[Senate Report 111-199]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
111th Congress
2d Session SENATE Report
111-199
_______________________________________________________________________
ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ATTACK ON NORTHWEST AIRLINES FLIGHT 253
__________
R E P O R T
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
May 24, 2010.--Ordered to be printed
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West ORRIN HATCH, Utah
Virginia OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BILL NELSON, Florida
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
------
David Grannis, Staff Director
Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
United States Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, May 20, 2010.
Hon. Robert C. Byrd,
President pro tempore,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: We are pleased to file today, as a
Senate report, the Report of the Select Committee on
Intelligence on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest
Airlines Flight 253.
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976) charges
the Committee with the duty to oversee and make continuing
studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the
United States Government, and to report to the Senate
concerning those activities and programs. Pursuant to its
responsibilities under Senate Resolution 400, the Committee has
undertaken an in-depth examination of the matters described in
the report.
The portion of the report that we are submitting for
printing is the unclassified Executive Summary and unclassified
Additional Views. The remainder of the report contains highly
classified information. For that reason it is being held in the
secure facilities of the Select Committee on Intelligence where
it will be available to Members of the Senate for reading. Both
the unclassified and classified portions of the report are also
being provided to appropriately cleared officials of the
Executive Branch. Officials of the Executive Branch have
already had an opportunity to review the report for
classification purposes.
Sincerely,
Dianne Feinstein,
Chairman.
Christopher S. Bond,
Vice Chairman.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Committee Letter of Transmittal to Senate........................ III
Unclassified Executive Summary................................... 1
Background................................................... 1
Committee Investigation...................................... 1
Background on Report......................................... 1
Findings and Conclusions..................................... 1
Committee Action............................................. 3
Note on Historical Hindsight................................. 3
Unclassified Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations...... 3
Unclassified Additional Views of Senators Chambliss and Burr..... 10
Unclassified Executive Summary of the Committee Report on the Attempted
Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253
Background: On December 25, 2009, a 23-year-old Nigerian
man, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (hereafter Abdulmutallab)
attempted to detonate a concealed nonmetallic device containing
the explosive pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) on Northwest
Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan, as the
plane was descending into Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County
Airport.
Committee Investigation: Chairman Feinstein and Vice
Chairman Bond of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(SSCI) announced on December 31, 2009, that the Committee would
conduct hearings on the attempted Christmas Day terrorist
attack and ``collect all intelligence related to Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab held by various intelligence agencies in order to
determine who had what, and how the information was handled. In
addition, the Committee [would] review national security
policies on sharing information and terrorist
watchlisting.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\SSCI Press Release, ``Intelligence Committee Announces Hearings
into Failed Christmas Day Terrorism Attack,'' available at http://
intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=321274
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background on Report: This report contains information
gathered by the Committee through hearings, briefings, and
document requests from the following agencies:
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI)
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
National Security Agency (NSA)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Department of State
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--including
agencies under its purview, such as the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A).
Findings and Conclusions: The Committee found there were
systemic failures across the Intelligence Community (IC), which
contributed to the failure to identify the threat posed by
Abdulmutallab. Specifically, the NCTC was not organized
adequately to fulfill its missions. Following 9/11, Congress
created the NCTC and charged it with serving as ``the primary
organization in the United States Government for analyzing and
integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the
United States Government pertaining to terrorism and
counterterrorism. . . .''\2\ In practice, however, the
Committee found that no one agency saw itself as being
responsible for tracking and identifying all terrorism threats.
In addition, technology across the IC is not adequate to
provide search enhancing tools for analysts, which contributed
to the failure of the IC to identify Abdulmutallab as a
potential threat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\50 U.S.C. 404o(d).
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The SSCI report identifies fourteen specific points of
failure--a series of human errors, technical problems, systemic
obstacles, analytical misjudgments, and competing priorities--
which resulted in Abdulmutallab being able to travel to the
United States on December 25, 2009. Those points of failure
are:
1. The State Department Did Not Revoke Abdulmutallab's U.S.
Visa.
2. Abdulmutallab Was Not Placed in the ``Terrorist
Screening Database'' (TSDB), on the Selectee List, or on the No
Fly List.
3. Reporting Was Not Distributed to All Appropriate CIA
Elements.
4. A CIA Regional Division, at CIA Headquarters, Did Not
Search Databases Containing Reports Related to Abdulmutallab.
5. CIA Did Not Disseminate Key Reporting Until after the
12/25 Attempted Attack.
6. A CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC) Office's Limited
Name Search Failed to Uncover the Key Reports on Abdulmutallab.
7. CIA CTC Analysts Failed to Connect the Reporting on
Abdulmutallab.
8. FBI Counterterrorism Analysts Could Not Access All
Relevant Reports.
9. NCTC's Directorate of Intelligence Failed to Connect the
Reporting on Abdulmutallab.
10. NCTC's Watchlisting Office Did Not Conduct Additional
Research to Find Additional Derogatory Information to Place
Abdulmutallab on a Watchlist.
11. NSA Did Not Pursue Potential Collection Opportunities
That Could Have Provided Information on Abdulmutallab.
12. Analysts Did Not Connect Key Reports Partly Identifying
Abdulmutallab and Failed to Ensure Dissemination of All
Relevant Reporting.
13. NSA Did Not Nominate Abdulmutallab for Watchlisting or
the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) Based on
Information Partly Identifying Him.
14. Intelligence Analysts Were Primarily Focused on Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Threats to U.S. Interests
in Yemen, Rather than on Potential AQAP Threats to the U.S.
Homeland.
Based on the information provided, the Committee concludes
that the Intelligence Community failed to connect and
appropriately analyze the information in its possession prior
to December 25, 2009 that would have identified Abdulmutallab
as a possible terrorist threat to the United States. The
Committee believes the IC, and other parts of the U.S.
Government, should have taken steps to prevent Abdulmutallab
from boarding Northwest Flight 253 to Detroit, Michigan, on
Christmas Day.
Points of failure #1 and #2 relate to failures of the
systems and procedures in place to prevent suspected terrorists
from entering the United States. Points of failure #3 through
#14 discuss why the relevant intelligence was not connected.
Doing so may have led analysts to link sufficient threat and
biographical information on Abdulmutallab to place him on the
watchlists.
Committee Action: On March 16, 2010, the Committee
unanimously approved a 55-page report and provided it to the
Intelligence Community for a classification review. This
unclassified Executive Summary was prepared based on that
Intelligence Community review.
On May 18, 2010, the Committee unanimously approved a
motion to report to the Senate its ``Report on the Attempted
Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253'' which
consists of (1) the publicly released unclassified Executive
Summary together with Additional Views of Senators Chambliss
and Burr, and (2) the previously adopted classified portion of
the report which shall be retained by the Committee and
available in its secure offices for reading by other Senators.
In the classified portion of the Committee's report, each
point of failure includes a description, a Committee
conclusion, Committee recommendations, and a discussion of the
corrective actions being taken by the Intelligence Community.
Because the other parts of the report remain classified, this
Executive Summary only contains unclassified portions of the
Committee's conclusions and recommendations about each failure.
The SSCI report also includes classified appendices which
describe: (1) the intelligence collected on Abdulmutallab prior
to the terrorist plot and what was or was not done with that
intelligence; (2) the terrorist watchlisting process and
standards as they existed at the time; and (3) additional
biographical information on Abdulmutallab.
In addition to the review conducted by the Committee, the
Director of National Intelligence created an Intelligence
Community Review Panel that was chaired by John McLaughlin,
former Deputy Director of the CIA. That panel's report endorsed
three of the specific classified recommendations made by the
SSCI report. The panel also disagreed with one of the
Committee's recommendations to expand access to certain
counterterrorism information. The Committee stands by its
recommendation.
Note on Historical Hindsight: As is the case with many
reports analyzing the past performance of the IC, the SSCI
report presents information that was relevant to the Flight 253
plot in hindsight. Briefers and intelligence officials stated
frequently that the intelligence described in the classified
SSCI report was among thousands of other intelligence reports
and that other terrorist threats were assessed to be more
pressing at the time. Thus, while the SSCI report presents the
information as it was known, and as it could have been known,
the Committee recognizes the benefit of ``20-20 hindsight'' in
our evaluation of the IC's performance.
1. The State Department did not revoke Abdulmutallab's U.S. visa
Conclusion:
The State Department could have revoked Abdulmutallab's
U.S. visa based on the information available to the Department.
The State Department consular officer in Abuja, Nigeria should
have used all of the tools available, including using ``fuzzy
logic'' or a passport number, to search for a visa for
Abdulmutallab. Had this occurred, it is likely that
Abdulmutallab's active U.S. visa would have been located in the
Department's database.
The State Department has an independent obligation to
evaluate a non-U.S. person's suitability for entry into the
U.S., but instead relies on the IC's assessment of whether an
individual meets the standard for placement on the terrorist
watchlists. The Committee believes Abdulmutallab's visa should
have been identified and revoked independently by the State
Department based on the information provided to the consulate
by other embassy officers, which included an assessment that
Abdulmutallab should be watchlisted because of suspected
``involvement with Yemeni-based extremists.''
Recommendations:
The State Department must use its independent
judgment and authority to revoke visas for anyone suspected of
being involved with terrorism or a terrorist group, and must be
able to do so in real-time in coordination with the
Intelligence Community.
The Director of NCTC should make recommendations
to deny or revoke a U.S. visa based on terrorism-related
intelligence. In addition to exercising its own independent
authority to revoke visas, the State Department should accept
the Director of NCTC's recommendations.
The State Department should develop a system for
electronically notifying all airlines of individuals whose
visas have been revoked.
2. Abdulmutallab was not placed in the ``Terrorist Screening Database''
(TSDB), on the Selectee List, or on the No Fly List
Conclusion:
The standards to place an individual on the Terrorist
Watchlists were interpreted too rigidly and may be too
complicated to address terrorist threats. Although U.S. Embassy
officials in Abuja recommended that Abdulmutallab be placed on
the No Fly List, the determination was made at CIA Headquarters
and at the NCTC Watchlisting Office that there was only
sufficient derogatory information to enter Abdulmutallab's
information in the general ``Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment'' (TIDE) database, but not sufficient derogatory
information to place him on any of the watchlists. Because of
the language of the watchlisting standard, the manner in which
it was being interpreted at the time, or both, analysts
responsible for making the watchlisting determination did not
believe they had the ability to give additional weight to
significant pieces of information from the field, such as the
report that resulted from the meeting with Abdulmutallab's
father.
Recommendations:
The Administration, in consultation with Congress,
should simplify, strengthen, and add flexibility to
watchlisting practices to better protect the U.S. homeland.
Intelligence officers responsible for watchlisting
terrorist suspects should have the flexibility to give added
weight to significant information, such as recommendations from
Chiefs of Station or other experienced intelligence
professionals, in determining whether to place an individual on
a watchlist.
3. Reporting was not distributed to all appropriate CIA elements
Conclusion:
The inconsistencies in distributing key intelligence
reports may have contributed to the failure of the Intelligence
Community to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat.
While there was no intent to limit access to the reports,
processes failed to disseminate relevant intelligence to all
offices and individuals with a need to know.
Recommendations:
Classified recommendation excluded.
4. A CIA Regional Division (at CIA Headquarters) did not search
databases containing reports related to Abdulmutallab
Conclusion:
CIA had reports related to Abdulmutallab, but a regional
division failed to search other databases that would have
identified relevant information. CIA tasked this division with
the responsibility, but not the tools to adequately identify
terrorism-related reporting. Inadequate technological search
tools and the fragmented nature of the Intelligence Community's
databases made it difficult to find additional intelligence
related to Abdulmutallab.
Recommendations:
The Director of the CIA should report to the
congressional intelligence committees within 30 days on the
increased access to its all-source counterterrorism database.
The report should include the total number of personnel with
increased access and the positions these individuals occupy.
Classified recommendation excluded.
5. CIA did not disseminate key reporting until after the 12/25
attempted attack
Conclusion:
Had the CIA intelligence report been disseminated, other
intelligence officers outside of the CIA and NCTC who tracked
intelligence on Yemen and AQAP may have made the connection
between the information provided.
Recommendations:
The CIA should set standards to ensure that all
intelligence reports are disseminated promptly--within two days
for counterterrorism and all other high priority issues.
The CIA and other intelligence agencies must
ensure that critical intelligence functions are not delayed
when personnel are temporarily deployed to other assignments.
The CIA should provide broader access to
operational traffic for all analysts with a need to know,
whether those analysts are employed by the CIA or by another
agency in the Intelligence Community.
6. A CIA CTC office's limited name search failed to uncover the key
reports on Abdulmutallab
Conclusion:
CTC conducted a limited name search of CIA's all-source
database, which included key reports on Abdulmutallab, to
determine if there was other available information. Because of
the limited nature of the search, it failed to uncover key
reports on Abdulmutallab. Thus, CTC failed to draw the link
between Abdulmutallab's father's information and the key
reports.
7. CIA CTC analysts failed to connect reporting on Abdulmutallab
Conclusion:
The failure of CIA CTC analysts to connect the reporting
contributed to the failure of the Intelligence Community to
identify Abdulmutallab as a potential threat. Like other
Intelligence Community analysts, according to CIA, CTC analysts
were focused on Yemen-based AQAP-related threats and supporting
operations to counter these threats.
Recommendations for 6 and 7:
The Director of the CIA should ensure that CIA
personnel understand their responsibility to connect related
all-source information and disseminate all possible threat
reporting, particularly reports that might help identify
homeland threats.
The DNI should develop a comprehensive plan to
implement advanced information technology systems that can draw
connections among related intelligence reports and assist in
the prioritization of terrorism threat streams. The DNI should
notify congressional intelligence committees of the progress
made in implementing the plan on a biannual basis.
8. FBI counterterrorism analysts could not access all relevant reports
Conclusion:
The misconfiguration of an analyst's computer profile
prevented her from accessing relevant intelligence reports,
despite their existence in FBI systems. Had the FBI
counterterrorism analyst's computer profile been configured
appropriately, the analyst may have been able to identify the
threat stream on Abdulmutallab.
Recommendations:
The Director of the FBI should conduct a review of
FBI's information technology systems to ensure all FBI analysts
have access to the necessary intelligence databases and that
the FBI information systems are appropriately configured to
support intelligence analysis. The Director should provide a
report to the congressional intelligence committees within 90
days on the changes made as a result of this review.
9. NCTC's Directorate of Intelligence failed to connect the reporting
on Abdulmutallab
Conclusion:
NCTC personnel had the responsibility and the capability to
connect the key reporting with the other relevant reporting.
The NCTC was not adequately organized and did not have
resources appropriately allocated to fulfill its missions.
NCTC has the primary role within the IC to bring together
and assess all-source terrorism-related intelligence. One of
the NCTC's missions, as outlined in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), is:
``to serve as the primary organization in the United
States Government for analyzing and integrating all
intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States
Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism
. . .''\3\
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\3\50 U.S.C. 404o(d).
NCTC has the primary role within the IC to bring together
and assess all-source terrorism-related intelligence. Prior to
12/25, NCTC's Directorate of Intelligence was not staffed
adequately and analysts were not tasked to track or identify
all threat streams related to the AQAP threat to the U.S.
homeland. Like other analysts in the Intelligence Community,
NCTC's analysts were primarily focused on Yemen-based AQAP-
related threats.
Recommendations:
The Director of the NCTC should ensure that all
NCTC analysts understand their responsibility to connect
related all-source information and disseminate all possible
threat reporting, particularly reports that might help identify
homeland threats.
The Director of the NCTC should ensure that NCTC
is organized and resourced to fulfill its responsibility to
track, analyze, and report on all terrorist threats to the
United States emanating from terrorist groups overseas.
Classified recommendation excluded.
10. NCTC's Watchlisting Office did not conduct additional research to
find additional derogatory information to place Abdulmutallab
on a watchlist
Conclusion:
NCTC had the responsibility and the capability to connect
the key intelligence reporting with the other relevant
reporting. Doing so could have produced sufficient information
to recommend that Abdulmutallab be placed on the terrorist
watchlists. The NCTC was not adequately organized and did not
have resources appropriately allocated to fulfill its missions.
Under IRTPA a primary role of the NCTC is:
``to serve as the central and shared knowledge bank
on known and suspected terrorists and international
terror groups.''\4\
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\4\50 U.S.C. 404o(d).
Prior to 12/25, NCTC's standard practice was to process
watchlisting information it received, but not to conduct
additional analysis or enhance existing records with more
derogatory information. Thus, even though NCTC created a basic
terrorist record for Abdulmutallab in TIDE, NCTC did not
conduct additional research to identify other intelligence
related to Abdulmutallab--intelligence that may have placed
Abdulmutallab in the TSDB, and potentially on the Selectee
List, or the No Fly List.
Recommendations:
NCTC should keep the congressional intelligence
committees fully informed of resources needed to perform the
watchlisting function without compromising its other missions.
11. NSA did not pursue potential collection opportunities that could
have provided information on Abdulmutallab
Conclusion:
NSA did not take all available actions which contributed to
the failure of the Intelligence Community to identify
Abdulmutallab as a potential threat.
Recommendations:
Classified recommendation excluded.
Classified recommendation excluded.
Classified recommendation excluded.
12. Analysts did not connect key reports partly identifying
Abdulmutallab and failed to ensure dissemination of all
relevant reporting
Conclusion:
The failure of analysts to connect and disseminate all
relevant reports may have contributed to the failure of the
Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as a potential
threat.
Recommendations:
Classified recommendation excluded.
Classified recommendation excluded.
Classified recommendation excluded.
13. NSA did not nominate Abdulmutallab for watchlisting or the
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) based on
information partly identifying him
Conclusion:
The policy of not making nominations to TIDE based on
information partly identifying Abdulmutallab may have
contributed to the failure of the Intelligence Community to
identify him as a potential threat.
Recommendations:
NSA should immediately clear the backlog of
reports that require review for watchlisting.
NCTC should change its practices to allow for
nominations to TIDE of partially identifying or other
incomplete information to assist in enhancing terrorist
identities records and other agencies should change their
policies accordingly.
14. Intelligence analysts were primarily focused on AQAP threats to
U.S. interests in Yemen, rather than on potential AQAP threats
to U.S. homeland
Conclusion:
Analysts' competing priorities contributed to the failure
of the Intelligence Community to identify Abdulmutallab as a
potential threat. Prior to the 12/25 plot, counterterrorism
analysts at NCTC, CIA, and NSA were focused on the threat of
terrorist attacks in Yemen, but were not focused on the
possibility of AQAP attacks against the U.S. homeland. These
other priorities contributed to the failure of analysts to
recognize and collate the several pieces of intelligence
reporting that mentioned Abdulmutallab.
Recommendations:
The DNI should review the roles and
responsibilities of counterterrorism analysts throughout the
Intelligence Community to ensure that all agencies understand
their counterterrorism role, their role in identifying and
analyzing threats to the U.S. homeland, and that
counterterrorism analysts actively collaborate across the
Intelligence Community to identify such threats. This review
should also investigate how to expand access to
counterterrorism intelligence throughout the Intelligence
Community, including whether counterterrorism analysts within
each IC component should be provided access to all
counterterrorism intelligence. In conducting this review, the
DNI should be mindful of the intent of Congress to give NCTC
the primary role and responsibility within the IC to bring
together and assess all-source terrorism-related intelligence
in IRTPA. The DNI should report the results of this review to
congressional intelligence committees within 60 days.
The DNI should examine whether adequate
intelligence resources are directed against the homeland
threat.
[The classified portion of the report is available for
reading by Members of the Senate in the offices of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence]
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS CHAMBLISS AND BURR
I. Background
As is illustrated throughout this report, there were a
number of technical or human errors by the CIA, NSA, the State
Department, and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
which led to the Intelligence Community's collective failure to
identify Abdulmutallab as a terrorist threat to the U.S. In
testimony before Congress, DNI Blair stated that ``this was
not--like in 2001--a failure to collect or share intelligence;
rather it was a failure to connect, integrate, and understand
the intelligence we had.'' However, as Members who participated
in the Joint Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence into Intelligence Community Activities Before and
After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (the
Congressional ``Joint Inquiry''), we respectfully disagree.
Some of the systemic errors this review identified also were
cited as failures prior to 9/11.
Following 9/11, several investigations, including the
Congressional Joint Inquiry, examined the intelligence failures
that led to that atrocious attack, and, overwhelmingly, found
that the Intelligence Community was severely inhibited by
information stove-pipes, lacked effective technological tools,
and in many cases was not aggressive enough to identify
terrorist plots. These failures resulted in an Intelligence
Community that was not well positioned to identify and disrupt
terrorist threats.
As a result of these findings, Congress passed the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). One
of the primary goals of this legislation was to create one
place in the Intelligence Community--the NCTC--where all
terrorism related information could be integrated and analyzed.
The IRTPA defines NCTC's primary missions, including:
``to serve as the primary organization in the United
States Government for analyzing and integrating all
intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States
Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism
. . .'' and
``to serve as the central and shared knowledge bank
on known and suspected terrorists and international
terror groups.''\1\
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\1\50 U.S.C. 404o(d).
In addition, the IRTPA directs that the Director of NCTC shall
have the role and responsibility to ``disseminate terrorism
information, including current threat information'' and ``have
primary responsibility within the United States Government for
conducting net assessments of terrorist threats.''\2\
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\2\50 U.S.C. 404o(f)(1)(G).
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II. NCTC Failed To Fulfill Its Mission
IRTPA was to have corrected the problems identified after
9/11 by making NCTC responsible and accountable for all
terrorism related intelligence analysis. Instead, the Committee
found in this review that no one agency believes its analysts
are responsible for tracking and identifying all terrorist
threats, essentially the same problem identified six years ago
by the 9/11 Commission, which found ``the intelligence
community's confederated structure left open the question of
who really was in charge of the entire U.S. intelligence
effort''\3\ to combat terrorism.
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\3\National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
The 9/11 Commission Report (W.W. Norton & Co., 2004). p. 93.
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Despite its statutory mission, NCTC did not believe it was
the sole agency in the IC for piecing together all terrorism
threats. In fact, in a response to the Committee, NCTC stated,
``no one entity within the IC has sole responsibility nor bears
the entire burden of either connecting dots or accountability
for failing to do so.''\4\ Further, NCTC stated to staff that
it focused primarily on providing strategic, or high level,
terrorism assessments, and providing support to senior
policymakers. No one at NCTC was given responsibility for
tracking all terrorist threats thoroughly or searching for
additional intelligence related to a threat. NCTC's daily
threat reports, ``Threats and Threads,'' tracked only the most
serious threats. All lower priority threats are not examined by
any one office at NCTC. Yet, a lower priority threat that
succeeds, as the 12/25 plot almost did, would most definitely
be seen as a serious attack by al-Qa'ida.
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\4\NCTC Response to SSCI, March 11, 2010.
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NCTC was created to be the central knowledge bank for all
terrorism related information. As such, it is the only
Intelligence Community agency with access to all intelligence
databases as well as law enforcement information. Its unique
role and access to information make it best suited to be
responsible for integrating all intelligence--and connecting
the dots--on any one particular threat, as well as, to provide
comprehensive strategic terrorism assessments. However, NCTC
failed to organize itself in a manner consistent with Congress'
intent or in a manner that would clearly identify its roles and
responsibilities necessary to complete its mission.
III. Team Efforts Do Not Negate Individual Responsibility
NCTC believes that tracking terrorist threats should be a
team effort, and ``without a clearly identified `lane of
responsibility'.''\5\ We disagree. Terrorism analysts
throughout the Intelligence Community often perform overlapping
analysis, repetition designed to identify oversights by any one
agency. This duplication serves as a valuable check and
balance--and enhances security. In this case, both CIA and NCTC
had access to all the relevant reporting on Abdulmutallab and
either agency could have connected them, however, neither
identified the intelligence as a threat stream. Overlapping
efforts can help reduce the risk of one agency overlooking a
threat, but these additional efforts cannot replace the need
for one primary agency to have ultimate responsibility for this
mission. As such, NCTC's failure to understand its fundamental
and primary missions is a significant failure and remains so
today.
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\5\NCTC Response to SSCI, March 11, 2010.
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IV. Technology Is Still a Problem for the Intelligence Community
The Congressional Joint Inquiry, that we participated in,
found in 2002 that, ``While technology remains one of this
nation's greatest advantages, it has not been fully and most
effectively applied in support of U.S. counterterrorism
efforts. Persistent problems in this area included a lack of
collaboration between Intelligence Community agencies, a
reluctance to develop and implement new technical capabilities
aggressively, the FBI's reliance on outdated and insufficient
technical systems, and the absence of a central
counterterrorism database.''\6\ This remains a problem today.
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\6\Joint Inquiry, p. 54.
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As this Committee review noted, technology across the
Intelligence Community still is not adequate to provide search
enhancing tools for analysts. Several of the intelligence
analysts involved in the Abdulmutallab case said that they were
unable to link together the various reports on Abdulmutallab
due to the struggle to balance searching the large volume of
terrorism-related intelligence available with their daily
workloads. The large number of intelligence databases
compounded this problem by forcing some analysts and collectors
to search multiple databases. NCTC officials told Committee
staff that NCTC does not have the technical ability to follow
or process all leads. Rather, NCTC is dependent on its
personnel to conduct complex searches in multiple intelligence
databases and to rely on the memory and knowledge of those
analysts to link intelligence. CIA has similar problems with
its main all-source counterterrorism database. This remains a
problem today.
V. Conclusion
Almost nine years after 9/11, we are concerned about
whether or not the Intelligence Community is organized
effectively to identify and disrupt terrorist attacks. While we
commend the Intelligence Community's hard-working personnel for
their dedicated and tireless service, we are concerned that the
policies, procedures and technology that they must work within
today are hampering their ability to detect in advance the next
attack against the Homeland.
We have seen terrorist organizations adapt and be agile in
concealing their operations. They are unwavering, however, in
their intent to strike the Homeland. In fact, since 12/25,
Anwar al-Aulaqi called upon individuals to act independently
and conduct attacks against the U.S. and other Western
countries.
We must ensure that NCTC understands its role and its
responsibilities as the Mission Manager for counterterrorism,
and that our analysts have the technological tools they require
to search through large quantities of intelligence. Today,
identifying terrorist operatives is the biggest challenge our
Intelligence Community faces, and they should have all the
support necessary to be successful in their mission.
Saxby Chambliss.
Richard Burr.
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