[Senate Report 117-132]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 438
117th Congress } { Report
SENATE
2d Session } { 117-132
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023
_______
July 20, 2022.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Warner, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. 4503]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an
original bill (S. 4503) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2023 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community
Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
and Disability System, and for other purposes, reports
favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.
Classified Annex to the Committee Report
Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on March 28,
2022, that the request for the National Intelligence Program
for Fiscal Year 2022 was $67.1 billion. Other than for limited
unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence
Community Management Account, the classified nature of United
States intelligence activities precludes any further
disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its
budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee has
prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule
of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the
Intelligence Authorization Act and has the legal status of
public law. The classified annex is made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2023 (the ``Act'') reported by the Committee.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 specifies that the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the Intelligence Community for Fiscal Year 2023.
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2023 are
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI) for Fiscal Year 2023.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA
Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2023.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Section 301. Plan for assessing counterintelligence programs
Section 301 requires the National Counterintelligence and
Security Center to submit a plan for assessing the
effectiveness of the counterintelligence programs of the
Federal Government.
Section 302. Modification of advisory board in National Reconnaissance
Office
Section 302 modifies the appointment mechanism and duration
of the advisory board in the National Reconnaissance Office.
Section 303. Prohibition on employment with governments of certain
countries
Section 303 establishes a prohibition on former
Intelligence Community employees providing certain services to
foreign state sponsors of terror and other foreign countries
determined to be a significant threat to the national security
interests of the United States, and establishes penalties for
former employees who knowingly and willfully violate that
prohibition.
Section 304. Counterintelligence and national security protections for
intelligence community grant funding
Section 304 establishes counterintelligence protections for
Intelligence Community grant funding to protect against risks
of misappropriation, theft, and other threats to U.S. national
security, including by the People's Republic of China, the
Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Republic of
Cuba.
Section 305. Extension of Central Intelligence Agency law enforcement
jurisdiction to facilities of Office of Director of National
Intelligence
Section 305 enhances the CIA's authority to exercise law
enforcement authority in order to protect ODNI facilities.
Section 306. Clarification regarding protection of Central Intelligence
Agency functions
Section 306 clarifies protections for certain information
regarding the functions of the CIA.
Section 307. Establishment of advisory board for National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency
Section 307 establishes an advisory board in the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) to study, advise on, and
report about matters relating to the agency's mission.
Section 308. Annual Reports on status of recommendations of Comptroller
General of the United States for the Director of National
Intelligence
Section 308 directs the Comptroller General to submit an
annual report listing all open recommendations made to the DNI.
Section 308 further directs the DNI to provide a status update
on each recommendation listed in the report.
Section 309. Timely submission of budget documents from intelligence
community
Section 309 requires the DNI to deliver budget
justification materials for elements of the Intelligence
Community to Congress no later than 14 days after the President
submits the budget request to Congress.
Section 310. Copyright protection for civilian faculty of the National
Intelligence University
Section 310 allows faculty at the National Intelligence
University to have limited copyright protection, consistent
with protection afforded to faculty at educational institutions
at the Department of Defense (DoD).
Section 311. Expansion of reporting requirements relating to authority
to pay personnel of Central Intelligence Agency for certain
injuries to the brain
Section 311 extends for five years a one-time reporting
requirement in the Helping American Victims Afflicted by
Neurological Attacks Act (P.L. 117-46), requires the CIA to
provide additional details in the contents of the report
submitted, and requires the National Intelligence Council to
coordinate an updated analytic assessment regarding the cause
and attribution of anomalous health incidents, along with any
dissenting views from the Intelligence Community.
Section 312. Modifications to Foreign Malign Influence Response Center
Section 312 renames the Center established by Section 119C
of the National Security Act of 1947 the ``Foreign Malign
Influence Center,'' requires a report assessing the Center's
need for continued operation, and sunsets the Center's
authorities and requirements on December 31, 2027.
Section 313. Requirement to offer cyber protection support for
personnel of intelligence community in positions highly
vulnerable to cyber attack
Section 313 amends Section 6308(b) of the Damon Paul Nelson
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (P.L. 116-92) to clarify that
the DNI shall offer protection support for Intelligence
Community personnel in positions highly vulnerable to cyber
attacks, including by providing such support to any such
personnel who request protection. Section 313 further requires
the DNI to submit a plan for the training and resources
required for such support.
Section 314. Minimum cybersecurity standards for national security
systems of intelligence community
Section 314 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
National Manager for National Security Systems, to establish
minimum cybersecurity requirements across the Intelligence
Community, and requires agencies to meet the deadlines
established under those requirements and to update their plans
to resource the full implementation of those standards.
Section 315. Review and report on intelligence community activities
under Executive Order 12333
Section 315 requires the DNI to conduct an assessment on
the feasibility and advisability of making public certain
information relating to activities under Executive Order 12333,
and to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on that assessment, including descriptions of incidents
in which the Intelligence Community violated Executive Order
12333 or other guidelines and procedures, and a recommendation
on whether such incidents can be disaggregated for public
release.
Section 316. Elevation of the commercial and business operations office
of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Section 316 directs the head of the commercial and business
operations office of the NGA to report directly to the Director
of the NGA.
Section 317. Assessing intelligence community open-source support for
export controls and foreign investment screening
Section 317 requires the DNI to carry out a pilot program
to assess the feasibility and advisability of providing certain
open source-derived intelligence to the Department of Commerce
to support the Department's efforts related to export controls
and investment screening functions. Section 317 further
requires the DNI to submit a plan to carry out the pilot
program and a report on the findings of the DNI with respect to
the program.
Section 318. Annual training requirement and report regarding analytic
standards
Section 318 requires the DNI to issue a policy requiring
the head of each element of the Intelligence Community to
create an annual training program on Intelligence Community
Directive (ICD) 203, Analytic Standards, and provide a report
to the congressional intelligence committees on compliance
incidents reported to Intelligence Community analytic
ombudspersons related to the standards set forth in ICD 203.
Section 318 further includes a five-year sunset provision.
Section 319. Historical Advisory Panel of the Central Intelligence
Agency
Section 319 establishes a Historical Advisory Panel in the
CIA to determine topics for research, publication, and
declassification, and identify technological tools to modernize
classification and declassification processes. Section 319
further requires the Panel to submit an annual report on its
activities to the Director of the CIA and to the congressional
intelligence committees. Section 319 also includes a seven-year
sunset provision.
TITLE IV--INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATED TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA
Section 401. Update to annual reports on influence operations and
campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party
Section 401 updates the reporting requirement in Section
1107(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 to require
assessments on the Chinese Communist Party's online influence
operations and propaganda campaigns, including through the use
of social media and news outlets, and opportunities to expose
and counter such activities.
Section 402. Report on wealth and corrupt activities of the leadership
of the Chinese Community Party
Section 402 requires reporting on the wealth and corrupt
activities of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.
Section 403. Identification and threat assessment of companies with
investments by the People's Republic of China
Section 403 requires the Intelligence Community to report
on the risk to national security posed by telecommunication,
hospitality, and conveyance companies in which the People's
Republic of China has substantially invested.
Section 404. Intelligence community working group for monitoring the
economic and technological capabilities of the People's
Republic of China
Section 404 establishes a cross-Intelligence Community
working group to assess and report on the economic and
technological capabilities of the People's Republic of China to
become the dominant military, technological, and economic
power, and to undermine the rules-based world order, including
providing unclassified lists of the top institutions,
businesses, and projects facilitating the Chinese Communist
Party's technology, military, and other objectives.
Section 405. Annual report on concentrated reeducation camps in the
Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region of the People's Republic of
China
Section 405 requires public reporting on the detention and
forced labor camps in the People's Republic of China's Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region, including victims, personnel,
funding, and participating Chinese companies.
Section 406. Assessments of production of semiconductors by the
People's Republic of China
Section 406 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an assessment of the People's Republic
of China in global competitiveness in the production of
semiconductors by Chinese firms.
TITLE V--PERSONNEL AND SECURITY CLEARANCE MATTERS
Section 501. Improving onboarding of personnel in intelligence
community
Section 501 requires the DNI to establish a methodology for
measuring the time it takes elements of the Intelligence
Community to onboard personnel, to submit a report on the time
it takes to onboard personnel in the Intelligence Community,
and to submit a plan to reduce that time for elements that have
median onboarding times that exceed 180 days.
Section 502. Improving onboarding at the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 502 requires the Director of the CIA to take
actions necessary to ensure that, by December 31, 2023, the
CIA's onboarding process has a median duration of 180 days or
less.
Section 503. Report on legislative action required to implement Trusted
Workforce 2.0 initiative
Section 503 requires the Office of Management and Budget to
submit a report on the legislative action required to implement
the Trusted Workforce (TW) 2.0 initiative, including any
statutory provisions requiring amendment.
Section 504. Comptroller General of the United States assessment of
administration of polygraphs in intelligence community
Section 504 requires the Comptroller General to conduct an
assessment, provide a briefing, and submit a report on the
administration of polygraph evaluations that are needed in the
Intelligence Community to meet current mission demand.
Section 505. Timeliness in the administration of polygraphs
Section 505 requires the DNI, in the DNI's capacity as the
Security Executive Agent, to issue standards for timeliness for
Federal agencies to administer polygraphs conducted for
purposes of adjudicating eligibility for access to classified
information and granting clearance reciprocity.
Section 506. Policy on submittal of applications for access to
classified information for certain personnel
Section 506 requires the DNI, in the DNI's capacity as the
Security Executive Agent, to issue a policy that allows
companies to submit applications for security clearances, on a
nonreimbursable basis, for personnel who perform key management
and oversight functions who may not merit an application due to
their work under any one contract.
Section 507. Prohibition on denial of eligibility for access to
classified information solely because of preemployment use of
cannabis
Section 507 prohibits the head of an element of the
Intelligence Community from denying an individual's security
clearance based solely on the individual's preemployment use of
cannabis.
Section 508. Technical correction regarding Federal policy on sharing
of covered insider threat information
Section 508 makes a technical correction to Section 806 of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L.
117-103), which requires the DNI to issue a policy for the
Federal Government on sharing covered insider threat
information pertaining to contractor employees.
Section 509. Establishing process parity for security clearance and
access determinations
Section 509 requires an agency, in justifying an adverse
security clearance or access determination against a
whistleblower, to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that the agency would have made the same security clearance or
access determination in the absence of the whistleblower's
disclosure. Section 509 further establishes parity in the legal
standards applied to Intelligence Community whistleblower
matters.
Section 510. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory
revocation of security clearances and access determinations
Section 510 removes the cap on compensatory damages for an
employee or former employee who was subjected to a reprisal
with respect to the employee's or former employee's security
clearance or access determination.
Section 511. Comptroller General of the United States report on use of
Government and industry space certified as secure compartmented
information facilities
Section 511 requires the Comptroller General to submit a
report on the average annual utilization of Federal Government
and industry space certified as secure compartmented
information facilities under Intelligence Community or DoD
policy.
TITLE VI--INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Section 601. Submittal of complaints and information by whistleblowers
in the intelligence community to Congress
Section 601 establishes security officers and protocols to
facilitate Intelligence Community employees' and contractors'
submissions of complaints and information to Congress. Section
601 further clarifies the requirements for submitting
whistleblower complaints and information, and ensures
bipartisan notification of such materials.
Section 602. Modification of whistleblower protections for contractor
employees in intelligence community
Section 602 ensures that Intelligence Community
whistleblowers can provide disclosures to supervisors who have
responsibility for the subject matter of the disclosure.
Section 603. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity
as reprisal against whistleblower disclosure by employees and
contractors in intelligence community
Section 603 adds a prohibition on knowing or willful
disclosures that reveal an Intelligence Community
whistleblower's identifying information without consent, except
as necessary during the course of an investigation. Section 603
further establishes a private right of action for an
Intelligence Community whistleblower if such disclosure is
taken as a reprisal against the whistleblower for bringing a
complaint.
Section 604. Definitions regarding whistleblower complaints and
information of urgent concern received by inspectors general of
the intelligence community
Section 604 clarifies the definition of ``urgent concern''
regarding whistleblower complaints and ensures that the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community has authority
over ``urgent concern'' determinations that are matters of
national security and not public policy matters.
TITLE VII--OTHER MATTERS
Section 701. Improvements relating to continuity of Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board membership
Section 701 permits (1) the reappointment of a member of
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board for additional
terms; (2) filling a vacancy in the same manner in which the
original appointment was made; and (3) the continued service of
a member following the expiration of their term.
Section 702. Report by Public Interest Declassification Board
Section 702 requires the Public Interest Declassification
Board to submit a report on recommendations to improve the
Information Security Oversight Office and Executive Order
13526, as well as other matters.
Section 703. Modification of requirement for office to address
unidentified aerospace-undersea phenomena
Section 703 renames the Office established to carry out the
duties of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, and
clarifies the Office's legal authorities, duties, and
leadership to incorporate Intelligence Community equities that
are integral to ensuring full oversight of unidentified
aerospace-undersea phenomena subject matters.
Section 704. Unidentified aerospace-undersea phenomena reporting
procedures
Section 704 ensures the Intelligence Community and DoD have
sufficient procedures in place to receive all relevant
reporting and disclosures regarding unidentified aerospace-
undersea phenomena.
Sections 705. Comptroller General of the United States compilation of
unidentified aerospace-undersea phenomena records
Section 705 requires the Comptroller General to undertake
an independent review and compilation of unidentified
aerospace-undersea phenomena-related historical documents and
submit a corresponding report. Section 705 further requires the
relevant agencies to provide the Comptroller General with
necessary materials and access to such records.
Section 706. Office of Global Competition Analysis
Section 706 requires the President to establish an office
on analysis of global competition regarding United States
leadership in technology and innovation sectors critical to
national security and economic prosperity, and to support
related policy development and decision making in related
matters. Section 706 authorizes $20 million for fiscal year
2023 to carry out this requirement.
Section 707. Report on tracking and collecting precursor chemicals used
in the production of synthetic opioids
Section 707 requires the Director of the CIA to submit a
report on intelligence gaps related to tracking and collecting
licit precursor chemicals bound for illicit use in opioid
production.
Section 708. Assessment and report on mass migration in the Western
Hemisphere
Section 708 requires the DNI to submit a report on the
national security threats posed by mass migration within the
Western Hemisphere, including the risks associated with the
regime in Cuba and the illegitimate Nicolas Maduro regime in
Venezuela.
Section 709. Notifications regarding transfers of detainees at United
States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Section 709 requires the Secretary of Defense to notify
appropriate Members of Congress when a final determination is
made that the continued law of war detention of an individual
detained at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay is unwarranted.
Section 709 further requires the Secretary of State to notify
appropriate Members of Congress prior to a detainee's transfer
outside of Guantanamo Bay, including specific information about
the detainee and the transfer.
Section 710. Report on international norms, rules, and principles
applicable in space
Section 710 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Commerce, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, and heads of other agencies as the DNI
determines to be necessary, to submit a report on international
norms, rules, and principles applicable in space, including how
threats to the United States may be mitigated through the
development of international norms, as well as opportunities
for the United States to influence those norms.
Section 711. Assessments of the effects of sanctions imposed with
respect to the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine
Section 711 requires the DNI to submit an assessment of the
cumulative and material effects of sanctions imposed by the
United States, European countries, and the international
community on the Russian Federation in response to Russia's
invasion of Ukraine, including efforts by Russia to evade
sanctions through direct or indirect assistance from other
countries and by using digital assets; the effect of the
sanctions on Russia's relationship with certain regimes,
countries, and senior leadership; the effect of the sanctions
on other countries' development of alternative payment systems;
and the impact of any general licenses issued in relation to
the sanctions.
Section 712. Assessment and briefing on implications of food insecurity
resulting from the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine
Section 712 requires the DNI to conduct an assessment of
the implications of food insecurity that may result from the
Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine.
Section 713. Pilot program for Director of Federal Bureau of
Investigation to undertake an effort to identify International
Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers and develop countermeasures
Section 713 amends Section 5725 of the Damon Paul Nelson
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (P.L. 116-92) authorizing the
DNI to undertake an effort to identify International Mobile
Subscriber Identity-catchers in the United States and, when
appropriate, develop countermeasures, by transferring the
authority to the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). Section 713 further directs the Director
of the FBI to exercise those authorities through a pilot
program within the National Capital Region, and limits the
pilot program to two years.
Section 714. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research
assessment of anomalous health incidents
Section 714 requires the Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research to submit a report on its assessment
of the findings of the events that have been collectively
labeled as ``anomalous health incidents.''
Section 715. Clarification of process for protecting classified
information using the Classified Information Procedures Act
Section 715 clarifies that a motion under Section 4 of the
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) may be supported
by a declaration executed by any official possessing original
classification authority, who shall not be required to be the
head of the relevant agency.
Committee Comments and Direction
Protecting classified information using the Classified Information
Procedures Act
In United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2008), the
Second Circuit held that the state secrets privilege applies to
criminal proceedings involving protection of classified
information under CIPA, and that the government must satisfy
the procedural requirements of the privilege when seeking the
protections of CIPA. These requirements include personal
invocation of the privilege by the head of the department which
has control over the matter, after actual personal
consideration by that officer. The Second Circuit holding is at
odds with the views of most other appellate courts, and the
Committee is concerned that it imposes substantial burdens in
addressing routine classified information issues in cases
within the Second Circuit. Accordingly, Section 715 clarifies
that the head of the department is not required to provide the
necessary declaration; instead, any official possessing
original classification authority may do so.
People's Republic of China Presence and Intentions in the Caribbean
The Committee commends the Intelligence Community's
recognition of--and increased commitment of resources to--the
threat posed by the People's Republic of China's long-term
goals and intentions related to United States interests
worldwide. The Committee remains concerned, among other areas,
about the People's Republic of China's intentions and influence
in the Caribbean, including in Suriname and Guyana. Therefore,
within 90 days following enactment of this Act, the Committee
directs the Director of the CIA to submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees regarding the threats and
risks presented to United States national security and economic
interests by People's Republic of China investments in critical
infrastructure, including energy and telecommunications
infrastructure, in the Caribbean.
Trusted Workforce 2.0
The Committee continues to exercise close oversight of the
executive branch's personnel vetting reform effort, TW 2.0. The
executive agents for security (the DNI) and suitability and
credentialing (the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management) have issued a number of policy documents to
modernize a vetting model that has largely remained unchanged
for more than 70 years. The Committee is closely watching how
the Intelligence Community can capitalize on reforms being
adopted in TW 2.0 to ensure personnel can maintain their
mobility across their career. The DNI has specific
responsibilities to lead this effort, which the Committee
endorses to drive much needed change for the Federal government
and its industry partners. DoD is responsible for the
information technology backbone for this effort, known as the
National Background Investigation Services (NBIS). The
Committee looks forward to NBIS's capabilities maturing to
support five core human resource scenarios--establishing,
continuing, upgrading, transferring, and reestablishing trust.
The Committee recognizes that modernizing the government's
personnel vetting paradigm is a long-term project that requires
sustained oversight attention.
Modification of Requirement for Office to Address Unidentified
Aerospace-Undersea Phenomena
At a time when cross-domain transmedium threats to United
States national security are expanding exponentially, the
Committee is disappointed with the slow pace of DoD-led efforts
to establish the office to address those threats and to replace
the former Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force as required
in Section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2022. The Committee was hopeful that the new office
would address many of the structural issues hindering progress.
To accelerate progress, the Committee has, pursuant to Section
703, renamed the organization formerly known as the
Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force and the Aerial Object
Identification and Management Synchronization Management Group
to be the Unidentified Aerospace-Undersea Phenomena Joint
Program Office. That change reflects the broader scope of the
effort directed by the Congress. Identification,
classification, and scientific study of unidentified aerospace-
undersea phenomena is an inherently challenging cross-agency,
cross-domain problem requiring an integrated or joint
Intelligence Community and DoD approach. The new Office will
continue to be led by DoD, with a Deputy Director named by the
Intelligence Community. The formal DoD and Intelligence
Community definition of the terms used by the Office shall be
updated to include space and undersea, and the scope of the
Office shall be inclusive of those additional domains with
focus on addressing technology surprise and ``unknown
unknowns.'' Temporary nonattributed objects, or those that are
positively identified as man-made after analysis, will be
passed to appropriate offices and should not be considered
under the definition as unidentified aerospace-undersea
phenomena.
Annual Reports on status of recommendations of Comptroller General of
the United States for the Director of National Intelligence
As noted in the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying
the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020, the
congressional intelligence committees believe the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) adds significant value to their
oversight efforts. GAO has provided numerous recommendations to
improve the functioning and efficiency of the Intelligence
Community. However, these improvements can only be achieved
through timely and deliberate action taken in response. The
committees do not always have sufficient information to
understand the status of ODNI actions taken in response to open
GAO recommendations, or where, if applicable, ODNI does not
plan to take action in response to GAO recommendations.
Accordingly, Section 308 directs the Comptroller General to
submit an annual report listing all open recommendations made
to the DNI. Section 308 further directs the DNI to provide a
status update on each recommendation listed in the report.
Minimum Cybersecurity Standards for National Security Systems of
Intelligence Community
Section 314 in this bill requires the DNI, in coordination
with the National Manager for National Security Systems, to
establish Intelligence Community-wide minimum cybersecurity
standards for national security systems. The Committee welcomes
the publication of the National Security Memorandum on
Improving the Cybersecurity of National Security, DoD, and
Intelligence Community Systems (NSM-8). This section codifies
the establishment of, and adherence to, minimum cybersecurity
standards for the national security systems of the Intelligence
Community, as provided for in NSM-08 or any successor policy
guidance. The provision further requires elements of the
Intelligence Community to meet the deadlines established for
implementation of the standards, and requires elements of the
Intelligence Community to update their plans to resource the
full implementation of those standards.
Report on the establishment of a cadre of professors to support the
Intelligence Community
The Committee continues to endorse exploring mechanisms by
which the Intelligence Community can better utilize expertise
outside of the government in its operations, such as the
public-private talent exchange program. The Committee
encourages the Intelligence Community to ensure that academics,
from a variety of fields, at universities, research
organizations, and elsewhere, can play a robust role in
contribution to the U.S. intelligence enterprise. The Committee
therefore directs ODNI to provide the congressional
intelligence committees, within 180 days after enactment of
this Act, with a plan for creating a reserve cadre of academics
who can perform specific assignments for the Intelligence
Community. That plan should include an assessment of and
solutions for any barriers to creating this cadre, such as
issues with contracting vehicles, a plan for expediting
granting of academics' security clearances, and protocols for
disclosure and accountability with the academics' host
institutions.
Response to report required by Section 6715 of the Fiscal Year 2018,
2019, and 2020 Intelligence Authorization Act
The Committee seeks a substantive response to a report
required by Section 6715 of the Fiscal Year 2018, 2019, and
2020 Intelligence Authorization Act, which was enacted on
December 20, 2019 (P.L. 116-92).The report required by that
provision included ``any attempts known to the intelligence
community by foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity
vulnerabilities in United States telecommunications networks
(including Signaling System No. 7) to target for surveillance
United States persons, including employees of the Federal
Government,'' and ``any actions taken by the intelligence
community to protect agencies and personnel of the United
States Government from surveillance conducted by foreign
governments.'' The document that the ODNI identified as a
response provided to the Committee on November 23, 2021, made
no reference to Signaling System No. 7. The Committee has
further addressed this concern in the classified annex.
Review of declassification practices and policies across Executive
agencies, funding for such activities, and investments in
technological modernization
The Committee remains concerned about the Government's
obsolete classification system whose deficiencies ``undermine
our national security, as well as critical democratic
objectives,'' according to the DNI. The Committee further notes
the DNI's acknowledgment that ``[t]he current prioritization
given to remediating these issues and the resources dedicated
to making tangible progress are simply not sufficient.'' The
Committee therefore directs the DNI, jointly with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)),
to conduct a review of declassification practices and policies
across Executive agencies, funding for such activities, and
investments in technological modernization. The Committee
further directs the DNI, jointly with the USD(I&S), to provide
a report to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees to include: (1) a description of declassification
practices and policies across Executive agencies, funding for
such activities, and investments in technological
modernization; (2) proposals for the promotion of best
practices that could be applied across relevant Executive
agencies and/or as part of a federated system, and cost
estimates associated with such proposals; and (3) a spend plan
for the research, development, and promotion of technological
solutions to, and other modernizations efforts for,
declassification.
Historical Advisory Panel of the Central Intelligence Agency
The Committee appreciates the steps CIA has recently taken
to consult scholarly experts on declassification. The CIA's
Historical Advisory Panel has demonstrated that it can be an
important tool in identifying topics for research, publication,
and discretionary declassification. Accordingly, Section 319
codifies the Panel to ensure that CIA sustains the Historical
Advisory Panel and that the Panel's work receives the attention
it deserves. The Committee expects the Director of the CIA to
meet with the Historical Advisory Panel at regular intervals
and take full heed of the panel's recommendations.
Committee Action
On June 22, 2022, a quorum being present, the Committee met
to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The
Committee took the following actions:
Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex
By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and
Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for
Fiscal Year 2023, the base text for purposes of amendment.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc twenty-six
amendments to the bill, as follows: (1) an amendment by Senator
Blunt, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to establish an
NGA Advisory Board; (2) an amendment by Senator Blunt, and
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and Senators Gillibrand and
Heinrich, to rename and modify the Unidentified Aerospace-
Undersea Phenomena Joint Program Office; (3) an amendment by
Vice Chairman Rubio to require notifications of Guantanamo Bay
transfers; (4) an amendment by Senator Collins to require
reports on Comptroller General recommendations; (5) an
amendment by Senator Bennet, and cosponsored by Senator
Feinstein, to require a report on international space norms;
(6) an amendment by Senator Collins, and cosponsored by
Chairman Warner, to require timely submission of certain
budgetary documents; (7) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and
cosponsored by Senators Sasse and Gillibrand, to establish
copyright protection for National Intelligence University
civilian faculty; (8) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and
cosponsored by Senator Cornyn, to require assessments of the
People's Republic of China's semiconductor production; (9) an
amendment by Senator Collins, and cosponsored by Senators
Gillibrand and Cotton, to expand reporting on CIA's payment
authorities for certain injuries; (10) an amendment by Chairman
Warner, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to extend the
CIA's law enforcement jurisdiction to certain ODNI facilities;
(11) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice
Chairman Rubio, to require assessments of the effects of
sanctions imposed regarding the Russian Federation's Ukraine
invasion; (12) an amendment by Senator Bennet, and cosponsored
by Senator Sasse and Chairman Warner, to establish an Office of
Global Competition Analysis; (13) an amendment by Senator
Blunt, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and Senators
Gillibrand and Heinrich, to require Comptroller General
historical compilations of Unidentified Aerospace-Undersea
Phenomena records; (14) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to modify and sunset the
Foreign Malign Influence Response Center; (15) an amendment by
Senator Wyden to require certain cyber protection support for
Intelligence Community personnel; (16) an amendment by Senator
Wyden, and cosponsored by Senator Heinrich, to require a pilot
program for the FBI to identify International Mobile Subscriber
Identity-catchers and develop countermeasures; (17) an
amendment by Senator Gillibrand, and cosponsored by Senator
Cotton, to require an assessment of anomalous health incidents
by the Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research;
(18) an amendment by Senator Collins, and cosponsored by
Senator Wyden and Chairman Warner, to require minimum
cybersecurity standards for the Intelligence Community's
National Security Systems; (19) an amendment by Senator Wyden,
and cosponsored by Senator Heinrich, to require a review and
report on Intelligence Community activities pursuant to
Executive Order 12333; (20) an amendment by Chairman Warner,
and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to elevate the NGA's
Commercial and Business Operations Office; (21) an amendment by
Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Senator Cornyn, to clarify
the Classified Information Protection Act; (22) an amendment by
Senator Casey, and cosponsored by Chairman Warner and Senator
Bennet, to require assessments on food security implications
from the Russian Federation's Ukraine invasion; (23) an
amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Senator Casey,
to assess Intelligence Community open source support for export
controls and foreign investment screening; (24) an amendment by
Senator King to require training and reporting on analytic
standards; (25) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio, and
cosponsored by Senator Sasse, to improve personnel onboarding
at the CIA; and (26) an amendment by Senator Sasse, and
cosponsored by Chairman Warner, to establish a Historical
Advisory Panel at the CIA.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc thirty-seven
amendments to the classified annex.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted a second-degree
amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Senator
Bennet, to an amendment by Senator Wyden, and cosponsored by
Senators Heinrich and Gillibrand. Senator Wyden's amendment, as
cosponsored by Senators Heinrich and Gillibrand, prohibited any
Federal agency from denying or revoking an individual's
eligibility for access to classified information solely because
of past or present use of cannabis. Chairman Warner's second-
degree amendment, as cosponsored by Senator Bennet, limited the
prohibition to Intelligence Community agencies, struck the
revocation prohibition, and replaced the ``past or present''
application with a ``pre-employment'' application. By a vote of
11 ayes and 5 noes, the Committee adopted the amendment by
Senator Wyden, and cosponsored by Senators Heinrich and
Gillibrand, as modified by Chairman Warner's second-degree
amendment (cosponsored by Senator Bennet). The votes in person
or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--aye; Senator
Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye;
Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye;
Senator Gillibrand--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--no; Senator
Burr--aye; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--aye; Senator
Blunt--no; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator
Sasse--aye.
By a vote of 5 ayes and 11 noes, the Committee did not
adopt an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to prohibit funds
authorized by this Act within the Intelligence Community
Management Account from being obligated or expended to provide
financial or in-kind support to certain tax-exempt
organizations that receive financial or in-kind support from
foreign governments outside of the Five Eyes alliance. The
votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--
no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator Wyden--no; Senator
Heinrich--no; Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--no; Senator
Casey--no; Senator Gillibrand--no; Vice Chairman Rubio--aye;
Senator Burr--no; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--no;
Senator Blunt--no; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye;
Senator Sasse--aye.
By a vote of 8 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee did not adopt
an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to prohibit funds
authorized by this Act from being obligated or expended by or
for the currently-paused Department of Homeland Security's
Disinformation Governance Board or successor organization. The
votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--
no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator Wyden--no; Senator
Heinrich--no; Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--no; Senator
Casey--no; Senator Gillibrand--no; Vice Chairman Rubio--aye;
Senator Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye;
Senator Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye;
Senator Sasse--aye.
Senator Cornyn offered and withdrew an amendment to limit
the availability of funds authorized by this Act to change the
section of the Questionnaire for National Security Positions
that pertains to association record.
By a vote of 8 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee did not adopt
an amendment by Senator Cotton to the classified annex. The
votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--
no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator Wyden--no; Senator
Heinrich--no; Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--no; Senator
Casey--no; Senator Gillibrand--no; Vice Chairman Rubio--aye;
Senator Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye;
Senator Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye;
Senator Sasse--aye.
By a vote of 9 ayes and 7 noes, the Committee adopted an
amendment by Senator Cotton to the classified annex. The votes
in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--no;
Senator Feinstein--no; Senator Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--no;
Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--no; Senator Casey--no;
Senator Gillibrand--no; Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; Senator
Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator
Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator
Sasse--aye.
Votes to report the committee bill
On June 22, 2022, the Committee voted to report the bill,
as amended, by a vote of 16 ayes and zero noes. The votes in
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--aye;
Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--
aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--
aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; Senator
Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator
Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator
Sasse--aye.
By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and
classified annex.
Compliance With Rule XLIV
Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of
authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited
tariff benefits.
Estimate of Costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On July 12,
2022, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing
the provisions of this legislation.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN RUBIO
Keeping politics out of our intelligence apparatus is
essential for its success. The Intelligence Authorization Act
for fiscal year 2023 represents a broad, bipartisan consensus
regarding the critical work performed by the men and women of
our Intelligence Community.
This year's bill includes bipartisan language contained in
the Annex to accompany the bill that prohibits the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) from performing intelligence
analysis that lacks a foreign nexus. When NCTC was created, it
was the drafters' intent that it bridge the divide between
intelligence and law enforcement to ``connect the dots''
regarding transnational terrorism--a critical capability absent
prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks. This constructive
relationship has helped to ensure that the Intelligence
Community is working with law enforcement when there is a link
to a foreign entity.
Over the past several years, NCTC has produced analysis on
events that pertain exclusively to domestic cases, even when it
is clear that there is no foreign nexus. This concerning
development disregards the clear intent for this Center and
risks threatening the integrity of the Intelligence Community
and the critical work of NCTC. Unless an act of terrorism
within the homeland has a known or suspected foreign nexus,
NCTC should not commit any of its limited analytic resources to
the response. I appreciate the bipartisan consensus directing
NCTC to focus its analytic resources on the threat of
transnational terrorism consistent with its authorizing
statute.
Similarly, I remain concerned by the use of National
Intelligence Program funds to support the Department of
Homeland Security's Disinformation Governance Board. Although
the Committee did not adopt an amendment I offered--and all
Minority members supported--that would prohibit Intelligence
Community support to the Disinformation Governance Board, I
will continue my efforts to ensure National Intelligence
Program funds are not used to regulate Americans' free speech.
Secretary Mayorkas signed the Board's Charter on February
24, 2022 and, given the administration's characterization that
the Board was on ``pause'' as of May 18, I presume the intent
remains to continue with the Board's activities. The Charter
stated that the Department's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis, one of 18 Intelligence Community elements whose funds
this Committee authorizes, was one of the ``Standing Board
members'' from inception. Whatever one thinks of a government-
sponsored, domestic-facing ``board'' designed to identify what
elements of free speech the government deems to be
disinformation, we should all be able to agree that our
Intelligence Community should have no part in it.
I intend to continue to work in a bipartisan manner to
ensure the Intelligence Community is focused on protecting
Americans from threats to the homeland and on countering
authoritarian regimes like Russia and China and not on lawful,
protected activities of U.S. persons.
Marco Rubio.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN
I am pleased that the Fiscal Year 2023 Intelligence
Authorization Act (IAA) includes numerous provisions and
amendments I put forward to increase transparency, advance
declassification reform, strengthen cybersecurity, protect
Intelligence Community whistleblowers, and improve the
Intelligence Community's recruiting.
One provision, co-sponsored by Senator Heinrich, directs
the DNI to report on the feasibility of greater transparency
with regard to the Intelligence Community's activities governed
by Executive Order 12333. In recent years, the Intelligence
Community has made significant, if incomplete, progress in
informing the public about surveillance conducted pursuant to
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. By contrast, the
Intelligence Community releases almost no information on the
impact of Executive Order 12333 activities on U.S. persons or
on violations of the Executive Order.
The bill promotes declassification reform by directing the
Public Interest Declassification Board to report on recommended
modifications to Executive Order 13526, which governs
classification and declassification, a provision I put forward
with Chairman Warner. As detailed above, the DNI is also
directed to report on progress in implementing declassification
reform. The critical importance of this direction was recently
underscored by the DNI's acknowledgment that deficiencies in
the current system undermine national security and that reform
efforts have received insufficient resources and
prioritization.
The bill includes a number of important cybersecurity and
counter-surveillance provisions. While the Fiscal Year 2020
National Defense Authorization Act granted the DNI the
authority to take actions to detect the use of international
mobile subscriber identity catchers (surveillance devices that
impersonate a phone company's cell towers in order to track,
intercept and hack cell phones) and deploy countermeasures
against them, that authority has not been exercised. The Fiscal
Year 2023 IAA therefore includes a provision, co-sponsored by
Senator Heinrich, mandating that the FBI Director conduct a
two-year effort within the National Capital Region. Similarly,
the Intelligence Community has not implemented a provision I
included in the Fiscal Year 2018, 2019 and 2020 IAA authorizing
the DNI to provide voluntary cybersecurity assistance for the
personal devices and accounts of Intelligence Community
personnel whom the DNI determines are vulnerable to foreign
surveillance. The Fiscal Year 2023 bill therefore requires the
DNI to offer that assistance and provide it if requested.
As described above, the bill ensures that the government
provide a report, required by a provision I included in the
Fiscal Year 2018, 2019, and 2020 IAA, on any attempts by
foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities in
U.S. telecommunications networks, including Signaling System
No. 7. Finally, I was pleased to work with Senator Collins on
an amendment mandating minimum cyber security standards for
national security systems and requiring reports to Congress on
any waivers of those standards.
The bill includes numerous provisions I included in the
Fiscal Year 2022 bill that have not yet been passed into law.
Most of those provisions protect Intelligence Community
whistleblowers, by ensuring that their security clearances
cannot be revoked based on a pretext, by removing the damages
cap for reprisals, by ensuring that whistleblowers can come
directly to Congress, and, by clarifying which whistleblower
complaints must be submitted to Congress, a provision
necessitated by the previous Administration's misinterpretation
of the law. The bill also includes a provision from last year's
bill ensuring continuity of the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board.
During the Committee's mark-up, I offered, with Senators
Gillibrand and Heinrich, an amendment prohibiting the denial or
revocation of a security clearance solely based on past or
ongoing use of cannabis. This reform, which reflects widespread
legalization around the country, is necessary if the U.S.
Government is going to compete with the private sector and
recruit and retain the talent it needs to defend the country.
The modified version of the amendment, which applies to pre-
employment use and to elements of the Intelligence Community,
is a significant step in this direction.
Ron Wyden.
Changes to Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is
necessary to dispense with the requipment of paragraph 12 to
expedite the business of the Senate.
[all]
