[Senate Report 105-1]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
105th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 105-1
_______________________________________________________________________
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
__________
SPECIAL REPORT
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
JANUARY 4, 1995 TO OCTOBER 3, 1996
January 22, 1997.--Ordered to be printed
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama,
Chairman
J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska, Vice
Chairman
JOHN GLENN, Ohio JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
BOB GRAHAM, Florida MIKE DEWINE, Ohio
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JON KYL, Arizona
MAX BAUCUS, Montana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
CARL LEVIN, Michigan WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
DAN COATS, Indiana
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi, Ex
Officio
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota,
Ex Officio
------
Taylor W. Lawrence, Staff Director
Christopher C. Straub, Minority
Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, January 22, 1997.
Dear Mr. President: As Chairman and Vice Chairman of the
Select Committee on Intelligence, we submit to the Senate the
Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of its
activities during the 104th Congress from January 4, 1995 to
October 4, 1996 under the Chairmanship of Senator Arlen Specter
and the Vice Chairmanship of Senator Bob Kerrey. The Committee
is charged by the Senate with the responsibility of carrying
out oversight of the intelligence activities of the United
States. While the majority of its work is of necessity
conducted it secrecy, the Committee believes that intelligence
activities should be as accountable as possible to the public.
This public report to the Senate is intended to contribute to
that requirement.
Sincerely,
Richard Shelby,
Chairman.
J. Robert Kerrey,
Vice-Chairman.
C O N T E N T S
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PREFACE
Page
I. Introduction.....................................................1
II. Legislation......................................................4
Intelligence Budget...................................... 4
S. 922 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996................................................. 5
S. 1718 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997................................................. 5
Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996.............. 6
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.................. 7
III. Arms Control.....................................................8
Chemical Weapons Convention.............................. 8
START II Treaty.......................................... 9
IV. Counterintelligence.............................................10
The Aldrich Ames Espionage Case.......................... 10
French Flap.............................................. 11
Economic Espionage....................................... 12
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.................... 13
V. Counterterrorism................................................13
Terrorism Threat Overview................................ 13
Khubar Towers and OPM-SANG Bombings...................... 14
VI. Counterproliferation............................................15
Non-Proliferation........................................ 15
North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs........ 16
Long-Range Missile Threat................................ 16
VII. Oversight Activities............................................17
National Security Threats to the United States........... 17
Intelligence Support to U.S. Efforts in Bosnia........... 18
Inquiry into U.S. Actions Regarding Iranian and Other
Arms Transfers to the Bosnian Army................... 18
Congressional Notification of Foreign Policy Decisions... 21
Persian Gulf Syndrome.................................... 22
Zona Rosa................................................ 22
Vietnamese Commandos..................................... 23
CIA/Contra/Cocaine Link.................................. 23
CIA Use of Journalists, Clergy, and Peace Corps
Volunteers in Intelligence Operations................ 24
Guatemala................................................ 24
Intelligence Support to Law Enforcement.................. 25
Congressional Notifications of Intelligence Activities... 25
Airborne Reconnaissance.................................. 26
National Reconnaissance Office Carry Forward............. 26
Small Satellites......................................... 27
Convert Action........................................... 27
Encryption Export Policy................................. 27
Security of the U.S. Information Infrastructure.......... 28
Jane Doe Thompson Case................................... 29
Oversight of the Intelligence Community Inspectors
General.............................................. 29
Organized Crime in the Former Soviet Union............... 30
Program Review and Audit Staff........................... 30
VIII.Foreign Intelligence............................................31
North Korea.............................................. 31
Iraq..................................................... 32
Russia................................................... 32
China.................................................... 32
Mexico................................................... 32
Economic Espionage....................................... 33
Environmental and Demographic Intelligence............... 33
Intelligence Sharing with the United Nations............. 34
IX. Confirmations...................................................35
DCI John M. Deutch....................................... 35
DDCI George J. Tenet..................................... 35
X. Committee Internal Reforms and Enhancements.....................35
End of the Designee System............................... 35
Term Limits.............................................. 36
PolicyNet................................................ 36
Appendix......................................................... 39
Summary of Committee Activities.......................... 39
Number of Meetings................................... 39
Bills and Resolutions Originated by the Committee.... 39
Bills Referred to the Committee...................... 39
Committee Publications............................... 39
Memorandum of Agreement Regarding TIARA and JMIP..... 40
105th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 105-1
_______________________________________________________________________
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
_______
January 22, 1997.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Shelby, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the
following
SPECIAL REPORT
I. Introduction
May 19, 1996 marked the twentieth anniversary of the
creation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The
Committee was established in 1976 by Senate Resolution 400 of
the 94th Congress in order to strengthen congressional
oversight of the programs and activities of U.S. intelligence
agencies. Throughout its twenty-year history, the Committee has
attempted to carry out its oversight responsibilities in a
genuinely bipartisan fashion. During the 104th Congress, the
Committee continued this bipartisan tradition in crafting
important intelligence reform legislation, conducting several
inquiries into intelligence community issues, and by providing
funding for and oversight of a wide array of U.S. intelligence
activities.
As part of its oversight responsibilities, the Committee
performs an annual review of the budget and prepares
legislation authorizing appropriations for the various civil
and military agencies and departments comprising the
Intelligence Community. The Committee also conducts periodic
audits, investigations, and inspections of intelligence
activities and programs with the goal of assuring that the
appropriate departments and agencies of the United States
provide informed and timely intelligence necessary for the
executive and legislative branches to make sound decisions
affecting the national security interests of the nation and
that U.S. military commanders have dominant awareness of any
potential battle environment. More importantly, the Committee's
oversight seeks to ensure that intelligence activities and
programs conform with the Constitution and laws of the United
States of America.
The Intelligence Community developed after World War II
with a central focus of providing United States civilian and
military leadership with the intelligence necessary to conduct
national security policy in our relationship with the Soviet
Union. With the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., and the
accompanying loss of this overriding intelligence focus, the
agencies and departments within the Intelligence Community have
begun to redirect their efforts to the national security issues
now confronting the United States or which may develop in the
coming years. Further, the emergence and growth of
transnational threats such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking,
international criminal organizations, and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction present our nation and the
Intelligence Community with challenges requiring different
doctrine, policy, and programs. With these new challenges and
threats confronting our nation comes an increasing need for the
oversight provided by the Committee to ensure our nation's
leaders have the intelligence necessary to make informed
national security decisions.
To address the intelligence challenges of the post-Cold War
world, the Select Committee on Intelligence made intelligence
reform legislation a major focus in the Fiscal Year 1997
Intelligence Authorization bill. The Intelligence Renewal and
Reform Act of 1996 included a number of substantial provisions
which will make the Intelligence Community more effective, more
efficient, and more accountable for its actions. The Committee
succeeded in including these provisions in the authorization
bill passed by Congress, and President Clinton signed these
reforms into law on October 11, 1996.
These reforms included the creation of two new committees
of the National Security Council, the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence and the Committee on Transnational Threats; the
establishment of a new Senate-confirmed Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence for Community Management and three new
Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence to assist the DCI
in managing the Intelligence Community; new authority for the
Director of Central Intelligence to concur to be consulted with
respect to the appointments of the heads of the principal
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) agencies;
strengthening the ability of the Director of Central
Intelligence to manage the Intelligence Community by codifying
his authority to participate in the development of the budgets
for defense-wide and tactical intelligence; giving the DCI a
database of all intelligence activities and requiring all NFIP
elements to submit periodic budget execution reports;
clarifying that U.S. law enforcement agencies may ``task''
intelligence collection agencies to collect intelligence about
non-U.S. persons outside the United States to enable CIA, NSA,
and other collection agencies to better support law enforcement
efforts; and the requirement that the DCI submit to the
Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the appropriate
congressional committees an evaluation of the performance and
responsiveness of the NSA, NRO, and NIMA in meeting their
national missions.
During the 104th Congress, the Committee continued its
investigation into the Aldrich Ames espionage case by reviewing
reports and holding hearings and briefings regarding
assessments on the damage done to U.S. national security
interests by Ames's activities. The Committee identified the
failure of the CIA to validate information received from
Russian sources, especially after the execution of several
Russian assets Ames had compromised. As a result, the CIA has
improved its counterintelligence efforts, is engaged in
additional damage assessment efforts, and has revamped its
procedures for dissemination of reporting from sensitive
assets. The Committee also convinced the Department of Defense
and the Department of State to conduct their own damage
assessments. While preliminary damage assessments of the
reports from tainted sources have been received from the
Department of State and Defense, the Committee continues to
monitor new findings on how the Ames case has affected U.S.
intelligence and counterintelligence efforts.
The conflict in Bosnia and U.S. policy in the region were
the focus of substantial Committee activity during the 104th
Congress. The Committee held numerous hearings and briefings on
intelligence community support to the deployed Americans forces
and the investigation into war crimes in Bosnia. with the
signing of the Dayton Peace Accords and the introduction of
U.S. ground troops into Bosnia as part of the Implementation
Force (IFOR), the Committee conducted an extensive review of
intelligence support to U.S. military forces in Bosnian
theater. This effort supplemented the Committee's continuing
oversight of the adequacy of intelligence support to U.S.
government efforts in the former Yugoslavia.
The Committee in early 1996 began an inquiry into U.S.
actions regarding Iranian and other arms shipments to the
Bosnian Army after press reports revealed that the Clinton
Administration had secretly decided not to intervene against
these violations of the arms embargo. The Committee held three
public hearings, four closed hearings, and six informal
sessions on this subject. While it did not reach a conclusion
as to whether the actions of U.S. officials constituted covert
action, the Committee did find that the Clinton Administration
should have communicated such a significant policy change to
Congress. The Committee also found three areas in which
administrative or legislative actions appeared to be required.
During the 104th Congress, the Committee conducted an
investigation of CIA activities in Guatemala, focusing on the
1990 murder of American citizen Michael DeVine and the death of
Guatemala guerrilla Efrain Bamaca Velasquez. This review
focused on allegations of CIA misconduct in the events
surrounding the DeVine murder and the fate of Efrain Bamaca.
The Committee also looked at accusations that the CIA funded
intelligence programs in Guatemala in contravention of U.S.
policy. In 1995, the CIA Inspector General completed an
investigation into CIA operations in Guatemala. As a result of
these inquiries, DCI John Deutch disciplined a number of CIA
personnel involved with operations in Guatemala.
The Committee held a number of briefings regarding proposed
legislation liberalizing the export of encryption products and
its likely impact on national security interests. To provide
the Senate with further information on this legislation, the
Committee took the lead in arranging a classified briefing that
provided all interested Senators the opportunity to directly
question the DCI, the Director of the FBI, and the Deputy
Attorney General, all of whom play pivotal roles in the
development and implementation of Administration encryption
export policy. As the Administration's encryption policy
continues to develop, the Committee will continue to assess how
changes will affect the collection and protection of national
security information.
The Committee held a total of 131 hearings or on-the-record
briefings, including thirty open hearings, seventy-nine
oversight hearings, eighteen legislative hearings, five
nomination hearings, seventeen Committee business or
legislative mark-up meetings, and twelve on-the-record
briefings. The unprecedented number of hearings, meetings, and
briefings held by the Committee reflects its charter to oversee
the wide range of national security issues confronting our
nation. Further, by holding thirty open hearings, the Committee
more than ever before has provided the American public a
greater awareness of the role of intelligence in the formation
of our national security policy and the role of congressional
oversight of this process while, in the process, protecting
intelligence sources and methods.
II. Legislation
a. intelligence budget
The Committee conducted annual reviews of the fiscal year
1996 and fiscal year 1997 budget requests for the DCI's
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). These reviews
included taking testimony from senior Intelligence Community
officials and evaluating detailed budget justification
documents and numerous Intelligence Community responses to
specific questions raised by the Committee. As a result of
these reviews, the Committee made recommendations, approved by
the Senate, that resulted in net reductions to the
Administration's funding requests for national intelligence.
During this period the Committee also took action to reduce
excess authorized and appropriated funds that had accumulated
in the budget of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The
Committee concurred with an initiative by the Defense
Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee in fiscal year
1996 to reduce available NRO funds by $1.2 billion, and with a
later Administration request to rescind $820 million of NRO
funds to pay for Bosnia operations.
As a result, when the $2 billion excess NRO forward funds
that were rescinded or reprogrammed are taken into account,
NFIP funding is now 13% lower in real terms than it was in
fiscal year 1990, and at its lowest level since fiscal year
1985.
The Committee also reviewed the Administration's fiscal
year 1996 and fiscal year 1997 requests for Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) and a new
intelligence funding category, the Joint Military Intelligence
Program (JMIP). The Committee's review of TIARA, which falls
under the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee, has
been in the form of separate letter-recommendations to that
committee for consideration in the Defense Authorization bill.
However, the new intelligence program--JMIP--contained
activities that formerly had been funded in NFIP as well as
TIARA, resulting in a jurisdictional dispute between the two
committees. Discussions resulted in an April 29, 1996
Memorandum of Agreement (see Appendix D) between the two
committees which allows for a defined and formal role for the
intelligence committee in the oversight of TIARA and JMIP while
acknowledging that the Armed Services Committee has
authorization jurisdiction over both programs.
B. S. 922 intelligence authorization act for fiscal year 1996
On June 14, 1995, the Committee reported out S. 922, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996. In
addition to providing the annual authorization for
appropriations for intelligence activities, the bill, inter
alia, authorized the President to delay imposing sanctions
against countries engaged in weapons proliferation in order to
protect intelligence sources and methods; provided for
forfeiture of the Government's contribution to an employee's
Thrift Savings Plan for those employees convicted of national
security offenses; amended the Hatch Act to allow intelligence
community employees to participate more actively in certain
local elections; and amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act to
permit the FBI to obtain consumer credit records necessary in
foreign counterintelligence investigations.
The Senate passed S. 922 on September 29, 1995 and agreed
to the conference report on the House counterpart bill on
December 21, 1995. The President signed the legislation as
Public Law 104-93 on January 6, 1996.
C. S. 1718 intelligence authorization act for fiscal year 1997
The Committee reported out S. 1718, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, on April 30, 1996. The
full Senate passed the bill on September 17 and approved the
conference report on the legislation on September 25. The
authorization act was signed by the President as Public Law
104-293 on October 11, 1996.
The Fiscal Year 1997 Authorization Act included a number of
significant legislative provisions in addition to the annual
authorization of appropriations. In particular, Title VIII of
the Act, short-titled the ``Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act
of 1996,'' contained provisions (described below) intended to
improve the operation of the Intelligence Community in the
post-Cold War world.
Other provisions in the Fiscal Year 1997 Act provided for
expedited naturalization for families of U.S. intelligence
assets killed as a result of unauthorized disclosures by U.S.
officials (such as convicted spy Aldrich Ames); placed
restrictions on intelligence-sharing with the United Nations so
as to protect against unauthorized disclosure of such
information; provided that it is U.S. policy not to use U.S.
journalists as intelligence assets unless the President or DCI
waives this policy in a particular case and notifies the
intelligence committees of Congress; required the DCI to issue
guidelines prohibiting some former CIA employees from working
for a foreign government for a period of three years after
leaving the CIA; and created a commission to study the
organization of the federal government to combat proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction.
D. intelligence renewal and reform act of 1996
During the second session of the 104th Congress, the
Committee focused much of its attention on consideration and
passage of legislation to make the Intelligence Community
operate more efficiently, more effectively, and more
accountably in the post-Cold War world. Begun in the early
1990s, these efforts were spurred by a perception among many
members of Congress and the public that the thirteen-agency
Community had lost its focus after the Cold War and needed
better guidance and direction.
The Committee held six hearings and three member-level
briefings on intelligence reorganization and reform proposals.
The twenty-six witnesses included former DCIs Webster, Turner,
and Woolsey; former Committee Chairmen Durenberger, Deconcini,
and Moynihan; and a broad array of intelligence consumers and
academic observers. Committee staff also conducted numerous
interviews with current and former intelligence professionals
and other knowledgeable individuals.
On March 1, 1996, the Committee received the report of the
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S.
Intelligence Community, the 17-member independent commission
that Congress had created in 1994 to study the Intelligence
Community. On March 6, after receiving testimony from the
Commission's Chairman, Harold Brown, Chairman Specter and Vice
Chairman Kerrey introduced S. 1593, which contained the
legislative recommendations of the Commission.
The Committee included its own renewal and reform
legislation as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997. The Committee's legislation built on the
recommendations of the Brown Commission but went further in a
number of significant respects.
A number of the provisions in the Committee's bill that
would have enhanced the authorities of the Director of Central
Intelligence were resisted strongly by the Department of
Defense, which viewed these provisions as reducing the
Secretary of Defense's control over defense intelligence
agencies. After extended discussions with the Senate Armed
Services Committee, the Committee agreed to drop or modify
several of these measures.
In its final form, the legislation provided the DCI new
authorities and a new management structure to manage the
Intelligence Community. The legislation amended the National
Security Act of 1947 to create a new Senate-confirmed Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management and
three new Senate-confirmed Assistant Directors of Central
Intelligence to oversee collection, analysis, and
administrative functions across the Community. In addition, the
Secretary of Defense will be required to secure the DCI's
concurrence in the appointments of the heads of the NSA, NRO,
and the new National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) or to
inform the President of the DCI's non-concurrence when
recommending persons for appointment to those positions, and to
be consulted regarding the appointments of the heads of the
principal departmental intelligence units. He will also submit
to the Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the appropriate
congressional committees an evaluation of the performance and
responsiveness of the NSA, NRO, and NIMA in meeting the needs
of national policymakers.
A number of provisions were included to help improve
budgetary controls throughout the Intelligence Community. By
codifying his authority to participate in the development of
the budgets for defense-wide and tactical intelligence, this
Act strengthens the ability of the Director of Central
Intelligence to manage the Intelligence Community's resources.
Other provisions call for the creation of a budget database of
all intelligence activities and require that all NFIP elements
submit periodic budget execution reports to improve financial
oversight.
In response to the growing transnational threat to the
national security, the Act contained a provision clarifying the
authority of U.S. law enforcement agencies to task intelligence
collection agencies to collect information about non-U.S.
persons outside the United States. This provision will enable
the CIA, NSA, and other collection agencies to better support
law enforcement efforts.
The legislation also established two new cabinet-level
committees of the National Security Council: a Committee on
Foreign Intelligence to provide overall policy and resource
guidance for the Intelligence Community; and a Committee on
Transnational Threats to direct the various activities of the
federal government in fighting terrorism, international
narcotics trafficking, and other global crimes.
Although the final legislation did not include all of the
provisions the Committee would have liked to have enacted, the
Committee believes that the DCI has been given important new
tools to help manage the Intelligence Community more
efficiently and more effectively.
E. THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY
In December 1995, the DCI, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed the
establishment of a new National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(NIMA) within the Department of Defense. NIMA was created to
provide an agency with broad authorities for the tasking,
collection, and dissemination of imagery and imagery products;
production and dissemination of imagery intelligence and
geospatial information; programming and budgeting; the conduct
of associated research and development; and, the acquisition of
common systems. The Central Imagery Office, the Defense Mapping
Agency, the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the
DIA's imagery exploitation element, the Air Force's Defense
Dissemination Program Office (DDPO), and several other imagery-
related offices have now all been consolidated into NIMA.
NIMA will have over 9,000 employees and manage
approximately 25 percent of the imagery and geospatial
information activities contained in the U.S. Defense and
Intelligence programs. It will also review the plans, budgets,
and acquisitions for the remaining 75 percent of the U.S.
imagery system to assure compliance with policy and data
standards and architectures.
The Committee included legislative provisions to establish
NIMA in the Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization bill. A
more comprehensive legislative framework was subsequently
included by the Armed Services Committee in the Fiscal Year
1997 National Defense Authorization bill, and accordingly the
Committee agreed to delete the provisions relating to NIMA from
its bill. At the same time, the Committee amended provisions in
the Defense bill to ensure that the interests of national
policymakers are served by NIMA. The Committee's amendments
codified the DCI's tasking authority over national imagery
assets, provided that the Director of NIMA could be either a
civilian or an military officer, stipulated the Secretary of
Defense must obtain the concurrence of the DCI, or note the
DCI's lack of concurrence, before making a nomination
recommendation to the President, and included language in the
National Security Act, Title 50 of the U.S. Code, stating
NIMA's responsibility to provide intelligence for the national
policymaker. The legislation creating the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency was signed into law by President Clinton on
September 23, 1996.
III. Arms Control
A. Chemical Weapons Convention
In order to assist the full Senate in its consideration of
whether to advise and consent to the ratification of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
Destruction (CWC), the Committee in 1994 undertook a thorough
review of the ability of the U.S. Intelligence Community to
monitor compliance by states party to the CWC.
In particular, the Committee examined issues surrounding
the monitoring effectiveness of the U.S. Government's
unilateral resources and the CWC's on-site inspection regime;
the interpretation and implementation of the CWC, including its
three annexes; the counterintelligence and security
implications of the CWC; and the implications of the CWC for
private companies, in light of the obligations imposed on such
companies to provide data declarations and to host on-site
inspections.
The Intelligence Community told the Committee in 1994 that
the CWC will provide another tool in the U.S. inventory of
means to circumscribe and stem the worldwide expansion of
chemical weapons capabilities and to assist in monitoring
chemical weapons programs worldwide. This point has been
reiterated to the Committee during additional staff briefings
on the CWC during the 104th Congress.
The Committee's public report to the Senate (Senate Report
103-390) was approved by a vote of sixteen members in favor and
none opposed. The Committee's report was provided to the Senate
in anticipation of action on the CWC. However, no Senate action
was taken with regard to the CWC in the 103rd Congress.
In anticipation of Senate consideration of the CWC during
the second session of the 104th Congress, the Committee staff
reviewed developments over the last two years to determine
whether any changes or updating of the Committee's 1994 report
were in order, and determined that its findings and
recommendations in the 1994 report with respect to the ability
of U.S. intelligence to monitor compliance by states party to
the CWC remained substantially valid, and, thus, no new report
was in order.
The 1994 Committee report to the Senate contained fourteen
recommendations. In recommendations 1, 6, and 7, the Committee
proposed that certain conditions and declarations be
incorporated in the resolution of ratification and the CWC
implementing legislation. Recommendations 2, 3, and 10 were put
forward as the basis for additional declarations in the
resolution of ratification. The great majority of those
recommendations were incorporated in the resolution of
ratification reported favorably by the Committee on Foreign
Relations to the Senate in April 1996. However, the 104th
Congress adjourned without acting on the Chemical Weapons
Convention. The Committee will continue to review the CWC and
issues surrounding the treaty in anticipation of its
consideration during the 105th Congress.
B. Start II Treaty
The Committee prepared an unclassified as well as a
classified report totalling over 100 pages during the 104th
Congress to provide the Senate its assessment of the arms
control monitoring and counterintelligence issues raised by the
START II Treaty.
This report was the culmination of the Committee's work
over some thirteen years monitoring the progress of the START
negotiations. The Committee routinely reviewed START progress
and addressed START monitoring capabilities in its annual
Intelligence Authorization Acts. Committee members and staff
met numerous times with U.S. negotiators, in both Washington
and Geneva. The Committee expressed its views on verification
issues to the negotiators and to other senior level officials
both formally and informally.
In preparation for the Senate vote on advice and consent to
ratification of the START II Treaty, Committee staff held
numerous staff briefings; reviewed hundreds of documents,
including National Intelligence Estimates of U.S. capabilities
to monitor compliance with START provisions and written
statements from the Director and Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence; and asked numerous formal questions for the
record. Committee staff also travelled to intelligence
collection sites to gain a more detailed, first-hand knowledge
of how the Intelligence Community collects, and how its
analysts use, information bearing upon other countries'
compliance with arms control agreements signed by the United
States.
On May 12, 1993, the Committee held a closed hearing on the
START II Treaty, its implementation and its counterintelligence
and security implications. Testimony was taken at this hearing
from the Honorable Linton Brooks, U.S. Negotiator for Strategic
Offensive Arms; Major General Gary Curtin, USAF, Deputy
Director for International Negotiations, J-5, the Joint Staff;
and Dr. Lawrence Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for
Strategic Programs.
On March 1, 1995, the Committee held a closed hearing on
U.S. monitoring capabilities and the risks and implications of
violations by the other party to the Treaty. At this hearing,
the Committee took testimony from Mr. Douglas MacEachin, Deputy
Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency;
Ambassador Linton Brooks, Chief U.S. START Negotiator; and Dr.
Amy Sands, Assistant Director, Bureau of Intelligence,
Verification and Information Support, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.
The Committee also received numerous responses to questions
for the record that were submitted to the Executive branch
after these hearings, and the results of these inquiries were
integrated into its report. Throughout the Committee's efforts,
experts in the U.S. Intelligence Community produced a detailed
and honest analysis of the strengths and limitations of U.S.
monitoring capabilities, in 1993, and an update of this and a
related analysis in 1995. The Committee was especially pleased
to find in these analyses a straightforward discussion of the
differences between agencies on some major issues.
As is the case with START I monitoring, the United States
will rely upon a combination of capabilities--including
imagery, signals intelligence, human intelligence, open-source
information and the verification provisions of the START I and
START II Treaties--to monitor compliance with the provisions of
START II. Those verification provisions include on-site
inspections, exhibitions of equipment for either on-site or
satellite-based observation, perimeter and portal continuous
monitoring (PPCM), notifications, unencrypted telemetry, and
exchanges of data, including telemetry. The Intelligence
Community assesses a high probability of detecting questionable
activity that might be contrary to the Treaty.
The Committee agreed with the Intelligence Community that
U.S. reconnaissance assets are generally sufficient to monitor
compliance with both START Treaties. Congress endeavored to
maintain and enhance those capabilities in the intelligence
budget for Fiscal Year 1996, as well as in past years. The
Committee is concerned, however, that U.S. capabilities could
be insufficient if competition for scarce collection and
analytic resources were intense and if Russian practices were
to change in ways designed to impede U.S. monitoring. The
Committee recommended that the President be required to certify
the sufficiency of U.S. monitoring capabilities regarding those
START II provisions relating to ICBM and SLBM capabilities and
to report to Congress on how such sufficiency will be assured.
The Committee also urged the Executive branch to pursue a firm
policy regarding Russian actions that may violate the terms of
START I or START II, including the verification provisions of
those Treaties. The majority of the Committee's recommendations
were incorporated into the resolution of ratification
accompanying the Treaty.
The Senate ratified the START II Treaty by a vote of 87-4
on January 26, 1996.
IV. Counterintelligence
A. The Aldrich Ames Espionage Case
During the 104th Congress, the Committee continued its
inquiry into the Aldrich Ames espionage case. The Committee
held five hearings to review the Intelligence Community's
continuing investigation into this case and its assessment of
damage caused by Mr. Ames' actions. Although the true damage
resulting from Ames' disclosures may not be known for years and
may in fact never be known, the analysis completed to date
suggests that the Russians and perhaps other countries'
intelligence agencies know detailed information about United
States intelligence gathering, analysis, dissemination, and
decision-making structure, and that for years the KGB/SVR
controlled raw information that flowed to the CIA and that was
passed on to high-level U.S. consumers at the policy level,
including President Bush and President-elect Clinton.
As part of the CIA's responsibility to keep the
intelligence committees ``fully and currently informed of * * *
any significant intelligence failure,'' CIA Inspector General
Fred Hitz completed an investigation on the assessment of
damage caused by the Aldrich Ames espionage case in October
1995. This investigation revealed the failure of the CIA to
validate information received from Russian sources, even after
the execution of several Russian assets compromised by Ames.
The CIA appears to have done little to verify whether or not
the information being provided by Soviet/Russian sources was
truthful or part of a Russian perception management campaign.
Further, the CIA Directorate of Operations either failed to
inform or misinformed consumers and policymakers about
reporting known or suspected to be under hostile control. This
failure to inform was carried out despite CIA suspicions
regarding tainted sources as early as 1986 when the Soviet
agents identified by Ames were being arrested and executed, and
despite a March 1991 report on the Soviet/East European (SE)
Division in which the CIA Inspector General (IG) made a number
of important comments and suggestions regarding SE Division
counterintelligence shortcomings.
As a result of the CIA IG investigation and its revelations
of tainted intelligence reporting, the Department of State and
the Department of Defense completed preliminary studies which
concluded these reports had played no significant role in any
policy, doctrinal, or budgetary decisions. The Committee will
continue to investigate the ramifications of Ames's treason as
other evidence comes to light and further analysis is
completed.
B. french flap
In early 1995, French officials made detailed allegations
regarding CIA intelligence activities in France. Although the
timing and nature of these allegations were possibly the result
of French internal political considerations, the resulting
uproar led the Committee to conduct a review covering a wide-
range of issues related to counterintelligence and economic
intelligence. As part of this review, the Committee requested
that the CIA Inspector General (IG) conduct an investigation
into what became known as the ``French Flap,'' and provide
recommendations for corrective measures, if appropriate.
The Committee received the CIA Inspector General Report in
March 1996. Shortly after this report was received by the
Committee, DCI John Deutch provided the Committee a list of his
actions to correct the operational and management deficiencies
identified in the IG Report. In April 1996, the DCI provided
the Committee a letter summarizing his actions related to
issues of individual accountability connected to the report's
findings. These actions included disciplinary action against
involved CIA officials and the formulation of guidelines
regarding economic intelligence. The Committee is continuing to
monitor the implementation of the DCI's actions.
c. economic espionage
Due to the importance attached to maintaining U.S. economic
competitiveness, current U.S. policy is to treat foreign
threats to our economic well-being as a national security
issue. In this regard, the February 1995 White House National
Security Strategy focused on economic security as a national
security priority and identified economic revitalization as one
of the three central goals of the United States. Secretary of
State Warren Christopher has stated in testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, ``In the post-Cold War
world, our national security is inseparable from our economic
security.''
Economic espionage by foreign governments targeting U.S.
industry and innovation is an issue of tremendous importance to
our national security and is one the Committee has been
examining for some time. The Committee held a number of
hearings and briefings during the 104th Congress which
addressed this issue and has met extensively with the
intelligence and law enforcement communities during this time.
In 1992, then-Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates
told the committee: ``We know that some foreign intelligence
services have turned from politics to economics and that the
United States is their prime target.'' According to the CIA, in
written response to additional questions from the Committee's
February 22, 1996 hearing on Current and Projected National
Security Threats to the United States and its Interests Abroad
(S. Hrg. 104-510),
CIC [the Intelligence Community's Counterintelligence
Center] has narrowly defined economic espionage to
include a government-directed or orchestrated
clandestine effort to collect U.S. economic secrets or
proprietary information. We do not characterize as
economic espionage legitimate information gathering
activities by a foreign government or foreign
corporation, even if carried out aggressively and
skillfully. We see government-orchestrated theft of
U.S. corporate S&T data as the type of espionage that
poses the greatest threat to U.S. economic
competitiveness. We have only identified about a half
dozen governments that we believe have extensively
engaged in economic espionage as we define it. These
governments include France, Israel, China, Russia,
Iran, and Cuba.
In order to address this growing threat, the Committee was
instrumental in passing legislation to criminalize foreign
government-sponsored economic espionage. Working closely on a
bipartisan basis with the Administration and the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees, as well as with industry,
academia, and others, the Committee was able to forge a
consensus on this important legislative measure after a year
and half of discussions and negotiations.
Provisions criminalizing foreign government-sponsored
economic espionage were originally included in the Fiscal Year
1997 Intelligence Authorization bill, reported by the Committee
in April 1996. They were subsequently dropped from the
authorization bill and included as part of the broader Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, which covers theft of trade secrets by
any person as well as foreign-sponsored economic espionage.
The final version of the economic espionage legislation
makes it a federal crime (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 1831) to
steal, alter, or misappropriate a trade secret knowing that
such offense will benefit a foreign government,
instrumentality, or foreign agent. Individuals convicted of
economic espionage may be imprisoned for up to 15 years and/or
fined up to $500,000; organizations may be fined up to
$10,000,000.
The President signed the Economic Espionage Act of 1996
into law on October 11, 1996.
d. foreign intelligence surveillance act
During the 104th Congress, the Committee conducted a
comprehensive review of the Intelligence Community's policy on
electronic surveillance and physical search for intelligence
and counterintelligence within the United States and its
implementation of these guidelines. The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (``FISA''), 50 United States Code
Sec. 1801 et seq., established comprehensive legal standards
and procedures for the use of electronic surveillance to
collect foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence within
the United States. The Act provided the first legislative
authorization for wiretapping and other forms of electronic
surveillance for intelligence purposes against foreign powers
and foreign agents in this country. It created the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (``FISC''), composed of seven
federal district judges, to review and approve surveillance
capable of monitoring United States persons who are in the
United States. As the Act was amended in 1994 to provide for
limited physical search authority, the Committee's study placed
special emphasis upon the use of the new authority to conduct
physical searches.
The Committee review included travel to key FBI field sites
to review actual use of the FISA authority, as well as tracking
of the FISA process through the budget cycle to ascertain the
sustained attention that certain relevant budgetary issues
receive. While interviews were undertaken with the Chief Judge
of the FISC and with the United States Attorney General
credited with assuring passage of the original FISA legislation
in 1978, and briefing were conducted with the Justice
Department and other key participants in the process, the
review was focused almost entirely upon actual cases. The cases
reviewed were traced from their inception as
counterintelligence matters, with attention placed upon the
sufficiency of review and upon issues of fundamental fairness
toward targets of the FISA coverage. The review was still being
undertaken at the conclusion of the 104th Congress and will
likely be completed during the 105th Congress.
V. Counterterrorism:
a. terrorism threat overview
In 1995 and 1996 the people of the United States were
shocked by bombings in Oklahoma City and at Atlanta's
Centennial Olympic Park, and by attacks against U.S. diplomats
in Pakistan and U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia. In the
104th Congress the Committee held eight hearings, both open and
closed, on terrorism. The Committee has given special attention
to the terrorist threat in Saudi Arabia and intelligence
support to the military deployed in the Middle East. The
Committee received testimony from Secretary of Defense William
J. Perry, DCI John Deutch, FBI Director Louis Freeh, numerous
other Administration officials, academicians and other experts.
Through these hearings the Committee received an assessment
of the worldwide terrorist threat and the particular threat in
the Middle East, including an analysis of the size,
organization, capabilities, state sponsorship and interlocking
ties of terrorist groups. These hearings also explored the
collection posture of the U.S. Intelligence Community vis-a-vis
international terrorism and the adequacy of existing resources.
In the wake of the bombings in Saudi Arabia, Secretary of
Defense William Perry testified before the Committee regarding
the situation in Saudi Arabia. These tragedies and his
testimony concentrated the Committee's attention on the issue
of intelligence support to the military for force protection.
The Committee continues to evaluate how well the relationship
between the Intelligence Community and the military commanders
is working and what the Intelligence Community can do to better
support this critical requirement.
Shortly before the 104th Congress completed its work, the
Administration asked for an increase in authorized funds and
personnel for fiscal year 1997 for Intelligence Community
counterterrorism programs. These increases were sought as part
of a larger Administration initiative to enhance U.S.
Government counterterrorism capabilities. The Committee
supported this request by modifying the Schedule of
Authorization contained in the report of the Committee of
Conference for the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1997 to reflect the requested increases in dollars and
civilian positions.
The Committee will continue to search for ways to enhance
the capability of the Intelligence Community to collect against
terrorist groups and to ensure the adequacy of the resources
devoted to this target.
b. khubar towers and opm-sang bombings
On June 25, 1996, at approximately 10:00 p.m. local time,
an explosion shook the Khubar Towers housing compound in
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The blast killed 19 American military
service personnel and at least one Saudi civilian, wounded more
than 200 Americans and injured hundreds of other civilians. At
the time, the Khubar Towers complex was home for the airmen of
the U.S. Air Force's 4404th Fighter Wing (Provisional), under
the operational command of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM),
who were participating in the United Nations effort to enforce
the ``no-fly'' zone in southern Iraq. The attack at Khubar
Towers was the second major terrorist incident directed at U.S.
interests, and U.S. military presence specifically, in Saudi
Arabia in less than a year. On November 13, 1995, a car bomb
containing approximately 250 pounds of explosives detonated
outside the headquarters of the Office of the Program Manager
of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG) in Riyadh. The
building was used by American military forces as a training
facility for Saudi military personnel. Five Americans died and
34 were wounded in this attack.
The staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
conducted a preliminary inquiry into the adequacy of the
Intelligence Community's collection, analysis and dissemination
of intelligence concerning terrorist threats in Saudi Arabia
prior to the OPM-SANG and Khubar Towers bombings to determine
whether a significant intelligence failure had occurred. The
Committee staff reviewed intelligence reporting produced from
late 1994 through June 1996. These products included reports
from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department and
others. During the inquiry, Committee staff also interviewed
field commanders and military personnel who played a critical
force protection and security role just prior to and
immediately after the blast. The staff also interviewed the FBI
lead investigator on the scene in Dhahran, as well as top-
ranking Intelligence Community personnel.
As part of this inquiry, Chairman Arlen Specter and staff
traveled to Dhahran, Riyadh, and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and other
Middle East countries in August 1996. During this trip the
Committee interviewed individuals in the Intelligence
Community, the Defense Department, and the State Department.
Senator Specter and staff also met with Saudi Crown Prince
Abdullah and Defense Minister Sultan while in Jeddah, as well
as with other Middle East leaders with unique insight into
terrorist activity in the region such as Prime Minister
Netanyahu of Israel, President Assad of Syria, and President
Arafat of the Palestinian Authority.
The Committee held several hearings focusing on terrorism,
the situation in Saudi Arabia, and intelligence support to the
military in the region. The available information led Chairman
Specter to issue a report stating that the U.S. Intelligence
Community provided sufficient information not only to suggest
active terrorist targeting of U.S. personnel and facilities,
but also to predict likely terrorist targets (of which OPM-SANG
and Khubar Towers were among the most probable). Further,
having concluded that the DCI was fully cognizant of and
attentive to the force protection issues in the Eastern
Province prior to the June 25 attack, and that consecutive DCIs
ensured that this force protection information was disseminated
to proper Defense Department recipients, Chairman Specter
concluded that an intelligence failure did not occur.
VI. Counterproliferation
a. non-proliferation
The Committee continued in the 104th Congress the high
priority that it has accorded over the years to the need to
counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The Committee's concern extends to nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, as well as long-range delivery systems for
such weapons. In the 104th Congress, as in past years, the
Committee added funds to the intelligence budget to better
equip U.S. policy makers to understand and combat this major
threat to U.S. national security.
The Committee held a closed hearing in 1995 on the
capability of U.S. intelligence to meet policy makers' needs in
this field. Another closed hearing in 1995 focused on Iran,
including the status of that country's WMD programs. On March
13, 1996, the Committee held a public hearing on the threat
that weapons of mass destruction might be used in terrorist
attacks in the United States or against U.S. interests
(especially in light of the Aum Shinrikyo group's release of
lethal chemical agents in the Tokyo subway). Also in 1996, the
Committee received closed briefings on Chinese involvement in
weapons proliferation, notably including its sales to Pakistan
of ring magnets that could be used in a uranium enrichment
process and its actions in providing long-range missiles to
Pakistan. Another issue of concern to the Committee has been
the status and control of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade
materials in other countries, especially the former Soviet
Union.
b. north korean weapons of mass destruction programs
The U.S.-North Korean nuclear framework agreement, which
had become a matter of concern to the Committee in 1994,
continued to be a topic in closed briefings and hearings in
1995. The Committee was particularly concerned, during the
104th Congress, about reports of North Korean misuse of the
first tranche of oil provided by the United States and about
U.S. capabilities to ensure that any further shipments would be
used only in accord with the agreement's provisions.
At the Committee's public hearing of January 10, 1995, on
world-wide threats to U.S. interests, both DCI James Woolsey
and DIA Director James Clapper discussed North Korea's long-
range missile program, which was seen as more likely than any
other countries' programs to result eventually in a new thereat
to U.S. territory. On February 22, 1995, the Committee held a
closed hearing to examine more closely the issue of prospective
ballistic and cruise missile threats to the United States.
c. long-range missile threat
In early 1996, some members of the Senate expressed concern
regarding a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of the long-
range missile threat to the United States, which they feared
might have been influenced by political or policy
considerations. These expressions of concern led the Staff
Director to undertake a staff inquiry into the estimative
process and the intelligence information and analysis that
formed the basis for those estimates.
On December 4, 1996, the Committee held an open hearing to
review these intelligence estimates. Witnesses included John E.
McLaughlin, Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council;
Richard Davis, Director, National Security Affairs, General
Accounting Office; R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central
Intelligence, 1993-1995; Robert M. Gates, former Director of
Central Intelligence, 1991-1993 and chairman of a panel of
independent experts appointed by DCI Deutch to review the
intelligence estimate pursuant to the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; and David J. Osias,
National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs and
Nuclear Proliferation.
At this hearing, former DCI Gates stated that the review
panel found no evidence that the intelligence estimate had been
politicized. However, the Gates Panel did find faults of
process and presentation in the NIE. The Panel found in
particular that the NIE omitted needed back-up information and
analysis underlying its main judgment (which paralleled the
GAO's observation that previous estimates had included more
analysis) and that it gave too little attention to such
significant, although less probable, outcomes as the use of
cruise or shipborne ballistic missiles, breakdown of the
Missile Technology Control Regime or unauthorized launch of
Russian missiles. The Panel also seconded former DCI Woolsey's
concern that the NIE gave much too little attention to the
threat to Alaska and Hawaii. Nonetheless, the review panel
found sound technical reasons to support the Intelligence
Community's view that the United States is unlikely to face an
indigenously developed and tested ICBM threat from the Third
World before 2010, even taking into account possible
acquisition of foreign hardware and technical assistance.
VII. Oversight Activities
a. national security threats to the united states
For a number of years, the Committee has begun each new
session of the Congress with an open hearing reviewing the
Intelligence Community's assessment of the current and
projected national security threats to the United States. The
Intelligence Community's assessment of the national security
threat to the United States plays a critical role in defining
our country's foreign policy and forms the foundation for our
military planning. It is therefore essential that the
Intelligence Community provide our nation's policymakers with
the most accurate and timely assessment of these threats
possible. The hearings on the national security threat are held
in open session not only to inform the Committee, but to
enlighten the American public about the threats facing our
country.
Among the many issues addressed by these hearings have been
the military capabilities of the former Soviet Union, the
ballistic missile threat, China's proliferation activity, the
stability of the North Korean regime, Intelligence Community
support to U.S. military operations in Bosnia, the stability of
the Cuban regime, and economic espionage against the U.S.
Continuing this tradition, on January 10, 1995, the
Committee held an open hearing on the current and projected
national security threats to the U.S. Testifying before the
Committee were then-DCI R. James Woolsey, Lt. General James R.
Clapper, Jr., USAF, then Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), and Toby Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research (INR). On February 22, 1996, the
Committee held a similar hearing, and testifying before the
Committee were DCI John M. Deutch, DIA Director Lt. General
Patrick M. Hughes, USA, and Toby Gati.
The transcripts for the Committee's January 10, 1995
hearing, ``Worldwide Intelligence Review'' [S. Hrg. 104-15],
and the Committee's February 22, 1996 hearing, ``Current and
Projected National Security Threats to the United States and
its Interests Abroad'' [S. Hrg. 104-510], which include the
responses to a large number of questions-for-the-record (QFRs)
covering a broad spectrum of national security issues, were
printed and made available to the public.
Additionally, the Committee held an open hearing with DCI
Deutch on December 18, 1996 to discuss issues confronting the
United States Intelligence Community.
b. intelligence support to u.s. efforts in bosnia
Throughout the 104th Congress, the Committee continued to
focus on the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
to monitor intelligence community support for policy makers and
U.S. and U.N. forces deployed on peacekeeping missions in the
region. During the summer of 1995, the Committee held four
hearings to consider the evolving military and diplomatic
situations, the likelihood that U.S. troops would be sent to
the region either as peacekeepers or to assist in a withdrawal
of UNPROFOR troops, and the capability of U.S. intelligence to
support the needs of U.S. policy makers and military
commanders. The issue of intelligence support to U.S. military
forces was of particular attention as a result of the incident
in which a U.S. F-15 aircraft was shot down by a Serbian
missile and its pilot was stranded for several days before he
could be located and rescued. Also, the Committee held a joint
open hearing with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
August 9, 1996 (S. Hrg. 104-448) to review intelligence support
to the war crimes investigation in the former Yugoslavia.
With the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Croatia, and the
Republic of Bosnia & Herzegovina in November 1995, which
brought the fighting among Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and
Bosnian Muslims in the disputed Bosnia-Herzegovina area to a
halt, and the subsequent deployment of U.S. troops into Bosnia
as part of the Implementation Force (IFOR), the Committee began
an extensive review of intelligence support to U.S. military
forces in the Bosnian theater. The Committee received regular
briefings from the DCI's Balkan Task Force, tasked to monitor
compliance with the accords, and conducted three hearings on
the viability of a time-limited deployment of U.S.
implementation forces and the lifting of the arms embargo for
all involved parties. The Committee also held numerous closed
hearings and briefings to determine the effectiveness of
collection, analysis and dissemination of U.S. intelligence to
support deployed forces in the field. Several members and staff
traveled to the former Yugoslavia to meet with U.S. military
commanders and intelligence officials to evaluate first hand
the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence operations in support of
Operation Joint Endeavor. The Intelligence Community continues
to monitor the intelligence situation in Bosnia with regular
updates from the Intelligence Community.
C. Inquiry Into U.S. Actions Regarding Iranian and Other Arms Transfers
to the Bosnian Army
On April 5, 1996, the Los Angeles Times reported that
``President Clinton secretly gave a green light to covert
Iranian arms shipments into Bosnia in 1994 despite a United
Nations arms embargo that the United States was pledged to
uphold and the administration's own policy of isolating Tehran
globally as a supporter of terrorism.'' The Committee began an
inquiry into the matter on April 7, 1996.
The Committee held three public hearings, four closed
hearings and six informal sessions on this matter. Testimony
was taken from: DCI John M. Deutch; former DCI R. James
Woolsey; Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott; former
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke; the Honorable
Charles E. Redman (U.S. Ambassador to Germany and former
Special Envoy to the Former Yugoslavia); the Honorable Peter W.
Galbraith (U.S. Ambassador to Croatia); three other persons who
served in the U.S. Embassy in Zagreb in 1994-1995; and legal
officials from the Department of State and Department of
Defense. Informal sessions were held with some of the above
persons and with: Dr. William Perry, Secretary of Defense;
General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; Dr. Anthony S. Harrington, Chairman, President's
Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB). Formal and informal staff
interviews were held with Department of State, Department of
Defense and intelligence personnel, and with the chairman and
staff of the IOB.
The Committee's staff reviewed substantial material
provided by the CIA and the NSA and smaller, but significant,
amounts of material provided by the Department of State and
Department of Defense (including finished intelligence products
of the Defense Intelligence Agency), as well as some National
Security Council (NSC) documents. The Chairman and Vice
Chairman were also briefed by NSC staff personnel on some
documents that the Executive branch refused to show to
Committee staff.
On November 7, 1996, the Committee issued a public report
summarizing its findings and recommendations in this matter.
The report's findings included the following:
The decision to let Croatia transship Iranian and
other arms to the Bosnian Muslims was made by the
President and was implemented largely by Department of
State and NSC personnel. Unusual steps were taken to
keep this action secret, such as refraining from filing
cables on it or from mentioning it at NSC meetings.
These steps kept knowledge of this significant policy
change from other agencies, including the Department of
Defense and the CIA.
Although the executive branch did inform appropriate
committees of intelligence information on the arms
flows, it did not inform Congress of the decision to
let Croatia transship Iranian and other arms to the
Bosnian Muslims. This action left Congress dangerously
ignorant of U.S. policy, even as it debated and voted
on legislation regarding enforcement of the arms
embargo.
CIA officials became attentive to actions that might
constitute an illegal covert action activity, which CIA
personnel feared was under way. CIA's concerns may have
been overwrought, but so are the allegations that CIA
was ``spying on'' Department of State personnel.
Much confusion might have been averted if Deputy
Secretary Talbott or other State Department officials
had adequately explained to DCI Woolsey the new policy
and their intent that Iranian arms be permitted to flow
to Bosnia and Croatia. It would also have helped if
State Department Headquarters had provided clearer
instructions to Ambassador Galbraith.
The decision to let Croatia transship Iranian and
other arms to the Bosnian Muslims achieved its purpose
of affecting the balance of forces in the former
Yugoslavia without prompting European actions that the
United States had feared would breed a wider and
bloodier war. But Iran maintained and probably
increased its influence in Bosnia as a result of its
resumed role as Bosnia's major arms supplier. In
addition, Croatian officials for a time found it hard
to reconcile U.S. support of Iranian arms flows to
Bosnia with continued U.S. support for other United
Nations arms embargoes (such as that against Libya) and
opposition to Iranian support for terrorism.
Ambassador Redman may not have intervened with
Croatian officials to secure release of a Bosnian
convoy in May 1994, contrary to the IOB's conclusion
that he probably did so.
Executive branch personnel in senior overseas
positions did not always understand the law and
regulations governing covert action programs.
Covert action options were prepared by Executive
branch agencies in 1994 and 1995, but no covert action
program for Bosnia was approved by the Executive
branch. CIA consistently opposed undertaking such a
program.
Some Executive branch officials made statements to
Bosnian and/or Croatian officials in the summer and
fall of 1994 that suggested support for increased
covert shipments of arms to the Bosnian Muslims.
The Committee could not determine whether U.S.
officials offered either support in implementing a
larger arms pipeline or a quid pro quo to Croatia for
agreeing to such increased arms shipments. The
Committee found no evidence that the United States ever
provided such support or any quid pro quo to Croatia,
or encouraged any country other than Croatia to provide
arms or military assistance in violation of the arms
embargo.
In early 1995, one U.S. official told a Croatian
official that the United States did not want Croatia to
discontinue a military resupply effort in Bosnia.
In the summer of 1995, U.S. personnel inspected
rockets bound for Bosnia; the Committee could not
determine whether this activity was undertaken for the
purpose of encouraging Croatia to continue the covert
arms shipments.
The Committee could not agree on whether the actions
of U.S. officials constituted covert action under
section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947. It
did conclude, however, that the interchange between the
United States Ambassador to Croatia and the President
of Croatia in April 1994 did not constitute traditional
diplomatic activity, at least as that term is
understood by most Americans. The Committee disagreed,
moreover, with the Executive branch view that
diplomatic requests to third parties to conduct covert
action are not covered by the definition of covert
action. It also noted that any encouragement of
promotion of arms shipments to Bosnia could violate
Executive Order 12846, 58 FR 25771 (April 25, 1993) on
sanctions against the former Yugoslavia.
Allegations regarding U.S. military or CIA
involvement in the arms flow or in logistical support
to the Bosnian Army appear to be false.
The Committee found three areas in which
administrative or legislative actions appear to be
required:
Recommendation No. 1: The Executive branch,
especially the White House and the Department of State,
should make a written record of every significant
foreign policy decision, and especially of those
decisions that reflect a change in policy; and it
should ensure that adequate mechanisms are in place to
generate and protect communications that are
particularly sensitive.
Recommendation No. 2: The Executive branch should
keep the Committee ``fully and currently informed'' of
the substantive content of intelligence that is
collected or analyzed by U.S. intelligence agencies.
Recommendation No. 3: The Executive branch should
inform Congress of significant secret changes in U.S.
foreign policy.
D. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS
As an outgrowth of its inquiry into the Iranian arms to
Bosnia matter, on September 5, 1996, the Committee held a
hearing on the desirability of legislation to require the
Executive Branch to notify Congress of secret changes in the
overt foreign policy of the United States. The Committee
received testimony from DCI John Deutch; former White House
Counsel Lloyd Cutler; former NSC official and American Civil
Liberties Union Washington Office Director Morton Halperin;
Acting State Department Legal Adviser Michael Matheson; and
Defense Department Deputy General Counsel Whit Peters.
During the hearing, members of the Committee expressed
concern that Congress had not been informed of the
Administration's decision to acquiesce in Iranian arms
shipments through Croatia into Bosnia. Members questioned
whether the actions of Administration officials constituted a
``covert action'' for purposes of Title V of the National
Security Act and, if not, whether Title V should be amended or
separate legislation should be enacted to require notice in
similar circumstances. While noting the need for improved
communication between the executive branch and Congress on
foreign policy matters, Mr. Cutler and Mr. Halperin questioned
whether legislation requiring notification of foreign policy
decisions was the appropriate means to accomplish this goal.
Further, Administration witnesses raised concerns regarding how
such a statutory requirement would work on a practical level.
The Committee ultimately decided not to introduce legislation
in the 104th Congress but discussed its concerns in greater
detail in its report on the arms to Bosnia matter.
e. persian gulf syndrome
Shortly after the end of the Persian Gulf War in February
of 1991, U.S. military personnel, both active duty and reserve,
began to complain about unexplained illnesses. Symptoms
included: fatigue, watery eyes, itchy skin, diarrhea,
headaches, nausea, sleep disorder and memory loss. Exposure of
U.S. personnel to nerve agents or mustard agents had been cited
as one of many possible causes of what has come to be known as
``Persian Gulf Syndrome.''
The Committee questioned Dr. John Deutch about his
knowledge and involvement in this issue during his confirmation
hearing on April 26, 1995. On September 25, 1996 the Committee
held a public hearing to receive intelligence assessments on
the possibility of exposure of U.S. military personnel to
chemical warfare agents during Operation Desert Storm.
Witnesses included: Mr. John McLaughlin, Vice Chairman for
Estimates, National Intelligence Council; Dr. Stephen Joseph,
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs; and Dr. Robert
Kizer, Undersecretary for Health, Department of Veterans
Affairs. Intelligence reports dating back to 1991, which had
been discovered by the CIA during a review of this issue,
determined that U.S. troops may have been exposed to sarin
nerve gas when they destroyed an ammunition dump at al-
Khamisiyah in southern Iraq in March 1991. The Department of
Defense has estimated that up to 20,000 U.S. troops could have
been exposed to low levels of sarin gas as a result of the
destruction of the rockets in Khamisiyah.
f. zona rosa
On June 19, 1985, four U.S. Marines and two American
businessmen were shot and killed while they were seated at a
sidewalk cafe in the Zona Rosa district of San Salvador,
reportedly by a faction of the communist FMLN movement during
El Salvador's civil war. In mid-1995, the television show ``60
Minutes'' claimed that the mastermind behind the incident went
unpunished and was living in the United States. The Committee
asked DCI John Deutch to investigate the allegations.
In October 1995, officials from the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Department of State, and the Department of Justice
indicated that a preliminary review of available data indicated
that the Department of State had assisted in the entry into the
United States of a person believed to have some involvement
with the ``Zona Rosa'' murders. Therefore, the Committee asked
the Secretary of State to direct his Inspector General to
conduct a review. The review was expanded in February 1996 to
include the CIA, the Department of Defense, and Department of
Justice's Inspector Generals to determine if they had been any
government wrongdoing, and if prosecution or deportation was
appropriate for those responsible for the June 1985 terrorist
attack.
In October 1996, the Committee held a closed briefing on
the Inspector General (IG) investigations into the Zona Rosa
case. During the course of its investigation, the Committee
received information from the IG reports which suggested that
State Department and possibly CIA officials may have acted
improperly in this case. At the time this report was written,
the Committee was preparing a consolidated report for release
to the public.
g. Vietnamese commandos
The Committee held a hearing on June 19, 1996, to hear
testimony regarding a Vietnam-era covert action program. This
operation, funded and supported by the United States, sent
several hundred Vietnamese commandos into North Vietnam on
espionage and sabotage missions. Nearly all of these commandos
were killed or captured by the North Vietnamese. Those who were
captured were not released in 1973 following the Paris peace
agreement and spent as long as twenty years in North Vietnamese
jails. Recently declassified documents and statements made by
individuals involved with this program suggested that in 1964
U.S. officials directing the operation began declaring these
men as killed-in-action so that the captured commandos could be
dropped from the program's payroll. In a case in the U.S. Court
of Claims, 281 of these commandos sought payment from the U.S.
Government for the time they spend in prison.
After the Committee's hearing, Senators John Kerry and John
McCain offered an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill
to provide these men, or their heirs, with compensation. The
Administration, without reference to any outstanding legal
issues, supported the Kerry-McCain amendment. This provision
was included in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997 signed by President Clinton. The Department of
Defense Appropriations Conference Report contained identical
language and provided up to $20 million for payment of the
claims.
H. CIA/CONTRA/COCAINE LINK
Beginning August 18, 1996, the San Jose Mercury News ran a
three-day series of articles purporting to trace the origins of
the crack coccaine epidemic to a pair of Nicaraguan drug
traffickers with connections to the U.S. backed Contras. The
series, ``Dark Alliance: The Story Behind the Crack Explosion,
A Mercury News Special Report,'' focused on the activities of
two Nicaraguans and a Los Angeles drug dealer and made veiled
references to possible CIA involvement in drug trafficking and/
or interference in the investigation and prosecution of the
Nicaraguan traffickers.
Since the series ran in late August, various Members of
Congress have called for an investigation. The Director of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, General Barry
McCaffrey, has also called for a review of the matter. On
September 4, 1996 DCI John Deutch, noting the seriousness of
the charges, notified the Committee that he had asked the CIA
Inspector General to conduct an immediate and thorough review
of all the allegations. Director Deutch stated that a
preliminary review found no signs of CIA involvement in such
activity. The Justice Department Inspector General has also
started an investigation.
On October 23, 1996, the Committee held an open hearing to
begin an independent evaluation of the allegations. The
witnesses included CIA Inspector General Fred Hitz, Department
of Justice Inspector General Michael R. Bromwich, and former
special counsel to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and
International Operations of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Jack Blum. The hearing included a review of a
previous Senate inquiry into similar accusations and an update
on planned executive branch actions. The Inspectors General
from the CIA and Justice Department testified regarding the
scope of their investigations.
On November 26, 1996, the Committee held an open hearing to
investigate alleged ties between the Contra organizations and
drug trafficking. The witnesses included former Contra leader
Adolfo Calero, and southern front leader Eden Pastora. The
witnesses at this hearing stated that, although the Contras may
have received some donations from Nicaraguans involved in
narcotics trafficking, the CIA had no direct involvement with
the drug traffickers.
I. CIA USE OF JOURNALISTS, CLERGY AND PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS IN
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
The Committee first raised this issue with the Director of
Central Intelligence during a public hearing on February 22,
1996 after discovering that a pending Council of Foreign
Relations Task Force report concerning Intelligence Community
reform had recommended that current policy prohibiting the use
of journalists, members of the clergy and Peace Corps
volunteers be reexamined. In the ensuring debate it was pointed
out that the Director of Central Intelligence has the authority
under current regulation to waive any prohibitions. That waiver
authority also applies to the clergy and, to a more limited
extent, Peace Corps volunteers.
The Committee held a hearing on July 17, 1996 on this
issue. Testifying before the Committee were Senator Paul
Coverdell (R-GA); DCI John Deutch; Kenneth L. Adelman,
journalist and former U.S. official; Terry Anderson,
journalist; Ted Koppel, anchorman, ABC News ``Nightline'';
Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Chairman and Editor-in-Chief, ``US News
and World Report''; Dr. Don Argue, President, National
association of Evangelicals; Dr.. John Orme, Executive
Director, International Foreign Mission Association; Sister
Claudette La Verdiere, President, Maryknoll Sisters; and Dr.
Rodney Page, Deputy General Secretary, Church World Service and
Witness Unit, National Council of Churches.
The Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization conference
report provided, in section 309, as policy of the Untied
states, that the Intelligence Community would not use as an
agent or asset for intelligence collection purposes any
individual who is a member of the news media. However, the
conference report allowed the President or the Director of
Central Intelligence to waive the prohibition in a particular
case if he or she determines in writing that the waiver is
necessary to address the overriding national security interests
of the Untied States. The congressional intelligence committees
are to be notified of any waivers of section 309.
J. GUATEMALA
During 1995 and 1996, the Committee inquired extensively
into CIA activities in Guatemala, focusing on the 1990 murder
of American citizen Michael DeVine and the death of Guatemala
guerrilla Efrain Bamaca Velasquez. The Committee conducted one
public hearing, two closed hearings and eight on-the-record
briefings. Committee Members and staff also traveled to
Guatemala to conduct further inquiries on two separate
occasions.
The Committee's open hearing on April 5, 1995, focused on
allegations regarding CIA's conduct in the events surrounding
the DeVine murder and the fate of Efrain Bamaca as well as
accusations that the CIF funded intelligence programs in
Guatemala in contravention of U.S. policy. Testimony was
received from Admiral William Studeman, Acting Director of
Central Intelligence; Alexander Watson, Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, Department of State; Col. Allen
Cornell, former Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy, Guatemala; John
Barrett, Counselor to the Inspector General, Department of
Justice; and Carol DeVine and Jennifer Harbury, widows of Mr.
DeVine and Mr. Bamaca, respectively. The Committee's hearing
transcript, ``Hearing on Guatemala,'' [S. Hrg. 104-161] was
printed and is available to the public.
The Committee also conducted two closed hearings in 1995--
on August 8 and September 29--receiving testimony from a number
of officials of the CIA and Justice Department. As part of its
inquiry, the Committee also met with former U.S. Ambassador to
Guatemala Thomas Stroock; Sister Dianna Ortiz, a victim of
human rights violations in Guatemala; various family members
and representatives of a number of other Americans subjected to
human rights violations in Guatemala; and representatives of
human rights organizations.
A CIA Inspector General investigation into the Guatemala
cases led to a report issued in July 1995. As a result of the
CIA IG report and the Committee's inquiry into this matter, DCI
Deutch in September 1995 took disciplinary action against a
number of personnel for their actions while stationed in or
overseeing the CIA operations in Guatemala. At the time this
biennial report was written, the Committee's inquiry into this
matter was still underway.
k. intelligence support to law enforcement
On October 25, 1995 the Committee held an open hearing on
intelligence support to law enforcement, receiving testimony
from Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick and CIA General
Counsel Jeffrey Smith. The witnesses discussed the evolving
relationship between law enforcement and intelligence, the
level of cooperation between the law enforcement and
intelligence communities and the impact of that cooperation on
combatting terrorism, narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling
and the smuggling of nuclear material.
l. congressional notifications of intelligence activities
During the 104th Congress, the Committee continued its
oversight of the Intelligence Community and received nearly 300
notifications of significant intelligence activities in 1995
and another 136 between January and September 1996. In order to
exercise its oversight responsibilities more effectively and to
preserve a comprehensive record over a longer period of time,
the Committee in 1995 requested that all congressional
notifications be made in writing. In addition, the Committee
receives numerous briefings and updates on selected
notifications and current intelligence issues.
m. airborne reconnaissance
The Committee continued its strong support for both the
manned and unmanned airborne reconnaissance programs of the
Department of Defense in the 104th Congress. The Committee
believes that it is vital to maintain a robust airborne
reconnaissance force that is capable of collection satisfying
priority intelligence requirements in peacetime, crisis, and
war.
In the area of manned reconnaissance, the Committee has
been concerned with the high operational tempo rates of our
manned airborne reconnaissance platforms. Because of these high
operational rates, the Committee initiated a program to re-
engine the RC-135 speciality aircraft fleet. This engine
upgrade will significantly improve the performance of the RC-
135 fleet and decrease operations and maintenance costs. The
Committee has also been concerned that the appropriate level of
resources has not been programmed to update the sensor
capabilities on several manned reconnaissance platforms. The
Committee views these sensor upgrades to be essential in order
to provide mission-capable forces to the regional Commanders-
in-Chief (CINCs). Therefore, the Committee made increased
funding for additional sensors a priority in the 104th
Congress. The Committee will continue to ensure that manned
platforms receive the required funding for sensors to fulfill
their reconnaissance missions in the future.
The Committee remains concerned that the Defense Department
has initiated more Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) programs than
can be supported in the future years Defense budget. While the
Committee was unsuccessful in terminating one of the UAV
programs, the Defense Department did restructure the current
family of UAVs under development from five programs to four.
The Committee continues to support the development of UAVs, but
remains concerned over the outyear budget implications of the
various UAV programs as they transition from research and
development into procurement.
The Committee continued its strong support for the Defense
Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO). While the Committee has
supported increases to the DARO budget, the Committee has also
become concerned over the ability of the DARO to fully execute
its programs. The Committee will continue to work with the
leadership of the DARO to closely monitor program execution.
n. national reconnaissance office carry forward
In July 1995, Congress discovered the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) had funding available grossly in
excess of its fiscal year 1995 requirements. This condition was
created largely by NRO program delays and by poor internal
controls within the National Reconnaissance Office. In
response, the Committee recommended, and the Senate approved,
significant reductions in the President's budget requests for
the National Reconnaissance Program in fiscal years 1996 and
1997. It also directed the CIA and Defense Department
Inspectors General to conduct reviews of the status of funding
within the National Reconnaissance Office and selected programs
of the Department of Defense. Learning of no misuse of
Government funds during the intense executive branch and
legislative branch reviews of the NRO's financial status, the
Committee recommended, and the Senate approved, new financial
management practices for the National Reconnaissance Office in
the report accompanying the Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence
Authorization Act.
o. small satellites
As part of the fiscal year 1996 intelligence authorization
process, a heated executive branch, legislative branch and
public debate developed concerning the next generation of
reconnaissance satellites. To help resolve the issue, the
Director of Central Intelligence formed a panel of experts
outside of the Government on reconnaissance satellites under
Dr. Robert Hermann, a former director of the NRO and senior
Defense Department official. Although the panel's report is
classified, an unclassified version was publicly released,
recommending the next generation of satellites should be
smaller vehicles than the current class. It further recommended
moving forward expeditiously with this initiative. In the
conference report to the fiscal year 1997 Intelligence
Authorization Act, the Committee used the Hermann panel's
vision as a component of many of its recommendations.
p. covert action
Covert action funding continued to comprise a small
proportion of the intelligence budget throughout the 104th
Congress. Nevertheless, the Committee continues to conduct
rigorous oversight of covert action programs, helping to ensure
that such programs serve an agreed foreign policy objective and
are conducted in accordance with American laws and values.
q. encryption export policy
The introduction of legislation in the 104th Congress to
liberalize the export of encryption products spurred the
Committee to undertake a series of briefings to assess the
potential impact of such legislation on U.S. national security
interests. Due to the many equities involved, including those
of business and law enforcement as well as the Intelligence
Community, the Committee sought the views of numerous
individuals from both the public and private sectors and
interviewed the authors of the National Research Council (NRC)
report entitled, ``Cryptography's Role in Securing the
Information Society.''
Due to the sensitivity of some issues associated with
encryption policies, and the interest the topic engendered on
the part of a number of different Senators and committees, the
Committee took the lead in arranging a classified briefing that
provided all interested members the opportunity to directly
question the DCI, the Director of the FBI, and the Deputy
Attorney General, all of whom play pivotal roles in the
development and implementation of Administration encryption
export policy. As a result of this and other Intelligence
Community briefings, as well as the seeming progress of
Industry-Administration negotiations on the encryption export
issue, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee
concluded, as the authors of the NRC report had, that it would
be premature to enact legislation to establish a statutory
framework for U.S. encryption export policy.
Shortly before the adjournment of the 104th Congress, the
Administration announced the parameters of a new encryption
export policy. Pursuant to this policy, corporations willing to
commit to the development of key escrow encryption products--
systems that would accommodate the needs of law enforcement for
court-authorized access to electronic communications--will be
permitted for up to two years to export 56 bit encryption
technologies. This policy is certain to renew interest in the
encryption issue in the 105th Congress and will remain a topic
of concern for the Intelligence Committee.
r. security of the u.s. information infrastructure
During its review of the fiscal year 1996 request for the
Department of Defense Information Systems Security Program
(ISSP), the Committee became concerned over the lack of a
national strategy for dealing with threats to the U.S.
information infrastructure. This infrastructure includes the
enormous variety of public and private communication and
information systems that today control everything from
telephone switching to routine financial transactions and
airport traffic control. These systems are the functional
equivalent of a national central nervous system, and threats to
their operation could have grave ramifications for U.S.
national security. An estimated 95% of Defense Department
communications are carried on the public switch network (PSN)
operated by private telecommunications vendors. Further, even
with the Administration's requested budget increases in 1996
and 1997, overall information security spending and manpower
are still far below the levels of the late 1980s,
notwithstanding an increased Defense Department reliance on
information systems to achieve ``dominant battlespace
awareness'' in future conflicts.
To address these concerns, in June 1995 the Committee
requested a report from the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence on the threats to the U.S.
information infrastructure as well as a comprehensive strategy
for ameliorating such threats. The report was to have been
received by the Committee not later than March 1, 1996.
In response to this request, the committee received a
letter dated January 3, 1996, from the DCI expressing agreement
with the need for a comprehensive threat assessment. The DCI's
letter, however, also indicated that it would be impossible to
meet the Committee's deadline. The Department of Defense has
still not provided a written response, although the Committee
has been orally notified that a reply will soon be forthcoming.
Due to the concerns expressed by the Committee and the
vigorous, independent efforts of Senators John Kyl (R-AZ) and
Sam Nunn (D-GA), the Administration has established a
Presidential Commission with a broad mandate to assess the
issues raised by the committee in 1995. The Committee intends
to maintain its scrutiny of this important issue and will
carefully evaluate the findings and recommendations of the
Presidential Commission.
s. jane doe thompson case
During the 104th Congress the Committee continued to follow
the progress of the Jane Doe Thompson case. Jane Doe Thompson
is a pseudonym for a female CIA Directorate of Operations
officer who in July 1994 filed a lawsuit against the CIA
alleging, among other things, sexual discrimination in terms of
her assignments and promotions and unfair treatment by the CIA
Inspector General (IG).
Thompson was the subject of an IG investigation which began
in 1991 and was completed the following year. The IG
recommended disciplinary actions be levied against Ms.
Thompson, who filed suit against the CIA IG and other CIA
personnel in July 1994 in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. The lawsuit alleged that the CIA
IG's investigation of her had been improper and discriminated
against her as a woman; and that she had been the victim of
discrimination with respect to her assignments and promotions
within the CIA Directorate of Operations. On December 22, 1994,
prior to the case being tried, an agreement was reached between
Ms. Thompson and the CIA wherein, among other things, Ms.
Thompson agreed to accept immediate voluntary retirement and
was paid a lump sum payment of $385,000 by the CIA.
In March 1995 CIA IG Fred Hitz appeared as the sole witness
before a closed session of the Committee to discuss the
Thompson case and other IG matters.
t. oversight of the intelligence community inspectors general
Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress, established the
Select Committee to oversee and make continuing studies of the
intelligence activities and programs of the United Stats
Government, and to provide ``vigilant legislative oversight
over the intelligence activities of the United States.'' An
important part of the Committee's oversight has been close
monitoring of the activities of the Inspectors General (IGs) of
the Intelligence Community, and review of IG products.
During the 104th Congress the Committee held five hearings
and briefings with various IGs on intelligence issues, and
reviewed nearly 200 IG reports. The Committee also arranged
numerous briefings with Community program and IG personnel in
order to follow up on the findings and recommendations from a
variety of IG products. Examples include NRO financial
practices, CIA administration of bank accounts, employee
grievances, CIA and NRO employee and applicant investigation
procedures, and sensitive DIA program. Staff also meets with
the IGs on a regular basis to address administrative issues
such as IG quality control, staffing and budgets. In addition,
staff attended two Intelligence Community IG conferences and
participated as guest speakers at three IG conferences. The
Committee's Audit Staff is currently engaged in a detailed
review of internal controls and procedures for the CIA IG.
On December 21, 1995, special recognition was given to Fred
Hitz, the first CIA statutory Inspector General, on his five
year anniversary in that office. Senate Resolution 201 (104th
Congress, 1st Session) commended the CIA IG and acknowledged
the important role of the statutory Inspector General's Office
on their role in the oversight of that agency.
The Committee also recognized that the Intelligence
Community agencies are becoming increasingly interconnected
and, as a result, Intelligence Community IGs must work closely
with each other on a growing number of interrelated issues. In
language accompanying the Committee's fiscal year 1997
authorization bill, the IGs form CIA, Central Imagery Office,
Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department
of Energy, the Military Services, National Reconnaissance
Office, National Security Agency, and the Departments of State,
Treasury and Justice were directed to provide by January 15,
1997 a report to the Committee describing the reviews involving
intelligence issues they have cooperated on since January 1,
1994. In addition, the Committee language asked each of the IGs
to make any recommendations they deem appropriate for improving
coordination and communication between the IGs, as well as
individual IG assessments of the feasibility and desirability
of creating an IG for the Intelligence Community to coordinate
all joint intelligence efforts.
Organized Crime in the Former Soviet Union
The crime problem facing Russia and the other states of the
former Soviet Union is staggering. The conversion to a market
economy has impoverished many people, causing some to turn to
crime for survival. And a legal system without basic laws on
corruption, conflict of interest, or racketeering is matched by
law enforcement agencies that may themselves be tainted. The
endemic crime and corruption threatens not only the transition
to a market-oriented society, but also the nascent democracies
in these nations.
This situation hinders the ability of the West to help the
transition by discouraging investment and causing nations to
question the efficacy of their foreign aid. The extortion and
protection rackets have targeted foreign concerns as well as
indigenous businesses. A poll of business executives rated
Russia as the worst place in the world to do business, largely
on the basis of the crime problem.
Organized crime in the former Soviet Union has a direct
effect on U.S. interests. These groups have spread quickly and
made connections with other international criminal
organizations. In many cases they are already operating in the
United States and Europe. They also have ties to Chinese,
Japanese, and Israeli criminal organizations, as well as the
Italian mafia and the South American drug cartels.
On March 15, 1996, the Committee held a hearing to examine
the Administration's response to this problem. The State
Department, the FBI, and intelligence agencies described their
attempts to help former Soviet states deal with the organized
crime problem and their efforts to better coordinate their
activities. The Committee has attempted to encourage
cooperation between intelligence an law enforcement agencies
and will continue to pursue this goal.
V. Program Review and Audit Staff
The Audit Staff was created in 1988 by the Committee to
provide ``a credible independent arm for Committee review of
covert action programs and other specific Intelligence
Community functions and issues.'' During the 104th Congress the
Audit Staff was increased from two to three persons. The
Program Review and Audit Staff either led or provided
significant support to numerous Committee reviews and oversight
activities. In addition, the Audit Staff conducted four in-
depth reviews, including one of a covert action program. These
reviews included the following:
Covert Action Review.--The Audit Staff conducted an
extensive review of a covert action program. Thirteen
recommendations were made to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of the program.
Intelligence Community Budget Execution.--One of the most
noteworthy unclassified projects undertaken by the Program
Review and Audit Staff was a review of Intelligence Community
(IC) Budget Execution. The review was prompted by revelations
about the financial management practices at the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) resulting in the NRO's financial
position being inaccurately reported to the Congress, and NRO
management being unaware that forward funding levels had
reached $3.7 billion as of 30 September 1995.
The staff review Intelligence Community budget execution
monitoring with particular emphasis on the effectiveness on
internal controls which would prevent the accumulation of
excess forward funding at other Intelligence Community
organizations. As the review progressed, staff learned that
until recently only limited oversight existed for the execution
of many of the IC budgets.
The staff found that prior to the 1995 revelations
regarding the NRO's excess forward funding, NFIP budget
execution monitoring had not been done in any significant way
by any office outside the individual agency comptrollers. For
example, neither the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), nor Community
Management Staff (CMS) participated in substantive reviews of
NFIP budget execution.
The NRO forward funding issue caused OMB, OSD and CMS to
rethink their oversight responsibilities and their capability
to monitor NFIP funds. During the last year the three
organizations have begun working together to increase their
individual, as well as their combined, efforts to provide
budget formulation and execution oversight of the NFIP
programs.
VIII. Foreign Intelligence
a. north korea
Since North Korea's accession to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1985, it has been a
main objective of U.S. diplomacy to secure North Korea's full
compliance with the NPT. On October 21, 1994, the United States
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued an
``Agreed Framework'' for resolution of the North Korean nuclear
problem. In early 1995 the Committee held a hearing to review
the agreement and to assess the ability of the Intelligence
Community to monitor the agreement over its phased life. The
hearing also reviewed North Korea's record on proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.
The Committee continued to monitor the still tense
situation on the Korean peninsula and received an on the record
briefing in December 1995. This briefing addressed questions on
the status of North Korea's military preparedness and an
evaluation of the Intelligence Community's warning capability.
The witnesses provided both a short- and medium-term overview
of the likely evolution of the North Korean political and
economic situation, and of the regional political and economic
context in which it will take place. The deteriorating economic
situation, with the possibility of severe food shortages, adds
to an already unstable environment and the Committee will
continue to monitor the situation closely.
b. iraq
The Committee held hearings and briefings on the situation
in Iraq during the 104th Congress. After Saddam Hussein
intervened in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, Director of
Central Intelligence John Deutch testified on September 19,
1996 before the Committee in open session on internal
developments in Iraq in the wake of U.S. military action
against that country. At that hearing, Director Deutch stated
that Saddam Hussein's hold on power had become stronger as a
result of the intervention in the fighting between Kurdish
factions.
c. russia
The political leadership, military situation, and ongoing
economic transition in Russia were of continued interest to the
Committee during 1995 and 1996. The Committee held a number of
closed briefings which focused upon Russia and the adequacy of
intelligence assessments of that country. The Committee also
reviewed the Intelligence Community's views on how the
political situation in Russia could influence acceptance of the
Chemical Weapons Convention and START II treaty by the Russian
legislature.
D. CHINA
The evolving relationship between the United States and
China is critical for strategic and economic reasons. During
the 104th Congress the Committee received testimony from
representatives of CIA, DIA, NSA and the State Department on a
variety of issues affecting this relationship. This testimony
centered on the tensions between China and Taiwan in the time
leading up to the Taiwanese Presidential election in March
1996.
The witnesses also discussed China's involvement in
proliferation activities such as the publicly reported transfer
of nuclear technology and ballistic missiles to Pakistan.
Finally the Intelligence Community provided the Committee with
an assessment of the impact of China's economic reform program
and the evolving leadership transition as Deng Xiaoping fades
from the scene.
E. MEXICO
In the aftermath of the December 1994 Mexican peso crisis,
the Committee reviewed the Intelligence Community's prior
assessment of this situation. In a letter to the Washington
Post printed on the February 28, 1995, the Committee stated
that the CIA analyses did cover crucial economic and political
factors in the months leading up to the crisis and made clear
that a large, delayed devaluation of the peso would have
significant ramifications for Mexico's economy and political
situation. The Committee conducted a closed briefing on March
22, 1995 to assess political, economic and social trends in
Mexico, with a particular focus on the country's banking
crisis.
F. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
During the last two years, the Intelligence Community has
continued to refine and clarify its role in the collection of
economic information. As a part of the Committee's Worldwide
Intelligence Review hearing on January 10, 1995, then-DCI
Woolsey defined what he called the ``permissible side'' of
economic intelligence, which included helping U.S. policymakers
understand general economic forces, foreign positions and
practices towards international agreements, and how foreign
governments or firms are violating laws, breaking international
agreements, or behaving outside the norm. DCI Woolsey stated
that the United States does not spy on foreign companies for
the purpose of providing information to U.S. firms, report
information that is openly available in the public sector, or
focus on any economic issue that is not directly responsive to
policymaker interests and needs
On November 7, 1995, the Committee held a closed briefing
to develop a better understanding of the many issues
surrounding the collection of economic intelligence.
Specifically, the briefing provided information on what
economic information is targeted by the Intelligence Community,
what sources and methods are used, how the risks of collection
are considered, and how valuable and unique the economic
intelligence information is to consumers.
As a part of the Committee's February 22, 1996 hearing on
Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United
States and Its Interests Abroad, DCI Deutch described in
greater detail the types of economic intelligence that have
been most useful to intelligence consumers. This list included
work done on key economies such as Russia, China, Eastern
Europe and large emerging markets; intelligence support for
bilateral and multilateral negotiations; monitoring of foreign
compliance with economic sanctions against Iraq, Libya, and
Serbia; and information to help policymakers better understand
how foreign governments have worked to undermine the efforts of
U.S. business to secure overseas contracts.
G. ENVIRONMENTAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE
The Committee has continued its support for efforts to use
intelligence sensors and data to assist environmental
scientists and federal agencies with an environmental mission.
While funding for this program through the Intelligence
Community has remained relatively steady, the program has
expanded due to the willingness of other federal agencies to
contribute resources to the effort.
The core of the environmental program is a group of
scientists from a variety of environmental backgrounds
representing government and academia who are sponsored by the
Intelligence Community. This group is called MEDEA, and the
scientists have received security clearances enabling them to
fully analyze and use intelligence data for environmental
purposes. The MEDEA scientists continue to be in high demand by
a number of federal agencies for their expertise and the unique
resources they bring to bear on environmental questions. MEDEA
has conducted a number of experiments to provide a baseline of
knowledge regarding how intelligence sensors can be used to
benefit environmental research and federal agencies with an
environmental mission.
On December 12, 1995, the Committee held a closed briefing
for members to explore the importance of ecological and
demographic information in intelligence analysis, and how
ecological and demographic factors may effect the stability of
nations. Dr. Murray Feshbach of Georgetown University testified
regarding the environmental devastation in Russia. Dr. Jack
Goldstone of the University of California, Davis provided
testimony regarding the demographics of China, and how
population pressures will affect China's future. In addition,
the Committee heard testimony from Dr. Richard Cooper, the
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, regarding the
extent to which the Intelligence Community takes into account
ecological and demographic information when producing
intelligence estimates.
h. intelligence sharing with the united nations
In March 1995, the Committee learned of the discovery of
several boxes of classified U.S. intelligence documents left
unsecured in a vacant United Nations office in Somalia. This
discovery led not only to questions regarding the security of
U.S. classified information given to the U.N. Peacekeeping
Forces in Somalia (UNOSOM), but also to broader questions
regarding U.S. intelligence sharing with the U.N.
The Committee held a closed briefing for members on this
issue on March 23, 1995, and received testimony from the State
Department, the Department of Defense, and staff of the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). In addition, the
Committee requested an investigation by the Department of
Defense, including a damage assessment, of what happened in
Somalia, how it happened, and what procedural improvements are
needed to ensure this type of situation does not recur.
A classified report summarizing the findings of the
Department of State, the Department of Defense and the DCI on
this issue was produced by the DCI's staff and sent to the
Committee on June 6, 1995. This report included recommendations
for both institutional and operational changes to improve
United Nations information security practices. The Committee
has continued to monitor the implementation of these
recommendations closely. This issue is particularly important
given the increasing frequency of United States participation
in multilateral efforts overseas.
To further address these concerns, the Committee included
provisions in the Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization
Act requiring the President to certify that proper procedures
to ensure the security of classified information have been
established and are being implemented by United Nations.
Additionally, the President is required to submit semiannual
reports to Congress on intelligence sharing with the United
Nations and to reports to Congress any unauthorized disclosure
of intelligence provided by the United States to the U.N.
IX. Confirmations
a. dci john m. deutch
On April 26, 1996, the Committee held a public hearing on
the nomination of John M. Deutch to be Director of Central
Intelligence. Since March of 1994, Mr. Deutch had served as the
Deputy Secretary of Defense and earlier served as Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. A former
professor and dean at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Mr. Deutch had previously served in the Department
of Energy as Director of Energy Research, Acting Assistant
Secretary for Energy Technology, and Under Secretary of the
Department. Mr. Deutch holds a B.A. in history and economics
from Amherst College, and a B.S. in chemical engineering and a
Ph.D. in physical chemistry from M.I.T.
Mr. Deutch testified on his own behalf at the confirmation
hearing. There were no other witnesses.
On May 3, 1996 the Committee reported Mr. Deutch's
nomination to the Senate by a vote of 17-0. The nomination was
confirmed by the Senate by a vote of 98-0 on May 9, 1996.
b. ddci george j. tenet
On June 14, 1996, the Committee held a public hearing on
the nomination of George J. Tenet to be Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence. Mr. Tenet previously served as Special
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Intelligence
Programs at the National Security Council. He also served as
Staff Director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
from 1988 to 1992. Mr. Tenet holds a B.S.F.S. from the School
of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and an M.I.A. from
the School of International Affairs at Columbia University.
On June 21, 1996, the Committee reported Mr. Tenet's
nomination to the Senate by a vote of 17-0. The Senate approved
his nomination in executive session on June 26, 1996.
X. Committee Internal Reforms and Enhancements
a. end of the designee system
At the beginning of the 104th Congress, the Committee
sought to enhance the effectiveness and nonpartisan nature of
the Committee staff by ending the Committee staff designee
system and has since relied on a cadre of non-partisan
professional staff directly accountable to both the Chairman
and the Vice Chairman. This change was effected because of a
combination of growing budgetary constraints (S. Res. 400
stipulates that the Committee should be limited to 15 Members
but the Senate leadership expanded the Committee to 17 Members
without providing additional resources for more staff), as well
as the need to more effectively manage the Committee's work.
Since the Committee's inception in 1976, Members of the
Committee were allowed to nominate an individual staff member
to be placed on the Committee's payroll and staff the
sponsoring Member on Committee issues. Designees understandably
felt a greater sense of loyalty to their sponsoring Member
rather than to the Committee as an institution. Accordingly, a
number of designees spent a large proportion of their time
working for their sponsoring Member on issues unrelated to the
Committee's intelligence oversight responsibility. Inevitably,
this created management problems on the Committee, with the
Committee leadership being able to regularly rely only on a
small proportion of the professional staff to focus on the work
of the Committee.
With the termination of individual designee personnel at
the beginning of the first session of the 104th Congress,
Committee staff were assigned to work with specific Members to
assist them in their Committee work. Also, an intelligence
oversight orientation was provided to the new Members appointed
to the Committee in the 104th Congress, including:
individualized briefings for Members; briefings on the
Committee's work for the personal staff of new Committee
Members; a Committee off-site with presentations provided by
senior Intelligence Community officials; and a series of
intelligence-related technical displays to update Members on
the unique technical capabilities of the Intelligence
Community.
b. term limits
In the context of its examination of the Intelligence
Community's organization, the Committee unanimously recommended
deleting Section 2(b) of Senate Resolution 400 which prohibits
members of the Committee from serving continuously for more
than eight years. Regrettably, while this provision was
reported out of the Committee as part of the Fiscal Year 1997
Intelligence Authorization Bill, it was removed prior to the
full Senate taking up this legislation.
The Committee believes that limiting tenure on the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence limits Member experience and
expertise, thereby detrimentally affecting the quality of
oversight. Across the Senate, Senators with the most extensive
service on committees have proved capable of the most
meaningful legislation. As stated in the report of the
Commission Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence
Community (the ``Brown Commission''), `` * * * because of the
fixed tenure rule, Members often have to rotate off the [House
and Senate intelligence oversight] committees at the very time
they have begun to master the complex subject matter. Indeed,
knowing their tenure is limited, some put their time in on
other committees. As a consequence, in the view of many
Commission witnesses, an unfortunate loss of expertise and
continuity occurs, weakening the effectiveness of the
committees.''
Both the Brown Commission and the Council on Foreign
Relations task force on the future of U.S. intelligence
recommended ending Member term limits on the Committee as a
means of increasing Member expertise in intelligence oversight.
In addition, former Directors of Central Intelligence Robert
Gates and R. James Woolsey have advocated the termination of
Committee term limits, as have Committee hearing witnesses
Harold Brown and former Committee Members Warren Rudman and
Howard Baker.
c. policynet
In the Fiscal Year 1995 Intelligence Authorization Act,
funds were set aside for the establishment of a secure computer
network, referred to as PolicyNet, to connect the Intelligence
Community with the legislative branch in an effort to provide
timely notification and access to intelligence products
generated by the executive branch.
In March 1995, Committee staff met with representatives of
the Intelligence Community to establish the priorities and to
lay the ground work for the project. During both sessions of
the 104th Congress, the CIA has worked closely with the
Committee to introduce this new computer network and to bring
the legislative branch ``on-line'' with the Intelligence
Community.
PolicyNet is the CIA's Automated Information System that
provides classified intelligence products, maps, charts, video,
imagery, etc. to the Congress and other Executive Branch
agencies involved with intelligence collection, analysis, and
dissemination. In addition, the network's secure video
conferencing feature provides the DCI, as well as other senior
intelligence officials, with the ability to communicate ``face-
to-face'' with Members of the Intelligence Committee on
extremely sensitive issues of national importance. This feature
also provides for timely briefings of sensitive late breaking
events in areas of importance, and can save hundreds of
personnel hours otherwise spent traveling to Capitol Hill to
brief Members.
Although it is not yet fully operational, PolicyNet
provides a vehicle that will greatly assist the Committee's
oversight responsibilities by providing timely intelligence in
``near-real time'' rather than requiring Members and staff to
wade through thousands of paper documents delivered by courier.
The secure video conferencing will benefit the Congressional
Oversight Committees, as well as the Intelligence Community, by
providing a capability to brief both the House and Senate
simultaneously on sensitive intelligence matters rather than
briefing each Committee separately. Also, with the migration
and publication of intelligence reports in softcopy on this
network--and the elimination of large quantities of paper
documents, transportation to deliver those reports, and the
requirements to securely store such material--PolicyNet will
help to decrease use of these resources.
The funds authorized in 1995 also allowed the Office of
Senate Security to provide non-Committee Members and their
appropriately cleared staff greater access to intelligence
related material on a variety of issues.
A P P E N D I X
----------
I. Summary of Committee Activities
a. number of meetings
During the 104th Congress the Committee held a total of 131
hearings or on-the-record briefings. Of these, seventy-nine
were oversight hearings, eighteen were legislative hearings,
and five were nomination hearings. There were seventeen
Committee business or legislative mark-up meetings. Also, the
Committee held twelve on-the-record briefings.
b. bills and resolutions originated by the committee
S. Res. 43--An original resolution authorizing expenditures
by the Select Committee on Intelligence.
S. Res. 256--To authorize the production of records by the
Select Committee on Intelligence.
S. 922--Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1996.
Enacted under H.R. 1655, Public Law 104-93.
S. 1718--Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1997.
Enacted under H.R. 3259, Public Law 104-293.
c. bills referred to the committee
S. 1326--Abolition of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1995.
S. 1557--Economic Security Act of 1996.
S. 1593--Intelligence Organization Act of 1996.
S. 1681--Combatting Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act of 1996.
S. 1745--The Department of Defense Authorization Act,
Fiscal Year 1997.
d. committee publications
Senate Report 104-4--Special Report--Committee Activities
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence January 4, 1993-
December 1, 1994.
Senate Hearing 104-15--Hearing before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence--World Wide Intelligence Review.
Senate Print 104-13--Rules of Procedures for the Senate
Select Committee in Intelligence.
Senate Report 104-97--Authorizing Appropriations for fiscal
year 1996. (To accompany S. 922)
Senate Hearing 104-156--Director of Central Intelligence 30
Day Report.
Senate Hearing 104-160--Nomination of John M. Deutch to be
Director of Central Intelligence.
Senate Hearing 104-161--Hearing on Guatemala.
Senate Hearing 104-203--Hearing on the Nomination of George
J. Tenet to be Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
Senate Print 103-122--Legislative Calendar One Hundred
Third Congress.
Public Law 104-93--To Authorize Appropriations for fiscal
year 1996.
Senate Report 104-246--Capability of the United States to
Monitor Compliance with the Start II Treaty.
Senate Report 104-258--Authorizing Appropriations for
fiscal year 1997 for the Intelligence Activities of the U.S.
Government and the CIA Retirement and Disability System and for
other purposes. (To accompany S. 1718)
Senate Hearing 104-448--War Crimes in the Balkans--Joint
Hearing Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Committee
on Foreign Relations. (Wednesday, August 9, 1995)
Senate Report 104-278--Department of Defense Authorization
for fiscal year 1997 to accompany S. 1745. (June 11, 1996
ordered to be printed)
Senate Hearing 104-510--Current and Projected National
Security Threats to the U.S. and Interests Aboard. (February
22, 1996)
Senate Hearing 104-499--Joint Hearing on Economic
Espionage. (February 28, 1996)
d. memorandum of agreement regarding tiara and jmip
Memorandum of agreement--April 29, 1996, between the Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC) and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI), Relating to the Joint Military Intelligence
Program (JMIP) and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)
The Chairman and Ranking Member of the SASC and the
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SSCI agree to the following
arrangements for the review and authorization of TIARA and
JMIP:
(1) The SSCI will consider TIARA and the JMIP in its
markup and will include a recommendation for TIARA and
the JMIP in its formal committee report on the annual
Intelligence Authorization Act. The SSCI's bill and
report, however, will make clear that the only schedule
of authorizations the SSCI is recommending to the
Senate is the schedule for the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP), and that the SSCI is only
making a recommendation for TIARA and the JMIP to the
SASC;
(2) The committee staffs will work together and the
SSCI staff may attend staff-level conference meetings
on the annual Department of Defense Authorization bill
in which matters related to TIARA and JMIP are
considered; and
(3) Before a TIARA or JMIP issue is finally closed
out in the Defense Authorization conference in a manner
with which they disagree, the SSCI Chairman and Vice
Chairman will have an opportunity to consult on the
issue with the SASC Chairman and Ranking Member.
Strom Thurmond,
SASC Chairman.
Sam Nunn,
SASC Ranking Member.
Arlen Specter,
SSCI Chairman.
J. Robert Kerrey,
SSCI Vice Chairman.
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