Publications

                                                   Calendar No. 412

118th Congress}                                           { Report

          SENATE

   2d Session }                                           { 118-181

======================================================================

                  INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR

                            FISCAL YEAR 2025

                                _______

                 June 12, 2024.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______

        Mr. Warner, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,

        submitted the following

     R E P O R T

   together with

 ADDITIONAL VIEWS

[To accompany S. 4443]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an

original bill (S. 4443) to authorize appropriations for Fiscal

Year 2025 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities

of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community

Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,

reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

                Classified Annex to the Committee Report

    Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of

National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on March 12,

2024, that the request for the National Intelligence Program

for Fiscal Year 2025 was $73.4 billion. Other than for limited

unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence

Community Management Account, the classified nature of United

States intelligence activities precludes any further

disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its

budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee has

prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a

classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule

of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 and has the

legal status of public law. The classified annex is made

available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and

the House of Representatives and to the President. It is also

available for review by any Member of the Senate subject to the

provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress

(1976).

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and

explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2025 (the ``Act'') reported by the Committee.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 specifies that the Act authorizes

appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related

activities of the Intelligence Community (IC) for Fiscal Year

2025.

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts

authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and

intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2025 are

contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that

the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made

available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and

House of Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence

Community Management Account of the Office of the Director of

National Intelligence (ODNI) for Fiscal Year 2025.

Section 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized

        by law

    Section 104 provides that funds authorized to be

appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other

benefits for federal employees may be increased by such

additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for

increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA

Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2025.

               TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 301. Improvements relating to conflicts of interest in the

        Intelligence Innovation Board

    Section 301 amends Section 7506 of the Intelligence

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, which established the

Intelligence Innovation Board, in order to improve the process

for vetting potential conflicts of interest.

Section 302. National Threat Identification and Prioritization

        Assessment and National Counterintelligence Strategy

    Section 302 amends Section 904 of the Counterintelligence

Enhancement Act of 2002 to update the process for submittal to

Congress of the National Threat Identification and

Prioritization Assessment and the National Counterintelligence

Strategy.

Section 303. Open Source Intelligence Division of Office of

        Intelligence and Analysis personnel

    Section 303 prohibits funds made available for Fiscal Year

2025 for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the

Department of Homeland Security from being obligated or

expended to increase the number of personnel assigned to the

Open Source Intelligence Division who work exclusively or

predominantly on domestic terrorism issues.

Section 304. Appointment of Director of the Office of Intelligence and

        Counterintelligence

    Section 304 requires that the Director of the Office of

Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of

Energy be appointed by the President, by and with the advice

and consent of the Senate, for a six-year term.

Section 305. Improvements to advisory board of National Reconnaissance

        Office

    Section 305 amends the composition of the Advisory Board of

the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) by permitting the

Director of the NRO to independently appoint up to eight

members to the Board. Section 305 also requires the Director to

establish a charter for the Board and extends the Board until

August 31, 2027.

Section 306. National Intelligence University acceptance of grants

    Section 306 authorizes the National Intelligence University

to accept qualifying research grants.

Section 307. Protection of Central Intelligence Agency facilities and

        assets from unmanned aircraft

    Section 307 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of

1949 to allow authorized CIA personnel to better detect and

respond to threats posed to CIA facilities and assets by

unmanned aircraft.

Section 308. Limitation on availability of funds for new controlled

        access programs

    Section 308 prohibits funds made available for fiscal year

2025 for the National Intelligence Program from being obligated

or expended for any controlled access program, until the head

of the element of the IC responsible for the program submits

the notification required by section 501A(b) of the National

Security Act of 1947.

Section 309. Limitation on transfers from controlled access programs

    Section 309 amends Section 501A(b) of the National Security

Act of 1947 to prohibit the head of an element of the IC from

transferring a capability from a controlled access program,

until the head submits to the appropriate congressional

committees and congressional leadership notice of the intent of

the head to make such transfer.

Section 310. Expenditure of funds for certain intelligence and

        counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard

    Section 310 authorizes the Commandant of the Coast Guard to

use up to 1% of the amounts made available for the National

Intelligence Program for each fiscal year for intelligence and

counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard relating to

objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature,

which may be accounted for solely on the certification of the

Commandant.

Section 311. Unauthorized access to intelligence community property

    Section 311 establishes criminal penalties for unauthorized

access to IC property.

Section 312. Strengthening of Office of Intelligence and Analysis

    Section 312 amends Section 311 of Title 31 to establish

within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of

the Department of Treasury, the Office of Economic Intelligence

and Security, which replaces the Office of Intelligence and

Analysis.

Section 313. Report on sensitive commercially available information

    Section 313 requires each element of the IC to submit to

the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on

the access to, collection, processing, and use of sensitive

commercially available information by such element. Section 313

further requires the DNI to make available to the public, once

every 2 years, a report on the policies and procedures of the

IC with respect to sensitive commercially available

information.

Section 314. Policy on collection of United States location information

    Section 314 requires the DNI, in coordination with the

Attorney General, to issue a policy on the collection of United

States location information by the IC.

Section 315. Display of flags, seals, and emblems other than the United

        States flag

    Section 315 provides that any flag, seal, or emblem that is

not the United States flag that is displayed at an official

location of an element of the IC shall be smaller than the

official United States flag and may not be displayed above the

United States flag. Section 315 further provides that none of

the funds made available by the Intelligence Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2025 for the National Intelligence Program may

be obligated or expended to fly or display a flag over a

facility of an element of the IC other than the United States

flag or another authorized flag.

                  TITLE IV--COUNTERING FOREIGN THREATS

                 Subtitle A--People's Republic of China

Section 401. Strategy and outreach on risks posed by People's Republic

        of China smartport technology

    Section 401 requires the Director of the National

Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) to engage with

United States industry partners on the risks of smartport

technology--including shipping and logistics infrastructure and

software--of the People's Republic of China to United States

supply chains and commercial activity.

Section 402. Assessment of current status of biotechnology of People's

        Republic of China

    Section 402 requires the DNI, in consultation with the

Director of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity

Center (NCBC), to assess the current status of the

biotechnology sector of the People's Republic of China. Within

30 days after the completion of the assessment, the DNI is

required to submit a report on the findings to the

congressional intelligence committees.

Section 403. Intelligence sharing with law enforcement agencies on

        synthetic opioid precursor chemicals originating in People's

        Republic of China

    Section 403 requires the DNI, in consultation with the head

of the Office of National Security Intelligence of the Drug

Enforcement Administration and the Under Secretary of Homeland

Security for Intelligence and Analysis, to develop a strategy

to ensure robust intelligence sharing relating to the illicit

trafficking of synthetic opioid precursor chemicals from the

People's Republic of China and other source countries. The DNI

is further required to develop a mechanism for collaboration

between the IC and other Federal Government agencies.

Section 404. Report on efforts of the People's Republic of China to

        evade United States transparency and national security

        regulations

    Section 404 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional

intelligence committees an unclassified report on the efforts

of the People's Republic of China to evade specified national

security restrictions and limitations.

Section 405. Plan for recruitment of Mandarin speakers

    Section 405 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate

committees of Congress a comprehensive plan to prioritize the

recruitment and training of individuals who speak Mandarin

Chinese for each element of the IC.

                   Subtitle B--The Russian Federation

Section 411. Assessment of Russian Federation sponsorship of acts of

        international terrorism

    Section 411 requires the DNI to conduct and submit to the

appropriate congressional committees an assessment on the

extent to which the Russian Federation provides support for

international acts of terrorism and cooperates with the

antiterrorism efforts of the United States.

Section 412. Assessment of likely course of war in Ukraine

    Section 412 requires the DNI, in collaboration with the

Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of

the CIA, to submit to the congressional intelligence committees

an assessment of the likely course of the war in Ukraine

through December 31, 2025.

                  Subtitle C--International Terrorism

Section 421. Inclusion of Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS

        officials and members among aliens engaged in terrorist

        activity

    Section 421 amends Section 212 of the Immigration and

Nationality Act to specify that any person who is a

spokesperson, or member of the Palestine Liberation

Organization, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, or any

successor or affiliate group, or who endorses or espouses

terrorist activities conducted by any of the aforementioned

groups, is considered to be engaged in terrorist activities.

Section 422. Assessment and report on the threat of ISIS-Khorasan to

        the United States

    Section 422 requires the Director of the National

Counterterrorism Center to conduct an assessment of the threats

to the United States and United States citizens posed by ISIS-

Khorasan.

Section 423. Terrorist financing prevention

    Section 423 requires the Secretary of the Treasury to

submit to the President a report identifying any foreign

financial institution or foreign digital asset transaction

facilitator that has knowingly facilitated a significant

financial transaction with a terrorist organization. Section

423 further requires the President to impose sanctions on such

foreign financial institutions and foreign digital asset

transaction facilitators.

                   Subtitle D--Other Foreign Threats

Section 431. Assessment of visa-free travel to and within Western

        Hemisphere by nationals of countries of concern

    Section 431 requires the DNI to conduct and submit to the

congressional intelligence committees a written assessment of

the impacts to national security caused by travel without a

visa to and within countries in the Western Hemisphere by

nationals of countries of concern.

Section 432. Study on threat posed by foreign investment in United

        States agricultural land

    Section 432 requires the DNI to conduct a study and provide

a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress on the

threats posed to the United States by foreign investment in

agricultural land in the United States.

Section 433. Assessment of threat posed by citizenship-by-investment

        programs

    Section 433 requires the DNI and the Assistant Secretary

for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury

to complete an assessment on the threat posed to the United

States by citizenship-by-investment programs. The DNI and the

Assistant Secretary are further directed to submit a report to

the appropriate congressional committees on the findings of the

assessment and provide a briefing to such committees on the

report.

Section 434. Mitigating the use of United States components and

        technology in hostile activities by foreign adversaries

    Section 434 requires the DNI within 180 days of enactment

to develop and commence implementation of a Supply Chain Risk

Mitigation Strategy to mitigate or disrupt the acquisition and

use of United States components in the conduct of activities

harmful to national security. The DNI is further required to

submit to Congress annually thereafter for three years a report

on the status and effect of the strategy.

Section 435. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence review of

        visitors and assignees

    Section 435 requires the Director of the Department of

Energy's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence to

establish procedures by which visitors and assignees are

assessed for counterintelligence risks to research or

activities undertaken at National Laboratories. It further

requires the Director to advise a National Laboratory on

visitors or assignees when the Director has reason to believe a

visitor or assignee is a non-traditional collector, or when the

Director has information indicating that the visitor or

assignee constitutes a counterintelligence risk to a lab.

Section 435 requires the Director to report quarterly to the

appropriate congressional committees metrics regarding

assignees and visitors admitted to the National Laboratories.

Section 436. Prohibition on National Laboratories admitting certain

        foreign nationals

    Section 436 limits entry into Department of Energy National

Laboratories by foreign nationals from China, Russia, Iran,

North Korea, and Cuba, with an exception for legal permanent

residents. Section 436 permits the Secretary of Energy, in

consultation with the Director of the Office of Intelligence

and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy and certain

senior counterintelligence officials at the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), to waive the prohibition for nationals

from these countries if the Secretary certifies that the

benefits to the United States of access outweigh the national

security and economic risks to the United States. Section 436

requires the Secretary to submit notifications to congressional

committees of each waiver issued.

Section 437. Quarterly report on certain foreign nationals encountered

        at the United States border

    Section 437 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in

coordination with the DNI, to publish a quarterly report

identifying the aggregate number of special interest aliens who

have been encountered at or near the United States border and

have been released, are under supervision, are being detained,

or have been removed from the United States.

Section 438. Assessment of the lessons learned by the intelligence

        community with respect to the Israel-Hamas war

    Section 438 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate

committees of Congress an assessment of the lessons learned

from the Israel-Hamas war.

Section 439. Central Intelligence Agency intelligence assessment on

        Tren de Aragua

    Section 439 requires the Director of the CIA to submit to

the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment on the

gang known as ``Tren de Aragua.''

Section 440. Assessment of Maduro regime's economic and security

        relationships with state sponsors of terrorism and foreign

        terrorist organizations

    Section 440 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional

intelligence committees an assessment of the economic and

security relationships of the regime of Nicolas Maduro of

Venezuela with specified state sponsors of terrorism and

foreign terrorist organizations.

Section 441. Continued congressional oversight of Iranian expenditures

        supporting foreign military and terrorist activities

    Section 441 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional

intelligence committees a report describing the current

occurrences, circumstances, and expenditures by Iran on

military and terrorist activities outside the country.

                     TITLE V--EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

Section 501. Strategy to counter foreign adversary efforts to utilize

        biotechnologies in ways that threaten United States national

        security

    Section 501 requires the DNI, acting through NCBC, to

develop and submit to the congressional intelligence committees

a whole-of-government strategy to address concerns relating to

biotechnologies.

Section 502. Improvements to the roles, missions, and objectives of the

        National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center

    Section 502 expands NCBC's authorities, to include

overseeing and coordinating the analysis of intelligence on

biotechnologies.

Section 503. Enhancing capabilities to detect foreign adversary threats

        relating to biological data

    Section 503 requires the DNI to take steps to standardize

and enhance the capabilities of the IC to detect foreign

adversary threats relating to biological data.

Section 504. National security procedures to address certain risks and

        threats relating to artificial intelligence

    Section 504 requires the President to develop and implement

procedures to facilitate information sharing on national

security threats emanating from, or directed at, artificial

intelligence systems.

Section 505. Establishment of Artificial Intelligence Security Center

    Section 505 establishes an Artificial Intelligence Security

Center within the National Security Agency, with functions that

include making available a research test-bed to facilitate

security research on artificial intelligence systems by private

sector and academic researchers in a secure environment.

Section 506. Sense of Congress encouraging intelligence community to

        increase private sector capital partnerships and partnership

        with Office of Strategic Capital of Department of Defense to

        secure enduring technological advantages

    Section 506 provides that it is the Sense of Congress that

the IC should further explore the strategic use of private

capital partnerships to secure enduring technological

advantages for the IC and undertake regular consultation with

Federal partners on best practices and lessons learned.

Section 507. Intelligence Community Technology Bridge Fund

    Section 507 creates a fund to assist in transitioning IC

products from the research and development phase to the

contracting and production phase, with priority given to small

business concerns and nontraditional defense contractors.

Section 508. Enhancement of authority for intelligence community

        public-private talent exchanges

    Section 508 amends Section 5306 of the Damon Paul Nelson

and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for

Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3334) to

enhance the authority for exchanges between the private sector

and the IC, with a focus on finance, acquisition, technology,

innovation, and research.

Section 509. Enhancing intelligence community ability to acquire

        emerging technology that fulfills intelligence community needs

    Section 509 enables the IC to use a streamlined acquisition

process to acquire property, products, or services from

companies that have completed an In-Q Tel work program in which

the company furnished property, products, or services to

address government technology needs or requirements.

Section 510. Management of artificial intelligence security risks

    Section 510 requires the Director of the National Institute

of Standards and Technology (NIST) to ensure that the National

Vulnerability Database of the Institute incorporates artificial

intelligence security vulnerabilities and addresses those

vulnerabilities. It also directs NIST, in coordination with the

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), to

establish a database by which vendors can voluntarily disclose

artificial intelligence security and safety incidents. Finally,

it directs the Director of CISA to ensure that the Common

Vulnerabilities and Exposures Program encompasses artificial

intelligence security vulnerabilities.

Section 511. Protection of technological measures designed to verify

        authenticity or provenance of machine-manipulated media

    Section 511 prohibits the concealment, subversion,

fraudulent distribution, and circumvention of technological

measures designed to verify the authenticity, modifications, or

conveyance of machine-manipulated media or characteristics of

the provenance of such media. Section 511 also establishes

civil penalties, enforceable by the Attorney General, for

violations of the prohibitions.

Section 512. Sense of Congress on hostile foreign cyber actors

    Section 512 provides that it is the sense of Congress that

foreign ransomware organizations constitute hostile foreign

cyber actors, that covered nations abet and benefit from the

activities of these actors, and that such actors should be

treated as hostile foreign cyber actors by the United States.

Section 513. Designation of state sponsors of ransomware and reporting

        requirements

    Section 513 requires the Secretary of State, in

consultation with the DNI, to annually designate as a state

sponsor of ransomware any country the government of which the

Secretary has determined provides support for ransomware demand

schemes. Section 513 further requires the President to impose

the sanctions and penalties imposed with respect to a state

sponsor of terrorism on each country designated by the

Secretary as a state sponsor of ransomware. Section 513

requires the Secretary of the Treasury to submit a report on

the number and geographic locations of individuals, groups, and

entities subject to sanctions imposed by the Office of Foreign

Assets Control who were subsequently determined to have been

involved in a ransomware demand scheme. Section 513 also

requires the Secretary of State to submit a report on the

number and geographic locations of individuals, groups, and

entities that identifies the country of origin of foreign-based

ransomware attacks. Section 513 further requires the

Comptroller General to issue a report on the authorities

available to respond to foreign-based ransomware attacks.

Section 514. Deeming ransomware threats to critical infrastructure a

        national intelligence priority

    Section 514 requires the DNI to deem ransomware threats to

critical infrastructure a national intelligence priority

component to the National Intelligence Priorities Framework.

Section 514 further requires the DNI, in consultation with the

Director of the FBI, to submit a report on the implications of

the ransomware threat to United States national security.

                    TITLE VI--CLASSIFICATION REFORM

Section 601. Governance of classification and declassification system

    Section 601 requires the President to designate an official

as Executive Agent for Classification and Declassification to

identify and promote technological solutions to support

efficient and effective systems for classification and

declassification to be implemented on an interoperable and

federated basis across the Federal Government. Section 601 also

requires the President to designate an official to establish

policies and guidance relating to classification and

declassification and controlled unclassified information and to

oversee the implementation of such policies and guidance.

Finally, Section 601 requires the President to establish an

Executive Committee on Classification and Declassification

Programs and Technology to provide direction, advice, and

guidance to the Executive Agent.

Section 602. Classification and declassification of information

    Section 602 authorizes the President to establish a system

for the classification and declassification of information,

subject to certain minimum requirements including the scope of

information that may be classified, the duration of

classification, and the processes for reviewing classified

records and materials.

Section 603. Minimum standards for Executive agency insider threat

        programs

    Section 603 requires each agency with access to classified

information to establish an insider threat program that meets

certain minimum standards, including establishing a capability

to monitor user activity on all classified networks.

  TITLE VII--SECURITY CLEARANCES AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE

                              IMPROVEMENTS

Section 701. Security clearances held by certain former employees of

        intelligence community

    Section 701 amends Section 803 of the National Security Act

of 1947 to require the Security Executive Agent to issue

guidelines and instructions to the heads of Federal agencies to

ensure that any individual who was appointed by the President

to a position in an element of the IC, but is no longer

employed by the Federal Government, maintains a security

clearance only in accordance with Executive Order 12968, or

successor order. Section 701 also requires submission of the

guidelines and instructions to Congress, as well as a report on

former Presidential appointees who hold security clearances.

Section 702. Policy for authorizing intelligence community program of

        contractor-owned and contractor-operated sensitive

        compartmented information facilities

    Section 702 requires the DNI to establish a standardized

policy for the IC that authorizes a program of contractor-owned

and contractor-operated sensitive compartmented information

facilities as a service to the national security and

intelligence enterprises.

Section 703. Enabling intelligence community integration

    Section 703 authorizes the head of an element of the IC to

provide goods or services to another element of the IC without

reimbursement or transfer of funds for hoteling initiatives for

IC employees and affiliates to enable those employees and

affiliates to work from secure facilities maintained by other

elements of the IC across a wide geographic area.

Section 704. Appointment of spouses of certain Federal employees

    Section 704 amends Section 3330d of Title 5 to extend to

spouses of an employee of the Department of State or an element

of the IC the same options for federal employment as currently

enjoyed by spouses of employees of the Department of Defense

(DOD).

Section 705. Plan for staffing the intelligence collection positions of

        the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 705 requires the Director of the CIA to submit a

plan for ensuring the Directorate of Operations has staffed

every civilian full-time equivalent position authorized for

that Directorate under the Intelligence Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2024.

Section 706. Intelligence community workplace protections

    Section 706 allows for IC incumbent personnel whose

positions are converted involuntarily to the excepted service,

or from one excepted service schedule to another, to retain

their adverse action protections. Section 706 further requires

congressional notification and explanation when heads of

agencies terminate personnel in contravention of existing

protections. Section 706 also prohibits the Director of the CIA

from terminating an officer or employee except in accordance

with guidelines and regulations submitted to the congressional

intelligence committees, unless the Director determines that

such compliance poses a threat to U.S. national security and

provides an explanation for such determination to the

committees.

Section 707. Sense of Congress on Government personnel support for

        foreign terrorist organizations

    Section 707 establishes a Sense of Congress that for the

purposes of adjudicating the eligibility of an individual for

access to classified information, renewal of a prior

determination of eligibility, or continuous vetting of an

individual for eligibility, certain enumerated actions shall be

considered acts advocating an act of terrorism.

                       TITLE VIII--WHISTLEBLOWERS

Section 801. Improvements regarding urgent concerns submitted to

        Inspectors General of the intelligence community

    Section 801 permits urgent concerns submitted by

whistleblowers to the inspectors general of the IC to be

provided directly to Congress rather than going through the

heads of agencies when an inspector general determines that

transmittal to the head of agency could compromise the

anonymity of the employee or result in the complaint being

transmitted to the subject of the complaint. Section 801

requires that submissions be made in writing and provides that

the statutory review period for such submissions begins on the

date the submitter confirms their written submission is

complete, while requiring the inspectors general to facilitate

a writing of a submission or treat a written record of a verbal

complaint as a submission. Finally, Section 801 clarifies that

individuals formerly affiliated with an element of the IC may

submit matters of urgent concern that arose during and related

to the time of their prior employment with the element.

Section 802. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity

        as act of reprisal

    Section 802 prohibits knowing or willful disclosures that

reveal an IC employee's or IC contractor employee's identifying

information without consent, so as to identify such employee or

contractor employee as a whistleblower, except as necessary

during the course of an investigation. Section 802 further

establishes a private right of action for an IC whistleblower

if such disclosure is taken as a reprisal against the

whistleblower for bringing a complaint.

Section 803. Protection for individuals making authorized disclosures

        to Inspectors General of elements of the intelligence community

    Section 803 clarifies that a disclosure of classified

information to an Inspector General of an element of the IC

that is made by a whistleblower who held a security clearance

during the whistleblower's IC employment, but who, at the time

of the disclosure, does not hold the appropriate clearance or

authority to access such classified information, and that is

otherwise made in accordance with such security standards and

procedures, shall be treated as an authorized disclosure.

Section 804. Clarification of authority of certain Inspectors General

        to receive protected disclosures

    Section 804 makes a technical correction to Section 1104 of

the National Security Act of 1947 to clarify that the

inspectors general of defense intelligence elements are

authorized recipients of whistleblower protected disclosures.

Section 805. Whistleblower protections relating to psychiatric testing

        or examination

    Section 805 amends Section 1104 of the National Security

Act of 1947 to establish that a decision to order psychiatric

testing or examination is a prohibited personnel practice when

taken or threatened as a reprisal for a protected disclosure.

Section 806. Establishing process parity for adverse security clearance

        and access determinations

    Section 806 requires an agency, in justifying an adverse

security clearance or access determination against a

whistleblower, to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence

that the agency would have made the same security clearance or

access determination in the absence of the whistleblower's

disclosure. Section 806 further establishes parity in the legal

standards applied to IC whistleblower matters.

Section 807. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory

        revocation of security clearances and access determinations

    Section 807 removes the cap on compensatory damages for an

employee or former employee who was subjected to a reprisal

with respect to the employee's or former employee's security

clearance or access determination.

                  TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS

Section 901. Additional discretion for Director of Central Intelligence

        Agency in paying costs of treating qualifying injuries and

        making payments for qualifying injuries to the brain

    Section 901 authorizes the Director of the CIA to pay or

reimburse the costs relating to diagnosing or treating a

qualifying injury that is not otherwise covered under existing

law, under circumstances the Director determines to be

extraordinary.

Section 902. Additional discretion for Secretary of State and heads of

        other Federal agencies in paying costs of treating qualifying

        injuries and making payments for qualifying injuries to the

        brain

    Section 902 authorizes the Secretary of State or the head

of any other Federal agency to pay or reimburse the costs

relating to diagnosing or treating a qualifying injury that is

not otherwise covered under existing law, under circumstances

the Secretary (or relevant head of another Federal agency)

determines to be extraordinary.

Section 903. Improved funding flexibility for payments made by

        Department of State for qualifying injuries to the brain

    Section 903 improves funding flexibility for payments made

by the Department of State for qualifying injuries to the

brain.

               TITLE X--UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA

Section 1001. Comptroller General of the United States review of All-

        domain Anomaly Resolution Office

    Section 1001 requires the Comptroller General to conduct

and submit a review of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office

regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena reporting and

Federal agency coordination.

Section 1002. Sunset of requirements relating to audits of unidentified

        anomalous phenomena historical record report

    Section 1002 terminates certain audit requirements of the

unidentified anomalous phenomena historical record report.

Section 1003. Funding limitations relating to unidentified anomalous

        phenomena

    Section 1003 maintains certain limitations on funding

absent congressional oversight for Fiscal Year 2025.

                         TITLE XI--AIR AMERICA

Section 1101. Short title

    Section 1101 provides that the title may be cited as the

``Air America Act of 2024.''

Section 1102. Findings

    Section 1102 sets forth Congress's findings that Air

America and its affiliated companies, in coordination with the

CIA, supported the United States Government from 1950 to 1976,

with service and sacrifice of its employees.

Section 1103. Definitions

    Section 1103 sets forth the definitions of Air America

affiliates, covered decedents, qualifying service, and other

terminology.

Section 1104. Award authorized to eligible persons

    Section 1104 authorizes the Director of the CIA to award

payments to certain qualifying Air America employees and

survivors, and sets forth eligibility requirements for award

payments.

Section 1105. Funding limitation

    Section 1105 sets a $60 million funding limitation, with

the ability for the Director of the CIA to request additional

funds to fulfill eligible award payments.

Section 1106. Time limitation

    Section 1106 establishes a two-year time period within

which claimants must file their award claims. The two-year

period starts upon the date of Director of the CIA's

application regulations, and upon receiving a claim, the

Director has 90 days within which to make an eligibility

determination.

Section 1107. Application procedures

    Section 1107 requires the Director of the CIA to prescribe

procedures for claimants to apply for award payments.

Section 1108. Rule of construction

    Section 1108 clarifies that nothing in this subtitle shall

entitle any person to Federal benefits under Title 5, chapters

81, 83, or 84.

Section 1109. Attorneys' and agents' fees

    Section 1109 makes it unlawful for more than 25 percent of

an award payment to be paid to, or received by, any agent or

attorney for services rendered in connection with an award

payment.

Section 1110. No judicial review

    Section 1110 establishes that the Director of the CIA's

determinations under this subtitle are not subject to judicial

review.

Section 1111. Reports to Congress

    Section 1111 requires the Director of the CIA to submit

semiannual reports on the award payments made and denied (and,

if a denial, the rationale therefor).

                        TITLE XII--OTHER MATTERS

Section 1201. Enhanced authorities for amicus curiae under the Foreign

        Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978

    Section 1201 enhances the authorities of court-appointed

amici and establishes new requirements to appoint amici in a

broader array of cases.

Section 1202. Limitation on directives under Foreign Intelligence

        Surveillance Act of 1978 relating to certain electronic

        communication service providers

    Section 1202 provides that a directive may not be issued

pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act to a covered electronic communication service

provider, unless the covered provider is a provider of the type

of service at issue in the opinions of the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

Court of Review authorized for public release on August 23,

2023. Section 1202 also requires notification and reporting of

information concerning such directives.

Section 1203. Strengthening Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect

        for Elections through Independent Testing Act of 2024

    Section 1203 directs the Election Assistance Commission

(EAC) to require that voting systems undergo penetration

testing as part of the standard certification process for such

systems. Section 1203 also directs the NIST to accredit

entities that can perform such testing and directs the EAC to

create a voluntary vulnerability disclosure program for

election systems.

Section 1204. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board

        qualifications

    Section 1204 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism

Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000ee(h)(2)) to ensure

that experience in positions requiring a security clearance and

relevant national security experience are among the

qualifications that may be considered when appointing members

of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Section

1204 retains authority to consider expertise in civil liberties

and privacy when appointing members to the Board.

Section 1205. Parity in pay for staff of the Privacy and Civil

        Liberties Oversight Board and the intelligence community

    Section 1205 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism

Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000ee(j)(1)) to ensure

that staff of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board

may be paid a rate of pay comparable to employees of the IC.

Section 1206. Modification and repeal of reporting requirements

    Section 1206 modifies and repeals certain prior

congressional intelligence committee reporting requirements

that, for certain reasons, are no longer relevant or necessary

to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 1207. Technical amendments

    Section 1207 makes certain technical amendments relating to

IC facility construction and copyright permissions for works by

the United States Government.

                    Committee Comments and Direction

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Oversight

    The Committee is encouraged that DOD concurred with the

recommendations outlined by the Government Accountability

Office (GAO) in its October 2023 assessment of matters related

to DOD's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)

processing, exploiting, and disseminating (PED) capabilities

(GAO-24-106088C), and is interested in the prompt

implementation of these recommendations. The Committee notes

that the ODNI did not respond to GAO's report, but recognizes

the important coordination role that it should play in these

matters. Consequently, the Committee directs the Office of the

Secretary of Defense and ODNI to provide a briefing, 180 days

after passage of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2025, to the congressional defense and intelligence

committees, on the DOD implementation of recommendations made

by the above-noted GAO report, and ODNI's support to these

efforts. The briefing should include a discussion of the

progress made by DOD, in coordination with ODNI, in

implementing the recommendations in the GAO report, including

any actions they have taken, challenges they face, and

timelines for implementation. The briefing should also include

a discussion of any proposals to the Congress that would

streamline or otherwise improve efforts to address the

recommendations.

Plan for Increased Security at United States Installations Used by

        Intelligence Community

    At present, no unified plan across the IC exists for

restricting access to transportation security companies

accessing U.S. government facilities that house IC entities.

While U.S. government installations generally have access

requirements, including DOD, as described in 346(d) of the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (10

U.S.C. Sec. 2661 note prec.), the IC has yet to clarify a

congruent policy for all U.S. government installations that

house IC components. The Committee remains concerned at

potential counterintelligence gaps in access to U.S.

installations that house IC entities and subsidiaries.

    Therefore, the Committee directs that not later than 180

days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the DNI shall

submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a plan to

increase security at each installation under the control of the

United States that is used by one or more elements of the IC,

including by controlling access to such installations by any

employee or contractor of a transportation company.

Establishing a National Intelligence Manager for Counternarcotics

    In September 2023, the ODNI convened a 90-day Sprint Cell

hosted by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to

``identify opportunities to strengthen the IC integration of

intelligence and support to policymakers and operators in

disrupting the illicit fentanyl supply chain.'' On April 2,

2024, the NCTC presented to Committee staff its report, which

found that coordination between the IC and Federal Law

Enforcement can be improved to enhance government-wide efforts

to counter illicit fentanyl production and distribution.

Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI to establish, within

90 days of enactment of this act, a National Intelligence

Manager for Counternarcotics to focus exclusively on the

counternarcotics mission.

China's attempts to exploit knowledge of proprietary U.S. tactics,

        techniques, and procedures

    The Committee is concerned that our adversaries are

targeting U.S. and allied servicemembers, and have successfully

recruited former servicemembers, for employment in positions

that allow adversaries to harvest knowledge and receive

training on U.S., NATO, and allied military tactics, techniques

and procedures (TTPs). These proprietary TTPs are a critical

element of combat effectiveness that underpins our national

security.

    Therefore, to improve awareness of the threat and to

develop mitigation strategies, the committee directs the DNI,

working in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for

Intelligence and Security, to undertake a review and report to

the Committee, no later than 60 days after enactment, on (1)

China's collection efforts and intended use of the information;

(2) an assessment of the threat profile and related trends; and

(3) recommended mitigating actions that can be taken across the

targeted population including to protect U.S. servicemembers

during and after their service, including veterans who operate

commercial tactical training services. To contribute to public

awareness, the report shall be unclassified to the maximum

extent practicable, with a classified annex if needed.

Evolving Tactics of Transnational Criminal Organizations

    Our national security is enhanced by continuing to

strengthen border security in response to evolving threats. In

recent years, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs),

including those operating in Latin America and the border

region, have leveraged technological developments and

demonstrated an evolution in tactics in furtherance of

narcotics trafficking and other activities that threaten

national security. These have included the use of digital

platforms, cryptocurrency and encrypted communication systems

for a variety of activities, and testing the use of unmanned

aerial vehicles to move drugs across the U.S. border and

maritime transit routes.

    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI to brief the

Committee, no later than 60 days after enactment, on (1) new

tactics being utilized by TCOs, including leveraging digital

technologies to include social media, cryptocurrency, and

encrypted communications for recruitment and financial flows,

and the use of unmanned underwater and aerial vehicles to

facilitate surveillance and movement of materiel across

maritime and land borders; (2) an assessment of the risk posed

by these emergent capabilities; and (3) an assessment of

resources necessary to support IC elements in addressing these

developments.

Comptroller Review of Reporting and Response Procedures for Anomalous

        Health Incidents

    The Committee is committed to ensuring continued

investigation and research into anomalous health incidents

(AHIs), and to the provision of appropriate medical care and

compensation for individuals affected by such incidents. To

achieve these aims, the U.S. government must have effective,

standardized, and enforceable policies and procedures for

reporting and responding to AHIs. However, the Committee is

concerned that existing policies and procedures lack clarity

and may be inconsistently applied across agencies and

locations, potentially resulting in premature dismissals of

AHIs without adequate diligence or process.

    Therefore, the Committee directs the Comptroller General of

the United States to conduct a review of the policies and

procedures surrounding AHIs at U.S. government agencies,

including but not limited to the IC, DOD, and Department of

State. This review should evaluate:

          1. The extent to which federal agencies have

        established and are following processes and procedures

        for consistent AHI reporting, evaluation, and response,

        consistent with section 6603 of the National Defense

        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022.

          2. The adequacy and consistency of agency and/or

        site-specific procedures and criteria at overseas and

        domestic locations for responding to, investigating,

        and evaluating the credibility of potential AHIs,

        including assessing disparities across agencies,

        location, and individual types (e.g. overseas vs.

        domestic, military vs. civilian employee, vs.

        contractor vs. dependent) and any mechanisms for

        appealing credibility determinations.

          3. The extent to which each agency is collecting,

        storing, and sharing data regarding AHIs as outlined in

        current legislation, and the adequacy of the mechanisms

        to do so, including the government-wide database

        maintained by the NCSC.

          4. How the data in the NCSC database are managed,

        shared across government, and used to support research,

        investigations, intelligence collection, and/or for

        other purposes.

          5. Recommendations for improvements to existing

        policies, initiatives, and/or mechanisms to ensure

        efficient and consistent interagency coordination as it

        relates to the U.S. government's investigation of and

        response to AHIs.

          6. Any other aspect relating to U.S. government's

        response to or treatment of AHIs that the Comptroller

        General deems appropriate.

    The Committee further directs the Comptroller General to

brief the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, House

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Armed

Services Committee, House Armed Services Committee, Senate

Foreign Relations Committee, and the House Foreign Relations

Committee on preliminary observations not later than 90 days

after the date of enactment of this Act, and to provide a final

report at such time as is mutually agreed upon by the

committees and the Comptroller General.

Annual Comptroller General Report on Cybersecurity and Surveillance

        Threats to Congress

    Section 5710 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young

Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018,

2019, and 2020 (P.L. 116-92), codified at 2 U.S.C. Sec. 4111,

requires the Comptroller General of the United States to submit

to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report

on cybersecurity and surveillance threats to Congress. For the

next annual report conducted pursuant to this provision on

cybersecurity and surveillance threats to the Senate, the

Committee requests the Comptroller General to assess the

following:

          1. The extent to which the cryptography used in

        Senate collaboration platforms is consistent with

        leading cybersecurity practices, including those

        relating to end-to-end encryption.

          2. Challenges that prevent offices or committees from

        implementing strong cryptography--such as end-to-end

        encryption--on Senate collaboration platforms.

          3. Efforts taken by the Senate Sergeant at Arms (SAA)

        to safeguard the personal accounts, devices, and

        information of Senators, their staffs, and immediate

        families, and how those efforts compare to efforts

        taken by certain executive and judicial branch entities

        with statutory authority to safeguard the personal

        accounts, devices or information of employees.

          4. The techniques, means, and methods used by the

        Senate SAA to detect surveillance against, hacks of,

        and the deployment of spyware by foreign governments,

        on mobile devices subject to Senate SAA cybersecurity

        safeguards, and how those techniques, means, and

        methods compare to those used by executive branch

        agencies to detect and protect against such

        cybersecurity and surveillance threats to mobile

        devices managed by those agencies.

    As part of the report, the Comptroller General shall

include any resulting recommendations to improve Senate

policies and programs to meaningfully address related

cybersecurity and surveillance threats and to protect Senate

information.

    In conducting the above assessments, the Committee suggests

the Comptroller General consult with the Attorney General; the

DNI, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United

States Courts; the Director of the National Security Agency;

the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and State; the

Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper of the Senate and any other

agencies the Comptroller General determines to have information

necessary for conducting comprehensive assessments. The

Committee expects these officials to fully cooperate with the

Comptroller General and provide any information the Comptroller

General determines is necessary to complete this work.

Intelligence Community Directive Oversight

    Four years ago, ODNI updated the Technical Specifications

for Construction and Management of Sensitive Compartmented

Information Facilities (SCIFs) issued pursuant to Intelligence

Community Directive 705. The Committee supports ODNI's efforts

to ensure the Technical Specifications are regularly updated to

account for changing and emerging technology. However,

compliance with updated Technical Specifications also imposes

costs on departments and agencies, as well as private industry,

responsible for implementing the updated standards. These costs

include those associated with displacing personnel and/or

equipment from SCIF space in order to implement necessary

physical upgrades.

    Therefore, the Committee directs that not later than 180

days after the date of enactment of this Act, the DNI, in

coordination with the Under Secretary for Defense for

Intelligence and Security, submit to the congressional

intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the

Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of

Representatives, a 5-year plan to communicate and implement the

updated Technical Specifications. The briefing should include a

threat background brief, and cost estimates for departments and

agencies within the IC, and a plan to mitigate any loss of use

of SCIF space resulting from renovations necessary to implement

appropriate upgrades.

Committee Support for Ongoing Intelligence Community Collection,

        Analysis, and Research into Anomalous Health Incidents

    As noted previously by the Committee's September 2022

organizational assessment of the National Counterintelligence

and Security Center, the Committee is concerned about the

emerging foreign intelligence threat landscape facing the IC.

One of the key novel threats facing the IC workforce is AHIs.

Many years after the first incidents were publicly reported,

AHIs continue to be a vexing issue, as case definitions have

proven elusive, and controversy has shrouded the results of

analytical and research efforts to-date.

    While most IC agencies assessed in March 2023 that AHIs

reported by U.S. personnel to date were probably the result of

factors that did not involve a foreign adversary--such as

preexisting conditions, conventional illness, and environmental

factors--the assessment acknowledged intelligence gaps and the

existence of cases that could not be explained. The September

2022 IC Experts Panel also identified various research gaps and

made a range of recommendations to help the U.S. government

better understand, prevent, and manage AHIs, including calling

for coordinated intelligence collection, data analysis, and

research efforts across the U.S. government.

    The Committee believes a whole-of-government approach is

necessary to identify and mitigate novel personnel threats,

including AHIs. To that end, the Committee, in the classified

annex, directs the National Counterintelligence and Security

Center to develop a strategy for next generation force

protection; directs the CIA to redouble analytic efforts on

emerging threats, including AHIs; and bolsters the budgets of

several intelligence collection and research efforts focused on

directed energy technology and next generation sensors.

    The Committee also expresses support for ongoing Department

of Defense initiatives related to AHIs, including establishing

a registry of AHI reporters' medical data collected from the

military health system and planning for acute stage,

retrospective, and longitudinal studies of AHI reporters'

medical conditions. The Committee directs IC agencies to

provide robust support to these efforts as necessary and in

accordance with the detailed direction in our classified annex.

                            Committee Action

    On May 22, 2024, a quorum being present, the Committee met

to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The

Committee took the following actions:

Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex

    By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman's and

Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for

Fiscal Year 2025, the base text for purposes of amendment.

    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc twenty-two

amendments to the bill as follows: (1) an amendment by Chairman

Warner, and cosponsored by Senators Collins and Cotton, to take

actions against foreign ransomware actors and designate state

sponsors of ransomware; (2) an amendment by Chairman Warner,

and cosponsored by Senator Rounds, to prevent foreign terrorist

financing regimes; (3) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and

cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to make certain revisions

to the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding NCBC; (4)

an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice

Chairman Rubio, to make certain revisions to the Chairman's and

Vice Chairman's bill regarding genomic data and biosurveillance

capabilities; (5) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and

cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and Senator Casey, to

strengthen the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; (6) an

amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to impose limitations on

National Laboratories from admitting certain foreign nationals;

(7) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio expressing the Sense of

Congress on government personnel support for Foreign Terrorist

Organizations; (8) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to

include Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS officials and

members among aliens engaged in terrorist activity; (9) an

amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to require a report on the

threat of ISIS Khorasan to the United States; (10) an amendment

by Vice Chairman Rubio limiting the display of flags, seals,

and emblems other than the United States flag at IC facilities;

(11) an amendment by Senator Wyden to require a report on

sensitive commercially available information; (12) an amendment

by Senator Wyden to require a policy on collection of United

States location information; (13) an amendment by Senator

Heinrich, and cosponsored by Senator Ossoff, regarding Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act directives relating to certain

electronic communication service providers; (14) an amendment

by Senator Cotton to require continued oversight of Iranian

expenditures supporting foreign military and terrorist

activities; (15) an amendment by Senator Cotton to require a

plan for staffing the CIA's intelligence collection positions;

(16) an amendment by Senator Cornyn, and cosponsored by

Chairman Warner and Senator Kelly, to make certain revisions to

the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding emerging

technologies; (17) an amendment by Senator Moran regarding the

Coast Guard's expenditure of funds for certain intelligence and

counterintelligence activities; (18) an amendment by Senator

Lankford to require reporting on certain foreign nationals

encountered at the United States border; (19) an amendment by

Senator Gillibrand to extend certain funding limitations

relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena; (20) an amendment

by Senator Ossoff, and cosponsored by Senators Wyden and

Heinrich, to make certain technical revisions to the Chairman's

and Vice Chairman's bill regarding Privacy and Civil Liberties

Oversight Board members' qualifications; (21) an amendment by

Senator Ossoff to make certain technical revisions to the

Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding an assessment of

the likely course of war in Ukraine; and (22) an amendment by

Senator Rounds, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and

Senators Risch, Moran, Cornyn, and Cotton, to prevent

unauthorized access to IC property.

    By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to adopt a

second-degree amendment by Senator Warner to his own amendment

to protect technological measures designed to verify

authenticity or provenance of machine-manipulated media. By

voice vote, the Committee adopted Chairman Warner's amendment,

as amended.

    By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to adopt a

second-degree amendment by Senator Wyden to his own amendment

providing certain protections, imposing reporting requirements

on the IC regarding termination authorities, and prohibiting

the Director of the CIA from terminating an officer or employee

except in accordance with guidelines and regulations submitted

to the congressional intelligence committees, unless the

Director determines that such compliance poses a threat to U.S.

national security and provides an explanation for such

determination to the committees. By a vote of 10 ayes and 7

noes, the Committee adopted Senator Wyden's amendment, as

amended. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows:

Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--

aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--

aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator

Kelly--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator

Collins--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator

Moran--aye; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no.

    By voice vote, the Committee did not adopt an amendment by

Senator Wyden to revise the definition of electronic

communication service provider, as amended by the Reforming

Intelligence and Securing America Act, with Senator Wyden

recorded as an aye.

    Senator Cornyn offered an amendment to strike the provision

in the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill to revise the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act's amicus curiae

authorities, and withdrew it pending future consideration.

    By a vote of 9 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee adopted an

amendment by Senator Ossoff to establish pay parity for Privacy

and Civil Liberties Oversight Board staff with IC employees.

The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman

Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator

King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator

Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye; Vice

Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--no;

Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no;

Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no.

Votes to report the committee bill

    On May 22, 2024, the Committee voted to report the bill, as

amended, by a vote of 17 ayes and zero noes. The votes in

person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--aye;

Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye;

Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator Gillibrand--

aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye; Vice Chairman

Rubio--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator

Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye; Senator

Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye.

    By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to

make technical and conforming changes to the bill and

classified annex.

                       Compliance With Rule XLIV

    Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires

publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed

spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff

benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report

accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the

Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending

items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the

report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of

authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of

authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited

tariff benefits.

                           Estimate of Costs

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing

Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to

include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the

provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the

operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On May 23,

2024, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional

Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred

in carrying out the unclassified provisions.

                    Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the

Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no

substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing

the provisions of this legislation.

                        Changes to Existing Law

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the

Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is

necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to

expedite the business of the Senate.

               ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN RUBIO,

                   SENATOR RISCH, AND SENATOR ROUNDS

    During the markup of the Fiscal Year 2025 Intelligence

Authorization Act (IAA), the Committee adopted an amendment

that purported to provide Intelligence Community (IC) employees

with new employment protections, but in reality it will

increase risks to America's national security and hinder the

ability of Presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed IC

officials to make personnel decisions to meet mission needs. We

believe this provision--if enacted--will thwart the IC's

effectiveness and upend decades of Congress's efforts to

recognize the unique mission of the IC. Notably, the IC and

Department of Defense (DOD) strongly oppose this amendment.

    This amendment dictates to the heads of IC elements,

specifically the Director of National Intelligence and the

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the

Secretary of Defense, how to manage personnel decisions at

their own agencies. The amendment restricts the ability of

heads of IC elements from converting the employment status of

their own personnel and mandates that IC employees in converted

positions retain their competitive service rights under Title 5

even if the employee's position falls under the excepted

service. The amendment further inhibits the Director of the

Central Intelligence Agency from exercising termination

authorities under Title 50 by imposing burdensome requirements

to notify Congress about internal agency guidelines and

regulations--which Congress intentionally declined to codify

given the IC's unique national security mission and

responsibilities.

    Rather than protecting IC and certain DOD employees from

adverse actions, the amendment micromanages the Senate-

confirmed Directors' and Secretary's fundamental authorities

and responsibilities to maintain their workforce in the

interest of national security. The amendment requires

congressional notifications upon conversion of competitive

service positions to excepted service positions, or when the

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or the Secretary of

Defense make certain termination decisions, which becomes a

slippery slope toward unraveling the very specific and critical

IC employment protections that Congress has legislated over the

decades.

    Congress recognized the Central Intelligence Agency's

unique employment requirements by specifically exempting the

Central Intelligence Agency from Title 5's requirements in 5

U.S.C. Sec. 7511(b)(7). Congress further gave the Director of

the Central Intelligence Agency full discretion to manage

termination protocols, see 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3036, and followed

suit as to the Director of National Intelligence, see 50 U.S.C.

Sec. 3024. It was a long-debated, thoughtful process

culminating in gradual codifications to ensure that America has

the most efficient, effective, and capable men and women

protecting us from terrorism, counterintelligence threats,

weapons of mass destruction, and many other national security

perils that go unseen by the public.

    The IC and DOD leadership, entrusted by the President of

the United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, must be

able to ensure the best and most capable personnel are in

operational positions. They must be able to determine the right

course of action when an employee's actions harm their

employing agency, the workforce, or our national security. As

to the DOD, the amendment would impose dual-track employment

requirements, ultimately meaning that two respective employees

serving in the same positions would be paid and treated

differently.

    Given all of the above, this amendment appears to be an

attempt to impede future administrations' abilities to build a

workforce that meets current critical national security

challenges. There is no valid problem that this amendment is

attempting to solve.

                                   Marco Rubio.

                                   James E. Risch.

                                   M. Michael Rounds.

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025

includes critical protections for Intelligence Community

personnel against political firings and whistleblower

reprisals.

    My amendment to the bill ensures that personnel who are

involuntarily moved from one employment status to another can

retain their protections from firing. The amendment also

ensures that if an Intelligence Community employee is fired

without any due process, as is currently authorized, the agency

must explain its reasons to Congress. This oversight is

critical to protecting against politically motivated firings

and preserving the independence and professionalism of the

Intelligence Community.

    The bill includes a number of provisions I submitted

protecting Intelligence Community whistleblowers. One provision

allows classified whistleblower complaints to be provided

directly to Congress if the Inspector General determines that

sending the complaint to the whistleblower's agency, as the

statute currently requires, could compromise the anonymity of

the whistleblower or result in the complaint being delivered to

the subject of that complaint. Other provisions ensure that

whistleblowers can't have their security clearances revoked on

a pretext; allow for former Intelligence Community employees to

submit whistleblower complaints; remove the cap on damages for

retaliatory revocation of whistleblowers' clearances; and

prohibit, as acts of reprisal, public disclosures of

whistleblowers' identities as well as orders to undertake

psychological examinations.

    The bill includes two of my amendments that increase

oversight of and public reporting on the Intelligence

Community's collection of Americans' private data. Since the

beginning of this administration, I have pressed the

Intelligence Community to be transparent about its purchases of

sensitive data on Americans. On May 8, 2024, the Office of the

Director of National Intelligence released the Intelligence

Community Policy Framework for Commercially Available

Information. While I was disappointed that the Framework did

not prohibit the Intelligence Community from purchasing any

particular type of information, it did require IC elements to

report to the ODNI on its purchases of sensitive information on

Americans, while directing IC elements to employ privacy-

protecting safeguards. My amendment requires an annual report

to Congress on the Intelligence Community's access to and

collection, purchase and use of commercial datasets that

contain sensitive data on Americans, as well as its

implementation of the safeguards. The amendment also codifies

the Framework's requirement of a public report every two years.

    In the years since the 2018 U.S. Supreme Court case of

Carpenter v. United States, the Intelligence Community's

policies with regard to the warrantless collection of U.S.

location data have been both inconsistent and opaque. My

amendment to the bill brings clarity to this long-standing

problem by requiring the Intelligence Community to issue a

public policy on its collection of U.S. location information.

    For years, I have worked to reform the country's broken

classification and declassification system. In particular, I

have joined with Senator Jerry Moran to ensure that there be an

Executive Agent for Classification and Declassification to lead

a fully integrated, U.S. government-wide reform effort. My

provision directs the President to designate an Executive Agent

and provide a clear funding plan for governing the reform

process, including money for the perpetually under-resourced

Public Interest Declassification Board.

    The bill modifies the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

(FISA) in several ways. In April 2024, as the Senate considered

the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA), I

sought to strike from the bill a sweeping new definition of

electronic communications service provider that would authorize

the government to force almost any American with access to a

server, a wire, a cable box or wifi to participate in

warrantless surveillance under Section 702 of FISA. At the

time, the Department of Justice stated that it would only apply

the new authorities to the type of service provider at issue in

a 2023 FISA Court case. However, no such limitation was in the

statute.

    The Intelligence Authorization Act represents a significant

improvement, codifying that limitation and adding provisions

allowing for FISA Court review and congressional oversight of

the new authorities. However, the actual boundaries of what is

legal under the new authorities remain hidden from the public.

It is a fundamental democratic principle that an American

citizen should be able to read the law and have some inkling

about what the government is and is not permitted to do,

particularly when it comes to warrantless surveillance.

    For this reason, I offered an amendment to replace the new

authorities with a clear articulation of which providers are

now subject to Section 702. This amendment would have allowed

the public to understand the intent and effect of the new

surveillance authorities, while permitting an informed, open

debate in Congress when these authorities sunset in 2026. The

defeat of my amendment unfortunately perpetuates secret law, a

problem that undermines trust in government and the Congress.

Voters have a need and a right to understand the limits of what

is and is not permitted under the law, so that they can ratify

or reject decisions that elected officials make on their

behalf.

    The bill includes a provision strengthening the role of the

amicus curiae in the FISA Court. Many of these reforms

originated in the USA RIGHTS Act, which I introduced in 2017

with a bipartisan, bicameral coalition. In 2020, they passed

the Senate by a 77-19 vote thanks to the leadership of Senators

Lee and Leahy, although they were not passed into law at that

time. I commend Chairman Warner and Vice Chairman Rubio for

continuing to push for these important reforms and for

including them in this bill.

    Finally, the bill includes a provision granting the

Attorney General new powers to police the labeling of AI-

generated media. This provision is modeled on the Digital

Millennium Copyright Act's anti-circumvention provisions, which

are extremely controversial and have chilled legitimate

cybersecurity research. The use of this problematic legislative

framework to address the cutting-edge issue of AI-generated

media raises numerous First Amendment and other questions that

need to be considered and debated in public. I am also

concerned about a blanket exemption for intelligence agencies

as well as law enforcement, state actors and contractors at all

levels to use unlabeled deepfake material.

                                                         Ron Wyden.

                  ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR HEINRICH

    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025

that the Senate Intelligence Committee reported out on May 22,

2024, includes a provision I drafted that would limit the new

definition of Electronic Communication Service Provider (ECSP)

in the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA)

to providers of the type of service at issue in the 2023 FISA

Court and FISA Court of Review opinions. The language was part

of a managers' amendment that was accepted with bipartisan

support.

    My provision is intended to be consistent with the

statement in the Assistant Attorney General letter of April 17,

2024, that: ``The Department commits to applying this

definition of ECSP exclusively to cover the type of service

provider at issue in the litigation before the FISC [Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Court].'' The letter went further to

explain that ``[t]he number of technology companies providing

this service is extremely small.''

    My provision is also intended to be consistent with the

clarification in the Explanatory Statement to accompany RISAA

that ``Congress intends that the amended ECSP definition will

be used exclusively to cover the type of service provider at

issue in the litigation before the FISC.''

    I also supported an amendment to the Intelligence

Authorization Act that would prohibit the intentional,

deceptive removal of content provenance information, such as a

watermark, label, or metadata attached to an image that

demonstrates where it came from. As the quality and

availability of AI-powered digital content generation tools

increases, content provenance information will be an

increasingly important basis of trust in the online information

ecosystem.

    The amendment takes an enforcement approach based on civil

actions against end users that deceptively remove content

provenance information (or providers of software that help

enable this removal). In order to truly address the problem of

online disinformation at scale, however, I believe the bulk of

the responsibility lies with online content distributors and

social media platforms to ensure that content provenance

information is available and transmitted faithfully, rather

than with end users.

                                                   Martin Heinrich.