Calendar No. 116
117th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 117-37
======================================================================
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022
_______
August 10, 2021.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Warner, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. 2610]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an
original bill (S. 2610) to authorize appropriations for Fiscal
Year 2022 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community
Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
and Disability System, and for other purposes, reports
favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.
Classified Annex to the Committee Report
Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on May 28, 2021,
that the request for the National Intelligence Program (NIP)
for Fiscal Year 2022 was $62.3 billion. Other than for limited
unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence
Community Management Account, the classified nature of United
States intelligence activities precludes any further
disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its
budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee has
prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule
of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the
Intelligence Authorization Act and has the legal status of
public law. The classified annex is made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2022 (the ``Act'') reported by the Committee.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the United States Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for Fiscal Year 2022.
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2022 are
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the ODNI for Fiscal Year
2022.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA
Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2022.
TITLE III-- GENERAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Subtitle A--Intelligence Community Matters
Section 301. Increasing agricultural and commercial intelligence
measures
Section 301 requires the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) to submit to designated congressional committees a report
detailing the options for the Intelligence Community (IC) to
improve intelligence support to the Department of Agriculture
and the Department of Commerce.
Section 302. Plan for allowing contracts with providers of services
relating to sensitive compartmented information facilities
Section 302 requires the DNI to submit a plan for allowing
IC elements to contract with providers of services related to
sensitive compartmented information facilities for use of those
facilities by businesses and organizations at multiple security
levels.
Section 303. Plan to establish commercial geospatial intelligence data
and services program office
Section 303 requires the Directors of the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI) to develop and submit to
designated congressional committees a plan to establish a co-
located joint commercial geospatial intelligence data and
services program office. Section 303 further requires that the
plan include milestones, an updated acquisition strategy, and a
plan for the establishment of a commercial geospatial
intelligence data innovation fund.
Section 304. Investment strategy for commercial geospatial intelligence
services acquisition
Section 304 requires the Director of NGA, in consultation
with the DNI and the Secretary of Defense, to submit to the
appropriate congressional committees an investment strategy for
NGA to acquire commercial geospatial intelligence data services
and analytics. Section 304 further requires that the strategy
include a plan to increase purchases of unclassified geospatial
intelligence data services and analytics, and to articulate any
challenges to procuring geospatial intelligence data and
services.
Section 305. Central Intelligence Agency Acquisition Innovation Center
report, strategy, and plan
Section 305 requires the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the CIA's Acquisition
Innovation Center and an implementation plan. The plan shall
address how the Director will ensure that personnel have access
to the technical expertise required to inform acquisitions
specifically in technical industries, and include projections
for resources to support the Acquisition Innovation Center.
Section 306. Improving authorities relating to national
counterintelligence and security
Section 306 clarifies the authorities and responsibilities
of the Office of the DNI's National Counterintelligence and
Security Center (NCSC). Section 306 clarifies NCSC's role in
coordinating strategic counterintelligence matters through
outreach efforts to the IC and non-Title 50 federal agencies,
as well as conducting risk assessments associated with
counterintelligence threats. Section 306 also expands NCSC's
role in coordinating and overseeing the development of budgets
and resource allocation plans for counterintelligence programs.
Finally, section 306 amends NCSC's public facing outreach
authorities to include state, local and tribal authorities,
foreign governments, and U.S. academic institutions.
Section 307. Removal of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community from level IV of the Executive Schedule
Section 307 removes the Chief Information Officer of the
Intelligence Community from Title 5, section 5315, given the
position no longer requires Presidential nomination and Senate
confirmation.
Section 308. Requirements relating to construction of facilities to be
used primarily by intelligence community
Section 308 amends Title 50, section 3304 to increase the
congressional notification threshold from $5,000,000 to
$6,000,000 when the IC engages in certain facilities
improvement or repair projects.
Section 309. Director of National Intelligence support for intelligence
community diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility
activities
Section 309 provides the DNI flexibility to expend funds in
support of IC-wide workforce activities related to recruitment,
retention, diversity, equity, inclusion, or accessibility,
provided that they are of benefit to the whole IC.
Section 310. Establishment of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Officer
of the intelligence community
Section 310 requires the DNI to appoint a Diversity,
Equity, and Inclusion Officer to serve as the IC's principal
advisor on diversity, equity, and inclusion. Section 310
further requires the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Officer
to submit a report, at least once a year, to the congressional
intelligence committees on strategies and initiatives developed
to advance diversity, equity, and inclusion in the IC.
Section 311. Clarification of authority of National Reconnaissance
Office
Section 311 prohibits any element of NRO from being
transferred to the U.S. Space Force.
Section 312. Director of National Intelligence declassification review
of information relating to terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001
Section 312 requires the DNI, in coordination with other
appropriate government entities, to conduct a declassification
review of information relating to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Section 312 further requires the review be
completed and a report on the findings of the review be
submitted to the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 313. Establishment of Chaplain Corps of the Central
Intelligence Agency
Section 313 requires the CIA to establish a Chaplain Corps
for the provision of spiritual or religious pastoral services.
Section 314. Pilot program on recruitment and retention in Office of
Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury
Section 314 establishes a pilot program during a four-year
period in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of the Treasury to assess the feasibility and
advisability of using adjustments of rates of pay to recruit
and retain staff for financial and cyber intelligence analyst
positions. Section 314 further requires the Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis to provide the
congressional intelligence committees and the DNI with a
briefing on the pilot program, and to submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees and the DNI on the
effectiveness of the pilot program and recommendations as to
whether the program should be modified.
Section 315. Pilot program on student loan repayment at Office of
Intelligence and Analysis of Department of the Treasury
Section 315 establishes a pilot program during a three-year
period in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of the Treasury to assess the feasibility and
advisability of using repayment of student loans as a
recruitment incentive for employment at the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis of China specialists, data
scientists, cyber specialist, and others with any other
analytic or technical capabilities that are in high demand.
Section 315 further requires the Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis to submit a preliminary
report, and an annual report on the pilot program. In addition,
Section 315 requires the DNI to submit any recommendations to
expand or modify the pilot program to the congressional
intelligence committees within two years after the program's
commencement.
Section 316. Prohibition on collection and analysis of United States
persons' information by intelligence community based on First
Amendment-protected activities
Section 316 reaffirms that no element of the IC may collect
or analyze a United States person's information based on
activity protected under the First Amendment of the
Constitution.
Section 317. Sense of the Senate on the use of intelligence community
resources for collection, assessment, and analysis of
information pertaining exclusively to United States persons
absent a foreign nexus
Section 317 expresses the Sense of the Senate that National
Intelligence Program funds should be expended only in support
of intelligence activities with a foreign nexus, and that the
IC should not engage in the collection, assessment, or analysis
of information that pertains exclusively to United States
persons, absent a foreign nexus.
Subtitle B--Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Section 321. Submittal of complaints and information by whistleblowers
in the intelligence community to Congress
Section 321 establishes security officers and protocols to
facilitate IC employees' and contractors' submission of
complaints and information to Congress. Section 321 further
clarifies the requirements for submitting whistleblower
complaints and information and ensures bipartisan notification
of such materials.
Section 322. Definitions and authorities regarding whistleblower
complaints and information of urgent concern received by
Inspectors General of the intelligence community
Section 322 clarifies the definition of ``urgent concern''
regarding whistleblower complaints and ensures that the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) has
authority over determining whether a matter falls within the
``urgent concern'' definition.
Section 323. Harmonization of whistleblower protections
Section 323 establishes uniformity among IC whistleblower
statutes to ensure consistency with respect to treatment of IC
agency employees and contractors, and regarding protected
disclosures related to security clearances and personnel
actions. Section 323 further establishes parity in the legal
standards applied to IC whistleblower matters by requiring an
agency, in justifying an adverse security clearance or access
determination against a whistleblower, to demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that the agency would have made the
same security clearance or access determination in the absence
of the whistleblower's disclosure.
Section 324. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity
as reprisal against whistleblower disclosure by employees and
contractors in intelligence community
Section 324 adds to prohibited personnel practices a
knowing or willful disclosure that reveals an IC
whistleblower's identifying information without consent, except
as necessary during the course of an investigation. Section 324
further provides an IC whistleblower with a private right of
action if such disclosure is taken as a reprisal against the IC
whistleblower for bringing a complaint.
Subtitle C--Reports and Assessments Pertaining to the Intelligence
Community
Section 331. Report on efforts to build an integrated hybrid space
architecture
Section 331 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and
the Director of the NRO, to submit a report on the IC's efforts
to build an integrated hybrid space architecture that combines
national and commercial capabilities, and large and small
satellites.
Section 332. Report on Project Maven transition
Section 332 requires the Director of the NGA, in
consultation with other appropriate government entities, to
submit a report on the transition of Project Maven to
operational mission support, including a detailed plan of
action and milestones identifying (1) points leading to the
transition of Project Maven-developed geospatial intelligence
capabilities to the NGA, and (2) metrics of success regarding
the transition and mission support provided to the NGA.
Section 333. Assessment of intelligence community counternarcotics
capabilities
Section 333 requires the DNI, in consultation with other
appropriate federal government entities, to submit an
assessment on the status of the IC's counternarcotics
capabilities and resourcing, operational support to foreign
liaison partners, and operational capacity to support the
government's counternarcotics mission.
Section 334. Assessment of intelligence community's intelligence-
sharing relationships with Latin American partners in
counternarcotics
Section 334 requires the DNI, in consultation with other
appropriate federal government entities, to submit an
assessment on the IC's intelligence sharing relationships with
foreign partners in Latin America on counternarcotics matters.
Section 335. Report on United States Southern Command intelligence
capabilities
Section 335 requires the Director of the DIA, in
consultation with other relevant federal government entities,
to submit a report detailing the status of United States
Southern Command's intelligence collection, analysis, and
operational capabilities to support missions in Latin America.
Section 336. Director of National Intelligence report on trends in
technologies of strategic importance to United States
Section 336 requires the DNI to submit to Congress, at
least every two years, a report assessing foreign trends in
technologies that the DNI considers of strategic importance to
the United States, including the top technology focus areas.
Section 336 further requires the report to include the top
technology focus areas of our foreign adversaries.
Section 337. Report on Nord Stream II companies and intelligence ties
Section 337 requires the DNI, in consultation with other
appropriate government entities, to submit a report on Nord
Stream II efforts, including an unclassified list of companies
supporting the project and an updated assessment of the current
or former ties between Nord Stream's Chief Executive Officer
and Russian, East German, or other hostile intelligence
agencies.
Section 338. Assessment of Organization of Defensive Innovation and
Research activities
Section 338 requires the DNI, in consultation with other
appropriate government entities, to submit an assessment of the
activities and objectives of Iran's Organization of Defense
Innovation and Research (SPND), including the organization's
composition, relationships to research on weapons of mass
destruction, and sources of financial and material support that
SPND receives (including from the Government of Iran).
Section 339. Report on intelligence community support to Visas Mantis
program
Section 339 requires the DNI, in consultation with any
other appropriate government entity, to submit a report on
intelligence matters relating to the Visas Mantis program,
including the IC's efforts to provide and plan for intelligence
support to this program, and hostile intelligence service
efforts to exploit this program or any program by which United
States visas are issued.
Section 340. Plan for artificial intelligence digital ecosystem
Section 340 requires the DNI, within one year of enactment
of this Act, to develop and submit a plan for developing and
resourcing a modern digital ecosystem to enable continuous
updates of artificial intelligence-powered applications.
Section 341. Study on utility of expanded personnel management
authority
Section 341 requires the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security and the DNI to submit a study on the
utility of providing Department of Defense IC elements (other
than the NGA) with personnel management authority to attract
science and engineering experts.
Section 342. Assessment of role of foreign groups in domestic violent
extremism
Section 342 requires the DNI to submit an assessment
identifying the role of foreign groups (including entities,
adversaries, governments, or other groups) in domestic violent
extremist activities in the United States.
Section 343. Report on the assessment of all source cyber intelligence
information, with an emphasis on supply chain risks
Section 343 requires the DNI to submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees on strengthening all-
source intelligence integration relating to foreign cyber
threats, with an emphasis on cyber supply chain risks.
Section 344. Review of National Security Agency and United States Cyber
Command
Section 344 requires the Inspectors General of the IC and
the Department of Defense to complete a review of the National
Security Agency and United States Cyber Command to assess the
current resource-sharing arrangement, and to determine whether
there are issues with directing intelligence collection in
support of United States Cyber Command rather than foreign
intelligence collection. Section 344 further requires the
Inspectors General to submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees on their findings.
Section 345. Support for and oversight of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena
Task Force
Section 345 directs the DNI and the Secretary of Defense to
require each IC element and the Department of Defense to make
data relating to unidentified aerial phenomena available
immediately to the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force and
to the National Air and Space Intelligence Center. Section 345
further requires the Unidentified Aerial Task Force to submit
quarterly reports to Congress on its findings.
Section 346. Publication of unclassified appendices from reports on
intelligence community participation in vulnerabilities
equities process
Section 346 directs the DNI to make public the unclassified
report required pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 3316a(c).
Section 347. Report on future structure and responsibilities of Foreign
Malign Influence Center
Section 347 requires the DNI to conduct an assessment of
the structure and responsibilities of the Foreign Malign
Influence Center and submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on its findings.
Subtitle D--People's Republic of China
Section 351. Assessment of posture and capabilities of intelligence
community with respect to actions of the People's Republic of
China targeting Taiwan
Section 351 requires the DNI and the Director of the CIA to
submit an assessment to determine whether the IC is capable of
providing sufficient warnings regarding the People's Republic
of China's (PRC's) actions towards Taiwan.
Section 352. Plan to cooperate with intelligence agencies of key
democratic countries regarding technological competition with
People's Republic of China
Section 352 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a plan to increase cooperation with key
democratic countries, partners, and allies of the United States
to track and analyze technology capabilities, efforts by the
PRC to invest in specific technologies, technology development
in key sectors, the efforts of the PRC relating to standard
setting forums, and supply chain vulnerabilities for key
sectors.
Section 353. Assessment of People's Republic of China genomic
collection
Section 353 requires the DNI, in consultation with other
appropriate agencies, to submit to the designated congressional
committees an assessment of the PRC's plans, intentions,
capabilities, and resources devoted to biotechnology. Section
353 further requires that the assessment include an analysis of
the PRC's efforts to acquire foreign-origin biotechnology,
research and development, and genetic information; identify
PRC-based organizations involved in these efforts; and include
an analysis of IC resourced devoted to biotechnology.
Section 354. Updates to annual reports on influence operations and
campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party
Section 354 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3237(b)) to require that the annual report that NCSC
submits to designated congressional committees include a
listing of all known Chinese talent recruitment programs
operating in the United States.
Section 355. Report on influence of People's Republic of China through
Belt and Road Initiative projects with other countries
Section 355 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on recent projects negotiated
by the PRC as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, to include
information about the types of such projects, costs, and
potential national security implications.
Section 356. Study on the creation of an official digital currency by
the People's Republic of China
Section 356 directs the President to submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on the national
security risks associated with the PRC's creation and use of an
official digital currency.
Section 357. Report on efforts of Chinese Communist Party to erode
freedom and autonomy in Hong Kong
Section 357 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the Chinese Communist
Party's efforts to stifle political freedoms, influence or
manipulate the judiciary, destroy freedom of the press and
speech, and take actions to otherwise undermine the democratic
processes of Hong Kong.
Section 358. Report on targeting renewable sectors by China
Section 358 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report assessing the PRC's efforts
and advancements in certain renewable energy sectors, to
include an assessment of the PRC's pursuit of rare earth
minerals and the use of forced labor.
TITLE IV--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS
Section 401. Definition of anomalous health incident
Section 401 provides the definition for anomalous health
incidents used throughout this Title.
Section 402. Assessment and report on interagency communication
relating to efforts to address anomalous health incidents
Section 402 requires the DNI to conduct (1) an assessment
of how the various IC elements are coordinating or
collaborating with each other and with non-IC elements of the
Federal Government in their efforts to address AHI; and (2)
submit a report on the findings of the DNI.
Section 403. Advisory panel on the Office of Medical Services of the
Central Intelligence Agency
Section 403 requires the DNI establish an advisory panel
sponsored by the National Institutes of Health to assess the
capabilities, expertise, and qualifications of the CIA's Office
of Medical Services (OMS) related to the care and health
management of IC personnel reporting symptoms of AHI. Section
403 further requires the advisory panel to (1) review the
performance of OMS for the treatment of IC personnel reporting
symptoms, consistent with those AHI experienced between January
1, 2016 and December 31, 2021; (2) assess the policies and
procedures that guided external treatment referral practices
during that period; (3) develop recommendations regarding
capabilities, processes, and policies to improve patient
treatment; and (4) prepare and submit a report within 1 year of
the date on which the panel is established on its activities.
Section 404. Joint task force to investigate anomalous health incidents
Section 404 requires the establishment of a joint task
force by the DNI and Director of the FBI to investigate AHI, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense. Section 404 also
requires the task force to complete the investigation and
submit a written report on its findings.
Section 405. Reporting on occurrence of anomalous health incidents
Section 405 requires the head of an IC element to issue a
report to the congressional intelligence committees of any
reported incident involving an AHI occurring among its
employees or contractors.
Section 406. Access to certain facilities of United States Government
for assessment of anomalous health conditions
Section 406 requires the DNI to ensure that IC elements
provide to IC employees and their family members experiencing
symptoms of AHI timely access for medical assessment to
facilities in the U.S. with expertise in traumatic brain
injury. Section 406 further requires the DNI coordinate with
the Secretary of Defense and the heads of any other appropriate
Federal agency to ensure there is a process to provide
employees and their family members with timely access to the
National Intrepid Center of Excellence at Walter Reed National
Military Medical Center for assessment and, if necessary,
treatment no later than 60 days following enactment of this
Act.
TITLE V--SECURITY CLEARANCES AND TRUSTED WORKFORCE
Section 501. Exclusivity, consistency, and transparency in security
clearance procedures, and right to appeal
Section 501 requires the Executive Branch to publish
adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility to access
classified information and makes these guidelines the exclusive
basis for granting, denying, and revoking clearances in order
to increase transparency and accountability, and ensure due
process. Section 501 further codifies the right of government
employees to appeal unfavorable eligibility determinations to
an agency-level panel. Section 501 also creates a higher level
review by a government-wide appeals panel, chaired by the DNI
as the government's Security Executive Agent, to review certain
agency-level panel determinations involving allegations of
constitutional violations or discrimination. This DNI-led panel
can remand decisions to the employing agency for reevaluation
if the panel finds valid cause.
Section 502. Federal policy on sharing of derogatory information
pertaining to contractor employees in the trusted workforce
Section 502 requires the DNI to issue a policy that
facilitates sharing of information that is relevant to a
security clearance adjudication (known colloquially as
``derogatory information'') the government obtains on cleared
contractors (along with any mitigation measures put in place)
with Federal contractor employers' chief security officers, to
help companies maintain robust insider threat programs. The
policy must comport with privacy rights, allow individuals to
verify the information, and stipulate that such sharing is only
for purposes of security risk mitigation. Such sharing should
be consistent with Section 2, 1-202, of the National Industrial
Security Program Operational Manual Conforming Change 2 of 2016
and the Industrial Security Letter issued by the Defense
Security Service in 2017 (now known as the Defense
Counterintelligence and Security Agency).
Section 503. Performance measures regarding timeliness for personnel
mobility
Section 503 requires the DNI to issue a policy for
measuring the total time it takes to transfer personnel with
security clearances and eligibility for access to information
from one Federal agency to another, or from one contract to
another. Section 503 further requires the DNI to submit an
annual report following policy issuance and once each year for
the following three years after the date of such issuance on
the implementation of such policy.
Section 504. Governance of Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative
Section 504 requires the DNI and the Director of the Office
Personnel Management, in coordination with the Deputy Director
for Management in the Office of Management and Budget and the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security to (1)
jointly publish in the Federal Register a policy with
guidelines and standards for Federal Government agencies and
industry partners to implement the Trusted Workforce 2.0
initiative; (2) periodically submit to Congress a report on the
timing, delivery, and adoption of Federal Government agencies'
policies, products, and services to implement Trusted Workforce
2.0; and (3) submit to Congress performance management metrics
for its implementation. Section 504 requires an independent
study be conducted, via the DNI, by an entity that is not part
of the Federal Government on the effectiveness of the
initiatives known as Trusted Workforce 1.25, 1.5, and 2.0.
TITLE VI--OTHER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Section 601. National technology strategy
Section 601 requires the President submit to Congress an
annual report on the United States' technology strategy.
Section 602. Improvements relating to continuity of Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board membership
Section 602 permits (1) the reappointment of a member of
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) for
additional terms; (2) filling a vacancy in the same manner in
which the original appointment was made; and (3) the continued
service of a member following the expiration of their term.
Section 603. Air America
Section 603 establishes as a qualifying service for
purposes of the Civil Service Retirement System the past
service of United States citizens who were employed by Air
America, a government-owned airline that provided air transport
for operations in Southeast Asia.
Section 604. Access by Comptroller General of the United States to
certain cybersecurity records
Section 604 permits access by the Comptroller General of
the United States to any records it may require for preparing
an annual report on cybersecurity and surveillance threats to
Congress.
Section 605. Reports on intelligence support for and capacity of the
Sergeants at Arms of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the United States Capitol Police
Section 605 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Director of FBI and Secretary of DHS, to submit a report on
intelligence support provided to the Sergeant at Arms and the
United States Capitol Police. Section 605 also requires a
report to be filed by the Government Accountability Office on
the capacity of the Sergeants at Arms and the United States
Capitol Police to assess and use intelligence and threat
information relevant to the physical and cyber security of
Congress.
Section 606. Study on vulnerability of Global Positioning System to
hostile actions
Section 606 requires the DNI, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Commerce, to conduct
a study on the vulnerability of the Global Positioning System
(GPS) to hostile actions, as well as any actions that the
Federal Government is taking to mitigate any risks from the
potential unavailability of the GPS system.
Section 607. Authority for transportation of federally owned canines
associated with force protection duties of intelligence
community
Section 607 authorizes IC personnel to use federal funds to
transport federally-owned canines associated with force
protection duties.
Committee Comments
Countering China
The People's Republic of China (PRC) poses the most
significant strategic challenge to the United States as the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) actively works to systematically
undermine the U.S. economically, politically, and militarily
while expanding the PRC's influence globally. The threat
requires a whole-of-government response to counter the CCP's
ambitions and malign activities globally. The CCP is actively
working to control strategic technology sectors, remake
international institutions to align with CCP objectives, weaken
U.S. alliances, modernize its military, and increase its trade
relationships through aggressive and predatory economic
behavior, while supplanting the United States' global
leadership.
The CCP, through its theft of intellectual property, brutal
authoritarianism, and economic might, seeks to strengthen its
position abroad and enrich the Party. The world is witnessing
the CCP's ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity against
Uyghurs and other Muslim groups in Xinjiang, its crushing of
Hong Kong's freedom and autonomy in direct violation of its
treaty commitments, and its widespread use of surveillance
equipment and facial recognition to control the Chinese people.
The CCP actively seeks to export its authoritarian model
abroad, with accompanying technology, to provide other
authoritarian regimes with sophisticated tools of repression.
The Intelligence Community must reorient to engage in a
strategic competition with the PRC while countering China's
malign activities globally. To do so, it must continue to build
open source intelligence capabilities and augment capacity;
enhance sharing of intelligence capabilities; and strengthen
the analytical and collection capabilities relating to non-
military threats including technology competition.
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence & Analysis'
role in domestic activities
The Committee is concerned about the Department of Homeland
Security, Office of Intelligence & Analysis' (I&A's) use of
Title 50 authorities and National Intelligence Program funds
for programs and operations focused entirely on the domestic
activities of U.S. persons without a foreign nexus. In
particular, a number of I&A activities, including, but not
limited to, the use of I&A resources to protect monuments,
memorials, and statues, appear to be focused on individuals or
groups that have no link to foreign governments, foreign
organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorist
activities. In addition, despite documented problems related to
I&A's collection and dissemination of open source information
collected on United States persons during protests in Portland,
Oregon, I&A continues to issue open source collection
requirements that are both overly broad in scope and
disconnected from national intelligence missions and
priorities.
Moreover, the Committee is concerned about the misuse of
Title 50 authorities and intelligence funding against domestic
threats, including I&A's open source collection activities
related to U.S. persons. When an IC element conducts activities
that involve the domestic activities of U.S. persons, it can
create a perception, if not reality, that the authorities
granted to the IC to combat foreign threats are being used
against U.S. persons. The failure of I&A to break down its
budget request by mission center or function, such as open
source collection, makes it difficult for the Committee to
assess the extent to which I&A is using intelligence funding to
gather information about the domestic activities of U.S.
persons.
Therefore, the Committee directs I&A, in coordination with
FBI and ODNI, to provide a report, within 180 days following
enactment of this Act. The report should include:
1. The feasibility and advisability of eliminating or
transitioning I&A activities directed at the domestic
activities of U.S. persons with no foreign nexus to
non-IC components of the Department of Homeland
Security, subject to all relevant privacy and civil
liberty protections afforded to a U.S. person;
2. The feasibility and advisability of eliminating or
transitioning I&A programs directed at the domestic
activities of U.S. persons with no foreign nexus to the
FBI, or other law enforcement entities, subject to all
relevant privacy and civil liberty protections afforded
to a U.S. person; and
3. An analysis of I&A's legal authorities that permit
or restrict activities that are solely focused on the
domestic activities of U.S. persons absent a foreign
nexus.
National Background Investigation Service (NBIS)
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security
(USD/I&S) oversees the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
Agency (DCSA), which includes the National Background
Investigation Service (NBIS). Pursuant to Executive Order 13869
(April 24, 2019), NBIS will provide the information technology
backbone for government-wide background investigations to
support security clearances and determinations of trust for
suitability and credentialing. The Committee recognizes that
NBIS is the critical path to successfully implementing the
Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative that the Performance
Accountability Council, led by the Office of Management and
Budget, have been leading the last three years. A key feature
to NBIS's success is its cybersecurity policies practices,
particularly after the data breach of the Office of Personnel
Management's personally identifiable information (PII)
repository in 2015. The Committee believes additional
explanation of NBIS's cybersecurity protocols is appropriate.
The Committee equally believes that NBIS's success relies upon
the scope and rate of agencies' adoption of NBIS products and
services.
Therefore, the Committee directs USD/I&S to provide the
congressional intelligence and defense committees, within 90
days of enactment of this Act, with a report that describes
NBIS's cybersecurity protocols to protect PII; how these
protocols compare to leading industry and government best
practices; how NBIS is factoring in resilience into its
architecture to recover from network attacks; and how NBIS is
being governed to ensure stakeholder perspectives are properly
accommodated.
Furthermore, the Committee directs NBIS to provide the
congressional intelligence and defense committees with
quarterly updates on the extent to which agencies are using
NBIS products and services.
Report on engagement of National Reconnaissance Office with university
community
The Committee recognizes that the survivability and
resiliency of United States satellites is critically important
to the United States intelligence and defense communities.
Combatting current threats to US satellites requires new
technologies using autonomous systems and artificial
intelligence. While the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
engages with the university community in support of basic
research and developing an education workforce pipeline to help
advance new technologies and produce skilled professionals, it
can do more in this regard to focus on space survivability.
Therefore, the Committee directs the NRO's Survivability
Assurance Office to report, within 180 days of enactment of
this Act, on NRO's current efforts and future strategies to
partner with a university or universities that are
strategically located, host secure information facilities, and
offer a strong engineering curriculum, with a particular focus
on space survivability, artificial intelligence, AI test beds,
and resiliency. This report should include a summary of NRO's
planned university engagement and levels of funding.
Implementing NGA IG acquisition report recommendations
In November 2019, the NGA Office of Inspector General
issued a report on NGA's acquisition policies and processes.
The Committee fully supports the recommendations of the report,
and highlights agency progress in acquisitions management
process, but remains concerned that key recommendations were
not fully implemented. For example, the OIG recommended that
NGA's Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) not be encumbered
by duties other than acquisition and that all acquisition
activities should fall under the CAE. The NGA has dual-hatted
the deputy director as the CAE, which does not meet the OIG
report's recommendation. The Committee believes that the CAE
function should be a full-time position reporting to the
Director of the agency.
Therefore, the Committee directs the NGA to report, within
90 days of enactment of this Act, on its compliance with the
OIG report recommendations, including a report outlining the
reasons for any outstanding recommendations. The report should
also include outcomes of the 90-day study on program
traceability.
Utilizing AI/ML in Joint Task Force investigation into anomalous health
incidents
The Committee is committed to protecting and supporting
Intelligence Community and other federal government personnel
who have experienced debilitating, unexplained attacks, or
anomalous health incidents, while serving their country. The
Committee is also focused on identifying and holding
accountable those responsible for inflicting these injuries on
U.S. personnel, and recognizes that artificial intelligence and
machine learning tools can play an important role in
identifying the actors, weapons, and patterns of these attacks.
Therefore, the Committee encourages the Joint Task Force
required by Section 404 to investigate anomalous health
incidents. In carrying out its investigation, the Committee
urges the Joint Task Force to utilize commercially available
technological tools, including but not limited to off-the-shelf
automated machine learning tools, to gain insights from open
source and commercially available data.
NRO acquisition of imagery from companies with foreign ownership
The Committee supports the NRO's intent to strengthen and
expand investment in the U.S. commercial imagery industry and
supports the concept that the NRO should build only those
capabilities that it cannot acquire from the commercial market.
However, the Committee is concerned about the NRO's recent
commercial imagery acquisition guidance. When it comes to
defining the boundaries of the U.S. commercial imagery market,
there is considerable precedent for the Department of Defense
and the Intelligence Community to contract with companies with
a Special Security Agreement (SSA), Foreign Ownership, Control,
or Influence (FOCI) mitigation and some foreign ownership. NRO
efforts to restrict the ability of U.S. companies with foreign
ownership equities to compete could unnecessarily limit user
access to some of the most innovative commercial imagery
capabilities the market can deliver. Therefore, within 120 days
of enactment of this Act, the Committee directs the NRO to
provide the Committee a plan to establish a repeatable process
for acquiring commercial imagery that would manage acceptable
risks associated with foreign ownership. The plan should also
clearly articulate specific risks that the NRO has determined
would exclude from competition U.S. companies with foreign
ownership equities that have an SSA and FOCI mitigation in
place.
Enhancing financial intelligence capability
Sections 314 and 315 authorize pilot programs at the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of the Treasury
to enhance recruitment and retention of financial intelligence
professionals. The Committee believes a robust financial
intelligence capability is critical to meeting 21st century
threats and ensuring U.S. economic security. The Committee is
concerned that the Intelligence Community has not adequately
resourced well-identified demands for financial intelligence
capability. Therefore, the Committee urges the Intelligence
Community to take additional steps to realign collection and
analysis to match growing demand for financial intelligence.
Reporting foreign employment by former intelligence community personnel
The Committee continues to have significant concerns about
former Intelligence Community personnel providing support to
foreign governments, particularly where it involves abuses of
human rights, violations of U.S. laws, or infringements on
United States persons' privacy rights. Section 5703 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
directed the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to conduct
a study on former intelligence personnel who have directly or
indirectly provided assistance to a foreign government in a
capacity that benefits the intelligence, military, or law
enforcement activities of the foreign country.
As a follow-on to this study, the Committee directs the DNI
to provide to the congressional intelligence committees and
both the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and the House Homeland Security Committee, within 120
days of enactment of the Act, a proposal to improve reporting
and tracking of employment of former IC personnel, to include
mechanisms to enforce or incentivize reporting of their
employment with foreign governments.
Explicit grant, cooperative agreement, and other transaction authority
ODNI communicated to the Committee its request to
explicitly set forth its acquisition and assistance tools
available for executing its R&D mission in legislation, and for
those tools to be available across the IC for all such
activities. The Committee understands that, while ODNI has
relied on its acquisition authorities to maintain and expand
acquisition and promotion of R&D services from outside
entities, including academic institutions and small businesses,
these authorities lack specific statements regarding the
particular acquisition or assistance instruments available to
the DNI. Providing explicit authorities would address questions
ODNI receives concerning the availability of grants,
cooperative agreements, and other transactions.
The Committee recognizes the importance of R&D activities
to ODNI's mission, and the mission of the IC writ large.
However, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 3024(n), the Committee believes
ODNI already has the authorities necessary to engage with non-
governmental entities on R&D activities. ODNI, for its part,
believes it has the authority to enter into these kinds of
agreements, but it has not executed one of those agreements to
date. Rather than provide additional authorities in this bill,
the Committee requests that ODNI work with the Committee by
providing notification when it uses existing authorities to
enter into grants, cooperative agreements, and other
transactions. In this way, the Committee will gain a more
practical understanding about these arrangements, the frequency
with which they are utilized, and what any associated funding
is used to do. The Committee will in turn use this information
to determine whether additional authorities are needed.
Assessment of critical supply chains
As demonstrated in The Supply Chain Assessment and
Vulnerability Act of 2021, S. 849, introduced by Senators
Cornyn and King, the Committee seeks to identify supply chains
that are critical to the national security, economic security,
or public health or safety of the United States. Furthermore,
the Committee seeks to identify important vulnerabilities in
such supply chains and recommendations for legislative or
administrative actions to secure them. The DNI, in consultation
with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, and
other government entities as appropriate, should lead this
effort to ensure our supply chains remain robust, resilient,
and capable of withstanding attacks or disruptions perpetrated
by our adversaries or other man-made or naturally-occurring
events. Moreover, the Committee seeks to identify those supply
chains which are critical to our foreign adversaries' national
security and defense.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation
with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, and
other government entities as appropriate, to provide an
assessment to the congressional intelligence and armed services
committees, within 120 days of the date of enactment of this
Act, that: (1) identifies those supply chains which are
critical to the national security, economic security, or public
health of the United States; (2) identifies those supply chains
which are critical to our foreign adversaries' national
security and defense; (3) provides recommendations for
legislative or administrative actions to secure supply chains
described in section (1); and (4) analyzes the adversary supply
chain vulnerabilities that can be exploited in the event of
conflict, or as necessary and appropriate. This assessment
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
Unidentified Aerial Phenomena
The Committee acknowledges the recent Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) report of the
Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) Task Force and the need for
increased collection and data to better understand the
potential national security threats that UAPs pose to our
nation.
The Committee remains concerned, however, that while the
U.S. Navy and the U.S. Navy-led UAP Task Force have made
efforts to standardize and destigmatize UAP reporting, the ODNI
report confirmed that the scope of UAP activity expands
significantly beyond the U.S. Navy's equities. Subsequently,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense has directed the Undersecretary
of Defense for Intelligence and Security to provide a plan to
formalize the mission currently performed by the UAP Task
Force. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 345 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (S. 2610), the Committee
has directed classified quarterly reporting on UAP-related
events.
Therefore, given the Department of Defense's mandate to the
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, and
the additional reporting mandates, the Committee continues to
support increased funding for UAP Task Force-related
operations.
Committee Action
On July 28, 2021, a quorum being present, the Committee met
to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the
following actions:
Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex
By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and
Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for
Fiscal Year 2022, the base text for purposes of amendment.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc twenty-four
amendments to the bill, as follows: (1) an amendment by Senator
King to require an assessment of all source cyber intelligence
information, with an emphasis on supply chain risks; (2) an
amendment by Senator Risch to improve Section 337; (3) an
amendment by Senator Risch to improve Section 353; (4) an
amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to prohibit the collection and
analysis of United States persons' information by the
Intelligence Community based on First Amendment-protected
activities; (5) an amendment by Chairman Warner to establish a
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Officer of the Intelligence
Community; (6) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored
by Vice Chairman Rubio, to improve Section 351 and Section 404;
(7) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice
Chairman Rubio, to require a report on the influence of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) through Belt and Road
Initiative projects; (8) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to establish a Chaplain
Corps at the CIA; (9) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to require a plan to
increase cooperation with intelligence agencies of key
democratic countries to track and analyze certain matters
relating to the technological competition with the PRC; (10) an
amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman
Rubio, to require a study on the PRC's creation of an official
digital currency; (11) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to require a report on the
efforts of the Chinese Communist Party to erode freedom and
autonomy in Hong Kong; (12) an amendment by Chairman Warner,
and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to improve Section 306;
(13) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice
Chairman Rubio, to provide legal authority for the
transportation of federally-owned canines associated with the
force protection duties of the Intelligence Community; (14) an
amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman
Rubio, to establish a pilot program on recruiting and retaining
high demand positions in the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis at the Department of Treasury; (15) an amendment by
Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to
require a report on the PRC's targeting of renewable sectors;
(16) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice
Chairman Rubio, to require a review of the National Security
Agency and United States Cyber Command; (17) an amendment by
Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to
require a plan for allowing contracts with providers of
services relating to SCIFs for use of those facilities by
businesses and organizations on contracts at multiple security
levels; (18) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored
by Vice Chairman Rubio, to establish a pilot program on student
loan repayment to enhance recruitment of intelligence personnel
in high-demand disciplines at the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis at the Department of Treasury; (19) an amendment by
Chairman Warner and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and
Senators Feinstein, Heinrich, and Blunt, to require support for
and oversight of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force;
(20) an amendment by Senator Wyden to improve Section 604; (21)
an amendment by Senator Wyden to improve Section 340; (22) an
amendment by Senator Wyden to require the publication of the
unclassified appendices from reports on the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process; (23) an amendment by Senator Cotton to
express the sense of the Senate on the use of Intelligence
Community resources for collection, assessment, and analysis of
information pertaining exclusively to United States persons
absent a foreign nexus; and (24) an amendment from Senator Burr
to require a report on the future structure and
responsibilities of the Foreign Malign Influence Center.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc twenty-eight
amendments to the classified annex.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment by
Senator Sasse to strike from the bill a provision to make
improvements to the Steering Committee on Emerging Technology
and National Security Threats, as established by section 236 of
the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283).
Votes to report the committee bill
On July 28, 2021, the Committee voted to report the bill,
as amended, by a vote of 16 ayes and zero nayes. The votes in
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--aye;
Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--
aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--
aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; Senator
Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator
Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator
Sasse--aye.
By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and
classified annex.
Compliance With Rule XLIV
Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of
authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited
tariff benefits.
Estimate of Costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On August 4,
2021, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing
the provisions of this legislation.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN
The Fiscal Year 2022 Intelligence Authorization Act
includes numerous provisions and amendments I put forward to
protect Intelligence Community whistleblowers, defend the
physical and cyber security of the U.S. Congress, and ensure
greater oversight, transparency and civil liberties.
The bill includes four amendments to protect
whistleblowers. The first creates a mechanism for
whistleblowers to go straight to Congress without going through
agency heads. The second addresses the previous
administration's misreading of existing law by confirming that
the inspectors general have the authority to determine which
whistleblower complaints are ``urgent concerns'' that must be
transmitted to Congress. The third prohibits the public
disclosure of a whistleblower's identity as a reprisal. The
final provision fixes the existing whistleblower statutes,
which are confusing and contradictory, harmonizing them to
strengthen whistleblower protections and provide necessary
clarity to whistleblowers and inspectors general.
As the January 6, 2021, insurrection highlighted, the
defense of American democracy must include the protection of
the U.S. Congress. That is why I am pleased that the bill
includes my provision requiring the DNI, in coordination with
the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security,
to report on intelligence support to the Senate and House
Sergeants at Arms and the U.S. Capitol police. The provision,
which covers both the physical and cyber security of the
Congress, also directs the GAO to report on the capabilities of
the Sergeants at Arms and U.S. Capitol police to use this
intelligence support. A separate provision ensures that the
GAO, in conducting an annual review of cyber and surveillance
threats against Congress required by the Fiscal Years 2018,
2019 and 2020 Act, has the accesses it needs. These reviews are
critically important to the task of protecting Congress from
serious hacking and surveillance threats, including from
sophisticated foreign adversaries.
In recent years, critical investigations and reports of the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board have been disrupted
due to the lack of a quorum. The bill addresses this problem by
allowing members to serve until their replacements are
confirmed. Another provision ensures that certain data related
to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process will be made public.
Yet another provision requires that the DNI's plans related to
artificial intelligence include recommendations to protect
Americans' privacy.
Finally, I remain deeply concerned about the failures of
the Federal Government's obsolete declassification system, a
problem described at length during the Committee's September 9,
2020, open hearing. I am therefore pleased that the classified
annex to the bill includes several amendments I offered to
advance efforts to accelerate declassification and promote
declassification reform.
Ron Wyden.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WYDEN AND HEINRICH
As in previous years, our votes in favor of the
Intelligence Authorization Act should not be read as an
endorsement of all Intelligence Community programs and
activities. We are particularly concerned about a CIA program
described in a report by the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB), which we have requested be
declassified.
Ron Wyden.
Martin Heinrich.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN RUBIO, AND SENATORS BURR, RISCH,
BLUNT, COTTON, CORNYN, AND SASSE
In the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress
rightly passed legislation to improve information sharing and
collaboration within the Intelligence Community--and also with
federal and state and local law enforcement--to make it more
likely that the Intelligence Community ``connects the dots'' of
international terror plotting in order to safeguard against
future attacks.
We note with concern, however, the growing number of
Intelligence Community activities focused on U.S. persons where
there is no foreign nexus, which law enforcement is poised to
address. Any American who commits a crime by planning,
plotting, or carrying out acts of violence in the United States
should be arrested by law enforcement and prosecuted by state
or federal prosecutors to the fullest extent of the law.
Diverting the unique capabilities of the Intelligence Community
toward domestic activities under the guise of analyzing
domestic terrorism or domestic violent extremism, however, is a
poor use of the IC's capabilities, is duplicative of the
resources and responsibilities of state and federal law
enforcement, and erodes public trust and confidence in the
Intelligence Community.
The reasons are twofold.
We must be careful not to repeat darker periods of our
history when the federal government abused its power by spying
on Americans for political purposes. This Committee was
created, in part, as a result of these abuses, and since that
time we have gone to great lengths to ensure the public that
the Intelligence Community does not and will not infringe on
the rights of Americans. The Intelligence Community can only
perform its formidable work if it has the trust and confidence
of the public at large. Intelligence Community involvement in
the collection, analysis, and assessment of intelligence
targeting Americans at home where no foreign nexus is present
would erode that confidence. We were pleased to hear the
President's nominee for the number two position in the
Intelligence Community agree in her confirmation hearing that
there must be a foreign nexus before the collection and
analysis capabilities of the IC are brought to bear against a
U.S. person.
Equally important, the Intelligence Community needs all the
resources it can muster to address the threats to this country
emanating from foreign sources, be they foreign adversaries
such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, or international
terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State.
Resources expended by the Intelligence Community for law
enforcement activities are resources not devoted to
intelligence activities related to those threats.
We will continue to work to address this complex issue in a
way that protects the First Amendment rights of the American
people, preserves the Intelligence Community's ability to
connect the dots to prevent transnational threats of terrorism
at home and abroad, while also ensuring that those who plan,
plot, or carry out acts of violence within the United States
are prevented from doing so by law enforcement and held
accountable to the fullest extent of the law.
Marco Rubio.
Richard Burr.
James E. Risch.
Roy Blunt.
Tom Cotton.
John Cornyn.
Ben Sasse.
Changes to Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that is
necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to
expedite the business of the Senate.
[all]
