[Senate Report 115-182]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 252
115th Congress} { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 115-182
======================================================================
FISA AMENDMENTS REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2017
_______
November 7, 2017.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Burr, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany S. 2010]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an
original bill (S. 2010) to extend the FISA Amendments Act of
2008 for 8 years, and for other purposes, reports favorably
thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017
that is being reported by the Committee.
Section 1. Short title
Section 1 provides that the Act may be cited as the ``FISA
Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017.''
Section 2. Eight-year extension of FISA Amendments Act of 2008
Section 2 extends the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 for eight
additional years, replacing the current sunset date of December
31, 2017 with a new sunset date of December 31, 2025.
Section 3. Congressional review and oversight of Abouts collection
Section 3 codifies the Intelligence Community's (IC's)
current prohibition on a subset of FISA collection under 50
U.S.C. Sec. 1881a (hereinafter, ``Section 702'') known as
``Abouts'' Upstream collection. Section 3 further provides an
exception that would permit the Director of National
Intelligence and the Attorney General to recommence ``Abouts''
collection if they submit a written notice of their intent to
recommence the collection, an order from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) approving such
collection, and any other supporting materials, to the
congressional intelligence committees and the congressional
judiciary committees. Section 3 also provides Congress with the
ability to review the written notice, and, upon expedited
consideration, enact qualifying legislation disapproving of the
``Abouts'' collection, thereby continuing the prohibition.
Section 4. Appointment of amici curiae by Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court
Section 4 provides a presumption requiring the FISC to
appoint an amicus if the IC seeks reauthorization of the
``Abouts'' Upstream collection, unless the FISC determines
affirmatively that such an appointment is unnecessary.
Section 5. Authorization for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to
compensate amici curiae and technical advisors for assistance
provided
Section 5 authorizes the FISC to compensate amicus curiae
legal or technical experts appointed pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
Sec. 1803(i).
Section 6. Minimization and disclosure provisions
Section 6 provides restrictions on the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI's) use of Section 702-derived information,
so that the FBI can use the information as evidence only in
court proceedings involving national security-related crimes or
other enumerated crimes, including death, kidnapping, serious
bodily injury, offenses against minors, harm to critical
infrastructure, cybersecurity crimes, transnational crimes, and
human trafficking.
Section 6 further provides for increased IC transparency,
including reporting on the number of targets FBI has authority
to surveil under FISA Title I, Title III, and 50 U.S.C.
Sec. Sec. 1881a-c, including the number of targets who are U.S.
persons and the number who are non-U.S. persons; the number of
times that the FBI received Section 702 information in response
to a query that was reasonably designed to find evidence of a
crime; the number of instances in which the FBI opened a
criminal investigation of a United States person based in whole
or in part on Section 702 information; and the number of
criminal proceedings in which the FBI provided notice that the
government intended to use FISA-derived information.
Section 7. Querying procedures required
Section 7 requires the Attorney General (AG), in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI),
to adopt querying procedures, which are subject to annual FISC
review, for data collected pursuant to Section 702. Section 7
also requires these querying procedures to ensure the retention
of records of all queries using an identifier associated with a
known U.S. person. Section 7 further requires the AG and DNI to
assess compliance with the querying procedures in the
semiannual assessments provided to congressional intelligence
and judiciary committees. Section 7 also authorizes the
Inspectors General of the Department of Justice and relevant IC
agencies to include querying procedures in their oversight
obligations.
Section 8. Review of queries conducted by Federal Bureau of
Investigation of acquisitions obtained under Section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
Section 8 requires the FBI to submit to the FISC, within
one business day, any query that returns information from the
FBI's repository of Section 702 information that concerns a
person the FBI has affirmatively determined to be a known U.S.
person, along with the responsive information and justification
for executing the query in a manner consistent with FISC-
approved procedures. Section 8 further requires the FISC,
within the next two business days, expeditiously to review the
query submissions for consistency with the Fourth Amendment. If
the FISC determines that such query was not consistent with the
Fourth Amendment, Section 8 prohibits the U.S. Government from
using any of the responsive information in court proceedings.
Section 8 further requires the FISC to submit an annual report
to the congressional intelligence committees that includes the
total number of query submissions and the total number of those
submissions that the FISC found not to be consistent with the
Fourth Amendment.
Section 9. Section 705 emergency provision
Section 9 provides for emergency authorizations pursuant to
50 U.S.C. Sec. 1881d (``Section 705''), which, among other
things, permits collections on United States persons located
outside of the United States who are likely to use facilities
both inside the United States and outside the United States.
Section 9 thereby creates consistency between the authorities
for collections under Section 705 and the emergency
authorizations already permitted under 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1881b
(``Section 703''), which permits collections on United States
persons located outside the United States who are likely to use
facilities inside the United States, and 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1881c
(``Section 704''), which permits collections on United States
persons located outside the United States who are likely to use
facilities outside the United States.
Section 10. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board reform
Section 10 provides an exemption for the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) from certain statutory
requirements regarding public reporting and public meeting
accessibility, given that much of PCLOB's activities involve
classified matters.
Section 11. Flexibility for Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
in staffing matters
Section 11 provides the PCLOB with hiring authorities in
the absence of a chairperson or a quorum.
Section 12. Increased penalties for unauthorized removal and retention
of classified documents or material
Section 12 provides for up to ten years imprisonment for
unauthorized removal and retention of classified documents of
material.
Committee Action
On October 24, 2017, a quorum being present, the Committee
met to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the
following actions:
Votes on amendments to committee bill and this report
By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and
Vice Chairman's bill the base text for purposes of amendment.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc four
amendments to the bill: (1) an amendment by Vice Chairman
Warner to increase the PCLOB's hiring authorities; (2) an
amendment by Vice Chairman Warner to provide compensation for
amici curiae legal and technical experts that support the FISC;
(3) an amendment by Senator King and Senator Cornyn, to provide
querying procedures and reporting requirements; and (4) an
amendment by Senator Cotton to enhance the penalties for
unauthorized removal and retention of classified information.
By a vote of four ayes to eleven noes, the Committee
rejected a second-degree amendment by Senator Feinstein,
cosponsored by Senator Harris, to an amendment by Vice Chairman
Warner that would have required the government to show probable
cause and obtain a warrant from the FISC before undertaking
certain Section 702 queries. The votes in person or by proxy
were as follows: Chairman Burr--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator
Rubio--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Blunt--no; Senator
Lankford--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Vice
Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--
aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--no; Senator Manchin--
no; and Senator Harris--aye.
By a vote of fifteen ayes, the Committee unanimously
adopted an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner that requires the
FISC to provide subsequent review of certain FBI queries of
Section 702 information. The votes in person or by proxy were
as follows: Chairman Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator
Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Blunt--aye; Senator
Lankford--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Vice
Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--
aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator
Manchin--aye; and Senator Harris--aye.
By a vote of four ayes to eleven noes, the Committee
rejected an amendment by Senator Wyden that would have
prohibited acquisition under Section 702 of communications
known to be entirely domestic under authority to target certain
persons outside of the United States. The votes in person or by
proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr--no; Senator Risch--no;
Senator Rubio--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Blunt--no;
Senator Lankford--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no;
Vice Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator
Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--no; Senator
Manchin--no; and Senator Harris--aye.
By a vote of four ayes to eleven noes, the Committee
rejected an amendment by Senator Wyden that would have codified
the IC's current prohibition on ``Abouts'' Upstream collection
without the exception provided for in Section 3. The votes in
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr--no; Senator
Risch--no; Senator Rubio--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator
Blunt--no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator
Cornyn--no; Vice Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--no;
Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye;
Senator Manchin--no; and Senator Harris--aye.
By a vote of four ayes to eleven noes, the Committee
rejected an amendment by Senator Wyden, as modified by Senator
King, which would have revised the standard on current reverse
targeting prohibitions to replace ``the'' with ``a,'' such that
the statute would state ``If a purpose of such acquisition is
to target a particular known person.'' The votes in person or
by proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr--no; Senator Risch--no;
Senator Rubio--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Blunt--no;
Senator Lankford--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no;
Vice Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator
Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator
Manchin--no; and Senator Harris--aye.
By a vote of two ayes to thirteen noes, the Committee
rejected an amendment by Senator Wyden that would have imposed
further restrictions on use of Section 702-derived information
in investigations and legal proceedings. The votes in person or
by proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr--no; Senator Risch--no;
Senator Rubio--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Blunt--no;
Senator Lankford--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no;
Vice Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator
Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--no; Senator
Manchin--no; and Senator Harris--no.
Vice Chairman Warner offered four amendments, which he
subsequently withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment to require
a semiannual assessment of querying practices; (2) an amendment
to strike Section 10 of the bill; (3) an amendment to increase
the period of FISC review for certain certifications; and (4)
an amendment regarding FBI oversight.
Senator Rubio offered three amendments, which he
subsequently withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment permanently
reauthorizing roving surveillance authorities; (2) an amendment
permanently reauthorizing lone wolf surveillance authorities;
and (3) an amendment striking Section 3 of the bill.
Senator Cotton offered three amendments, which he
subsequently withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment providing a
clean reauthorization of FISA Title VII to September 11, 2026;
(2) an amendment providing a clean, permanent reauthorization
of FISA Title VII; and (3) an amendment repealing Presidential
Policy Directive 28.
Senator Cotton and Senator Cornyn offered two amendments,
which they subsequently withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment
providing a clean, permanent reauthorization of FISA Title VII,
with the authorities provided in Section 9 of the bill; and (2)
an amendment providing a clean reauthorization of FISA Title
VII to September 11, 2026, with the authorities provided in
Section 9 of the bill.
Senator Heinrich offered one amendment, which he
subsequently withdrew, that would have required the FISC to
undertake prior review of government queries of the Section 702
database for U.S. person communications, with certain
exceptions, including for emergencies.
Senator Cornyn offered three amendments, which he
subsequently withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment authorizing
certain acquisitions of data stored abroad; (2) an amendment
providing for electronic communications transactional records
authorities; and (3) an amendment to Section 3, regarding the
Senate procedural requirements for certain qualifying
legislation.
Vote to report the committee bill
The Committee voted to report the bill, as amended, by a
vote of 12 ayes and 3 noes. The votes in person or by proxy
were as follows: Chairman Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye;
Senator Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Blunt--aye;
Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--
aye; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator
Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King--aye; Senator
Manchin--aye; and Senator Harris--no.
By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to
make technical and conforming changes, following the completion
of the mark-up.
Compliance With Rule XLIV
Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill or the
report to accompany the bill. The bill and report also contain
no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits.
Estimate of Costs
On October 25, 2017, the Committee transmitted this bill to
the Congressional Budget Office and requested an estimate of
the costs incurred in carrying out the provisions.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR FEINSTEIN
While I support reauthorization of Section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, I am disappointed that
the committee voted down my amendment, which would have
required the government to obtain a warrant based on probable
cause prior to accessing the content of an American's
communications under Section 702. I strongly believe that
Americans have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
communications, and that the Fourth Amendment requires the
government to obtain a warrant prior to accessing the content
of those messages.
Section 702 was established as part of the FISA Amendments
Act of 2008. It was intended to modernize the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) consistent with advances
in communications technology. Section 702 permits the
government to collect foreign intelligence information
including phone calls and email messages on non-U.S. persons
that are located overseas without obtaining a warrant.
Americans cannot be targeted under the program, but can be
collected incidentally if they are communicating with a non-
U.S. person target. Additionally, current law also permits the
government to query its Section 702 database specifically for
U.S. persons incidentally caught, and access the content of any
U.S. person communication collected under the program without
obtaining a warrant.
However, the Supreme Court has consistently found that a
warrant is required prior to law enforcement accessing the
content of an American's private communications, and I believe
that protection should also apply to communications
incidentally collected under Section 702.
Consequently, the first criminal cases challenging the
constitutionality of evidence derived from Section 702 are
currently being litigated. Part of the reason is that prior to
2013, the Department of Justice did not notify defendants that
evidence derived from Section 702 would be used at trial. As a
result, defendants were previously unaware that they could
challenge evidence derived from Section 702 collection. As soon
as the Department changed that policy, defendants began
challenging Section 702 as violative of the Fourth Amendment.
Several of the courts that have considered these challenges to
date have expressed skepticism about the constitutionality of
various aspects of Section 702, including U.S. person queries.
For example, in United States v. Mohamud, 834 F.3d 420, 438
(9th Cir. 2016), the court purposefully excluded unresolved
constitutional questions, including U.S. person queries under
Section 702. The court found:
``Although [Section] 702 potentially raises complex
statutory and constitutional issues, this case does
not. As explained below, the initial collection of
Mohamud's email communications did not involve so-
called ``upstreaming'' or targeting of Mohamud under
[Section 702], more controversial methods of collecting
communications. It also did not involve the retention
and querying of incidentally collected communications.
All this case involved was the targeting of a foreign
national under Section 702, through which Mohamud's
email communications were incidentally collected.
Confined to the particular facts of this case, we hold
that the [Section] 702 acquisition of Mohamud's email
communications did not violate the Fourth Amendment.''
My amendment was intended to strike a reasonable balance
between the public's constitutional right to privacy and the
legitimate investigative needs of law enforcement. To that end,
my amendment permitted the government to continue to query U.S.
persons under Section 702, but would have required a warrant
based on probable cause prior to accessing the content of any
American's communications.
In fact, I believe that putting a warrant requirement in
place for U.S. person queries under Section 702 actually
protects the program by preserving its core capability and
putting it on more solid constitutional footing.
While my amendment did not pass in committee, I will
continue to advocate for this change along with other privacy
and civil liberty protections as the bill moves to the full
Senate.
Dianne Feinstein.
MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN
I oppose the Committee bill reauthorizing Section 702 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act because it does not
include provisions necessary to ensure that the government can
conduct surveillance of foreign threats while also protecting
the rights of innocent Americans. I and numerous other members
of Congress have proposed commonsense reforms to protect
Americans' rights that in no way prevent the Intelligence
Community from identifying threats to our national security.
These reforms are not included in the Committee bill.
The bill's failings begin with the lack of a warrant
requirement for searches of Section 702 collection for
communications to, from and about Americans. Under current law,
the CIA, NSA and FBI can conduct these searches for no other
reason than that they reasonably believe the searches will turn
up foreign intelligence information. The FBI can also conduct
searches for Americans to find evidence of a crime. The ability
to read those Americans' communications without a warrant poses
serious Fourth Amendment concerns. The Constitution requires
that the government first use the authorities available to it
to obtain communications metadata and other non-content
information and build a case for a warrant, rather than going
directly to reading the content of private communications.
The Committee bill fails to address these concerns. It
requires no warrant. There is no requirement for any FISA Court
review before or after the searches, meaning that extended
fishing expeditions for particular Americans are beyond court
oversight. The bill only requires that the FBI submit its
searches to the Court if those searches have already produced
information on known U.S. persons. Further, the FBI is not
required to determine the nationality of the individuals whose
information the FBI has retrieved, and thus any uncertainty
results in no submission to the FISA Court at all. The bill
provides no legal standard for the Court to consider, only a
review for consistency with the Fourth Amendment. It is not
clear on what basis that determination would be made, much less
how the court would consider the subsequent use of the
information against these Americans in ways that may have
nothing to do with national security. Finally, the bill applies
only to FBI searches, omitting the thousands of Americans whose
content has been searched, and the tens of thousands whose
metadata has been searched, by the CIA and the NSA. The
constitutional rights of those Americans matter as well.
The bill fails to protect the rights of Americans in
numerous other ways. It does not prohibit the ``abouts''
collection, which can result in the government sweeping up
communications that are entirely between Americans on whom
there is no suspicion at all. The government stopped this form
of collection due to extensive, unresolved compliance problems.
Congress should insist that the government seek congressional
approval before resuming ``abouts'' collection.
The bill does not include a meaningful prohibition on
reverse targeting, which would require a warrant when a
significant purpose of targeting a foreigner is actually to
collect the communications of the American communicant. The
current standard permits the government to conduct unlimited
warrantless searches on Americans, disseminate the results of
those searches, and use that information against those
Americans, so long as it has any justification at all for
targeting the foreigner.
Nor does the bill adequately restrict the use of
information on Americans derived from Section 702 for purposes
other than national security. The bill limits its restrictions
to the use as evidence in criminal cases, disregarding the
numerous ways in which government investigations as well as
administrative and civil proceedings affect the rights and
liberties of Americans. The bill also includes exceptions for
non-national security crimes and a broad, undefined exception
for ``transnational crime.''
On June 7, 2017, the Director of National Intelligence
testified that Section 702 could not be used to collect
communications that are entirely domestic. The DNI subsequently
stated that the issue was classified. I offered an amendment to
the bill that would have codified the DNI's original testimony,
which would be consistent with the purpose as well as the
public's understanding of Section 702. The Committee rejected
that amendment.
The bill lacks numerous other critical reforms. It leaves
in place current statutory authority to compel companies to
provide assistance, potentially opening the door to government
mandated de-encryption without FISA Court oversight. The bill
fails to provide the FISA Court amici the access to FISA
information needed to ensure they can raise important legal and
technical concerns with the Court. It leaves in place
unnecessary restrictions on the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board, such as the arbitrary limitation on its
mandate that excludes most intelligence collection efforts. And
it does nothing to remove impediments to constitutional
challenges by those affected by Section 702 surveillance.
I also believe that the eight-year extension provided by
the bill is far too long. Rapid changes in both technology and
operational activities require much more frequent congressional
review, as do the government's shifting, and often secret
reinterpretations of the statute.
Finally, I have concerns about this report. By omitting key
information about the scope of authorities granted the
government, the Committee is itself contributing to the
continuing corrosive problem of secret law.
Ron Wyden.
MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR HEINRICH
On October 24, 2017, the Senate Intelligence Committee
reported out the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act, which
would extend the expiration of the existing FISA Amendments Act
until December 2025. I opposed passage of the bill.
I strongly support the use of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) and specifically Section 702 to gather
intelligence on foreign targets. The value of the program to
the Intelligence Community and our national security is
indisputable. However, it has become disturbingly routine for
the government to use this authority to search through the
communications of Americans whose information has been
inadvertently swept up under this surveillance program.
The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act is a modest
improvement on the statute it would replace. Among other
provisions, it would codify procedures for querying data
collected incidentally under Section 702. It would require the
Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to
ensure there is a technical procedure in place to keep a record
of all queries referencing a known American, which the FBI
currently does not do. The bill would also require the FBI to
seek a FISA Court review following a query in which a U.S.
person's information was identified--before law enforcement
could use that information.
While I support these improvements to the program, they
merely nibble around the edges of the real problem with the
existing statute: It contains a loophole that allows the
government to effectively conduct warrantless searches for
Americans' communications. The FISA Amendments Reauthorization
Act does not close that loophole or adequately protect the
privacy of Americans.
When Section 702 was added to the original FISA statute in
2008, it was designed to give the government new authorities to
collect the communications of people who are reasonably
believed to be foreigners outside the United States. Although
Section 702 contemplated the ``incidental'' collection of
Americans' communications, the purpose of the law was clear--to
go after foreign terrorists and spies.
Calling it ``incidental'' collection makes light of the
fact that the government regularly uses this foreign
intelligence surveillance authority to sweep up communications
of Americans that would otherwise require a warrant. The
communications of Americans were never intended to be collected
under this law, and yet it has been interpreted to allow the
government to do exactly that.
There should be clear rules regarding the government's
authority to search through Section 702 communications in an
effort to find the phone calls or emails of particular
Americans. If there is clear evidence that an American is a
terrorist or spy, or is involved in serious crime, then the
government should be permitted to search for the communications
of that American--after getting a warrant or an emergency
authorization for that search.
During the markup, Senator Wyden introduced an amendment
that would require a warrant or an emergency authorization
prior to any searches of the Section 702 database for
Americans' communications, a proposal that I have long
supported but that did not have the votes to pass in the
Committee.
Searching through the communications of any American should
require a warrant before the search takes place. That is what
our framers sought to ensure with the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution. I hope we can further improve this legislation by
requiring a warrant for any searches of Americans'
communications. Such a change would properly balance our
liberty and our security and would secure my support for this
reauthorization.
Martin Heinrich.
MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR HARRIS
Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act is a vital tool for
protecting our national security and ensuring public safety.
Like other members of this Committee, I have seen the men and
women of our Intelligence Community use these authorities to
combat grave threats to the American people. These intelligence
professionals are patriots doing a difficult job and Congress
must ensure they remain equipped with the tools they need.
Yet this reauthorization should be about more than simply
rubber-stamping existing authorities. It's also a chance to
reevaluate the effectiveness of these tools. Nearly a decade
has gone by since Congress passed Section 702. In that time, we
have learned important lessons about how it works--and how it
can be improved.
As our daily life becomes increasingly digital, I believe
it is more important than ever that reauthorization legislation
sufficiently protects both the privacy and security of
Americans. Innocent individuals should not have to worry that
their calls or correspondence are being monitored by their
government. Regrettably, I do not believe the Committee's
current bill does enough to prioritize these privacy rights.
I believe we must do everything in our power to protect our
country in a dangerous world. But I also believe we cannot
sacrifice our deepest values in the process. I will continue
working with my colleagues--including those across the aisle
and in the other chamber--to craft reauthorization legislation
that aligns our newest technologies with our oldest ideals.
Kamala D. Harris.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact and Changes in Existing Law
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing
the provisions of this legislation. In accordance with
paragraph 12 of rule XXVI, the Committee finds it necessary to
dispense with the requirements therein to expedite the business
of the Senate.
[all]
