the United States Senate has
unanimously approved my resolution to designate this day and
say thank you to these professionals. I note with pride that
Virginia is the home to thousands of these men and women, and
is also home to the headquarters of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Department of Defense, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation's Academy, as well as elements of every other
civilian and military intelligence agency.
Mark R. Warner.
Changes in Existing Laws
In the opinion of the Committee, it is necessary to
dispense with the requirements of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of
the Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the
business of the Senate.
