Legislation

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,
the third day of January, two thousand and twenty-four

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2025 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. Short title.

(a) In general.—This Act may be cited as the “Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025”.

(b) Reference.—Any reference in this or any other Act to the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025” shall be deemed to be a reference to the “Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025”.

SEC. 2. Organization of Act into divisions; table of contents.

(a) Divisions.—This Act is organized into 7 divisions as follows:

(1) Division A—Department of Defense Authorizations.

(2) Division B—Military Construction Authorizations.

(3) Division C—Department of Energy National Security Authorizations and Other Authorizations.

(4) Division D—Funding Tables.

(5) Division E—Other Matters.

(6) Division F—Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025.

(7) Division G—Department of State Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025.

(b) Table of contents.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Organization of Act into divisions; table of contents.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
Sec. 4. Budgetary effects of this Act.
Sec. 5. Joint explanatory statement.

……..

DIVISION F—INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025

SEC. 6001. Short title; table of contents.

(a) Short title.—This division may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025”.

(b) Table of contents.—The table of contents for this division is as follows:

Sec. 6001. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 6002. Definitions.
Sec. 6003. Explanatory statement.

TITLE LXI—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 6101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 6102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 6103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 6104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.
Sec. 6105. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.

TITLE LXII—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 6201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE LXIII—INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Subtitle A—Intelligence community generally

Sec. 6301. Improvements relating to conflicts of interest in the Intelligence Innovation Board.
Sec. 6302. National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment and National Counterintelligence Strategy.
Sec. 6303. Prohibition on availability of funds for certain activities of the Overt Human Intelligence and Open Source Intelligence Collection Programs of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.
Sec. 6304. Improvements to advisory board of National Reconnaissance Office.
Sec. 6305. National Intelligence University acceptance of grants.
Sec. 6306. Expenditure of funds for certain intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard.
Sec. 6307. Codification of the National Intelligence Management Council.
Sec. 6308. Responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 6309. Formalized counterintelligence training for Department of Energy personnel.

Subtitle B—Matters relating to Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 6311. Requirements for the Special Victim Investigator.

Subtitle C—Reports and other matters

Sec. 6321. Extension of requirement for annual report on strikes undertaken by the United States against terrorist targets outside areas of active hostilities.
Sec. 6322. Budget transparency for open-source intelligence activities.
Sec. 6323. Report on the mission effect of civilian harm.

TITLE LXIV—COUNTERING FOREIGN THREATS

Subtitle A—People's Republic of China

Sec. 6401. Assessment of current status of biotechnology of People's Republic of China.
Sec. 6402. Report on the economic outlook of China.
Sec. 6403. Intelligence sharing with law enforcement agencies on synthetic opioid precursor chemicals originating in People’s Republic of China.
Sec. 6404. Report on efforts of the People's Republic of China to evade United States transparency and national security regulations.
Sec. 6405. Assessment on recruitment of Mandarin speakers.

Subtitle B—The Russian Federation

Sec. 6411. Report on Russian Federation sponsorship of acts of international terrorism.
Sec. 6412. Assessment of likely course of war in Ukraine.
Sec. 6413. Ukraine lessons learned working group.

Subtitle C—International terrorism

Sec. 6421. Assessment and report on the threat of ISIS-Khorasan to the United States.

Subtitle D—Other foreign threats

Sec. 6431. Assessment of visa-free travel to and within Western Hemisphere by nationals of countries of concern.
Sec. 6432. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence review of visitors and assignees.
Sec. 6433. Assessment of the lessons learned by the intelligence community with respect to the Israel-Hamas war.
Sec. 6434. Central Intelligence Agency intelligence assessment on Tren de Aragua.
Sec. 6435. Assessment of Maduro regime’s economic and security relationships with state sponsors of terrorism and foreign terrorist organizations.
Sec. 6436. Continued congressional oversight of Iranian expenditures supporting foreign military and terrorist activities.
Sec. 6437. Analyses and impact statements regarding proposed investment into the United States.

TITLE LXV—EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

Sec. 6501. Intelligence strategy to counter foreign adversary efforts to utilize biotechnologies in ways that threaten United States national security.
Sec. 6502. Improvements to the roles, missions, and objectives of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.
Sec. 6503. Enhancing capabilities to detect foreign adversary threats relating to biological data.
Sec. 6504. Establishment of Artificial Intelligence Security Center.
Sec. 6505. Sense of Congress encouraging intelligence community to increase private sector capital partnerships and partnership with Federal partners to secure enduring technological advantages.
Sec. 6506. Enhancement of authority for intelligence community public-private talent exchanges.
Sec. 6507. Sense of Congress on hostile foreign cyber actors.
Sec. 6508. Deeming ransomware threats to critical infrastructure as national intelligence priority.
Sec. 6509. Enhancing public-private sharing on manipulative adversary practices in critical mineral projects.

TITLE LXVI—SECURITY CLEARANCES AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE IMPROVEMENTS

Subtitle A—Security clearances and controlled access program improvements

Sec. 6601. Security clearances held by certain former employees of intelligence community.
Sec. 6602. Limitation on availability of funds for new controlled access programs.
Sec. 6603. Limitation on transfers from controlled access programs.
Sec. 6604. Data with respect to timeliness of polygraph examinations.

Subtitle B—Workforce improvements

Sec. 6611. Enabling intelligence community integration.
Sec. 6612. Appointment of spouses of certain Federal employees.
Sec. 6613. Plan for staffing the intelligence collection positions of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 6614. Congressional notifications and summaries of misconduct regarding employees within the intelligence community.
Sec. 6615. Modification to waiver for post-service employment restrictions.
Sec. 6616. Intelligence community recruitment for certain security-cleared separating military members.
Sec. 6617. Strategy to strengthen intelligence community recruitment efforts in the United States territories.
Sec. 6618. Pilot program on establishing a geospatial workforce development program.

TITLE LXVII—WHISTLEBLOWERS

Sec. 6701. Improvements to urgent concerns submitted to Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 6702. Protection for individuals making authorized disclosures to inspectors general of elements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 6703. Clarification of authority of certain Inspectors General to receive protected disclosures.

TITLE LXVIII—UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA

Sec. 6801. Comptroller General of the United States review of All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office.
Sec. 6802. Sunset of requirements relating to audits of unidentified anomalous phenomena historical record report.

TITLE LXIX—OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 6901. Modification and repeal of reporting requirements.
Sec. 6902. Technical amendments.

SEC. 6002. Definitions.

In this division:

(1) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The term “congressional intelligence committees” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

(2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in such section.

SEC. 6003. Explanatory statement.

The explanatory statement regarding this division, printed in the House section of the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and in the Senate section of the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this division as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference.

TITLE LXI—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 6101. Authorization of appropriations.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2025 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Federal Government.

SEC. 6102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.

(a) Specifications of amounts.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 6101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the Federal Government are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this division.

(b) Availability of classified Schedule of Authorizations.—

(1) AVAILABILITY.—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch of the Federal Government.

(3) LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

SEC. 6103. Intelligence Community Management Account.

(a) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2025 the sum of $666,173,000.

(b) Classified authorization of appropriations.—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2025 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 6102(a).

SEC. 6104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.

Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 6105. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.

The authorization of appropriations by this division shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

TITLE LXII—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 6201. Authorization of appropriations.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year 2025.

TITLE LXIII—INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Subtitle A—Intelligence Community Generally

SEC. 6301. Improvements relating to conflicts of interest in the Intelligence Innovation Board.

Section 7506(g) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2)—

(A) in subparagraph (A), by inserting “active and” before “potential”;

(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking “the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community” and inserting “the designated agency ethics official”;

(D) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following:

“(C) Authority for the designated agency ethics official to grant a waiver for a conflict of interest, except that—

“(i) no waiver may be granted for an active conflict of interest identified with respect to the Chair of the Board;

“(ii) every waiver for a potential conflict of interest requires review and approval by the Director of National Intelligence; and

“(iii) for every waiver granted, the designated agency ethics official shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees notice of the waiver.”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(3) DEFINITION OF DESIGNATED AGENCY ETHICS OFFICIAL.—In this subsection, the term ‘designated agency ethics official’ means the designated agency ethics official (as defined in section 13101 of title 5, United States Code) in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.”.

SEC. 6302. National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment and National Counterintelligence Strategy.

Section 904(f)(3) of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383(f)(3)) is amended by striking “National Counterintelligence Executive” and inserting “Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center”.

SEC. 6303. Prohibition on availability of funds for certain activities of the Overt Human Intelligence and Open Source Intelligence Collection Programs of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) COVERED ACTIVITY.—The term “covered activity” means—

(A) with respect to the Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program, an interview for intelligence collection purposes with any individual, including a United States person, who has been criminally charged, arraigned, or taken into the custody of a Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency, but whose guilt with respect to such criminal matters has not yet been adjudicated, unless the Office of Intelligence and Analysis has obtained the consent of the interviewee following consultation with counsel;

(B) with respect to either the Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program or the Open Source Intelligence Collection Program, any collection targeting journalists in the performance of their journalistic functions; and

(C) with respect to the Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program, an interview for intelligence collection purposes with a United States person where the Office of Intelligence and Analysis lacks a reasonable belief based on facts and circumstances that the United States person may possess significant foreign intelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).

(2) OVERT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM.—The term “Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program” means the program established by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis pursuant to Policy Instruction 907 of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, issued on June 29, 2016, or any successor program.

(3) OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM.—The term “Open Source Collection Intelligence Program” means the program established by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis for the purpose of collecting intelligence and information for potential production and reporting in the form of Open Source Information Reports as reflected in Policy Instruction 900 of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, issued on January 13, 2015, or any successor program.

(4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen;

(B) an alien known by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to be a permanent resident alien;

(D) a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.

(5) UNITED STATES PERSON INFORMATION (USPI).—The term “United States person information”—

(A) means information that is reasonably likely to identify 1 or more specific United States persons; and

(B) may be either a single item of information or information that, when combined with other available information, is reasonably likely to identify one or more specific United States persons.

(b) Prohibition on availability of funds for covered activities of Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program and Open Source Intelligence Collection Program.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this division may be made available to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a covered activity.

(c) Limitation on personnel.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this division may be used by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security to increase, above the staffing level in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (division G of Public Law 118–31), the number of personnel assigned to the Open Source Intelligence Division who work exclusively or predominantly on domestic terrorism issues.

(d) Rules of construction.—

(1) EFFECT ON OTHER INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT.—Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting or superseding the authority of any official within the Department of Homeland Security to conduct legal, privacy, civil rights, or civil liberties oversight of the intelligence activities of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

(2) SHARING AND RECEIVING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit, or to limit the authority of, personnel of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security from sharing intelligence information with, or receiving information from—

(A) foreign, State, local, Tribal, or territorial governments (or any agency or subdivision thereof);

(B) the private sector; or

SEC. 6304. Improvements to advisory board of National Reconnaissance Office.

Section 106A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a(d)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (3)(A)—

(A) in clause (i)—

(i) by striking “five members appointed by the Director” and inserting “up to 8 members appointed by the Director”; and

(ii) by inserting “, and who do not present any actual or potential conflict of interest” before the period at the end;

(B) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); and

“(ii) MEMBERSHIP STRUCTURE.—The Director shall ensure that no more than 2 concurrently serving members of the Board qualify for membership on the Board based predominantly on a single qualification set forth under clause (i).”;

(2) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (7) as paragraphs (6) through (8), respectively;

(3) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:

“(5) CHARTER.—The Director shall establish a charter for the Board that includes the following:

“(A) Mandatory processes for identifying potential conflicts of interest, including the submission of initial and periodic financial disclosures by Board members.

“(B) The vetting of potential conflicts of interest by the designated agency ethics official, except that no individual waiver may be granted for a conflict of interest identified with respect to the Chair of the Board.

“(C) The establishment of a process and associated protections for any whistleblower alleging a violation of applicable conflict of interest law, Federal contracting law, or other provision of law.”; and

(4) in paragraph (8), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by striking “September 30, 2024” and inserting “August 31, 2027”.

SEC. 6305. National Intelligence University acceptance of grants.

(a) In general.—Subtitle D of title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3227 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“§ 1035. National Intelligence University acceptance of grants

“(a) Authority.—The Director of National Intelligence may authorize the President of the National Intelligence University to accept qualifying research grants.

“(b) Qualifying grants.—A qualifying research grant under this section is a grant that is awarded on a competitive basis by an entity referred to in subsection (c) for a research project with a scientific, literary, or educational purpose.

“(c) Entities from which grants may be accepted.—A qualifying research grant may be accepted under this section only from a Federal agency or from a corporation, fund, foundation, educational institution, or similar entity that is organized and operated primarily for scientific, literary, or educational purposes.

“(d) Administration of grant funds.—

“(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNT.—The Director shall establish an account for administering funds received as qualifying research grants under this section.

“(2) USE OF FUNDS.—The President of the University shall use the funds in the account established pursuant to paragraph (1) in accordance with applicable provisions of the regulations and the terms and conditions of the grants received.

“(e) Related expenses.—Subject to such limitations as may be provided in appropriations Acts, appropriations available for the National Intelligence University may be used to pay expenses incurred by the University in applying for, and otherwise pursuing, the award of qualifying research grants.

“(f) Regulations.—The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe regulations for the administration of this section.”.

(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1034 the following new item:

“Sec. 1035. National Intelligence University acceptance of grants.”.

SEC. 6306. Expenditure of funds for certain intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard.

The Commandant of the Coast Guard may use up to 1 percent of the amounts made available for the National Intelligence Program (as such term is defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) for each fiscal year for intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard relating to objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, which amounts may be accounted for solely on the certification of the Commandant and each such certification shall be considered to be a sufficient voucher for the amount contained in the certification.

SEC. 6307. Codification of the National Intelligence Management Council.

(a) Establishment of National Intelligence Management Council.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103L the following (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):

“SEC. 103M. National Intelligence Management Council.

“(a) Establishment.—There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a National Intelligence Management Council.

“(b) Composition.—

“(1) The National Intelligence Management Council shall be composed of senior officials within the intelligence community and substantive experts from the public or private sector, who shall be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure of, the Director of National Intelligence.

“(2) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security requirements for personnel appointed from the private sector as a condition of service on the National Intelligence Management Council, or as contractors of the Council or employees of such contractors, to ensure the protection of intelligence sources and methods while avoiding, wherever possible, unduly intrusive requirements which the Director considers to be unnecessary for this purpose.

“(c) Duties and responsibilities.—Members of the National Intelligence Management Council shall work with each other and with other elements of the intelligence community to ensure proper coordination and to minimize duplication of effort, in addition to the following duties and responsibilities:

“(1) Provide integrated mission input to support the processes and activities of the intelligence community, including with respect to intelligence planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation processes.

“(2) Identify and pursue opportunities to integrate or coordinate collection and counterintelligence efforts.

“(3) In concert with the responsibilities of the National Intelligence Council, ensure the integration and coordination of analytic and collection efforts.

“(4) Develop and coordinate intelligence strategies in support of budget planning and programming activities.

“(5) Advise the Director of National Intelligence on the development of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (or any successor mechanism established for the prioritization of programs and activities).

“(6) In concert with the responsibilities of the National Intelligence Council, support the role of the Director of National Intelligence as principal advisor to the President on intelligence matters.

“(7) Inform the elements of the intelligence community of the activities and decisions related to missions assigned to the National Intelligence Management Council.

“(8) Maintain awareness, across various functions and disciplines, of the mission-related activities and budget planning of the intelligence community.

“(9) Evaluate, with respect to assigned mission objectives, requirements, and unmet requirements, the implementation of the budget of each element of the intelligence community.

“(10) Provide oversight on behalf of, and make recommendations to, the Director of National Intelligence on the extent to which the activities, program recommendations, and budget proposals made by elements of the intelligence community sufficiently address mission objectives, intelligence gaps, and unmet requirements.

“(d) Mission management of members.—Members of the National Intelligence Management Council, under the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, shall serve as mission managers to ensure integration among the elements of the intelligence community and across intelligence functions, disciplines, and activities for the purpose of achieving unity of effort and effect, including through the following responsibilities:

“(1) Planning and programming efforts.

“(2) Budget and program execution oversight.

“(3) Engagement with elements of the intelligence community and with policymakers in other agencies.

“(4) Workforce competencies and training activities.

“(5) Development of capability requirements.

“(6) Development of governance fora, policies, and procedures.

“(e) Staff; availability.—

“(1) STAFF.—The Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the National Intelligence Management Council such staff as may be necessary to assist the National Intelligence Management Council in carrying out the responsibilities described in this section.

“(2) AVAILABILITY.—Under the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Intelligence Management Council shall make reasonable efforts to advise and consult with officers and employees of other departments or agencies, or components thereof, of the United States Government not otherwise associated with the intelligence community.

“(f) Support from elements of the intelligence community.—The heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall provide appropriate support to the National Intelligence Management Council, including with respect to intelligence activities, as required by the Director of National Intelligence.”.

(2) OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—Section 103(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3025) is amended—

(A) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (14) as paragraphs (6) through (15), respectively; and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:

“(5) The National Intelligence Management Council.”.

(b) Sense of Congress with respect to China mission.—It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence should create a role in the National Intelligence Management Council for a National Intelligence Manager dedicated to the People’s Republic of China.

(c) Sense of Congress with respect to counternarcotics mission.—It is the sense of Congress that, consistent with section 7325 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (137 Stat. 1043), the Director of National Intelligence should create a role in the National Intelligence Management Council for a National Intelligence Manager dedicated to the counternarcotics mission of the United States.

SEC. 6308. Responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence.

Section 102A(f)(10) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(f)(10)) is amended by striking the period and inserting “, and upon receiving any such direction, the Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees immediately in writing with a description of such other intelligence-related functions directed by the President.”.

SEC. 6309. Formalized counterintelligence training for Department of Energy personnel.

(a) Training.—Section 215(d) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(3) The Director shall develop and implement—

“(A) a plan and cost assessment for delineated and standardized counterintelligence training for all personnel who interact with classified and sensitive military technology and dual-use commercial technology in the Department; and

“(B) a delineated and standardized training plan to train officers in the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence who have counterintelligence responsibilities on counterintelligence skills and practices.”.

(b) Reporting requirement.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the plans developed under section 215(d)(3) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (as amended by subsection (a)), including with respect to—

(1) the training content;

(2) periodicity;

(3) fulfillment rate;

(4) internal controls; and

(5) oversight.

Subtitle B—Matters Relating to Central Intelligence Agency

SEC. 6311. Requirements for the Special Victim Investigator.

Section 32(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3533(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: “No individual appointed as the Special Victim Investigator may, at the time of such appointment, be a current employee of the Central Intelligence Agency.”.

Subtitle C—Reports and Other Matters

SEC. 6321. Extension of requirement for annual report on strikes undertaken by the United States against terrorist targets outside areas of active hostilities.

Section 1723 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1811) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking “until 2022” and inserting “until 2027”; and

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “The report” and inserting “Each report”; and

(B) in paragraph (1), by striking the semicolon and inserting “; and”; and

(3) in subsection (d), by striking “The report” and inserting “Each report”.

SEC. 6322. Budget transparency for open-source intelligence activities.

(a) Budget summaries to Director of National Intelligence.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the Director of National Intelligence a complete and comprehensive summary of all budget information with respect to the element’s open-source intelligence activities.

(b) Report to Congress.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report compiling the information in the summaries submitted to the Director pursuant to subsection (a).

(c) Open-source intelligence defined.—In this section, the term “open-source intelligence” means intelligence derived exclusively from publicly or commercially available information that addresses specific intelligence priorities, requirements, or gaps.

SEC. 6323. Report on the mission effect of civilian harm.

(a) Definition of appropriate congressional committees.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) Report required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council and in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report examining the extent to which civilian harm that occurs during counterterrorism operations informs analyses of the intelligence community on the mission success of campaigns to degrade, disrupt, or defeat foreign terrorist organizations.

(1) The methodology of the intelligence community for measuring the effect of civilian harm.

(2) The extent to which analysts of the intelligence community apply such methodology when assessing the degree to which a terrorist group is degraded, disrupted, or defeated.

(3) A framework to enable analysts to assess, as objectively as possible, the effect that civilian harm has had on the mission of degrading, disrupting, or defeating a terrorist group, or an explanation of why such framework cannot be generated.

(4) A framework to enable analysts to assess, as objectively as possible, the effect that civilian harm has had on other United States foreign policy goals, programs, and activities in any country where counterterrorism operations take place.

(5) The extent to which dissenting opinions of analysts of the intelligence community are included or highlighted in final written products presented to senior policymakers of the United States.

(6) Recommendations to improve the quality of future intelligence community analyses by accounting for the effects of civilian harm on efforts to successfully degrade, disrupt, or defeat a foreign terrorist group.

(d) Form.—The report under subsection (b) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, the report shall include an unclassified summary of key findings that is consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

TITLE LXIV—COUNTERING FOREIGN THREATS

Subtitle A—People’s Republic of China

SEC. 6401. Assessment of current status of biotechnology of People’s Republic of China.

(a) Assessment.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with such heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate, conduct an assessment of the current status of the biotechnology capability of the People’s Republic of China, which shall include how the People’s Republic of China is supporting the biotechnology sector, such as foreign direct investment, subsidies, talent recruitment, or other efforts to gain superiority.

(b) Report.—

(1) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Agriculture, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence completes the assessment required by subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the findings of the assessment.

(3) FORM.—The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 6402. Report on the economic outlook of China.

(a) Definition of appropriate committees of Congress.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(3) Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(b) Report required.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, acting through the National Intelligence Council and in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the economic outlook of the People’s Republic of China, which shall include alternative analyses of the economic projections of the People’s Republic of China.

(1) Assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of the economy of the People’s Republic of China, including the potential effects of debt, demographics, and China’s international relationships.

(2) Potential challenges for the People’s Republic of China to sustain economic growth and the potential for global effects as a result.

(3) The implications of the economic future of the People’s Republic of China on the country’s foreign and defense policy.

SEC. 6403. Intelligence sharing with law enforcement agencies on synthetic opioid precursor chemicals originating in People’s Republic of China.

(a) Strategy required.—The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of such other departments and agencies as the Director considers appropriate, develop a strategy to ensure robust intelligence sharing relating to the illicit trafficking and diversion of synthetic opioid chemicals, including precursor and pre-precusor chemicals, from the People’s Republic of China and other source countries.

(b) Elements.—The strategy developed pursuant to subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) An assessment of existing intelligence sharing between the intelligence community, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, any other relevant Federal agencies, including any mechanisms that allow appropriate Federal Government employees with and without security clearances to share and receive information and any gaps identified.

(2) A plan to ensure robust intelligence sharing, including by addressing gaps identified pursuant to paragraph (1) and identifying additional capabilities and resources needed;

(3) A detailed description of the measures used to ensure the protection of civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy rights in carrying out this strategy.

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, with inputs from such other departments and agencies as the Director considers appropriate, provide the appropriate committees of Congress a briefing on the strategy under development pursuant to subsection (a).

SEC. 6404. Report on efforts of the People’s Republic of China to evade United States transparency and national security regulations.

(a) Definition of appropriate committees of Congress.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) Report required.—The Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the heads of such elements of the intelligence community as the Director determines appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on plans and intentions of the Government of the People’s Republic of China to evade the following:

(1) Identification under section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283; 10 U.S.C. 113 note).

(2) Restrictions or limitations imposed by any of the following:

(A) Section 805 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31).

(B) Section 889 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232; 41 U.S.C. 3901 note prec.).

(C) The list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury (commonly known as the “SDN list”).

(D) The Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.

(E) Commercial or dual-use export controls under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.) and the Export Administration Regulations.

(F) Executive Order 14105 (88 Fed. Reg. 54867; relating to addressing United States investments in certain national security technologies and products in countries of concern), or successor order.

(G) Import restrictions on products made with forced labor implemented by U.S. Customs and Border Protection pursuant to Public Law 117–78 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

SEC. 6405. Assessment on recruitment of Mandarin speakers.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive assessment on the recruitment and training of individuals who speak Mandarin Chinese for each element of the intelligence community.

(b) Appropriate congressional committees.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

Subtitle B—The Russian Federation

SEC. 6411. Report on Russian Federation sponsorship of acts of international terrorism.

(a) Definitions.—In this section—

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.—The term “foreign terrorist organization” means an organization that has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary of State, pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).

(3) SPECIALLY DESIGNATED GLOBAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.—The term “specially designated global terrorist organization” means an organization that has been designated as a specially designated global terrorist by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism).

(4) STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM.—The term “state sponsor of terrorism” means a country the government of which the Secretary of State has determined has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, for purposes of—

(A) section 1754(c)(1)(A)(i) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4813(c)(1)(A)(i));

(B) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371); or

(b) Report required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, conduct and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes the following:

(1) A summary of key instances in which the Russian Federation, or an official of the Russian Federation, has provided financial, material, technical, or lethal support to foreign terrorist organizations, specially designated global terrorist organizations (including the Russian Imperial Movement), state sponsors of terrorism, or for acts of international terrorism.

(2) A summary of key instances in which the Russian Federation, or an official of the Russian Federation, has willfully aided or abetted the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to foreign terrorist organizations, specially designated global terrorist organizations, or state sponsors of terrorism.

(3) An assessment of threats to the homeland based on the summaries provided pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2).

(c) Form.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) Briefings.—Not later than 30 days after submittal of the report required by subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall provide a classified briefing to the appropriate congressional committees on the findings of the report.

SEC. 6412. Assessment of likely course of war in Ukraine.

(a) Definition of appropriate committees of Congress.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in collaboration with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment of the likely course of the war in Ukraine through December 31, 2025.

(1) The ability of the military of Ukraine to defend against Russian aggression if the United States continues or discontinues military and economic assistance to Ukraine and maintains or withdraws policy restrictions on the use of United States weapons during the period described in such subsection.

(2) The likely course of the war during such period based on the scenarios described in paragraph (1).

(3) The ability and willingness of other countries to continue or discontinue military and economic assistance to Ukraine based on the assessments required by paragraphs (1) and (2), including the ability of such countries to make up for any shortfall in United States assistance.

(4) The effects of a potential defeat of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on United States national security and foreign policy interests, including the potential for further aggression from the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

(d) Form.—The assessment required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 6413. Ukraine lessons learned working group.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and

(B) the congressional defense committees.

(2) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES.—The term “congressional defense committees” has the meaning given that term in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code.

(3) WORKING GROUP.—The term “Working Group” means the working group described in subsection (b).

(b) Establishment.—The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly establish a working group to identify and share lessons that the United States intelligence community has learned from the Ukraine conflict.

(c) Membership.—The composition of the Working Group may include any officer or employee of a department or agency of the United States Government determined appropriate by the Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense.

(d) Chair.—The Working Group shall be jointly chaired by—

(1) an officer or employee of the Department of Defense chosen by the Secretary of Defense; and

(2) an officer or employee of an element of the intelligence community chosen by the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the head of the element concerned.

(e) Duties.—The sole duties of the Working Group shall be exclusively the following:

(1) Identify tactical and operational intelligence lessons derived from the Ukraine conflict.

(2) Develop a repeatable process for promulgating such lessons to elements of the Department of Defense responsible for the development of joint and service-specific doctrine, acquisitions decisions, and capability development.

(3) Provide recommendations on intelligence collection priorities to support the elements of the Department of Defense described in paragraph (2) in implementing the lessons identified pursuant to paragraph (1).

(f) Meetings.—The Working Group shall meet not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(g) Termination.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), the Working Group shall terminate on the date that is 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) EXTENSION.—The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense may extend the termination date under paragraph (1) to a date not later than 4 years after the date of the enactment of this Act if the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense jointly—

(A) determine than an extension is appropriate and agree to such extension; and

(B) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notification of the extension that includes a description of the justification for the extension.

(h) Congressional briefing and summary.—

(1) BRIEFING.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Working Group shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the activities of the Working Group.

(2) SUMMARY.—Not later than the date that is 30 days before the date on which the Working Group terminates pursuant to subsection (g), the Working Group shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a summary of Working Group activities and conclusions.

Subtitle C—International Terrorism

SEC. 6421. Assessment and report on the threat of ISIS-Khorasan to the United States.

(a) Definition of appropriate committees of Congress.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with such elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers relevant, shall—

(1) conduct an assessment of the threats to the United States and United States citizens posed by ISIS-Khorasan; and

(2) submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a written report on the findings of the assessment.

(1) A description of the ideology, stated intentions, and capabilities of ISIS-Khorasan as related to the United States and the interests of the United States, including capabilities that threaten the homeland.

(2) A list of all terrorist attacks worldwide attributable to ISIS-Khorasan or for which ISIS-Khorasan claimed credit, beginning on January 1, 2015.

(3) The recruiting and training strategy of ISIS-Khorasan, including—

(A) the geographic regions in which ISIS-Khorasan is physically present;

(B) regions from which ISIS-Khorasan is recruiting; and

(4) An assessment of any known travel of members of ISIS-Khorasan within the Western Hemisphere and specifically across any border of the United States.

(d) Form.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Subtitle D—Other Foreign Threats

SEC. 6431. Assessment of visa-free travel to and within Western Hemisphere by nationals of countries of concern.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) COUNTRIES OF CONCERN.—The term “countries of concern” means—

(A) the Russian Federation;

(B) the People’s Republic of China;

(D) the Syrian Arab Republic;

(E) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;

(F) the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; and

(G) the Republic of Cuba.

(b) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a written assessment of the impacts to national security caused by travel without a visa to and within countries in the Western Hemisphere by nationals of countries of concern and nationals of any other country the Director determines it appropriate to consider.

(c) Form.—The assessment required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 6432. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence review of visitors and assignees.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) COUNTRY OF RISK.—The term “country of risk” means—

(A) the People’s Republic of China;

(B) the Russian Federation;

(D) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

(3) COVERED ASSIGNEE; COVERED VISITOR.—The terms “covered assignee” and “covered visitor” mean a foreign national from a country of risk who—

(A) is not an employee of either the Department of Energy or the management and operations contractor operating a National Laboratory on behalf of the Department of Energy; and

(B) has requested access to the premises, information, or technology of a National Laboratory.

(4) DIRECTOR.—The term “Director” means the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy (or their designee).

(5) FOREIGN NATIONAL.—The term “foreign national” has the meaning given the term “alien” in section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)).

(6) NATIONAL LABORATORY.—The term “National Laboratory” has the meaning given the term in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801).

(7) NONTRADITIONAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.—The term “nontraditional intelligence collection” means a risk posed by an individual not employed by a foreign intelligence service, who is seeking access to information about a capability, research, or organizational dynamics of the United States to inform a foreign adversary or non-state actor.

(b) Policy for review of covered visitor and covered assignee access requests.— (1) The Director shall, in consultation with the applicable Under Secretary of the Department of Energy that oversees the National Laboratory, or their designee, promulgate a policy to assess the counterintelligence risk that covered visitors or covered assignees pose to the research or activities undertaken at a National Laboratory.

(2) Prior to being granted access to the premises, information, or technology of a National Laboratory, a covered visitor or covered assignee should be appropriately screened by the National Laboratory and the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department in accordance with the policy promulgated under paragraph (1).

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director shall provide advice to a National Laboratory on covered visitors and covered assignees when 1 or more of the following conditions are present:

(A) The Director has reason to believe that a covered visitor or covered assignee poses a nontraditional intelligence collection risk.

(B) The Director is in receipt of information indicating that a covered visitor or covered assignee poses a counterintelligence risk to a National Laboratory.

(2) ADVICE DESCRIBED.—Advice provided to a National Laboratory in accordance with paragraph (1) shall include a description of the assessed risk.

(3) RISK MITIGATION.—When appropriate, the Director shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, or the Secretary’s designee, provide recommendations to mitigate the assessed risk as part of the advice provided in accordance with paragraph (1).

(d) Reports to Congress.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and quarterly thereafter, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, which shall include—

(1) the number of covered visitors or covered assignees permitted to access the premises, information, or technology of each National Laboratory during the previous quarter;

(2) the number of instances in which the Director provided advice to a National Laboratory in accordance with subsection (c) during the previous quarter; and

(3) the number of instances in which a National Laboratory took action inconsistent with advice provided by the Director in accordance with subsection (c) during the previous quarter.

(e) Funding.—The Secretary of Energy may expend such sums as are authorized to be appropriated for the purposes detailed in this section.

SEC. 6433. Assessment of the lessons learned by the intelligence community with respect to the Israel-Hamas war.

(a) Appropriate committees of Congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) Assessment submitted to appropriate committees of Congress.—

(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such other heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a written assessment of the lessons learned from the Israel-Hamas war.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The assessment required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) Lessons learned from advances in warfare, including the use by adversaries of a complex tunnel network.

(B) Lessons learned from attacks by adversaries against maritime shipping routes in the Red Sea.

(C) Lessons learned from the use by adversaries of rockets, missiles, and unmanned aerial systems, including attacks by Iran.

(D) Analysis of the impact of the Israel-Hamas war on the global security environment, including the war in Ukraine.

(3) FORM.—The assessment required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such other heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written assessment of the intelligence lessons learned from the Israel-Hamas war.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The assessment required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) Lessons learned from the timing and scope of the October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas against Israel, including lessons related to United States intelligence cooperation with Israel and other regional partners, both bilaterally and in facilitating regional intelligence sharing.

(B) An assessment of the state, strength, and limitations of intelligence relationships between Israel and regional partners, especially with respect to Hamas and Gaza.

(C) A review of any failures in national and regional intelligence analysis, collection, and sharing that occurred before the October 7, 2023 attack, and any lessons learned for future intelligence activities.

(3) FORM.—The assessment required by paragraph (1) may be submitted in classified form.

SEC. 6434. Central Intelligence Agency intelligence assessment on Tren de Aragua.

(a) Definition of appropriate committees of Congress.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in consultation with such other heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an intelligence assessment on the transnational criminal organization known as “Tren de Aragua”.

(1) A description of the key leaders, organizational structure, subgroups, and presence in countries in the Western Hemisphere of Tren de Aragua.

(2) A description of the illicit practices used by Tren de Aragua to generate revenue, including the sale of illicit drugs, kidnapping, and human trafficking, and an estimate of the annual revenue generated by those illicit practices.

(3) A description of the level at which Tren de Aragua receives support from the regime of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.

(4) A description of any known cooperation between Tren de Aragua and any other transnational criminal organizations in the Western Hemisphere.

(5) Any other information the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers relevant.

(d) Form.—The intelligence assessment required by subsection (b) may be submitted in classified form.

SEC. 6435. Assessment of Maduro regime’s economic and security relationships with state sponsors of terrorism and foreign terrorist organizations.

(a) Definition of appropriate committees of Congress.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) In general.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a written assessment of the economic and security relationships of the regime of Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela with foreign terrorist organizations and state sponsors of terrorism (as designated by the Department of State), including formal and informal support to and from such countries and organizations.

(c) Form.—The assessment required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 6436. Continued congressional oversight of Iranian expenditures supporting foreign military and terrorist activities.

(a) Definition of appropriate committees of Congress.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) Update required.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an update to the report submitted under section 6705 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (22 U.S.C. 9412) to reflect current occurrences, circumstances, and expenditures.

(c) Form.—The update submitted pursuant to subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 6437. Analyses and impact statements regarding proposed investment into the United States.

Section 102A(z) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(z)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2)(A) by inserting “, including with respect to counterintelligence” before the semicolon; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(3) Definitions.—In this subsection:

“(A) The term ‘a review or an investigation of any proposed investment into the United States for which the Director has prepared analytic materials’ includes a review, investigation, assessment, or analysis conducted by the Director pursuant to section 7 or 10(g) of Executive Order 13913 (85 Fed. Reg. 19643; relating to Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector), or successor order.

“(B) The term ‘investment’ includes any activity reviewed, investigated, assessed, or analyzed by the Director pursuant to section 7 or 10(g) of Executive Order 13913, or successor order.”.

TITLE LXV—EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

SEC. 6501. Intelligence strategy to counter foreign adversary efforts to utilize biotechnologies in ways that threaten United States national security.

(a) Definition of appropriate committees of Congress.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that as biotechnologies become increasingly important with regard to the national security interests of the United States, and with the addition of biotechnologies to the biosecurity mission of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, the intelligence community must articulate and implement an intelligence strategy to identify and assess threats relating to biotechnologies.

(1) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the heads of such other elements of the intelligence community as the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate, develop and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategy to address threats relating to biotechnologies.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy developed and submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) Identification and assessment of threats associated with biotechnologies critical to the national security of the United States, including materials that involve a dependency on foreign adversary nations.

(B) A determination of how best to counter foreign adversary efforts to utilize biotechnologies that threaten the national security of the United States, including threats identified pursuant to paragraph (1).

(C) A plan to support efforts of other Federal departments and agencies to secure United States supply chains of the biotechnologies critical to the national security of the United States, by coordinating—

(i) across the intelligence community;

(ii) the support provided by the intelligence community to other relevant Federal departments and agencies and policymakers;

(iii) the engagement of the intelligence community with private sector entities, in coordination with other relevant Federal departments and agencies, as may be applicable; and

(iv) how the intelligence community, in coordination with other relevant Federal departments and agencies, supports and coordinates comparative assessments of United States competitiveness in biotechnologies critical to national and economic security.

(D) Proposals for such legislative or administrative action as the Director considers necessary to support the strategy.

SEC. 6502. Improvements to the roles, missions, and objectives of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.

Section 119A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3057) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(4), by striking “biosecurity and” and inserting “counterproliferation, biosecurity, and”; and

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) in paragraph (1)—

(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking “analyzing and”;

(ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking “Establishing” and inserting “Coordinating the establishment of”;

(iii) in subparagraph (D), by striking “Disseminating” and inserting “Overseeing the dissemination of”;

(iv) in subparagraph (E), by inserting “and coordinating” after “Conducting”; and

(v) in subparagraph (G), by striking “Conducting” and inserting “Coordinating and advancing”; and

(B) in paragraph (2)—

(i) in subparagraph (B), by striking “and analysis”;

(ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (C) through (E) as subparagraphs (D) through (F), respectively;

(iii) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following:

“(C) Overseeing and coordinating the analysis of intelligence on biosecurity and foreign biological threats in support of the intelligence needs of Federal departments and agencies responsible for public health, including by providing analytic priorities to elements of the intelligence community and by coordinating net assessments.”;

(iv) in subparagraph (D), as redesignated by clause (ii), by inserting “on matters relating to biosecurity and foreign biological threats” after “public health”;

(v) in subparagraph (F), as redesignated by clause (ii), by inserting “and authorities” after “capabilities”; and

(vi) by adding at the end the following:

“(G) Enhancing coordination between elements of the intelligence community and private sector entities on information relevant to biosecurity, biotechnology, and foreign biological threats, and coordinating such information with relevant Federal departments and agencies, as applicable.”.

SEC. 6503. Enhancing capabilities to detect foreign adversary threats relating to biological data.

(a) Definition of biological data.—In this section, the term “biological data” means information, including associated descriptors, derived from the structure, function, or process of a biological system that is either measured, collected, or aggregated for analysis.

(b) In general.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with relevant heads of Federal departments and agencies, shall designate intelligence community experts to conduct a 90-day assessment to determine how best to standardize the intelligence community’s use of biological data and the ability of the intelligence community to detect foreign adversary threats relating to biological data, under which the experts shall—

(1) examine how best to standardize the processes and procedures for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information relating to foreign adversary use of biological data, particularly in ways that threaten or could threaten the national security of the United States;

(2) provide recommendations to implement paragraph (1) throughout the intelligence community, including with respect to the feasibility and advisability of—

(A) standardizing the data security practices for biological data maintained by the intelligence community, including security practices for the handling and processing of biological data, including with respect to protecting the civil rights, liberties, and privacy of United States persons;

(B) standardizing intelligence engagements with foreign allies and partners with respect to biological data; and

(3) provide recommendations to ensure coordination with such Federal departments and agencies and entities in the private sector as the Director considers appropriate to understand how foreign adversaries are accessing and using biological data stored within the United States.

(c) Timelines for implementation of recommendations.—The recommendations provided pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b) shall include timelines for implementation not later than 180 days after the date of the completion of the assessment required by such subsection.

(d) Briefing requirement.—Not later than 30 days after the completion of the assessment required by subsection (b), the experts designated under that subsection shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on the assessment.

SEC. 6504. Establishment of Artificial Intelligence Security Center.

(a) Definition of counter-artificial intelligence.—In this section, the term “counter-artificial intelligence” means techniques or procedures to extract information about the behavior or characteristics of an artificial intelligence system, or to learn how to manipulate an artificial intelligence system, in order to subvert the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an artificial intelligence system or adjacent system.

(b) Establishment.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency shall establish an Artificial Intelligence Security Center (referred to in this section as the “Center”) within the Cybersecurity Collaboration Center of the National Security Agency.

(1) Developing guidance to prevent or mitigate counter-artificial intelligence techniques.

(2) Promoting secure artificial intelligence adoption practices for managers of national security systems (as defined in section 3552 of title 44, United States Code) and elements of the defense industrial base.

(3) Such other functions as the Director considers appropriate.

(d) Disestablishment.—The Director of the National Security Agency may disestablish the Center established in subsection (b) not earlier than 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act provided that the Director of the National Security Agency submits to the congressional intelligence committees a report documenting the rationale for disestablishment of the Center, including resource trades, effectiveness, priority, and any other pertinent considerations not later than 6 months prior to the disestablishment.

SEC. 6505. Sense of Congress encouraging intelligence community to increase private sector capital partnerships and partnership with Federal partners to secure enduring technological advantages.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) acquisition leaders in the intelligence community should further explore the strategic use of private capital partnerships to secure enduring technological advantages for the intelligence community, including through the identification, development, and transfer of promising technologies to full-scale programs capable of meeting intelligence community requirements; and

(2) the intelligence community should undertake consultation with Federal partners, including the Office of Strategic Capital of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Domestic Finance of the Department of the Treasury, on best practices and lessons learned from their experiences integrating these resources so as to accelerate attainment of national security objectives.

SEC. 6506. Enhancement of authority for intelligence community public-private talent exchanges.

(a) Focus areas.—Subsection (a) of section 5306 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334) is amended—

(1) by striking “Not later than” and inserting the following:

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) FOCUS AREAS.—The Director shall ensure that the policies, processes, and procedures developed pursuant to paragraph (1) require exchanges under this section that relate to intelligence or counterintelligence with a focus on rotations described in such paragraph with private-sector organizations in the following fields:

“(A) Finance.

“(B) Acquisition.

“(C) Biotechnology.

“(D) Computing.

“(E) Artificial intelligence.

“(F) Business process innovation and entrepreneurship.

“(G) Cybersecurity.

“(H) Materials and manufacturing.

“(I) Any other technology or research field the Director determines relevant to meet evolving national security threats in technology sectors.”.

(b) Duration of temporary details.—Subsection (e) of section 5306 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “3 years” and inserting “5 years”; and

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking “3 years” and inserting “5 years”.

(1) in paragraph (5), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(7) shall not have access to any trade secrets or proprietary information which is of commercial value or competitive advantage to the private-sector organization from which such employee is detailed.”.

(d) Organizational conflicts of interest.—Such section is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (i) as subsection (j); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (h) the following:

“(i) Organizational conflicts of interest.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—A private-sector organization that temporarily details a member of its workforce to an element of the intelligence community or that accepts the temporary detail of a member of the intelligence community shall not be considered to have an organizational conflict of interest with the element of the intelligence community solely because of participation in the program established under this section.

“(2) IDENTIFICATION OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.—If the identification of an organizational conflict of interest arises based on the particular facts surrounding an individual’s participation in the program established under this section and the nature of any contract, then the heads of intelligence community elements shall implement a system to avoid, neutralize, or mitigate any such organizational conflicts of interest.”.

(e) Annual reports.—

(1) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for 2 more years, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an annual report on—

(A) the implementation of the policies, processes, and procedures developed pursuant to subsection (a) of such section 5306 (50 U.S.C. 3334) and the administration of such section;

(B) how the heads of the elements of the intelligence community are using or plan to use the authorities provided under such section; and

(C) recommendations for legislative or administrative action to increase use of the authorities provided under such section.

SEC. 6507. Sense of Congress on hostile foreign cyber actors.

It is the sense of Congress that foreign ransomware organizations, and foreign affiliates associated with them, constitute hostile foreign cyber actors, that covered nations abet and benefit from the activities of these actors, and that such actors should be treated as hostile foreign cyber actors by the United States. Such actors include the following:

(1) DarkSide.

(2) Conti.

(3) REvil.

(4) BlackCat, also known as “ALPHV”.

(5) LockBit.

(6) Rhysida, also known as “Vice Society”.

(7) Royal.

(8) Phobos, also known as “Eight” and also known as “Joanta”.

(9) C10p.

(10) Hackers associated with the SamSam ransomware campaigns.

(11) Play.

(12) BianLian.

(13) Killnet.

(14) Akira.

(15) Ragnar Locker, also known as “Dark Angels”.

(16) Blacksuit.

(17) INC.

(18) Black Basta.

SEC. 6508. Deeming ransomware threats to critical infrastructure as national intelligence priority.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.—The term “critical infrastructure” has the meaning given such term in subsection (e) of the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)).

(b) Sense of Congress that Ransomware threats to critical infrastructure should be a national intelligence priority.—It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence should deem ransomware threats to critical infrastructure a national intelligence priority as part of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework.

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the implications of the ransomware threat to United States national security.

(2) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall address the following:

(A) Identification of individuals, groups, and entities who pose the most significant threat, including attribution to individual ransomware attacks whenever possible.

(B) Locations from which individuals, groups, and entities conduct ransomware attacks.

(D) Any relationships between the individuals, groups, and entities that conduct ransomware attacks and their governments or countries of origin that could impede the ability to counter ransomware threats.

(3) FORM.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 6509. Enhancing public-private sharing on manipulative adversary practices in critical mineral projects.

(a) Strategy required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of such Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate, develop a strategy to improve the sharing between the Federal Government and private entities of information and intelligence to mitigate the threat that foreign adversary illicit activities and tactics pose to United States persons in foreign jurisdictions on projects relating to energy generation and storage, including with respect to critical minerals inputs.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall cover—

(1) how best to assemble and transmit information to United States persons—

(A) to protect against foreign adversary illicit tactics and activities relating to critical mineral projects abroad, including foreign adversary efforts to undermine such United States projects abroad;

(B) to mitigate the risk that foreign adversary government involvement in the ownership and control of entities engaging in deceptive or illicit activities targeting critical mineral supply chains pose to the interests of the United States; and

(C) to inform on economic espionage and other threats from foreign adversaries to the rights of owners of intellectual property, including owners of patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets, and other sensitive information, with respect to such property; and

(2) how best to receive information from United States persons on threats to United States interests in the critical mineral supply chains, resources, mines, and products, or other suspicious malicious activity.

(1) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director completes developing the strategy pursuant to subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress, or provide such committees a briefing on, a plan for implementing the strategy, which shall include a description of risks, benefits, opportunities, and drawbacks.

TITLE LXVI—SECURITY CLEARANCES AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE IMPROVEMENTS

Subtitle A—Security Clearances and Controlled Access Program Improvements

SEC. 6601. Security clearances held by certain former employees of intelligence community.

(a) Issuance of guidelines and instructions required.—Section 803(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162a(c)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (3), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(5) issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of Federal agencies to ensure that any individual who was appointed by the President to a position in an element of the intelligence community but is no longer employed by the Federal Government shall maintain a security clearance only in accordance with Executive Order 12968 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to access to classified information), or successor order.”.

(b) Submittal of guidelines and instructions to Congress required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, or such other officer of the United States acting as the Security Executive Agent pursuant to subsection (a) of section 803 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162a), shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees the guidelines and instructions required by subsection (c)(5) of such section, as added by subsection (a) of this section.

(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:

(A) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(i) the congressional intelligence committees;

(ii) the congressional defense committees;

(iii) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and

(iv) the Committee on Oversight and Accountability of the House of Representatives.

(B) COVERED FORMER OFFICER.—The term “covered former officer” means an individual who meets the following criteria:

(i) The individual—

(I) has been appointed by the President to a position, including in an acting capacity, in the intelligence community that requires the advice and consent of the Senate; or

(II) has performed in an acting capacity the functions and duties of a head of an element of the intelligence community.

(ii) The individual is not employed in a position covered by any of sections 2104 through 2107 of title 5, United States Code.

(iii) The individual holds a security clearance.

(2) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually until December 31, 2029, the Director of National Intelligence, or such other officer of the United States acting as the Security Executive Agent pursuant to section 803(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162a(a)), shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an annual report on covered former officers.

(3) CONTENTS.—Each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) shall include the following:

(A) A list of each individual who was a covered former officer at any time during the period covered by the report.

(B) For each individual listed in accordance with subparagraph (A)—

(i) the position described in paragraph (1)(b)(i) with respect to the covered former officer;

(ii) the dates of service in such position;

(iii) a description of each subsequent employment position, other than any such position described in paragraph (1)(b)(ii), occupied by the covered former officer while the covered former officer held a security clearance; and

(iv) the element of the United States Government that authorized and adjudicated the security clearance of the covered former officer.

SEC. 6602. Limitation on availability of funds for new controlled access programs.

(a) In general.—Section 501A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091a) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections (d) and (e), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:

“(c) Limitation on spending.—Funds authorized to be appropriated for the National Intelligence Program may not be obligated or expended for any controlled access program, or a compartment or subcompartment therein, until the head of the element of the intelligence community responsible for the establishment of such program, compartment, or subcompartment, submits the notification required by subsection (b).”.

(b) Applicability.—Subsection (c) of such section shall apply with respect to controlled access programs (as defined in such section), and compartments and subcompartments therein, that are established on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 6603. Limitation on transfers from controlled access programs.

Section 501A(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091a(b)) is amended—

(1) in the subsection heading, by striking “Limitation on Establishment” and inserting “Limitations”;

(2) by striking “A head” and inserting the following:

“(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—A head”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) TRANSFERS.—

“(A) LIMITATION.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a head of an element of the intelligence community may not transfer a capability from a controlled access program, including from a compartment or subcompartment therein to a compartment or subcompartment of another controlled access program, to a special access program (as defined in section 1152(g) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (50 U.S.C. 3348(g))), or to anything else outside the controlled access program, until the head submits to the appropriate congressional committees and congressional leadership notice of the intent of the head to make such transfer.

“(B) EXCEPTION.—The head of an element of the intelligence community may make a transfer described in subparagraph (A) without prior congressional notification if the head determines that doing so—

“(i) is required to mitigate an urgent counterintelligence issue; or

“(ii) is necessary to maintain access in the event of an organizational restructuring.”.

SEC. 6604. Data with respect to timeliness of polygraph examinations.

Section 7702 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3352h) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(d) Data with respect to timeliness of polygraph examinations.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—With respect to each report on compliance with timeliness standards for rendering determinations of trust for personnel vetting prepared pursuant to subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the congressional intelligence committees as soon as practicable anonymized raw data with respect to the timeliness of polygraph examinations used to prepare each such report in machine-readable format for each element of the intelligence community that collects such data.

“(2) FORM AND CLASSIFICATION JUSTIFICATION.—The data provided to the congressional intelligence committees under paragraph (1) may be modified to remove any personally identifying information, shall be submitted in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible, and shall contain a justification for the classification of any such data provided.”.

Subtitle B—Workforce Improvements

SEC. 6611. Enabling intelligence community integration.

(a) In general.—The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 113B the following new section:

“SEC. 113C. Enabling intelligence community integration.

“(a) Provision of goods or services.—Subject to and in accordance with any guidance and requirements developed by the Director of National Intelligence, the head of an element of the intelligence community may provide goods or services to another element of the intelligence community without reimbursement or transfer of funds for hoteling initiatives for intelligence community employees and affiliates defined in any such guidance and requirements issued by the Director of National Intelligence.

“(b) Approval.—Prior to the provision of goods or services pursuant to subsection (a), the head of the element of the intelligence community providing such goods or services and the head of the element of the intelligence community receiving such goods or services shall approve such provision.

“(c) Hoteling defined.—In this section, the term ‘hoteling’ means an alternative work arrangement in which employees of one element of the intelligence community are authorized flexible work arrangements to work part of the time at one or more alternative worksite locations, as appropriately authorized.”.

(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 113B the following:

“Sec. 113C. Enabling intelligence community integration.”.

SEC. 6612. Appointment of spouses of certain Federal employees.

(a) In general.—Section 3330d of title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in the section heading, by striking “military and Department of Defense civilian spouses” and inserting “military and Department of Defense, Department of State, and intelligence community spouses”;

(2) in subsection (a)—

(A) by redesignating the second paragraph (4) (relating to a spouse of an employee of the Department of Defense) as paragraph (7);

(B) by striking paragraph (5);

(C) by redesignating paragraph (4) (relating to the spouse of a disabled or deceased member of the Armed Forces) as paragraph (6);

(D) by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following:

“(3) The term ‘covered spouse’ means an individual who is married to an individual who—

“(A) (i) is an employee of the Department of State or an element of the intelligence community; or

“(ii) is a member of the Armed Forces who is assigned to an element of the intelligence community; and

“(B) is transferred in the interest of the Government from one official station within the applicable agency to another within the agency (that is outside of normal commuting distance) for permanent duty.

“(4) The term ‘intelligence community’ has the meaning given the term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

“(5) The term ‘remote work’ refers to a work flexibility arrangement under which an employee—

“(A) is not expected to physically report to the location from which the employee would otherwise work, considering the position of the employee; and

“(B) performs the duties and responsibilities of such employee’s position, and other authorized activities, from an approved worksite—

“(i) other than the location from which the employee would otherwise work;

“(ii) that may be inside or outside the local commuting area of the location from which the employee would otherwise work; and

“(iii) that is typically the residence of the employee.”; and

(E) by adding at the end the following:

“(8) The term ‘telework’ has the meaning given the term in section 6501.”; and

(3) in subsection (b)—

(A) in paragraph (2), by striking “or” at the end;

(B) in the first paragraph (3) (relating to a spouse of a member of the Armed Forces on active duty), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon;

(C) by redesignating the second paragraph (3) (relating to a spouse of an employee of the Department of Defense) as paragraph (4);

(D) in paragraph (4), as so redesignated—

(i) by inserting “, including to a position in which the spouse will engage in remote work” after “Department of Defense”; and

(ii) by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”; and

(E) by adding at the end the following:

“(5) a covered spouse to a position in which the covered spouse will engage in remote work.”.

(b) Technical and conforming amendment.—The table of sections for subchapter I of chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section 3330d and inserting the following:

“3330d. Appointment of military and Department of Defense, Department of State, and intelligence community civilian spouses.”.

(1) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Oversight and Accountability, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing the use of the authority provided pursuant to the amendments made by subsection (a) and the impacts on recruitment, retention, and job opportunities created by such amendments.

(d) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this section or an amendment made by this section shall be construed to revoke or diminish any right of an individual provided by title 5, United States Code.

(e) Sunset and snapback.—On the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(1) section 3330d of title 5, United States Code, as amended by subsection (a), is amended to read as it read on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(2) the item for such section in the table of sections for subchapter I of chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code, as amended by subsection (b), is amended to read as it read on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 6613. Plan for staffing the intelligence collection positions of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan for ensuring that the Directorate of Operations of the Agency has staffed every civilian full-time equivalent position authorized for that Directorate under the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (division G of Public Law 118–31).

(b) Elements.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) Specific benchmarks and timelines for accomplishing the goal described in such subsection by September 30, 2025.

(2) An assessment of the appropriate balance of staffing between the Directorate of Operations and the Directorate of Analysis consistent with the responsibilities of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under section 104A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3036(d)).

SEC. 6614. Congressional notifications and summaries of misconduct regarding employees within the intelligence community.

(a) Annual reports for calendar years 2024, 2025, and 2026.—Not later than 60 days after the end of calendar years 2024, 2025, and 2026, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on civilian employees in the intelligence community placed on administrative leave pending possible adverse personnel action during that calendar year.

(b) Elements.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include, for the calendar year covered by the report, the following:

(1) The total number of employees who were placed on administrative leave pending possible adverse personnel action, disaggregated by intelligence community element and pay grade.

(2) The number of employees placed on paid administrative leave pending possible adverse personnel action.

(3) The number of employees placed on administrative leave pending possible adverse personnel action whose leave has exceeded 365 days, disaggregated by paid and unpaid status.

(c) Notification of referral to Department of Justice.—If a referral is made to the Department of Justice from any element of the intelligence community regarding an allegation of misconduct against a civilian employee of the intelligence community, the head of the element of the intelligence community that employs the covered employee shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of the referral not later than 10 days after the date on which such referral is made.

SEC. 6615. Modification to waiver for post-service employment restrictions.

(a) In general.—Section 304(a)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a(a)(2)) is amended—

(1) by amending subparagraph (A) to read as follows:

“(A) AUTHORITY TO GRANT WAIVERS.—The applicable head of an intelligence community element may waive a restriction in paragraph (1) with respect to an employee or former employee who is subject to that restriction only after—

“(i) the employee or former employee submits to the applicable head of the intelligence community element a written application for such waiver in such form and manner as the applicable head of the intelligence community element determines appropriate; and

“(ii) the applicable head of the element of the intelligence community determines that granting such waiver will not harm the national security interests of the United States.”;

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking “Director” and inserting “applicable head of the intelligence community element”;

(3) in subparagraph (C), by striking “Director” each place it appears and inserting “applicable head of the intelligence community element”; and

(4) by amending subparagraph (E) to read as follows:

“(E) REPORTING TO CONGRESS.—On a quarterly basis, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees for Department of Defense elements of the intelligence community, a written notification of each waiver or revocation that shall include the following:

“(i) With respect to a waiver issued to an employee or former employee—

“(I) the covered intelligence position held or formerly held by the employee or former employee; and

“(II) a brief description of the covered post-service employment, including the employer and the recipient of the representation, advice, or services.

“(ii) With respect to a revocation of a waiver issued to an employee or former employee—

“(I) the details of the waiver, including any renewals of such waiver, and the dates of such waiver and renewals; and

“(II) the specific reasons why the applicable head of the intelligence community element determined that such revocation is warranted.”.

(b) Written advisory opinions with respect to post-service employment restrictions.—Section 304(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(4) WRITTEN ADVISORY OPINIONS.—Upon request from a current employee who occupies a covered intelligence position or a former employee who previously occupied a covered intelligence position, the applicable head of the element of the intelligence community concerned may provide a written advisory opinion to such current or former employee regarding whether a proposed employment, representation, or provision of advice or services constitutes covered post-service employment as defined in subsection (g).”.

(c) Covered post-service employment.—Section 304(g)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a(g)(2)) is amended by striking “relating to national security, intelligence, the military, or internal security to, the government of a foreign country or any company, entity, or other person whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in major part, by any government of a foreign country” and inserting “to the government of a foreign country or any company, entity, or other person whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in major part, by any government of a foreign country if such employment, representation, or provision of advice or services relates to national security, intelligence, the military, or internal security”.

(d) Conforming amendments.—Section 304(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a(a)(1)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking “paragraph (2)(A)(i)” and inserting “paragraph (2)(A)”; and

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking “paragraph (2)(A)(ii)” and inserting “paragraph (2)(A)”.

SEC. 6616. Intelligence community recruitment for certain security-cleared separating military members.

(a) In general.—The Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer shall, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, develop a human resources strategy for enhancing the recruitment into the intelligence community of covered military members.

(b) Contents.—The strategy developed under subsection (a) shall address—

(1) a requirement for each intelligence community element to facilitate job applications for qualified covered military members on each element’s job application portal, on USA Jobs, or other appropriate hiring platform;

(2) additional authorities or policy waivers required to overcome identified barriers to enhancing the recruitment into the intelligence community of covered military members to include those military members with technical training and experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree; and

(3) in consultation with the military departments, the development of best practices for matching job applications from among covered military members who have transferable qualifying backgrounds, skills, or expertise to relevant intelligence occupational specialties within the Federal civilian intelligence community workforce, including coordinating intelligence community recruiting events and hiring blitzes.

(c) Briefing and implementation plan.—Not later than 30 days after the development of the strategy under subsection (a), the Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing regarding the strategy developed under subsection (a), including a plan for how each element of the intelligence community intends to implement such strategy.

(d) Covered military member defined.—In this section, the term “covered military member” means any member of the Armed Forces transitioning out of service in the Armed Forces who holds a current top-secret security clearance.

SEC. 6617. Strategy to strengthen intelligence community recruitment efforts in the United States territories.

(a) In general.—The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer, shall, in coordination with the human capital offices of such elements of the intelligence community as determined appropriate, develop an intelligence community-wide strategy to strengthen efforts to recruit qualified individuals residing in the United States territories.

(b) Briefing requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer, shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing with respect to the strategy developed under subsection (a), including with respect to a plan for the implementation of such strategy.

(c) United States territories defined.—In this section, the term “United States territories” means Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa.

SEC. 6618. Pilot program on establishing a geospatial workforce development program.

(a) Pilot program required.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of establishing a program to develop a skilled workforce in geospatial technologies, methodologies, and capabilities to support the defense intelligence requirements of the Department of Defense.

(2) DESIGNATION.—The pilot program carried out pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be known as the “Geospatial Workforce Pilot Program” (in this section referred to as the “Pilot Program”).

(b) Goals.—In carrying out the Pilot Program, the Secretary shall seek—

(1) to assess the demand for geospatial technology skills in both military and civilian sectors in proximity to facilities of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency in the United States;

(2) to expand, align, and accelerate the education, training, and certification of a geospatial workforce;

(3) to support a global research hub for geospatial science and technology;

(4) to foster partnerships with secondary and postsecondary educational institutions, industry leaders, and local governments to support the workforce development;

(5) to increase employment opportunities and economic growth in regions that are in proximity to National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency locations in the United States through enhanced geospatial capabilities; and

(6) to support Department of Defense operations and infrastructure with a skilled geospatial workforce.

(1) IN GENERAL.—In selecting a location for the pilot program required under subsection (a), the Secretary shall prioritize a location—

(A) where the Secretary can partner with an eligible institution of higher education that—

(i) conducts research;

(ii) is in close proximity to National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency facilities outside of the National Capital Region;

(iii) offers programs of education in geospatial or related matters; and

(iv) has a demonstrated ability to build the professional workforce, by impacting kindergarten through college learning and beyond, as demonstrated by an educational partnership agreement and a collaborative research and development agreement with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;

(B) that has a significant presence of Department of Defense installations or related activities; and

(C) that demonstrates a strong potential to recruit from a broad spectrum of academic candidates for growth in geospatial technology sectors;

(2) ELIGIBLE INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.—For purposes of the Pilot Program, an eligible institution of higher education is an institution of higher education (as defined in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001)) that—

(A) is an institution of higher education described in paragraph (1)(A);

(B) has a demonstrated capacity for research and development in geospatial technologies; and

(C) engages in partnerships with local schools and community organizations to promote geospatial education at all levels.

(d) Implementation.—In carrying out the Pilot Program, the Secretary shall—

(1) collaborate with local and regional educational institutions, including public research institutions, to develop curriculum and training modules tailored to geospatial technology skills;

(2) engage with industry partners to ensure the training meets current and future workforce demands;

(3) provide funding and resources for training facilities, instructors, and materials;

(4) monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the training programs and make necessary adjustments to improve outcomes; and

(5) ensure, in carrying out the pilot program under subsection (a), the Department’s activities do not detract from, interfere with, or otherwise hinder the efforts carried out by Geomatics Emerging Scientist Consortium for Education, Research, and Capabilities Enhancement (GEO-ESCON), or any successor program.

(e) Citizenship requirement.—The Secretary shall ensure that participation in the Pilot Program is limited to citizens of the United States.

(f) Termination.—The requirement to carry out a pilot program under subsection (a) shall terminate on September 30, 2030.

(g) Reports.—

(1) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a report on the establishment of the Pilot Program.

(2) ANNUAL REPORT.—

(A) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than one year after the date of the commencement of the Pilot Program, and not less frequently than once each year thereafter through fiscal year 2030, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives an annual report on the Pilot Program.

(B) ELEMENTS.—Each report submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include, for the period covered by the report, the following with respect to the goals described in subsection (b):

(i) An assessment of the demand for geospatial technology skills.

(ii) The progress in developing and implementing the Pilot Program.

(iii) Employment outcomes and economic impact.

(iv) Recommendations for expanding or modifying the Pilot Program.

TITLE LXVII—WHISTLEBLOWERS

SEC. 6701. Improvements to urgent concerns submitted to Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community.

(a) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.—Section 103H(k)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A)—

(A) by inserting “(i)” before “An employee of”;

(B) by inserting “in writing” before “to the Inspector General”; and

“(ii) The Inspector General shall—

“(I) provide reasonable support necessary to ensure that an employee can report a complaint or information under this subparagraph in writing; and

“(II) if such submission is not feasible, create a written record of the employee’s verbal complaint or information and treat such written record as a written submission.”;

(2) by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the following:

“(B) (i) In accordance with clause (ii), the Inspector General shall determine whether a complaint or information reported under subparagraph (A) appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the Director a notice of that determination, together with the complaint or information.

“(ii) The Inspector General shall make the determination under clause (i) with respect to a complaint or information under subparagraph (A) by not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date on which the employee who reported the complaint or information confirms to the Inspector General the intent of the employee to report to Congress that complaint or information.”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(J) In this paragraph, the term ‘employee’ includes a former employee, if the complaint or information reported under subparagraph (A) arises from or relates to the period during which the former employee was an employee.”.

(b) Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.—Section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A)—

(A) by inserting “(i)” before “An employee of”;

(B) by inserting “in writing” before “to the Inspector General”; and

“(ii) The Inspector General shall—

“(I) provide reasonable support necessary to ensure that an employee can report a complaint or information under this subparagraph in writing; and

“(II) if such submission is not feasible, create a written record of the employee’s verbal complaint or information and treat such written record as a written submission.”;

(2) in subparagraph (B)—

(A) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii);

(B) by striking clause (i) and inserting the following:

“(i) In accordance with clause (ii), the Inspector General shall determine whether a complaint or information reported under subparagraph (A) appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the Director a notice of that determination, together with the complaint or information.

(3) in subparagraph (G)(i), by adding at the end the following:

“(III) The term ‘employee’ includes a former employee or former contractor, if the complaint or information reported under subparagraph (A) arises from or relates to the period during which the former employee or former contractor was an employee or contractor, as the case may be.”.

(c) Inspectors General of other elements of the intelligence community.—Section 416 of title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following:

“(3) EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘employee’ includes a former employee or former contractor, if the complaint or information reported pursuant to this section arises from or relates to the period during which the former employee or former contractor was an employee or contractor, as the case may be.”;

(2) in subsection (b)(1)—

(A) in the paragraph heading, by inserting “; support for written submission”; after “made”;

(B) by inserting “in writing” after “may report the complaint or information” each place it appears;

(D) by adding at the end the following:

“(E) SUPPORT FOR WRITTEN SUBMISSION.—The Inspector General shall—

“(i) provide reasonable support necessary to ensure that an employee can submit a complaint or information under this paragraph in writing; and

“(ii) if such submission is not feasible, shall create a written record of the employee’s verbal complaint or information and treat such written record as a written submission.”; and

(3) in subsection (c)—

(A) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and

(B) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following:

“(1) CREDIBILITY.—In accordance with paragraph (2), the Inspector General shall determine whether a complaint or information reported under subsection (b) appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the head of the establishment notice of that determination, together with the complaint or information.

“(2) DEADLINE FOR COMPLIANCE.—The Inspector General shall make the determination under paragraph (1) with respect to a complaint or information reported under subsection (b) not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date on which the employee who reported the complaint or information confirms to the Inspector General the intent of the employee to report to Congress that complaint or information.”.

SEC. 6702. Protection for individuals making authorized disclosures to inspectors general of elements of the intelligence community.

(a) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.—Section 103H(g)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), respectively;

(2) by striking “The Inspector General is authorized” and inserting “(A) The Inspector General is authorized”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(B) (i) An individual may disclose classified information to the Inspector General in accordance with the applicable security standards and procedures established under section 102A or 803 of this Act, chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161 et seq.), Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to Classified National Security Information), or any applicable provision of law.

“(ii) A disclosure under clause (i) of classified information made by an individual without appropriate clearance or authority to access such classified information at the time of the disclosure, but that is otherwise made in accordance with applicable security standards and procedures, shall be treated as an authorized disclosure that does not violate a covered provision.

“(iii) Nothing in clause (ii) may be construed to limit or modify the obligation of an individual to appropriately store, handle, or disseminate classified information in accordance with applicable security guidance and procedures, including with respect to the removal or retention of classified information.

“(iv) In this subparagraph, the term ‘covered provision’ means—

“(I) any otherwise applicable nondisclosure agreement;

“(II) any otherwise applicable regulation or order issued under the authority of chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) or Executive Order 13526;

“(III) section 798 of title 18, United States Code; or

“(IV) any other provision of law with respect to the unauthorized disclosure of national security information.”.

(b) Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.—Section 17(e)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(e)(3)) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), respectively;

(2) by striking “The Inspector General is authorized” and inserting “(A) The Inspector General is authorized”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(B) (i) An individual may disclose classified information to the Inspector General in accordance with the applicable security standards and procedures established under section 102A or 803 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024, 3162a), chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161 et seq.), Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to Classified National Security Information), or any applicable provision of law.

“(iv) In this subparagraph, the term ‘covered provision’ means—

“(I) any otherwise applicable nondisclosure agreement;

“(II) any otherwise applicable regulation or order issued under the authority of chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) or Executive Order 13526;

“(III) section 798 of title 18, United States Code; or

“(IV) any other provision of law with respect to the unauthorized disclosure of national security information.”.

(c) Other inspectors general of elements of the intelligence community.—Section 416 of title 5, United States Code, as amended by section 6701, is further amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following:

“(4) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term ‘intelligence community’ has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(i) Protection for individuals making authorized disclosures.—

“(1) DISCLOSURE.—An individual may disclose classified information to an Inspector General of an element of the intelligence community in accordance with the applicable security standards and procedures established under section 102A or 803 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024, 3162a), chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161 et seq.), Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to Classified National Security Information), or any applicable provision of law.

“(2) DISCLOSURE WITHOUT CLEARANCE OR AUTHORITY.—

“(A) TREATMENT.—A disclosure under paragraph (1) of classified information made by an individual without appropriate clearance or authority to access such classified information at the time of the disclosure, but that is otherwise made in accordance with applicable security standards and procedures, shall be treated as an authorized disclosure that does not violate a covered provision.

“(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in subparagraph (A) may be construed to limit or modify the obligation of an individual to appropriately store, handle, or disseminate classified information in accordance with applicable security guidance and procedures, including with respect to the removal or retention of classified information.

“(C) COVERED PROVISION DEFINED.—In this paragraph, the term ‘covered provision’ means—

“(i) any otherwise applicable nondisclosure agreement;

“(ii) any otherwise applicable regulation or order issued under the authority of chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) or Executive Order 13526;

“(iii) section 798 of title 18; or

“(iv) any other provision of law with respect to the unauthorized disclosure of national security information.”.

SEC. 6703. Clarification of authority of certain Inspectors General to receive protected disclosures.

Section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)(1), by inserting “or covered intelligence community element” after “the appropriate inspector general of the employing agency”; and

(2) in subsection (c)(1)(A), by inserting “or covered intelligence community element” after “the appropriate inspector general of the employing or contracting agency”.

TITLE LXVIII—UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA

SEC. 6801. Comptroller General of the United States review of All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office.

(a) Definitions.—In this section, the terms “congressional defense committees”, “congressional leadership”, and “unidentified anomalous phenomena” have the meanings given such terms in section 1683(n) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(n)).

(b) Review required.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a review of the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (in this section referred to as the “Office”).

(1) A review of the implementation by the Office of the duties and requirements of the Office under section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373), such as the process for operational unidentified anomalous phenomena reporting and coordination with the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and other departments and agencies of the Federal Government and non-Government entities.

(2) A review of such other matters relating to the activities of the Office that pertain to unidentified anomalous phenomena as the Comptroller General considers appropriate.

(d) Report.—Following the review required by subsection (b), in a timeframe mutually agreed upon by the congressional intelligence committees, the congressional defense committees, congressional leadership, and the Comptroller General, the Comptroller General shall submit to such committees and congressional leadership a report on the findings of the Comptroller General with respect to the review conducted under subsection (b).

SEC. 6802. Sunset of requirements relating to audits of unidentified anomalous phenomena historical record report.

Section 6803 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3373 note) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting “until the date that is 90 days after the delivery of the final volume of the Historical Record Report” after “quarterly basis”; and

(2) in subsection (c), by inserting “until the date that is 180 days after the delivery of the final volume of the Historical Record Report” after “semiannually thereafter”.

TITLE LXIX—OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 6901. Modification and repeal of reporting requirements.

(a) Briefing on Iranian expenditures supporting foreign military and terrorist activities.—Section 6705(a)(1) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (22 U.S.C. 9412(a)(1)) is amended by striking “, and not less frequently than once each year thereafter provide a briefing to Congress,”.

(b) Briefing on review of intelligence community analytic production.—Section 1019(c) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364(c)) is amended by striking “December 1” and inserting “February 1”.

(c) Repeal of report on oversight of foreign influence in academia.—Section 5713 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3369b) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)—

(A) by striking “report” and inserting “briefing”; and

(B) by striking “submit” and inserting “provide”; and

(2) in subsection (c), by striking “report” and inserting “briefing”.

(d) Repeal of report on foreign investment risks.—Section 6716 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3370a) is repealed.

(e) Repeal of report on intelligence community loan repayment programs.—Section 6725(c) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334g(c)) is repealed.

(f) Repeal of report on data collection on attrition in intelligence community.—Section 306(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (50 U.S.C. 3334h(c)) is repealed.

SEC. 6902. Technical amendments.

(a) National Security Act of 1947.—The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended as follows:

(1) In section 102A(f)(8), by striking “withing” and inserting “within”.

(2) In section 103H(k)(6), by striking “involves” and inserting “involve”.

(3) In section 1102A(c)(1)(B)(ii), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon.

(4) In section 1104—

(A) in subsection (b)(2)(A), by striking “subsections (a)(1), (d), and (g) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.)” and inserting “subsections (b)(1), (e), and (h) of section 416 of title 5, United States Code”; and

(B) in subsection (c)(1)—

(i) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and

(ii) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking “subsections (a)(1), (d), and (g) of section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.)” and inserting “subsections (b)(1), (e), and (h) of section 416 of title 5, United States Code”.

(5) In section 1114(a), by inserting “the” before “Office of the Director”.

(b) National Security Agency Act of 1959.—Section 16(d)(3)(C) of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3614(d)(3)(C)) is amended by striking “an program” and inserting “a program”.

(c) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024.—The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (division G of Public Law 118–31) is amended—

(1) in section 7102(a), by striking “section 101” and inserting “section 7101”; and

(2) in section 7103(b), by striking “section 102(a)” and inserting “section 7102(a)”.

(d) Requirements relating to construction of facilities to be used primarily by intelligence community.—Section 602(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. 3304(a)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “$6,000,000” and inserting “$9,000,000”; and

(2) in paragraph (2)—

(A) by striking “$2,000,000” each place it appears and inserting “$4,000,000”; and

(B) by striking “$6,000,000” and inserting “$9,000,000”.

(e) Copyright protection for civilian faculty of certain accredited institutions.—Section 105 of title 17, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

“§ 105. Subject matter of copyright: United States Government works

“(a) In general.—Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government, but the United States Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.

“(b) Copyright protection of certain works.—Subject to subsection (c), the covered author of a covered work owns the copyright to that covered work.

“(c) Use by Federal Government.—

“(1) SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AUTHORITY.—With respect to a covered author who produces a covered work in the course of employment at a covered institution described in subparagraphs (A) through (K) of subsection (d)(2) and subparagraph (L) of such subsection when the Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Navy, the Secretary of Defense may direct the covered author to provide the Federal Government with an irrevocable, royalty-free, worldwide, nonexclusive license to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display such covered work for purposes of the United States Government.

“(2) SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT IN WHICH THE COAST GUARD IS OPERATING WHEN IT IS NOT OPERATING AS A SERVICE IN THE NAVY AUTHORITY.—With respect to a covered author who produces a covered work in the course of employment at the covered institution described in subsection (d)(2)(L), the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating when it is not operating as a service in the Navy may direct the covered author to provide the Federal Government with an irrevocable, royalty-free, worldwide, nonexclusive license to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display such covered work for purposes of the United States Government.

“(3) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY.—With respect to a covered author who produces a covered work in the course of employment at the covered institution described in subsection (d)(2)(M), the Director of National Intelligence may direct the covered author to provide the Federal Government with an irrevocable, royalty-free, worldwide, nonexclusive license to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display such covered work for purposes of the United States Government.

“(4) SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.—With respect to a covered author who produces a covered work in the course of employment at the covered institution described in subsection (d)(2)(N), the Secretary of Transportation may direct the covered author to provide the Federal Government with an irrevocable, royalty-free, worldwide, nonexclusive license to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display such covered work for purposes of the United States Government.

“(d) Definitions.—In this section:

“(1) COVERED AUTHOR.—The term ‘covered author’ means a civilian member of the faculty of a covered institution.

“(2) COVERED INSTITUTION.—The term ‘covered institution’ means the following:

“(A) National Defense University.

“(B) United States Military Academy.

“(C) Army War College.

“(D) United States Army Command and General Staff College.

“(E) United States Naval Academy.

“(F) Naval War College.

“(G) Naval Postgraduate School.

“(H) Marine Corps University.

“(I) United States Air Force Academy.

“(J) Air University.

“(K) Defense Language Institute.

“(L) United States Coast Guard Academy.

“(M) National Intelligence University.

“(N) United States Merchant Marine Academy.

“(3) COVERED WORK.—The term ‘covered work’ means a literary work produced by a covered author in the course of employment at a covered institution for publication by a scholarly press or journal.”.

(f) Coordination with other amendments made by this division.—For purposes of applying amendments made by provisions of this division other than this section, the amendments made by this section shall be treated as having been enacted immediately before any such amendments by other provisions of this division.

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