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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT ON THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025

               The following is the Explanatory Statement to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (“the Act”), which has been included as Division F of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025. The Explanatory Statement reflects the result of negotiations between the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (together, “the Committees”). The Explanatory Statement shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of the Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a conference committee. 

               The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities prevents the Committees from publicly disclosing many details concerning their final decisions regarding funding levels and policy direction. Therefore, the Committees have prepared a classified annex — referred to here and within the annex itself as “the Agreement” — that contains a classified Schedule of Authorizations and describes in detail the scope and intent of the Committees’ actions.

               The Agreement authorizes the Intelligence Community to obligate and expend funds as requested in the President’s budget and as modified by the classified Schedule of Authorizations, subject to applicable reprogramming procedures.

               The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated into the Act pursuant to Section 6102 of the Act. It has the status of law. The Agreement supplements and adds detail to clarify the authorization levels found in the Act and in the classified Schedule of Authorizations.

               This Explanatory Statement incorporates by reference, and the Executive Branch shall comply with, all direction contained in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (S. Rept. 118-181) and in the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (H. Rept. 118-662). The Agreement supersedes all classified direction in the classified annexes to accompany S. Rept. 118-181 and H. Rept. 118-662 related to programs and activities authorized by the Schedule of Authorization.

               The Executive Branch is further directed as follows:

Study on Threats Posed by Citizenship-by-Investment Programs.

The Committees are concerned with the threats to the United States posed by citizenship-by-investment programs operated by foreign governments. A recent Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report highlighted the ease of identity laundering, bribery and corruption that result from these programs, as well as the freedom of movement offered to malign actors, sanctioned individuals, weapons and human traffickers, and terrorists. The FATF and OECD report noted that these programs “make it challenging for compliance professionals at [financial institutions] or other businesses to engage in accurate due diligence,” undermine visa controls and sanctions enforcement, and facilitate the movement of individuals who have violated the law to other jurisdictions to avoid arrest.

The Committees therefore direct the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the heads of any other elements of the Intelligence Community the Director considers appropriate, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to submit to the Committees a study on the threat posed to the United States by foreign citizenship-by-investment programs and the investments allowed under such programs; and provide to the committees a briefing on the results of the study.

The study shall include the following:

1. A detailed description of the threats posed to the national security of the United States by citizenship-by-investment programs;
2. The types of investments or contributions which an individual may make in exchange for citizenship under a foreign government’s citizenship-by-investment program, including investments in, or donations or transfers to, the government of a foreign country or any person, business, or entity in such foreign country, or for the benefit of a foreign country;

3.   The use of such programs to evade sanctions or taxes, facilitate or finance crimes related to national security, including terrorism, weapons trafficking or proliferation, cybercrime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and espionage, or any other activity which furthers the interests of a foreign adversary or undermines the integrity of the immigration laws or security of the United States, or undermines the United States and its interests through any other means identified by the Director;

4.   The foreign countries whose citizenship-by-investment programs pose the greatest threat to the national security of the United States;

5.   Recommendations for any additional resources or authorities necessary to counter such threats; and

6.   A description of opportunities to counter such threats.

Study on Threat Posed by Foreign Investment in United States Agricultural Land.

The Committees note that foreign ownership and investment in U.S. agricultural land—which includes farmland, pastures, and forest land—has grown almost 50% since 2017, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). While foreign investors in U.S. agricultural land are required to submit forms describing their transactions to USDA by the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. § 3501) (AFIDA), AFIDA was not designed to identify potential national security concerns.

The Committees therefore direct the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in coordination with the elements of the Intelligence Community the Director considers appropriate, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to (1) submit to the Committees a study on the threat posed to the United States by foreign investment in agricultural land in the United States, and (2) provide to the committees a briefing on the results of the study.

The study shall include the following:

1. Data and an analysis of agricultural land holdings, including current and previous uses of the land disaggregated by sector and industry, held by a foreign person from a country identified as a country that poses a risk to the national security of the United States in the most recent annual report on worldwide threats issued by the Director pursuant to section 108B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 3043b) (commonly known as the “Annual Threat Assessment”), a nonmarket economy country, or any other country that the Director determines to be appropriate;
2. An analysis of the proximity of the agricultural land holdings to critical infrastructure and military installations;
3. An assessment of the threats posed to the national security of the United States by malign actors that use foreign investment in agricultural land in the United States; 
4. An assessment of warning indicators and methods by which to detect potential threats from the use by foreign adversaries of agricultural products for nefarious ends; and
5. An assessment of additional resources or authorities necessary to counter threats identified during the study.

Intelligence Assessment of Economic Coercion by the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific Region.

The Committees direct that, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research shall submit a classified intelligence assessment to the Committees that (1) outlines economic coercion efforts by the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific region, and (2) describes measures that have been, or could be, taken to enhance the resilience of countries in the region to such coercion.

Classified Annex to Report on Mission Effect of Civilian Harm.

Section 6323 of the Act requires the DNI, acting through the National Intelligence Council, to submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report examining the extent to which civilian harm that occurs during counterterrorism operations informs analyses of the Intelligence Community on the mission success of campaigns to degrade, disrupt, or defeat foreign terrorist organizations. 

The Committees direct that this report include a classified annex, to be submitted to the Committees, that provides an inventory of (1) collection gaps and challenges that may affect the analysis of the success or failure of campaigns against terrorist groups, and (2) actions taken by the DNI to mitigate such gaps and challenges.

Report on Establishing a National Intelligence Center Dedicated to Strategic Competition.

Section 6307 of the Act, among other things, codifies the National Intelligence Management Council and expresses the sense of Congress that the DNI should create a role in the Council for a National Intelligence Manager dedicated to the People’s Republic of China.   

The Committees direct the DNI, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and in consultation with the heads of elements of the Intelligence Community determined appropriate by the Director, to submit to the Committees a report that examines the potential effects of establishing a new national intelligence center dedicated to strategic competition, which would:

1.   Integrate all-source intelligence on the plans and intentions of strategic competitors;

2.   Synchronize intelligence collection efforts among the elements of the Intelligence

Community;

3.   Optimize resource investments made by elements of the Intelligence Community in support of strategic competition;

4.   Integrate the work of other national intelligence centers that is relevant to strategic competition; and

5.   Inform the President, Congress, and other policymakers as they craft and execute the United States’ approach to strategic competition. 

The report shall seek to incorporate lessons learned from previous Intelligence Community reorganizations, including those undertaken pursuant to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458). The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

National Reconnaissance Office Workforce.

The Committees’ find that —

1. From its inception, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has met joint warfighter requirements because of a workforce that includes Intelligence Community and Department of Defense civilians and uniformed service members;
2. The NRO has achieved success, in part, because the Department of Defense has consistently fulfilled its longstanding commitment to assign Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Guardians to positions at the NRO;
3. The NRO is negatively affected—and its ability to meet warfighter requirements diminished—when the United States Space Force does not assign Guardians to the NRO at a rate that meets the NRO requirements;  
4. The NRO and the Space Force jointly benefit from Guardian assignments at the NRO; and
5. The NRO and Space Force are negatively affected by the Space Force’s uneven emphasis on developing space operators without similar emphasis on developing Guardians with space acquisition and engineering expertise.

Therefore, the Committees direct the DNI and the heads of any other departments and agencies the Director deems relevant to provide quarterly updates to the appropriate congressional committees on the status of the Department of Defense fulfilling its commitment to assign uniformed personnel to the NRO. 

Increased Effort and Resources in the Field of Geomatics.

The Committees find that —

1.   The Intelligence Community and the broader United States Government require professionals with advanced training in geomatics and geodesy, and the preservation of these skillsets is crucial to advancing geospatial intelligence tradecraft for the United States for national security and military operations;

2.   The Intelligence Community should use existing authorities to engage in novel ways with academic and industry partners to ensure the Intelligence Community’s demand signal for geomatics and geodesy professionals is received by the largest possible number of United States citizens while also seeking to foster a culture of academic excellence and research to propel the field of geomatics forward at the pace of innovation;

3.   By engaging with academic and industry partners, the Intelligence Community can help speed the reversal of the current trend wherein the United States not only produces fewer geomatics scientists and engineers compared to its global competitors and potential adversaries, but such competitors and adversaries also provide them with training and expertise that could be used against the United States;

4.   There is abundant opportunity for the Intelligence Community to advance its growing need for geomatics and geodesy professionals by partnering with American universities and researchers with proven experience in diverse fields who can lead the way to solving the United States most vexing geomatics challenges; and

5.   The Intelligence Community must balance the increasing demand for recruiting the best geomatics and geodesy talent while still ensuring a dedicated and patriotic workforce with allegiance to the Constitution and the United States Government.