119th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 119-1
_______________________________________________________________________
R E P O R T
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
COVERING THE PERIOD
JANUARY 3, 2023
TO
JANUARY 3, 2025
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
February 20, 2025.--Ordered to be printed
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-010 WASHINGTON : 2025
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
TOM COTTON, Arkansas, Chairman
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman
RON WYDEN, Oregon JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado JERRY MORAN, Kansas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
JON OSSOFF, Georgia M. MICHAEL ROUNDS, South Dakota
MARK KELLY, Arizona TODD YOUNG, Indiana
TED BUDD, North Carolina
John Thune, South Dakota, Ex Officio Member
Charles Schumer, New York, Ex Officio Member
Roger F. Wicker, Mississippi, Ex Officio Member
Jack Reed, Rhode Island, Ex Officio Member
Ryan Tully, Staff Director
William Wu, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey S. Bailey, Chief Clerk
During the period covered by this report, the composition of the Select
Committee on Intelligence was as follows:
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RON WYDEN, Oregon SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico TOM COTTON, Arkansas
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado JERRY MORAN, Kansas
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York M. MICHAEL ROUNDS, South Dakota
JON OSSOFF, Georgia
MARK KELLY, Arizona
Charles Schumer, New York, Ex Officio Member
Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
Jack Reed, Rhode Island, Ex Officio Member
Roger F. Wicker, Mississippi, Ex Officio Member
Michael Casey, Staff Director
William Wu, Staff Director
Brian W. Walsh, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey S. Bailey, Chief Clerk
PREFACE
The Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate
this report on its activities from January 3, 2023, to January
3, 2025. This report also includes references to activities
underway at the conclusion of the 118th Congress that the
Committee expects to continue into the future.
Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th
Congress, the Committee is charged with the responsibility of
carrying out oversight of the programs and activities of the
Intelligence Community (IC) of the United States (U.S.). Most
of the Committee's oversight work is conducted in secret and
cannot be discussed publicly to protect sensitive IC sources
and methods. Nevertheless, the Select Committee on Intelligence
has submitted activities reports on a biennial basis since 1977
to provide the American public with information about its
intelligence oversight activities. We submit this report to the
Senate, in observance of this practice.
We also take this opportunity to thank all of the members
of the Committee in the 118th Congress. In particular, we take
special note of Senator Feinstein, who passed away on September
29, 2023. Senator Feinstein served on the Committee since the
107th Congress, and served as Chair of the Committee from 2009
to 2015. Her commitment to the important work of the Committee
has helped to ensure a strong IC and a secure nation. We are
grateful for her contributions. The Committee also notes the
extensive contributions of Senator Marco Rubio, who served on
the Committee since the 112th Congress, as Acting Chairman
during the 116th Congress, and as Vice Chairman during the
117th and 118th Congresses. His efforts resulted in
improvements to congressional oversight of national security,
IC authorities and personnel, and, importantly, legal and
operational authorities to counter our foreign adversaries.
Finally, the Committee notes Senator Robert Casey, Jr.'s
important contributions during the 117th and 118th Congresses.
We also express our deep gratitude for the work of all
Committee staff during the 118th Congress. Their vigilance,
professionalism, and perseverance were essential to the
Committee's fulfillment of its oversight obligations.
Tom Cotton,
Chairman.
Mark R. Warner,
Vice Chairman.
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Preface.......................................................... III
I. Introduction...................................................... 1
II. Legislation....................................................... 2
A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024............ 2
B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025............ 3
III.Oversight Activities.............................................. 4
A. Worldwide Threats Hearings..................................... 4
B. Russia and Ukraine............................................. 5
C. China and Taiwan............................................... 6
D. Iran........................................................... 6
E. North Korea.................................................... 6
F. Middle East and North Africa................................... 7
G. Western Hemisphere/Latin America/Caribbean..................... 7
H. Africa......................................................... 7
I. Implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.... 8
J. Covert Action.................................................. 8
K. Counterterrorism............................................... 9
L. Counterintelligence............................................ 9
M. Counternarcotics.............................................. 10
N. Artificial Intelligence....................................... 10
O. Emerging Technologies......................................... 11
P. Biological Security Threats................................... 11
Q. Energy Security............................................... 12
R. Cyber......................................................... 12
S. Audits and Projects........................................... 12
T. Anomalous Health Incidents.................................... 13
U. Personnel Vetting Reform...................................... 13
V. Foreign Malign Influence...................................... 14
W. Space......................................................... 14
X. Whistleblowers and Other Complainants......................... 15
Y. Inspectors General............................................ 16
IV. Nominations...................................................... 16
A. Timothy D. Haugh.............................................. 16
B. Michael Colin Casey........................................... 17
C. John Bradford Wiegmann........................................ 17
D. Kristi Zuleika Lane Scott..................................... 17
V. Support to the Senate............................................ 17
VI. Summary of Committee Actions..................................... 17
A. Number of meetings............................................ 17
B. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee............. 18
C. Bills referred to the Committee............................... 18
D. Committee publications........................................ 18
119th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 119-1
======================================================================
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
_______
February 20, 2025.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Cotton, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
I. INTRODUCTION
The activities of the Committee during the 118th Congress
included passage of critical enabling legislation, confirmation
of appointees to key IC leadership posts, and inquiries on the
performance and activities of the IC.
As detailed in Part II of this report, the Committee's
paramount legislative priority and achievement in the 118th
Congress was the successful enactment of Intelligence
Authorization Acts for both Fiscal Year 2024 and Fiscal Year
2025.
Throughout the 118th Congress, the Committee's oversight
activities focused on the national security threats posed by
The People's Republic of China (PRC or China) and the Russian
Federation (Russia), including China's military, economic, and
political activities around the world, and Russia's unjustified
and illegal invasion of Ukraine. In addition, the Committee
devoted considerable attention to the ongoing conflicts
involving The State of Israel (Israel), Hamas, Hezbollah, and
the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran). The Committee maintained
continued focus on the malign activities of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), as well as
strategically significant political, military, and economic
developments in Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South
America. The Committee also conducted vigorous oversight of
covert action, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence
programs carried out by the IC during the 118th Congress. The
Committee closely examined the Executive Branch's use of
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes,
particularly with respect to the implementation of Section 702
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Finally,
the Committee sustained its emphasis on overseeing the national
security implications of certain technological advancements and
advancing integration of emerging technologies into the IC,
including in the areas of artificial intelligence (AI),
biotechnology, and energy.
II. LEGISLATION
A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024
In the 118th Congress, the Committee focused its efforts on
enacting annual intelligence authorization acts as its primary
means of carrying out its oversight responsibility. In early
2023, the Committee began consideration of the President's
request for funding levels and legislative authority for Fiscal
Year 2024. The Committee evaluated the funding and legislative
requests submitted by the Executive Branch and conducted
numerous topical and regional briefings and hearings, including
classified budget hearings.
The Committee reported the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2024 (S. 2103) on June 22, 2023, and
subsequently filed an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 118-59) on
July 13, 2023.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence passed
its version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2024 (H.R. 3932) on July 13, 2023, and then reported the
bill to the full House and filed an accompanying report (H.
Rpt. 118-162) on August 18, 2023. The Committee proceeded to
work with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and other congressional committees on a final version of the
legislation.
The product of the committees' efforts, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, was incorporated as
Division G of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2024 (P.L. 118-31). The National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2024 passed the Senate on December 13, 2023 by
a vote of 87-13, and passed the House on December 14, 2023 by a
vote of 310-118. The President signed the bill into law on
December 22, 2023.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024
authorized funding for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities across the U.S. Government and was accompanied by a
classified schedule of authorizations and a classified annex.
The Act ensures accountability and integrity from IC agencies,
which undertake the Nation's most sensitive intelligence
programs and activities, and included significant legislative
provisions to strengthen national security by:
Increasing oversight of the national
security threats posed by the PRC, including its
economic practices, foreign malign influence
operations, and military capabilities;
Establishing an IC atrocities coordinator to
increase collection, analysis, and intelligence support
to government-wide efforts to hold China accountable
for its human rights abuses, including the Uyghur
genocide;
Improving the IC's procurement, adoption,
and integration of emerging technologies;
Enhancing insight into the Maduro regime's
imprisonment of U.S. persons in the Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela (Venezuela);
Improving workforce mobility among IC
agencies to meet national security needs;
Establishing new requirements for reporting
and investigating allegations of sexual assault and
sexual harassment within the CIA;
Promoting reform of the nation's security
classification system;
Continuing to drive improvement in the
security clearance process;
Requiring intelligence assessments of the
strategic competition in Latin America and the
Caribbean, as well as assessments of certain cartels;
and,
Ensuring continued support to the victims of
anomalous health incidents (AHIs or ``Havana
Syndrome'').
B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025
In early 2024, the Committee began consideration of the
President's request for funding levels and legislative
authority for Fiscal Year 2025. The Committee evaluated the
funding and legislative requests submitted by the Executive
Branch and conducted numerous topical and regional briefings
and hearings, including classified budget hearings, and
official oversight travel.
The Committee reported the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2024 (S. 4443) on June 3, 2024, and
subsequently filed an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 118-181) on
June 12, 2024.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence passed
its version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2025 (H.R. 8512) on June 11, 2024, and then reported the
bill to the full House and issued an accompanying report (H.
Rpt. 118-662) on September 11, 2024. The Committee proceeded to
work with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and other congressional committees on a final version of the
legislation.
The product of the committees' efforts, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, was incorporated as
Division F of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2025 (P.L. 118-159). The National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2025 passed the House on December 11, 2024,
by a vote of 281-140, and passed the Senate on December 18,
2024, by a vote of 85-14. The President signed the bill into
law on December 23, 2024.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025
authorized funding for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities across the U.S. Government and was accompanied by a
classified schedule of authorizations and a classified annex.
The Act, as incorporated in the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2025, ensures accountability and integrity
from IC agencies and contained a number of legislative
provisions, including:
Increasing oversight of the national
security threats posed by the PRC including its
attempts to evade sanctions, as well as its military
capabilities, and investments in, and attempts to
dominate, supply chains;
Enhancing the IC's ability to identify and
counter adversary threats relating to biotechnologies,
including by improving and modernizing the roles,
missions, and objectives of the National
Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center and by
standardizing the IC's processes for collecting and
analyzing biological data;
Improving the IC's response to foreign
ransomware organizations, including by promoting the
designation of leading ransomware groups as hostile
foreign cyber actors;
Enhancing policies relating to AI, including
by establishing an AI Security Center within the
National Security Agency (NSA) to advance AI security
research;
Expanding the IC's ability to procure,
transition, and incorporate emerging technologies,
including by enhancing public-private talent exchanges;
Increasing the IC's focus on the growing
threats to the U.S. by the Islamic State of Iraq and
ash-Sham (ISIS) and affiliated terrorist organizations;
Requiring the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy to
advise National Laboratories regarding visitors and
assignees who pose counterintelligence risks;
Requiring a strategy to improve information
sharing between the Federal government and the private
sector regarding foreign adversary-based threats to
U.S. critical minerals and other energy-related
projects abroad;
Requiring the IC to conduct an assessment of
the likely course of Russia's war in Ukraine, and the
effects of Western support to Ukraine;
Requiring the IC to conduct an assessment of
the lessons learned by the IC with respect to the
Israel-Hamas war;
Improving oversight related to the Western
Hemisphere, specifically related to national security
implications of visa-free travel by certain foreign
nationals;
Enhancing insight into the Maduro regime's
relationship with state sponsors of terrorism and
foreign terrorist organizations;
Increasing support for IC recruitment and
integration;
Extending the requirement for annual reports
on strikes against terrorist targets;
Requiring a Government Accountability Office
(GAO) review of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution
Office regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena
reporting and Federal agency coordination;
Reforming management of controlled access
programs to improve congressional oversight; and
Maintaining strong congressional oversight
of and enhancing protections for IC whistleblowers.
III. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES
A. Worldwide Threats Hearings
Since 1994, the Committee has held annual open hearings to
review the IC's assessment of the current and projected
national security threats to the U.S. There have been only two
years (1999 and 2020) when the Committee did not hold a
``Worldwide Threats'' hearing. It is one of the few open
hearings that the Committee has regularly conducted to share
the work of the IC with the public. These Worldwide Threats
hearings cover national security assessments pertaining to all
geographic regions, as well as transnational threats such as
terrorism and the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass
destruction.
On March 8, 2023 and March 11, 2024, the Committee held
open Worldwide Threats hearings on the current and projected
threats to the U.S. The lead witness before the Committee at
both hearings was Director of National Intelligence Avril
Haines. During the March 8, 2023 hearing, she was joined at the
witness table by the Honorable William J. Burns, Director of
the CIA; the Honorable Christopher Wray, Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); General Paul Nakasone,
U.S. Army, Director of the NSA; and Lieutenant General Scott
Berrier, U.S. Army, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA). During the March 11, 2024 hearing, she was joined at the
witness table by the Honorable William J. Burns, Director of
the CIA; the Honorable Christopher Wray, Director of the FBI;
General Timothy D. Haugh, U.S. Air Force, Director of the NSA;
Lieutenant General Jeffrey A. Kruse, U.S. Air Force Director of
the DIA; and Brett M. Holmgren, Assistant Secretary of State
for Intelligence and Research. Both open (public) hearings were
followed by closed, classified sessions. Video recordings of
the open hearings are available on the Committee's website,
along with Director Haines's unclassified statements for the
record.
B. Russia and Ukraine
During the 118th Congress, the Committee focused
extensively on the threat to U.S. national security from
Russia, including its continuing unjustified and illegal
invasion of Ukraine that began on February 24, 2022. The
Committee conducted at least 16 formal hearings and briefings
on issues specifically focusing on the threat from Russia,
including its war against Ukraine, as well as numerous other
briefings and hearings where the threat from Russia was a key
topic.
In addition to the Committee's focus on the threat from
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it also examined the threat posed
by Russia's other malign activities around the world. These
include Russia's traditional and cyber espionage, ransomware,
malign influence activities, sabotage operations, and
asymmetric threats, including threats to U.S. and global space
and undersea architecture.
The Committee held hearings and briefings on Russia's
continued reliance on misinformation and disinformation to
target global audiences and interfere with elections and
democratic processes in the United States and around the world,
as well as Russia's use of corruption and criminal networks to
further its strategic goals.
The Committee further examined Russia's economic and
industrial capacity to rebuild its conventional, strategic, and
asymmetric arsenals, often in contravention of the
international sanctions and the export control regime imposed
after its invasion of its sovereign neighbor. Key to Russia's
capacity has been a convergence among previously disparate
authoritarian countries, including China, Iran, and North
Korea, all of which have enabled Russia to continue its war in
Ukraine, including through military and economic support.
The Committee's activities regarding these issues were
designed to provide oversight and assess the IC's capabilities
to collect against, analyze, provide warning of, and counter
these and other malign activities of Russia under the
leadership of Vladimir Putin.
In its Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025,
the Committee enacted legislation relating to Russia that
directs the IC to provide an assessment of the likely course of
the war in Ukraine, depending upon whether the United States
maintains or withdraws military and economic assistance;
directs the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary
of Defense to establish a working group to identify lessons
learned from the war in Ukraine; and directs the DNI to submit
a report on Russia's support to foreign terrorist
organizations.
C. China and Taiwan
The Committee prioritized the PRC as the greatest national
and economic security threat to the U.S. throughout the 118th
Congress. The Committee dedicated a significant number of both
classified and open hearings and briefings to threats posed by
China, including the threat to Taiwan.
Through oversight briefings and hearings, the Committee
continued to evaluate the IC's budget and programs to ensure
its capabilities, collection posture, and analysis relating to
the PRC were sufficient to defend our national security. In
addition, the Committee focused its attention on the PRC's
military, intelligence, and economic, activities around the
world, including its efforts to obtain, dominate, and leverage
for political and economic influence specific technologies,
including relating to energy and biotechnologies.
D. Iran
The Committee held hearings, briefings, and roundtables
focused on Iran's outsized role in creating instability and
supporting terrorist activity in the Middle East and beyond,
with special attention paid to Iranian proxies and its so-
called ``Axis of Resistance'' following the onset of
hostilities in October 2023, the Iranian nuclear program, and
ongoing Iranian support to Russian aggression in Ukraine. The
Committee focused on intelligence collection to better
ascertain Iranian plans and intentions and held hearings to
explore Iran's role in regional instability and its
contribution to global tension through its loose alliance with
other American adversaries, such as Russia, China, and North
Korea. The Committee also identified opportunities for
partnerships with regional allies to combat Iranian malign
influence and supported efforts to identify and disrupt Iranian
threats to former U.S. government officials involved in the
2020 strike that killed Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps--Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.
E. North Korea
During the 118th Congress, the Committee continued to
monitor the threat posed by North Korea, including holding two
hearings and conducting multiple engagements with the IC. In
particular, the Committee's efforts focused on the regime's
escalatory rhetoric and military actions aimed at the Republic
of Korea (South Korea), growing weapons programs, illicit cyber
activities, and sanctions violations. The Committee also
conducted oversight of North Korea's cooperation and
coordination with foreign adversaries, including Russia.
F. Middle East and North Africa
The Committee conducted briefings, roundtables, and
extensive official travel to the Middle East and North Africa
to conduct oversight, especially following the HAMAS terrorist
attack on Israel in October of 2023 and associated disruption
to regional norms. The Committee held several hearings
examining the role of intelligence in the run up and conduct of
the conflict, the U.S. intelligence relationship with Israel,
and the reaction of regional partners and adversaries. The
Committee examined the role the region and the ongoing
conflicts play in the broader global realignment, with the U.S.
and its allies on one side and Russia, China, Iran, and North
Korea on the other. The Committee also focused on U.S.
intelligence support to operations targeting the Huthis in the
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Yemen) following their
attacks on Red Sea shipping, the U.S. footprint in Iraq and
Syria, and the stability of countries such as Iraq and Lebanon.
Finally, the Committee closely monitored the partnerships and
alliances across the region, including with the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman,
through several oversight visits focused on intelligence and
national security priorities regarding these critical
relationships.
G. Western Hemisphere/Latin America/Caribbean
The Committee focused its efforts on monitoring key
elections across the region in the Argentine Republic
(Argentina), Dominican Republic, the Republic of El Salvador
(El Salvador), the Republic of Guatemala (Guatemala), the
United Mexican States (Mexico), the Republic of Panama
(Panama), the Republic of Paraguay (Paraguay), the Oriental
Republic of Uruguay (Uruguay), and Venezuela. The Committee
also tracked developments in the authoritarian regimes in the
Republic of Cuba (Cuba), the Republic of Nicaragua (Nicaragua),
and Venezuela; and tracked instability in the Plurinational
State of Bolivia (Bolivia) and the Republic of Haiti (Haiti).
The Committee continued to monitor the supply chain,
production, and trafficking of illicit narcotics, with
increased focus on synthetic opioids; the threat posed by
violent transnational criminal organizations to the U.S. and
the stability of the region; and the military and intelligence
activities of U.S. adversaries in Latin America and the
Caribbean, including escalation in PRC and Russian activity.
H. Africa
During the 118th Congress, the Committee remained
steadfastly focused on Africa, including the Sahel, Sudan, and
the Sub-Saharan region.
The Committee conducted close oversight on the humanitarian
crisis and escalating violence in the Republic of Sudan, which
has displaced millions of civilians, resulted in thousands of
deaths, and left over half the population with substantial food
insecurities. The Committee also sustained its focus on the
role of foreign external actors in supporting the atrocities
occurring on both sides of the Sudan conflict, and holding
those external actors to account.
The Committee further focused closely on U.S. adversaries'
malicious activities across the region. Russia and its military
and political proxies intensified disinformation efforts,
especially in the Sahel region and other politically fragile
areas, to sow discord and secure support for Russia's own
military and economic agendas.
Likewise, China continues to attempt to secure influence
and military footprints under the auspices of economic
investment. The Committee renewed focus, in particular, on
China's nefarious attempts to control critical material supply
chains and other energy resources across the continent as part
of China's ongoing efforts to dominate power generation for
economic and geo-political gain.
Finally, the Committee continued to conduct oversight on
the growing terrorist threat emanating from the Sahel,
particularly in the wake of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
the Republic of Niger (Niger), as well as amid the rise of
foreign-sown anti-U.S. sentiment in West Africa and increasing
political violence and instability across the continent.
I. Implementation of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act
The Committee, since its inception in 1976, has considered
oversight of the Executive Branch's use of electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes to be one of its
most important responsibilities. This oversight has covered
both collection activities conducted pursuant to FISA and
activities that fall outside of FISA and are governed by
Executive Order 12333. During the 118th Congress, a central
focus of these oversight efforts included the implementation of
Section 702 of FISA, as established in the FISA Amendments Act
of 2008, which provided procedures for intelligence collection
activities targeting non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be
located outside the U.S. In particular, the Committee conducted
extensive oversight of non-compliance with applicable statutory
or procedural requirements, especially incidents involving U.S.
person queries of information acquired pursuant to Section 702
of FISA and performed by the FBI. This oversight resulted in
enactment of the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America
Act (H.R. 7888, P.L. 118-49) (RISAA) on April 20, 2024. RISAA
imposed new restrictions and limitations on queries performed
by the FBI. The Act also reauthorized for two years the
critical intelligence authorities against foreign targets, as
set forth in Title VII of FISA, while providing enhanced
transparency and privacy protections for Americans and
individuals in the U.S., among other reforms.
J. Covert Action
The Committee conducted vigorous oversight of covert action
programs throughout the 118th Congress. The Committee's rules
require the Committee's Staff Director to ``ensure that covert
action programs of the United States government receive
appropriate consideration once a quarter.'' In accordance with
this rule, the Committee receives a written report every
quarter on each covert action program that is being carried out
under a presidential finding. Committee staff reviews these
reports and meet with IC personnel to discuss their substance
and pose additional questions. The Committee also holds
periodic hearings and briefings on covert action programs,
conducts official oversight travel, and receives written
reviews of covert actions from the CIA Inspector General, which
are often the basis for additional staff inquiries.
Further, under section 503 of the National Security Act (50
U.S.C. Sec. 3093), the Director of National Intelligence and
the heads of all departments, agencies, and entities of the
U.S. Government involved in a covert action are required to
keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and
currently informed of all covert actions that are the
responsibility of, are engaged in, by, or are carried out for,
or on behalf of any department or agency of the U.S. Upon
receiving such notifications, the Committee reviews the details
of each and receives briefings to fully understand the issues.
The Committee seeks to ensure that covert action programs
are consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals, and are
conducted in accordance with all applicable U.S. laws.
K. Counterterrorism
In the 118th Congress, the Committee conducted oversight of
the IC's counterterrorism programs and activities, through
hearings, briefings, roundtables, and official overseas travel.
The Committee reviewed the IC's response to the threat posed to
the U.S. from foreign terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and
ISIS, including ISIS Khorasan, and its activities related to a
series of overseas attacks and the threat they posed to the
U.S. homeland. Specifically, the Committee focused on examining
how counterterrorism resources are directed against the most
pressing threats, the role of the IC in combatting domestic
violent extremism, ensuring the proper use of intelligence
resources and protection of Americans' civil liberties, and
clarifying the respective responsibilities of the National
Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security's
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and the FBI. As part of
the Committee's official oversight travel overseas, the
Committee reviewed on-the-ground IC counterterrorism
activities, as well as liaison relationships with foreign
partners.
L. Counterintelligence
During the 118th Congress, the Committee continued its work
defining counterintelligence roles and responsibilities within
the IC, while ensuring that the counterintelligence enterprise
remained equipped with the authorities and resources to stay
apace of adversaries, particularly the PRC, Iran, Cuba, and
Russia. In response to direction in the Report to Accompany the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, the
Director of National Intelligence provided definitions of
``strategic counterintelligence'' and ``offensive
counterintelligence,'' both of which will help to clarify
interagency counterintelligence operations. Notably, this
effort stems from the Committee's non-partisan Audits and
Projects Team's comprehensive 18-month study in 2021-22 on the
role of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center
(NCSC) and the report's recommendations to improve NCSC and
strengthen integration. The Committee ensured timely updates
from NCSC as well as the FBI on a number of ongoing threat
streams. Topics of oversight included the guilty pleas of a
former FBI official and a former State Department employee for
working for a sanctioned Russian oligarch and for Cuba,
respectively; the threat posed by Iran against U.S. government
officials; risks posed by PRC telecommunications technology;
and the counterintelligence implications of adversarial cyber-
attacks.
M. Counternarcotics
In the 118th Congress, the Committee conducted oversight
over the IC's counternarcotics programs and activities through
hearings, briefings, and official oversight overseas travel.
The Committee supported an amendment to FISA, enacted as part
of RISAA, to enhance the collection of foreign intelligence
concerning the ``international production, distribution, or
financing of illicit synthetic drugs, opioids, cocaine, or
other drugs driving overdose deaths, or precursors of any
aforementioned.'' Furthermore, the Committee continued to
monitor the supply chain, production, and trafficking of
illicit narcotics, with a focus on synthetic opioids; the
threat posed by violent transnational criminal organizations to
the U.S.; and the need for increased intelligence sharing
between law enforcement and the IC to better map and target
drug trafficking networks. As part of its overseas oversight
travel, the Committee reviewed on-the-ground IC
counternarcotics activities, as well as liaison relationships
with foreign partners.
N. Artificial Intelligence
The Committee elevated efforts to address the national
security implications of AI in the 118th Congress. Through
multiple Committee hearings, including a public hearing with
one of the world's leading AI innovators and prominent thought
leaders, the Committee sought to identify advantages of AI to
the IC's mission, challenges and legal implications to the IC's
adoption of AI, and growing threats posed by foreign
adversaries' embrace of AI tools. The Committee engaged closely
with private sector and academic experts to understand research
development and commercial trends, as well as examine
opportunities for adversarial use of AI and machine learning-
based technologies. In addition, the Chairman and Vice Chairman
convened meetings with industry-leading executives and national
security leaders to improve public-private collaboration in AI.
Building on efforts initiated as part of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, the Committee enacted
legislation in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2024 to require the Director of National Intelligence to
establish governance policies applicable to development,
purchase, and adoption of AI by the IC, including promoting
testing, evaluation, and documentation of capabilities
developed or acquired by the IC. As part of the Intelligence
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2025, the Committee also
established the NSA's AI Security Center, directing it to
develop guidance to prevent counter-AI techniques for public
and private sector users, as well as promote secure AI adoption
practices for managers of national security systems. The
Committee further sought to advance legislation in the Senate
that promoted authenticity and provenance measures for
synthetic media, promoted broader federal efforts to address AI
security, and established a clear inter-agency process by which
national security risks directed--or emanating from--AI systems
could be communicated to the private sector.
O. Emerging Technologies
During the 118th Congress, the Committee continued its
oversight of foundational and emerging technologies that have
significant implications for national security and national
competitiveness. The Committee pushed the IC to meet the
challenge of identifying and publishing intelligence relating
to emerging and disruptive technologies that can support
policymakers outside of the traditional defense realm.
Committee staff continued to work with the IC to identify
the intelligence needs of federal agencies responsible for
monitoring and countering efforts related to those
technologies, and formulate strategies to promote U.S. and
allied alternatives to counter adversary efforts. The Committee
focused on identifying technologies and related supply chains
that may confer military, political, and economic leverage for
foreign adversaries, including enhancing the ability of foreign
adversaries to shape wider technology ecosystems for strategic
objectives and geopolitical influence.
The Committee continued to provide oversight of critical
emerging technology areas such as semiconductors,
biotechnologies, and energy (described in further detail
separately in this report), and advocated for the national
security needs that are unique to IC and defense customers for
critical emerging technologies. The Committee engaged closely
with private sector experts, the IC, and other departments and
agencies to understand the unique needs of national security
customers with respect to these technologies, as well as
critical supply chain dependencies and other impacts of global,
strategic competition that could have implications for U.S.
national security. The Committee also worked to craft
legislation to ensure that the IC's acquisition and integration
of emerging technologies are streamlined and efficient, and
that the IC continues to lead in the innovation and adoption of
emerging technologies, including through public-private
cooperation.
P. Biological Security Threats
As part of the Committee's focus on technologies that might
confer military, economic, or political leverage for foreign
adversaries, the Committee expanded its oversight efforts of
biological security threats, including bioweapons,
biotechnologies, and use of synthetic biology to create
advanced weapons.
In particular, the Committee conducted oversight by
convening Senate Committees and IC experts, hosting public-
private roundtables, holding briefings, conducting official
oversight travel, and proposing legislation, to ensure that the
IC is postured to identify, counter, and respond to biological
security threats posed by foreign adversaries. The Committee
also worked to ensure the IC supports the needs of federal
agencies responsible for responding to biological security
threats to our country and private sector companies that may be
targets for foreign adversaries attempting to steal or
otherwise threaten U.S. innovations.
Q. Energy Security
The Committee remained focused on emerging technologies and
related supply chains critical to energy security and
resiliency. The Committee held briefings, convened public-
private roundtables, conducted official travel, and met with
experts across industry, academia, and government, to counter
foreign adversary efforts to control emerging energy
technologies, and to ensure that the IC is postured to support
U.S. and allied leadership in innovating, securing, and
deploying energy technologies.
In particular, the Committee focused on efforts by the PRC
to monopolize supply chains for next-generation batteries,
including critical material inputs, equipment, and chemistries
for battery technologies. The Committee also focused on
adversary efforts by the PRC and Russia to commercialize and
deploy energy generation technologies, especially small modular
and advanced nuclear reactors, across Europe, Africa, Asia, and
Latin America, in order to gain global geopolitical and
economic leverage, aiming to undermine U.S. national and
economic security.
R. Cyber
During the 118th Congress, the Committee continued to
monitor the IC's efforts to identify and track foreign cyber
actors that pose significant threats to the U.S. and its
allies, including foreign threats to government networks. The
Committee closely tracked the threats posed by the PRC cyber
actors referred to publicly as Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon
which pose serious threats to U.S. critical and
telecommunications infrastructure. In addition, the Committee
performed vigorous oversight of the IC's posture to warn of
cyber threats leading up to the 2024 U.S. federal elections,
holding both open and closed hearings with government officials
and relevant private sector stakeholders.
The Committee focused on the growing risk to U.S. national
security interests posed by foreign ransomware actors. As part
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, the
Committee advanced legislation that promoted deeming ransomware
threats to U.S. critical infrastructure as an intelligence
priority and encouraged the designation of leading ransomware
groups as hostile foreign cyber actors.
The Committee continued its oversight over IC cyber
activities, to include the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence's Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center and
the NSA's Cybersecurity Directorate. As noted in previous
biennial reports, the Committee continues to be hampered in
conducting effective oversight of joint cyber activities
involving the IC and U.S. Cyber Command.
S. Audits and Projects
The Committee's rules stipulate that within its staff there
``shall be an element with the capability to perform audits of
programs and activities undertaken by departments and agencies
with intelligence functions. Such element shall be comprised of
persons qualified by training and/or experience to carry out
such functions in accordance with accepted auditing
standards.'' This capability resides within the Committee's
``Audits and Projects Team.'' The Committee charges the Audits
and Projects Team to conduct in-depth reviews of IC-related
matters and assist the Committee with its oversight
obligations. The Committee has also assigned the Audits and
Projects Team responsibility for managing the Committee's
relationship with the GAO, to include overseeing the
development and execution of reviews that the Committee assigns
to GAO, and for managing the Committee relationship with IC
Inspectors General. In addition, the Audits and Projects Team
works with Committee Counsel to manage the whistleblower and
complainant intake and review process.
During the 118th Congress, the Audits and Projects Team
conducted an in-depth review of the CIA's efforts to facilitate
medical care, financial compensation, and other benefits to
CIA-affiliated personnel who reported AHIs. This work supports
the Committee's broader and continued oversight of this
important topic. The Audits and Projects Team's review
culminated in a classified report that offered 11
recommendations to CIA and three potential actions for
congressional consideration to address challenges the Committee
identified during its review. The Audits and Projects Team also
produced an unclassified summary of the classified report,
which is available on the Committee's website.
Additionally, the Audits and Projects Team continued to
support Committee oversight of the counterintelligence
enterprise by working with the NCSC on implementation of the
Committee's 17 recommendations from its prior organizational
assessment of the NCSC.
T. Anamolous Health Incidents
Throughout the 118th Congress, the Committee has continued
its oversight of the IC's response to reported AHIs through
hearings, briefings, and meetings with individuals who have
been affected by such incidents. The foci of this oversight
have included the IC's implementation of the authorities
provided by Helping American Victims Affected by Neurologic
Attacks Act of 2021, investigations into the potential causes
of anomalous health incidents, and related research. As noted
above, the Audits and Projects Team completed a review of the
CIA's efforts to facilitate medical care, financial
compensation, and other benefits to CIA affiliates affected by
such incidents. Members of the Committee remain committed to
supporting individuals affected by these health incidents and
overseeing the IC's investigations into their causes.
U. Personnel Vetting Reform
During the 118th Congress, the Committee continued its
rigorous oversight of the Executive Branch's efforts to reform
a personnel vetting model that had remained largely unchanged
for more than 70 years. Since 2016, the Committee has sponsored
quarterly briefings from the Performance Accountability
Council, led by the Office of Management and Budget, to keep
all congressional committees in the House and Senate apprised
of reforms to address problems surfaced by the Navy Yard
shooting in 2013; the government's public admission in 2015 of
China's breach of personnel data held by the Office of
Personnel Management; and the introduction of the new Trusted
Workforce 2.0 paradigm. The Director of National Intelligence
bears particular responsibility in leading these reforms as the
government's statutory Security Executive Agent. The Committee
has taken specific interest in efforts to vet government and
contract personnel employed in the IC.
The Committee held hearings on Trusted Workforce 2.0 and on
the remediation plan to get the National Background
Investigation System (NBIS) on track following significant
technical and program management issues. With renewed oversight
and governance mechanisms put in place by the Department of
Defense, the program is on track to deliver capabilities to
investigative service providers and sunset legacy systems.
Following a longstanding tradition of legislating in this area,
both the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024
and the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025
contained provisions on personnel vetting. These Acts
established expectations regarding shared IT infrastructure and
tools in support of personnel vetting, timeliness standards and
reporting requirements to increase accountability, transparency
and performance metrics related to personnel vetting, among
other things. The Committee's sustained, bipartisan pressure
has yielded results: the backlog in background investigations
that once topped 725,000, has reached a reasonable steady
state. There have been significant improvements in timelines
for adjudications of clearances to levels established in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
reciprocity across agencies, and the Executive Branch's
adoption of Trusted Workforce 2.0.
V. Foreign Malign Influence
During the 118th Congress, the Committee continued its
longstanding efforts to monitor foreign malign influence
activity and evaluate the IC's ability to identify, analyze,
and disrupt such activity. With the increased availability of
powerful generative AI tools, the Committee engaged leading
private sector and civil society experts to identify risks of
foreign misuse of these tools for foreign malign influence
applications, as well as evaluate policy interventions and
responses to mitigate such impacts.
As it has in previous U.S. federal elections in 2018, 2020,
and 2022, the Committee maintained its oversight on the posture
of the IC towards foreign malign influence activity directed at
U.S. federal elections. Pursuant to this effort, the Committee
held briefings with IC agencies throughout 2024 to evaluate
intelligence collection and analysis and assess the federal
government's ability to expose and counter foreign efforts to
undermine or interfere with U.S. democratic processes. In
September 2024, the Committee held a public hearing with
leading American technology companies to assess their posture
towards foreign exploitation of their services.
W. Space
During the 118th Congress, the Committee continued to
oversee the IC's critical role in the space domain and monitor
the growing space and counterspace threats posed by China and
Russia. Consistent with efforts during the previous Congress,
the Committee focused on ensuring the IC has reliable and
resilient access to, and an ability to operate in, space to
provide intelligence support.
The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is focused on the
ongoing build-out of its proliferated overhead architecture,
growing the number of NRO satellites from dozens on orbit to
hundreds, which will result in the largest government
constellation in history. The success of this architecture
depends on effective collaboration and unity of effort between
NRO and the range of stakeholders in the Department of Defense
and the IC, for which the Committee continues to advocate.
Committee oversight is focused on acquisition and budget
challenges, as well as ensuring that NRO and its partners are
taking advantage of AI, automation, and other advanced
technologies, which is critical to improve the speed and
quality of data delivered to the warfighter and other
government customers.
The Committee held hearings and briefings on NRO's approach
to resilience in an increasingly contested domain, the
expanding role of commercial space within the IC, and adversary
threats to U.S. space infrastructure. After the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) took over the Maven
program from the Department of Defense, the Committee also
focused on ensuring that NGA effectively integrates Maven--
which applies AI to process and analyze large volumes of
geospatial data more efficiently--into NGA operations. The
Committee continues to advocate for increased use of AI and
other advanced technologies, and to encourage the NRO and NGA
to capitalize on the ongoing revolution in the commercial space
sector, which has yielded reductions in the cost of launch, new
sensor technologies, smaller satellites, and sophisticated data
analytics and services.
In addition to hearings, briefings, and regular committee
staff interactions with the NRO and NGA, the Committee has been
active in ensuring NRO and NGA work to meet increasing
intelligence demands from U.S. warfighters, partners, and
allies. The Committee and its staff also engaged frequently on
overhead architecture topics with the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence and other IC and Department of Defense
government officials and conducted site visits to government
facilities and commercial companies to meet with government
officials and industry leaders. The Committee also continued to
monitor the establishment of the U.S. Space Force as the
eighteenth and newest element of the IC to ensure it meets the
standards set for all IC elements.
X. Whistleblowers and Other Complainants
The Committee annually receives hundreds of phone calls,
letters, and email communications from self-identified
whistleblowers and other complainants on matters they believe
constitute a violation of law, rule, or regulation; gross
mismanagement; waste of resources; abuse of authority; or a
substantial danger to public health and safety. Committee staff
reviewed and, where warranted, investigated those complaints,
often working closely with the Inspectors General of agencies
in the IC. During the 118th Congress, the Committee received a
significant number of complaints specific to the CIA's handling
of allegations of sexual assault and harassment among its work
force. The Committee met with numerous individuals who wanted
to share their experience, resulting in Committee legislative
action, additional and ongoing oversight efforts, and a request
for an Inspector General investigation.
Y. Inspectors General
The Committee continued its strong relationship with, and
oversight of, the Inspectors General of agencies in the IC.
During the 118th Congress, this oversight consisted of reviews
of Inspectors General semiannual reports and annual work plans,
commissioning specific audits and reviews, and regular
engagements with leadership and staff from the Offices of the
Inspectors General. During this Congress, the Committee has
taken special interest in ensuring that the Inspectors General
have the independence necessary to carry out their critical
missions. To that end, the Committee commissioned a report by
the Intelligence Community Inspector General on the
independence of all Inspectors General in the IC and took
legislative actions to protect their budgetary resources.
IV. NOMINATIONS
During the 118th Congress, the Committee received four
nominations from President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Section 17 of S. Res. 400 of the 94th Congress (as amended)
and a 2009 unanimous consent agreement govern referrals of
nominations to the Committee. S. Res. 445, which amended S.
Res. 400 in 2004, required all nominations to positions in the
IC requiring the Senate's advice and consent be reported by the
Select Committee on Intelligence, even when they are positions
within departments that are primarily under the jurisdiction of
other Senate committees, though the committee overseeing the
given department or agency may hold hearings and interviews on
the nomination. Notwithstanding that general guidance, the
resolution directed the Assistant Attorney General for National
Security be reported by the Committee on the Judiciary, but
referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence. In the wake
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014,
which made the directors and Inspectors General of the NRO and
the NSA Senate-confirmed positions, the Senate adopted S. Res.
470 on July 7, 2014. This resolution directed that if the
nominee were a civilian, the Select Committee on Intelligence
would report the nomination and refer it to the Committee on
Armed Services, and if the nominee were a member of the Armed
Forces on active duty, the reverse.
A unanimous consent agreement of January 7, 2009, refers
all nominations for Inspectors General to the committees of
primary jurisdiction and then sequentially to the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Under
this consent agreement, the nominations for the NRO and NSA
Inspectors General are also referred to the Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee. The exception to this
consent agreement is the Inspector General for the CIA, which
is considered exclusively by the Select Committee on
Intelligence.
The following nominations were referred to the Committee
during the 118th Congress:
A. Timothy D. Haugh, Director of the
National Security Agency
On May 30, 2023, President Biden nominated Lieutenant
General Timothy D. Haugh, U.S. Air Force, to be the Director of
the NSA. Pursuant to S. Res. 400, the nomination was initially
referred to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, which
favorably reported the nomination on June 13, 2023. Upon
sequential referral, the Committee held a hearing on July 12,
2023. The Committee reported the nomination favorably on July
13, 2023, and the Senate confirmed Director Haugh by voice vote
on December 19, 2023.
B. Michael Colin Casey, Director of the National Counterintelligence
and Security Center
On June 8, 2023, President Biden nominated Michael Colin
Casey to be the Director of the National Counterintelligence
and Security Center. The Committee held a hearing on July 12,
2023, and reported the nomination favorably on July 26, 2023.
The Senate confirmed Director Casey by voice vote on September
19, 2023.
C. John Bradford Wiegmann, General Counsel of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence
On April 18, 2024, President Biden nominated John Bradford
Wiegmann to be General Counsel of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence. The Committee held a hearing on June 5,
2024, and reported the nomination favorably on September 11,
2024.
D. Kristi Zuleika Lane Scott, Inspector General of the National
Security Agency
On July 31, 2024, President Biden nominated Kristi Zuleika
Lane Scott to be Inspector General of the NSA. The nomination
was referred to the Committee but no further action was taken
before the 118th Congress adjourned sine die.
V. SUPPORT TO SENATE
Under Senate Resolution 400, which established the
Committee in 1976, the Select Committee on Intelligence has an
important role in assuring that the IC provides ``informed and
timely intelligence necessary for the executive and legislative
branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and
vital interests of the Nation.'' The Committee fulfills this
responsibility by providing access to IC information and
officials to the U.S. Senate.
The Committee facilitated access to IC information for
members and staff outside the Committee by inviting them to
participate in briefings and hearings on issues of shared
jurisdiction or interest. The Committee also provided
intelligence briefings by its professional staff to Members
outside the Committee and assisted Members in resolving issues
with intelligence agencies.
VI. SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTIONS
A. Number of Meetings
During the 118th Congress, the Committee held a total of
102 on-the-record interviews, meetings, briefings, and
hearings, as well as numerous off-the-record briefings. There
were 25 oversight hearings, including 11 hearings on the IC
budget. Of these 25 hearings, 10 were open to the public,
including open confirmation hearings for 3 administration
nominees, while the remainder were closed to protect classified
information pursuant to Senate rules. The Committee also held
seven business meetings including mark-ups of legislation.
B. Bills and Resolutions Originated by the Committee
S. Res. 40--An original resolution authorizing expenditures
by the Select Committee on Intelligence.
S. 2103--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2024.
S. 4443--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2025.
C. Bills Referred to the Committee
S. 1048--Ending the NARCOS Act of 2023.
S. 1541--Classification Reform Act of 2023.
S. 1791--China Defense Spending Transparency Act.
S. 1903--CCP Act.
S. 1981--Iranian Enrichment Monitoring Act of 2023.
S. 3047--Air America Act of 2023.
S. 3957--A bill to require the Director of National
Intelligence to develop a strategy to improve the sharing of
information and intelligence on foreign adversary tactics and
illicit activities affecting the ability of United States
persons to compete in foreign jurisdictions on projects
relating to energy generation and storage, and for other
purposes.
S. 4366--Enable IC Acquisitions Act of 2024.
S. 4369--Secure Smartports Act of 2024.
S. 4520--Confronting Chinese Communist Party Malign
Influence Act of 2024.
S. 4790--Trump Assassination Attempt Transparency Act.
S. 4883--Unmasking Networks of Virtual Election
Interference and Lies Act of 2024.
S. 4956--CLEARED Act of 2024.
S. 5444--A bill to enhance the authority of the
intelligence community to enter into public-private talent
exchanges, and for other purposes.
D. Committee Publications
Report 118-5--Report of the Select Committee on
Intelligence covering the period January 3, 2021-January 3,
2023.
Report 118-59--Report to accompany the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024.
Report 118-181--Report to accompany the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025.
[all]
