[Senate Report 108-52]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
108th Congress
1st Session SENATE Report
108-52
_______________________________________________________________________
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
__________
SPECIAL REPORT
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
JANUARY 3, 2001 to NOVEMBER 22, 2002
May 21, 2003.--Ordered to be printed
C O N T E N T S
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Page
I. Introduction......................................................1
II. Legislation.......................................................2
A. Intelligence Budget
B. S. 1428, Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2002
C. S. 2506, Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2003
III.Oversight Activities..............................................6
A. Hearings.............................................. 6
1. Joint Inquiry Into the Events of September 11,
2001
2. S. 1448--A bill to enhance intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the US.
Government in the prevention of terrorism
3. S. 2586 and S. 2659--Bills to Amend the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act
4. Counterterrorism
5. Counterintelligence
6. Counterproliferation
7. Iraq WMD
8. Counternarcotics: Colombia
9. Counternarcotics: Review of Peruvian Shootdown of
a Civilian Aircraft on April 20, 2001
10. National Security Threats to the United States
11. Covert Action Quarterly Review
12. Arms Control: The Moscow Treaty
B. Community Issues...................................... 14
1. Oversight of Intelligence Community Inspectors
General
2. Strategic and Performance Planning for the
Intelligence Community
3. National Commission for the Review of Research
and Development Programs of the U.S. Intelligence
Community
4. Intelligence Community Financial Management
5. Specifying National Foreign Intelligence Budget
Amounts for Counterterrorism,
Counterproliferation, Counternarcotics, and
Counterintelligence
C. Investigations and Inquiries.......................... 17
1. USS Cole
2. Captain Michael ``Scott'' Speicher
3. Robert Hanssen
D. Audits................................................ 19
1. CIA's Directorate of Operations
2. Foreign Materiel Program
3. Counterterrorism
IV. Confirmations....................................................21
A. John L. Helgerson, Inspector General for CIA
B. Scott W. Muller, General Counsel of the CIA
V. Support to the Senate............................................22
VI. Appendix.........................................................22
1. Number of Meetings
2. Bills and Resolutions Originated by the Committee
3. Bills Referred to the Committee
4. Publications
108th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 108-52
======================================================================
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
_______
May 21, 2003.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Roberts, from the Committee on Intelligence, submitted the
following
SPECIAL REPORT
I. Introduction
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, underscore the
importance of the Intelligence Community as our early warning
system against security threats to the United States. In 2002,
both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)
conducted historic joint inquiry into the Intelligence
Community's performance in dealing with the terrorist threat to
our country.
In addition to addressing the U.S. Intelligence Community's
counterterrorism capabilities, the Intelligence Authorization
Acts for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 reflect the Committee's
attention to five priority areas to enhance the role of
intelligence in our national security strategy: (1)
revitalization of the National Security Agency (NSA); (2)
correcting deficiencies in human intelligence; (3) addressing
the imbalance between intelligence collection and analysis; (4)
rebuilding a robust research and development program for the
Intelligence Community; and (5) modernizing the capabilities of
Measurements and Signatures Intelligence to fulfill key
intelligence requirements. The intelligence budgets, as marked
up by the SSCI, reflected an emphasis on these priority areas.
The SSCI was established in 1976 by Senate Resolution 400
to strengthen congressional oversight of the programs and
activities of U.S. intelligence agencies. Throughout its
history, the Committee has sought to carry out its oversight
responsibilities in a nonpartisan manner. During the 107th
Congress, the Committee continued this tradition in crafting
important intelligence legislation, conducting investigations
and audits into Intelligence Community and other national
security issues, and authorizing--and as necessary, increasing
or reallocating--funding for a wide array of U.S. intelligence
activities.
As part of its oversight responsibilities, the Committee
performs an annual review of the intelligence budget submitted
by the President and prepares legislation authorizing
appropriations for the various civilian and military agencies
and departments comprising the Intelligence Community. These
entities include the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office,
the intelligence capabilities of the military services, as well
as the intelligence-related components of the Department of
State, the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, the Department of
the Treasury, the Department of Energy and the United States Coast
Guard. The Committee makes recommendations to the Senate Armed Services
Committee on authorizations for the intelligence-related components of
the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Marine Corps. The
Committee also conducts periodic investigations, audits, and
inspections of intelligence activities and programs.
The Committee's charge is to ensure that the Intelligence
Community provides the accurate and timely intelligence
necessary to identify and monitor threats to the national
security; to support the executive and legislative branches in
their decisions on national security matters; to ensure that
U.S. military commanders have the intelligence support to allow
them to prevail swiftly and decisively on the battlefield, and
to ensure that all intelligence activities and programs conform
with the Constitution and laws of the United States of America.
During the 107th Congress, the Committee held a total of
117 on-the-record meetings, briefings, and hearings, as well as
over 300 off-the-record briefings. There were 14 hearings held
on the Intelligence Community's budget, including the
Conference sessions with the House. Two nomination hearings
were held.
Additionally, the Committee held a total of 22 hearings
with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
concerning the Joint Inquiry into the Events of September 11,
2001.
II. Legislation
A. INTELLIGENCE BUDGET
During the 107th Congress, the Committee conducted annual
reviews of the fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 budget
requests for the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the
Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence
and Related Activities. As part of its review, the Committee
received testimony from senior Intelligence Community officials
and evaluated the detailed budget justification documents
submitted by the Executive branch.
For fiscal year 2003, the Administration proposed
significant resource increases for the overall national
intelligence effort. This increase built upon substantial
supplemental appropriations approved for the Intelligence
Community for fiscal year 2002 in the wake of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. The increased amounts approved
for the National Foreign Intelligence Program are consistent
with the need to strengthen the Intelligence Community in
executing its roles in the ongoing war against terrorism and
the protection of the American homeland. Additionally,
requested resources will aid the Intelligence Community's
ongoing effort to pursue those intelligence subjects of
greatest concern to our nation.
In the budget review for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the
Committee sought to highlight five areas for priority attention
in the near term if intelligence is to fulfill its role in our
national security strategy. They are: (1) revitalizing the
National Security Agency; (2) correcting deficiencies in human
intelligence; (3) addressing the imbalance between intelligence
collection and analysis; (4) rebuilding a robust research and
development program; and (5) modernizing the capabilities of
Measurements and Signatures Intelligence to fulfill key
intelligence requirements.
Despite significant increased resource levels, the
Committee identified other shortfalls in the National Foreign
Intelligence Program budget that did not, or could not, receive
adequate attention during the Administration's budget process.
These shortfalls include:
A looming crisis in our ability to collect
information from key platforms as a result of
unexpected failures;
Insufficient funds to complete a major
acquisition program; and
Inadequate funding to ensure that
information collected by the next generation of space-
based sensors will be processed, exploited, and
disseminated appropriately to intelligence analysts.
These shortfalls are not the only ones facing the Intelligence
Community. As the war against terrorism continues, a series of
intelligence challenges will likely arise which will tax the
resources and overall capabilities of the people and programs
comprising the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
Beyond any specific measures proposed in the
Administration's budget for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the
Administration must continue to devote attention to the five
priority areas identified by the Committee, as well as a host
of resource-related issues that must be addressed if the near-
term increases in intelligence capabilities are to translate
into sustained, long-term intelligence successes
againstprotracted and complex threats to our nation.. The Committee
looks forward to working with the Administration in the days ahead in
this overall effort.
B. S. 1428, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY 2002
On September 14, 2001, the Committee reported out S. 1428,
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. In
addition to providing the annual authorization for
appropriations for intelligence activities, the bill, inter
alia:
Amended the National Security Act of 1947 to require
that notifications to Congress of intelligence
activities and failures be made in writing and to
require that the Director of Central Intelligence
establish standards and procedures applicable to such
reports;
Required the Director of Central Intelligence to
prepare a comprehensive report describing the
mechanisms for ensuring that Congress is appropriately
served in its policy-making role as a consumer of
intelligence;
Amended current law regarding interdiction of
aircraft used in illicit drug trafficking to require
the President to make an annual certification to
Congress concerning the existence of a drug threat in
the country at issue and the existence in that country
of appropriate procedures to protect against innocent
loss of life;
Altered the process of handling complaints brought to
the Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community so
that all complaints are forwarded to the Director of
Central Intelligence, or other agency head, and to the
congressional intelligence committees; and
Required the Attorney General, in consultation with
the Director of Central Intelligence, to conduct a
comprehensive review of current laws, regulations and
protections against unauthorized disclosure of
classified information and to submit a report to
Congress.
The Senate passed S. 1428 by voice vote.
On the Floor, the Senate took up the intelligence
authorization bill passed by the House of Representatives,
struck all of the House bill after the enacting clause and
inserted a substituted text, consisting of the text of S. 1428
and amendments. In conference, members of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) met to seek agreement on the
authorization of appropriations for fiscal year 2003 and to
resolve differences in the legislative provisions in the House
and Senate bills. The HPSCI receded from its disagreement to
the amendment of the Senate with an amendment that was a
substitute for the House bill and the Senate amendment. The
conference report passed both houses and was signed by the
President on December 28. 2001, as P.L. 107-108. The provisions
of S. 1428 described above remained in the final conference
report. In addition, the conference report:
Codified the inclusion of the Coast Guard as an
element of the Intelligence Community;
Required a report on the implementation of the
recommendations of the National Commission on
Terrorism;
Required Presidential approval and submission to
Congress of the National Counterintelligence Strategy
and each National Threat Identification and
Prioritization Assessment produced under Presidential
Decision Directive 75; and
Required that the Director of Central Intelligence
rescind existing guidelines regarding recruitment of
assets with human rights concerns.
C. S. 2506, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY 2003
On May 9, 2002, the Committee reported out S. 2506, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. In
addition to providing the annual authorization for
appropriations for intelligence activities, the bill, inter
alia:
Established in law the National Counterintelligence
Executive (NCIX) to serve as the substantive leader of
national-level counterintelligence policy. The NCIX had
been established previously under Presidential Decision
Directive 75;
Established the National Commission for the Review of
the Research and Development Programs of the U.S.
Intelligence Community. The Commission, to be composed
of government officials and private sector experts, is
to review the current state of research and development
within the Intelligence Community and determine whether
current activities are aligned with the fields that are
of the greatest importance to future intelligence
efforts;
Required the creation of a Terrorist Identification
Classification System. The Director of Central
Intelligence was directed to establish and maintain a
list of known or suspected terrorists and to ensure
that pertinent information on the list is shared with
other agencies of the Federal, State and local
governments. The DCI is to prescribe appropriate
standards for including names on, and removing names
from, the list:
Required that the National Foreign Intelligence
Program budget submission include cross-agency budget
aggregates for total Intelligence Community
expenditures in counterterrorism, counterproliferation,
counternarcotics and counterintelligence; and
Required the Director of Central Intelligence to
establish the National Virtual Translation Center and
the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center.
The Senate passed S. 2506 by voice vote.
On the floor, the Senate took up the intelligence
authorization bill passed by the House of Representatives,
struck all of the House bill after the enacting clause and
inserted a substituted text, consisting of the text of S. 2506
and amendments. In conference, members of the HPSCI and the
SSCI met to seek agreement on the authorization of
appropriations for fiscal year 2003 and to resolve differences
in the legislative provisions in the House and Senate bills.
The HPSCI receded from its disagreement to the amendment of the
Senate with an amendment that was a substitute for the House
bill and the Senate amendment. The conference report passed
both houses and was signed by the President on November 27,
2002, as P.L. 107-306. The provisions of S. 2506 described
above remained in the final conference report. In addition, the
conference report:
Established the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the United States to examine and report upon the facts and
causes relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
The Commission is to investigate and report its findings and
recommendations on the circumstances surrounding the attacks
and the extent of the nation's preparedness for, and immediate
response to, the attacks. The Commission is required to build
upon the work of the Joint Inquiry of the SSCI and HPSCI,
rather than duplicating it, by review the Joint Inquiry's
accomplishments and directing its intelligence-related inquiry
at areas that need additional review.
Required the Secretary of the Treasury to submit a
semiannual report concerning operations against terrorist
financial networks, such as total number of asset seizures,
applications for asset seizures and physical searches, as well
as the extent to which information from these activities has
been shared with other government agencies.
Directed the delay of implementation of a compensation
reform plan at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) until
February 1, 2004, or the completion of a pilot project, and
expressed the sense of Congress that evaluation training for
CIA managers and employees should be provided.
Amended the Freedom of Information Act so that foreign
governments and their representatives cannot make requests for
information from the agencies in the Intelligence Community.
III. Oversight Activities
a. hearings
1. Joint inquiry into the events of September 11, 2001
Shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on
New York City and Washington, D.C., the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence initiated a joint inquiry into the performance of
the agencies of the Intelligence Community leading up to the
attacks. This inquiry represents the first time in U.S. history
that two standing committees of the Senate and House of
Representatives have cooperated in such an undertaking.
The two committees hired a separate professional staff and
assigned it responsibility for: (1) collecting information in
the possession of the Intelligence Community prior to September
11 related to the attacks; (2) identifying the nature of any
specific or systemic problems that may have impeded the
Community's ability to prevent those attacks or undercut its
preparedness for such terrorist threats; and (3) making
recommendations to the two Committees about how to improve the
U.S. Intelligence Community's ability to predict and prevent
terrorist attacks in the future.
In the months that followed, between March and December
2002, the Joint Inquiry Staff reviewed approximately 500,000
pages of relevant documents,conducted almost 300 interviews and
participated in briefings and discussions involving about 600
individuals. The Joint Inquiry focused primarily on the Intelligence
Community, but also acquired relevant information from other federal
agencies, state and local authorities, foreign governments, and private
sector individuals and organizations. Based on this investigative
effort, the Senate and House Committees held 22 joint hearings. Nine of
these were public hearings and 13 were held in closed session because
of the highly classified nature of much of the information presented in
documents and testimony.
In December 2002, the Senate and House Committees, voting
separately, unanimously approved the Joint Inquiry's classified
450-page Final Report and made public the unclassified Findings
and Recommendations contained in the Report. Including
appendices, the Final Report totals about 900 pages. The
Committees currently are working with the Intelligence
Community in an effort to declassify and make public as much of
the Final Report as possible, consistent with the interests of
national security. In addition, a number of Senators and
Members of Congress prepared their own ``Additional Views'' to
this report, adding additional analysis totaling more than 100
pages.
Among the findings of the Joint Inquiry was the conclusion
that the U.S. Intelligence Community had substantial
information in its possession before September 11, 2001, that
was relevant to the terrorist attacks. The Community failed to
focus upon this information, however, and failed to appreciate
its collective significance in terms of providing warning of
the danger of a domestic terrorist attack of the type that
occurred on September 11. The Joint Inquiry also identified a
number of systemic weaknesses that contributed to the
Community's inability to detect and prevent the attacks, and to
cope successfully with the problem of modern international
terrorism in general. These weaknesses included a lack of
coordinated Community-level leadership, poor allocation of
resources, an insufficient focus on the potential for a
domestic attack, the absence of a comprehensive
counterterrorist strategy, inadequate analytic focus and
quality, a reluctance to develop and implement new technical
capabilities aggressively, and inadequate sharing of relevant
counterterrorism information.
To help correct these deficiencies, the Joint Inquiry
promulgated nineteen recommendations for reform. Among the more
significant of these recommendations was the Joint Inquiry's
endorsement of the creation of a new office of the ``Director
of National Intelligence'' to lead the Intelligence Community.
This would be an office separate from that of Director of the
CIA and would have considerably greater budgetary and
management powers over Intelligence
Community components than enjoyed today by the Director of
Central Intelligence. The Joint Inquiry also recommended that
Congress promptly consider whether all entirely new
intelligence agency should be created to perform the domestic
intelligence functions of the U.S. Government currently handled
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (The full text of the
Joint Inquiry's findings and recommendations may be found at
http://www.intell igence.senate.gov/pubs107.htm.)
2. S. 1448, a bill to enhance intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government in the prevention of
terrorism
S. 1448, a bill to enhance intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the United States Government in the
prevention of terrorism, was introduced by Senator Bob Graham,
along with Senators Feinstein, Bayh, Nelson of Florida and
Rockefeller on September 21, 2001. The bill was referred to the
Committee, and the Committee held a public hearing on September
24, 2001. The Committee heard from witnesses representing the
Department of Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency, as
well as public interest groups.
S. 1448 contained a number of provisions intended to
support the fight against international terrorism. The bill,
inter alia:
Placed the overall strategy and setting of priorities
for foreign intelligence collection pursuant to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) under the
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence;
Provided that intelligence officers are permitted to
establish and maintain intelligence relationships with
any person for purposes of acquiring terrorism
information;
Permitted the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
collect non-content information without obtaining a
FISA order;
Extended renewal periods for FISA orders;
Directed that foreign intelligence obtained during
the course of a criminal investigation must be provided
to the Director of Central Intelligence; and
Required proposals for the establishment of the
Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center and the
National Virtual Translation Center.
The hearing also addressed legislative proposals submitted
to Congress by the Attorney General shortly after the attacks
of September 11. 2001. The Attorney General recommended:
Lengthening the period of a FISA order, and providing
for ``roving'' wiretap authority under FISA;
Amending FISA so that the official applying for a
FISA order must certify that foreign intelligence is
``a'' purpose of the FISA application rather than a
primary purpose, as interpreted by the courts;
Permitting the use of information obtained through
foreign government wiretaps in United States courts if
the United States was not involved with the wiretap;
Amending Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, pertaining to grand juries, as well as Title
III, pertaining to criminal wiretaps, so that foreign
intelligence obtained from a grand jury or Title III
could be shared with other federal agencies; and
Amending the law regarding National Security letters
so that they can be obtained by a Special Agent in
Charge of an FBI field office rather than a
headquarters official.
Many of the provisions in S. 1448 and the Attorney
General's proposals were enacted by the USA PATRIOT Act, P.L.
107-56 and in the Intelligence Authorization Acts for Fiscal
Years 2002 and 2003.
A transcript of the hearing was published in S. Hrg. 107-
449, a Government Printing Office publication.
3. S. 2586 and S. 2659 (proposed amendments to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act)
S. 2586, a bill to amend the definition of ``foreign
power'' under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(FISA) relating to international terrorism, was introduced by
Senators Kyl and Schumer on June 5, 2002. S. 2659, a bill to
amend FISA to modify the standard of proof for issuance of
orders regarding non-United States persons from probable cause
to reasonable suspicion, was introduced by Senator DeWine on
June 20, 2002. The Committee held a public hearing on both
bills on July 31, 2002. The Committee heard testimony from
representatives of the Department of Justice, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, as
well as from academic and public interest witnesses.
S. 2586 would amend the definition of ``foreign power''
under FISA. One of the showings necessary to obtain a FISA
order is that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power. Currently, one definition of ``foreign power''
is ``a group engaged in international terrorism or activities
in preparation therefor.'' S. 2586 would amend that definition
to read ``any person, other than a United States person, or
group that is engaged in international terrorism or activities
in preparation therefor.'' The amendment is aimed at the so-
called ``lone wolf'' terrorist. The definition of ``foreign
power'' would be changed so that for a non-U.S. person, a FISA
order could be obtained upon the showing that the individual is
engaged in international terrorism, without requiring a nexus
to any group of foreign terrorists. S. 2659 would amend the
probable cause standard under FISA. Currently, for a FISA order
to be approved, the FISA Court must find probable cause that
the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power
and that the location of the electronic surveillance or
physical search is being used, or is about to be used, by a
foreign power. S. 2659 would amend the standard so that for a
non-U.S. person, the necessary showing is reasonable suspicion
that the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power,
and that the location is being used, or is about to be used, by
a foreign power.
Full Senate action is still pending on both bills.
4. Counterterrorism
Terrorism is, and will likely remain for some time, the
most critical and immediate national security threat facing our
nation. Intelligence is the first, and perhaps best, defense
against terrorism, and the Committee has focused much of its
effort during the 107th Congress on this issue.
The Committee held a series of hearings throughout the
spring and summer of 2001, the clear message of which was that
there was a very serious terrorist threat to the United States,
and that a large-scale attack was probable, possibly within our
borders. As a result, the attacks of September 11 were
surprising to Members of the Committee only in the scope of
devastation and their audacious success; the fact that
terrorists struck within the United States was not a surprise.
In those pre-September 11 hearings, as well as numerous
staff briefings, the Committee's belief that the terrorist
threat was growing was accompanied by concern that our
Intelligence Community was not well-positioned to meet that
threat. In particular, there appeared to be a critical lack of
interagency coordination and cooperation on this vital subject.
Witnesses appeared before the Committee and its staff stating
that the relationship between the elements of the Intelligence
Community, particularly between the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency was good, and
getting better, but the Committee was not convinced.
With the attacks on September 11, and the developing ``war
on terrorism,'' the Committee stepped up the frequency and
intensity of its scrutiny of this issue. A centerpiece of this
effort was the establishment of regular ``War on Terrorism
Update'' hearings, usually held every other week, in which
representatives of the Intelligence Community provided in-depth
descriptions of the efforts, and progress, in the intelligence
response to the attacks.
In addition to these regular formal briefings, Committee
staff continued to receive briefings on a wide variety of
subjects related to the resources, structure and legislative
framework governing the Intelligence Community's intelligence
efforts.
Most importantly, the Committee, in concert with the HPSCI,
undertook a joint investigation into the attacks of September
11. The resulting Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry
into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Joint
Inquiry) conducted numerous hearings; its staff conducted
hundreds of interviews and gathered millions of pages of
relevant documentation. On December 20, 2002, the staff of the
Joint Inquiry completed a report, which was unanimously adopted
by both this Committee and its House counterpart.
5. Counterintelligence
The Committee continued to monitor closely
counterintelligence issues in the 107th Congress. The SSCI held
a number of closed hearings on the Robert Hanssen espionage
case and received numerous staff briefings on the Hanssen case
and other espionage cases, as well as a wide array of other
counterintelligence-related issues. The counterintelligence
issues reviewed by the Committee included: the systemic
security issues at the Federal Bureau of Investigation as cited
in the March 2002 report of the Commission for the Review of
Federal Bureau of Investigation Security Programs (the Webster
Commission); the effectiveness and accountability of the Office
of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX); and the
effectiveness and efficiency of the counterintelligence
function at the Department of Energy's Office of
Counterintelligence and the National Nuclear Security
Administration's Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence.
6. Counterproliferation
The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons, and their means of delivery, remains a central threat
to U.S. national security and a key issue both to our ongoing
war on terrorism and potential military action against Iraq.
The Committee took significant interest in this issue in an
effort to monitor the scope and trend of proliferation; to
encourage better cooperation among the Intelligence Community
to support counter-proliferation efforts; to make more informed
decisions on national security policy debates; and to assess
how best to assist the Intelligence Community in its support to
counter-proliferation.
The Committee held a number of hearings on proliferation
topics, including hearings on global proliferation trends, the
Moscow Treaty, and Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In
addition, the Committee received numerous briefings and
reviewed many Intelligence Community products addressing
proliferation of WMD and advanced conventional munitions. Due
to the potential for WMD use by terrorists, these hearings and
briefings generated much valuable information and dialogue.
7. Iraqi WMD hearings
In 2002, we saw United States and United Nations debates on
the Iraq issue. At the Committee's request, the National
Intelligence Council produced a National Intelligence Estimate
on proscribed Iraqi WMD and missile programs, as well as an
unclassified paper. In early October, the Committee held two
hearings on this issue.
United States and United Nations debates on the Iraq
problems culminated in the October 11, 2002, passage by
Congress of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution of 2002 and the United Nations Security
Council's unanimous adoption of resolution number 1441 on
November 8. Resolution 1441 gives Baghdad ``a final opportunity
to comply with its disarmament obligations.'' Baghdad
acquiesced to this pressure and allowed inspectors back into
the country. Under the auspices of Security CouncilResolutions,
the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC) restarted inspections in late 2002.
8. Counternarcotics: Colombia
Counternarcotics issues remain of concern to the Committee,
especially in light of evidence showing the nexus between drug
trafficking and terrorism. In addition to parts of southeast
and southwest Asia, Latin America, specifically, Colombia,
continues to be a major drug producing region. The Committee
held a closed hearing on March 7, 2001, to hear information
about Colombia, with a particular emphasis on Plan Colombia.
The hearing centered on current intelligence analysis and
assessments of the political and military situations in
Colombia, with significant insight into the illegal armed
groups, drug production, and drug trafficking activity in the
country. The hearing also addressed the potential for regional
spillover, as well as human rights issues in relation to the
Government of Colombia.
9. Counternarcotics: Review of the Peruvian shootdown of a civilian
aircraft on April 20, 2001
On the morning of April 20, 2001, a Peruvian Air Force A-37
fighter engaged in counter-drug operations over northeastern
Peru fired on and disabled a suspected drug trafficking
aircraft. The single engine float plane actually was owned and
operated by the Association of Baptists for World Evangelism
and was carrying missionaries returning to their homes in
Iquitos, Peru. Two of the missionaries were killed by the
gunfire and a third was wounded. The damaged float plane made
an emergency landing on the Amazon River about 80 miles from
Iquitos, Peru. The missionary's plane had been tracked by a
Cessna Citation owned by the U.S. military and operated by the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as part of a bi-national
drug interdiction program.
The Committee held one closed hearing and a closed briefing
concerning the Peru shootdown. On April 24, 2001, the Committee
heard testimony from George Tenet, Director of Central
Intelligence, and other senior CIA officials. On May 10, 2001,
Committee members and staff met to view the videotape and
transcript of the shootdown and were briefed by CIA officials.
On July 26, 2001, the Committee staff received an on-the-record
briefing from Assistant Secretary of State Rand Beers, who
summarized the results of the joint American-Peruvian
investigation of the shootdown.
Committee staff conducted interviews with executives and
personnel from: the CIA, the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, the Customs Service, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, the Peruvian Air Force, Peru's aeronautical agency and
the Association of Baptists for World Evangelism. Individuals
interviewed included: the American crew of the Citation tracker
aircraft, two of the surviving missionaries, and ground
personnel in Peru. The Peruvian authorities did not permit
Committee staff to interview the host nation rider, the
interceptor pilots, the Peruvian Officer in Charge on the day
of the shootdown, or the Commanding General of the Peruvian Air
Force Sixth Territorial Air Region who authorized the
shootdown. The Peruvians denied the interview request because
of pending judicial proceedings against the Peruvian pilots and
the host nation rider. The Peruvians had made all of the
officers available to the joint Peruvian/American investigation
team. In order to complete their interviews and the review of
relevant evidence, Committee staff traveled to the headquarters
of both the U.S. Southern Command and the Joint Interagency
Task Force East, the Peruvian cities of Lima, Pulcallpa, and
Iquitos and the Association of Baptists for World Evangelism
Headquarters in Harrisburg. Pennsylvania. Committee staff
reviewed substantial material provided by the CIA and smaller,
but significant, amounts of material provided by the Department
of State, the Department of Defense and the Office of National
Drug Control Policy.
The Committee issued a final report in October 2001. The
report included eleven major conclusions and four
recommendations. The Committee recommended that the requirement
for a Presidential Determination prior to providing U.S.
assistance to a foreign government engaged in a program of
interdicting drug trafficking planes should be changed to an
annual Presidential Certification process with more thorough
reporting requirements. This recommendation was implemented
through legislation included in the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2002. The Committee's recommendation that
responsibility for air interdiction programs of this nature be
transferred to an agency other than the CIA has been
implemented with regard to the air interdiction program in
Colombia. The State Department has been charged with operating
that program. Since the Administration has not made a decision
on the future of the program, other specifics to the air
interdiction program in Peru are still pending.
10. National security threats to the United States
It has become a Committee practice to begin each new
session of the Congress with an open hearing to review the
Intelligence Community's assessment of the current and
projected national security threats to the United States.
Thesehearings cover a wide range of issues and are held in open and
closed session. Tile hearings inform the Committee and the American
public about the threats facing the country.
On February 7, 2001, the SSCI held an open hearing on the
current and projected national security threats to the United
States. Testifying before the Committee were Director of
Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, Thomas Fingar, Acting
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, and
Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency. On February 6, 2002, the SSCI held a
similar hearing. Testifying before the Committee were Director
of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, Carl W. Ford, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research,
Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency and Dale L. Watson, Executive Assistant
Director, Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. After each of these public
hearings, Committee Members met in closed session to receive a
classified briefing on threats to U.S. interests from
Intelligence Community representatives.
The transcript of the Committee's February 7, 2001,
hearing, ``Current and Projected National Security Threats to
the United States'' [S. Hrg. 107-2], and the Committee's
February 6, 2002 hearing ``Current and Projected National
Security Threats to the United States'' [S. Hrg. 107-597],
which includes the responses to a large number of questions-
for-the-record (QFRs) covering a broad spectrum of national
security issues, were printed and made available to the public.
11. Covert action quarterly review
Throughout the 107th Congress, the Committee continued to
conduct rigorous oversight of covert action programs. In
accordance with Committee rules, these reviews occurred on a
quarterly basis. The Committee reviewed these programs to
ensure their means and objectives were consistent with United
States foreign policy goals, and were conducted in accordance
with all applicable American laws. The Committee pursues its
oversight responsibilities for covert action with the
understanding that these programs can be a significant factor
in accomplishing foreign policy objectives, but with the
knowledge that to be successful such programs must be congruous
with the ideals and principles of our nation.
12. Arms control: The Moscow Treaty
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has formal
responsibility for reviewing all treaties, including arms
control agreements, before they are acted upon by the full
Senate. In the case of arms control agreements, the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence supports this process by
providing the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate its
assessment of the monitoring issues and counterintelligence
issues; if any, raised by such treaties.
Our assessment of the monitoring issues associated with the
Moscow Treaty represents a continuation of the Committee's work
over two decades overseeing the progress of negotiations to
reduce strategic offensive nuclear arms. During the 1990s, the
Committee routinely reviewed the progress of the START
negotiations and addressed START monitoring capabilities in its
annual intelligence authorization legislation. Committee
members and staff have met routinely with U.S. negotiators and
have expressed their views, both formally and informally, on
verification issues to the negotiators and to other senior
level officials.
In preparation for a Senate vote on consent to ratification
of the Moscow Treaty, Committee staff held numerous staff
briefings, reviewed numerous documents, including the recent
National Intelligence Estimate entitled ``Monitoring the Moscow
Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions'' (June 2002), and
asked formal questions-for-the-record. Staff members of the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed
Services were invited to participate in these briefings.
On September 10, 2002, the Committee held a closed hearing
on U.S. monitoring capabilities and the risks and implications
of violations by the other party to the Moscow Treaty. At this
hearing, the Committee received testimony from Robert Walpole,
the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear
Issues at the Central Intelligence Agency. The Committee also
received numerous responses to questions-for-the-record that
were submitted to the Executive branch prior to and following
the hearing, and the results of these inquiries have informed
the Committee's judgments.
The key feature of the Moscow Treaty relates to the central
limit on warheads (Article 1), whereby each Party commits to
reduce and limit its strategic nuclear warheads so that by
December 31, 2012, its aggregate number of such warheads does
not exceed 1700-2200. In addition, each party determines for
itselfthe composition and structure of its strategic offensive
arms, and thus each party's achievement of the 1700-2200 level by
December 31, 2012, is to be reached through its own reduction plans.
The Committee has been assured that the Intelligence
Community possesses sufficient assets and capabilities to
monitor the Moscow Treaty and that the combination of national
technical means (NTM), analytical expertise, and information
gained from START Treaty provisions will enable it to estimate
with a high degree of certainty the number of Russian nuclear
warheads deployed on December 31, 2012. Nonetheless, the
Committee shares the Community's concern that more resources
will be required if, over the duration of the Treaty, strategic
arms control monitoring is to remain a core NTM task.
B. COMMUNITY ISSUES
1. Oversight of Intelligence Community Inspectors General
During the 107th Congress, the Committee continued to
monitor the activities of the Inspectors General (IGs) of the
Intelligence Community. This oversight included: review of over
180 IG products, including audit reports, inspection reports,
reports of investigation, and semi-annual reports of IG
activities; visits to IG offices for updates on plans and
procedures; and attendance at several IG conferences. In
addition to planning hearings focused on issues reviewed by the
Intelligence Community IGs, the Committee arranged briefings
with Community program and IG personnel to follow up on the
status of IG recommendations. Examples of these briefings
include employee grievances, management of operational
activities, contracting procedures, employee recruitment and
security processing, effective use of resources on new
technology, covert action programs, and financial management
practices.
During the 107th Congress, the Committee continued its work
to ensure the effectiveness and independence of the
administrative Inspectors General at the National
Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the Defense
Intelligence Agency. The Committee reinforces the importance of
the IG function through its regular interaction with the agency
directors, the IGs, and their staffs. The administrative IGs
also submit annual reports to the Committee detailing their
requests for fiscal and personnel resources and the plan for
their use. These reports describe the programs and activities
scheduled for review during the fiscal year; comment on the
office's ability to hire and retain qualified personnel;
describe concerns relating to the independence and
effectiveness of the IG's office; and give an overall
assessment of the agency's response to the IG's recommendations
during the previous year. These annual reports serve as a basis
for Committee oversight throughout the year.
2. Strategic and performance planning for the Intelligence Community
During the 107th Congress, the Committee continued to
monitor the ability of the Intelligence Community to set
priorities and goals consistent with the Administration's
defined objectives, and to assess its own performance in
achieving such goals. In Senate Report 107-63, accompanying the
Fiscal Year 2002 Intelligence Authorization Bill, the
Committee, consistent with the 1993 Government Performance and
Results Act, directed the Director of Central Intelligence to
produce a comprehensive Intelligence Community strategic plan
and performance plan, and complementary strategic and
performance plans for the intelligence agencies within the
National Foreign Intelligence Program. The Committee further
directed that the Intelligence Community's strategic plan be
updated every four years and that the performance plans be
updated annually. The purpose of the plans is to provide the
Intelligence Community with vehicles to articulate program
goals, measure program performance, improve program efficiency,
and aid in resource planning.
In Senate Report 107-149, accompanying the Intelligence
Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2003, the Committee reviewed
the progress of the Intelligence Community in producing its
first set of strategic and performance plans. The Committee
further requested that the Director of Central Intelligence
include output measures in future performance plans to aid in
determining the value of Intelligence Community capabilities in
achieving its stated strategic goals. Additionally, the
Committee requested information to examine how the individual
intelligence agencies utilized their performance plans in
preparing future budget submissions. The Committee took note of
the decision of the Director of Central Intelligence in the
summer of 2002 to produce a new version of an Intelligence
Community strategic plan, independent of any Committee-imposed
deadline, along with his guidance to the intelligence agencies
emphasizing the importance of performance-based output measures
in future plans.
3. National Commission for the Review of Research and Development
Programs of the United States Intelligence Community
Title X of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003 established an independent review of the research and
development programs of the Intelligence Community. The
decision to create the Commission followed the concerns of the
Senate and House Committees that a need existed to review the
full range of research and development programs under the
purview of the Intelligence Community; evaluate such programs
against the scientific and technical fields judged to be of
most importance for future intelligence needs: and articulate
appropriate program and resource priorities.
The Commission is to comprise twelve members: two from the
Senate, two from the House of Representatives, six from the
private sector, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for
Community Management, and a senior intelligence official of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The committees tasked the Commission to assess the current
status of research and development programs within the
Intelligence Community, and to assess whether current programs
should be modified; to evaluate the appropriateness of the
current allocation of resources for research and development
programs within the individual intelligence agencies; and to
evaluate the relationship between the research and development
programs of the Intelligence Community and those being carried
out by other agencies of the federal government and the private
sector. The Commission's final report is due to the
Intelligence Committees by September 1, 2003. The committees
also tasked the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense to provide their assessment of the report
to the Intelligence Committees.
4. Intelligence Community financial management
The Committee has taken an increasingly active role in
ensuring the Intelligence Community's compliance with federal
financial accounting standards. Although not all of the
Intelligence Community agencies are specifically named in the
Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, the Committee believes
that each of the agencies should comply with the Act as a way
to strengthen internal controls and improve financial
management.
In Senate Report 107-63, to accompany the Intelligence
Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2002, the Committee took
note of the significant shortcomings revealed by an independent
audit of the Fiscal Year 2000 financial statements of the
National Reconnaissance Office. The findings of the independent
audit were explored further in a Committee hearing in the
summer of 2001.
Concerned that similar shortcomings may exist within other
National Foreign Intelligence Program agencies which have not
received the same level of financial management oversight, the
Committee directed the Director of Central Intelligence to have
the appropriate statutory Inspector General carry out an audit
of the form and content of the Fiscal Year 2001 financial
statements of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the
National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). The
responses revealed that none of the agencies were able to
produce auditable financial statements. Specific weaknesses
were identified for the agencies to rectify, including the
improper preparation of selected required statements and
inaccurate reporting of property, plant, and equipment. Also,
the Committee learned that modernization of the financial
management systems for the NSA, DIA, and NIMA would likely be
delayed due to the decision of the Defense Department to
undertake a new Department-wide financial management
modernization program.
The Committee's Audit and Investigations staff made follow-
up visits to each agency to assess their ability to correct
identified problems. In Senate Report 107-149, to accompany the
Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2003, the
Committee requested that it be kept informed of the impact of
such a modernization program on the financial accounting
systems of the stated agencies and steps being taken to make
current systems compliant with federal accounting standards.
Additionally, in Senate Report 107-63, the Committee
directed that the CIA and all National Foreign Intelligence
Program agencies within the Defense Department aggregation
receive a complete audit of their financial statements by March
1, 2005. To facilitate adequate oversight of the Intelligence
Community's financial management systems and practices, the
Committee requested, in Senate Report 107-149, that the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management
report by February 1, 2003, on how the Community Management
Staff is structured to monitor Intelligence Community
compliance with statutory requirements and related guidance
from the Office of Management and Budget.
5. Specifying National Foreign Intelligence budget amounts for
counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and
counterintelligence
Section 311 of P.L. 107-306, the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003; amended Title V of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) to require that
budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support
of the President's annual budget specify the aggregate amounts
requested as part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program
for counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics,
and counterintelligence. Such action was a result of the
Committee's belief that a rational budget process must make
clear the level of resources devoted to such key national
priorities across the government. In the past, however, the
Committee has found it difficult to discern the amount of
funding and, by association, the level of commitment, that the
Intelligence Community has devoted to each discipline. The
amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 also complements
Section 1051 of the 1998 National Defense Authorization Act,
which requires the Administration to provide ``cross cut''
information on Executive branch funding to combat terrorism, to
include intelligence funding.
C. INVESTIGATIONS AND INQUIRIES
The Committee's Audit and Investigations Staff was created
in 1988 to provide ``a credible independent arm for committee
review of covert action programs and other specific
Intelligence Community functions and issues.'' During the 107th
Congress, the staff of three to four full-time auditors led or
provided significant support to the Committee's investigations
and its review of a number of administrative and operational
issues relating to the agencies of the Intelligence Community.
In addition, the Audit and Investigations Staff completed three
indepth reviews of specific intelligence programs or issues.
The staff's efforts included the following projects.
1. USS ``Cole''
On October 12, 2000, terrorists attacked the United States
Navy destroyer USS Cole while it was refueling in the harbor at
Aden, Yemen. The attack killed 17 American sailors and wounded
39 others. The Committee immediately began an inquiry into the
relevant intelligence collection, reporting, analysis, and
warning within the Intelligence Community prior to the attack.
The Committee's efforts included a review of the Intelligence
Community's overall effectiveness in those areas.
The Committee conducted its inquiry through hearings,
member briefings, and staff interviews. The final, classified
report, which the Committee completed on October 4, 2002,
included several findings and recommendations to the Director
of Central Intelligence. Specifically, the Committee found that
the CIA and the NSA aggressively collected and promptly
disseminated raw intelligence pertaining to potential terrorist
threats. The inquiry also revealed that Intelligence Community
analysts in Washington, D.C., did not always enhance their
terrorism products with historical information and the task was
left to field operators and analysts with limited resources.
The process was hampered further by limitations on intelligence
sharing between agencies. In addition, the Committee concluded
that the degree of specificity required by the analysts and
managers responsible for issuing Intelligence Community warning
products was overly stringent and exceeded the existing
published guidelines.
The principal shortcomings identified in the Committee's
report were the lack of historical context for terrorist threat
products and the failure to abide by established guidelines for
producing and disseminating warning reports. To address these
problems, the report recommends that the Director of Central
Intelligence increase analytic depth on the terrorist target,
revise the procedures and standards for issuing formal
Intelligence Community warning products and create a training
program to ensure that terrorism analysts and consumers of
warning items understand the standards for issuing a warning
product and the significance of those publications.
2. Captain Michael ``Scott'' Speicher
During the 107th Congress, the Committee continued its
involvement in the case of U.S. Navy Captain Michael ``Scott''
Speicher, who was shot down over Iraq on January 17, 1991, the
first night of Operation Desert Storm. He was declared Killed
In Action (KIA) in May 1991; the Navy changed his status to
Missing In Action (MIA) in January 2001; and the Navy recently
designated him Missing/Captured.
Captain Speicher's case first came to the Committee's
attention during the 105th Congress. Since that time, the
Committee has held numerous hearings,Member briefings, and
staff-led meetings to determine the facts surrounding Captain
Speicher's shootdown, the Intelligence Community's input into the
Navy's status detemination process and any available intelligence about
his fate. Based on the information learned during these oversight
efforts and the unprecedented change in Captain Speicher's status in
January 2001, five Senators requested that the Committee conduct a
formal investigation of Captain Speicher's case and the Intelligence
Community's support in determining his fate. The Senators also
disagreed with the conclusion of an October 2000 joint review by the
Inspectors General of the Department of Defense and the Central
Intelligence Agency that the Intelligence Community generally had
performed well in regard to the Speicher case.
The Committee investigated the matter and published a
lengthy classified report on the Speicher case on October 4,
2002. The Committee's investigation found that, due to a lack
of tasking, in the first years after Operation Desert Storm the
Intelligence Community was only minimally involved in locating
Captain Speicher's crash site in Iraq or determining what
happened to him. The Defense Intelligence Agency's Special
Office for POW/MIA Affairs (now the Defense Missing Personnel/
Prisoner of War Office) was responsible for tracking POW/MIA
events during Operation Desert Storm. At specific moments over
the four month period following Captain Speicher's shootdown,
the Office had the opportunity to play a critical role in
accounting for Captain Speicher, but it failed to do so.
Specifically, the Office possessed conflicting information
that, if investigated, might have led to the discovery of
Captain Speicher's crash site much earlier than actually
occurred. Personnel in the Office also failed to act when they
learned--two days before the U.S. Navy changed Captain
Speicher's status from MIA to KIA--that the remains they had
associated with Captain Speicher were not his.
In addition, the U.S. Navy did not appear to take advantage
of the available intelligence about Captain Speicher's fate
during its status determination hearings. Since that time, the
Department of Defense created the Defense Missing Personnel/
Prisoner of War Office and the Intelligence Community
established mechanisms to improve intelligence collection and
analysis on prisoner of war and missing personnel issues. While
the Committee's investigation report acknowledges that these
entities are likely to improve Intelligence Community input
into future missing personnel cases and status determinations,
the report concludes that further improvements are needed to
the communication and coordination mechanisms among the
relevant organizations.
The report includes a recommendation to implement more
formal mechanisms for information exchanges among the
Intelligence Community elements dedicated to prisoner of war
and missing persons issues and the policymakers who require
intelligence to make status determinations. Based on its
investigation, the Committee also recommended that the
Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence
clarify the roles and responsibilities of the various
organizations that address prisoner of war and missing
personnel matters.
3. Robert Hanssen
The Committee continued during the 107th Congress its
oversight of the espionage activities and investigation of
former FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen. Given that Hanssen
spent his long FBI career focused on counterintelligence, the
Committee is concerned about the serious damage he inflicted on
U.S. national security by taking advantage of his access to
sensitive intelligence investigations and programs. The FBI
arrested Hanssen for espionage on February 18, 2001, and the
Committee approved a formal investigation of this case on March
7, 2001. Hanssen was sentenced to life without parole in May
2002.
The Committee's investigation has focused on the extent and
severity of the damage to U.S. national security resulting from
Hanssen's espionage and the shortcomings in FBI security
programs that may have allowed Hanssen to escape detection for
more than 21 years. As part of the investigation, the Committee
held hearings in 2001 about Hanssen's activities and the status
of the FBI investigation. Committee staff also received
briefings and interviewed numerous officials from the FBI and
other Intelligence Community agencies. The Committee's
investigation is ongoing.
D. AUDITS
1. CIA's Directorate of Operations
Early in the 107th Congress, the Audit and Investigations
Staff completed a review of the CIA's Directorate of
Operations' (DO) strategic plan. While agreeing that the CIA
needed to improve its clandestine collection capabilities,
Committee members and staff were unsatisfied with the CIA's
limited ability to justify and provide documentation to support
the particular goals it was pursuing. As a result, the staff
undertook its audit of the DO strategic plan to gain more
precise dataabout the program and provide information to
Committee members for their budget authorization decisions.
The audit revealed a need for improved financial planning
within the CIA. The audit report recommended that the CIA
utilize and improve budget models developed by the Office of
the Chief Financial Officer to obtain an accurate estimate of
the cost of the DO strategic plan and designate funds for the
program based on those results. Prior to the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, the CIA had provided detailed responses
outlining its progress in implementing the Committee's
recommendations. In response to the terrorist attacks, the CIA
developed a new program to thwart terrorist activity worldwide,
incorporating aspects of the DO's previous strategic plan and
the Committee's recommendations for improvement.
2. Foreign Materiel Program
Following up on concerns raised during the Committee's
oversight activities, the Audit and Investigations Staff
reviewed the Intelligence Community's foreign materiel
acquisition and exploitation programs, contained primarily
within the Department of Defense (DoD). The project stemmed
from specific problems in two exploitation projects and a
concern that these issues were indicative of systemic
weaknesses. In addition to interviews at the appropriate
agencies, review of documents, and visits to operational
elements, the staff selected a sample of eight acquisition and/
or exploitation projects and obtained specific information
about these efforts in order to evaluate how the process and
structure described by the agencies operated in practice.
In general, the staff found that the Foreign Materiel
Program is effective and well-administered. The perceived
problems that were the impetus for the review did not appear to
be systemic weaknesses. Instead, they seem to be isolated
incidents that are being addressed through changes in the
acquisition and exploitation processes. During the review,
however, the staff identified two funding issues that led to
continuing attention during the Committee's oversight
activities.
3. Counterterrorism
In response to a request from four Members of this
Committee and two Members of the House Judiciary Committee, the
Audit and Investigations Staff examined the counterterrorism
programs and activities of the Intelligence Community. Together
with the General Accounting Office's review of counterterrorism
budgets within the remainder of the federal government, this
effort sought to provide an overview of the entire U.S.
Government budget to combat terrorism. Both reviews used the
Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Annual Report to
Congress on Combating Terrorism as the starting point for their
analysis of counterterrorism spending from fiscal year 1998
through fiscal year 2002. In addition to the information in the
OMB report, the Committee's staff collected budget data from
individual Intelligence Community agencies and programs.
Of note, the classified annex to the 2002 OMB report does
not include budget data for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the information for the National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(NIMA) is significantly lower than the figures the agency
provided to the Committee. The methodologies employed by the
Intelligence Community agencies for estimating the portion of
their budget devoted to counterterrorism also varied across
agencies and was likely to change from year to year. As such,
it is very difficult to provide an accurate estimate of the
Intelligence Community or U.S. Government budget for
counterterrorism during the time period studied.
The staff found that the Intelligence Community's dispersed
budget formulation process and various interagency working
groups for counterterrorism appear to be relatively effective
in coordinating activities and avoiding duplication of effort.
Improvements are possible, however, especially in the areas of
planning and budget analysis. The audit report recommends that
the Intelligence Community make better use of the strategic
planning documents that currently exist or are under
development. Similarly, the report recommends that the OMB
enhance the Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism,
specifically the classified annex, so that the agencies and
Congress will be more likely to utilize the report and its
content as a management tool.
IV. Confirmations
A. JOHN L. HELGERSON, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
On April 17, 2002, the Committee held a public hearing on
the nomination of John L. Helgerson to be Inspector General of
the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Helgerson was nominated by
the President to the position on Feburary 27, 2002. Mr.
Helgerson has had a thirty-year career in the Central
Intelligence Agency, andhis prior positions have included
Chairman, National Intelligence Council, Deputy Director of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and Deputy Inspector General of
the CIA. The Inspector General of the CIA is an independent, statutory
IG responsible for conducting audits, inspections and investigations to
assure that the CIA's programs are run in an efficient and effective
manner.
Mr. Helgerson's nomination was considered favorably by the
Committee on April 25, 2002. The Senate considered and approved
his nomination on April 26, 2002, by voice vote.
B. SCOTT W. MULLER, GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
On October 9, 2002, the Committee held a public hearing on
the nomination of Scott W. Muller to be the General Counsel of
the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Muller was nominated by
the President on September 4, 2002. Mr. Muller, a partner at
the law firm of Davis Polk & Wardwell, has 24 years of
experience as a litigator. Mr. Muller has also served as
Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of
New York.
The position of General Counsel of the CIA was made subject
to Senate confirmation by the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1997. The General Counsel is the chief legal
officer of the CIA and is responsible for the sound management
of the legal affairs of the CIA. The General Counsel also
provides legal advice to the Director of Central Intelligence
in his roles as head of the CIA, head of the Intelligence
Community, and principal intelligence adviser to the President.
Mr. Muller's nomination was considered favorably by the
Committee on October 16, 2002. The Senate considered and
approved his nomination on October 17, 2002, by voice vote.
V. Support to the Senate
The Committee undertook a number of activities to support
the Senate's deliberations. In addition to its unclassified
reports, the Committee has sought to support Senate
deliberations by inviting the participation of Members outside
the Committee in briefings and hearings on issues of shared
jurisdiction or interest. The Committee has prepared, and made
available for the Senate, compendia of intelligence information
regarding topics relevant to current legislation. Members
outside the Committee have frequently sought and received
intelligence briefings by members of the Committee staff.
Members have also requested and received assistance in
resolving issues with the actions of an element of the
Intelligence Community. Finally, the Committee routinely
invites staff from other Committees to briefings on
intelligence issues of common concern.
VI. Appendix
A. SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
1. Number of meetings
During the 107th Congress, the Committee held a total of
117 on-the-record meetings, briefings, and hearings, and over
300 off-the record briefings. There were fourteen hearings held
on the Intelligence Community budget, including the conference
sessions with the House. Two nomination hearings were held.
Additionally, the Committee held a total of 22 hearings
with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
concerning the Joint Inquiry into the Events of September 11,
2001.
2. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee
S. Res. 47--An original resolution authorizing expenditures
by the Select Committee on Intelligence.
S. 1428--Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year
2002.
S. 2506--Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year
2003.
3. Bills referred to the Committee
S. 1448--Intelligence to Prevent Terrorism Act of 2001.
S. 2586--To exclude United States Persons from the
definition of ``foreign power'' under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, relating to international terrorism.
S. 2645--Intelligence Community Leadership Act of 2002.
S. 2659--To amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 to modify the standard of proof for issuance of orders
regarding non-United States persons from probable cause to
reasonable suspicion.
4. Publications
Joint Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Judiciary Committee on the Wen Ho Lee Matter.
S. Hrg. 107-2 Current and Projected National Security
Threats to the United States (February 7, 2001).
Report 107-51 Special Report of the Select Committee on
Intelligence for the period January 6, 1999 to December 15,
2000.
S. Rept. 107-63 Report to accompany S. 1428, FY 02
Intelligence Authorization Bill.
S. Rept. 107-149 Report to accompany S. 2506, FY 03
Intelligence Authorization Bill.
S. Rept. 107-64 Report on a Review of United States
Assistance to Peruvian Counter-Drug Air Interdiction Efforts,
and the Shootdown of a Civilian Aircraft on April 20, 2001.
S. Hrg. 107-449 S. 1448, The Intelligence to Prevent
Terrorism Act of 2001 and Other Legislative Proposals in the
wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks.
S. Hrg. 107-597 Current and Projected National Security
Threats to the United States.
S. Hrg. 107-596 Hearing on the Nomination of John L.
Helgerson to be Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency.
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