[Senate Report 112-3]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
112th Congress
1st Session SENATE Report
112-3
_______________________________________________________________________
REPORT
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
covering the period
JANUARY 3, 2009
to
JANUARY 4, 2011
March 17, 2011.--Ordered to be printed
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
RON WYDEN, Oregon JAMES RISCH, Idaho
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland DANIEL COATS, Indiana
BILL NELSON, Florida ROY BLUNT, Missouri
KENT CONRAD, North Dakota MARCO RUBIO, Forida
MARK UDALL, Colorado
MARK WARNER, Virginia
Harry Reid, Nevada, Ex Officio Member
Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
Carl Levin, Michigan, Ex Officio Member
John McCain, Arizona, Ex Officio Member
David Grannis, Staff Director
Martha Scott Poindexter, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
During the period covered by this report, the composition of the Select
Committee on Intelligence was as follows:
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West ORRIN HATCH, Utah
Virginia OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JAMES RISCH, Idaho
BILL NELSON, Florida
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
Harry Reid, Nevada, Ex Officio Member
Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
Carl Levin, Michigan, Ex Officio Member
John McCain, Arizona, Ex Officio Member
David Grannis, Staff Director
Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
PREFACE
The Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate
this report on its activities from January 3, 2009, to January
4, 2011. This report also includes references to activities
underway at the conclusion of the 111th Congress that the
Committee expects to continue into the future.
Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th
Congress, the Committee is charged with the responsibility of
carrying out oversight of the programs and activities of the
Intelligence Community of the United States. Most of the
Committee's oversight must be conducted in secret to protect
the sources and methods used by the Intelligence Community to
protect our nation's security. Nevertheless, the Select
Committee on Intelligence has submitted activities reports
since 1977, during the 95th Congress, in order to provide as
much information as possible about its intelligence oversight
activities to the American public consistent with national
security concerns. We submit this report to the Senate in
continuation of that practice.
We also thank all of the members of the Committee in the
111th Congress. In particular, we acknowledge the contribution
of Senator Christopher S. ``Kit'' Bond who served on the
Committee from 2003 to 2010 and was Vice Chairman during the
110th and 111th Congresses. Five other Senators who played
important roles in the oversight of the Intelligence Community
have also completed their service with the Committee. Senator
Orrin Hatch served his second term on the Committee from 1997
to 2010 after previously serving from 1985 to 1990, making him
the longest-serving member of the Committee in its history.
Senator Evan Bayh served on the Committee from 2001 to 2010.
Senator Russell Feingold came to the Committee in 2006 and
served until 2010. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse served on the
Committee during the 110th and 111th Congresses from 2007 to
2010. Senator Tom Coburn served on the Committee during the
111th Congress from 2009 to 2010. Their unique perspectives and
support to a strong Intelligence Community have contributed
substantially to the mission of the Committee and for that we
are grateful.
We also thank all the Committee's staff during the 111th
Congress whose hard work and professionalism were essential to
the fulfillment of the Committee's oversight and legislative
responsibilities.
Dianne Feinstein,
Chairman
Saxby Chambliss,
Vice Chairman
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Preface.......................................................... iii
I. Introduction......................................................1
II. Legislation.......................................................2
A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010....... 2
B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year............ 6
C. Extensions of Expiring FISA Authorities................... 6
D. Administration Views on Bills Referred to the Intelligence
Committee.................................................. 7
1. Detention and Interrogation, S. 147 and S. 248........ 7
2. GGovernment Accountability Office Participation in
Intelligence Community Audits and Evaluations, S. 385.. 8
3. Security Clearance Modernization and Reporting, S.
2834................................................... 9
4. Weapons Acquisition, S. 454........................... 10
E. Committee Views on the New START Treaty................... 10
F. GS. Res. 600, Authorizing the Select Committee on
Intelligence to Provide Documents in Unauthorized
Disclosure of Classified Information Investigation and for
Present and Former Employees to Testify.................... 11
G. GRelease of Declassified Narrative Describing the
Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel's Opinions
on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program........... 12
III.Oversight Activities.............................................12
A. Annual Worldwide Threat Hearings.......................... 12
B. Cybersecurity Task Force.................................. 14
C. Committee Reviews......................................... 15
1. Cybersecurity........................................ 15
2. Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program................................................ 16
3. High Value Detainee Interrogation Group.............. 17
4. GIntelligence Issues regarding Detainees Held at U.S.
Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay.......................... 19
5. Oversight of Intelligence Community Counterterrorism
Efforts................................................ 20
6. Mass Shooting at Fort Hood, Texas.................... 20
7. Christmas Day 2009 Attack on Northwest Airlines
Flight 253............................................. 20
8. Najibullah Zazi and David Headley.................... 22
9. Faisal Shahzad....................................... 22
10. Khowst Attack........................................ 22
11. Afghanistan.......................................... 23
12. Threat Finance and Financial Intelligence............ 23
13. Oversight of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence........................................... 24
14. Intelligence Community Directive 402................. 25
15. Information Sharing and Intelligence Community
Directive 501.......................................... 25
16. Foreign Language Requirements and Capabilities....... 25
17. Education and Training............................... 26
18. Analytic Transformation and Quality of Analysis...... 26
19. Size and Apportionment of Analytic Workforce......... 27
20. Forward Deployment of Analysts....................... 28
21. Analytic Integrity and Standards..................... 28
22. Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis........ 28
23. Analyst-Collector Relationships...................... 29
24. National Intelligence Estimates Production Process... 29
25. Lessons Learned Programs............................. 30
26. Measures of Effectiveness............................ 30
27. National Collaboration Development Center............ 30
28. FBI Intelligence Transformation...................... 30
29. GImplementation of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008
and Compliance with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court Orders........................................... 31
30. Counterintelligence.................................. 32
31. Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information.... 32
32. Covert Action........................................ 33
33. Counterproliferation................................. 34
34. Research and Development............................. 34
35. Technical Advisory Group Reviews..................... 35
36. Commercial Imagery................................... 35
37. Defense Attache System............................... 36
38. GOversight of Department of Homeland Security
Intelligence Activities................................ 36
39. Intelligence Community Facilities.................... 36
40. Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office
(DTSPO)................................................ 37
D. Financial Accounting, Inspectors General, and Audits...... 37
1. Compliance with Federal Financial Accounting Standards 37
2. Oversight of Intelligence Community Inspectors General 41
3. Audit of Intelligence Community Acquisition Practices. 41
IV. Nominations......................................................41
A. Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence........ 42
B. Leon E. Panetta, Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency..................................................... 43
C. David S. Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National
Security, Department of Justice............................ 44
D. Priscilla E. Guthrie, Chief Information Officer of the
Intelligence Community..................................... 45
E. Robert S. Litt, General Counsel, Office of the Director
of National Intelligence................................... 45
F. Philip Mudd, Undersecretary of Information and Analysis,
Department of Homeland Security............................ 46
G. Stephen W. Preston, General Counsel of the Central
Intelligence Agency........................................ 47
H. David C. Gompert, Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence............................................... 47
I. Philip S. Goldberg, Assistant Secretary of State,
Intelligence and Research.................................. 48
J. Caryn A. Wagner, Undersecretary for Intelligence and
Analysis, Department of Homeland Security.................. 49
K. Leslie Ireland, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Intelligence and Analysis.................................. 50
L. James R. Clapper, Jr., Director of National Intelligence. 50
M. David B. Buckley, Inspector General of the Central
Intelligence Agency........................................ 51
N. Stephanie O'Sullivan, Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence...................................... 52
V. Support to the Senate...........................................52
VI. Appendix.........................................................53
I. INTRODUCTION
The activities of the Committee during the 111th Congress
were shaped by a range of legislative, nomination, and
oversight responsibilities.
As described in part II of this report, the Committee's top
legislative priority in the 111th Congress was enactment of an
Intelligence Authorization Act after a lapse, since the end of
fiscal year 2005, in the enactment of annual intelligence
legislation.
During the 111th Congress, the Committee received 14
nominations for leadership positions in the Intelligence
Community (IC). In keeping with its record of expeditious
consideration of nominations, coupled with its commitment to
the establishment of a public record on the background and
views of nominees, the Committee requested that nominees answer
extensive questions, posted on its website the unclassified
answers to those questions, held 19 hearings and business
meetings, and recommended that the Senate give its advice and
consent to 12 nominations. (One nominee withdrew his nomination
and one nomination, initially made in December 2010, was
considered early in the 112th Congress.)
As in the past, the Committee's oversight work may have
been the most important and least visible of its activities.
Among other oversight matters, the Committee held numerous
hearings, and the staff conducted extensive oversight through
briefings and field visits, on a broad range of activities of
intelligence agencies, including such matters as intelligence
support to U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and
the performance of the Intelligence Community in using
intelligence collection and analysis to help prevent terrorist
attacks against the United States. In addition, the Committee
undertook a study of the Central Intelligence Agency's
detention and interrogation program as it existed under the
previous Administration, and inquired into policies and actions
of the new Administration, in order to shape detention and
interrogation policies now and in the future. Through review of
the implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, including the amendments to that Act made in the 110th
Congress, and through review of the development of U.S.
Government programs on cybersecurity, the Committee continued
its oversight of activities implicating national security and
individual privacy.
While much of its work was planned early in the Congress,
the Committee also responded to unfolding events, including
tragedies that were averted, as in the failed Christmas Day
2009 attack against Northwest Flight 253, or that were carried
out, as at the CIA's Khowst base in Afghanistan. In each case
the Committee sought to learn the lessons needed for the
Intelligence Community to improve its ability to help protect
the U.S. homeland, and also protect Intelligence Community and
other U.S. Government personnel in harm's way overseas.
II. LEGISLATION
A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
The Committee's top legislative priority in the 111th
Congress was the enactment of an Intelligence Authorization
Act. As recounted in the Committee's previous two biennial
reports, the last enactment of an Intelligence Authorization
Act was in December 2004 for fiscal year 2005. The Committee is
committed to restoring annual passage of the bill as a key
instrument of intelligence oversight and took a significant
step in that direction through the enactment in October 2010 of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
In the first months of 2009, the Committee conducted its
annual review of the President's budget recommendations for the
civilian and military agencies and departments comprising the
Intelligence Community (IC) for fiscal year 2010. These reviews
included the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the
Military Intelligence Program (MIP), the latter about which the
Committee makes recommendations to the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
The intelligence entities covered by the annual budget
reviews included the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency
(NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the intelligence
capabilities of the military services and the Coast Guard, as
well as the intelligence-related components of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Departments of State,
Treasury, Energy, and Homeland Security (DHS), and the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA).
As part of its reviews, the Committee held closed budget
hearings at which senior IC officials testified. During
briefings at the Committee and on site at IC agencies,
Committee staff, designated as budget monitors for particular
IC elements, evaluated detailed budget justifications submitted
by the Executive Branch. On the basis of those reviews, the
Committee prepared a classified annex to its annual
authorization bill and report. This annex contained a
classified schedule of appropriations and classified directions
to IC elements that addressed a wide range of issues identified
during the annual budget reviews and other Committee oversight
activities.
While the annual budget review proceeded, the Committee
also reviewed the Administration's proposals for the public
part of the FY 2010 bill consisting of new or amended
legislative authority requested by the IC. The Committee posted
on its public website testimony, in unclassified form,
presented by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) at a
closed hearing on May 19, 2009, on the Administration's
legislative proposals for the FY 2010 bill, as well as the text
and explanation of the complete Administration legislative
request that the Committee received on May 22, 2009. The
Committee posted on its website additional proposed sections
submitted by the Administration in June and early July 2009.
The Committee also considered legislative proposals it had
previously reported as well as a number of new proposals
formulated by Committee members in response to evolving or
current oversight matters.
On July 22, 2009, the Committee reported S. 1494, its
proposed Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,
accompanied by S. Rep. No. 111-55 (2009), by a vote of 15-0.
The report explained the provisions of the bill and also
provided comments, including directions to the IC, which could
be stated in an unclassified form. As customary, it was
accompanied by the classified annex with classified budget
recommendations and guidance on implementation of budget
authority. With a managers' amendment to address concerns of
other committees, the bill passed the Senate by unanimous
consent on September 16, 2009. 155 Cong. Rec. S9447-9480 (daily
ed.).
Following passage by the House on February 26, 2010, of
H.R. 2701, the proposed FY 2010 authorization bill reported by
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) sent to
the intelligence committees a letter setting forth the
Administration's views on S. 1494 and H.R. 2701. The letter
identified thirteen serious concerns, three of which were veto-
threat items, including amendments on notification to the
intelligence committees about sensitive intelligence matters
and covert actions and provisions on the authority of the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct audits,
investigations, and evaluations of the IC. On March 15, 2010,
the Department of Justice wrote to the committees stating its
concerns about the constitutionality of various provisions in
the two bills.
The intelligence committees undertook a three-month process
of reconciling the House and Senate bills and addressing the
Administration's concerns. On June 10, 2010, the OMB Director
wrote to the committees that the Administration had reviewed
the product of that effort and the President's senior advisers
would recommend that he sign the resulting legislation.
On July 19, 2010, the Committee reported a new bill, S.
3611, which incorporated the agreement. It was accompanied by
S. Rep. No. 111-223 (2010), which provided a section-by-section
description of how S. 3611 reconciled S. 1494 and H.R. 2701.
With a managers' amendment to resolve concerns of other Senate
committees, the Senate passed S. 3611 by unanimous consent on
August 5, 2010. 156 Cong. Rec. S6767-6799 (daily ed.).
Further work remained, however, before final action on the
FY 2010 legislation. A renewed effort was made to craft
language on improving notifications to Congress on sensitive
intelligence activities and covert actions and also on GAO
authority. After this effort produced amendments acceptable to
the committees, the House and Senate leadership, and the
Administration, the Senate acted on September 27, 2010, for a
third time on the FY 2010 legislation by amending and passing
H.R. 2701 with this negotiated agreement. 156 Cong. Rec. S7558-
7559 (daily ed.). House passage followed on September 29, 2010,
and the President signed the FY 2010 bill, as Public Law 111-
259, on October 7, 2010.
Because fiscal year 2010 was drawing to a close, the final
negotiations on the bill removed the classified schedule of
authorizations applicable to the ending fiscal year and the
classified annex that described those budgetary authorization
levels. The enacted bill accordingly focused on needed
improvements in Intelligence Community authorities and
oversight mechanisms. Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Bond,
and House Intelligence Committee Chairman Reyes, however, wrote
to the President on October 19, 2010, concerning the provisions
in the classified annex that were reviewed and accepted by the
Administration and the Intelligence Community during
negotiations over the legislation, and the fact that these
would be the subject of further discussion in the future.
The provisions of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 are explained more fully in S. Rep. No. 111-
223, the report that accompanied S. 3611, and in the floor
remarks on Senate passage of H.R. 2701, in which Chairman
Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond explained the several
subsequent changes that cleared the way for final action, 156
Cong. Rec. S7498-7500 and S7558-7559 (daily ed., Sept. 27,
2010). The provisions include:
Modifications, in Title V of the National Security
Act of 1947, to the requirements and the process by which, the
President, DNI, and heads of all U.S. departments, agencies,
and entities keep the intelligence committees fully and
currently informed of all intelligence activities and covert
actions. This includes the responsibility to furnish to the
committees any information, requested by them, about the legal
basis for intelligence activities or covert actions that is
within the custody or control of the departments, agencies, or
entities of the United States which are involved in those
activities or covert actions. The amendments also address
``Gang of Eight'' notifications to the Senate and House
leadership, and leadership of the two intelligence committees,
about covert actions. They require that when a finding or
notification is limited to the Gang of Eight, the statement of
reasons for doing so shall be in writing and all members of the
intelligence committees shall be provided with a general
description regarding the finding or notification consistent
with the reasons for not yet fully informing all such members.
Any such determination would have to be reviewed every 180
days.
Acquisition reforms, including vulnerability
assessments of major systems, establishment of requirements for
a business enterprise architecture to enhance IC business
system modernization, and measures developed from the Nunn-
McCurdy Act on defense overruns to curb excessive cost growth
of major intelligence systems.
Establishment of a strong and independent
Inspector General (IG) for the Intelligence Community,
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to review programs of the Intelligence Community and
the relationships among the elements of it, and to report to
the DNI and Congress. Of particular importance, the statutory
IG for the Intelligence Community will have the authority to
address issues that run across the jurisdiction of individual
IC elements and that cannot be fully addressed by Inspectors
General for individual IC elements whose jurisdictions are
bounded by the elements in which they serve.
The Act also strengthens existing IGs that serve
elements of the Intelligence Community. It provides for the
availability to the CIA IG of authorities made available to
other IGs pursuant to the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008,
including the authority to appoint a Counsel to the Inspector
General who shall report to the CIA IG. For the IGs at the NSA,
NRO, NGA, and DIA, the Act provides for their statutory
recognition and the availability to them of the authorities and
protections applicable to other administratively appointed IGs
under the Inspector General Act of 1978, such as measures to
protect independence, provide for access to information, and
ensure regular reporting to Congress.
Measures to improve personnel management. These
include measures designed to improve oversight of IC personnel
planning and account for the number and use of the IC's
burgeoned number of contractors. To enable the IC to meet
advanced technical needs, the Act provides for enhanced pay
authority for critical positions such as those requiring
special scientific abilities. It provides for improvements in
IC education programs, including language programs, and
personnel management flexibilities that will foster the
participation of IC employees in language training programs.
Although omitted from the final text in light of the end of the
fiscal year, the Committee throughout the consideration of the
FY 2010 bill supported measures to facilitate the replacement
of contractors with regular IC employees, and will take up this
issue again in the 112th Congress.
Measures to improve information sharing by
authorizing interagency funding to quickly address deficiencies
or needs that arise in intelligence information access or
sharing capabilities. The Act also facilitates information
sharing with the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) by
extending exemptions from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
search requirements to operational files that have been
provided to the ODNI, of which NCTC is a part.
An increase in the maximum penalties for the
disclosure of the identity of undercover intelligence officers
and agents.
A preliminary framework for congressional and
Executive Branch oversight of federal cybersecurity activities
to ensure the government's national cybersecurity mission is
carried out in a manner consistent with legal authorities and
individual privacy rights.
A requirement for a comprehensive report by the
Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, on the policies
and procedures of the U.S. Government concerning participation
by elements of the Intelligence Community in the interrogation
of individuals suspected of international terrorism, including
the legal basis for these policies and procedures.
A requirement for the DNI to make publicly
available an unclassified summary of intelligence relating to
recidivism of detainees held at the Naval Detention Facility at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and an assessment of the likelihood that
such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with
persons in terrorist organizations.
A requirement for a report and strategic plan on
the intelligence collection efforts of the United States to
assess the threat from biological weapons and to protect the
biodefense knowledge and infrastructure of the United States.
This section of the Act also requires a strategic plan for
closing important intelligence gaps related to biological
weapons.
A requirement that the DNI, in consultation with
the Comptroller General (as the head of the GAO), issue a
written directive governing access by the Comptroller General
to information in the possession of an element of the
Intelligence Community, and to provide that directive to the
Congress together with any comments no later than May 1, 2011.
Unless accelerated by the DNI for reasons of national security,
the directive or any amendment to it shall take effect 60 days
after submission to the Congress. The directive shall be
consistent with both the provisions of Title 31 of the United
States Code on the authorities of the Comptroller General and
those of the National Security Act.
B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011
In the first months of 2010, even while consideration of
the Fiscal Year 2010 bill continued, the Committee reviewed the
President's Fiscal Year 2011 requests for funding levels and
legislative proposals.
As previously, the Committee's budget monitors evaluated
the budget requests submitted by the Executive Branch.
Committee staff held briefings at the Committee and onsite at
agencies, and the Committee conducted closed budget hearings.
The Committee received the Administration's proposed FY 2011
bill on May 27, 2010, and conducted a closed hearing on the
Administration's legislative request on June 22, 2010. The
Committee subsequently posted on its website both the full
legislative request and an unclassified version of the
testimony offered by Robert Litt, the ODNI General Counsel.
Committee staff prepared budget and bill material for
consideration early in the 112th Congress in the event the
Committee determined to proceed with a fiscal year 2011
intelligence authorization bill.
C. Extensions of Expiring FISA Authorities
As the 111th Congress began, three provisions of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)--commonly known as
the roving wiretaps, lone wolf, and business records sections
of the Act--were scheduled to expire on December 31, 2009. On
March 31, 2009, Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond wrote
to the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence to request their recommendations on whether the
provisions should be extended, modified, or allowed to expire.
On September 14, 2009, the Department of Justice, in a response
to the Committee for itself and the DNI, recommended that the
expiring provisions be reauthorized.
With regard to roving wiretaps, under which roving
surveillance is authorized by court orders for targets who take
actions to thwart FISA surveillance, the Justice Department
stated that the authority ``has proven an important
intelligence-gathering tool in a small but significant subset
of FISA electronic surveillance orders.'' For lone wolf
authority, pursuant to which a non-U.S. person who engages in
international terrorism may be the subject of FISA collection
even though connection to a specific international terrorist
group has not been determined, the Department noted that, as of
the September 2009 letter, it had not been necessary to use
that authority. Nevertheless, the Department requested
reauthorization of the authority on the grounds that it could
foresee circumstances in which a known terrorism target had
broken from his terrorist group. Concerning business records,
the Department urged reauthorization because it believed that
``[t]he absence of such an authority could force the FBI to
sacrifice key intelligence opportunities.''
Section 1004 of H.R. 3326, the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2010, enacted December 19, 2009, extended
the three expiring provisions to February 28, 2010.
In February 2010, as the new sunset approached, the
Attorney General, the DNI, and the intelligence committees took
steps to enable members of both Houses to understand more fully
the intelligence collection made possible by the expiring
authority. The Attorney General and the DNI provided to the
committees a classified paper and asked for their assistance in
making it available, in a secure setting, directly and
personally to any interested Member. On February 23, 2010,
Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond wrote to each Member
of the Senate inviting the Member to read the classified paper
in the Committee's offices and conveying the offer of the
Attorney General and DNI to have their personnel available to
meet with any Member who had questions. The House Intelligence
Committee extended a similar invitation to Members of the
House. 156 Cong. Rec. H838 (daily ed., Feb. 25, 2010).
On February 27, 2010, Congress extended the roving, lone
wolf, and business records provisions once again, this time for
one year to February 28, 2011 in Public Law 111-141.
D. Administration Views on Bills Referred to the Intelligence Community
Rule 12.2 of the Committee's Rules of Procedure provides
that ``Unless otherwise ordered by them, measures referred to
the Committee shall be referred by the Chairman and Vice
Chairman to the appropriate department or agency of the
Government for reports thereon.'' Pursuant to this rule, during
the 111th Congress the Chairman and Vice Chairman made three
referrals for comments. Additionally, the Chairman and Vice
Chairman made one referral to the Director of National
Intelligence for comment on the effect legislation not referred
to the Committee but being considered by the Senate would have
on the Intelligence Community.
1. Detention and Interrogation, S. 147 and S. 248
On March 3, 2009, the Chairman and Vice Chairman referred
to the Director of National Intelligence for comment two bills
on detention and interrogation: S. 147, introduced by the
Chairman and co-sponsored by Senators Rockefeller, Wyden, and
Whitehouse, and S. 248, introduced by the Vice Chairman. Both
of these bills were referred to the Committee.
S. 147, entitled the ``Lawful Interrogation and Detention
Act,'' would bar any person in the custody or under the control
of an IC element from being subjected to a treatment or
technique of interrogation not authorized by the Army Field
Manual. It would require notice of an IC detention and access
to such detainee, in a manner consistent with the practices of
the U.S. Armed Forces, to the International Committee of the
Red Cross. It would bar CIA interrogations by contractors,
instead requiring that all CIA interrogations be conducted by
Agency employees. It would also require the closing of the
detention facility at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.
S. 248, entitled the ``Limitations on Interrogation
Techniques Act of 2009,'' would preclude the use of specific
interrogation techniques, similar to those currently prohibited
by the Army Field Manual.
On April 3, 2009, the DNI replied that ``the President has
directed thorough reviews of detention, interrogation, and
transfer policies as well as a review of both the options for
the disposition of individuals captured or apprehended in
connection with armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations
and those individuals currently detained at the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base.''
Further, the DNI noted that the ``President has ordered
that individuals under the effective control of U.S. Government
employees or their agents or detained in a U.S. Government
owned, operated, or controlled facility must be treated
humanely and shall not be subjected to torture or to outrages
on personal dignity, including humiliating and degrading
treatment'' and ``may only be interrogated in accordance with
the Army Field Manual 2-22.3.'' The DNI also stated that
``(b)ecause these task forces are reviewing the very issues
these legislative proposals address, we have forwarded these
bills to the task forces for their consideration as part of
their efforts. We anticipate that, once these reviews have been
completed and the task forces have reported to the President,
the Administration will be better able to assess these
proposals.''
As described earlier in this report, Congress included in
Section 333 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2010 a
requirement for a comprehensive report by the Director of
National Intelligence on detention and interrogation
activities.
2. Government Accountability Office participation in intelligence
community audits and evaluations, S. 385
On March 12, 2009, the Chairman and Vice Chairman referred
to the DNI for comment S. 385, a bill referred to the
Committee, entitled the Intelligence Community Audit Act of
2009. S. 385, which had been introduced by Senator Akaka and
co-sponsored by Senators Lautenberg, McCaskill, Sanders, Wyden,
Carper, and Durbin, to ``reaffirm'' the authority of the
Comptroller General to perform audits and evaluations of the
financial transactions, programs, and activities of the
Intelligence Community. It also would ``reaffirm'' the
authority of the Comptroller General to obtain access to
records for the purpose of those audits. It provided that those
audits may be requested by any committee of jurisdiction and
may include matters related to strategic planning, financial
management, information technology, human capital, knowledge
management, and information sharing conducted by management and
administration elements of the Intelligence Community. The bill
proposed a number of limitations on this authority including
that the Comptroller General may conduct an audit or evaluation
of intelligence sources or methods, or covert actions, only on
the request of one of the congressional intelligence committees
or the House or Senate majority or minority leader.
On April 20, 2009, the DNI responded to the Chairman and
Vice Chairman. The DNI stated that, ``I believe that oversight
of the Intelligence Community by the intelligence committees
plays a critical role in making sure we are fulfilling our
responsibilities with regard to keeping our Nation safe while
ensuring privacy and civil liberties protections. This
oversight, precisely because it is conducted by the committees
through a cadre of knowledgeable and experienced staff, is a
valuable contribution to improving the quality of intelligence
and the effective, efficient operation of the Intelligence
Community.'' He continued that the ``Intelligence Community has
worked together with GAO on hundreds of their reviews ranging
from personnel security clearance reform, to U.S.-Saudi Counter
Terrorism and Terrorism Financing, to an examination of the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. We will
continue working cooperatively with GAO on such reviews to
improve federal government performance.'' However, the DNI
concluded that ``there is no clear necessity or benefit from
expanding GAO's scope of authority to the Intelligence
Community.'' The DNI was also concerned that S. 385 would
``authorize the Comptroller General to carry on self-initiated
work and other work beyond that directed by intelligence
committees'' which ``would negatively impact the ability of the
Intelligence Community to respond to requests from the
intelligence committees in a timely manner, within available
resources.''
As described earlier in this report, section 348 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2010 provides for the
issuance by the DNI, no later than May 1, 2011, and in
consultation with the Comptroller General, of a directive
governing access of the Comptroller General to information in
the possession of an element of the Intelligence Community. The
directive shall be consistent with both the National Security
Act and the provisions of title 31 of the U.S. Code on the
authorities of the Comptroller General. The directive shall be
submitted to Congress together with any comments of the
Comptroller General.
3. Security clearance modernization and reporting, S. 2834
On February 9, 2010, the Chairman and Vice Chairman
referred to the DNI for comment S. 2834, a bill referred to the
Committee entitled the ``Security Clearance Modernization and
Reporting Act of 2009.'' This legislation, which had been
introduced by Senator Akaka and co-sponsored by Senator
Voinovich, would mandate more detailed and more timely
reporting on the security clearance process; require a
comprehensive information technology needs assessment; and
require the creation of a strategic plan that would outline
reform goals, establish performance measures, create a more
robust communications strategy, define clear roles and
responsibilities for stakeholders, and examine funding needs.
On July 26, 2010, the DNI responded to the Chairman and
Vice Chairman. The DNI noted that S. 2834 ``does not recognize
and build on the significant progress made to date, may limit
the flexibility and development of the [Performance
Accountability Council], and requires duplicative reporting.''
He noted that ``the significant improvements in timeliness and
streamlined policy and process successes gained to date are
likely attributable to IRTPA's legislative foundation flexibly
executed through a series of Executive Orders that updated,
clarified and improved the reform effort over time.'' With
regard to information technology, the DNI stated that
``(l)egislating in this area may limit continued quality and
technology improvement going forward.'' The DNI also noted that
the February 2010 Security and Suitability Process Reform
Strategic Framework document ``presents the reform effort's
mission, strategic goals, approach, key deliverables,
performance measures, external factors, roles and
responsibilities, and long term funding requirements.''
Section 367 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY
2010 provides for a series of reports and audits on the U.S.
Government's security clearance process and the measurement of
improvement in the timeliness of that process.
4. Weapons acquisition, S. 454
On April 27, 2009, the Chairman and Vice Chairman referred
S. 454, the ``Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009,''
to the DNI for comment. The Senate Armed Services Committee had
reported this legislation on April 2, 2009. Although the
measure was not referred to the SSCI, the Chairman and Vice
Chairman sought the DNI's views on whether, and if so how, this
legislation would affect IC acquisition programs. S. 454 set
additional restrictions and reporting requirements on
Department of Defense major defense acquisition programs. Since
many IC agencies reside within the Defense Department, the
Committee was concerned that the legislation would place
requirements on IC acquisition programs.
On May 11, 2009, the DNI responded to this inquiry. He
assessed that ``S. 454 does not impact the acquisition programs
funded by the [National Intelligence Program].'' He noted that
S. 454 is ``specifically applicable to a `major defense
acquisition program' (MDAP)'' and that Title 10, United States
Code, Section 2430(a) ``defines a MDAP to exclude a Department
of Defense (DoD) acquisition program that is a ``highly
sensitive classified program'' as determined by the SecDef.''
Under a March 25, 2008, Secretary of Defense and DNI Memorandum
of Agreement, ``fully and majority NIP-funded major system
acquisitions'' are considered to be ``highly sensitive
classified programs'' and not susceptible to MDAP guidelines.
The Conference Report on S. 454 (Public Law No. 111-23)
passed the Senate on May 20, 2009, and was signed into law by
the President on May 22, 2009.
E. Committee Views on the New START Treaty
In mid-September 2010, shortly before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee reported a resolution of advice and consent
with respect to the ratification of the New START Treaty, the
Chairman and Vice Chairman submitted separate, classified,
views letters on the Treaty to the Chairman and Ranking Member
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These letters
contributed to the Senate Foreign Relations report and minority
views on the treaty.
The Committee's oversight activities in relation to this
treaty began with the start of negotiations in 2009, well
before the President submitted the treaty to the Senate for its
advice and consent. In November 2009, the Chairman travelled to
Geneva, Switzerland, to visit with the U.S. and Russian treaty
negotiators and gain a first-hand view of the key issues being
negotiated. Staff activities included IC briefings on Russian
strategic forces and the capabilities of national technical
means (NTM) of verification.
The President submitted the treaty to the Senate on May 13,
2010, and the Intelligence Community completed a national
intelligence estimate (NIE) on monitoring under the treaty in
June 2010. With these events, the Committee's oversight
activities intensified. Committee staff met with U.S. treaty
negotiators and with IC officials to fully understand the
treaty's details and its implications for U.S. monitoring
capabilities. Staff also conducted a thorough review of the
NIE. Members participated in several briefings given by
Administration cabinet members.
The Committee held a closed hearing on New START in July,
centered on the NIE and the IC's ability to monitor the
treaty's limits. Subsequently, the Committee submitted more
than 70 questions for the record. Testimony at the hearing,
answers to the questions for the record, and memoranda from
prior briefings were key inputs to Member treaty views,
published separately by the Chairman and Vice Chairman.
Additionally, Committee staff briefed individual Members on
treaty monitoring issues.
On December 20, 2010, the Senate held a rare closed session
in the Old Senate Chamber to review classified materials
regarding the New START Treaty. During that session, both the
Chairman and Vice Chairman presented classified information
from the Intelligence Community on the New START Treaty and
other issues regarding Russia.
On December 22, 2010, the Senate ratified the New START
Treaty by a vote of 71 to 26.
As the treaty has entered into force, the Committee will
shift its oversight focus to the IC's efforts in monitoring
under the treaty, as well as Russia's activities related to the
treaty.
F. S. Res. 600, Authorizing the Select Committee on Intelligence To
Provide Documents in Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information
Investigation and for Present and Former Employees To Testify
On July 28, 2010, the Senate agreed to Senate Resolution
600, which had been offered by Majority Leader Reid and
Minority Leader McConnell. The preamble stated that the
Department of Justice had requested the Select Committee on
Intelligence to provide documents in a pending investigation
into the unauthorized disclosure of classified national
security information.
The resolution authorized the Chairman and Vice Chairman,
acting jointly, to provide to the Justice Department copies of
Committee documents in connection with that investigation and
authorized former and current Committee employees to testify,
except concerning matters for which a privilege should be
asserted. Additionally, the resolution authorized the Senate
Legal Counsel to represent the Committee and former or current
employees from whom testimony may be required.
At the time the Senate acted on the resolution, no
indictment had been filed and the underlying matter was under
consideration by a grand jury in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Accordingly,
neither the resolution nor the accompanying floor statement
referred to any defendant or otherwise described the subject of
the investigation.
On December 22, 2010, the grand jury handed down a sealed
indictment in United States v. Jeffrey Alexander Sterling, No.
1:10CR485 (LMB), the case resulting from the investigation for
which Senate Resolution 600 had authorized the production of
documents and testimony. The indictment was unsealed on January
6, 2011. It charges a former CIA officer with the illegal
disclosure of national security information and obstruction of
justice. Among other matters, it alleges that the former
officer sought to induce an author to disclose classified
information to a national book publisher and then to the
public, including foreign adversaries of the United States,
through the publication of a book containing information about
a classified program and a human asset.
G. Release of Declassified Narrative Describing the Department of
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel's Opinions on the Cia's Detention and
Interrogation Program
On April 22, 2009, the Committee posted on its website a
declassified narrative describing the Department of Justice's
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinions on the CIA's detention
and interrogation program. As the preface to the narrative
indicates, the purpose of the document was to provide to the
public an initial narrative of the history of the opinions from
2002 to 2007 on the legality of the CIA's detention and
interrogation program. The effort involved meetings and
exchanges of drafts among committee counsel and representatives
of the Department of Justice, CIA, the ODNI, and Counsel to the
President.
Although this process produced a draft narrative,
declassification was not authorized until April 2009. The
narrative is posted on the committee's website under
publications for the 111th Congress.
III. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES
A. Annual Worldwide Threat Hearings
Since 1994, the Committee has held a hearing to review the
Intelligence Community's assessment of the current and
projected national security threats to the United States. These
Worldwide Threat hearings cover national security concerns in
all geographic regions and transnational threats--such as
counterterrorism and counterproliferation--that transcend
borders. These hearings fulfill an important role in educating
both the Congress and the American public about the threats
facing the country, the ability of the Intelligence Community
to provide information and analysis about those threats, and,
in the case of some agencies, the capabilities within their
organizations to counter such threats.
On February 12, 2009, the Committee held an open hearing on
the current and projected threats to the United States.
Testifying before the Committee was Dennis C. Blair, the
recently confirmed Director of National Intelligence. His
unclassified prepared statement for the record is available in
the Hearings section of the Committee's website and the record
of the hearing has been printed as S. Hrg. 111-62.
Director Blair stated ``The primary near-term security
concern of the United States is the global economic crisis and
its geopolitical implications.'' He assessed that the ``crisis
presents many challenges for the United States'' and that the
effect of the crisis ``already has increased questioning of
U.S. stewardship of the global economy and the international
financial structure.'' In regard to violent extremism, Director
Blair noted, ``(o)ver the last year and a half, al-Qaeda has
faced significant public criticism from prominent religious
leaders and fellow extremists primarily regarding the use of
brutal and indiscriminate tactics--particularly those employed
by al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and al-Qaeda in the Lands of Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM)-- that have resulted in the deaths of Muslim
civilians'' and that a broad array of Muslim nations are
``having success in stemming the rise of extremism and
attractiveness of terrorist groups.'' The DNI also noted the
concern over homegrown extremism and the potential rise of such
terrorist cells within the U.S. His statement further commented
on the ``arc of instability'' from the Middle East and South
Asia; how the rise of India and China would enable them to
``become the long-term power center of the world;'' the
impressive stability of democracy in Latin America despite the
``challenge that populist, often autocratic regimes still pose
in the region;'' and the ``growing cyber and organized crime
threat.''
On February 2, 2010, in the second session of the 111th
Congress, the Committee held an open hearing on the current and
projected threats to the United States. DNI Blair presented a
consolidated statement on behalf of the Intelligence Community
and was joined by Leon Panetta, Director of the CIA; Lieutenant
General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Director of the DIA; Robert S.
Mueller, Director of the FBI; and John Dinger, Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. Director
Blair's unclassified statement for the record is available in
the Hearings section of the Committee's website and the record
of the hearing has been printed as S. Hrg. 111-557.
Director Blair focused his initial discussion on the threat
from cyber attacks and intrusions. He stated that the
``national security of the United States, our economic
prosperity, and the daily functioning of our government are
dependent on a dynamic public and private information
infrastructure, which includes telecommunications, computer
networks and systems, and the information residing within'' and
assessed that this ``critical infrastructure is severely
threatened.'' He noted that ``neither the U.S. Government nor
the private sector can fully control or protect the country's
information infrastructure,'' but suggested that government and
the private sector could mitigate the threat by working
together. Director Blair also noted the continuing concerns
over the consequences of the global recession; the growing
proliferation threat from chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons; strategic health challenges and threats; and possible
increased instability in particular geographic regions.
B. Cybersecurity Task Force
On July 1, 2010, the Committee's Cybersecurity Task Force
submitted its classified Final Report to the full Committee.
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Senator Olympia Snowe, and Senator
Barbara Mikulski formed the Cybersecurity Task Force at the
request of the Chairman and Vice Chairman to undertake an
intensive six-month survey of the cybersecurity landscape and
help the full Committee map out an oversight agenda.
The Task Force launched on January 1, 2010, with five
principal goals:
1. Elevate the profile of cybersecurity issues on the
Committee's policy and oversight agenda;
2. Refine the Committee's policy and oversight
responsibilities on cyber issues;
3. Expand the pool of Committee expertise on a
technically challenging matter of vital importance to
America's national and economic security;
4. Develop a concise set of policy recommendations on
the DHS program known as EINSTEIN 3 that add value to
existing policy debates and demonstrate the Committee's
intention to assume a more prominent role in the
development and oversight of cybersecurity policy; and
5. Enrich the context in which the Committee debates
cybersecurity policy and oversight by providing a
layered overview of cybersecurity threats and issues.
In the six months that followed, the Task Force hosted more
than three dozen meetings and consulted with leading experts
from industry, academia, and government, including those in the
Intelligence Community. The Task Force also performed an
extensive review of classified and unclassified cybersecurity
literature.
The Task Force's classified Final Report consisted of two
parts: Part I focused on understanding the cyber threat;
identifying areas of consensus and dissent in cybersecurity
policy; and analyzing key components of the federal
government's cyber capabilities and workforce most relevant to
the purview of the Intelligence Committee. The Task Force
distilled what it learned into six preliminary observations
about America's cybersecurity posture:
1. The threat is malicious, unrelenting, and
evolving.
2. There is a surprisingly robust consensus on a set
of general principles that should guide U.S. government
cybersecurity efforts.
3. The consensus does not extend far beyond the need
for an appropriate relationship between the federal
government and the private sector.
4. International cooperation on cybersecurity is
important but challenging in unique respects.
5. The federal government is making limited and
incremental progress towards improving cybersecurity.
6. The overwhelming majority of cyber threats to
federal and private sector information systems may be
effectively mitigated by commercial off-the-shelf
technology in the hands of informed users. Mitigating
the remaining threats, however, will likely require
proprietary technologies as well as the federal
government's unique capabilities and authorities.
The Final Report identified a number of oversight themes
corresponding to these analytic observations.
Part II examined EINSTEIN 3, an automated intrusion
prevention system for protecting the civilian computer networks
in the Executive Branch. The DHS operates EINSTEIN 3, and the
NSA provides critical technical and personnel support. EINSTEIN
3 is managed by the United States Computer Emergency Readiness
Team (US-CERT), the operational arm of DHS's National Cyber
Security Division. During the 111th Congress, DHS did not
deploy EINSTEIN 3, and the White House did not approve
deployment. An exercise was underway, however, to test and
demonstrate the system.
Given the centrality of EINSTEIN 3 to current efforts to
protect civilian Executive Branch networks and the unique
nature of the technology, the Task Force identified several
overarching themes that will require sustained oversight from
the Committee in the 112th Congress. These include evaluating
the impact of EINSTEIN 3 on privacy and civil liberties,
ensuring smooth governance and interagency relations concerning
EINSTEIN 3, and regular assessments of the EINSTEIN 3
technology.
C. Committee Reviews
1. Cybersecurity
In addition to the Cybersecurity Task Force noted above,
the Committee held numerous hearings and briefings on
cybersecurity-related matters. Committee staff met regularly
with Intelligence Community and other government officials, and
with private sector entities involved in cybersecurity-related
efforts. These hearings, briefings, and meetings were
instrumental in keeping the Committee informed of the
Intelligence Community's cybersecurity-related programs and
initiatives. Also, the Committee's all-volunteer Technical
Advisory Group, consisting of 18 distinguished, nationally
recognized science and technology leaders, completed three 6-
month studies of technology and policy aspects of
cybersecurity, and reported findings and recommendations on
priorities for Congress at a closed Committee hearing.
The Committee also promoted timely and appropriate
oversight of government cybersecurity activities by including
related provisions in the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY
2010 (Public Law 111-259). Section 336 of this Act includes a
number of provisions to enhance government cybersecurity
efforts and ensure that Congress is fully informed about the
Executive Branch's cybersecurity programs. For example, Section
336(a) requires a congressional notification within 30 days of
the bill's enactment for each cybersecurity program in
operation, as well as a notification of any new cybersecurity
program not later than 30 days after the new program's
commencement. The Committee notes that the report was not
provided on a timely basis in the 111th Congress and expects
compliance early in 2011.
As cybersecurity activities may, in the course of
authorized operations, encounter U.S. citizen data, this
Section formally requested documents detailing the legal
foundations, privacy implications, concept of operations, and
periodic audits of large government-managed cybersecurity
programs including the DHS's EINSTEIN 2 and EINSTEIN 3 programs
and the DoD's cybersecurity system.
To keep Congress informed of the Executive Branch's
internal reviews of these programs, Section 336(b) requires
additional reports on any audits a department or agency has
conducted on a cybersecurity program.
Because the Committee recognizes that the United States
cannot achieve its cybersecurity objectives without a ``whole
of government'' approach to the problem in partnership with the
private sector, Section 336(c) mandates a report on the status
of the sharing of cyber threat information across the
government and with the private sector. The Committee requested
that the DNI and the Secretary of Homeland Security jointly
assess how cyber threat intelligence information, including
classified information, is shared with the U.S. critical
infrastructure leadership, and combine the best threat
information from the IC and the best vulnerability information
from DHS to create a net assessment of the cyber risk to U.S.
critical infrastructure.
At the same time, Section 336(d) gives the head of an IC
element funded through the National Intelligence Program the
authority to detail personnel to the FBI's National Cyber
Investigative Joint Task Force or to DHS. This enhanced
authority will allow the Task Force and DHS to better leverage
the IC's expertise and experience. In addition, Section 336(e)
requires the DNI to submit to a plan to Congress for
recruiting, retaining, and training a highly-qualified
cybersecurity IC workforce to secure IC networks.
Finally, Section 336(f) requires the DNI to coordinate a
report to Congress on guidelines or legislative recommendations
to improve the cybersecurity capabilities of the IC and law
enforcement agencies. The Committee believes this report will
be instrumental as Congress considers whether to develop
legislation or policy on a range of cybersecurity matters.
2. Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program
On March 5, 2009, as described in the joint release of
Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond, the Committee agreed
``on a strong bipartisan basis to begin a study of the CIA's
detention and interrogation program.'' The Committee announced
that the purpose of the study was to review the program and to
shape detention and interrogation policies in the future. Among
other things, the review was to examine:
How the CIA created, operated, and
maintained its detention and interrogation program;
Whether the CIA accurately described the
detention and interrogation program to other parts of
the U.S. government, including the Department of
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel and the Senate
Intelligence Committee;
Whether the CIA implemented the program in
compliance with official guidance, including covert
action findings, Office of Legal Counsel opinions, and
CIA policy; and
An evaluation of intelligence information
gained through the use of enhanced and standard
interrogation techniques.
The Committee engaged in discussions with the CIA regarding
the Committee's comprehensive request for documents related to
the program and made arrangements with the CIA for the proper
handling of this material. The Committee and the CIA also
reached an agreement regarding the protection of sources and
methods, as well as other sensitive matters. Pursuant to these
arrangements, the CIA has made available to the Committee over
4 million pages of CIA records relating to its detention and
interrogation program.
Additionally, the Committee requested documents related to
the CIA program from the Department of Defense, the Department
of State, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
On August 24, 2009, Attorney General Holder assigned a
career prosecutor in the Department of Justice to conduct a
preliminary review into whether federal laws were violated in
connection with the CIA's interrogation of specific detainees
at overseas locations. This investigation remains pending.
On September 25, 2009, the Vice Chairman withdrew his staff
from the study in response to the Attorney General's decision.
The Vice Chairman noted his belief that the Attorney General's
decision made it unlikely that CIA employees involved in the
program would agree to be interviewed for the Committee's
study. The Committee's resolution establishing the review has
remained in force and, pursuant to the Chairman's direction,
the review has continued toward the goal of presenting to the
Committee, in the 112th Congress, the results of the review of
the extensive documentary record that has been provided to the
Committee.
3. High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group
On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order
13491 on ensuring lawful interrogations. Section 3(b) directed
that no individual in the custody or under the control of the
U.S. Government shall be subjected to an interrogation
technique not authorized by the Army Field Manual. It further
provided that ``Nothing in this section shall preclude the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, or other Federal law
enforcement agencies, from continuing to use authorized, non-
coercive techniques of interrogation that are designed to
elicit voluntary statements and do not involve the use of
force, threats or promises.''
Executive Order 13491 also established a Special
Interagency Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies
whose mission included studying whether Army Field Manual
practices, when employed by agencies outside of the military,
provide an appropriate means of acquiring intelligence
necessary to protect the Nation and, if necessary, recommending
guidance for other departments or agencies. On August 24, 2009,
Attorney General Holder announced that the Task Force had
proposed the Administration establish a specialized
interrogation group to bring together officials from law
enforcement, the Intelligence Community, and the Defense
Department. The Attorney General stated the Task Force had
unanimously concluded ``that the practices and techniques
identified by the Army Field Manual or currently used by law
enforcement provide adequate and effective means of conducting
interrogations.'' The recommendations of the Task Force were
approved by the President.
In the following months, the Committee expressed a strong
interest, through staff briefings, statements of Members at
hearings, and legislation, in being advised about the
implementation of the Task Force recommendations. Part of the
interest focused on the charter the Administration was
preparing to govern the operations of the specialized
interrogation group, which came to be known as the High-Value
Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG). The Charter was finalized
on April 19, 2010, and, as a result of legislation in the
Senate, was provided to the Committee on May 18, 2010.
The HIG is as an interagency body administratively housed
within the FBI and subject to policy direction from the
National Security Council. The leadership of the HIG consists
of a Director appointed by the Director of the FBI and two
Deputy Directors, one drawn from the CIA and the other from the
Defense Department. The Department of Justice, through an
attorney at the National Security Division, provides legal
counsel to the HIG.
The HIG's primary responsibility is to deploy expert Mobile
Interrogation Teams to conduct and support the interrogation of
High-Value Detainees who have been identified as having access
to information with the greatest potential of preventing
terrorist attacks against the United States. These mobile teams
are directed to use only those techniques authorized by the
Army Field Manual; this limitation does not preclude the use of
authorized, non-coercive interrogation techniques that are
designed to elicit voluntary statements and do not involve the
use of force, threats, or promises, in accordance with the
provisions of Executive Order 13491. The HIG also has
responsibilities concerning improving the training of
interrogators and sponsoring research on interrogation.
The Committee monitored the implementation of the HIG,
including lessons learned from the initial work of the HIG.
Section 333 of S. 3611, reported by the Committee on July 19,
2010, as part of the effort to enact the Intelligence
Authorization Act for FY 2010, included a requirement that
within 60 days of enactment the DNI shall submit to the
appropriate committees an analysis and assessment of lessons
learned from the operations and activities of the HIG since its
establishment. As a result of an amendment in the
Appropriations Committee offered by Senators Bond and
Feinstein, as members of that committee, this requirement
became law in section 308 of the Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 2010, Pub. L. 111-212 (2010). The DNI submitted the
classified lessons learned report to the Committee on October
4, 2010.
On December 16, 2010, the DNI submitted a report pursuant
to the remaining requirements of section 333 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2010 (Public Law 111-
259). Section 333 directed the submission of a comprehensive
report on the policies and procedures governing participation
by IC elements, including the legal basis for their
participation, in the interrogation of international terrorism
suspects. This reporting requirement applied to the HIG as the
interagency body established to carry out interrogations. The
report submitted pursuant to section 333 contains both
classified and unclassified portions concerning the HIG. The
Committee has begun the process of seeking further elaboration
from the DNI about the report.
4. Intelligence issues regarding detainees held at U.S. Naval Station
Guantanamo Bay
During the 110th Congress, the Committee was made aware of
rising recidivism levels and, as a result, began to review the
transfer of detainees from the Guantanamo Bay detention
facility. During the 111th Congress, the Committee continued
its oversight of Intelligence Community involvement with
detainees held at U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, including
the IC's role in detainee transfers. The Committee sought to
review the Intelligence Community's threat assessments about
the detainees, effectiveness and extent of measures being taken
to monitor detainees and provide security by countries to which
the detainees were transferred, and information about detainee
recidivism. These efforts gained additional momentum following
reports that two of the leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), the group that claimed responsibility for the
failed 2009 Christmas Day attack, were former Guantanamo
detainees. The Chairman and Vice Chairman wrote to the
President on January 5, 2010, asking that he halt the transfer
of detainees to Yemen. The Administration has imposed a
moratorium on such transfers, with the exception of a Yemeni
detainee ordered released by a U.S. court.
Concerned about rising rates of recidivism, the Committee
held Member briefings on the activities and recidivism of
transferred Guantanamo detainees, and the processes used by,
and decisions of, the Administration's Guantanamo Detainee
Review Task Force. The Task Force briefing included
representatives from the Departments of Justice, State,
Defense, and Homeland Security and the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
Committee submitted numerous questions for the record and
document requests following the Task Force briefing to provide
additional information and context to witness testimony. The
Committee also held staff level briefings with officials from
the Detainee Review Task Force, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Committee staff also reviewed: (1) the implementation of
monitoring and security requirements each country negotiated
with the U.S. government; (2) the foreign government's
perception of the thoroughness of detainee information provided
by the United States; (3) how each country dealt with the
challenges of resettling detainees; (4) the extent and content
of interaction between the Intelligence Community and
intelligence services of host countries; and (5) any conditions
that may permit transferred detainees to re-engage in terrorist
activity, including an ability to travel abroad. Staff also
heard from U.S. government representatives about the status of
the transferred detainees and efforts to monitor them.
Legislation passed by the Committee and the Senate in S.
1494, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,
later modified and included in the Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 2010, required the Administration to provide the
congressional intelligence committees with the basis for
detainee disposition decisions reached by the Guantanamo
Detainee Review Task Force, including the written threat
analyses prepared on each detainee, and access to the
intelligence information that formed the basis of the threat
analyses. The information provided to date has proven
invaluable to the Committee's understanding of the potential
threat posed by transferred detainees and those remaining at
Guantanamo Bay. The Committee will continue to efforts to
obtain requested information and review intelligence issues
concerning the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay and
Intelligence Community involvement with efforts to prosecute,
transfer, or further hold those detained there.
5. Oversight of Intelligence Community counterterrorism efforts
The Committee during the 111th Congress increased the scope
and depth of its oversight of the Intelligence Community's role
in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The Committee has increased
oversight by conducting numerous hearings and briefings with IC
agency heads and staff as well as regularly scheduled staff
meetings. The Committee has placed particular emphasis on its
need to examine the underlying legal basis for the IC's
activities as well as the short and long-term effects and
consequences of IC activities. The Committee's efforts have
resulted in additional and more detailed congressional
notifications by IC agencies. The IC agencies have also
provided more documentation and detail on current and future
plans and operations.
6. Mass shooting at Fort Hood, Texas
On November 5, 2009, a mass shooting at Fort Hood, Texas
killed thirteen people and wounded thirty-one. The alleged
shooter, Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Malik Hasan, has been
described by NCTC Director Michael Leiter as a ``lone actor
inspired by the global violent extremist movement who attacked
without oversight or guidance from overseas-based al-Qaeda
elements.'' The Committee conducted two hearings on the Fort
Hood shooting and whether the IC and other government agencies
had information which could have prevented this tragedy, and
engaged with the IC on ways to improve its investigative
guidelines and collection, analysis, and sharing of threat
information related to U.S. persons.
7. Christmas Day 2009 Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253
On December 25, 2009, a 23-year-old Nigerian man, Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab, attempted to detonate a concealed
explosive device on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from
Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan, as the plane was descending
into Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport.
The Chairman and Vice Chairman announced on December 31,
2009, that the Committee would conduct hearings on the
attempted Christmas Day terrorist attack and ``collect all
intelligence related to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab held by
various intelligence agencies in order to determine who had
what, and how the information was handled. In addition, the
Committee [would] review national security policies on sharing
information and terrorist watchlisting.'' In the months that
followed, the Committee gathered information through hearings,
briefings, and document requests from the ODNI, NCTC, CIA, NSA,
FBI, Department of State, and DHS (including agencies under its
purview, such as the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)).
The Committee held a closed hearing on the attack on
January 21, 2010. Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond
issued a joint statement following the hearing that the
Committee staff had prepared a draft report which had been
delivered to the Committee members, and that the Committee
would begin discussing, on a bipartisan basis, conclusions and
recommendations to include in the report.
On March 16, 2010, the Committee unanimously approved a 55-
page report and provided it to the Intelligence Community for a
classification review. Once that classification review was
completed, the Committee made corrective edits to the report
based on IC recommendations, and prepared an unclassified
Executive Summary. On May 18, 2010, the Committee unanimously
approved that unclassified Executive Summary and released it to
the public.
On May 18, 2010, the Committee also unanimously approved a
motion to report to the Senate its ``Report on the Attempted
Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253'' which
consists of: (1) the publicly released unclassified Executive
Summary together with Additional Views of Senators Chambliss
and Burr; and (2) the previously adopted classified portion of
the report, which has been retained by the Committee and is
available in its secure offices for reading by other Senators.
The Committee concluded that the IC failed to connect and
appropriately analyze the information in its possession prior
to December 25, 2009, that would have identified Abdulmutallab
as a possible terrorist threat to the United States. The
Committee believed the IC and other parts of the U.S.
Government should have taken steps to prevent Abdulmutallab
from boarding Northwest Flight 253 to Detroit. The SSCI report
identified fourteen specific points of failure a series of
human errors, technical problems, systemic obstacles,
analytical misjudgments, and competing priorities which
resulted in Abdulmutallab being able to travel to the United
States on December 25, 2009. In the classified portion of the
Committee's report, each point of failure includes a
description, a Committee conclusion, Committee recommendations,
and a discussion of the corrective actions already being taken
by the IC at the time of the report's release.
The first two points of failure identified by the Committee
relate to failures of the systems and procedures in place to
prevent suspected terrorists from entering the United States.
The remaining points discuss why the relevant intelligence was
not connected and analyzed together. Doing so might have led
analysts to link sufficient threat and biographical information
on Abdulmutallab to place him on the relevant watch lists.
As the Committee's Report describes, the Committee found
there were systemic failures across the IC that contributed to
the failure to identify the threat posed by Abdulmutallab.
Specifically, the NCTC was not organized adequately to fulfill
its missions. Following 9/11, Congress created the NCTC and
charged it with serving as ``the primary organization in the
United States Government for analyzing and integrating all
intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States
Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism. . .
.'' In practice, however, the Committee found that no one
agency saw itself as responsible for tracking and identifying
all terrorism threats. In addition, technology across the IC
was not adequate to provide search enhancing tools for analysts
who might have identified Abdulmutallab as a potential threat.
In addition to the review conducted by the Committee, the
DNI created an Intelligence Community Review Panel chaired by
John McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of the CIA. That
panel's report endorsed three of the specific classified
recommendations made by the SSCI report. In response to the
Committee's findings and conclusions, the IC has implemented
significant changes and reforms. The Committee continues to
monitor those efforts and study what additional reforms may be
required.
8. Najibullah Zazi and David Headley
In September 2009, Najibullah Zazi was arrested and charged
with plans to attack the New York City subway system. He pled
guilty in federal court in February 2010. Zazi's alleged two
New York-based associates were indicted in January 2010. The
plot, which included the development of hydrogen peroxide-based
homemade explosives, was the first known instance since 9/11
that al-Qaeda had successfully deployed a trained operative
inside the United States.
On October 27, 2009, the FBI arrested David Headley in
Chicago on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks in Denmark.
The FBI later also charged Headley with participating in the
November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India. In March
2010, Headley pled guilty in federal court to all charges.
During this timeframe, the Committee held hearings and
briefings on these cases and on IC support to these
investigations.
9. Faisal Shahzad
In May 2010, Faisal Shahzad attempted to detonate a car
bomb in Times Square, New York City, an attack for which
Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility. It
was the first time the TTP had been known to expand its
operational focus from attacks within South Asia to plotting
attacks inside the United States. The Committee held a hearing
and conducted staff briefings on this case to review
Intelligence Community collection and analysis on Shahzad and
his links to TTP.
10. Khowst attack
On December 30, 2009, the CIA suffered its most devastating
losses in its efforts against al Qaeda and related terrorist
organizations in an attack at Forward Operating Base Chapman in
Khowst, Afghanistan. The attack was carried out by a foreign
national who was believed to be working for the CIA and
providing valuable information against the al Qaeda terrorist
network. In light of his previous reporting, CIA officers
decided to meet with him with the hope of forming a more
productive relationship. However, the assailant used this
opportunity to detonate an explosive vest, killing seven CIA
employees and wounding six others.
The CIA conducted an internal counterintelligence review
and commissioned an independent external review led by former
CIA official Charles Allen and retired Ambassador Thomas
Pickering to determine what happened at Khowst, what lessons
could be learned, and what steps should be taken to prevent
such incidents in the future. In response to this attack, the
Committee held hearings and staff briefings on the attack
itself and the results of the two counterintelligence reviews.
The Committee will continue to monitor and actively engage with
the CIA to ensure the recommendations of the CIA internal
review and the independent external review are implemented
quickly and successfully.
11. Afghanistan
During the 111th Congress, the Committee spent considerable
time and effort reviewing the IC's support to the
Administration's commitment of additional resources to U.S.
military operations in Afghanistan. Commonly known as the
``surge,'' the increased U.S. military operations in
Afghanistan required an accompanying increased commitment of
significant intelligence resources. The Committee held numerous
hearings to understand developments in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and whether and how the new policy initiatives in the
region were affecting the situation in the region.
The Committee's oversight of Afghanistan intelligence
issues and IC support to the surge focused on the analysis of
the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and IC activities in
the region, including intelligence collection and other
operations.
In the analysis area, the Committee reviewed the IC's
assessment of the anticipated challenges to the surge strategy;
its development of metrics to measure both intelligence support
and progress on policy goals; its analysis on progress achieved
compared to the goals of the strategy; its perspective on
developments immediately following the controversial Afghan
elections; and the two National Intelligence Estimates on
Afghanistan and Pakistan, respectively, produced to inform
policy makers conducting the December 2010 policy review of the
Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.
The Committee also focused on IC goals and progress in
supporting the Afghanistan strategy; the creation of a new
office of the Associate Director for National Intelligence for
Afghanistan and Pakistan (ADNI Af/Pak), who was responsible for
coordinating IC efforts to support policy in the region; and
how the various intelligence disciplines of collection,
analysis, operations, and counter-intelligence were coordinated
and reinforced in this region. In addition, the Committee
reviewed the Administration's Fiscal Year 2010 and 2011 budget
requests to support these efforts.
The Committee held a number of other hearings and briefings
on related activities by various elements of the Intelligence
Community that included in-depth examination of the complex
intelligence support to U.S. policy initiatives in the region.
12. Threat finance and financial intelligence
The Committee conducted a comprehensive survey of the
elements of the Intelligence Community that collect and analyze
intelligence pertaining to the financial activities of U.S.
adversaries, such as the illicit banking and procurement
transactions related to Iran's and North Korea's missile and
nuclear development, and the illicit funding streams that fuel
insurgent networks and terrorist organizations in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. The Committee's work on these issues included
identifying gaps in coverage; holding multiple meetings and
briefings with Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis
and other relevant agencies and Departments; and developing a
catalog of all financial intelligence-related finished
intelligence analysis products. In addition, Committee staff
worked with staff from the Senate Committees on Armed Services,
Foreign Relations, Homeland Security and Government Affairs,
Finance, and Banking to develop a coherent cross-Committee and
interagency approach to these issues throughout the government.
Following the President's December 1, 2009, announcement of
the new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the
Chairman and Vice Chairman, along with Senators Rockefeller,
Wyden, Bayh, Whitehouse, and Majority Leader Harry Reid, wrote
to the DNI and the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs to urge that they coordinate a comprehensive
interagency campaign to identify, target, and attack the
funding networks that sustain the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The
Committee also held a hearing to review the efforts of the IC
and other government agencies in this area. In response to the
Committee's request, the DNI, on August 1, 2010, issued a
report detailing the IC's strategy and implementation plan to
improve collection and analysis against the financing networks
of the Taliban and al Qaeda.
On October 6, 2010, Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman
Bond, along with Senators Rockefeller, Wyden, Bayh, Whitehouse,
and Snowe, wrote to DNI Clapper to commend the Intelligence
Community's work pertaining to threat finance and financial
intelligence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and suggested that
Director Clapper seek to replicate this work with regard to
other national security challenges outside of Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
13. Oversight of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
The Committee continued its oversight of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence throughout the 111th
Congress. The position of the Director of National
Intelligence, as established by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, was given a variety of
statutory authorities and responsibilities. The ODNI includes a
management staff that assists the Director in coordinating the
resources and activities of the various intelligence agencies.
It also includes several functional organizations, including
the National Counterterrorism Center, the National
Counterproliferation Center, the National Counterintelligence
Executive, and the National Intelligence Council.
During the 111th Congress, DNIs Blair and Clapper, as well
as other officials within their office, appeared before the
Committee for numerous briefings and hearings. These meetings
were necessary both to monitor the progress of the ODNI and to
assist in the oversight of the individual agencies of the
Intelligence Community.
The ODNI submitted numerous reports and strategy documents
to the Committee during 2009 and 2010. For example, the ODNI
provided the National Intelligence Strategy, the National
Intelligence Priorities Framework, progress reports on the
implementation of the DNI's budget authorities, a report on
Information Integration, annual reports on the functions of
analytic integrity and standards, a report on the status of the
IC language program, and reports on security and suitability
process reform.
14. Intelligence Community Directive 402
The Committee also conducted oversight on Intelligence
Community Directive (ICD) 402, which DNI Blair issued early in
his tenure. On May 19, 2009, DNI Blair, completing a process
that began under previous DNI Michael McConnell, issued ICD 402
to designate ``DNI representatives'' to U.S. foreign partners
and international organizations. In recognition of the
historical overseas role of the CIA, ICD 402 provided that in
``virtually all cases globally'' the CIA Chief of Station would
serve as the DNI representative to U.S. diplomatic missions. In
``rare circumstances,'' according to the document, the DNI, in
consultation with the Chiefs of Mission, the Director of the
CIA, and other affected departments or agencies, could
designate a DNI representative other than a CIA Chief of
Station. The Committee wrote in S. Report 111-55, which
accompanied S. 1494, the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010, that ICD 402 was faithful to the National
Security Act because the DNI is not only the head of the
Intelligence Community in Washington, D.C., but is the
Intelligence Community's head wherever it operates in the
world. In November 2009, however, the National Security Council
supported the CIA's position that CIA Chiefs of Station should
be the DNI representatives in all cases.
15. Information sharing and Intelligence Community Directive 501
The Committee spent considerable time examining the
progress of the Intelligence Community in implementing ICD
501--``Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information
Within the Intelligence Community.'' The ICD directs that IC
elements ``shall treat information collected and analysis
produced as national assets and, as such, shall act as stewards
of information who have a predominant responsibility to
provide.''
The Committee found that, while the DNI and IC agencies
have made substantial progress at improving discoverability and
sharing of information across the IC, much more needs to be
done to fulfill the goals set forth in ICD 501. The Committee
discovered that policies and practice regarding access to
needed information differed from agency to agency. More than
once, the Committee intervened to improve access to specific
programs for specific IC managers and analysts. However, the
Committee believed that the need for its involvement to improve
information sharing was contrary to the spirit of ICD 501. The
Committee will continue to oversee the implementation of ICD
501 to ensure information necessary for intelligence officials
to perform their mission is made available in a systemic and
routine fashion, with appropriate measures in place to protect
sources and methods.
16. Foreign language requirements and capabilities
The Committee reviewed the IC's foreign language
requirements and capabilities in order to discern the specific
gaps, shortfalls, weaknesses, and national level issues that
contribute to the IC's overall deficit in foreign language
capability. This effort focused on a range of issues, including
IC requirements for heritage speakers; security clearance
processes; professional language training throughout the IC;
foreign language professional retention and incentive programs;
linguist utilization and language maintenance pay; and the use
of foreign language contractors worldwide.
The Committee found that serious shortfalls persist for
languages critical to intelligence agency missions in spite of
multiple past and ongoing efforts to improve this capability.
While IC agencies have attempted to correct their hiring
patterns and increase their language training programs, many
still rely heavily on contract linguists, interpreters, and
translators for critical languages. Persistent shortfalls in
critical languages coupled with the increasing volumes of
information available through open source and other means have
exacerbated the effects of a national deficit in foreign
language capability on intelligence collection and analysis.
By the end of the reporting period, the Committee staff had
ascertained a number of systemic, community-wide and/or agency
specific problems in the areas of billet structure and language
training; contractor hiring and utilization; security clearance
processes; linguist recruitment and hiring practices; and
military linguist utilization. The Committee will continue to
follow and address the foreign language deficit of the
Intelligence Community.
17. Education and training
The Committee spent considerable time examining the
progress and status of a wide range of educational, training,
and scholarship programs within and associated with the
Intelligence Community, including the IC Centers of Academic
Excellence (CAE) in National Security Studies Program, the
National Security Education Program (NSEP), Boren Scholars, and
the National Intelligence University.
The IC CAE in National Security Studies Program was
established during 2005 in response to the nation's increasing
need for IC professionals who are educated and trained with the
unique knowledge, skills, and capabilities to carry out
America's national security objectives. The Committee is
monitoring the program, particularly in schools whose programs
were originally funded with program money but are now self-
sustaining.
In multiple meetings with academic scholarship and program
managers, Committee staff explored the scope, scale, and
resourcing of programs, and examined the historical and
potential returns on investment experienced throughout the IC.
The Committee sought to ensure that the IC is adequately
resourced to educate, recruit, and train a broad spectrum of
professionals capable of contributing to the national security
of the United States, including through educational programs
that lead to quantitative and qualitative increases in the
national talent pool from which the IC recruits.
18. Analytic transformation and quality of analysis
The Committee maintained its focus on ongoing analytic
transformation as well as the quality of analytic products
disseminated to customers of the IC. The 2004 Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) mandated a number
of reforms in the IC to improve the analytic standards of the
community, address faulty intelligence analysis, and increase
information sharing between analysts and agencies. The DNI
implemented policies and procedures to encourage sound analytic
methods and tradecraft throughout the IC elements, and the
Committee continued to monitor the progress of agencies and
analytic directorates at meeting those standards.
The Committee conducted a full committee hearing with top
analytic leaders of the IC on the state of intelligence
analysis, as well as efforts to improve the quality of analytic
tradecraft since the passage of IRTPA. The Committee remains
keenly interested in significant issues relating to
intelligence analysis, including: IC and individual agency
efforts to create and follow community-wide standards of
analytic tradecraft; analyst recruitment, training, utilization
and retention; the balance between the IC's focus on reporting
current threats versus long-term analysis; and the status of
analytic collaboration and intelligence-sharing within and
among intelligence agencies.
In addition to the hearing, the Committee received regular
substantive briefings from analysts, held analysis oversight
meetings with senior analysts and analytic chiefs, and
conducted quality of analysis meetings with the IC's analytic
ombudsman. These activities supported intelligence oversight in
general, but specifically contributed to focusing the analytic
community on a continuing pursuit of analytic quality.
A large part of the analytic transformation underway in the
IC should be happening in the realm of information technology,
the tools that analysts use to discover, retrieve, share,
analyze, produce, and share intelligence. Unfortunately,
individual agencies continue to develop analyst tools,
technologies, and databases for their own analysts that may not
be usable by all the IC agencies. The Committee continues to
see stovepipes in the development and fielding of analytic
technologies, although collaborative workspaces, common
metadata, shared databases, and universal access to needed
information should be the rule rather than the exception.
19. Size and apportionment of analytic workforce
The Committee began to look more closely into the IC's
analytic workforce, apportionment, and division of labor to
determine if the specific analytic personnel requests of the IC
agencies were justified. The Committee examined the analysis
being produced, the analysts requested and required, and the
National Intelligence Priorities that serve as the foundational
basis for resource requests to determine what redundancies or
gaps if any, were present. In multiple substantive briefings,
the Committee reviewed the oversight of analytic accounts,
discussing the number of analysts focused on specific issues,
determining whether a particular agency was duplicating the
efforts of another, or discovering whether analytic gaps were
left unaddressed. The Committee continues to encourage IC
agencies to align growth in analytic resources to meet
specified priorities and missions, rather than allowing general
growth across all analytic missions randomly.
20. Forward deployment of analysts
During its consideration of the Fiscal Year 2010
Intelligence Authorization Act, the Committee noted the
increasing numbers and locations where IC strategic level
analysts are forward deployed to overseas locations. The
Committee understands the value of providing periodic ``quality
of analysis''-type regional familiarization opportunities for
analysts and recognizes that geographical proximity to
customers is important for some analytic mission sets. At the
same time, the Committee continues to examine the link between
foundational intelligence strategy documents such as ICD 204
(``Roles and Responsibilities for the National Intelligence
Priorities Framework''), National Intelligence Priorities
Framework, and the actual deployment of analytic resources
globally. The Committee remains concerned that the forward
deployment of analysts in support of operational or tactical
missions should not undercut the strategic priorities of the
Intelligence Community.
21. Analytic integrity and standards
Concerned that there appeared to be a wide disparity in
analytic tradecraft standards followed across the IC, in some
cases diverging from the standards mandated in IRTPA, the
Committee undertook a study of Analytic Integrity and Standards
(AIS) at the ODNI and in several agencies. This study explored
the organization and functioning of AIS offices across the IC,
the rigor with which analytic integrity and tradecraft review
standards are being applied, actions being taken to improve
AIS, and what further steps could be taken to increase and
improve the analytic standards and policies of the IC.
One of the reforms put in place with the passage of IRTPA
was the creation, formalization, and enhancement of AIS
organizations at the ODNI and within individual agencies. These
AIS organizations were meant to improve both the conduct and
outcomes of analysis. Every IC agency which produces analysis
has created one or more offices with the specific
responsibilities of training analysts in analytic
methodologies, tradecraft, and standards, conducting in-depth
post-production reviews of analytic products for adherence to
tradecraft standards, and creation and dissemination of
analytic ``lessons learned'' and ``best practices.''
In the course of visiting AIS offices and officers
throughout the IC, Committee staff found that while the IC has
generally raised its level of emphasis on teaching, mentoring,
monitoring, and enforcing analytic tradecraft standards, there
are still specific areas requiring improvement. These areas as
well as agency ``best practices'' have been identified and
recommendations made to ODNI and agency staffs.
22. Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis
During the 111th Congress, the Committee continued to
monitor the activities and programs of the CIA's Sherman Kent
School for Intelligence Analysis. The Sherman Kent School
provides CIA officers with an integrated, career-long program
that combines specialized training in the craft of intelligence
analysis with a substantive curriculum interwoven with the
values, traditions, and history of the CIA.
The Committee's oversight included: examining the size and
scope of programs; the numbers and specialties of analysts
trained compared to the number and specialties of analysts
requiring training; future growth of the school; strategic
planning; and ties to the wider IC.
The Committee found that the School provides excellent
foundational and follow-on training for intelligence analysts.
The Committee also identified resource shortfalls that, if
corrected, could lead to a broader and more robust analytic
capability in the wider IC.
23. Analyst-collector relationships
In late 2010, the Committee initiated a study into the
technological, cultural, and policy issues that affect the
relationships between intelligence analysts and various
collection systems. The Committee believes that individual
agencies' analysts currently use agency-specific systems to
manage collection requirements, have little capability to task
beyond their own agencies, and are often discouraged from
direct contact with collection organizations, a situation that
may create stovepipes and obstruct the flow of information.
The Committee has developed a better understanding of the
relationships between analysts and collectors/collection
systems, and has developed new insights into the depth of
planning and involvement of the ODNI in collection management.
The Committee is establishing a baseline understanding of
technical systems which support the flow of information between
analysts and collectors.
The Committee plans to explore these relationships in more
depth by examining IC and individual agency policies regarding
analyst communications with collectors in the field; IC and
individual agency policies regarding collector communications
with analysts and input into analytic assessments; the manner
and specific technologies used to task collection within
individual agencies and across the IC; the manner and specific
technologies used to provide feedback to collectors within an
agency and across the IC; and analyst interaction with
collection managers.
24. National Intelligence Estimates production process
In 2010, the Committee initiated a research project that
examined the procedural reforms put into place since 2004 in
the production processes of National Intelligence Estimates
(NIEs). NIEs are the most authoritative written means by which
the DNI conveys to the President and other senior policymakers
the judgments of the entire IC regarding national security
issues. Committee staff interviewed National Intelligence
Officers and their deputies, as well as analysts who had
participated directly in the drafting of Estimates, Community
Memoranda, and Terms of Reference. Intelligence Community
officials expressed their belief that there is presently
greater consistency and formality to the NIE production process
than there was in the years prior to 2005, noted a variety of
process improvements under consideration, and identified other
areas that still require improvements.
This initial work has laid the foundation for further
research in 2011 that will include interviews of policymakers,
the principal customers of NIEs, and coordination with the
ODNI's Director of Analytic Integrity and Standards, the office
responsible for ensuring quality analysis. The Committee seeks
to understand how well the reforms to the NIE process put into
place since the creation of the DNI in 2004 have addressed the
quality of analysis and satisfied the needs of policymakers.
25. Lessons Learned Programs
During the 111th Congress, the Committee began to review
the individual intelligence agencies to determine the scope and
depth of their commitment for self-examination, with an
emphasis on increasing the use of lessons learned programs. The
Committee believes such programs are essential to help
intelligence agencies learn from their successes and mistakes,
and to anticipate and be ready for new challenges. The
Committee commended the CIA for establishing a Lessons Learned
Program and fully supports its growth into the individual
components of the CIA.
The Committee firmly believes that the IC should
institutionalize the lessons learned process and develop policy
supporting that effort. To that end, the Committee has
encouraged the IC to increase the number and type of studies,
to create web-based lesson-sharing environments, to modernize
its oral history programs, and to support component-based
lessons learned activities throughout the IC.
26. Measures of effectiveness
The Committee continued to press the Intelligence Community
during the 111th Congress to establish quantitative measures of
effectiveness to provide insight into how effectively a program
is performing. The Committee believes well-designed measures of
effectiveness that accurately reflect performance and cost
issues can assist decision makers in making better informed and
timelier decisions.
The Committee is pleased that the IC is developing more
meaningful measures of effectiveness for its programs and will
continue to monitor the agencies as they refine established
measures and expand them to additional programs.
27. National Collaboration Development Center
During the 111th Congress, the Committee reviewed and
supported the creation of the National Collaboration
Development Center (NCDC). The NCDC emphasizes the development
of working relationships at the field level between U.S.
officials charged with intelligence, national security, and
homeland security missions. The Committee believes that
participants in the NCDC learn to recognize information of
national security value, and to evaluate and implement joint
intelligence collection and operational opportunities as a
result. The Committee strongly supports the NCDC mission of
facilitating cooperation between U.S. agencies and will
continue to monitor the development of the Center in the
future.
28. FBI intelligence transformation
The Committee continued to examine efforts by the FBI to
transform itself into a premier intelligence and national
security organization. The Committee held hearings and
briefings with FBI officials, conducted oversight visits to FBI
field offices and Legal Attaches, met with representatives of
FBI-employee associations, and consulted with current and
former intelligence officials regarding the strengthening of
FBI intelligence and national security functions.
The Committee successfully secured additional surveillance
resources for threat mitigation and intelligence collection,
and has worked with the FBI to ensure the Committee has an
increasingly broad view of FBI national security operations and
activities, including written analysis of international
terrorism and counterintelligence matters. In addition, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required
the DNI, in coordination with the Director of the FBI, to
establish performance metrics and timetables for FBI reform
initiatives. The DNI is required to submit a report on FBI
reform efforts to the congressional intelligence committees on
a semi-annual basis for five years.
29. Implementation of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and compliance
with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders
During the 111th Congress, the Committee held three closed
hearings and numerous staff briefings to review issues related
to implementation of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and
compliance with the orders of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC).
In conducting its oversight, the Committee utilized
reporting required under provisions in FISA and the USA PATRIOT
Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act, including the annual
and semi-annual reports from the Attorney General, the DNI, and
relevant inspectors general. In particular, the Committee has
benefited from being able to review decisions, orders, and
opinions, as well as the related pleadings, applications, and
memoranda of law, that include ``significant construction or
interpretation of any provision'' of FISA that are required to
be submitted to the oversight committees under 50 U.S.C.
1871(c). These documents were routinely the subject of
subsequent briefings by officials of the Department of Justice
and the Intelligence Community, in Committee spaces and at the
relevant agencies.
Prior to the extension of the expiring FISA provisions in
February 2010, the Committee acted to bring to the attention of
the entire membership of the Senate important information
related to the nature and significance of the FISA collection
authority subject to sunset. Chairman Feinstein and Vice
Chairman Bond notified their colleagues that the Attorney
General and the DNI had provided a classified paper on
intelligence collection made possible under the Act and that
the Committee was providing a secure setting where the
classified paper could be reviewed by any Senator prior to the
vote on passage of what became Public Law 111-141 to extend
FISA sunsets.
In addition, as part of its oversight activities, the
Committee regularly reviewed the activities of the Office of
Compliance of the National Security Agency. The Director of the
National Security Agency in 2009 appointed a Director of
Compliance, a position later established in law by Section 433
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, to
ensure compliance with FISC orders, as well as laws and
regulations involving the privacy of U.S. persons, during the
conduct of intelligence operations. The Committee believes that
the Office of Compliance has brought rigor to NSA's efforts to
ensure verifiable adherence to the laws, policies, and
compliance standards under which the Agency is required to
operate as it conducts its mission.
30. Counterintelligence
During the 111th Congress, the Intelligence Committee held
oversight hearings and briefings on the state of
counterintelligence (CI) in the Intelligence Community.
Specifically, the Committee held an oversight hearing on the
National Counterintelligence Executive's (NCIX) policies and
efforts to unify CI practices across the Intelligence
Community, as well as efforts by the FBI to combat the
activities of foreign intelligence organizations in the United
States. Additionally, the Committee was briefed by the FBI on
their efforts to uncover and dismantle a ring of Russian spies
operating in the United States. The Committee will continue to
focus on how the Intelligence Community can enhance and unify
counterintelligence efforts among the intelligence agencies in
the 112th Congress.
Additionally, the Committee reviewed issues related to the
NCIX's internal management, community acquisition practices,
and ways to enhance the timely production of damage assessments
by the NCIX. Committee staff met with DNI Blair's National
Counterintelligence Review Group (NCIRG) in March 2009. The
NCIRG, which was chaired by former FBI Director Louis Freeh,
solicited the Committee's views and input on how to best
elevate the Intelligence Community's counterintelligence
policy, operations, and training in the coming years.
In September 2009, Robert M. Bryant was named the third
National Counterintelligence Executive. Later, Douglas Thomas
was selected to be the Deputy National Counterintelligence
Executive. During the course of the 111th Congress, Committee
staff met repeatedly with these two officials and their staff
to discuss pending counterintelligence issues, and will
continue to do so in the next Congress.
31. Unauthorized disclosure of classified information
The Committee continued its vigorous oversight of the
Intelligence Community's efforts to address unauthorized
disclosures of classified information. In furtherance of this
effort, the Committee held a hearing with Attorney General
Holder, FBI Director Mueller, and former DNI Blair on how to
best address the damaging nature of leaks of classified
information. Additionally, the Committee conducted multiple
oversight briefings with the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and the Department of Justice on their collective
efforts to stem leaks of classified information. To keep the
intelligence committees better informed of the IC's efforts, in
September 2010, DNI Clapper agreed to provide the Committee
with additional information on leaks of classified information.
This agreement includes notifying the Committee of any
serious and significant leak of classified information to the
media, including if and when an IC element has reported and
referred the matter to the Department of Justice; notifying the
Committee if administrative sanctions are imposed upon any IC
employee for the unauthorized disclosure of classified
material; and, finally, at the beginning of each calendar year,
the Department of Justice will provide the Committee the number
of leak matters reported to the Attorney General by the IC and
the number of matters referred to the originating agencies for
administrative action.
Additionally, the Committee's review of unauthorized
disclosures identified a number of ways to combat future
potential releases of classified information. These include
consideration of enhanced resources for the auditing and
monitoring of information technology systems handling
classified information; strengthening laws prohibiting
unauthorized disclosure of classified information; and ensuring
proper implementation of the ``need to know'' principle with
respect to the sharing of classified information.
The Committee also held a hearing on the Wikileaks
organization and the principle of ``need to know.'' Wikileaks
is an international organization that has published improperly
obtained classified material including approximately 77,000
tactical and situational reports relating to U.S. military
activities in Afghanistan, some of which included sensitive
intelligence information; nearly 400,000 US military cables on
the Iraq War, which included intelligence assessments and
operational information; and some 250,000 U.S. State Department
cables, which highlight various aspects of the United States
global diplomatic efforts and intelligence matters.
The Committee's review of Wikileaks and other unauthorized
releases of classified information raised concerns about how
the Intelligence Community is balancing the ``need to know''
with efforts to share information more broadly, and its ability
to identify anomalous activities by its employees. The
Committee in the 112th Congress will use information gained
from oversight of these issues to determine whether additional
statutory or policy changes are necessary to help protect
information vital to U.S. national security.
32. Covert action
Under the National Security Act, the DNI shall keep the
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently
informed of all covert actions that are the responsibility of,
are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of any
department or agency of the United States, including
significant failures. The National Security Act defines a
covert action to be ``an activity of the United States
Government to influence political, economic, or military
conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the
U.S. Government will not be apparent or acknowledged
publicly.'' The DNI is responsible for furnishing the
committees with any information concerning covert actions that
is in the possession of any U.S. Government entity and which is
requested by either intelligence committee in order to carry
out its responsibilities. The only qualification on this
reporting responsibility is due regard for protection from
unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to
sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other
exceptionally sensitive matters.
Throughout the 111th Congress, the Committee continued to
conduct rigorous oversight of covert action programs. In
accordance with Committee rules, these reviews occur on a
quarterly basis. Every quarter, the Committee receives a
written report on each covert action that is being carried out
under a presidential finding. Committee staff then devotes
several sessions to review with Intelligence Community
personnel the reports on each subject, and often pose follow up
questions and receive further briefings or written answers. The
Committee also holds quarterly hearings on covert action
programs and often holds other hearings and briefings on these
programs on a more frequent basis.
The Committee reviewed covert action programs to ensure
their means and objectives were consistent with United States
foreign policy goals, and conducted in accordance with all
applicable U.S. laws. The Committee pursues its oversight
responsibilities for covert action with the understanding that
these programs can be a significant factor in accomplishing
foreign policy objectives.
In 2009, the National Security Council led a review of all
ongoing covert action programs. The Committee held closed
hearings at which the results of this review were discussed.
At an open hearing in 2010, Senator Feinstein noted that
``the CIA IG conducts a detailed review on each authorized
covert action program every three years,'' and asked the new
CIA IG nominee if he planned to continue this practice. The
nominee, David Buckley, replied that ``while a routine, every-
three-years audit will obviously get some coverage of each of
the covert actions, I'm also open to reviewing a covert action
twelve months later if that's what's required to make sure
things stay on track.'' The Committee routinely receives the
results of the reviews that Mr. Buckley mentioned, and often
follows up by examining the issue in committee hearings or via
staff inquiries.
33. Counterproliferation
The Committee continues to conduct oversight on the IC's
counterproliferation collection and analysis. The Committee
staff also met regularly with the National Counterproliferation
Center (NCPC) and components in the intelligence agencies which
handle proliferation issues to receive updates. In particular,
the Committee has strongly supported NCPC's work on performance
budgeting, which has been an exemplar for performance budgeting
in the IC.
34. Research and development
Recent studies sponsored by the Intelligence Community and
the Committee concluded that the Intelligence Community must
dramatically increase funding for research and development in
order to develop new capabilities that will provide unique and
actionable intelligence to U.S. decision-makers in the future.
The Committee recommended in the report accompanying the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 that the
Intelligence Community should invest proportionately more on a
broad portfolio of longer term research and development
projects with the potential for high-impact effects on
intelligence collection and analysis. To that end, the
Committee strongly supported additional funding for the new
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, a dedicated,
community-wide research activity created to take great
scientific risks with the hope of reaping great technological
rewards for the Intelligence Community.
35. Technical Advisory Group reviews
The Committee's Technical Advisory Group (TAG) is comprised
of distinguished experts in various scientific disciplines who
volunteer their time to assist the SSCI in reviewing the
technological needs and programs of the Intelligence Community.
In 2009, the TAG conducted reviews of cybersecurity policy,
operations, and research and development. The TAG's studies
have supported the Committee's intelligence oversight
activities and helped to inform the debate over appropriate
U.S. policy for cybersecurity. The TAG studies also identified
problems with the government's ability to attract and retain a
skilled and trained cyber work force. To help address this
problem, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010 requires the DNI to submit a plan for recruiting,
retaining, and training qualified personnel for cybersecurity
work within the Intelligence Community.
In 2010, the TAG conducted a year-long review of planned
investment in electro-optical satellite collection systems. The
TAG found flawed processes and results from the earliest stage
of the requirements process, through the analysis of
alternatives, and into the selection and design phases. The
study group members judged the technical justification for the
proposed system fell far short of the standard they expected
from an investment of this magnitude. Moreover, the depth of
engineering analysis, documentation, and clarity of Executive
Branch presentations all fell short of contemporary common
practices demanded of analogous systems in the scientific arena
and in the private sector. The TAG recommended the IC pursue
alternative satellite constellations than currently planned and
more rigorous external engineering and technical peer review
for all satellite acquisitions. The Committee continues to
pursue these TAG recommendations to ensure the IC pursues the
most cost-effective solution for its electro-optical satellite
requirements.
36. Commercial imagery
During the 111th Congress, the Committee reviewed issues
related to the acquisition, management, security,
dissemination, and use of commercially acquired imagery and the
government's role in supporting the domestic commercial
satellite industry. The Secretary of Commerce, through the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
licenses and regulates the U.S. commercial remote sensing space
industry, pursuant to the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of
1992. At the same time, elements of the IC acquire and use
domestic and foreign commercial imagery from a variety of
sources, in the conduct of their intelligence missions. The
Committee will continue to focus on how the IC acquires and
manages the tasking, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination (TPED) of commercial imagery as means of
fulfilling its intelligence collection requirements.
37. Defense Attache System
The Committee continued its oversight of the Defense
Attache System (DAS), which is managed by the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). As a result of Committee actions,
the Director of the DIA and the Director of National
Intelligence agreed to begin routine notifications of the
Congress when attaches are dismissed for other than health-
related, family and compassionate reasons. The Committee staff
also found that too many attaches are not sufficiently
conversant in the languages, cultures, and traditions of the
countries to which they are assigned. While the Committee staff
found a preponderance of individual attaches exceptionally
qualified and thoroughly productive, many others were ill-
suited and underprepared. Additionally, the Committee sought to
enhance the security and capability of the DAS information
technology systems and programs. The Committee has worked with
the DIA's Defense Counterintelligence and HUMINT Center (DCHC)
and the DIA Chief Information Officer to identify resource
requirements and specific locations for improving secure
communications.
38. Oversight of Department of Homeland Security Intelligence
activities
The Committee continued its oversight of the development of
the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). The
Committee continues to have concerns over I&A's personnel
situation and related budget issues, as well as the quality of
the analysis performed at I&A. Close to half of I&A's personnel
during the 111th Congress were contractors and approximately a
third of its government positions have remained unfilled for
years; nonetheless, I&A has continued to request additional
positions in its budget submissions. As contractors on average
cost significantly more than government employees, the
Committee believes that I&A needs to improve its personnel
recruitment and retention efforts, and hire for the unfilled
positions before requesting additional personnel.
Further, the Committee notes that I&A still needs to refine
the scope and quality of its finished intelligence products. In
particular, the strategic products produced by I&A often do not
appear to meet the tactical and operational needs of the
individual DHS components. The Committee will continue to
review I&A's efforts to better meet the needs of its customers
and acquire the appropriate personnel to perform its mission.
39. Intelligence community facilities
The Committee continues to examine issues related to the
design, construction, renovation, use, lease negotiation, and
lease termination of facilities owned and leased by the IC.
With the growth of the IC workforce following the 9/11 attacks,
and the decrease in facilities caused in part by the Base
Realignment and Closure recommendations of 2005, space suitable
for IC agencies especially in the National Capitol Region is in
increasingly short supply.
To address these issues, the Committee met with numerous IC
facilities managers, financial officers, and IT professionals
to review the status of IC facilities. The Committee found that
standards for sizes of individual and common area work spaces
vary greatly from agency to agency and within agencies, costs
per square foot vary widely for similar facilities in similar
locations, and agency strategies for future space development
and management have not been coordinated within their agencies
and across the IC.
The Committee will continue to review the IC's efforts to
develop common facilities standards where applicable, to
conduct strategic management of properties through their needed
lifecycle, and to determine appropriate performance measures
for adequate use of space across the IC.
40. Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office
The Committee continues to monitor the operation of the
Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTS-PO)
to ensure it is meeting the communication needs of all United
States government agencies and departments operating from
diplomatic and consular facilities abroad, including the needs
of agencies with national security missions for secure,
reliable and robust communication capabilities. During the
111th Congress, the Committee identified organizational changes
that will strengthen DTS-PO including reorganizing that office,
establishing a Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Governance
Board, funding DTS-PO on a two-year fiscal schedule, and
permitting DTS-PO to charge fees for its services. The
Committee included provisions to implement these reforms in the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
D. Financial Accounting, Inspectors General, and Audits
The Committee's rules provide that within its staff there
``shall be an element with the capability to perform audits of
programs and activities undertaken by departments and agencies
with intelligence functions. Such element shall be comprised of
persons qualified by training and/or experience to carry out
such functions in accordance with accepted auditing
standards.'' The functions described in this rule were
performed during the 111th Congress by the Committee's
Oversight Team. The Oversight Team also was responsible for the
Committee's oversight of the IC's compliance with financial
accounting standards and was the Committee element responsible
for reviewing the work and performance of the various IGs whose
work includes or covers the Intelligence Community.
1. Compliance with Federal financial accounting standards
The Committee has a long history of oversight and reform
efforts in financial management. The Committee has emphasized
the importance of achieving auditable financial statements,
dating back to the Committee's Fiscal Year 2002 Intelligence
Authorization bill. That bill called for the NRO, NSA, CIA,
DIA, and what is now called the NGA to produce auditable
financial statements by March 1, 2005. Since that time, the
Committee has been continuously engaged in a dialogue with the
IC on financial auditability and on the modern business systems
that are necessary to sustain auditability. The Committee has
also played a central role in encouraging elements of the IC to
ensure that they properly estimate costs and budget for the
programs they are pursuing.
To date, the NRO is the only one of the IC agencies
required to produce auditable financial statements that has
achieved what appears to be a sustainable opinion with no
qualifications from its independent auditors. The Chairman and
Vice Chairman officially congratulated the NRO in a December
2009 letter and urged the NRO to help lead other IC agencies
toward auditability. The CIA has submitted its financial
reports to an independent auditor but has received a disclaimer
of opinion due to the inability of the auditor to gather
certain relevant facts. The NSA, DIA, and NGA are still not
even prepared to submit their financial reports to independent
audit.
During the 111th Congress, Committee staff analyzed these
agencies' annual financial reports and met with each of the
agencies' Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) to discuss this
analysis. Most of these annual financial reports showed some
improvement in quality and forthrightness, but still reflected
insufficient progress toward auditability. The NSA's annual
financial report was the exception, in that it showed no
apparent improvement. In particular, the Committee was
concerned about the failed implementation of NSA's new
financial system. An NSA Inspector General report found that
this system was put into operation before it was adequately
tested and that operators were not properly trained to use it.
The NSA also made $7 million in duplicative invoice payments,
and the agency could not successfully reconcile its financial
books at the end of fiscal year 2008. Further, a July 2008 Army
Finance Command report, referenced by the NSA IG, found that
the NSA's accounting system was in violation of public laws,
Treasury Department financial manuals, and DoD regulations, and
was inconsistent with the Federal Managers Financial Integrity
Act. Accordingly, staff held meetings with the NSA's Inspector
General in 2009, as well as with the NSA's Chief Financial
Executive, to understand this problem, its implications, and
prospects for improvement.
In March 2009, the Chairman and Vice Chairman sent a letter
to the new DNI expressing their discontent with the state of
financial accounting in the IC and urging him to ``take strong
and decisive action to see that appropriate reforms and
oversight controls are in place as soon as possible.'' In
particular, the letter expressed alarm at the breakdown in
internal controls at the NSA following its attempts to
implement its commercial, off-the-shelf accounting system. The
letter lent the Committee's support to the DNI's fledgling
Business Transformation Office (BTO), but cautioned that the
BTO's work must not delay sorely-needed improvements to
internal controls. These controls are critical to preventing
millions of dollars of potential fraud, waste, and abuse, as
well as providing reliable business information for sound
decision-making. The Chairman and Vice Chairman requested
several specific actions to promote progress and ensure careful
oversight. These included:
Briefing the Committee on a Business
Enterprise Architecture framework by July 31, 2009;
Presenting an initial Business Enterprise
Architecture to the Committee by December 31, 2009;
Providing monthly updates on progress in
staffing the new BTO; and
Explaining changes to the DNI's April 2007
financial auditability plan and apprising the Committee
on progress with respect to this revised plan.
In June 2009, the Director of NSA wrote to the Chairman and
Vice Chairman, claiming that the NSA was now ``fully compliant
with the laws, regulations, and manuals'' referenced in the
U.S. Army Finance Command report and the Federal Financial
Managers Integrity Act. The NSA Director's letter also stated
that the NSA had been able to reconcile its fiscal year 2008
financial records. In July 2009, the Chairman and Vice Chairman
wrote to the Secretary of Defense concerning the NSA Director's
letter. They stated that in light of the NSA's past
difficulties in producing auditable financial statements, the
Committee believed the progress claimed by the NSA should be
independently confirmed by the DoD Inspector General.
Specifically, the letter requested that the DoD IG conduct a
form and content review of the NSA's fiscal year 2009 financial
statements to determine whether they were supported by reliable
accounting data and supporting information.
The Committee received the results of the DoD IG's review
in November 2009, which was very critical of NSA's claims.
Overall, the IG found that the NSA's financial statements were
not adequately supported by reliable accounting data and
supporting information. An even more disturbing finding was
that the NSA's ``remediation plans do not fully address audit
impediments.'' Specific findings included an inability to
reconcile critical general ledger balances, failure to perform
required accounting processes, and inconsistencies between the
information contained in the notes to the financial statements
and the information provided to the IG. The IG's findings
raised serious questions about the assertions made by the NSA
Director in his June 2009 letter and the support he is
receiving from the administrative staff involved. During a
meeting with Committee staff in August 2009, the NSA Deputy
Director committed to ensure a new level of senior management
attention to the NSA's financial practices.
Throughout the 111th Congress, Committee staff met
frequently with the ODNI to discuss financial auditability and
business transformation. As requested in the Committee's March
2009 letter, the IC CFO presented to Committee staff the DNI's
framework for the Business Enterprise Architecture. Also as
requested in the March 2009 letter, the ODNI CFO presented
quarterly progress reports to Committee staff on the CFO's
revised auditability plan. Committee staff has provided
feedback to the ODNI on these progress reports, as well as on
the ODNI's progress reports on BTO staffing.
In 2010, Committee staff became aware of an internal ODNI
staff report that estimated that $2 billion could be saved over
ten years by consolidating business systems and standardizing
processes throughout the IC. Committee staff met with ODNI and
OMB staff to review this report and urge the Administration to
take aggressive steps to maximize savings and efficiencies.
While IC officials expressed little confidence in the exact
amount that could be saved, senior IC officials did concede
that substantial savings and increased efficiencies would
result from consolidation. Committee efforts in this area
subsequently focused on encouraging the IC to align programs
and budgets to achieve these savings and efficiencies.
In addition to extensive oversight interaction with the IC
on financial management, the Committee legislated reforms to
promote financial auditability, business transformation, and
sound budgetary policy in the Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence
Authorization Act, Pub. L. 111-259.
Section 322 on ``Business System Transformation'' requires
that no funds may be obligated for IC business systems that
cost over $3 million unless the DNI certifies that the
acquisition complies with the approved business enterprise
architecture. This will ensure that the IC follows a ``best
business practice'' of having a business enterprise
architecture and only building systems that conform to it.
These business systems are important for producing auditable
financial statements.
Section 368, ``Correcting Long-standing Material
Weaknesses'' requires the head of an intelligence agency to
name a senior management official who is responsible for
correcting long-standing, correctable material weaknesses, as
identified in the agencies' annual financial reports. This is
intended to ensure accountability for fixing long-standing
problems that have a high risk of resulting in waste, fraud,
and abuse, and impede an agency's ability to produce auditable
financial statements.
P.L. 111-259 also contained important budget reform
provisions that will make IC processes more coherent and ensure
that large acquisition programs are affordable before they are
initiated.
Section 406, ``Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence
Community,'' establishes a DNI-appointed CFO of the IC to be
the principal resource advisor to the DNI and to carry out
duties described in the CFO Act. It also requires the CFO to be
involved in strategic planning and requirements development,
processes which in the past have resulted in unrealistic
resource commitments. This provision will better empower the
DNI to conduct his budgetary responsibilities, and it will
clarify the budgetary decision-making within the ODNI and the
IC.
Section 325, ``Future Budget Projections'' requires the IC
to produce five year budget plans with a moderate amount of
detail and projections for the subsequent five year period with
less detail. When the IC starts a new acquisition, it will be
required to assess what impact the new acquisition will have on
this ten year financial projection. The DNI will be required to
submit this assessment before the President submits the first
budget for the new acquisition and must update it whenever the
law requires an Independent Cost Estimate of the acquisition.
This provision will ensure that the IC considers the long-term
financial consequences of near-term budget decisions. The
Committee hopes that enactment of this provision will help end
the IC's poor record of spending billions of dollars to start
acquisition programs that it cannot afford to finish.
Additionally, the Committee included in the unclassified
report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 an assessment of the IC's progress in
performance budgeting and encouraging the IC to make further
progress in specified areas. The Committee continues to believe
that the Intelligence Community can better achieve its national
security mission by further use of performance budgeting.
2. Oversight of Intelligence Community Inspectors General
During the 111th Congress, the Committee continued both to
utilize the work of the IGs of the IC and to promote the
responsibilities and authorities of these offices. The
Committee reviewed IG products, including audit reports,
inspection reports, reports of investigation, and semi-annual
reports of IG activities; conducted numerous visits to IG
offices for updates on plans and procedures; and attended and
participated in IG conferences. The Committee used information
gained through review of IC IG products in its own oversight of
the Intelligence Community, and raised IG recommendations with
the senior leadership of IC agencies.
As noted in Section II A, the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 included provisions to add the IGs of
the NRO, NSA, NGA, and DIA to Section 8G of the Inspector
General Act of 1978. This statutory designation provides these
IGs with additional authorities to conduct investigations
including the ability to compel production of information. The
Act also included a provision amending the National Security
Act of 1947 to establish a statutory charter for the DNI IG.
3. Audit of Intelligence Community acquisition practices
During the 111th Congress, the oversight staff completed an
audit on the Intelligence Community Acquisition Processes which
had begun during the 110th Congress. The audit focused on the
role of the DNI in overseeing the IC's acquisition processes
and how the NSA, NGA, NRO, and CIA managed and conducted
acquisitions for their agencies. This audit found that,
although the ODNI had provided valuable oversight and has
placed additional emphasis on improving IC acquisition
practices, significant problems remain in how the IC agencies
acquire technology and equipment necessary for their missions.
The audit found that the senior managers within the IC
agencies were not appropriately focused on acquisition issues;
the IC did not have enough experienced acquisition
professionals to oversee billions of dollars in annual
acquisitions; and the IC needed better management, training,
and career planning for its workforce. In addition, the audit
raised serious concerns about the role of contractors in
overseeing acquisitions; the insufficient government monitoring
of contractor performance and the need to better incentivize
contractor performance; and the need to improve contract audit
services. The final audit report contained recommendations on
how to improve acquisition in the Intelligence Community. The
Committee discussed implementation of these recommendations
with the ODNI and IC agencies. The Committee will continue to
follow the IC's implementation of these recommendations and its
overall acquisition performance in coming years.
IV. NOMINATIONS
During the 111th Congress, coinciding with the beginning of
a new Administration, fourteen nominations were referred to the
Committee, twelve directly upon receipt of the nomination in
the Senate and two sequentially after referral to and reporting
by another committee. The Committee held hearings for eleven of
the thirteen pending nominees\1\ and recommended to the Senate
that it give its advice and consent to each of the pending
nominations. The Senate in the 111th Congress confirmed all
twelve of the individuals recommended by the Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The Nomination of Philip Mudd, to be Undersecretary for
Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security, was
withdrawn prior to the hearing scheduled on his nomination. The
Committee did not hold hearings on the nomination of Priscilla Guthrie
to be the Chief Information Officer and the nomination of S. Leslie
Ireland to be the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence
and Analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Throughout the 111th Congress, referrals to the Committee
were governed by Section 17 of S. Res. 400 of the 94th
Congress, which had been added by S. Res. 445 of the 108th
Congress and was further augmented during the 109th Congress.
As a result of S. Res. 445, all nominations to advice and
consent positions in the Intelligence Community are referred to
the Select Committee on Intelligence, even when they are
positions--such as the Assistant Attorney General for National
Security--that are within departments which are primarily under
the jurisdiction of other Senate committees.
Four of the nominations received by the Committee were for
positions created by the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004: the
DNI; the Principal Deputy DNI; the General Counsel of the ODNI;
and the Chief Information Officer of the ODNI. One other
nomination, the position of Assistant Attorney General for
National Security, was established by the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (March 9, 2006).
A primary task of the Committee during the 111th Congress
has been to examine in detail the responsibilities of these
relatively new leadership positions in the IC. The Committee
accomplished this not only through questioning the nominees at
their confirmation hearings but also through extensive
prehearing questions, the responses to which have been or will
be printed in the hearing volumes for these nominations, where
applicable. Through the nomination process and its traditional
oversight, the Committee has been able to assess the unique
role and contributions of each position within the Intelligence
Community.
The following were the nominations referred to the
Committee during the 111th Congress, listed in accordance with
the date of the nomination:
A. Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (IRTPA) created the position of the DNI and assigned to
the DNI the responsibility of serving as the head of the
Intelligence Community and acting as the principal adviser to
the President for intelligence matters relating to national
security. IRTPA provides that any individual nominated to be
appointed as the DNI shall have extensive national security
experience. Among the position's duties and responsibilities,
the DNI is charged with determining the annual National
Intelligence Program budget and ensuring the effective
execution of it. The DNI is to determine requirements and
priorities for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
national intelligence. The DNI shall ensure compliance with the
Constitution and laws by the CIA and, through their host
departments, by the other elements of the Intelligence
Community.
On January 9, 2009, the President-elect announced he would
nominate retired Admiral Dennis C. Blair to be the DNI. Admiral
Blair had served as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command,
the largest of the combatant commands. During his 34-year
career, Admiral Blair served on guided missile destroyers in
both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets and commanded the Kitty
Hawk Battle Group. He served as Director of the Joint Staff and
as the first Associate Director of Central Intelligence for
Military Support at the CIA. He also served in budget and
policy positions on the National Security Council and several
major Navy staffs. From 2003 to 2006, Admiral Blair was
President and CEO of the Institute for Defense Analyses. He was
also the John M. Shalikashvili Chair in National Security
Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research, and the
Deputy Director of the Project on National Security Reform, an
organization that analyzes the U.S. national security structure
and develops recommendations to improve its effectiveness. A
1968 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Admiral Blair earned a
master's degree in History and Languages from Oxford University
as a Rhodes Scholar, and served as a White House Fellow at the
Department of Housing and Urban Development.
After receiving Admiral Blair's responses to the
Committee's standard questionnaire and responses to the
Committee's prehearing questions about his understanding of the
duties and responsibilities of the office to which he had been
nominated, the Committee held a nomination hearing on January
22, 2009. Admiral Blair's testimony and his responses to the
Committee's questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions
for the record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-125. The Committee
reported the nomination favorably on January 28, 2009, by a
vote of 15-0. The Senate confirmed Admiral Blair's appointment
to be DNI on January 28, 2009, by a voice vote.
DNI Blair resigned from this position on May 28, 2010.
B. Leon E. Panetta, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
On January 30, 2009, the President nominated Leon E.
Panetta to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Prior to his confirmation, Mr. Panetta was the founder and the
Director of the Leon and Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public
Policy at California State University Monterey Bay.
Mr. Panetta majored in political science at Santa Clara
University where he graduated magna cum laude in 1960. In 1963,
Mr. Panetta received his juris doctorate from Santa Clara
University as well. After law school, he served in the U.S.
Army from 1964 to 1966 and attended the Army Intelligence
School.
In 1966, Mr. Panetta joined the Washington, D.C., staff of
Senator Thomas Kuchel of California. In 1969, he served as
director of the Office of Civil Rights in the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare in the Nixon Administration. From
1970 to 1971, he worked as the Executive Assistant to New York
City Mayor John Lindsay. Afterwards, he returned to Monterey to
practice law. In 1976, Mr. Panetta ran and won election to the
House of Representatives where he served for 16 years. During
that time, he also served as Chairman of the House Budget
Committee.
In 1993, he joined the Clinton Administration as head of
the Office of Management and Budget. In July 1994, Mr. Panetta
became President Clinton's Chief of Staff. He served in that
capacity until January 1997, when he returned to California to
found and lead the Leon and Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public
Policy at California State University--Monterey Bay.
After receiving Mr. Panetta's responses to the Committee's
standard questionnaire, and responses to the Committee's
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated,
the Committee held a nomination hearing on February 5 and 6,
2009. Mr. Panetta's testimony and his responses to the
Committee's questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions
for the record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-172. The Committee
reported the nomination favorably on February 11, 2009, by a
vote of 15-0. The Senate confirmed Mr. Panetta's appointment to
be Director of the CIA on February 12, 2009, by a voice vote.
C. David S. Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security,
Department of Justice
The National Security Division at the Department of Justice
and the position of Assistant Attorney General for National
Security were created by Congress in the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, which became law
on March 9, 2006, in an effort to coordinate national security
investigations and prosecutions within the Department of
Justice. The Assistant Attorney General (AAG) serves as the
Attorney General's principal legal advisor on national security
issues and is the primary liaison for the Department of Justice
to the DNI.
On February 11, 2009, the President nominated David S. Kris
to fill the position of AAG for National Security. Prior to his
confirmation, Mr. Kris served as Senior Vice President and
Deputy General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer of Time
Warner, Inc. Previously, he was a career attorney at the U.S.
Department of Justice, where he rose from attorney in the
Criminal Division (Appellate Section), 1999-2000, to Associate
Deputy Attorney General with national security
responsibilities, 2000-2003. He is co-author of the treatise
National Security Investigations and Prosecutions (2007) and a
recognized expert on the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance
Act of 1978. He was a law clerk for Judge Stephen Trott of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Mr. Kris is a
graduate of Haverford College and received his J.D. from the
Harvard Law School.
Under a procedure established in the PATRIOT Act
Reauthorization, and incorporated in Senate Resolution 400 of
the 94th Congress on the Committee's jurisdiction and
procedures, nominations for the position of Assistant Attorney
General for National Security are referred first to the
Judiciary Committee and then sequentially to the Intelligence
Committee. The nomination was reported favorably by the
Judiciary Committee on March 5, 2009. It was then referred
sequentially to this Committee.
After receiving Mr. Kris's responses to the Committee's
standard questionnaire, and responses to the Committee's
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated,
the Committee held a nomination hearing on March 10, 2009. Mr.
Kris's testimony and his responses to the Committee's
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the
record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-163. The Committee reported
the nomination favorably on March 12, 2009, by a vote of 15-0.
The Senate confirmed Mr. Kris's appointment to be Assistant
Attorney General of National Security on March 25, 2009, by a
vote of 97-0.
Mr. Kris has announced his intention to resign this
position on March 4, 2011.
D. Priscilla E. Guthrie, Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community
On April 20, 2009, the President nominated Priscilla E.
Guthrie to be the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community. Prior to her confirmation, Ms. Guthrie served as the
Director of the Information Technology and Systems Division at
the Institute for Defense Analyses, a non-profit corporation
that administers three federally funded research and
development centers to provide objective analyses of national
security issues.
From 2001 to 2006, Ms. Guthrie served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Deputy Chief Information Officer) at the
Department of Defense, where she was responsible for
information support to deployed forces. Prior to her position
at the Pentagon, Ms. Guthrie was a Vice President of TRW, Inc.
(now part of Northrop Grumman), where she established and led a
small, global unit responsible for driving new IT technology
into the company's businesses. She also served in several other
positions at TRW, Inc. during her career. At the time of her
nomination, Ms. Guthrie was also a member of the Strategy
Advisory Group for USSTRATCOM, where she chaired the Cyber
Panel, Chair of the NSA NC2 Review, and Chair of the Penn State
Leonhard Center for Engineering Excellence Advisory Board. Ms.
Guthrie holds a B.S. from Pennsylvania State University and an
M.B.A. from Marymount College.
After receiving Ms. Guthrie's responses to the Committee's
standard questionnaire, and responses to the Committee's
prehearing questions about her understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of the office to which she had been nominated,
the Committee reported the nomination favorably on May 19,
2009, by voice vote. Ms. Guthrie's responses to the Committee's
questionnaire and additional questions were posted to the
Committee's website. The Senate confirmed Ms. Guthrie's
appointment to be Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community on May 21, 2009, by voice vote.
Ms. Guthrie resigned from this position on November 19,
2010.
E. Robert S. Litt, General Counsel of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence
On April 28, 2009, the President nominated Robert S. Litt
to be the General Counsel of Office of the Director of National
Intelligence. Prior to his confirmation, Mr. Litt was a partner
at the law firm of Arnold & Porter, since 1999, where his
practice included representation of current and former
government officials in national security matters, including
congressional investigations. Mr. Litt served at the Department
of Justice as Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General from
1997 to 1999, and earlier served as Deputy Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division and as an Assistant U.S.
Attorney. He also served as Special Advisor to the Assistant
Secretary of State, Europe. From 1984 to 1993, Mr. Litt was a
partner and associate at the law firm of Williams and Connelly.
He held clerkships with Justice Potter Stewart and Judge Edward
Weinfeld of the Southern District of New York. Mr. Litt is a
graduate of Harvard University and Yale Law School.
After receiving Mr. Litt's responses to the Committee's
standard questionnaire, and responses to the Committee's
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated,
the Committee held a nomination hearing on May 21, 2009. Mr.
Litt's testimony and his responses to the Committee's
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the
record are printed in S. Hrg. 111--558. The Committee reported
the nomination favorably on June 11, 2009, by a vote of 8-1.
The Senate confirmed Mr. Litt's appointment to be General
Counsel of the ODNI on June 25, 2009, by voice vote.
F. Philip Mudd, Undersecretary of Information and Analysis, Department
of Homeland Security
On May 5, 2009, the President nominated Philip Mudd to be
Undersecretary of Information and Analysis, Department of
Homeland Security. Prior to his nomination, Mr. Mudd served as
the Associate Executive Assistant Director, National Security
Branch, at the FBI. Prior to his arrival at the FBI, Mr. Mudd
served as Deputy Director of the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center
(CTC), a position to which he was appointed in December 2003.
In his capacity as the Deputy Director, CTC, Mr. Mudd was
responsible for overseeing operational, analytical, and support
programs in the Center.
Mr. Mudd joined the CIA in 1985 as a leadership analyst
responsible for South Asian issues and continued as a political
analyst specializing in South Asia until the early 1990s. He
first shifted to work at CTC during 1992-1995, focusing largely
on terrorism in the Middle East in general, with an emphasis on
Iranian state-sponsored terrorism. He later joined the National
Intelligence Council for a tour as Deputy National Intelligence
Officer for Near East and South Asian issues. Mr. Mudd worked
as the Executive Assistant to the CIA's Associate Deputy
Director for Intelligence in 1998-1999 and then spent two years
as chief of CIA's analytic group directed against Iraq. From
February 2001 to January 2002, he was the Director for Gulf
Affairs Near East and North African Affairs at the National
Security Council. He then returned to become the Deputy
Director of the Office of Terrorism Analysis, the analytic arm
of the CTC.
Mr. Mudd was presented the Director's Award by the Director
of Central Intelligence in July 2004 for his leadership,
extraordinary fidelity, and essential service. In November
2002, Mr. Mudd received the William L. Langer Award for his
deep substantive expertise and outstanding talents as a leader.
Mr. Mudd has also received the CIA's Distinguished Intelligence
Medal and the George H. W. Bush Award for Excellence in
Counterterrorism.
Mr. Mudd earned a Master of Arts in English Literature from
the University of Virginia (1984), with a specialty in fiction
from the Victorian era, and a Bachelor of Arts in English
Literature from Villanova University (1983).
After receiving Mr. Mudd's responses to the Committee's
standard questionnaire and responses to the Committee's
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated,
the Committee was informed on July 6, 2009, that the nomination
of Mr. Mudd was withdrawn.
G. Stephen W. Preston, General Counsel of the Central Intelligence
Agency
Under section 403t of title 50, United States Code, the
General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency is the chief
legal officer of the CIA. The General Counsel shall perform
such functions as the Director of the CIA may prescribe.
On May 11, 2009, the President nominated Stephen W. Preston
to be the General Counsel of Central Intelligence Agency. Prior
to his confirmation, Mr. Preston served as a partner at the law
firm of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, from 2001.
Previously, from 1993 to 2000, he had served as the General
Counsel of the Department of Navy, the Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, of the Department of Justice,
and the Acting General Counsel and Principal Deputy General
Counsel, the Department of Defense. He clerked for Judge
Phyllis A. Kravitch, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. He is a graduate of Yale University and the Harvard
Law School.
After receiving Mr. Preston's responses to the Committee's
standard questionnaire, and responses to the Committee's
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated,
the Committee held a nomination hearing on May 21, 2009. Mr.
Preston's testimony and his responses to the Committee's
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the
record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-558. The Committee reported
the nomination favorably on June 11, 2009, by a vote of 14-1.
The Senate confirmed Mr. Preston's appointment to be General
Counsel of the CIA on June 25, 2009, by voice vote.
H. David C. Gompert, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevent Act of 2004
(IRTPA) established the position of Principal Deputy Director
of National Intelligence (PDDNI) to assist the DNI in carrying
out the duties and responsibilities of the Director under the
National Security Act. The Act provides that the PDDNI shall
exercise the powers of the DNI during the DNI's absence or
disability, or in the event of a vacancy. It also provides that
an individual nominated for appointment as PDDNI shall not only
have extensive national security experience (a requirement
applicable to the DNI as well) but also management expertise.
The Act contains a ``sense of the Congress'' that under
ordinary circumstances, one of the persons serving as DNI or
PDDNI shall be a commissioned officer in active status or have,
by training or experience, an appreciation of military
intelligence.
On August 6, 2009, the President nominated David C.
Gompert, to be the third PDDNI. Prior to his confirmation, Mr.
Gompert was a Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation. Prior to
this he was Distinguished Research Professor at the Center for
Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense
University. In 2003 he was a Senior Advisor for National
Security and Defense to the Coalition Provisional Authority in
Iraq. He was also on the faculty of the RAND Pardee Graduate
School, the United States Naval Academy, and the National
Defense University. Mr. Gompert served as President of RAND
Europe from 2000 to 2003, during which period he was on the
RAND Europe Executive Board and the Chairman of RAND Europe-UK.
He was Vice President of RAND and Director of the National
Defense Research Institute from 1993 to 2000. From 1990 to
1993, Mr. Gompert served as Special Assistant to President
George H. W. Bush and Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia on
the National Security Council staff.
Mr. Gompert has held a number of positions at the State
Department, including Deputy to the Under Secretary for
Political Affairs (1982-83), Deputy Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs (1981-82), Deputy Director of the Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs (1977-81), and Special Assistant to
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (1973-75). Mr. Gompert
worked as an executive in the private sector from 1983-1990,
when he held executive positions at Unisys and at AT&T. Mr.
Gompert holds a Bachelor of Science degree in engineering from
the United States Naval Academy and a Master of Public Affairs
degree from the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University.
The Committee held a nomination hearing for Mr. Gompert on
October 13, 2009. Mr. Gompert's testimony and his responses to
the Committee's questionnaire, prehearing questions, and
questions for the record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-545. The
Committee reported the nomination favorably on October 29,
2009, by voice vote. The Senate confirmed Mr. Gompert's
appointment to be Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence on November 9, 2009, by voice vote.
Mr. Gompert resigned from this position on August 27, 2010.
I. Philip S. Goldberg, Assistant Secretary of State, Intelligence and
Research
On October 26, 2009, the President nominated Philip S.
Goldberg to be Assistant Secretary of State, Intelligence and
Research. Prior to his nomination, Mr. Goldberg served as the
United States Coordinator for Implementation of United Nations
Security Council Resolutions on North Korea. A career foreign
service officer, Mr. Goldberg has served as Ambassador to
Bolivia; Chief of Mission in Kosovo and Charge d'affaires and
Deputy Chief of Mission in Chile. At the time of his
nomination, he was coordinating implementation of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1874. His earlier assignments include:
acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative
Affairs; Executive Assistant and Special Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of State; Bosnia Desk Officer and member of US
delegation at Dayton Peace Negotiations; Political-Economic
Officer in South Africa, and Consular and Political officer in
Colombia. Mr. Goldberg is a graduate of Boston University.
After receiving Mr. Goldberg's responses to the Committee's
standard questionnaire, and responses to the Committee's
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated,
the Committee held a nomination hearing on December 1, 2009.
Mr. Goldberg's testimony and his responses to the Committee's
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the
record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-556. The Committee reported
the nomination favorably on December 10, 2009, by voice vote.
The Senate confirmed Ambassador Goldberg to be Assistant
Secretary of State, Intelligence and Research, on February 9,
2010, by voice vote.
J. Caryn A. Wagner, Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis,
Department of Homeland Security
On October 26, 2009, the President nominated Caryn A.
Wagner to be Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis,
Department of Homeland Security. Prior to her nomination, Ms.
Wagner served as an instructor in intelligence resource
management for The Intelligence and Security Academy, LLC. She
retired from the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence on October 1, 2008, where she served as Budget
Director and cybersecurity coordinator. Prior to that from
April 2005 to January 2007, Ms. Wagner served in the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence as an Assistant Deputy
Director of National Intelligence for Management and the first
Chief Financial Officer for the National Intelligence Program.
She assumed this position after serving as the Executive
Director for Intelligence Community Affairs from May 2004 to
April 2005.
Prior to her service with the ODNI, Ms. Wagner was the
senior Defense Intelligence Agency Representative to the United
States European Command and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization from April 2003 to May 2004. She also served from
November 2000 to April 2003 as DIA Deputy Director for Analysis
and Production and as Director, Military Intelligence Staff,
from November 1996 to November 2000. Before joining DIA, Ms.
Wagner was the Staff Director of the Subcommittee on Technical
and Tactical Intelligence, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. Her intelligence experience also includes serving
as a Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Officer in the
United States Army. She has a Bachelor of Arts from the College
of William and Mary and a Master of Science from the University
of Southern California.
After receiving Ms. Wagner's responses to the Committee's
standard questionnaire, and responses to the Committee's
prehearing questions about her understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of the office to which she had been nominated,
the Committee held a nomination hearing on December 1, 2009.
Ms. Wagner's testimony and her responses to the Committee's
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the
record are printed in S. Hrg. 111--556. The Committee reported
the nomination favorably on December 10, 2009, by voice vote.
The Senate confirmed Ms. Wagner to be Undersecretary for
Intelligence and Analysis on February 11, 2010, by voice vote.
K. S. Leslie Ireland, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Intelligence and Analysis
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
created the Treasury Department's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis to replace the Office of Intelligence Support. The
Office of Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for the
receipt, analysis, collation, and dissemination of foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence information related to the
operation and responsibilities of the Treasury Department
S. Leslie Ireland was nominated by the President to the
position on April 12, 2010. Beginning in 1985, she served for
twenty-five years as an analyst in the CIA, holding senior
leadership positions in the Intelligence Community and
Department of Defense, including intelligence briefer for
President Barack Obama, Iran Mission Manager in the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, executive assistant to
CIA Director Porter Goss and Deputy CIA Director John
McLaughlin, country director for Kuwait and Iran in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, and various analytical and
management portfolios related to the Middle East and weapons of
mass destruction.
On May 25, 2010, the Committee considered the nomination
and reported it favorably by a unanimous vote. She was
confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 2010, by unanimous consent.
Ms. Ireland is the second person to hold the position of
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and
Analysis.
In November 2010, Director of National Intelligence James
R. Clapper, Jr. and Secretary of the Treasury Timothy F.
Geithner jointly appointed Assistant Secretary Ireland to serve
as the National Intelligence Manager for Threat Finance, and,
in this capacity, to coordinate the Intelligence Community's
collection and analysis of financial intelligence.
L. James R. Clapper, Jr., Director of National Intelligence
President Obama nominated Lieutenant General James R.
Clapper, Jr. (U.S.A.F. Ret.), the Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD(I)) to the position of Director of National
Intelligence on June 7, 2010, after DNI Blair resigned
effective May 28, 2010.
At the time of his nomination, General Clapper had over
forty-six years of experience in the field of intelligence,
including 32 years on active duty in the Air Force. He was
nominated to be USD(I) by President George W. Bush and
confirmed by the Senate by voice vote on April 11, 2007. As
USD(I), General Clapper served as the Program Executive for the
Military Intelligence Program and developed and promulgated
standards for DoD intelligence, counter-intelligence and
security matters. He was served simultaneously as the DNI's
Director of Defense Intelligence, to be in what he described as
a ```bridging' capacity, to help the DNI manage the DoD
intelligence components.''
General Clapper began his active duty career in the Air
Force with two tours of duty in the Southeast Asia conflict. He
served as a Director of Intelligence (J-2) in three commands
and learned firsthand the functions of intelligence collection,
analysis, operations, planning and programming, in each of the
intelligence disciplines.
General Clapper headed two of the major intelligence
agencies within the Intelligence Community. He led the DIA
while on active duty from 1991-1995 and was appointed to head
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (subsequently known as
the National Geo-spatial Intelligence Agency) on September 13,
2001, and served in that position until June 2006. While in the
private sector, from 1995 to 2001, General Clapper served on
boards, commissions and panels related to intelligence,
defense, and homeland security issues, and held positions in
industry at several firms.
After receiving General Clapper's responses to the
Committee's standard questionnaire and responses to the
Committee's prehearing questions about his understanding of the
duties and responsibilities of the office to which he had been
nominated, the Committee held a nomination hearing on July 20,
2010. General Clapper's testimony and his responses to the
Committee's questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions
for the record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-857. The Committee
reported the nomination favorably on July 29, 2010, by a vote
of 15-0. The Senate confirmed General Clapper's appointment to
be DNI on August 5, 2010, by a voice vote.
M. David B. Buckley, Inspector General of the Central Intelligence
Agency
Under Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949,
the Inspector General of the CIA provides policy and overall
direction of the Office of Inspector General of the CIA in
conducting independent inspections, investigations, and audits
of the CIA. The Inspector General is also responsible for
keeping the Director of CIA fully and currently informed, and
reports to and is under the general supervision of the
Director. Section 17 also states that the appointment of the
Inspector General of the CIA is to be made ``solely on the
basis of integrity, compliance with the security standards of
the Agency, and prior experience in the field of foreign
intelligence.''
On August 6, 2010, the President nominated David Buckley to
be the Inspector General of the CIA. Prior to his confirmation,
Mr. Buckley was a senior manager at Deloitte Consulting from
2007 to 2010. Mr. Buckley had served for nearly 30 years in
Federal Government positions in the areas of national security,
intelligence, law enforcement, congressional oversight, and
criminal and administrative investigations. He served on the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as Minority
Staff Director from 2005 to 2007 and was an investigator and
then chief investigator at the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations from 1987 to 1995. Mr. Buckley served in the
Department of Treasury from 1998 to 1999 as a Senior Advisor
and from 1999 to 2005 as Assistant IG for Investigations for
the Inspector General for Tax Administration. He has also
served as Assistant Director of the Office of Special
Investigations at the Government Accountability Office and as
Special Assistant to the Inspector General of the Department of
Defense. Mr. Buckley was also a counterespionage case officer
for the U.S. Air Force.
After receiving Mr. Buckley's responses to the Committee's
standard questionnaire and responses to the Committee's
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated,
the Committee held a nomination hearing on September 21, 2010.
Mr. Buckley's testimony and his responses to the Committee's
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the
record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-856. Following those
hearings, the Committee reported the nomination favorably on
September 28, 2010 by a vote of 15-0. The Senate approved the
nomination by unanimous consent the next day.
N. Stephanie O'Sullivan, Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence
In the final days of the 111th Congress, on December 13,
2010, the President nominated Stephanie O'Sullivan to be
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. Ms.
O'Sullivan was nominated to the position again on January 5,
2011, at the beginning of the 112th Congress.
V. SUPPORT TO THE SENATE
The Committee has an important role in supporting the
Senate's deliberations by providing access to Intelligence
Community information and officials. In the 111th Congress, the
Chairman and Vice Chairman wrote to all members explaining the
intelligence information which it holds and to encourage them
to make use of these resources. The Chairman and Vice Chairman
also wrote to new Senators to describe the special role of the
Intelligence Committee and to make them aware of support the
Committee provides to members.
The Committee routinely invited members and staff outside
the Committee to participate in briefings and hearings on
issues of shared jurisdiction or interest. The Committee
maintained and provided access to intelligence information
regarding topics relevant to current legislation and foreign
policy interest for members of the Senate.
The Committee also offered intelligence briefings by its
professional staff to Members and assisted Members in resolving
issues with intelligence agencies.
VI. APPENDIX
Summary of Committee Actions
A. Number of meetings
During the 111th Congress, the Committee held a total of
125 on-the-record interviews, meetings, briefings, and
hearings, and numerous off-the-record briefings. There were 54
oversight hearings, 9 open and 1 closed confirmation hearings,
13 hearings on the IC budget, and 2 legislative hearings. Of
these 79 hearings, 11 were open to the public and 68 were
closed to protect classified information pursuant to Senate
rules. The Committee also held 34 on-the-record briefings and
meetings, and 16 business meetings including mark-ups of
legislation. Additionally, the Committee staff conducted 6 on-
the-record briefings and interviews and numerous off-the-record
briefings.
B. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee
S. Res. 34, An original resolution authorizing expenditures
by the Select Committee on Intelligence.
S. 1494, An original bill to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2010 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
S. 3611, An original bill to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2010 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
C. Bills referred to the Committee
S. 147, A bill to require the closure of the detention
facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to limit the use of certain
interrogation techniques, to prohibit interrogation by
contractors, to require notification of the International
Committee of the Red Cross of detainees, and for other
purposes.
S. 248, A bill to prohibit the use of certain interrogation
techniques and for other purposes.
S. 385, A bill to reaffirm and clarify the authority of the
Comptroller General to audit and evaluate the programs,
activities, and financial transactions of the intelligence
community, and for other purposes.
S. 1126, A bill to require the Director of National
Intelligence to submit a report to Congress on retirement
benefits for former employees of Air America and for other
purposes.
S. 1387, A bill to enable the Director of National
Intelligence to transfer full-time equivalent positions to
elements of the intelligence community to replace employees who
are temporarily absent to participate in foreign language
training, and for other purposes.
S. 1528, A bill to establish a Foreign Intelligence and
Information Commission and for other purposes.
S. 2834, A bill to amend the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to establish a Security
Clearance and Suitability Performance Accountability Council
and for other purposes.
D. Publications
Report 111-6--Report of the Select Committee on
Intelligence covering the period January 4, 2007-January 2,
2009
S. Prt. 111-20--Rules of Procedure (amended February 24,
2009)
Report 111-55--Report to accompany S. 1494
S. Hrg. 111-62--Current and Projected National Security
Threats to the United States--February 12, 2009.
S. Hrg. 111-125--Nomination of Dennis C. Blair to be
Director of National Intelligence--January 22, 2009.
S. Hrg. 111-163--Nomination of David S. Kris to be
Assistant Attorney General for National Security--March 10,
2009.
S. Hrg. 111-172--Nomination of Leon Panetta to be Director,
Central Intelligence Agency--February 5 and 6, 2009.
Report 111-199--Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest
Airlines Flight 253--May 24, 2010.
Report 111-223--Report to accompany the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (S. 3611).
S. Hrg. 111-545--Nomination of David C. Gompert to be
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence--October 13,
2009.
S. Hrg. 111-556--Nomination of Caryn A. Wagner to be Under
Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis
and Nomination of Philip S. Goldberg to be Assistant Secretary
of State for Intelligence and Research--December 1, 2009.
S. Hrg. 111-557--Current and Projected National Security
Threats to the United States--February 2, 2010.
S. Hrg. 111-558--Nomination of Robert S. Litt to be General
Counsel, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and
Nomination of Stephen W. Preston to be General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency--May 21, 2009
S. Hrg. 111-856--Nomination of David B. Buckley to be
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency--September
21, 2010.
S. Hrg. 111-857--Nomination of Lieutenant General James
Clapper, Jr., USAF, Ret., to be Director of National
Intelligence--July 20, 2010.
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