[Senate Report 108-44]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
108th Congress Report
1st Session SENATE 108-44
======================================================================
AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 FOR INTELLIGENCE AND
INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, THE
COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT, AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
_______
May 8, 2003.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Roberts, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 1025]
The Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI or Committee),
having considered the original bill (S. 1025), to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for
other purposes reports favorably thereon and recommends that
the bill pass.
CONTENTS
page
Classified Supplement to the Committee Report.................... 2
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion....................... 2
Committee Comments on Fiscal Year 2004 Intelligence Authorization
Bill and Other Matters......................................... 12
Intelligence Community Management, Planning, and Performance:
Intelligence Community strategic and performance planning.... 12
Intelligence Community compliance with Federal financial
accounting standards....................................... 13
National Security Agency budget, acquisition, and
compensation reform........................................ 15
Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the National
Security Agency............................................ 19
Authority for Intelligence Community elements of Department
of Defense to award personal service contracts............. 19
Report on detail of civilian intelligence personnel
throughout the Intelligence Community and the Department of
Defense.................................................... 19
Protection of certain Intelligence Community personnel from
tort liability............................................. 20
Modification of authority to obligate and expend certain
funds for intelligence activities.......................... 20
Modification of notice and wait requirements on projects to
construct or improve Intelligence Community facilities..... 20
Provision of affordable living quarters for certain students
working at National Security Agency Laboratory............. 21
Repeal of certain Intelligence Community reporting
requirements............................................... 21
Cancellation of other Intelligence Community reporting
requirements............................................... 22
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 notification
requirements............................................... 22
Information Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination:
``Hard Target'' human intelligence........................... 23
Pilot Program on analysis of signals and other intelligence
by intelligence analysts of various elements of the
Intelligence Community..................................... 24
Pilot program on training for intelligence analysts.......... 25
Report on modifications of policy and law on classified
information to facilitate sharing of information for
national security purposes................................. 26
Report on data-mining capabilities for the Intelligence
Community.................................................. 27
Security and Counterintelligence:
Protecting against unauthorized disclosures of classified
information................................................ 28
Coordination of United States Government research on security
evaluations................................................ 29
Report on cleared insider threats to classified computer
networks................................................... 30
Report on security background investigations and security
clearance procedures of the Federal Government............. 30
Report on United States dependence on computer hardware and
software manufactured overseas............................. 30
Summary of Reporting Requirements................................ 31
Committee Action................................................. 32
Estimate of Costs................................................ 32
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact.................................. 33
Changes in Existing Law.......................................... 33
CLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMITTEE REPORT
The classified nature of United States intelligence
activities prevents the Committee from disclosing the details
of its budgetary recommendations in this Report. The Committee
has prepared a classified supplement to this Report which
contains (a) the Classified Annex to this Report and (b) the
classified Schedule of Authorizations which is incorporated by
reference in the Act and has the same legal status as public
law. The Classified Annex to this Report explains the full
scope and intent of the Committee's action as set forth in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations. Reports required by the
Classified Annex and this Report have been incorporated by
reference in Section 105 of the Bill. In addition, the
Committee expects the Intelligence Community to comply with any
other directions as requirements contained therein as it would
any other statutory requirement.
The classified supplement to the Committee Report is
available for review by any Member of the Senate, subject to
the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress.
The classified supplement is made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for appropriate distribution within the
Executive Branch.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION
The following is a section-by-section summary of the fiscal
year 2004 Intelligence Authorization Bill. Following the
section-by-section analysis and explanation is a more detailed
discussion of the provisions contained in the Bill and of the
Committee's related comments.
Title I--Intelligence Activities
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the U.S. Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for fiscal year 2004.
Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and applicable personnel
ceilings covered under this title for fiscal year 2004 are
contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives, to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and to the
President.
Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central
Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB), in fiscal year 2004 to
authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the
personnel ceilings applicable to the components of the
Intelligence Community under section 102 by an amount not to
exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings applicable
under section 102. The Director of Central Intelligence may
exercise this authority only if necessary to the performance of
important intelligence functions. Any exercise of this
authority must be reported to the Intelligence Committees.
Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Community
Management Account (CMA) of the Director of Central
Intelligence and sets the personnel end-strength for the
Intelligence Community Management Staff (CMS) for fiscal year
2004.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations of $198,390,000
for fiscal year 2004 for the activities of the CMA of the
Director of Central Intelligence. Subsection (a) also
authorizes funds identified for advanced research and
development to remain available for two years.
Subsection (b) authorizes 310 full-time personnel for
elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2004 and provides that
such personnel may be permanent employees of the CMA element or
detailed from other elements of the U.S. Government.
Subsection (c) authorizes additional appropriations and
personnel for the CMA as specified in the classified Schedule
of Authorizations and permits the additional funding for
research and development to remain available through September
30, 2005.
Subsection (d) requires that, except as provided in section
113 of the National Security Act of 1947, personnel from
another element of the U.S. Government be detailed to an
element of the CMA on a reimbursable basis, or for temporary
situations of less than one year on a non-reimbursable basis.
Subsection (e) authorizes $37,090,000 of the amount
authorized in subsection (a) to be made available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). Subsection (e)
requires the Director of Central Intelligence to transfer these
funds to the Department of Justice to be used for NDIC
activities under the authority of the Attorney General, and
subject to section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act.
Section 105. Incorporation of reporting requirements
Section 105 incorporates reporting requirements in the
conference report to the Act, and the House and Senate reports
on the associated Bills, and the classified annexes thereto,
into the Act.
Section 106. Preparation and submittal of reports, reviews, studies,
and plans relating to intelligence activities of Department of
Defense or the Department of Energy
Section 106 governs preparation and submittal of reports
relating to Department of Defense (DoD) or Department of Energy
(DoE).
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
Authorization of Appropriations
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$226,400,000 for fiscal year 2004 for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
Title III--General Provisions
Subtitle A--Recurring General Provisions
Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for Federal employees may beincreased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
Subtitle B--Intelligence
Section 311. Modification of authority to obligate and expend certain
funds for intelligence activities
Section 311 amends the National Security Act of 1947 by
removing the ``unforeseen requirements'' criterion from section
504(a)(3)(B) of the Act (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) (relating to the
funding of certain intelligence activities by reprogramming).
Section 312. Modification of notice and wait requirements on projects
to construct or improve Intelligence Community facilities
Section 312 amends section 602 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-359) to
change unprogrammed construction notice and wait periods and to
raise notification thresholds for certain construction and
renovation projects. Section 312(b) amends section 602(b)(2) of
the Act to authorize the Director of Central Intelligence and
Secretary of Defense to initiate within seven days (vice 21
days) of congressional notification unprogrammed construction
projects in excess of the amount specified in section 602(a) of
the Act. The provision separately authorizes, in emergencies,
commencement of construction immediately upon notification
despite the 7-day waiting period that would normally apply,
subject to a joint Director of Central Intelligence-Secretary
of Defense determination that ``an emergency relating to the
national security or the protection of health, safety, or
environmental quality exists and that delay would harm any or
all of those interests.'' For projects that primarily concern
subsection (b)(3) authorizes the Director of Central
Intelligence to make the required determination unilaterally.
Section 313. Use of funds for counterdrug and counterterrorism
activities for Colombia
Section 313 authorizes the use of funds designated for
intelligence or intelligence-related purposes for assistance to
the Government of Colombia for counterdrug activities for
fiscal year 2004 (and any unobligated funds designated for such
purposes for prior years) to be utilized to support a unified
campaign against narcotics trafficking and against activities
by organizations (such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)), and to take
actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency
circumstances, including undertaking rescue actions. A similar
provision was enacted as Section 501 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306).
Section 314. Pilot program on analysis of signals and other
intelligence by intelligence analysts of various elements of
the Intelligence Community
Section 314 requires the National Security Agency (NSA) to
develop a pilot program to improve the ability of analysts in
other intelligence agencies to obtain access to and analyze
data collected and held by NSA while retaining appropriate
handling safeguards.
Section 315. Pilot program on training for intelligence analysts
Section 315 proposes that a Reserve Officers Training Corps
(ROTC)-like Intelligence Analyst Program be established by the
Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and
Production (ADCI/A&P). The goal of the program should be to
recruit entry-level analysts and operations specialists with
enhanced analytic and foreign language skills who are committed
to a career in the Intelligence Community.
Section 316. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the
Research and Development Program of the United States
Intelligence Community
Concerning Section 316, because of military operations to
disarm Iraq, Senate organizational issues, and other
priorities, the Senate leadership has not yet appointed
Commission members. This section extends theCommission to
permit appointment of members and commencement of the Commission's
duties.
Subtitle C--Surveillance
Section 321. Clarification and modification of sunset of surveillance-
related amendments made by USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
Regarding Section 321(a) of this measure, it should be
recalled that Section 224 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
(Public Law 107-56 (Oct. 26, 2001)) contained language that
would terminate certain provisions of that Act on December 31,
2005. Section 224 clearly assumed, but did not explicitly
provide, that the pre-existing text of laws modified by the Act
would be restored upon operation of this ``sunset'' clause.
This has raised some concern on account of the provisions of 1
U.S.C.108, which provides as a general rule of statutory
construction that ``[w]henever an Act is repealed, which
repealed a former Act, such former Act shall not thereby be
revived, unless it shall be expressly so provided.'' The
Committee believes that because the USA PATRIOT Act ``sunset''
clause does not involve the ``repeal'' of actual ``Acts,'' that
1 U.S.C. 108 would in all likelihood not affect the coherence
of Section 224 of the Act. Nevertheless, in order to provide
absolute clarity, the Committee provides in this section that
laws modified by those sections of the USA PATRIOT Act listed
in Section 224 will return to their pre-USA PATRIOT Act form
after the operation of the ``sunset'' provision.
Section 216 of the USA PATRIOT Act modified authorities
relating to the use of pen registers and trap and trace
devices. Section 204 of the Act clarified that intelligence
exceptions continued to apply to limitations on the
interception and disclosure of wire, oral, and electronic
communications, notwithstanding the modifications of Section
216. Section 224 of the Act contains a sunset provision that
excludes section 216, but includes section 204. This omission
of Section 204 from the sections excluded from ``sunset''
creates a technical anomaly. Section 321(b) corrects the
technical oversight and removes Section 204 of the Act from the
sunset provision. If not removed, valuable and necessary
intelligence exemptions to the pen register and trap and trace
provision would be lost after December 31, 2005.
Subtitle D--Reports
Section 331. Report on cleared insider threats to classified computer
networks
Section 331 requires the Director of Central Intelligence,
in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, to provide, in a
one-time report to Congress, an assessment of the national
security risks posed by ``cleared insiders'' that are inherent
in current computer security practices within the Intelligence
Community and DoD.
Section 332. Report on security background investigations and security
clearance procedures of the Federal Government
Section 332 requires the Director of Central Intelligence,
in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to provide a
report on the adequacy and future direction of security
background investigations and clearance procedures within the
U.S. Government.
Section 333. Report on detail of civilian intelligence personnel among
elements of the Intelligence Community and the Department of
Defense
Section 333 requires the Director of Central Intelligence,
in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, to provide an
assessment to Congress of ways to ease movement of civilian
intelligence personnel between various elements of the
Intelligence Community to respond more flexibly and effectively
to the shifting needs of intelligence collection and analysis.
Section 334. Report on modifications of policy and law on classified
information to facilitate sharing of information for national
security purposes
Section 334 requests that the President review Executive
Orders 12333 and 12598 and submit a report within 6 months on
potential changes to the Executive Orders or legislative
actions which could be applied to facilitate information
sharing and data access across the Intelligence Community.
Section 335. Report of Secretary of Defense and Director of Central
Intelligence on strategic planning
Section 335 requires the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence, jointly, to report not later
than February 15, 2004, on progress toward establishing an
independent, comprehensive, analytical capability to assess
collection program alternatives, as well as the steps taken to
better coordinate DoD and Intelligence Community strategic
planning.
Section 336. Report on United States dependence on computer hardware
and software manufactured overseas
Section 336 directs the Director of Central Intelligence to
prepare a thorough evaluation of the trends and the strategic
implications of increasing United States reliance on foreign
hardware and software.
Section 337. Report on lessons learned from military operations in Iraq
Section 337 requires the Director of Central Intelligence
to submit a report regarding intelligence lessons learned as a
result of Intelligence Community support to military operations
during the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The report must
be submitted to the appropriate committees not later than one
year after enactment of this Act.
Section 338. Reports on conventional weapons and ammunition obtained by
Iraq in violation of certain United Nations Security Council
resolutions
Section 338 requires the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), not later than 120 days after the
cessation of hostilities in Iraq, to submit a preliminary
report to certain specified committees regarding conventional
weapons and ammunition obtained by Iraq in violation of
applicable United Nations resolutions. A final report is
required not later than 270 days after the cessation of
hostilities in Iraq. Given the May 1, 2003 remarks by the
President concerning the conclusion of major combat operations
in Iraq, the Committee believes there has been a cessation of
hostilities in Iraq as of that date for purposes of this
reporting requirement.
Section 339. Repeal of certain report requirements relating to
intelligence activities
Section 339 eliminates certain reporting requirements that
no longer have enough utility in the legislative oversight
process to justify the burdens they impose upon intelligence
agencies that are hard at work protecting the United States
against international terrorism, supporting our troops in
combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, and otherwise safeguarding and
advancing our national security. This section identifies a
number of reports for elimination.
Subtitle E--Other Matters
Section 351. Extension of suspension of reorganization of Diplomatic
Telecommunications Service Program Office
Section 351 extends for an indefinite period the suspension
authorized in section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for fiscal year 2002, Public Law 107-108 (Dec. 28, 2001), and
extended by section 351 of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law 107-306 (Nov. 27, 2002).
Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002 suspended the provisions of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 7301 et seq.)
that required reorganization of the Diplomatic
Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTS-PO). Section 315
of this Act extends the suspension until 60 days after the
appropriate congressional committees are notified by the
Secretary of State or the Director of OMB, or the Director's
designees, that the present operating framework for the DTS-PO
has been terminated. In designating officials under this
section, the Committee expects that the Director of OMB shall
designate at least those officials referenced in the Classified
Annex to this Bill.
Section 352. Modifications of authorities on explosive materials
Section 352 amends the Safe Explosives Act, Public Law 107-
296, Secs. 1121-28 (Nov. 25, 2002), to ensure that the
provision provides sufficient authority for the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to conduct,
respectively, authorized military and intelligence activities
of the U.S. Government. In addition, the provision makes minor
technical corrections to certain other provisions in the Act.
Section 353. Modification of prohibition on the naturalization of
certain persons
Section 353 amends section 313(e)(4) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1424(e)(4)), bringing the provision
into essential conformity with the determination process
established in comparable provisions of law governing the
admission or expedited naturalization of certain aliens and
their immediate family members, based on the alien having
contributed to the national security or intelligence mission of
the United States. Under section 7 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (CIA Act) (50 U.S.C. 403h), section 316(f)
of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1427(f)), and section 305 of Public Law
104-293 (Oct. 11, 1996) (8 U.S.C. 1427 note), admission
determinations regarding an alien's national security or
intelligence mission contribution are made by the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Attorney General, and (formerly) the
Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization. Unlike those
provisions, section 313(e)(4) requires consultation with the
Secretary of Defense. This difference from comparable
determination processes has created implementation
difficulties. This amendment to section 313(e)(4) leaves the
determination process to the Director of Central Intelligence,
the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security,
reflecting the transfer of responsibility for adjudication of
naturalization petitions from the Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization to the Department of Homeland Security. See
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296 (Nov. 25,
2002). The Secretary of Defense may still request the
naturalization of a particular alien by forwarding to the
Director of Central Intelligence the names of aliens who have
made a national security or intelligence contribution to DoD.
Moreover, when DoD activities are relevant to the
determination, consultation with the Secretary of Defense would
still be required.
Section 354. Modification to definition of financial institution in the
Right to Financial Privacy Act
Section 354 provides enhanced authority for authorized
Intelligence Community collection activities designed to
prevent, deter, and disrupt activities directed against the
United States. This section expands the definition of
``financial institution'' for purposes of section 1114 of the
Right to Financial Privacy Act (12 U.S.C. 3414). Section 1114
currently permits U.S. Government authorities engaged in
counterintelligence or foreign intelligence activities to
obtain certain financial records. The definition of ``financial
institution'' in the Right to Financial Privacy Act--
essentially unmodified since the Act became law in 1978--
significantly excludes certain entities that provide financial
services to the public. Financial records maintained by these
entities are not covered by the Act and, thus, are not
accessible by counterintelligence and foreign intelligence
elements of the U.S. Government under the Act, limiting the
effectiveness of national security investigations. In order to
expand the definition of ``financial institution'' for purposes
only of section 1114, this subsection adopts, in part, the
definition of ``financial institution'' found in section
5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code. The expansion of
this definition is consistent with the definition used in
section 804(5) of the Counterintelligence and Security
Enhancements Act of 1994, Public Law 103-359 (50 U.S.C. 438).
Section 355. Coordination of Federal Government research on security
evaluations
Section 355 requires that the National Science Foundation
and the Office of Science and Technology jointly submit to
Congress a written report identifying the research most likely
to advance the understanding of the use of certain assessments
of individuals in security evaluations; distinguish between
short-term and long-term areas of research in order to maximize
the utility of short-term and long-term research on such
assessments; identify the Federal agencies best suited to
support such research; and develop recommendations for
coordinating future Federally-funded research for the
development, improvement, or enhancement of security
evaluations.
Section 356. Technical Amendments
Section 356 corrects now-erroneous citations to section
103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
3(c)(7)), which was redesignated section 103(c)(7) by section
901 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Public Law 107-56 (Oct. 26,
2001), thus necessitating the technical correction made by this
section. This section also corrects incorrect cross-references
in Section 15 of the CIA Act (50 U.S.C. 403o) and Section 11 of
the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note)
to the authorities of the General Services Administration (GSA)
special policemen. The authorities of GSA special policemen
were transferred to ``officers and agents of the Department of
Homeland Security'' pursuant to Section 1706(b)(1) of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296 (Nov. 25,
2002) (40 U.S.C. 1315). This section provides technical
corrections to the referenced statutes.
Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency
Section 401. Amendment to certain Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 notification requirements
Section 401 amends the CIA Act (50 U.S.C. 403e(b)(5)) to
exempt section 4(b)(1) implementing regulations from the prior
notification requirements of section 4(b)(5). To the extent the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) adopts unique allowances and
benefits under section 4(b)(2) or (b)(3) or adopts or modifies
regulations under section 4(b)(4), notification of the
Intelligence Committees prior to implementation is still
required.
Section 402. Protection of certain Central Intelligence Agency
personnel from tort liability
Section 402 provides protections from tort liability for
certain specified CIA personnel (and, with respect to specified
NSA personnel, Section 502) when those personnel take
reasonable action, including the use of force, (1) to protect
an individual in their presence from a ``crime of violence'',
(2) to assist an individual who has suffered, or is threatened
with, bodily harm, or (3) to prevent the escape of an
individual who the personnel reasonably believe to have
committed a crime of violence in their presence.
Section 403. Repeal of obsolete limitation on use of funds in Central
Services Working Capital Fund
Section 403 modifies the CIA Central Services Program (CSP)
by removing the technically expired requirements of section
21(f)(2)(B) of the CIA Act (50 U.S.C. 403u(f)(2)(B)).
Section 404. Technical amendment to Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002
Section 404 is a technical amendment to the Federal
Information Security Management Act of 2002. Section 1001(b)(1)
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and Section 301(b)(1) of
the E-Government Act of 2002 amended title 44, United States
Code, to require an annual independent evaluation of
information security programs. As enacted, only an Inspector
General created by the Inspector General Act of 1978 or an
independent external auditor may perform the evaluation
required by these provisions. Section 404 clarifies that
Inspectors General authorized by other statutes (e.g., Section
17 of the CIA Act (50 U.S.C. 403q)) may also perform the
required evaluation.
Title V--Department of Defense Intelligence Matters
Section 501. Protection of operational files of the National Security
Agency
Section 501 allows the Director of NSA, in coordination
with the Director of Central Intelligence, to exempt certain
operational files of NSA from search and review under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552. This section
would allow exemptions for files concerning the activities of
NSA that document the means by which foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence is collected through scientific and
technical systems. This exemption authority parallels that
currently enjoyed by CIA, the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA), and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).
Section 502. Provision of affordable living quarters for certain
students working at National Security Agency laboratory
Section 502 amends section 2195 of title 10, United States
Code, to permit the Director of NSA to provide and pay for
living quarters for Cooperative Education Program and Summer
Program students to address an existing housing shortage.
Section 503. Protection of certain National Security Agency personnel
from tort liability
Section 503 provides protections from tort liability for
certain designated NSA personnel when those personnel take
specified actions. The protections are similar to those
afforded certain CIA personnel under Section 402.
Section 504. Authority for Intelligence Community elements of
Department of Defense to award personal service contracts
Section 504 provides authority for Intelligence Community
elements of DoD to award personal services contracts, similar
to the CIA's existingauthority for personal services contracts
under Section 8 of the CIA Act (50 U.S.C. 403j(a)(1)).
COMMITTEE COMMENTS ON FISCAL YEAR 2004 INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION BILL
AND OTHER MATTERS
The Committee is mindful of the many sacrifices over the
last year made by members of the Intelligence Community around
the world. The Committee expresses its profound gratitude to
them, and offers its heartfelt condolences to the families of
those who made the supreme sacrifice.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT, PLANNING, AND PERFORMANCE
The Committee has been vigilant and will continue to
vigorously oversee the management, planning, and performance of
the Intelligence Community. We have grown concerned with--and
the Administration has continually raised--the issue of
bureaucratic impediments to the prosecution of the important
national security mission of the Intelligence Community. To
address these impediments, the Committee has repealed or
modified statutory requirements on the Intelligence Community
that no longer serve a legitimate oversight purpose, are
unnecessary obstacles to the implementation of new initiatives,
or fail to account for the passage of time. The Committee
remains concerned, however, with several management issues
still unresolved by the Intelligence Community.
Intelligence Community strategic and performance planning
Fiscal year strategic and performance plans
For the last two fiscal years, the Committee has expressed
in its report language an interest in strategic and performance
planning within the Intelligence Community. In response, the
CMS in 2002 submitted strategic and performance plans for the
Intelligence Community as a whole, as well as for selected
agencies within the National Foreign Intelligence Program
(NFIP). These documents were the first-ever plans coordinated
across the Intelligence Community aimed at establishing
performance measures aligned with the stated goals and
priorities of the Director of Central Intelligence.
While the Committee was pleased with this first effort by
CMS and the Intelligence Community, Senate Report 107-149
contained suggestions for improvements to future reports.
Specifically, the Committee was concerned that the Intelligence
Community's initial performance plans focused more on
increasing intelligence capabilities than on the value that
such capabilities would add to achieving the Intelligence
Community's missions. As such, the Committee directed that the
fiscal year 2004 performance plans include ``mission-based''
performance measures linking Intelligence Community
capabilities to the stated strategic goals of the Director of
Central Intelligence. The Committee believes that these mission
oriented performance measures should complement the budget
process within the CMS and the agencies within the NFIP. For
this reason, the Committee also directed that the fiscal year
2004 performance plans include specific information on how the
agencies utilized them in preparing their respective sections
of the fiscal year 2004 budget for the NFIP.
On February 25, 2003, the CMS submitted to the Committee
the Fiscal Year 2004-2009 Intelligence Community Strategy, as
well as the strategies for the component agencies. The
Committee, however, has yet to receive an updated Intelligence
Community performance plan for fiscal year 2004 and has
received only two fiscal year 2004 performance plans for
individual Intelligence Community components. These documents
were due to Congress by March 1, 2003. Although the Committee
understands that the CMS is still editing and revising the
performance plans submitted by the component agencies, no
extension of the March 1, 2003, deadline has been requested.
The Committee is disappointed that the Intelligence Community
has not completed these valuable documents in time to support
the Committee's authorization for this fiscal year or to inform
the Intelligence Community's own planning processes. The
Committee looks forward to receiving the performance plans and
expects that CMS will submit them in the near future. Before
submitting these reports, CMS should coordinate their efforts
with the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence to ensure that requirements in CMS performance
reports do not conflict with commitments that Intelligence
Community agencies within DoD make as part of the DoD strategic
and performance planning processes.
Strategic planning for sensors and platforms
The Committee is aware of no capability within DoD or the
Intelligence Community for objectively, independently, and
comprehensively evaluatingalternative sensor and platform
architectures and capabilities. There are some capabilities within
different agencies and departments, but none that are available,
independent of the program offices, to model and assess cross-program
trades without regard to the location of the sensor or platform (air,
space, land, or sea) or the level of compartmentation. Consequently,
although DoD and Intelligence Community officials expend substantial
effort and time evaluating program trades, they do so without the
benefit of the rigorous quantitative modeling necessary to optimize
collection capabilities and architectures. Given the vast sums involved
in these programs, even modest increases in the efficiency of resource
allocation could lead to substantial benefits. Further, the Committee
notes that the national military strategy, as well as the Defense
Planning Guidance, have been developed in recent years without the
participation of the Director of Central Intelligence or his staff,
notwithstanding the growing importance of intelligence to military
operations and the need to build forces commensurate to validated
threats.
Accordingly, in Section 335, the Committee requires the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence
to jointly report on progress toward establishing an
independent, comprehensive, analytical capability to assess
collection program alternatives, as well as the steps taken to
better coordinate DoD and Intelligence Community strategic and
budgetary planning.
Intelligence Community compliance with Federal financial accounting
standards
In Senate Report 107-63, the Committee conveyed its concern
with the Intelligence Community's financial management
practices and required the Director of Central Intelligence and
the Secretary of Defense to task the appropriate statutory
Inspectors General to perform an audit of the form and content
of the Fiscal Year 2001 financial statements of NSA, DIA, NIMA,
and CIA. This audit was designed to ascertain if these agencies
were able to produce financial statements that met Federal
Government financial accounting standards and OMB requirements.
The NRO was not included in this requirement because its
financial statements have been audited by an independent public
accounting firm for the past three years.
The resulting DoD and CIA Inspectors General reports found
that NSA, DIA, NIMA, and CIA could not produce auditable
financial statements. Among the faults depicted were the
improper preparation of selected required statements, failure
to use accrual accounting, inability to reconcile the fund
balance with Treasury, and inaccurate reporting of property,
plant, and equipment. The Committee found the lack of internal
controls reflected by these problems of great concern.
Senate Report 107-63 also mandated that the Director of
Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, should ensure that NSA, DIA, NIMA, and CIA all receive
an audit of their financial statements no later than March 1,
2005, to be executed by a statutory Inspector General or a
qualified independent public accountant. The Committee
acknowledged that NSA, DIA, and NIMA may be affected by DoD
plans to implement a DoD-wide Financial Management
Modernization Program, which is not expected to be completed
before 2007. For example, the DoD Inspector General noted that
NSA halted its plan to purchase a compliant accounting system
based on guidance from the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller). This, in turn, affected DIA and NIMA, which both
use portions of the NSA accounting system.
In Senate Report 107-149, to facilitate adequate oversight
of the Intelligence Community's financial management systems
and practices, the Committee directed that the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence for Community Management provide the
Intelligence Committees with a report on how CMS is structured
to monitor Intelligence Community compliance with the Chief
Financial Officers Act and related OMB guidance. The report
recently provided to the Committee by CMS included plans to
monitor the ability of each agency to produce a financial
statement audit by 2005 and a description of the ability of CMS
to assess the financial systems of each agency in order to
generate required oversight information.
Prior to the 2005 audit requirement, and as follow-on to
the initial Inspectors General reports, Public Law 107-306
contained a statutory requirement for annual reports from each
agency head describing the activities their organization had
undertaken to produce auditable financial statements.
Additionally, the annual agency reports required by Public Law
107-306 were to include a description of the impact of the DoD
modernization program and the steps being taken to make current
systems compliant with Federal standards in the interim. As of
this writing, no such report has been received from NSA, DIA,
NIMA, or CIA. The Committee notes that, due to the shift of
certain report due dates in Public Law 107-306,some confusion
existed as to the actual due date of these reports. CMS recently
coordinated interim responses from the subject agencies. The Committee,
however, is concerned that this initial failure to consult the
Committee on the due date is an indication that the Intelligence
Community still lacks the appropriate level of interest in responsible
financial management.
While the Committee has not received direct agency
responses, it notes that the DoD Inspector General
independently provided the Committee with follow-up reports
that addressed the soundness of the fiscal year 2002 financial
statements of DIA and NIMA, as well as the adequacy of their
related procedures and controls. The DoD Inspector General
found that the financial statements of these agencies were
still unreliable. The reports determined that neither agency
dedicated the proper resources to the financial management and
reporting function and had not addressed the lack of internal
controls or deficiencies related to reconciling the data
contained in the various financial statements. The reports
noted that the existing noncompliant budgeting systems and the
current DoD financial management modernization program hampered
the agencies. The DoD Inspector General recommended that the
agencies institute improved internal control procedures and
devote the appropriate resources toward the preparation of
financial statements that will meet OMB and DoD standards. A
similar follow-up report on NSA is in progress.
The CMS report on its oversight capabilities noted that the
respective DoD agency heads, not the Director of Central
Intelligence, have direct financial management authority and
responsibility for their agencies. Thus, the agency directors,
not the CMS, should provide the annual reports describing the
activities that each agency has undertaken to produce auditable
financial statements. Furthermore, in response to known
difficulties in acquiring the systems necessary to produce
financial statements, the Committee has indicated its
willingness to address the issue of extending the 2005 audit
requirement. However, in the absence of the required progress
reports from the directors of NSA, DIA, NIMA, and CIA, the
Committee has elected to delay a decision on the deferral of
the 2005 audits, pending the receipt of these progress reports
by December 1, 2003. The Committee has recently learned that a
decision on the contractor for the new DoD financial management
architecture is forthcoming. In light of this imminent
selection, the Committee believes the December 1, 2003 deadline
will provide the agencies with ample time to assess the impact
of the new architecture.
National Security Agency budget, acquisition, and compensation reform
Congressional Budget Justification Book
The Committee commends the Director of NSA for the progress
made in the presentation and format of the Congressional Budget
Justification Book (CBJB) for the Administration's request for
fiscal year 2004. When compared to previous submissions, NSA's
CBJB represents a good faith effort to project to Congress an
accurate, comprehensible request. The new budget structure and
attendant cross-walk, while complex, are understandable. Much
remains to be done, but the progress displayed in this single
year is noteworthy.
Acquisition
The Committee continues to be concerned with the state of
the NSA acquisition process and frustrated by the lack of
progress realized in remedying this problem over the past three
years. The Administration's budget request sustains the long
overdue increase for the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP)
executed by NSA. Last year's significant increase over the
previous year coupled with the fiscal year 2004 requested
increase, will allow NSA to continue its transformation
initiative while supporting the global war on terrorism and the
war to liberate Iraq. These significant investments will lead
to major acquisition programs designed to modernize the Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) enterprise for the future. The lack of a
fundamentally sound acquisition process, however, raises
concerns with respect to the efficiency and execution of these
major acquisitions.
The Committee's concern with the health of the NSA
acquisition process is not new. In both fiscal year 2002 and
2003, the Committee noted significant shortfalls and
recommended actions that would correct the documented
deficiencies. In both the Fiscal Year 2002 and 2003
Intelligence Authorization Act Conference Reports, lack of a
credible NSA acquisition process was noted, along with several
recommendations for corrective actions. While NSA has made
modest progress in some of the various components of a good
acquisition process, reports from oversight departments within
the Administration point out one glaring fault in the roadto
progress: the authority of the NSA Senior Acquisition Executive (SAE)
is not commensurate with that needed to empower him to take the
necessary actions to correct even the most elementary deficiencies. The
NSA SAE has not been given the requisite authority by the Director of
NSA to bring the agency's acquisition process up to acceptable DoD
standards.
In June 2000, the SAEs for the Intelligence Community and
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)), in response to a
Congressionally Directed Action (CDA), provided a report titled
``Independent Review of the National Security Agency
Acquisition Process'', which they have updated on a periodic
basis. These reviews have covered nine specific components that
can contribute to attaining the DoD standard for acquisition
performance. The review is metrics based. The nine categories
are evaluated on a ``red, yellow, green'' criteria and an
assessment measurement has been added for implementation. While
marginal progress has been noted, none of the nine criteria has
yet to be judged fully green, and none of the implementation
ratings is above 2 on a 1-4 scale. After three years, the
average for the nine categories is ``yellow--Process and
Structure Identified.'' The average assessment is 1.4, with the
definition of a 2 rating being ``Process immature; inconsistent
application or effectiveness.'' A rating of 1 is defined as
``Process ineffective or limited acceptance and practice.''
Perhaps the most glaring area reviewed is titled ``Establish a
dedicated SAE reporting directly to the [Director of NSA].''
This category actually moved down from ``Yellow/Green'' to
``Yellow'' over the last evaluation period and is judged to be
at implementation level 1. Establishing an NSA SAE that reports
directly to the Director of NSA can be remedied easily, and the
fact that the rating associated with this component has moved
backward is of great concern to the Committee. To hire the very
best NSA SAE is commendable; to deny that individual the
necessary authority to make a difference is an opportunity
missed.
The Committee recommends that the Director of NSA take the
following actions immediately: (1) Clarify the lines of
authority to and responsibility of the NSA SAE for program
execution; (2) Align Program Manager (PM) and Acquisition
Program Manager (APM) acquisition responsibilities under the
NSA SAE; (3) Establish clear budgetary authority for the NSA
SAE over all budgets associated with major acquisition
programs; (4) Establish clear reporting and evaluation lines
from the PMs and APMs to the NSA SAE; (5) Provide the NSA SAE
true management power over the acquisition decision process.
The requirement for acquisition decisions to be made by
consensus must be eliminated. Acquisition management groups
made up of non-acquisition professionals must be made advisory
only, and the NSA SAE must not be forced to form a consensus
within these groups to enable an acquisition decision.
The Committee greatly appreciates the efforts by CMS and
DoD to remedy this problem and requests that an update to the
February 2003 report be submitted to the Committee no later
than August 30, 2003.
Acquisition baseline
For the past two years, the Committee has made an issue of
the inadequacy of the NSA acquisition baseline. It is very
difficult for the Committee to understand what needs to be done
to modernize NSA when NSA cannot provide an adequate baseline
of ongoing development and acquisition programs, projects, and
activities. A great deal of funding has been appropriated to
NSA over the past year, and there is little doubt that more
will be required to ensure that the country has the very best
SIGINT capability in the world. The results witnessed during
the ongoing global war on terrorism and the support provided to
our troops in Iraq has been excellent. But our successes will
not be lost on future enemies, and the threat will evolve to
defeat our present capabilities. Transformation is expensive,
and the Committee wants to support the Director of NSA in this
effort, but without the knowledge of what is actually being
funded at NSA, it is difficult to sustain support for
increasing levels of authorization.
The Committee has fenced funds over the past two fiscal
years to try to bring command attention to this problem.
Submissions to date have shown progress, but are not
comprehensive in identifying known projects and programs that
are being funded in the CCP. Several projects listed in the
CBJB requesting continued funding in fiscal year 2004 are not
currently listed in the project baseline provided to the
Committee. It is imperative that the baselining effort be put
under competent, empowered authority with clear direction to
develop a complete and comprehensive baseline. Future funding
requests will be balanced against the NSA acquisition baseline
so it is in the agency's best interest to get this done right,
and soon.
The Committee directs NSA, beginning the first quarter of
fiscal year 2004, to submit quarterly to the Committee a
document baselining allprograms, projects, and activities
ongoing within the CCP. This document should be prepared by the NSA SAE
in conjunction with the Chief Financial Manager--the only two
authorities below the Director of NSA who have the ability to validate,
track, and link NSA programs, projects, and activities to acquisition
schedules and funding authorizations. These quarterly reports will
integrate each entry in the baseline to a master schedule and link the
various entries showing dependencies and functional similarities.
Specific requirements will be listed with the entries such that
customer relationships are understood and definable. Ideally, the NSA
acquisition baseline can be fully automated and put online so that all
members of the SIGINT enterprise can understand what projects,
programs, and activities are ongoing to reduce redundancies and
facilitate technology exchange. Rates of expenditures by appropriations
will be reflected in these quarterly submissions.
Menwith Hill Station
The Committee is encouraged by the budgetary increase
requested to improve the condition of the facilities and
infrastructure at Menwith Hill Station. There may be an
opportunity to improve these conditions even further with a
process known as the ``Public Private Partnership''--a process
used effectively by other organizations in the United Kingdom.
This acquisition method is used to establish a long-term
contract for acquiring, building, and updating facilities and
could benefit both infrastructure and mission support. The
``Public Private Partnership'' is frequently coupled with a
``Private Financing Initiative'' that leverages private
financing to provide capital funding for infrastructure
projects. In the United Kingdom, the Ministry of Defence is
moving positively to this acquisition method and the method
might have considerable benefit to United States interests in
the United Kingdom, as well.
The Committee directs that the Director of NSA review the
``Public Private Partnership''--and the ``Private Financing
Initiative'' concepts for application to Menwith Hill Station
and report to the Committee the findings of the review no later
than June 13, 2003. The report should describe the benefits of
this approach, identify any potential issues, and recommend
whether this acquisition method should be executed by the U.S.
Government. The report should capitalize on the experience
gained by the host government, particularly the experiences of
the General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in their recent
initiatives in this regard. The review will be coordinated with
the U.S. Executive Agent for the United Kingdom and the on-
going Menwith Hill Transition Team.
National Security Agency Compensation Reform
The NSA has briefed the Committee on the proposed
implementation of its new Compensation Reform Plan. Changing
compensation systems is difficult in any work force, and the
Committee is pleased to see that the NSA leadership has taken
the time to ensure that all employees are informed of the need
for change and of the impacts on them of the new system. As a
necessary precursor to any new compensation plan, the Committee
has supported the implementation of a new employee performance
evaluation mechanism. The Committee strongly believes that any
new evaluation mechanism should be implemented at least a year
before initiation of a revised compensation plan. The Committee
will closely follow both the implementation of the new employee
performance evaluation mechanism and the initiation of the
pilot compensation reform initiative at NSA.
Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the National Security Agency
The NSA is making progress in its financial and accounting
practices. Additional work remains to be done, however, and
resources will be required to modernize this critical part of
the NSA business practice.
The Committee has been advised that the Defense Finance and
Accounting Service (DFAS) is considering moving certain aspects
of the NSA support centers to a centralized accounting and
finance structure under the control of DFAS. The Director of
NSA is making progress in modernizing his business practices.
Separation of the finance function from his authority would not
support the overall objectives of this Committee to improve the
acquisition business area at NSA. Therefore, the Committee
directs that DFAS brief the Committee before any transfer of
authority, personnel, or resources is considered or affected.
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community
Management will notify the Committee of any efforts by DFAS to
transfer accounting or finance authorities from any NFIP
components prior to such transfer. No transfer will be affected
without the approval of this Committee.
Authority for Intelligence Community elements of Department of Defense
to award personal service contracts
Intelligence Community elements of DoD frequently have a
temporary need for additional personnel with specific expertise
to meet unanticipated, yet significant, operational
requirements that necessitate a bolstering of organizational
and personnel efforts created by world events. Current examples
include experts on al-Qa'ida, the countries of the Middle East,
chemical and biological warfare, and Islamic militant
personalities, along with linguists to support interrogation of
detainees and review of captured documents. Under current law,
U.S. Government agencies generally must choose between hiring
additional personnel as government employees or contracting for
their services under the restrictive provisions for the
temporary or intermittent employment of experts and consultants
under section 3109 of title 5, United States Code. The
Committee provides relief from these more restrictive
authorities by granting authority for Intelligence Community
elements of DoD to award personal services contracts
notwithstanding any other provision of law. This authority is
similar to that already exercised by CIA under Section 8 of the
CIA Act (50 U.S.C. 403j(a)(1)). This provision will optimize
the capabilities of Intelligence Community elements of DoD in
the performance of their roles in the global war on terrorism
and in the execution of future national security missions.
Report on detail of civilian intelligence personnel throughout the
Intelligence Community
The Committee is aware that DoD uses a system for quickly
and rapidly moving Senior Executive Service employees from one
component to another to respond flexibly and effectively to
shifting needs and to implement policy guidance from seniors.
The Committee believes that the Intelligence Community should
study a similar system. To that end, Section 333 requires the
Director of Central Intelligence, in conjunction with the
Secretary of Defense, to provide an assessment to Congress of
ways to ease movement of civilian intelligence personnel
between the various elements of the Intelligence Community to
respond to the shifting needs of intelligence collection and
analysis.
Protection of certain Intelligence Community personnel from tort
liability
Specified law enforcement and Diplomatic Security Service
officers are provided protections from tort liability pursuant
to section 627 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 (Public Law 105-277)
when they take reasonable action, including the use of force,
(1) to protect an individual in their presence from a ``crime
of violence'', (2) to assist an individual who has suffered, or
is threatened with, bodily harm, or (3) to prevent the escape
of an individual who the personnel reasonably believe to have
committed a crime of violence in their presence. The Committee
extends these protections from tort liability to certain
specified personnel of CIA and NSA. When these highly trained
CIA and NSA professionals are on official duty and take
reasonable actions to protect and aid individuals in their
presence, they should not be deprived of protections from tort
liability that other similarly situated personnel of the
Federal Government are granted under existing law. In
recognition of the current potential exposure of these
personnel to tort liability and the protections in law for
other personnel of the U.S. Government, the Committee (in
Sections 402 and 503) extends the protections of section 627 of
Public Law 105-277 to these specified CIA and NSA personnel.
Modification of authority to obligate and expend certain funds for
intelligence activities
Section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC
414) requires that funds appropriated to an intelligence agency
for an intelligence or intelligence-related activity may be
obligated or expended only if such funds are specifically
authorized for use for such activities. Although reprogrammings
to meet a higher-priority intelligence need are permitted upon
notification to the Intelligence Committees, Section
504(a)(3)(B) also mandates that the need be based on
``unforeseen requirements.'' The ``unforeseen requirements''
criterion in Section 504 tied the hands of Congress and the
Intelligence Community in unnecessary and time-consuming legal
debates over proposed reprogrammings.
In Section 311 of the Bill, the Committee amends Section
504 to delete the ``unforseen requirements'' criterion,
ensuring that the Intelligence Community--in cooperation with
the Intelligence Committees--can react more quickly to confront
higher-priority intelligence needs. Elimination of this
requirement will permit reprogrammings to be reviewed on the
basis ofrelative needs and priorities. The provision will also
provide the Intelligence Community and Congress with flexibility to
resolve differences between funds appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities but not specifically authorized, and
vice versa.
Modification of notice and wait requirements on projects to construct
or improve intelligence community facilities
Section 602 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1995, Public Law 103-359 (Oct. 14, 1994) (50 U.S.C.
403-2b) placed certain notification requirements for
unprogrammed Intelligence Community construction and renovation
projects. Since passage of the original notification
requirements over eight years ago, construction costs have
grown steadily--particularly those costs related to security
and information technology. Moreover, in recognition of the
Intelligence Community's need for increased agility to meet
shifting threats, the Committee has lowered the ``notice-and-
wait'' period associated with certain unprogrammed construction
and renovation projects from 21 days to 7 days and added an
additional emergency category in which only notice (and no
wait) would be required. The Committee expects that the
emergency category would be used only in the most extraordinary
circumstances.
Provision of affordable living quarters for certain students working at
National Security Agency laboratory
Student programs are essential for NSA to compete in the
highly challenging labor market and to ensure that it remains a
competitive, prospective employer for students with hard-to-
find scientific and technical skills. The single biggest
obstacle identified by NSA to the growth of these student
programs is a lack of affordable short-term housing in and
around NSA. By permitting the Director of NSA to pay for living
quarters for certain students in specified NSA programs,
Section 502 seeks to ensure that future students are not
deterred from seeking a valuable and beneficial employment
opportunity with NSA simply because of the unavailability of
affordable, short-term housing.
Repeal of certain Intelligence Community reporting requirements
The Committee maintains that ad hoc reporting requirements
and other CDAs imposed by Congress upon the Intelligence
Community are a vital tool of legislative oversight and are
often highly valuable to various committees. Unfortunately,
these reporting obligations have proven easier to impose than
to remove. As a result, the Intelligence Community has faced
ever-increasing reporting burdens, even when the practical
utility of specific reports to Congress has largely lapsed. As
the reporting burdens multiplied, the fragmented and
unsystematic nature of reporting requirements led the
Intelligence Community to become lax about fulfilling its
obligations to provide the requested reports in a timely and
effective manner. In sum, neither Congress nor the Executive
Branch was well served by the reporting and CDA process that
had developed.
In Title VIII of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003, Congress took steps to rationalize and
structure the previously ad hoc reporting process--organizing
and incorporating the myriad existing requirements into a
single reporting structure, imposing clear deadlines, and
reemphasizing that the Intelligence Community is required by
law to comply with all such requirements.
The Committee is resolved to building upon prior efforts to
bring the reporting/CDA process under control. In this bill,
the Committee takes affirmative steps to eliminate reporting
requirements that no longer have sufficient utility in the
legislative oversight process to justify the burdens imposed
upon intelligence agencies hard at work protecting the United
States against international terrorism, supporting our troops
in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, and otherwise safeguarding
and advancing our national security. Section 339 identifies a
number of reports for elimination and changes one semiannual
report to an annual report.
Periodic reports are often very important tools of
legislative oversight, but there can be no substitute for
taking affirmative steps to request information from the
Intelligence Community as an everyday part of effective
oversight. The Committee anticipates that the elimination of
these and other reporting requirements will in no way diminish
the vigor of intelligence oversight, will contribute to the
Intelligence Community's ability to accomplish its important
national security missions, and will not otherwise effect (and
will hopefully improve) the Community's willingness to fulfill
the day-to-day requests of the Intelligence Committees.
Cancellation of other Intelligence Community reporting requirements
In addition to the modifications to certain statutory
reporting obligations, the following reports required to be
submitted by Committee reports from previous fiscal years shall
be deemed cancelled when the fiscal year 2004 Intelligence
Authorization Bill is reported by the Committee. Thereafter,
the Executive Branch need not submit:
a. Recurring report(s) on comprehensive annual
reviews of customer satisfaction created under
``Customer Satisfaction With Intelligence Collection
and Analysis and Production,'' National Foreign
Intelligence Program, discussed on p. 4, Senate Report
106-48, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2000
for the Intelligence Activities of the United States
Government and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System and for Other
Purposes; and
b. Recurring report on the Intelligence Community's
information infrastructure, created under ``Assessment
of the Intelligence Community's Information
Infrastructure'' on p. 17, Senate Report 105-185,
Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999 for the
Intelligence Activities of the United States Government
and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System and for Other Purposes.
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 notification requirements
Section 4(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949
Section 4(b) of the CIA Act (50 U.S.C. 403e(b)(5)) permits
CIA to authorize and implement certain allowances and benefits
for payment to officers and employees of CIA and to personnel
detailed or assigned to CIA. Section 4(b)(5) requires CIA to
submit all regulations authorizing allowances and benefits
under section 4(b) to the Intelligence Committees prior to
implementation. This notification requirement was included to
ensure that the Intelligence Committees were apprised of CIA's
use of the broad authority conferred by section 4(b)--
particularly with respect to sections 4(b)(2) and (b)(3), which
authorize CIA to adopt Agency-unique allowances and benefits
under certain circumstances.
Under section 4(b)(1), however, CIA may adopt only
allowances and benefits comparable to those authorized for
members of the Foreign Service under the Foreign Service Act of
1980 or other applicable laws. Section 4(b)(1) does not
authorize CIA to adopt Agency-unique allowances and benefits
such as those authorized under sections 4(b)(2) and (3).
Section 4(b)(5), however, still requires that the Intelligence
Committees be notified prior to implementation of section
4(b)(1) allowances and benefits. The notification requirement
for these section 4(b)(1) regulations adds nearly a month to
CIA's process for implementation of employee-friendly policies
that enhance morale or meet recruitment and retention
concerns--allowances and benefits already authorized for
members of the Foreign Service. In order to speed
implementation of these section 4(b)(1) allowances and
benefits, the Committee amends section 4(b)(5) to exempt
section 4(b)(1) implementing regulations from the prior
notification requirement.
Section 21(f)(2)(B) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949
The Committee removes the technically expired requirements
of section 21(f)(2)(B) of the CIA Act (50 U.S.C.
403u(f)(2)(B)). This subparagraph required the Director of
Central Intelligence to obtain the approval of the Director of
OMB and to notify the Intelligence Committees before expending
amounts in the CSP Working Capital Fund that are attributable
to certain fees imposed and collected under the program.
Although CIA has continued to comply with the terms of this
expired mandate, the approval and notification requirements set
forth in the subparagraph are no longer necessary given CIA
experience using CSP authorities. Removing the requirement of
subparagraph (f)(2)(b) will not deprive OMB of its oversight
role with respect to the CSP. Moreover, the Committee expects
that CIA will also continue to comply with other generally
applicable requirements for informing Congress of information
relating to the management of the CSP, such as the requirements
of Title V of the National Security Act of 1947.
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND DISSEMINATION
``Hard Target'' Human Intelligence
The invaluable contributions of accurate Human Intelligence
(HUMINT) to United States efforts in Operation Enduring
Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the global war on
terrorism are evident.
Particularly in the context of the 107th Congress's Joint
Inquiry into the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
various Committee Members expressed concern about the need for
more vigorous HUMINT collection--especially unilateral
collection--under non-official cover and from non-traditional
HUMINT ``platforms.'' Some experts have even suggested the need
for the creation of a small, highly-specialized semi- or fully-
independent HUMINT entity charged with collecting against non-
traditional targets and rogue states that traditionally have
proven highly resistant to HUMINT penetration involving
traditional official-cover operations.
Without endorsing such a radical solution at this time, the
Committee attaches the highest degree of importance to far more
aggressive and sustained non-traditional HUMINT collection
program. The Intelligence Community must act now to meet the
United States requirement for much improved HUMINT collection
against hard targets. This will require diligent effort and new
approaches to HUMINT management within existing agency
components. The Committee hopes and expects that the Director
of Central Intelligence will ensure the implementation and
success of such changes within the Intelligence Community.
Pilot program on analysis of signals and other intelligence by
intelligence analysts of various elements of the Intelligence
Community
The Committee has become increasingly concerned in recent
years about bureaucratic and cultural obstacles to effective
information and data sharing. Such resistance to data access by
``outsiders'' within the Intelligence Community--let alone to
other entities such as analysts at the new Department of
Homeland Security--causes at least three serious problems.
First, it impedes the ability of the Intelligence Community
to adopt state-of-the-art data-mining and analytical tools that
are badly needed to help analysts cope with the flood of
information brought in by collection components. Cutting-edge
analytical tools, many of which are already in use in the
private sector, increasingly involve innovative automated or
computer-assisted tools to perform large-scale, multi-database
analysis and pattern recognition. Using such approaches within
the Intelligence Community, however, cannot proceed far without
a significant revision of current orthodoxy as to information
``ownership'' and control.
Second, barriers to data access inhibit the Intelligence
Community's ability to understand, correlate, and assess
information that they already possess. Data-control
restrictions sometimes impede sharing within an individual
element of the Community, as well as between elements, limiting
the effectiveness of analytical work far beyond what is
necessary to protect highly sensitive information from undue
risk of compromise.
Third, barriers to data access prevent the Community from
employing other elements' analysts in understanding available
information--both for the basic purpose of reducing data
overload, and for more sophisticated goals like applying fresh
analytical perspectives and experience to existing analytical
tasks. The Committee supports additional analytic views to
issues, and those views can only be enriched when informed by
access to all available information and data.
The NSA, in particular, is an analytical organization that
is far too small to handle the volumes of data that it
collects. The reluctance of NSA to give other agency analysts
access to data that NSA analysts do not have time or priority
to review--even when such analysts are as well trained as NSA
personnel in protecting ``U.S. person'' information--has
prevented the use of non-NSA analytic manpower to help narrow
the gap between collection and analysis and to ensure that more
of the unevaluated NSA data is reviewed by an analyst. It has
also drained NSA of trained analysts, because the agency elects
to send many of its analysts to other agencies and
organizations to supervise and regulate the small degree of NSA
information sharing that does occur.
If other agency analysts were properly trained in the rules
and procedures governing the handling of SIGINT information (as
many are) and these analysts enjoyed the trust of NSA, such
analysts would provide ``value added'' beyond their numbers.
Many NSA liaison officers who are now situated in other
Intelligence Community agencies to provide those agencieswith
the ability to access NSA data could return to full-time NSA analytical
work.
It has proven difficult to achieve significant improvements
in data sharing and information access within and between
elements of the United States Intelligence Community. The
events of September 11, 2001--and the record of the Community's
preparedness for these terrorist atrocities, as detailed by the
Senate and House Intelligence Committees' Joint Inquiry during
the 107th Congress--make immediate action and cooperation
imperative. Accordingly, in Section 314, the Committee requires
that concrete steps be taken to pave the way for a future of
vastly improved data sharing and information analysis within
the Intelligence Community.
Section 314 requires NSA to develop a pilot program to
improve the ability of analysts in other Intelligence Community
elements to obtain access to and analyze data collected and
held by NSA, while retaining appropriate handling safeguards.
The pilot program's objectives are: (a) to augment the
Intelligence Community's ability to undertake true ``all-source
fusion'' analysis in support of intelligence requirements by
helping build a legal and practical foundation for increased
inter-agency cooperation and data sharing; (b) to increase to
the maximum practicable extent the proportion of NSA-collected
information that is reviewed and assessed by intelligence
analysts; and (c) to reduce the drain on NSA analytical
manpower caused by current barriers to inter-agency information
sharing.
Not later than December 31, 2003, therefore, NSA must begin
to implement a program to:
a. Develop efficient and effective methods for
certifying that designated analysts from other agencies
are properly trained in the relevant procedures for
handling SIGINT information and for ``minimizing'' any
``U.S. person'' information that might be contained
therein so that such analysts may be given access to
NSA databases in an identical fashion to NSA analysts;
those analysts from other agencies will be designated
as requiring such access by the head of their parent
agency, who will retain full accountability for the
analytic products produced by such agency's analysts;
and
b. Explore and improve innovative ways to allow other
agencies to apply their analytical expertise to NSA
data, including the use of ``detailees in place''
(i.e., other-agency employees who are notionally
detailed to NSA, thus becoming part of the SIGINT
enterprise while remaining at their home agency).
Pilot program on training for intelligence analysts
Current programs that encourage students to pursue
educational programs relevant to national security or foreign
language training have not produced the number of qualified
analysts or foreign language experts necessary to meet the
ongoing needs of the Intelligence Community. Although the David
L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991, Title VIII,
Public Law 102-183 (Dec. 4, 1991) moves in the right direction,
the David L. Boren National Security Education Program (NSEP)
places students in national security positions throughout the
Federal Government, not merely within the analytic components
of the Intelligence Community.
To address the shortage in language proficient and area
expert analytic capabilities within the Intelligence Community,
the Committee proposes the Director of Central Intelligence
establish a ROTC-like Intelligence Analyst Program. This
program should seek to increase the number of qualified entry-
level intelligence professional analysts available to the
Intelligence Community. The goal of the program should be to
recruit entry-level analysts and operations specialists with
enhanced analytic and foreign language skills who are committed
to a career in the Community. The Committee believes this
program should be national in scope (conducted at universities
throughout the United States), able to identify individuals
interested in working in the Intelligence Community, able to
provide financial assistance to participants, and capable of
providing guidance to participants in selecting courses that
would be most useful for an intelligence analyst's career. The
program should also include educating participants on the
various analytic specialties and opportunities within the
Intelligence Community. Prerequisites of the program, and
financial assistance thereunder, should include the ability to
obtain a security clearance and a commitment for service within
the Intelligence Community.
The Committee is pleased that the ADCI/A&P has expressed
strong support of the goals of this initiative. Moreover, the
Committee believes that the ADCI/A&P is the proper entity to
manage such a pilot program forapproximately 150 students in
fiscal year 2004. Therefore, the Committee recommends an increase of
$8.0 million to the ADCI/A&P to create and manage this pilot program.
Report on modifications of policy and law on classified information to
facilitate sharing of information for national security
purposes
The Committee is concerned that Executive Orders 12333 and
12958 and related regulations and policies may inappropriately
limit the effective sharing of intelligence information and
data. The Committee therefore has several provisions within the
Bill to improve sharing within the Intelligence Community to
enhance the quality and timeliness of intelligence products.
Furthermore, it is the sense of the Committee that information
sharing will become increasingly important as the Department of
Homeland Security endeavors to move critical information in
both directions between the Intelligence Community and
regional, state, and local governments.
Of particular concern to the Committee are various sections
in Executive Orders 12333 and 12958 that the Administration
should expeditiously review to accurately reflect the movement
to electronic data collection and storage and to address the
requirement to more effectively assess and share pertinent
national security information. The war on terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction require foreign
and domestic and national and local partners to effectively
collaborate on analysis and coordinate on operations. Achieving
this aim will require the U.S. Government to move beyond the
paradigm imposed by individual agency ``ownership'' of
information. In that regard, the Committee notes that agencies
that collect information often do not have the requisite
analytic workforce to fully exploit the data they collect.
Further, expanded access to data--providing it is done
securely--will foster more rapid access and more competitive
analysis and exploitation. Notwithstanding extremely sensitive
security, operational, and related matters, the President
should continue to encourage broader and more secure exchange
of information within the Intelligence Community and between
the Community and its many consumers. Executive Order 12958
should be revised not only to remove restrictive impediments
within the Executive Order as to the inter-agency sharing of
classified information, but also to facilitate sharing and
access (except in narrowly defined circumstances). Executive
Order 12333 similarly needs to be revised such that other
organizations besides NSA can engage in SIGINT activities,
specifically analysis of SIGINT information that has been
lawfully collected.
Revisions to Executive Orders 12333 and 12958 are needed,
but represent one of many issues that need to be addressed to
achieve greater teamwork in the defense of the nation.
Technical solutions, such as the need to implement machine-
enabled processes to automatically tag data, are needed to
facilitate efficient access and analysis. Further, the
Intelligence Community must recognize that information sharing
cannot succeed without revised security policies and
technologies. This Bill, therefore, requires several related
reports, including reviews of security clearance procedures,
the threats to networks posed by ``cleared insiders,'' and the
growing reliance of the United States on foreign hardware and
software. Only with a broad approach, encompassing policy and
technology and security and sharing, can we achieve the maximum
advantages offered by modern information technologies and a
highly-trained and motivated workforce.
The Committee requests that the President review Executive
Orders 12333 and 12598 and submit a report within 6 months on
potential changes to the Executive Orders or legislative
actions which could be applied to facilitate information
sharing and data access across the Intelligence Community.
Report on data-mining capabilities for the Intelligence Community
Data mining is emerging as potentially one of the most
valuable tools for Intelligence Community analysts. Data mining
involves the use of data analysis tools to discover previously
unknown, valid patterns and relationships in large data sets.
This technology has the potential to provide intelligence
analysts with the capability to identify terrorists, to
recognize the development and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and to detect illicit narcotics activity (e.g.,
communications, money transfers, and travel) by examining
voluminous records.
The Committee is concerned, however, that components of the
Intelligence Community are investing in a variety of data-
mining capabilities without sufficient coordination of
Community-wide data-mining requirements. Strategic planning in
this area is vital to ensure that there is no redundancy of
effort and that interface standards are in place to enable
collaboration and cross-program application, as required.
Accordingly, the Committee directs that the Chief
Information Officer for the Intelligence Community (CIO) and
the ADCI/A&P jointly review data-mining capabilities throughout
the Intelligence Community and assess which capabilities meet
Intelligence Community analytic requirements. The CIO will
publish guidelines to the Community on standards and protocols
to enable cross-agency interfaces for migration and data-level
information exchange. The results of this assessment should be
included in a written report to the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees (submitted no later than December 1,
2003) and should include funding requirements for respective
data-mining capabilities.
SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Although the Committee has sought to eliminate or limit the
number of reporting obligations placed on the Intelligence
Community, several issues--from security investigations of U.S.
Government personnel to the protection of the sensitive
national security information maintained by the U.S.
Government--require closer examination. To that end, the bill
contains a number of one-time reports that will aid the
Committee in the careful analysis of the issues presented.
Protecting against unauthorized disclosures of classified information
For some time, the Committee has been greatly concerned
about the dangers posed to United States national security from
the epidemic of ``leaking''--when persons with detailed access
to highly sensitive national security information reveal it to
unauthorized persons. As President Bush, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, Attorney General Ashcroft, Federal Bureau of
Intelligence Director Mueller, Director of Central Intelligence
Tenet, and many other government officials have repeatedly
emphasized, unauthorized disclosures of national security
information impose huge and ongoing costs. Such leaks give
valuable intelligence to our adversaries, can cost the lives of
intelligence sources, imperil foreign government liaison
relationships, compromise collection capabilities, imperil the
lives of American servicemen and women and the public at large,
and greatly impede the U.S. Government ability to protect and
advance vital national security interests in the war on
terrorism, in fighting foreign espionage, and in prosecuting
military campaigns in Iraq and elsewhere. Such leaks also cost
the American taxpayer vast sums of money, because capabilities
compromised due to leaks must be slowly, laboriously, and
expensively rebuilt--or new and costly substitutes must be
found.
In the Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year
2001, Congress attempted to pass legislation making it a felony
to disclose properly classified information. President Clinton
vetoed the legislation, however, and the Authorization Act was
only made law after Congress had removed the section
criminalizing unauthorized disclosures. Understanding that such
a broad measure still appears to lack political support--
despite the demonstrable costs that today's ``leak culture''
has imposed, especially since September 11, 2001--the Committee
wishes to encourage the Executive Branch to adopt a new and
more aggressive approach to leak issues. The Committee
recommends that the U.S. Government consider the workability of
aggressive criminal and civil enforcement, even civil
compensatory remedies (e.g., liquidated damages).
Coordination of United States Government research on security
evaluations
In October 2002, the National Academies of Science released
a report entitled, ``The Polygraph and Lie Detection''--``a
scientific review of the research on polygraph examinations
that pertains to their validity and reliability, in particular
for personnel security screening.'' In the report--the first
comprehensive assessment of the polygraph since the 1983 study
by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment--the National
Academies stated:
[W]e recommend an expanded research effort directed
at methods for deterring and detecting major security
threats, including efforts to improve techniques for
security screening. * * * We cannot guarantee that
research related to techniques for detecting deception
will yield valuable practical payoff for national
security, even in the long term. However, given the
seriousness of the national need, an expanded research
effort appears worthwhile. * * * The research program
we envision would seek any edge that science can
provide for deterring and detecting security threats.
It would have two major objectives: (1) to provide
Federal agencies with methods of the highest possible
scientific validity for protecting national security by
deterring and detecting espionage, sabotage, terrorism,
and other major security threats; and (2) to make these
agencies fully aware of the strengths and limitations
of the techniques they use.
In Section 355, the Committee authorizes $500,000 from the
Intelligence Community Management Account for the National
Science Foundation and the Office of Science and Technology to
convene components of the U.S. Government to provide a forum to
catalogue and coordinate Federally-funded research activities
relating to the development of new techniques in the
behavioral, psychological, or physiological assessment of
individuals to be used in security evaluations. This effort is
intended to serve as an important step in developing a more
focused research effort leading to the development of
alternatives to the polygraph as a security evaluation tool for
the U.S. Government. By March 1, 2004, the National Science
Foundation and the Office of Science and Technology are
required to jointly submit to Congress a written report
identifying the research most likely to advance the
understanding of the use of such assessments of individuals in
security evaluations; distinguish between short-term and long-
term areas of research in order to maximize the utility of
short-term and long-term research on such assessments; identify
the Federal departments and agencies best suited to support
such research; and develop recommendations for coordinating
future Federally-funded research for the development,
improvement, or enhancement of security evaluations. The
components of the Federal Government who will participate in
this effort include DoD, DoE, the Department of State, the
Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the
Director of Central Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the National Counterintelligence Executive.
Report on cleared insider threats to classified computer networks
The Committee is concerned that the classified computer
networks of the U.S. Government lack adequate protections from
cleared insiders and from certain outside threats. Accordingly,
section 331 requires the Director of Central Intelligence, in
conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, to provide a one-
time report to Congress. The report should assess the national
security risks posed by ``cleared insiders'' that are inherent
in current computer security practices within the Intelligence
Community and DoD with regard to vulnerabilities such as
Information Warfare (IW), Information Operations (IO), Computer
Network Exploitation (CNE), and Computer Network Attack (CNA)
activity by foreign governments, international terrorist
organizations, or organized crime groups. In particular, this
report should describe the risks inherent in furnishing to
users of local area networks (LANs) and wide-area networks
(WANs) that include classified information such capabilities as
e-mail, upload/download authorization, and removable storage
media without comprehensive firewalls, accountability
procedures, or other appropriate security controls. The
Committee understands, for instance, that thousands of
classified computer terminals within DoD may suffer from these
vulnerabilities, which have been highlighted by recent
exercises conducted within the U.S. Government in light of the
Regan and Hanssen espionage cases. The Committee expects that
the report should not only assess what vulnerabilities exist in
this regard, but should also describe in detail what steps are
being taken to eliminate these threats, including any budget
requirements to address shortfalls.
Report on security background investigations and clearance procedures
of the United States Government
Most publicly known instances of foreign espionage in this
country have been committed by persons who legitimately
obtained sensitive security clearances before deciding to
betray their country. The Committee is concerned that current
security investigations, however, focus more upon screening
individuals prior to giving them clearances than upon
ascertaining their trustworthiness on an ongoing basis. With
this in mind, the Committee has requested a report to assess
the relative risks of pre-clearance and post-clearance
compromise. This report should state whether current approaches
address adequately the risk of cleared employees compromising
classified information after their period of access to such
information has already begun. The report should also make
recommendations about how background investigations might in
the future be better targeted to historically verifiable
counterintelligence vulnerabilities.
Report on United States dependence on computer hardware and software
manufactured overseas
After 1973, when the risks inherent in America's reliance
on foreign oil became clear, many positive steps were taken to
ameliorate United States vulnerabilities. Those steps included,
among other things, establishment of a strategic petroleum
reserve, establishment of a Central Command, and research and
development into alternative fuel supplies. In many respects,
information technology has become as important to the
functioning of the United States economy as oil, and the
growing dependence of the United States on foreign information
technology raises concerns similar to those raised with respect
to foreign oil dependence. Unlike foreign oildependence,
however, United States dependence on foreign information technology
creates opportunities for espionage and clandestine information
operations that are extremely difficult to detect. In that regard, the
Committee notes that most of the leading suppliers of hardware and
software to the United States are countries that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation indicates are already actively engaged in economic
espionage against this country.
To accurately determine the dimensions of the problem
relating to United States dependence on foreign hardware and
software, the Committee directs the Director of Central
Intelligence to prepare a thorough evaluation of the trends
within this critical industry and the strategic implications of
increasing United States reliance on foreign hardware and
software. Recognizing that some of the greatest sources of
expertise on this issue reside in the private sector, the
Committee authorizes and supports such consultation with
industry as may be required. Once the Committee has received
this analysis, Congress will be in a better a position to
develop appropriate policies to mitigate this new
vulnerability.
SUMMARY OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
One-time reporting requirements
The Fiscal Year 2004 Intelligence Authorization Bill
requires the following one-time reporting requirements, which
are discussed throughout the report:
(a) Report on cleared insider threat to classified
computer networks;
(b) Report on security background investigations and
security clearance procedures of the United States
Government;
(c) Report on detail of civilian intelligence
personnel among elements of the Intelligence Community
and the Department of Defense;
(d) Report on modifications of policy and law on
classified information to facilitate to sharing of
information for national security purposes;
(e) Report of Secretary of Defense and Director of
Central Intelligence on strategic planning;
(f) Report on United States dependence of computer
hardware and software manufactured overseas;
(g) Report on intelligence lessons learned from
military operations in Iraq;
(h) Report on conventional weapons and ammunition
obtained by Iraq in violation of certain United Nations
Security Council resolutions;
(i) Report on data-mining capabilities for the
Intelligence Community;
(j) Report on the National Security Agency Senior
Acquisition Executive;
(k) Quarterly report baselining all program,
projects, and activities ongoing within the
Consolidated Cryptologic Program;
(l) Report on a review of the ``Public Private
Partnership'' and the ``Private Financing Initiative''
concepts for application to Menwith Hill Station.
Reports repealed or cancelled
The following is a list of reports that are repealed or
cancelled, and are no longer required to be submitted to the
Committee. Additional reports repealed in the Fiscal Year 2004
Intelligence Authorization Bill are contained in the Classified
Annex.
(a) Annual Evaluation of Performance and
Responsiveness of Intelligence Community;
(b) Periodic and Special Reports on Disclosure of
Intelligence Information to the United Nations;
(c) Annual Report on Intelligence Community
Cooperation with Counterdrug Activities;
(d) Annual Report on Russian Nuclear Facilities;
(e) Annual Report on Covert Leases;
(f) Annual Report on Protection of Covert Agents;
(g) Annual Report on Certain Foreign Companies
Involved in Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction;
(h) Annual Report on Intelligence Activities of
People's Republic of China;
(i) Annual Report on Coordination of
Counterintelligence Matters with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation;
(j) Reports on Decisions not to Prosecute Violations
of Classified Information Procedures Act;
(k) Report on Postemployment Assistance for
Terminated Intelligence Employees;
(l) Annual Report on Activities of Federal Bureau of
Investigation Personnel Outside the United States;
(m) Annual Report on Exceptions to Consumer
Disclosure Requirements for National Security
Investigations;
(n) Recurring report(s) on comprehensive annual
reviews of customer satisfaction;
(o) Recurring report on the Intelligence Community's
information infrastructure.
COMMITTEE ACTION
On May 1, 2003, the Select Committee on Intelligence
approved the Bill and ordered that it be favorably reported.
ESTIMATE OF COSTS
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the estimated costs incurred in carrying
out the provisions of this Bill for fiscal year 2003 are set
forth in the Classified Annex to this Bill. Estimates of the
costs incurred in carrying out this Bill in the five fiscal
years thereafter are not available from the Executive Branch,
and therefore the Committee deems it impractical, pursuant to
paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the
Senate, to include such estimates in this report. On [ ],
2003, the Committee transmitted this Bill to the Congressional
Budget Office and requested that it conduct an estimate of the
costs incurred in carrying out the provisions of this Bill.
EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing the
provisions of this legislation.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
In the opinion of the Committee it is necessary to dispense
with the requirements of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the business
of the Senate.
