Legislation
118th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 2226
_______________________________________________________________________
AN ACT
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2024 for military
activities of the Department of Defense for military construction, and
for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Organization of Act into divisions; table of contents.
Sec. 3. Congressional defense committees.
Sec. 4. Budgetary effects of this Act.
…….
DIVISION M--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This division may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this division is
as follows:
DIVISION M--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Community Matters
Sec. 301. Plan to recruit, train, and retain personnel with experience
in financial intelligence and emerging
technologies.
Sec. 302. Policy and performance framework for mobility of intelligence
community workforce.
Sec. 303. In-State tuition rates for active duty members of the
intelligence community.
Sec. 304. Standards, criteria, and guidance for counterintelligence
vulnerability assessments and surveys.
Sec. 305. Improving administration of certain post-employment
restrictions for intelligence community.
Sec. 306. Mission of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center.
Sec. 307. Prohibition relating to transport of individuals detained at
United States Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 308. Department of Energy science and technology risk assessments.
Sec. 309. Congressional oversight of intelligence community risk
assessments.
Sec. 310. Inspector General review of dissemination by Federal Bureau
of Investigation Richmond, Virginia, field
office of certain document.
Sec. 311. Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 321. Change to penalties and increased availability of mental
health treatment for unlawful conduct on
Central Intelligence Agency installations.
Sec. 322. Modifications to procurement authorities of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 323. Establishment of Central Intelligence Agency standard
workplace sexual misconduct complaint
investigation procedure.
TITLE IV--MATTERS CONCERNING FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Subtitle A--People's Republic of China
Sec. 401. Intelligence community coordinator for accountability of
atrocities of the People's Republic of
China.
Sec. 402. Interagency working group and report on the malign efforts of
the People's Republic of China in Africa.
Sec. 403. Amendment to requirement for annual assessment by
intelligence community working group for
monitoring the economic and technological
capabilities of the People's Republic of
China.
Sec. 404. Assessments of reciprocity in the relationship between the
United States and the People's Republic of
China.
Sec. 405. Annual briefing on intelligence community efforts to identify
and mitigate Chinese Communist Party and
Russian foreign malign influence operations
against the United States.
Sec. 406. Assessment of threat posed to United States ports by cranes
manufactured by countries of concern.
Subtitle B--Other Foreign Countries
Sec. 411. Report on efforts to capture and detain United States
citizens as hostages.
Sec. 412. Sense of Congress on priority of fentanyl in National
Intelligence Priorities Framework.
TITLE V--MATTERS PERTAINING TO UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND EMERGING
TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION WITH UNITED STATES ADVERSARIES
Subtitle A--General Matters
Sec. 501. Assignment of detailees from intelligence community to
Department of Commerce.
Subtitle B--Next-generation Energy, Biotechnology, and Artificial
Intelligence
Sec. 511. Expanded annual assessment of economic and technological
capabilities of the People's Republic of
China.
Sec. 512. Assessment of using civil nuclear energy for intelligence
community capabilities.
Sec. 513. Policies established by Director of National Intelligence for
artificial intelligence capabilities.
TITLE VI--WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS
Sec. 601. Submittal to Congress of complaints and information by
whistleblowers in the intelligence
community.
Sec. 602. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity as
reprisal against whistleblower disclosure
by employees and contractors in
intelligence community.
Sec. 603. Establishing process parity for adverse security clearance
and access determinations.
Sec. 604. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory
revocation of security clearances and
access determinations.
Sec. 605. Modification and repeal of reporting requirements.
TITLE VII--CLASSIFICATION REFORM
Subtitle A--Classification Reform Act of 2023
Sec. 701. Short title.
Sec. 702. Definitions.
Sec. 703. Classification and declassification of information.
Sec. 704. Transparency officers.
Subtitle B--Sensible Classification Act of 2023
Sec. 711. Short title.
Sec. 712. Definitions.
Sec. 713. Findings and sense of the Senate.
Sec. 714. Classification authority.
Sec. 715. Promoting efficient declassification review.
Sec. 716. Training to promote sensible classification.
Sec. 717. Improvements to Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 718. Implementation of technology for classification and
declassification.
Sec. 719. Studies and recommendations on necessity of security
clearances.
TITLE VIII--SECURITY CLEARANCE AND TRUSTED WORKFORCE
Sec. 801. Review of shared information technology services for
personnel vetting.
Sec. 802. Timeliness standard for rendering determinations of trust for
personnel vetting.
Sec. 803. Annual report on personnel vetting trust determinations.
Sec. 804. Survey to assess strengths and weaknesses of Trusted
Workforce 2.0.
Sec. 805. Prohibition on denial of eligibility for access to classified
information solely because of past use of
cannabis.
TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS
Sec. 901. Improved funding flexibility for payments made by the Central
Intelligence Agency for qualifying injuries
to the brain.
Sec. 902. Clarification of requirements to seek certain benefits
relating to injuries to the brain.
Sec. 903. Intelligence community implementation of HAVANA Act of 2021
authorities.
Sec. 904. Report and briefing on Central Intelligence Agency handling
of anomalous health incidents.
TITLE X--ELECTION SECURITY
Sec. 1001. Strengthening Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect for
Elections through Independent Testing Act
of 2023.
TITLE XI--OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 1101. Modification of reporting requirement for All-domain Anomaly
Resolution Office.
Sec. 1102. Funding limitations relating to unidentified anomalous
phenomena.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given
such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3003).
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in such section.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2024
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the Federal Government.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to be
appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence
activities of the Federal Government are those specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this
division.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives,
and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule,
within the executive branch of the Federal Government.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the
budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2024 the sum of
$658,950,000.
(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for
fiscal year 2024 such additional amounts as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
SEC. 104. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased
by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year
2024.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Community Matters
SEC. 301. PLAN TO RECRUIT, TRAIN, AND RETAIN PERSONNEL WITH EXPERIENCE
IN FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the heads of human capital of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a plan for
the intelligence community to recruit, train, and retain personnel who
have skills and experience in financial intelligence and emerging
technologies in order to improve analytic tradecraft.
(b) Elements.--The plan required by subsection (a) shall include
the following elements:
(1) An assessment, including measurable benchmarks of
progress, of current initiatives of the intelligence community
to recruit, train, and retain personnel who have skills and
experience in financial intelligence and emerging technologies.
(2) An assessment of whether personnel in the intelligence
community who have such skills are currently well integrated
into the analytical cadre of the relevant elements of the
intelligence community that produce analyses with respect to
financial intelligence and emerging technologies.
(3) An identification of challenges to hiring or
compensation in the intelligence community that limit progress
toward rapidly increasing the number of personnel with such
skills, and an identification of hiring or other reforms to
resolve such challenges.
(4) A determination of whether the National Intelligence
University has the resources and expertise necessary to train
existing personnel in financial intelligence and emerging
technologies.
(5) A strategy, including measurable benchmarks of
progress, to, by January 1, 2025, increase by 10 percent the
analytical cadre of personnel with expertise and previous
employment in financial intelligence and emerging technologies.
SEC. 302. POLICY AND PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK FOR MOBILITY OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY WORKFORCE.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the
Office of Personnel Management as the Director of National Intelligence
considers appropriate, develop and implement a policy and performance
framework to ensure the timely and effective mobility of employees and
contractors of the Federal Government who are transferring employment
between elements of the intelligence community.
(b) Elements.--The policy and performance framework required by
subsection (a) shall include processes with respect to the following:
(1) Human resources.
(2) Medical reviews.
(3) Determinations of suitability or eligibility for access
to classified information in accordance with Executive Order
13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to reforming processes
related to suitability for Government employment, fitness for
contractor employees, and eligibility for access to classified
national security information).
SEC. 303. IN-STATE TUITION RATES FOR ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Section 135(d) of the Higher Education Act of 1965
(20 U.S.C. 1015d(d)), as amended by section 6206(a)(4) of the Foreign
Service Families Act of 2021 (Public Law 117-81), is further amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or'' after the
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) a member of the intelligence community (as defined in
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003)) (other than a member of the Armed Forces of the United
States) who is on active duty for a period of more than 30
days.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall
take effect at each public institution of higher education in a State
that receives assistance under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1001 et seq.) for the first period of enrollment at such
institution that begins after July 1, 2026.
SEC. 304. STANDARDS, CRITERIA, AND GUIDANCE FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS AND SURVEYS.
Section 904(d)(7)(A) of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of
2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383(d)(7)(A)) is amended to read as follows:
``(A) Counterintelligence vulnerability assessments
and surveys.--To develop standards, criteria, and
guidance for counterintelligence risk assessments and
surveys of the vulnerability of the United States to
intelligence threats, including with respect to
critical infrastructure and critical technologies, in
order to identify the areas, programs, and activities
that require protection from such threats.''.
SEC. 305. IMPROVING ADMINISTRATION OF CERTAIN POST-EMPLOYMENT
RESTRICTIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 304 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a)
is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(1)--
(A) by striking ``A former'' and inserting the
following:
``(A) In general.--A former''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) Prior disclosure to director of national
intelligence.--
``(i) In general.--In the case of a former
employee who occupies a covered post-service
position in violation of subsection (a),
whether the former employee voluntarily
notified the Director of National Intelligence
of the intent of the former employee to occupy
such covered post-service position before
occupying such post-service position may be
used in determining whether the violation was
knowing and willful for purposes of
subparagraph (A).
``(ii) Procedures and guidance.--The
Director of National Intelligence may establish
procedures and guidance relating to the
submittal of notice for purposes of clause
(i).''; and
(2) in subsection (d)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the
restrictions under subsection (a) and'' before ``the
report requirements'';
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``ceases to
occupy'' and inserting ``occupies''; and
(C) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``before the
person ceases to occupy a covered intelligence
position'' and inserting ``when the person occupies a
covered intelligence position''.
SEC. 306. MISSION OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
CENTER.
(a) In General.--Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement
Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (d) through (i) as
subsections (e) through (j), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Mission.--The mission of the National Counterintelligence and
Security Center shall include organizing and leading strategic planning
for counterintelligence activities of the United States Government by
integrating instruments of national power as needed to counter foreign
intelligence activities.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Counterintelligence enhancement act of 2002.--Section
904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50
U.S.C. 3383) is amended--
(A) in subsection (e), as redesignated by
subsection (a)(1), by striking ``Subject to subsection
(e)'' both places it appears and inserting ``Subject to
subsection (f)''; and
(B) in subsection (f), as so redesignated--
(i) in paragraph (1), by striking
``subsection (d)(1)'' and inserting
``subsection (e)(1)''; and
(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking
``subsection (d)(2)'' and inserting
``subsection (e)(2)''.
(2) Counterintelligence and security enhancements act of
1994.--Section 811(d)(1)(B)(ii) of the Counterintelligence and
Security Enhancements Act of 1994 (50 U.S.C. 3381(d)(1)(B)(ii))
is amended by striking ``section 904(d)(2) of that Act (50
U.S.C. 3383(d)(2))'' and inserting ``section 904(e)(2) of that
Act (50 U.S.C. 3383(e)(2))''.
SEC. 307. PROHIBITION RELATING TO TRANSPORT OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT
UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.
(a) Definition of Individual Detained at Guantanamo.--In this
section, the term ``individual detained at Guantanamo'' has the meaning
given that term in section 1034(f)(2) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat.
971; 10 U.S.C. 801 note).
(b) Prohibition on Chartering Private or Commercial Aircraft to
Transport Individuals Detained at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.--No head of an element of the intelligence
community may charter any private or commercial aircraft to transport
an individual who is or was an individual detained at Guantanamo.
SEC. 308. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RISK ASSESSMENTS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Country of risk.--
(A) In general.--The term ``country of risk'' means
a foreign country determined by the Secretary, in
accordance with subparagraph (B), to present a risk of
theft of United States intellectual property or a
threat to the national security of the United States if
nationals of the country, or entities owned or
controlled by the country or nationals of the country,
participate in any research, development,
demonstration, or deployment activity authorized under
this Act or an amendment made by this Act.
(B) Determination.--In making a determination under
subparagraph (A), the Secretary, in coordination with
the Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, shall take into consideration--
(i) the most recent World Wide Threat
Assessment of the United States Intelligence
Community, prepared by the Director of National
Intelligence; and
(ii) the most recent National
Counterintelligence Strategy of the United
States.
(2) Covered support.--The term ``covered support'' means
any grant, contract, subcontract, award, loan, program,
support, or other activity authorized under this Act or an
amendment made by this Act.
(3) Entity of concern.--The term ``entity of concern''
means any entity, including a national, that is--
(A) identified under section 1237(b) of the Strom
Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1999 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; Public Law 105-261);
(B) identified under section 1260H of the William
M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note; Public Law
116-283);
(C) on the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of
Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and
set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 15,
Code of Federal Regulations;
(D) included in the list required by section
9(b)(3) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020
(Public Law 116-145; 134 Stat. 656); or
(E) identified by the Secretary, in coordination
with the Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence and the applicable office that
would provide, or is providing, covered support, as
posing an unmanageable threat--
(i) to the national security of the United
States; or
(ii) of theft or loss of United States
intellectual property.
(4) National.--The term ``national'' has the meaning given
the term in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8 U.S.C. 1101).
(5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Energy.
(b) Science and Technology Risk Assessment.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall develop and maintain
tools and processes to manage and mitigate research security
risks, such as a science and technology risk matrix, informed
by threats identified by the Director of the Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, to facilitate
determinations of the risk of loss of United States
intellectual property or threat to the national security of the
United States posed by activities carried out under any covered
support.
(2) Content and implementation.--In developing and using
the tools and processes developed under paragraph (1), the
Secretary shall--
(A) deploy risk-based approaches to evaluating,
awarding, and managing certain research, development,
demonstration, and deployment activities, including
designations that will indicate the relative risk of
activities;
(B) assess, to the extent practicable, ongoing
high-risk activities;
(C) designate an officer or employee of the
Department of Energy to be responsible for tracking and
notifying recipients of any covered support of
unmanageable threats to United States national security
or of theft or loss of United States intellectual
property posed by an entity of concern;
(D) consider requiring recipients of covered
support to implement additional research security
mitigations for higher-risk activities if appropriate;
and
(E) support the development of research security
training for recipients of covered support on the risks
posed by entities of concern.
(3) Annual updates.--The tools and processes developed
under paragraph (1) shall be evaluated annually and updated as
needed, with threat-informed input from the Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, to reflect changes in the
risk designation under paragraph (2)(A) of research,
development, demonstration, and deployment activities conducted
by the Department of Energy.
(c) Entity of Concern.--
(1) Prohibition.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), no
entity of concern, or individual that owns or controls, is
owned or controlled by, or is under common ownership or control
with an entity of concern, may receive, or perform work under,
any covered support.
(2) Waiver of prohibition.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary may waive the
prohibition under paragraph (1) if determined by the
Secretary to be in the national interest.
(B) Notification to congress.--Not less than 2
weeks prior to issuing a waiver under subparagraph (A),
the Secretary shall notify Congress of the intent to
issue the waiver, including a justification for the
waiver.
(3) Penalty.--
(A) Termination of support.--On finding that any
entity of concern or individual described in paragraph
(1) has received covered support and has not received a
waiver under paragraph (2), the Secretary shall
terminate all covered support to that entity of concern
or individual, as applicable.
(B) Penalties.--An entity of concern or individual
identified under subparagraph (A) shall be--
(i) prohibited from receiving or
participating in covered support for a period
of not less than 1 year but not more than 10
years, as determined by the Secretary; or
(ii) instead of the penalty described in
clause (i), subject to any other penalties
authorized under applicable law or regulations
that the Secretary determines to be in the
national interest.
(C) Notification to congress.--Prior to imposing a
penalty under subparagraph (B), the Secretary shall
notify Congress of the intent to impose the penalty,
including a description of and justification for the
penalty.
(4) Coordination.--The Secretary shall--
(A) share information about the unmanageable
threats described in subsection (a)(3)(E) with other
Federal agencies; and
(B) develop consistent approaches to identifying
entities of concern.
(d) International Agreements.--This section shall be applied in a
manner consistent with the obligations of the United States under
international agreements.
(e) Report Required.--Not later than 240 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report
that--
(1) describes--
(A) the tools and processes developed under
subsection (b)(1) and any updates to those tools and
processes; and
(B) if applicable, the science and technology risk
matrix developed under that subsection and how that
matrix has been applied;
(2) includes a mitigation plan for managing risks posed by
countries of risk with respect to future or ongoing research
and development activities of the Department of Energy; and
(3) defines critical research areas, designated by risk, as
determined by the Secretary.
SEC. 309. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RISK
ASSESSMENTS.
(a) Risk Assessment Documents and Materials.--Except as provided in
subsection (b), whenever an element of the intelligence community
conducts a risk assessment arising from the mishandling or improper
disclosure of classified information, the Director of National
Intelligence shall, not later than 30 days after the date of the
commencement of such risk assessment--
(1) submit to the congressional intelligence committees
copies of such documents and materials as are--
(A) within the jurisdiction of such committees; and
(B) subject to the risk assessment; and
(2) provide such committees a briefing on such documents,
materials, and risk assessment.
(b) Exception.--If the Director determines, with respect to a risk
assessment described in subsection (a), that the documents and other
materials otherwise subject to paragraph (1) of such subsection (a) are
of such a volume that submittal pursuant to such paragraph would be
impracticable, the Director shall--
(1) in lieu of submitting copies of such documents and
materials, submit a log of such documents and materials; and
(2) pursuant to a request by the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives for a copy of a
document or material included in such log, submit to such
committee such copy.
SEC. 310. INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW OF DISSEMINATION BY FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, FIELD OFFICE OF
CERTAIN DOCUMENT.
(a) Review Required.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Department of
Justice shall conduct a review of the actions and events, including any
underlying policy direction, that served as a basis for the January 23,
2023, dissemination by the field office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation located in Richmond, Virginia, of a document titled
``Interest of Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in
Radical-Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Almost Certainly Presents New
Mitigation Opportunities.''.
(b) Submittal to Congress.--The Inspector General of the Department
of Justice shall submit the findings of the Inspector General with
respect to the review required by subsection (a) to the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
(3) The Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on
Oversight and Accountability, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 311. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS.
Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(h) Prohibition.--
``(1) Definition.--In this subsection, the term `United
States person' means a United States citizen, an alien known by
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to be a permanent
resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially
composed of United States citizens or permanent resident
aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States,
except for a corporation directed and controlled by 1 or more
foreign governments.
``(2) Collection of information from united states
persons.--
``(A) In general.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis may not engage in the collection of
information or intelligence targeting any United States
person except as provided in subparagraph (B).
``(B) Exception.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply
to any employee, officer, or contractor of the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis who is responsible for
collecting information from individuals working for a
State, local, or Tribal territory government or a
private employer.''.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 321. CHANGE TO PENALTIES AND INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF MENTAL
HEALTH TREATMENT FOR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INSTALLATIONS.
Section 15(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3515(b)) is amended, in the second sentence, by striking ``those
specified in section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code'' and
inserting ``the maximum penalty authorized for a Class B misdemeanor
under section 3559 of title 18, United States Code''.
SEC. 322. MODIFICATIONS TO PROCUREMENT AUTHORITIES OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Section 3 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
3503) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``sections'' and all
that follows through ``session)'' and inserting ``sections
3201, 3203, 3204, 3206, 3207, 3302 through 3306, 3321 through
3323, 3801 through 3808, 3069, 3134, 3841, and 4752 of title
10, United States Code'' and
(2) in subsection (d), by striking ``in paragraphs'' and
all that follows through ``1947'' and inserting ``in sections
3201 through 3204 of title 10, United States Code, shall not be
delegable. Each determination or decision required by sections
3201 through 3204, 3321 through 3323, and 3841 of title 10,
United States Code''.
SEC. 323. ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY STANDARD
WORKPLACE SEXUAL MISCONDUCT COMPLAINT INVESTIGATION
PROCEDURE.
(a) Workplace Sexual Misconduct Defined.--The term ``workplace
sexual misconduct''--
(1) means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
when--
(A) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment;
(B) submission to or rejection of such conduct by
an individual is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting such individual; or
(C) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment; and
(2) includes sexual harassment and sexual assault.
(b) Standard Complaint Investigation Procedure.--Not later than 90
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency shall--
(1) establish a standard workplace sexual misconduct
complaint investigation procedure;
(2) implement the standard workplace sexual misconduct
complaint investigation procedure through clear workforce
communication and education on the procedure; and
(3) submit the standard workplace sexual misconduct
complaint investigation procedure to the congressional
intelligence committees.
(c) Minimum Requirements.--The procedure established pursuant to
subsection (b)(1) shall, at a minimum--
(1) identify the individuals and offices of the Central
Intelligence Agency to which an employee of the Agency may
bring a complaint of workplace sexual misconduct;
(2) detail the steps each individual or office identified
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall take upon receipt of a
complaint of workplace sexual misconduct and the timeframes
within which those steps shall be taken, including--
(A) documentation of the complaint;
(B) referral or notification to another individual
or office;
(C) measures to document or preserve witness
statements or other evidence; and
(D) preliminary investigation of the complaint;
(3) set forth standard criteria for determining whether a
complaint of workplace sexual misconduct will be referred to
law enforcement and the timeframe within which such a referral
shall occur; and
(4) for any complaint not referred to law enforcement, set
forth standard criteria for determining--
(A) whether a complaint has been substantiated; and
(B) for any substantiated complaint, the
appropriate disciplinary action.
(d) Annual Reports.--On or before April 30 of each year, the
Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives an annual report that
includes, for the preceding calendar year, the following:
(1) The number of workplace sexual misconduct complaints
brought to each individual or office of the Central
Intelligence Agency identified pursuant to subsection (c)(1),
disaggregated by--
(A) complaints referred to law enforcement; and
(B) complaints substantiated.
(2) For each complaint described in paragraph (1) that is
substantiated, a description of the disciplinary action taken
by the Director.
TITLE IV--MATTERS CONCERNING FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Subtitle A--People's Republic of China
SEC. 401. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COORDINATOR FOR ACCOUNTABILITY OF
ATROCITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Atrocity.--The term ``atrocity'' means a crime against
humanity, genocide, or a war crime.
(2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means--
(A) any person or entity that is not a United
States person; or
(B) any entity not organized under the laws of the
United States or of any jurisdiction within the United
States.
(3) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' has the meaning given that term in section 105A(c) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3039).
(b) Intelligence Community Coordinator for Accountability of
Atrocities of the People's Republic of China.--
(1) Designation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall designate a senior official of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence to serve as the
intelligence community coordinator for accountability of
atrocities of the People's Republic of China (in this section
referred to as the ``Coordinator'').
(2) Duties.--The Coordinator shall lead the efforts of and
coordinate and collaborate with the intelligence community with
respect to the following:
(A) Identifying and addressing any gaps in
intelligence collection relating to atrocities of the
People's Republic of China, including by recommending
the modification of the priorities of the intelligence
community with respect to intelligence collection and
by utilizing informal processes and collaborative
mechanisms with key elements of the intelligence
community to increase collection on atrocities of the
People's Republic of China.
(B) Prioritizing and expanding the intelligence
analysis with respect to ongoing atrocities of the
People's Republic of China and disseminating within the
United States Government intelligence relating to the
identification and activities of foreign persons
suspected of being involved with or providing support
to atrocities of the People's Republic of China,
including genocide and forced labor practices in
Xinjiang, in order to support the efforts of other
Federal agencies, including the Department of State,
the Department of Justice, the Department of the
Treasury, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the
Department of Commerce, the Bureau of Industry and
Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the
National Security Council, to hold the People's
Republic of China accountable for such atrocities.
(C) Increasing efforts to declassify and share with
the people of the United States and the international
community information regarding atrocities of the
People's Republic of China in order to expose such
atrocities and counter the disinformation and
misinformation campaign by the People's Republic of
China to deny such atrocities.
(D) Documenting and storing intelligence and other
unclassified information that may be relevant to
preserve as evidence of atrocities of the People's
Republic of China for future accountability, and
ensuring that other relevant Federal agencies receive
appropriate support from the intelligence community
with respect to the collection, analysis, preservation,
and, as appropriate, dissemination, of intelligence
related to atrocities of the People's Republic of
China, which may include the information from the
annual report required by section 6504 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023
(Public Law 117-263).
(E) Sharing information with the Forced Labor
Enforcement Task Force, established under section 741
of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 4681), the Department of
Commerce, and the Department of the Treasury for the
purposes of entity listings and sanctions.
(3) Plan required.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress--
(A) the name of the official designated as the
Coordinator pursuant to paragraph (1); and
(B) the strategy of the intelligence community for
the collection and dissemination of intelligence
relating to ongoing atrocities of the People's Republic
of China, including a detailed description of how the
Coordinator shall support, and assist in facilitating
the implementation of, such strategy.
(4) Annual report to congress.--
(A) Reports required.--Not later than May 1, 2024,
and annually thereafter until May 1, 2034, the Director
shall submit to Congress a report detailing, for the
year covered by the report--
(i) the analytical findings, changes in
collection, and other activities of the
intelligence community with respect to ongoing
atrocities of the People's Republic of China;
(ii) the recipients of information shared
pursuant to this section for the purpose of--
(I) providing support to Federal
agencies to hold the People's Republic
of China accountable for such
atrocities; and
(II) sharing information with the
people of the United States to counter
the disinformation and misinformation
campaign by the People's Republic of
China to deny such atrocities; and
(iii) with respect to clause (ii), the date
of any such sharing.
(B) Form.--Each report submitted under subparagraph
(A) may be submitted in classified form, consistent
with the protection of intelligence sources and
methods.
(c) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have effect on the date
that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 402. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP AND REPORT ON THE MALIGN EFFORTS OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA.
(a) Establishment.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with such heads of elements of the intelligence
community as the Director considers appropriate, shall
establish an interagency working group within the intelligence
community to analyze the tactics and capabilities of the
People's Republic of China in Africa.
(2) Establishment flexibility.--The working group
established under paragraph (1) may be--
(A) independently established; or
(B) to avoid redundancy, incorporated into existing
working groups or cross-intelligence efforts within the
intelligence community.
(b) Report.--
(1) Definition of appropriate committees of congress.--In
this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of
Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and twice annually thereafter, the
working group established under subsection (a) shall submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the specific
tactics and capabilities of the People's Republic of China in
Africa.
(3) Elements.--Each report required by paragraph (2) shall
include the following elements:
(A) An assessment of efforts by the Government of
the People's Republic of China to exploit mining and
reprocessing operations in Africa.
(B) An assessment of efforts by the Government of
the People's Republic of China to provide or fund
technologies in Africa, including--
(i) telecommunications and energy
technologies, such as advanced reactors,
transportation, and other commercial products;
and
(ii) by requiring that the People's
Republic of China be the sole provider of such
technologies.
(C) An assessment of efforts by the Government of
the People's Republic of China to expand intelligence
capabilities in Africa.
(D) A description of actions taken by the
intelligence community to counter such efforts.
(E) An assessment of additional resources needed by
the intelligence community to better counter such
efforts.
(4) Form.--Each report required by paragraph (2) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex if necessary.
(c) Sunset.--The requirements of this section shall terminate on
the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 403. AMENDMENT TO REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL ASSESSMENT BY
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKING GROUP FOR MONITORING THE
ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
Section 6503(c)(3)(D) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023 (division F of Public Law 117-263) is amended by
striking ``the top 200'' and inserting ``all the known''.
SEC. 404. ASSESSMENTS OF RECIPROCITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research, in consultation with the Director of
National Intelligence and such other heads of elements of the
intelligence community as the Assistant Secretary considers relevant,
shall submit to Congress the following:
(1) A comprehensive assessment that identifies critical
areas in the security, diplomatic, economic, financial,
technological, scientific, commercial, academic, and cultural
spheres in which the United States does not enjoy a reciprocal
relationship with the People's Republic of China.
(2) A comprehensive assessment that describes how the lack
of reciprocity between the People's Republic of China and the
United States in the areas identified in the assessment
required by paragraph (1) provides advantages to the People's
Republic of China.
(b) Form of Assessments.--
(1) Critical areas.--The assessment required by subsection
(a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.
(2) Advantages.--The assessment required by subsection
(a)(2) shall be submitted in classified form.
SEC. 405. ANNUAL BRIEFING ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY
AND MITIGATE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN
MALIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Chinese entities engaged in foreign malign influence
operations.--The term ``hinese entities engaged in foreign
malign influence operations'' means all of the elements of the
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese
Communist Party involved in foreign malign influence, such as--
(A) the Ministry of State Security;
(B) other security services of the People's
Republic of China;
(C) the intelligence services of the People's
Republic of China;
(D) the United Front Work Department and other
united front organs;
(E) state-controlled media systems, such as the
China Global Television Network (CGTN); and
(F) any entity involved in foreign malign influence
operations that demonstrably and intentionally
disseminate false information and propaganda of the
Government of the People's Republic of China or the
Chinese Communist Party.
(2) Russian malign influence actors.--The term ``Russian
malign influence actors'' refers to entities or individuals
engaged in foreign malign influence operations against the
United States who are affiliated with--
(A) the intelligence and security services of the
Russian Federation
(B) the Presidential Administration;
(C) any other entity of the Government of the
Russian Federation; or
(D) Russian mercenary or proxy groups such as the
Wagner Group.
(3) Foreign malign influence operation.--The term ``foreign
malign influence operation'' means a coordinated and often
concealed activity that is covered by the definition of the
term ``foreign malign influence'' in section 119C of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059) and uses
disinformation, press manipulation, economic coercion, targeted
investments, corruption, or academic censorship, which are
often intended--
(A) to coerce and corrupt United States interests,
values, institutions, or individuals; and
(B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or
outcomes in the United States that support the
interests of the Government of the People's Republic of
China or the Chinese Communist Party.
(b) Briefing Required.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter until the date that
is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
the Foreign Malign Influence Center shall, in collaboration with the
heads of the elements of the intelligence community, provide Congress a
classified briefing on the ways in which the relevant elements of the
intelligence community are working internally and coordinating across
the intelligence community to identify and mitigate the actions of
Chinese and Russian entities engaged in foreign malign influence
operations against the United States, including against United States
persons.
(c) Elements.--The classified briefing required by subsection (b)
shall cover the following:
(1) The Government of the Russian Federation, the
Government of the People's Republic of China, and the Chinese
Communist Party tactics, tools, and entities that spread
disinformation, misinformation, and malign information and
conduct influence operations, information campaigns, or other
propaganda efforts.
(2) A description of ongoing foreign malign influence
operations and campaigns of the Russian Federation against the
United States and an assessment of their objectives and
effectiveness in meeting those objectives.
(3) A description of ongoing foreign malign influence
operations and campaigns of the People's Republic of China
against the United States and an assessment of their objectives
and effectiveness in meeting those objectives.
(4) A description of any cooperation, information-sharing,
amplification, or other coordination between the Russian
Federation and the People's Republic of China in developing or
carrying out foreign malign influence operations against the
United States.
(5) A description of front organizations, proxies, cut-
outs, aligned third-party countries, or organizations used by
the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China to
carry out foreign malign influence operations against the
United States.
(6) An assessment of the loopholes or vulnerabilities in
United States law that Russia and the People's Republic of
China exploit to carry out foreign malign influence operations.
(7) The actions of the Foreign Malign Influence Center, in
coordination with the Global Engagement Center, relating to
early-warning, information sharing, and proactive risk
mitigation systems, based on the list of entities identified in
subsection (a)(1), to detect, expose, deter, and counter
foreign malign influence operations of the Government of the
People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party
against the United States.
(8) The actions of the Foreign Malign Influence Center to
conduct outreach, to identify and counter tactics, tools, and
entities described in paragraph (1) by sharing information with
allies and partners of the United States, in coordination with
the Global Engagement Center, as well as State and local
governments, the business community, and civil society in order
to expose the political influence operations and information
operations of the Government of the Russian Federation and the
Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese
Communist Party carried out against individuals and entities in
the United States.
SEC. 406. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT POSED TO UNITED STATES PORTS BY CRANES
MANUFACTURED BY COUNTRIES OF CONCERN.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
on Oversight and Accountability, the Committee on
Financial Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Country of concern.--The term ``country of concern''
has the meaning given that term in section 1(m)(1) of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C.
2651a(m)(1)).
(b) Assessment.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with such other heads of the elements of the intelligence
community as the Director considers appropriate and the Secretary of
Defense, shall conduct an assessment of the threat posed to United
States ports by cranes manufactured by countries of concern and
commercial entities of those countries, including the Shanghai Zhenhua
Heavy Industries Co. (ZPMC).
(c) Report and Briefing.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit a report and provide a briefing to
the appropriate committees of Congress on the findings of the
assessment required by subsection (b).
(2) Elements.--The report and briefing required by
paragraph (1) shall outline the potential for the cranes
described in subsection (b) to collect intelligence, disrupt
operations at United States ports, and impact the national
security of the United States.
(3) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
Subtitle B--Other Foreign Countries
SEC. 411. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO CAPTURE AND DETAIN UNITED STATES
CITIZENS AS HOSTAGES.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
the Judiciary, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the
Judiciary, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on efforts by
the Maduro regime in Venezuela to detain United States citizens and
lawful permanent residents.
(c) Elements.--The report required by subsection (b) shall include,
regarding the arrest, capture, detainment, or imprisonment of United
States citizens and lawful permanent residents, the following:
(1) The names, positions, and institutional affiliation of
Venezuelan individuals, or those acting on their behalf, who
have engaged in such activities.
(2) A description of any role played by transnational
criminal organizations, and an identification of such
organizations.
(3) Where relevant, an assessment of whether and how United
States citizens and lawful permanent residents have been lured
to Venezuela.
(4) An analysis of the motive for the arrest, capture,
detainment, or imprisonment of United States citizens and
lawful permanent residents.
(5) The total number of United States citizens and lawful
permanent residents detained or imprisoned in Venezuela as of
the date on which the report is submitted.
(d) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 412. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PRIORITY OF FENTANYL IN NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIES FRAMEWORK.
It is the sense of Congress that the trafficking of illicit
fentanyl, including precursor chemicals and manufacturing equipment
associated with illicit fentanyl production and organizations that
traffic or finance the trafficking of illicit fentanyl, originating
from the People's Republic of China and Mexico should be among the
highest priorities in the National Intelligence Priorities Framework of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
TITLE V--MATTERS PERTAINING TO UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND EMERGING
TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION WITH UNITED STATES ADVERSARIES
Subtitle A--General Matters
SEC. 501. ASSIGNMENT OF DETAILEES FROM INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.
(a) Authority.--In order to better facilitate the sharing of
actionable intelligence on foreign adversary intent, capabilities,
threats, and operations that pose a threat to the interests or security
of the United States, particularly as they relate to the procurement,
development, and use of dual-use and emerging technologies, the
Director of National Intelligence may assign or facilitate the
assignment of members from across the intelligence community to serve
as detailees to the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department
of Commerce.
(b) Assignment.--Detailees assigned pursuant to subsection (a)
shall be drawn from such elements of the intelligence community as the
Director considers appropriate, in consultation with the Secretary of
Commerce.
(c) Expertise.--The Director shall ensure that detailees assigned
pursuant to subsection (a) have subject matter expertise on countries
of concern, including China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, as well as
functional areas such as illicit procurement, counterproliferation,
emerging and foundational technology, economic and financial
intelligence, information and communications technology systems, supply
chain vulnerability, and counterintelligence.
(d) Duty Credit.--The detail of an employee of the intelligence
community to the Department of Commerce under subsection (a) shall be
without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege.
Subtitle B--Next-generation Energy, Biotechnology, and Artificial
Intelligence
SEC. 511. EXPANDED ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CAPABILITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
Section 6503(c)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(I) A detailed assessment, prepared in
consultation with all elements of the working group--
``(i) of the investments made by the
People's Republic of China in--
``(I) artificial intelligence;
``(II) next-generation energy
technologies, especially small modular
reactors and advanced batteries; and
``(III) biotechnology; and
``(ii) that identifies--
``(I) competitive practices of the
People's Republic of China relating to
the technologies described in clause
(i);
``(II) opportunities to counter the
practices described in subclause (I);
``(III) countries the People's
Republic of China is targeting for
exports of civil nuclear technology;
``(IV) countries best positioned to
utilize civil nuclear technologies from
the United States in order to
facilitate the commercial export of
those technologies;
``(V) United States vulnerabilities
in the supply chain of these
technologies; and
``(VI) opportunities to counter the
export by the People's Republic of
China of civil nuclear technologies
globally.
``(J) An identification and assessment of any unmet
resource or authority needs of the working group that
affect the ability of the working group to carry out
this section.''.
SEC. 512. ASSESSMENT OF USING CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY CAPABILITIES.
(a) Assessment Required.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall, in consultation with the heads of such other elements of the
intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, conduct
an assessment of capabilities identified by the Intelligence Community
Continuity Program established pursuant to section E(3) of Intelligence
Community Directive 118, or any successor directive, or such other
intelligence community facilities or intelligence community
capabilities as may be determined by the Director to be critical to
United States national security, that have unique energy needs--
(1) to ascertain the feasibility and advisability of using
civil nuclear reactors to meet such needs; and
(2) to identify such additional resources, technologies,
infrastructure, or authorities needed, or other potential
obstacles, to commence use of a nuclear reactor to meet such
needs.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
and the Committee on Oversight and Accountability and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report, which may be
in classified form, on the findings of the Director with respect to the
assessment conducted pursuant to subsection (a).
SEC. 513. POLICIES ESTABLISHED BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES.
(a) In General.--Section 6702 of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), in the matter preceding paragraph
(1), by striking ``subsection (b)'' and inserting ``subsection
(c)'';
(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Policies.--
``(1) In general.--In carrying out subsection (a)(1), not
later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, the
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
heads of the elements of the intelligence community, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and such other
officials as the Director of National Intelligence determines
appropriate, shall establish the policies described in
paragraph (2).
``(2) Policies described.--The policies described in this
paragraph are policies for the acquisition, adoption,
development, use, coordination, and maintenance of artificial
intelligence capabilities that--
``(A) establish a lexicon relating to the use of
machine learning and artificial intelligence developed
or acquired by elements of the intelligence community;
``(B) establish guidelines for evaluating the
performance of models developed or acquired by elements
of the intelligence community, such as by--
``(i) specifying conditions for the
continuous monitoring of artificial
intelligence capabilities for performance,
including the conditions for retraining or
retiring models based on performance;
``(ii) documenting performance objectives,
including specifying how performance objectives
shall be developed and contractually enforced
for capabilities procured from third parties;
``(iii) specifying the manner in which
models should be audited, as necessary,
including the types of documentation that
should be provided to any auditor; and
``(iv) specifying conditions under which
models used by elements of the intelligence
community should be subject to testing and
evaluation for vulnerabilities to techniques
meant to undermine the availability, integrity,
or privacy of an artificial intelligence
capability;
``(C) establish guidelines for tracking
dependencies in adjacent systems, capabilities, or
processes impacted by the retraining or sunsetting of
any model described in subparagraph (B);
``(D) establish documentation requirements for
capabilities procured from third parties, aligning such
requirements, as necessary, with existing documentation
requirements applicable to capabilities developed by
elements of the intelligence community;
``(E) establish standards for the documentation of
imputed, augmented, or synthetic data used to train any
model developed, procured, or used by an element of the
intelligence community; and
``(F) provide guidance on the acquisition and usage
of models that have previously been trained by a third
party for subsequent modification and usage by such an
element.
``(3) Policy review and revision.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall periodically review and revise each policy
established under paragraph (1).''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 6712(b)(1) of such Act (50
U.S.C. 3024 note) is amended by striking ``section 6702(b)'' and
inserting ``section 6702(c)''.
TITLE VI--WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS
SEC. 601. SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS OF COMPLAINTS AND INFORMATION BY
WHISTLEBLOWERS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Amendments to Chapter 4 of Title 5.--
(1) Appointment of security officers.--Section 416 of title
5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(i) Appointment of Security Officers.--Each Inspector General
under this section, including the designees of the Inspector General of
the Department of Defense pursuant to subsection (b)(3), shall appoint
within their offices security officers to provide, on a permanent
basis, confidential, security-related guidance and direction to
employees and contractors described in subsection (b)(1) who intend to
report to Congress complaints or information, so that such employees
and contractors can obtain direction on how to report to Congress in
accordance with appropriate security practices.''.
(2) Procedures.--Subsection (e) of such section is
amended--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``or any other
committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of
Representatives'' after ``either or both of the
intelligence committees'';
(B) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:
``(2) Limitation.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), the employee may contact an
intelligence committee or another committee of
jurisdiction directly as described in paragraph (1) of
this subsection or in subsection (b)(4) only if the
employee--
``(i) before making such a contact,
furnishes to the head of the establishment,
through the Inspector General (or designee), a
statement of the employee's complaint or
information and notice of the employee's intent
to contact an intelligence committee or another
committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the
House of Representatives directly; and
``(ii)(I) obtains and follows, from the
head of the establishment, through the
Inspector General (or designee), procedural
direction on how to contact an intelligence
committee or another committee of jurisdiction
of the Senate or the House of Representatives
in accordance with appropriate security
practices; or
``(II) obtains and follows such procedural
direction from the applicable security officer
appointed under subsection (i).
``(B) Lack of procedural direction.--If an employee
seeks procedural direction under subparagraph (A)(ii)
and does not receive such procedural direction within
30 days, or receives insufficient direction to report
to Congress a complaint or information, the employee
may contact an intelligence committee or any other
committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of
Representatives directly without obtaining or following
the procedural direction otherwise required under such
subparagraph.''; and
(C) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph
(4); and
(D) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) Committee members and staff.--An employee of an
element of the intelligence community who intends to report to
Congress a complaint or information may report such complaint
or information to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking
Member, as the case may be, of an intelligence committee or
another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, a nonpartisan member of the committee staff
designated for purposes of receiving complaints or information
under this section, or a member of the majority staff and a
member of the minority staff of the committee.''.
(3) Clarification of right to report directly to
congress.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by adding
at the end the following:
``(4) Clarification of right to report directly to
congress.--Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (e),
an employee of an element of the intelligence community who
intends to report to Congress a complaint or information may
report such complaint or information directly to Congress.''.
(b) Amendments to National Security Act of 1947.--
(1) Appointment of security officers.--Section 103H(j) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(j)) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(5) The Inspector General shall appoint within the Office
of the Inspector General security officers as required by
section 416(i) of title 5, United States Code.''.
(2) Procedures.--Subparagraph (D) of section 103H(k)(5) of
such Act (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)) is amended--
(A) in clause (i), by inserting ``or any other
committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of
Representatives'' after ``either or both of the
congressional intelligence committees'';
(B) by amending clause (ii) to read as follows:
``(ii)(I) Except as provided in subclause (II), an employee
may contact a congressional intelligence committee or another
committee of jurisdiction directly as described in clause (i)
only if the employee--
``(aa) before making such a contact, furnishes to
the Director, through the Inspector General, a
statement of the employee's complaint or information
and notice of the employee's intent to contact a
congressional intelligence committee or another
committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of
Representatives directly; and
``(bb)(AA) obtains and follows, from the Director,
through the Inspector General, procedural direction on
how to contact a congressional intelligence committee
or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or
the House of Representatives in accordance with
appropriate security practices; or
``(BB) obtains and follows such procedural
direction from the applicable security officer
appointed under section 416(i) of title 5, United
States Code.
``(II) If an employee seeks procedural direction
under subclause (I)(bb) and does not receive such
procedural direction within 30 days, or receives
insufficient direction to report to Congress a
complaint or information, the employee may contact a
congressional intelligence committee or any other
committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of
Representatives directly without obtaining or following
the procedural direction otherwise required under such
subclause.'';
(C) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv);
and
(D) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:
``(iii) An employee of an element of the intelligence
community who intends to report to Congress a complaint or
information may report such complaint or information to the
Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member, as the case may
be, of a congressional intelligence committee or another
committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, a nonpartisan member of the committee staff
designated for purposes of receiving complaints or information
under this section, or a member of the majority staff and a
member of the minority staff of the committee.''.
(3) Clarification of right to report directly to
congress.--Subparagraph (A) of such section is amended--
(A) by inserting ``(i)'' before ``An employee of'';
and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(ii) Subject to clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph
(D), an employee of an element of the intelligence community
who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information
may report such complaint or information directly to Congress,
regardless of whether the complaint or information is with
respect to an urgent concern--
``(I) in lieu of reporting such complaint or
information under clause (i); or
``(II) in addition to reporting such complaint or
information under clause (i).''.
(c) Amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--
(1) Appointment of security officers.--Section 17(d)(5) of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
3517(d)(5)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(I) The Inspector General shall appoint within the Office of the
Inspector General security officers as required by section 416(i) of
title 5, United States Code.''.
(2) Procedures.--Subparagraph (D) of such section is
amended--
(A) in clause (i), by inserting ``or any other
committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of
Representatives'' after ``either or both of the
intelligence committees'';
(B) by amending clause (ii) to read as follows:
``(ii)(I) Except as provided in subclause (II), an employee may
contact an intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction
directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
``(aa) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the
employee's complaint or information and notice of the
employee's intent to contact an intelligence committee or
another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of
Representatives directly; and
``(bb)(AA) obtains and follows, from the Director, through
the Inspector General, procedural direction on how to contact
an intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction
of the Senate or the House of Representatives in accordance
with appropriate security practices; or
``(BB) obtains and follows such procedural direction from
the applicable security officer appointed under section 416(i)
of title 5, United States Code.
``(II) If an employee seeks procedural direction under
subclause (I)(bb) and does not receive such procedural
direction within 30 days, or receives insufficient direction to
report to Congress a complaint or information, the employee may
contact an intelligence committee or another committee of
jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives
directly without obtaining or following the procedural
direction otherwise required under such subclause.'';
(C) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv);
and
(D) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:
``(iii) An employee of the Agency who intends to report to Congress
a complaint or information may report such complaint or information to
the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member, as the case may be,
of an intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, a nonpartisan member of the
committee staff designated for purposes of receiving complaints or
information under this section, or a member of the majority staff and a
member of the minority staff of the committee.''.
(3) Clarification of right to report directly to
congress.--Subparagraph (A) of such section is amended--
(A) by inserting ``(i)'' before ``An employee of'';
and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(ii) Subject to clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph (D), an
employee of the Agency who intends to report to Congress a complaint or
information may report such complaint or information directly to
Congress, regardless of whether the complaint or information is with
respect to an urgent concern--
``(I) in lieu of reporting such complaint or information
under clause (i); or
``(II) in addition to reporting such complaint or
information under clause (i).''.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section or an amendment
made by this section shall be construed to revoke or diminish any right
of an individual provided by section 2303 of title 5, United States
Code.
SEC. 602. PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCLOSURE OF WHISTLEBLOWER IDENTITY AS
REPRISAL AGAINST WHISTLEBLOWER DISCLOSURE BY EMPLOYEES
AND CONTRACTORS IN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(3) of such section--
(A) in subparagraph (I), by striking ``; or'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (J) as
subparagraph (K); and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (I) the
following:
``(J) a knowing and willful disclosure revealing
the identity or other personally identifiable
information of an employee or contractor employee so as
to identify the employee or contractor employee as an
employee or contractor employee who has made a lawful
disclosure described in subsection (b) or (c); or'';
(2) by redesignating subsections (f) and (g) as subsections
(g) and (h), respectively; and
(3) by inserting after subsection (e) the following:
``(f) Personnel Actions Involving Disclosure of Whistleblower
Identity.--A personnel action described in subsection (a)(3)(J) shall
not be considered to be in violation of subsection (b) or (c) under the
following circumstances:
``(1) The personnel action was taken with the express
consent of the employee or contractor employee.
``(2) An Inspector General with oversight responsibility
for a covered intelligence community element determines that--
``(A) the personnel action was unavoidable under
section 103H(g)(3)(A) of this Act (50 U.S.C.
3033(g)(3)(A)), section 17(e)(3)(A) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
3517(e)(3)(A)), section 407(b) of title 5, United
States Code, or section 420(b)(2)(B) of such title;
``(B) the personnel action was made to an official
of the Department of Justice responsible for
determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken;
or
``(C) the personnel action was required by statute
or an order from a court of competent jurisdiction.''.
(b) Applicability to Detailees.--Subsection (a) of section 1104 of
such Act (50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(5) Employee.--The term `employee', with respect to an
agency or a covered intelligence community element, includes an
individual who has been detailed to such agency or covered
intelligence community element.''.
(c) Harmonization of Enforcement.--Subsection (g) of such section,
as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this section, is amended to
read as follows:
``(g) Enforcement.--
``(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, the President shall provide for the enforcement of
this section.
``(2) Harmonization with other enforcement.--To the fullest
extent possible, the President shall provide for enforcement of
this section in a manner that is consistent with the
enforcement of section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States
Code, especially with respect to policies and procedures used
to adjudicate alleged violations of such section.''.
SEC. 603. ESTABLISHING PROCESS PARITY FOR ADVERSE SECURITY CLEARANCE
AND ACCESS DETERMINATIONS.
Subparagraph (C) of section 3001(j)(4) of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)) is amended
to read as follows:
``(C) Contributing factor.--
``(i) In general.--Subject to clause (iii),
in determining whether the adverse security
clearance or access determination violated
paragraph (1), the agency shall find that
paragraph (1) was violated if the individual
has demonstrated that a disclosure described in
paragraph (1) was a contributing factor in the
adverse security clearance or access
determination taken against the individual.
``(ii) Circumstantial evidence.--An
individual under clause (i) may demonstrate
that the disclosure was a contributing factor
in the adverse security clearance or access
determination taken against the individual
through circumstantial evidence, such as
evidence that--
``(I) the official making the
determination knew of the disclosure;
and
``(II) the determination occurred
within a period such that a reasonable
person could conclude that the
disclosure was a contributing factor in
the determination.
``(iii) Defense.--In determining whether
the adverse security clearance or access
determination violated paragraph (1), the
agency shall not find that paragraph (1) was
violated if, after a finding that a disclosure
was a contributing factor, the agency
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence
that it would have made the same security
clearance or access determination in the
absence of such disclosure.''.
SEC. 604. ELIMINATION OF CAP ON COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR RETALIATORY
REVOCATION OF SECURITY CLEARANCES AND ACCESS
DETERMINATIONS.
Section 3001(j)(4)(B) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)(B)) is amended, in the
second sentence, by striking ``not to exceed $300,000''.
SEC. 605. MODIFICATION AND REPEAL OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Modification of Frequency of Whistleblower Notifications to
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.--Section 5334(a) of
the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (Public Law
116-92; 50 U.S.C. 3033 note) is amended by striking ``in real time''
and inserting ``monthly''.
(b) Repeal of Requirement for Inspectors General Reviews of
Enhanced Personnel Security Programs.--
(1) In general.--Section 11001 of title 5, United States
Code, is amended--
(A) by striking subsection (d); and
(B) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection
(d).
(2) Technical corrections.--Subsection (d) of section 11001
of such title, as redesignated by paragraph (1)(B), is
amended--
(A) in paragraph (3), by adding ``and'' after the
semicolon at the end; and
(B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a period.
TITLE VII--CLASSIFICATION REFORM
Subtitle A--Classification Reform Act of 2023
SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Classification Reform Act of
2023''.
SEC. 702. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means any Executive agency
as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code, any
military department as defined in section 102 of such title,
and any other entity in the executive branch of the Federal
Government that comes into the possession of classified
information.
(2) Classify, classified, classification.--The terms
``classify'', ``classified'', and ``classification'' refer to
the process by which information is determined to require
protection from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to Executive
Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified
national security information), or previous and successor
executive orders or similar directives, or section 703 in order
to protect the national security of the United States.
(3) Classified information.--The term ``classified
information'' means information that has been classified under
Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to
classified national security information), or previous and
successor executive orders or similar directives, or section
703.
(4) Declassify, declassified, declassification.--The terms
``declassify'', ``declassified'', and ``declassification''
refer to the process by which information that has been
classified is determined to no longer require protection from
unauthorized disclosure pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (50
U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security
information), or previous and successor executive orders or
similar directives, or section 703.
(5) Information.--The term ``information'' means any
knowledge that can be communicated, or documentary material,
regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is
owned by, is produced by or for, or is under the control of the
United States Government.
SEC. 703. CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--The President may, in accordance with this
section, protect from unauthorized disclosure any information owned by,
produced by or for, or under the control of the executive branch of the
Federal Government when there is a demonstrable need to do so in order
to protect the national security of the United States.
(b) Establishment of Standards and Procedures for Classification
and Declassification.--
(1) Governmentwide procedures.--
(A) Classification.--The President shall, to the
extent necessary, establish categories of information
that may be classified and procedures for classifying
information under subsection (a).
(B) Declassification.--At the same time the
President establishes categories and procedures under
subparagraph (A), the President shall establish
procedures for declassifying information that was
previously classified.
(C) Minimum requirements.--The procedures
established pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B)
shall--
(i) provide that information may be
classified under this section, and may remain
classified under this section, only if the harm
to national security that might reasonably be
expected from disclosure of such information
outweighs the public interest in disclosure of
such information;
(ii) establish standards and criteria for
the classification of information;
(iii) establish standards, criteria, and
timelines for the declassification of
information classified under this section;
(iv) provide for the automatic
declassification of classified records with
permanent historical value;
(v) provide for the timely review of
materials submitted for pre-publication;
(vi) narrow the criteria for classification
set forth under section 1.4 of Executive Order
13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to
classified national security information), as
in effect on the day before the date of the
enactment of this Act;
(vii) narrow the exemptions from automatic
declassification set forth under section 3.3(b)
of Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note;
relating to classified national security
information), as in effect on the day before
the date of the enactment of this Act;
(viii) provide a clear and specific
definition of ``harm to national security'' as
it pertains to clause (i); and
(ix) provide a clear and specific
definition of ``intelligence sources and
methods'' as it pertains to the categories and
procedures under subparagraph (A).
(2) Agency standards and procedures.--
(A) In general.--The head of each agency shall
establish a single set of consolidated standards and
procedures to permit such agency to classify and
declassify information created by such agency in
accordance with the categories and procedures
established by the President under this section and
otherwise to carry out this section.
(B) Submittal to congress.--Each agency head shall
submit to Congress the standards and procedures
established by such agency head under subparagraph (A).
(c) Conforming Amendment to FOIA.--Section 552(b)(1) of title 5,
United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(1)(A) specifically authorized to be classified under
section 703 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2024, or specifically authorized under criteria
established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national security; and
``(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to that
section or Executive order;''.
(d) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--Subsections (a) and (b) shall take effect
on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(2) Relation to presidential directives.--Presidential
directives regarding classifying, safeguarding, and
declassifying national security information, including
Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to
classified national security information), or successor order,
in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this
Act, as well as procedures issued pursuant to such Presidential
directives, shall remain in effect until superseded by
procedures issues pursuant to subsection (b).
SEC. 704. TRANSPARENCY OFFICERS.
(a) Designation.--The Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the head of any
other department, agency, or element of the executive branch of the
Federal Government determined by the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board established by section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee) to be
appropriate for coverage under this section, shall each designate at
least 1 senior officer to serve as the principal advisor to assist such
head of a department, agency, or element and other officials of the
department, agency, or element of the head in identifying records of
significant public interest and prioritizing appropriate review of such
records in order to facilitate the public disclosure of such records in
redacted or unredacted form.
(b) Determining Public Interest in Disclosure.--In assisting the
head of a department, agency, or element and other officials of such
department, agency, or element in identifying records of significant
public interest under subsection (a), the senior officer designated by
the head under such subsection shall consider whether--
(1) or not disclosure of the information would better
enable United States citizens to hold Federal Government
officials accountable for their actions and policies;
(2) or not disclosure of the information would assist the
United States criminal justice system in holding persons
responsible for criminal acts or acts contrary to the
Constitution;
(3) or not disclosure of the information would assist
Congress or any committee or subcommittee thereof, in carrying
out its oversight responsibilities with regard to the executive
branch of the Federal Government or in adequately informing
itself of executive branch policies and activities in order to
carry out its legislative responsibilities;
(4) the disclosure of the information would assist Congress
or the public in understanding the interpretation of the
Federal Government of a provision of law, including Federal
regulations, Presidential directives, statutes, case law, and
the Constitution of the United States; or
(5) or not disclosure of the information would bring about
any other significant benefit, including an increase in public
awareness or understanding of Government activities or an
enhancement of Federal Government efficiency.
(c) Periodic Reports.--
(1) In general.--Each senior officer designated under
subsection (a) shall periodically, but not less frequently than
annually, submit a report on the activities of the officer,
including the documents determined to be in the public interest
for disclosure under subsection (b), to--
(A) the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(C) the head of the department, agency, or element
of the senior officer.
(2) Form.--Each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall be submitted, to the greatest extent possible, in
unclassified form, with a classified annex as may be necessary.
Subtitle B--Sensible Classification Act of 2023
SEC. 711. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Sensible Classification Act of
2023''.
SEC. 712. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the
term ``Executive agency'' in section 105 of title 5, United
States Code.
(2) Classification.--The term ``classification'' means the
act or process by which information is determined to be
classified information.
(3) Classified information.--The term ``classified
information'' means information that has been determined
pursuant to Executive Order 12958 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note;
relating to classified national security information), or
successor order, to require protection against unauthorized
disclosure and is marked to indicate its classified status when
in documentary form.
(4) Declassification.--The term ``declassification'' means
the authorized change in the status of information from
classified information to unclassified information.
(5) Document.--The term ``document'' means any recorded
information, regardless of the nature of the medium or the
method or circumstances of recording.
(6) Downgrade.--The term ``downgrade'' means a
determination by a declassification authority that information
classified and safeguarded at a specified level shall be
classified and safeguarded at a lower level.
(7) Information.--The term ``information'' means any
knowledge that can be communicated or documentary material,
regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is
owned by, is produced by or for, or is under the control of the
United States Government.
(8) Originate, originating, and originated.--The term
``originate'', ``originating'', and ``originated'', with
respect to classified information and an authority, means the
authority that classified the information in the first
instance.
(9) Records.--The term ``records'' means the records of an
agency and Presidential papers or Presidential records, as
those terms are defined in title 44, United States Code,
including those created or maintained by a government
contractor, licensee, certificate holder, or grantee that are
subject to the sponsoring agency's control under the terms of
the contract, license, certificate, or grant.
(10) Security clearance.--The term ``security clearance''
means an authorization to access classified information.
(11) Unauthorized disclosure.--The term ``unauthorized
disclosure'' means a communication or physical transfer of
classified information to an unauthorized recipient.
(12) Unclassified information.--The term ``unclassified
information'' means information that is not classified
information.
SEC. 713. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF THE SENATE.
(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) According to a report released by the Office of the
Director of Intelligence in 2020 titled ``Fiscal Year 2019
Annual Report on Security Clearance Determinations'', more than
4,000,000 individuals have been granted eligibility for a
security clearance.
(2) At least 1,300,000 of such individuals have been
granted access to information classified at the Top Secret
level.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) the classification system of the Federal Government is
in urgent need of reform;
(2) the number of people with access to classified
information is exceedingly high and must be justified or
reduced;
(3) reforms are necessary to reestablish trust between the
Federal Government and the people of the United States; and
(4) classification should be limited to the minimum
necessary to protect national security while balancing the
public's interest in disclosure.
SEC. 714. CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY.
(a) In General.--The authority to classify information originally
may be exercised only by--
(1) the President and, in the performance of executive
duties, the Vice President;
(2) the head of an agency or an official of any agency
authorized by the President pursuant to a designation of such
authority in the Federal Register; and
(3) an official of the Federal Government to whom authority
to classify information originally has been delegated pursuant
to subsection (c).
(b) Scope of Authority.--An individual authorized by this section
to classify information originally at a specified level may also
classify the information originally at a lower level.
(c) Delegation of Original Classification Authority.--An official
of the Federal Government may be delegated original classification
authority subject to the following:
(1) Delegation of original classification authority shall
be limited to the minimum required to administer this section.
Agency heads shall be responsible for ensuring that designated
subordinate officials have a demonstrable and continuing need
to exercise this authority.
(2) Authority to originally classify information at the
level designated as ``Top Secret'' may be delegated only by the
President, in the performance of executive duties, the Vice
President, or an agency head or official designated pursuant to
subsection (a)(2).
(3) Authority to originally classify information at the
level designated as ``Secret'' or ``Confidential'' may be
delegated only by the President, in the performance of
executive duties, the Vice President, or an agency head or
official designated pursuant to subsection (a)(2), or the
senior agency official described in section 5.4(d) of Executive
Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified
national security information), or successor order, provided
that official has been delegated ``Top Secret'' original
classification authority by the agency head.
(4) Each delegation of original classification authority
shall be in writing and the authority shall not be redelegated
except as provided by paragraphs (1), (2), and (3). Each
delegation shall identify the official by name or position
title.
(d) Training Required.--
(1) In general.--An individual may not be delegated
original classification authority under this section unless the
individual has first received training described in paragraph
(2).
(2) Training described.--Training described in this
paragraph is training on original classification that includes
instruction on the proper safeguarding of classified
information and of the criminal, civil, and administrative
sanctions that may be brought against an individual who fails
to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure.
(e) Exceptional Cases.--
(1) In general.--When an employee, contractor, licensee,
certificate holder, or grantee of an agency who does not have
original classification authority originates information
believed by that employee, contractor, licensee, certificate
holder, or grantee to require classification, the information
shall be protected in a manner consistent with Executive Order
13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national
security information), or successor order.
(2) Transmittal.--An employee, contractor, licensee,
certificate holder, or grantee described in paragraph (1), who
originates information described in such paragraph, shall
promptly transmit such information to--
(A) the agency that has appropriate subject matter
interest and classification authority with respect to
this information; or
(B) if it is not clear which agency has appropriate
subject matter interest and classification authority
with respect to the information, the Director of the
Information Security Oversight Office.
(3) Agency decisions.--An agency that receives information
pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) or (4) shall decide within 30 days
whether to classify this information.
(4) Information security oversight office action.--If the
Director of the Information Security Oversight Office receives
information under paragraph (2)(B), the Director shall
determine the agency having appropriate subject matter interest
and classification authority and forward the information, with
appropriate recommendations, to that agency for a
classification determination.
SEC. 715. PROMOTING EFFICIENT DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW.
(a) In General.--Whenever an agency is processing a request
pursuant to section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly known
as the ``Freedom of Information Act'') or the mandatory
declassification review provisions of Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C.
3161 note; relating to classified national security information), or
successor order, and identifies responsive classified records that are
more than 25 years of age as of December 31 of the year in which the
request is received, the head of the agency shall review the record and
process the record for declassification and release by the National
Declassification Center of the National Archives and Records
Administration.
(b) Application.--Subsection (a) shall apply--
(1) regardless of whether or not the record described in
such subsection is in the legal custody of the National
Archives and Records Administration; and
(2) without regard for any other provisions of law or
existing agreements or practices between agencies.
SEC. 716. TRAINING TO PROMOTE SENSIBLE CLASSIFICATION.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Over-classification.--The term ``over-classification''
means classification at a level that exceeds the minimum level
of classification that is sufficient to protect the national
security of the United States.
(2) Sensible classification.--The term ``sensible
classification'' means classification at a level that is the
minimum level of classification that is sufficient to protect
the national security of the United States.
(b) Training Required.--Each head of an agency with classification
authority shall conduct training for employees of the agency with
classification authority to discourage over-classification and to
promote sensible classification.
SEC. 717. IMPROVEMENTS TO PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.
Section 703 of the Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (50
U.S.C. 3355a) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following:
``(5) A member of the Board whose term has expired may continue to
serve until a successor is appointed and sworn in.''; and
(2) in subsection (f)--
(A) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``Any employee'';
and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(2)(A) In addition to any employees detailed to the Board under
paragraph (1), the Board may hire not more than 12 staff members.
``(B) There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out
subparagraph (A) such sums as are necessary for fiscal year 2024 and
each fiscal year thereafter.''.
SEC. 718. IMPLEMENTATION OF TECHNOLOGY FOR CLASSIFICATION AND
DECLASSIFICATION.
(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Office of Electronic
Government (in this section referred to as the ``Administrator'')
shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of National Intelligence,
the Public Interest Declassification Board, the Director of the
Information Security Oversight Office, and the head of the National
Declassification Center of the National Archives and Records
Administration--
(1) research a technology-based solution--
(A) utilizing machine learning and artificial
intelligence to support efficient and effective systems
for classification and declassification; and
(B) to be implemented on an interoperable and
federated basis across the Federal Government; and
(2) submit to the President a recommendation regarding a
technology-based solution described in paragraph (1) that
should be adopted by the Federal Government.
(b) Staff.--The Administrator may hire sufficient staff to carry
out subsection (a).
(c) Report.--Not later than 540 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a
classified report on the technology-based solution recommended by the
Administrator under subsection (a)(2) and the President's decision
regarding its adoption.
SEC. 719. STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON NECESSITY OF SECURITY
CLEARANCES.
(a) Agency Studies on Necessity of Security Clearances.--
(1) Studies required.--The head of each agency that grants
security clearances to personnel of such agency shall conduct a
study on the necessity of such clearances.
(2) Reports required.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the
date of the enactment of this Act, each head of an
agency that conducts a study under paragraph (1) shall
submit to Congress a report on the findings of the
agency head with respect to such study, which the
agency head may classify as appropriate.
(B) Required elements.--Each report submitted by
the head of an agency under subparagraph (A) shall
include, for such agency, the following:
(i) The number of personnel eligible for
access to information up to the ``Top Secret''
level.
(ii) The number of personnel eligible for
access to information up to the ``Secret''
level.
(iii) Information on any reduction in the
number of personnel eligible for access to
classified information based on the study
conducted under paragraph (1).
(iv) A description of how the agency head
will ensure that the number of security
clearances granted by such agency will be kept
to the minimum required for the conduct of
agency functions, commensurate with the size,
needs, and mission of the agency.
(3) Industry.--This subsection shall apply to the Secretary
of Defense in the Secretary's capacity as the Executive Agent
for the National Industrial Security Program, and the Secretary
shall treat contractors, licensees, and grantees as personnel
of the Department of Defense for purposes of the studies and
reports required by this subsection.
(b) Director of National Intelligence Review of Sensitive
Compartmented Information.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall--
(1) review the number of personnel eligible for access to
sensitive compartmented information; and
(2) submit to Congress a report on how the Director will
ensure that the number of such personnel is limited to the
minimum required.
(c) Agency Review of Special Access Programs.--Each head of an
agency who is authorized to establish a special access program by
Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified
national security information), or successor order, shall--
(1) review the number of personnel of the agency eligible
for access to such special access programs; and
(2) submit to Congress a report on how the agency head will
ensure that the number of such personnel is limited to the
minimum required.
(d) Secretary of Energy Review of Q and L Clearances.--The
Secretary of Energy shall--
(1) review the number of personnel of the Department of
Energy granted Q and L access; and
(2) submit to Congress a report on how the Secretary will
ensure that the number of such personnel is limited to the
minimum required
(e) Independent Reviews.--Not later than 180 days after the date on
which a study is completed under subsection (a) or a review is
completed under subsections (b) through (d), the Director of the
Information Security Oversight Office of the National Archives and
Records Administration, the Director of National Intelligence, and the
Public Interest Declassification Board shall each review the study or
review, as the case may be.
TITLE VIII--SECURITY CLEARANCE AND TRUSTED WORKFORCE
SEC. 801. REVIEW OF SHARED INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICES FOR
PERSONNEL VETTING.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a review of the extent
to which the intelligence community can use information technology
services shared among the intelligence community for purposes of
personnel vetting, including with respect to human resources,
suitability, and security.
SEC. 802. TIMELINESS STANDARD FOR RENDERING DETERMINATIONS OF TRUST FOR
PERSONNEL VETTING.
(a) Timeliness Standard.--
(1) In general.--The President shall, acting through the
Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing
Executive Agent, establish and publish in such public venue as
the President considers appropriate, new timeliness performance
standards for processing personnel vetting trust determinations
in accordance with the Federal personnel vetting performance
management standards.
(2) Quinquennial reviews.--Not less frequently than once
every 5 years, the President shall, acting through the Security
Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive
Agent--
(A) review the standards established pursuant to
paragraph (1); and
(B) pursuant to such review--
(i) update such standards as the President
considers appropriate; and
(ii) publish in the Federal Register such
updates as may be made pursuant to clause (i).
(3) Conforming amendment.--Section 3001 of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341) is
amended by striking subsection (g).
(b) Quarterly Reports on Implementation.--
(1) In general.--Not less frequently than quarterly, the
Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing
Executive Agent shall jointly make available to the public a
quarterly report on the compliance of Executive agencies (as
defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code) with the
standards established pursuant to subsection (a).
(2) Disaggregation.--Each report made available pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall disaggregate, to the greatest extent
practicable, data by appropriate category of personnel risk and
between Government and contractor personnel.
(c) Complementary Standards for Intelligence Community.--The
Director of National Intelligence may, in consultation with the
Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability
Council established pursuant to Executive Order 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161
note; relating to reforming processes related to suitability for
Government employment, fitness for contractor employees, and
eligibility for access to classified national security information)
establish for the intelligence community standards complementary to
those established pursuant to subsection (a).
SEC. 803. ANNUAL REPORT ON PERSONNEL VETTING TRUST DETERMINATIONS.
(a) Definition of Personnel Vetting Trust Determination.--In this
section, the term ``personnel vetting trust determination'' means any
determination made by an executive branch agency as to whether an
individual can be trusted to perform job functions or to be granted
access necessary for a position.
(b) Annual Report.--Not later than March 30, 2024, and annually
thereafter for 5 years, the Director of National Intelligence, acting
as the Security Executive Agent, and the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management, acting as the Suitability and Credentialing
Executive Agent, in coordination with the Security, Suitability, and
Credentialing Performance Accountability Council, shall jointly make
available to the public a report on specific types of personnel vetting
trust determinations made during the fiscal year preceding the fiscal
year in which the report is made available, disaggregated, to the
greatest extent possible, by the following:
(1) Determinations of eligibility for national security-
sensitive positions, separately noting--
(A) the number of individuals granted access to
national security information; and
(B) the number of individuals determined to be
eligible for but not granted access to national
security information.
(2) Determinations of suitability or fitness for a public
trust position.
(3) Status as a Government employee, a contractor employee,
or other category.
(c) Elimination of Report Requirement.--Section 3001 of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C.
3341) is amended by striking subsection (h).
SEC. 804. SURVEY TO ASSESS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF TRUSTED
WORKFORCE 2.0.
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act,
and once every 2 years thereafter until 2029, the Comptroller General
of the United States shall administer a survey to such sample of
Federal agencies, Federal contractors, and other persons that require
security clearances to access classified information as the Comptroller
General considers appropriate to assess--
(1) the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation of
the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative; and
(2) the effectiveness of vetting Federal personnel while
managing risk during the onboarding of such personnel.
SEC. 805. PROHIBITION ON DENIAL OF ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION SOLELY BECAUSE OF PAST USE OF CANNABIS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Cannabis.--The term ``cannabis'' has the meaning given
the term ``marihuana'' in section 102 of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802).
(2) Eligibility for access to classified information.--The
term ``eligibility for access to classified information'' has
the meaning given the term in the procedures established
pursuant to section 801(a) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3161(a)).
(b) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
head of an element of the intelligence community may not make a
determination to deny eligibility for access to classified information
to an individual based solely on the use of cannabis by the individual
prior to the submission of the application for a security clearance by
the individual.
TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS
SEC. 901. IMPROVED FUNDING FLEXIBILITY FOR PAYMENTS MADE BY THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR QUALIFYING INJURIES TO THE BRAIN.
Section 19A(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3519b(d)) is amended by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the
following new paragraph:
``(3) Funding.--
``(A) In general.--Payment under paragraph (2) in a
fiscal year may be made using any funds--
``(i) appropriated in advance specifically
for payments under such paragraph; or
``(ii) reprogrammed in accordance with
section 504 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3094).
``(B) Budget.--For each fiscal year, the Director
shall include with the budget justification materials
submitted to Congress in support of the budget of the
President for that fiscal year pursuant to section
1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, an estimate of
the funds required in that fiscal year to make payments
under paragraph (2).''.
SEC. 902. CLARIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS TO SEEK CERTAIN BENEFITS
RELATING TO INJURIES TO THE BRAIN.
(a) In General.--Section 19A(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)(5)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Payments made'' and inserting the
following:
``(A) In general.--Payments made''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) Relation to certain federal workers
compensation laws.--Without regard to the requirements
in sections (b) and (c), covered employees need not
first seek benefits provided under chapter 81 of title
5, United States Code, to be eligible solely for
payment authorized under paragraph (2) of this
subsection.''.
(b) Regulations.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall--
(1) revise applicable regulations to conform with the
amendment made by subsection (a); and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations
of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives copies of
such regulations, as revised pursuant to paragraph (1).
SEC. 903. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IMPLEMENTATION OF HAVANA ACT OF 2021
AUTHORITIES.
(a) Regulations.--Except as provided in subsection (c), not later
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, each head of
an element of the intelligence community that has not already done so
shall--
(1) issue regulations and procedures to implement the
authorities provided by section 19A(d) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)) and
section 901(i) of title IX of division J of the Further
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (22 U.S.C. 2680b(i)) to
provide payments under such sections, to the degree that such
authorities are applicable to the head of the element; and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence, the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives committees
copies of such regulations.
(b) Reporting.--Not later than 210 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, each head of an element of the intelligence
community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on--
(1) the estimated number of individuals associated with
their element that may be eligible for payment under the
authorities described in subsection (a)(1);
(2) an estimate of the obligation that the head of the
intelligence community element expects to incur in fiscal year
2025 as a result of establishing the regulations pursuant to
subsection (a)(1); and
(3) any perceived barriers or concerns in implementing such
authorities.
(c) Alternative Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, each head of an element of the
intelligence community (other than the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency) who believes that the authorities described in
subsection (a)(1) are not currently relevant for individuals associated
with their element, or who are not otherwise in position to issue the
regulations and procedures required by subsection (a)(1) shall provide
written and detailed justification to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives to explain
this position.
SEC. 904. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HANDLING
OF ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agency.--The term ``Agency'' means the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(2) Qualifying injury.--The term ``qualifying injury'' has
the meaning given such term in section 19A(d)(1) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)(1)).
(b) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on
the handling of anomalous health incidents by the Agency.
(c) Contents.--The report required by subsection (b) shall include
the following:
(1) HAVANA act implementation.--
(A) An explanation of how the Agency determines
whether a reported anomalous health incident resulted
in a qualifying injury or a qualifying injury to the
brain.
(B) The number of participants of the Expanded Care
Program of the Central Intelligence Agency who--
(i) have a certified qualifying injury or a
certified qualifying injury to the brain; and
(ii) as of September 30, 2023, applied to
the Expanded Care Program due to a reported
anomalous health incident.
(C) A comparison of the number of anomalous health
incidents reported by applicants to the Expanded Care
Program that occurred in the United States and that
occurred in a foreign country.
(D) The specific reason each applicant was approved
or denied for payment under the Expanded Care Program.
(E) The number of applicants who were initially
denied payment but were later approved on appeal.
(F) The average length of time, from the time of
application, for an applicant to receive a
determination from the Expanded Care Program,
aggregated by qualifying injuries and qualifying
injuries to the brain.
(2) Priority cases.--
(A) A detailed list of priority cases of anomalous
health incidents, including, for each incident,
locations, dates, times, and circumstances.
(B) For each priority case listed in accordance
with subparagraph (A), a detailed explanation of each
credible alternative explanation that the Agency
assigned to the incident, including--
(i) how the incident was discovered;
(ii) how the incident was assigned within
the Agency; and
(iii) whether an individual affected by the
incident is provided an opportunity to appeal
the credible alternative explanation.
(C) For each priority case of an anomalous health
incident determined to be largely consistent with the
definition of ``anomalous health incident'' established
by the National Academy of Sciences and for which the
Agency does not have a credible alternative
explanation, a detailed description of such case.
(3) Anomalous health incident sensors.--
(A) A list of all types of sensors that the Agency
has developed or deployed with respect to reports of
anomalous health incidents, including, for each type of
sensor, the deployment location, the date and the
duration of the employment of such type of sensor, and,
if applicable, the reason for removal.
(B) A list of entities to which the Agency has
provided unrestricted access to data associated with
anomalous health incidents.
(C) A list of requests for support the Agency has
received from elements of the Federal Government
regarding sensor development, testing, or deployment,
and a description of the support provided in each case.
(D) A description of all emitter signatures
obtained by sensors associated with anomalous health
incidents in Agency holdings since 2016, including--
(i) the identification of any of such
emitters that the Agency prioritizes as a
threat; and
(ii) an explanation of such prioritization.
(d) Additional Submissions.--Concurrent with the submission of the
report required by subsection (b), the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives--
(1) a template of each form required to apply for the
Expanded Care Program, including with respect to payments for a
qualifying injury or a qualifying injury to the brain;
(2) copies of internal guidance used by the Agency to
adjudicate claims for the Expanded Care Program, including with
respect to payments for a qualifying injury to the brain;
(3) the case file of each applicant to the Expanded Care
Program who applied due to a reported anomalous health
incident, including supporting medical documentation, with name
and other identifying information redacted;
(4) copies of all informational and instructional materials
provided to employees of and other individuals affiliated with
the Agency with respect to applying for the Expanded Care
Program; and
(5) copies of Agency guidance provided to employees of and
other individuals affiliated with the Agency with respect to
reporting and responding to a suspected anomalous health
incident, and the roles and responsibilities of each element of
the Agency tasked with responding to a report of an anomalous
health incident.
(e) Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall brief the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives on the report.
TITLE X--ELECTION SECURITY
SEC. 1001. STRENGTHENING ELECTION CYBERSECURITY TO UPHOLD RESPECT FOR
ELECTIONS THROUGH INDEPENDENT TESTING ACT OF 2023.
(a) Requiring Penetration Testing as Part of the Testing and
Certification of Voting Systems.--Section 231 of the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(e) Required Penetration Testing.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this subsection, the Commission shall
provide for the conduct of penetration testing as part of the
testing, certification, decertification, and recertification of
voting system hardware and software by accredited laboratories
under this section.
``(2) Accreditation.--The Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology shall recommend to the
Commission entities the Director proposes be accredited to
carry out penetration testing under this subsection and certify
compliance with the penetration testing-related guidelines
required by this subsection. The Commission shall vote on the
accreditation of any entity recommended. The requirements for
such accreditation shall be a subset of the requirements for
accreditation of laboratories under subsection (b) and shall
only be based on consideration of an entity's competence to
conduct penetration testing under this subsection.''.
(b) Independent Security Testing and Coordinated Cybersecurity
Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Election Systems.--
(1) In general.--Subtitle D of title II of the Help America
Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15401 et seq.) is amended by adding
at the end the following new part:
``PART 7--INDEPENDENT SECURITY TESTING AND COORDINATED CYBERSECURITY
VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE PILOT PROGRAM FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS
``SEC. 297. INDEPENDENT SECURITY TESTING AND COORDINATED CYBERSECURITY
VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE PILOT PROGRAM FOR ELECTION
SYSTEMS.
``(a) In General.--
``(1) Establishment.--The Commission, in consultation with
the Secretary, shall establish an Independent Security Testing
and Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Pilot Program for
Election Systems (VDP-E) (in this section referred to as the
`program') in order to test for and disclose cybersecurity
vulnerabilities in election systems.
``(2) Duration.--The program shall be conducted for a
period of 5 years.
``(3) Requirements.--In carrying out the program, the
Commission, in consultation with the Secretary, shall--
``(A) establish a mechanism by which an election
systems vendor may make their election system
(including voting machines and source code) available
to cybersecurity researchers participating in the
program;
``(B) provide for the vetting of cybersecurity
researchers prior to their participation in the
program, including the conduct of background checks;
``(C) establish terms of participation that--
``(i) describe the scope of testing
permitted under the program;
``(ii) require researchers to--
``(I) notify the vendor, the
Commission, and the Secretary of any
cybersecurity vulnerability they
identify with respect to an election
system; and
``(II) otherwise keep such
vulnerability confidential for 180 days
after such notification;
``(iii) require the good faith
participation of all participants in the
program;
``(iv) require an election system vendor,
within 180 days after validating notification
of a critical or high vulnerability (as defined
by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology) in an election system of the
vendor, to--
``(I) send a patch or propound some
other fix or mitigation for such
vulnerability to the appropriate State
and local election officials, in
consultation with the researcher who
discovered it; and
``(II) notify the Commission and
the Secretary that such patch has been
sent to such officials;
``(D) in the case where a patch or fix to address a
vulnerability disclosed under subparagraph (C)(ii)(I)
is intended to be applied to a system certified by the
Commission, provide--
``(i) for the expedited review of such
patch or fix within 90 days after receipt by
the Commission; and
``(ii) if such review is not completed by
the last day of such 90 day period, that such
patch or fix shall be deemed to be certified by
the Commission, subject to any subsequent
review of such determination by the Commission;
and
``(E) 180 days after the disclosure of a
vulnerability under subparagraph (C)(ii)(I), notify the
Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency of the vulnerability for inclusion in
the database of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures.
``(4) Voluntary participation; safe harbor.--
``(A) Voluntary participation.--Participation in
the program shall be voluntary for election systems
vendors and researchers.
``(B) Safe harbor.--When conducting research under
this program, such research and subsequent publication
shall be considered to be:
``(i) Authorized in accordance with section
1030 of title 18, United States Code (commonly
known as the `Computer Fraud and Abuse Act'),
(and similar state laws), and the election
system vendor will not initiate or support
legal action against the researcher for
accidental, good faith violations of the
program.
``(ii) Exempt from the anti-circumvention
rule of section 1201 of title 17, United States
Code (commonly known as the `Digital Millennium
Copyright Act'), and the election system vendor
will not bring a claim against a researcher for
circumvention of technology controls.
``(C) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this
paragraph may be construed to limit or otherwise affect
any exception to the general prohibition against the
circumvention of technological measures under
subparagraph (A) of section 1201(a)(1) of title 17,
United States Code, including with respect to any use
that is excepted from that general prohibition by the
Librarian of Congress under subparagraphs (B) through
(D) of such section 1201(a)(1).
``(5) Exempt from disclosure.--Cybersecurity
vulnerabilities discovered under the program shall be exempt
from section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly
referred to as the Freedom of Information Act).
``(6) Definitions.--In this subsection:
``(A) Cybersecurity vulnerability.--The term
`cybersecurity vulnerability' means, with respect to an
election system, any security vulnerability that
affects the election system.
``(B) Election infrastructure.--The term `election
infrastructure' means--
``(i) storage facilities, polling places,
and centralized vote tabulation locations used
to support the administration of elections for
public office; and
``(ii) related information and
communications technology, including--
``(I) voter registration databases;
``(II) election management systems;
``(III) voting machines;
``(IV) electronic mail and other
communications systems (including
electronic mail and other systems of
vendors who have entered into contracts
with election agencies to support the
administration of elections, manage the
election process, and report and
display election results); and
``(V) other systems used to manage
the election process and to report and
display election results on behalf of
an election agency.
``(C) Election system.--The term `election system'
means any information system that is part of an
election infrastructure, including any related
information and communications technology described in
subparagraph (B)(ii).
``(D) Election system vendor.--The term `election
system vendor' means any person providing, supporting,
or maintaining an election system on behalf of a State
or local election official.
``(E) Information system.--The term `information
system' has the meaning given the term in section 3502
of title 44, United States Code.
``(F) Secretary.--The term `Secretary' means the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
``(G) Security vulnerability.--The term `security
vulnerability' has the meaning given the term in
section 102 of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing
Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501).''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents of such Act
is amended by adding at the end of the items relating to
subtitle D of title II the following:
``PART 7--Independent Security Testing and Coordinated Cybersecurity
Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Election Systems
``Sec. 297. Independent security testing and coordinated cybersecurity
vulnerability disclosure program for
election systems.''.
TITLE XI--OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 1101. MODIFICATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENT FOR ALL-DOMAIN ANOMALY
RESOLUTION OFFICE.
Section 1683(k)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(k)(1)), as amended by section 6802(a)
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law
117-263), is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``Director of national
intelligence and secretary of defense'' and inserting ``All-
domain anomaly resolution office''; and
(2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``Director of National
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly'' and
inserting ``Director of the Office shall''.
SEC. 1102. FUNDING LIMITATIONS RELATING TO UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS
PHENOMENA.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' means--
(A) the majority leader of the Senate;
(B) the minority leader of the Senate;
(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives;
and
(D) the minority leader of the House of
Representatives.
(3) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of
the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office.
(4) Unidentified anomalous phenomena.--The term
``unidentified anomalous phenomena'' has the meaning given such
term in section 1683(n) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(n)), as amended by
section 6802(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263).
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that, due to
the increasing potential for technology surprise from foreign
adversaries and to ensure sufficient integration across the United
States industrial base and avoid technology and security stovepipes--
(1) the United States industrial base must retain its
global lead in critical advanced technologies; and
(2) the Federal Government must expand awareness about any
historical exotic technology antecedents previously provided by
the Federal Government for research and development purposes.
(c) Limitations.--No amount authorized to be appropriated by this
Act may be obligated or expended, directly or indirectly, in part or in
whole, for, on, in relation to, or in support of activities involving
unidentified anomalous phenomena protected under any form of special
access or restricted access limitations that have not been formally,
officially, explicitly, and specifically described, explained, and
justified to the appropriate committees of Congress, congressional
leadership, and the Director, including for any activities relating to
the following:
(1) Recruiting, employing, training, equipping, and
operations of, and providing security for, government or
contractor personnel with a primary, secondary, or contingency
mission of capturing, recovering, and securing unidentified
anomalous phenomena craft or pieces and components of such
craft.
(2) Analyzing such craft or pieces or components thereof,
including for the purpose of determining properties, material
composition, method of manufacture, origin, characteristics,
usage and application, performance, operational modalities, or
reverse engineering of such craft or component technology.
(3) Managing and providing security for protecting
activities and information relating to unidentified anomalous
phenomena from disclosure or compromise.
(4) Actions relating to reverse engineering or replicating
unidentified anomalous phenomena technology or performance
based on analysis of materials or sensor and observational
information associated with unidentified anomalous phenomena.
(5) The development of propulsion technology, or aerospace
craft that uses propulsion technology, systems, or subsystems,
that is based on or derived from or inspired by inspection,
analysis, or reverse engineering of recovered unidentified
anomalous phenomena craft or materials.
(6) Any aerospace craft that uses propulsion technology
other than chemical propellants, solar power, or electric ion
thrust.
(d) Notification and Reporting.--Any person currently or formerly
under contract with the Federal Government that has in their possession
material or information provided by or derived from the Federal
Government relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena that formerly
or currently is protected by any form of special access or restricted
access shall--
(1) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, notify the Director of such possession; and
(2) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, make available to the Director for assessment,
analysis, and inspection--
(A) all such material and information; and
(B) a comprehensive list of all non-earth origin or
exotic unidentified anomalous phenomena material.
(e) Liability.--No criminal or civil action may lie or be
maintained in any Federal or State court against any person for
receiving material or information described in subsection (d) if that
person complies with the notification and reporting provisions
described in such subsection.
(f) Limitation Regarding Independent Research and Development.--
(1) In general.--Consistent with Department of Defense
Instruction Number 3204.01 (dated August 20, 2014,
incorporating change 2, dated July 9, 2020; relating to
Department policy for oversight of independent research and
development), independent research and development funding
relating to material or information described in subsection (c)
shall not be allowable as indirect expenses for purposes of
contracts covered by such instruction, unless such material and
information is made available to the Director in accordance
with subsection (d).
(2) Effective date and applicability.--Paragraph (1) shall
take effect on the date that is 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and shall apply with respect to funding
from amounts appropriated before, on, or after such date.
(g) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 30 days after the date on
which the Director has received a notification under paragraph (1) of
subsection (d) or information or material under paragraph (2) of such
subsection, the Director shall provide written notification of such
receipt to the appropriate committees of Congress, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee
on Oversight and Accountability of the House of Representatives, and
congressional leadership.
Passed the Senate July 27, 2023.