Legislation
[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7776 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]
H.R.7776
One Hundred Seventeenth Congress
of the
United States of America
AT THE SECOND SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday,
the third day of January, two thousand and twenty-two
An Act
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2023 for military activities
of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel
strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
(a) In General.--This Act may be cited as the ``James M. Inhofe
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023''.
(b) References.--Any reference in this or any other Act to the
``National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023'' shall be
deemed to be a reference to the ``James M. Inhofe National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023''.
SEC. 2. ORGANIZATION OF ACT INTO DIVISIONS; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Divisions.--This Act is organized into 11 divisions as follows:
(1) Division A--Department of Defense Authorizations.
(2) Division B--Military Construction Authorizations.
(3) Division C--Department of Energy National Security
Authorizations and Other Authorizations.
(4) Division D--Funding Tables.
(5) Division E--Non-Department of Defense Matters.
(6) Division F--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2023.
(7) Division G--Homeland Security.
(8) Division H--Water Resources.
(9) Division I--Department of State Authorizations.
(10) Division J--Oceans and Atmosphere.
(11) Division K--Don Young Coast Guard Authorization Act of
2022.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Organization of Act into divisions; table of contents.
Sec. 3. Congressional defense committees.
Sec. 4. Budgetary effects of this Act.
Sec. 5. Explanatory statement.
……
DIVISION F--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023
SEC. 6001. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This division may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this division is
as follows:
DIVISION F--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023
Sec. 6001. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 6002. Definitions.
Sec. 6003. Explanatory statement.
TITLE LXI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 6101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 6102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 6103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 6104. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 6105. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
TITLE LXII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 6201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE LXIII--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 6301. Modification of requirements for certain employment
activities by former intelligence officers and employees.
Sec. 6302. Counterintelligence and national security protections for
intelligence community grant funding.
Sec. 6303. Extension of Central Intelligence Agency law enforcement
jurisdiction to facilities of Office of Director of National
Intelligence.
Sec. 6304. Annual reports on status of recommendations of Comptroller
General of the United States for the Director of National
Intelligence.
Sec. 6305. Timely submission of classified intelligence budget
justification materials.
Sec. 6306. Copyright protection for civilian faculty of the National
Intelligence University.
Sec. 6307. Modifications to Foreign Malign Influence Response Center.
Sec. 6308. Requirement to offer cyber protection support for personnel
of intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable to
cyber attack.
Sec. 6309. Enforcement of cybersecurity requirements for national
security systems.
Sec. 6310. Review and briefing on intelligence community activities
under Executive Order 12333.
Sec. 6311. Assessing intelligence community open-source support for
export controls and foreign investment screening.
Sec. 6312. Annual training requirement and report regarding analytic
standards.
Sec. 6313. Review of Joint Intelligence Community Council.
Sec. 6314. Required policy for minimum insider threat standards.
Sec. 6315. Unfunded priorities of the intelligence community.
Sec. 6316. Submission of covered documents and classified annexes.
Sec. 6317. Improvements to program on recruitment and training.
Sec. 6318. Measures to mitigate counterintelligence threats from
proliferation and use of foreign commercial spyware.
Sec. 6319. Personnel vetting performance measures.
Sec. 6320. Proactive cybersecurity.
TITLE LXIV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 6401. Modifications to responsibilities and authorities of Director
of National Intelligence.
Sec. 6402. Annual submission to Congress of National Intelligence
Priorities Framework.
Sec. 6403. Disposition of records of Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 6411. Clarification regarding protection of Central Intelligence
Agency functions.
Sec. 6412. Expansion of reporting requirements relating to authority to
pay personnel of Central Intelligence Agency for certain
injuries to the brain.
Sec. 6413. Historical Advisory Panel of Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 6414. Authority of Central Intelligence Agency to provide
protection for certain personnel.
Sec. 6415. Notification of use of certain expenditure authorities.
Sec. 6416. Office supporting Central Intelligence Agency workforce
wellbeing.
Subtitle C--Elements of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise
Sec. 6421. Inclusion of Space Force as element of intelligence
community.
Sec. 6422. Oversight of Defense Intelligence Agency culture.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
Sec. 6431. Modification of advisory board in National Reconnaissance
Office.
Sec. 6432. Establishment of advisory board for National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 6433. Elevation of the commercial and business operations office of
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 6435. Study on personnel under Strategic Intelligence Partnership
Program.
Sec. 6436. Briefing on coordination between intelligence community and
Bureau of Industry and Security.
TITLE LXV--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Subtitle A--Intelligence Matters Relating to the People's Republic of
China
Sec. 6501. Report on wealth and corrupt activities of the leadership of
the Chinese Communist Party.
Sec. 6502. Identification and threat assessment of companies with
investments by the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 6503. Intelligence community working group for monitoring the
economic and technological capabilities of the People's
Republic of China.
Sec. 6504. Annual report on concentrated reeducation camps in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of
China.
Sec. 6505. Assessments of production of semiconductors by the People's
Republic of China.
Subtitle B--Miscellaneous Authorities, Requirements, and Limitations
Sec. 6511. Notice of deployment or transfer of containerized missile
systems by Russia, China, or Iran.
Sec. 6512. Intelligence community coordinator for Russian atrocities
accountability.
Sec. 6513. Lead intelligence community coordinator for countering and
neutralizing proliferation of Iran-origin unmanned aircraft
systems.
Sec. 6514. Collaboration between intelligence community and Department
of Commerce to counter foreign commercial threats.
Sec. 6515. Intelligence assessment on foreign weaponization of
advertisement technology data.
Sec. 6516. Intelligence community assessment regarding Russian gray zone
assets.
Subtitle C--Reports and Other Matters
Sec. 6521. Report on assessing will to fight.
Sec. 6522. Report on threat from hypersonic weapons.
Sec. 6523. Report on ordnance of Russia and China.
Sec. 6524. Report on activities of China and Russia targeting Latin
America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 6525. Report on support provided by China to Russia.
Sec. 6526. Report on global CCP financing of port infrastructure.
Sec. 6527. Sense of Congress on provision of support by intelligence
community for atrocity prevention and accountability.
TITLE LXVI--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE MATTERS
Sec. 6601. Improving onboarding of personnel in intelligence community.
Sec. 6602. Report on legislative action required to implement Trusted
Workforce 2.0 initiative.
Sec. 6603. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community assessment of
administration of polygraphs in intelligence community.
Sec. 6604. Timeliness in the administration of polygraphs.
Sec. 6605. Policy on submittal of applications for access to classified
information for certain personnel.
Sec. 6606. Technical correction regarding Federal policy on sharing of
covered insider threat information.
Sec. 6607. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community report on use
of space certified as sensitive compartmented information
facilities.
Sec. 6608. Improving prohibition of certain personnel practices in
intelligence community with respect to contractor employees.
Sec. 6609. Definitions regarding whistleblower complaints and
information of urgent concern received by inspectors general
of the intelligence community.
TITLE LXVII--MATTERS RELATING TO EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Subtitle A--General Matters
Sec. 6701. Definitions.
Sec. 6702. Additional responsibilities of Director of National
Intelligence for artificial intelligence policies, standards,
and guidance for the intelligence community.
Sec. 6703. Director of Science and Technology.
Sec. 6704. Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer.
Subtitle B--Improvements Relating to Procurement
Sec. 6711. Additional transaction authority.
Sec. 6712. Implementation plan and advisability study for offices of
commercial integration.
Sec. 6713. Pilot program on designated emerging technology transition
projects.
Sec. 6714. Harmonization of authorizations to operate.
Sec. 6715. Plan to expand sensitive compartmented information facility
access by certain contractors; reports on expansion of
security clearances for certain contractors.
Sec. 6716. Compliance by intelligence community with requirements of
Federal Acquisition Regulation relating to commercially
available off-the-shelf items and commercial services.
Sec. 6717. Policy on required user adoption metrics in certain contracts
for artificial intelligence and emerging technology software
products.
Sec. 6718. Certification relating to information technology and software
systems.
Subtitle C--Reports
Sec. 6721. Reports on integration of artificial intelligence within
intelligence community.
Sec. 6722. Report on potential benefits of establishment of ICWERX.
Sec. 6723. Requirements and report on workforce needs of intelligence
community relating to science, technology, engineering, and
math, and related areas.
Subtitle D--Talent, Education, and Training
Sec. 6731. Report on establishment of technology acquisition cadre.
Sec. 6732. Emerging technology education and training.
Subtitle E--Other Matters
Sec. 6741. Improvements to use of commercial software products.
Sec. 6742. Code-free artificial intelligence enablement tools policy.
TITLE LXVIII--OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 6801. Improvements relating to continuity of Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board membership.
Sec. 6802. Modification of requirement for office to address
unidentified anomalous phenomena.
Sec. 6803. Comptroller General of the United States audits and briefings
on unidentified anomalous phenomena historical record report.
Sec. 6804. Report on precursor chemicals used in the production of
synthetic opioids.
Sec. 6805. Assessment and report on mass migration in the Western
Hemisphere.
Sec. 6806. Report on international norms, rules, and principles
applicable in space.
Sec. 6807. Assessments of the effects of sanctions imposed with respect
to the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine.
Sec. 6808. Assessment of impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on food
security.
Sec. 6809. Pilot program for Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation
to undertake an effort to identify International Mobile
Subscriber Identity-catchers.
Sec. 6810. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research
assessment of anomalous health incidents.
Sec. 6811. Repeal and modification of certain reporting and briefing
requirements.
Sec. 6812. Increased intelligence-related engineering, research, and
development capabilities of minority institutions.
Sec. 6813. Reports on personnel vetting processes and progress under
Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative.
Sec. 6814. Reports relating to programs of record of National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 6815. Plan regarding Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center.
Sec. 6816. Report on use of publicly available social media information
in personnel vetting determinations.
Sec. 6817. Report on strengthening workforce diversity planning and
oversight.
Sec. 6818. Report on transition of National Reconnaissance Office to
digital engineering environment.
Sec. 6819. Briefing on Department of Homeland Security intelligence
activities.
Sec. 6820. Report on declassification efforts of Central Intelligence
Agency.
Sec. 6821. Report on National Space Intelligence Center.
Sec. 6822. Report on implementation of Executive Order 13556, regarding
controlled unclassified information.
Sec. 6823. National Museum of Intelligence and Special Operations.
Sec. 6824. Technical corrections.
SEC. 6002. DEFINITIONS.
In this division:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given
such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3003).
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in such section.
SEC. 6003. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT.
The explanatory statement regarding this division, printed in the
House section of the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and in the Senate section of the Congressional Record
by the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate,
shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this
division as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of
conference.
TITLE LXI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 6101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2023
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the Federal Government.
SEC. 6102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to be
appropriated under section 6101 for the conduct of the intelligence
activities of the Federal Government are those specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this
division.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the
President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph (3),
the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection
(a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the
executive branch of the Federal Government.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion
of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 6103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2023 the sum of
$664,445,000.
(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for
fiscal year 2023 such additional amounts as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 6102(a).
SEC. 6104. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this division shall not be
deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence
activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the
laws of the United States.
SEC. 6105. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased
by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
TITLE LXII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY
SYSTEM
SEC. 6201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year
2023.
TITLE LXIII--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 6301. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT
ACTIVITIES BY FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.
(a) In General.--Subsections (a) and (b) of section 304 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a) are amended to read as
follows:
``(a) Post-employment Restrictions.--
``(1) Covered post-service position.--
``(A) Permanent restriction.--Except as provided by
paragraph (2)(A)(i), an employee of an element of the
intelligence community who occupies a covered intelligence
position may not occupy a covered post-service position for a
designated prohibited foreign country following the date on
which the employee ceases to occupy a covered intelligence
position.
``(B) Temporary restriction.--Except as provided by
paragraph (2)(A)(ii), an employee of an element of the
intelligence community who occupies a covered intelligence
position may not occupy a covered post-service position during
the 30-month period following the date on which the employee
ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position.
``(2) Waiver.--
``(A) Authority to grant temporary waiver.--
``(i) Waivers of permanent restriction.--On a case-by-
case basis, the Director of National Intelligence may
temporarily waive the restriction in paragraph (1)(A) with
respect to an employee or former employee who is subject to
that restriction only after--
``(I) the employee or former employee submits to
the Director a written application for such waiver in
such form and manner as the Director determines
appropriate;
``(II) the Director determines that not granting
such waiver would result in a grave detrimental impact
to current or future intelligence operations of the
United States; and
``(III) the Director provides the congressional
intelligence committees with a detailed justification
stating why not granting such waiver would result in a
grave detrimental impact to current or future
intelligence operations of the United States.
``(ii) Waivers of temporary restriction.--On a case-by-
case basis, the Director may temporarily waive the
restriction in paragraph (1)(B) with respect to an employee
or former employee who is subject to that restriction only
after--
``(I) the employee or former employee submits to
the Director a written application for such waiver in
such form and manner as the Director determines
appropriate; and
``(II) the Director determines that such waiver is
necessary to advance the national security interests of
the United States.
``(B) Period of waiver.--A waiver issued under subparagraph
(A) shall apply for a period not exceeding 5 years. The
Director may renew such a waiver.
``(C) Revocation.--The Director may revoke a waiver issued
under subparagraph (A) to an employee or former employee,
effective on the date that is 60 days after the date on which
the Director provides the employee or former employee written
notice of such revocation.
``(D) Tolling.--The 30-month restriction in paragraph
(1)(B) shall be tolled for an employee or former employee
during the period beginning on the date on which a waiver is
issued under subparagraph (A) and ending on the date on which
the waiver expires or on the effective date of a revocation
under subparagraph (C), as the case may be.
``(E) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after the date
on which the Director issues a waiver under subparagraph (A) or
a revocation of a waiver under subparagraph (C), the Director
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees
written notification of the waiver or revocation, as the case
may be. Such notification shall include the following:
``(i) With respect to a waiver issued to an employee or
former employee--
``(I) the details of the application, including the
covered intelligence position held or formerly held by
the employee or former employee;
``(II) the nature of the activities of the employee
or former employee after ceasing to occupy a covered
intelligence position;
``(III) a description of the national security
interests that will be advanced by reason of issuing
such waiver; and
``(IV) the specific reasons why the Director
determines that issuing such waiver will advance such
interests.
``(ii) With respect to a revocation of a waiver issued
to an employee or former employee--
``(I) the details of the waiver, including any
renewals of such waiver, and the dates of such waiver
and renewals; and
``(II) the specific reasons why the Director
determined that such revocation is warranted.
``(b) Covered Post-service Employment Reporting.--
``(1) Requirement.--During the period described in paragraph
(2), an employee who ceases to occupy a covered intelligence
position shall--
``(A) report covered post-service employment to the head of
the element of the intelligence community that employed such
employee in such covered intelligence position upon accepting
such covered post-service employment; and
``(B) annually (or more frequently if the head of such
element considers it appropriate) report covered post-service
employment to the head of such element.
``(2) Period described.--The period described in this paragraph
is the period beginning on the date on which an employee ceases to
occupy a covered intelligence position.
``(3) Regulations.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community shall issue regulations requiring, as a
condition of employment, each employee of such element occupying a
covered intelligence position to sign a written agreement requiring
the regular reporting of covered post-service employment to the
head of such element pursuant to paragraph (1).''.
(b) Definition of Designated Prohibited Foreign Country.--
Subsection (g) of such section is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (4) through (6) as paragraphs
(5) through (7), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
``(4) Designated prohibited foreign country.--The term
`designated prohibited foreign country' means the following:
``(A) The People's Republic of China.
``(B) The Russian Federation.
``(C) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
``(D) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
``(E) The Republic of Cuba.
``(F) The Syrian Arab Republic.''.
(c) Additional Written Notice.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (d) of such section is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(3) Written notice about restrictions.--The head of each
element of the intelligence community shall provide written notice
of the restrictions under subsection (a) to any person who may be
subject to such restrictions on or after the date of enactment of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023--
``(A) when the head of the element determines that such
person may become subject to such covered intelligence position
restrictions; and
``(B) before the person ceases to occupy a covered
intelligence position.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--Paragraph (2) of such subsection is
amended in the paragraph heading by adding ``about reporting
requirements'' after ``Written notice''.
(d) Revised Regulations.--
(1) Definition of covered intelligence position.--In this
subsection, the term ``covered intelligence position'' has the
meaning given such term by such section 304.
(2) Submission.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence
community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees
new or updated regulations issued to carry out such section 304, as
amended by subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section.
(3) Requirements.--The regulations issued under paragraph (1)
shall--
(A) include provisions that advise personnel of the
intelligence community of the appropriate manner in which such
personnel may opt out of positions that--
(i) have been designated as covered intelligence
positions before the effective date established in
subsection (e) of this section; or
(ii) may be designated as covered intelligence
provisions before such designation becomes final; and
(B) establish a period of not fewer than 30 days and not
more than 60 days after receipt of the written notice required
under paragraph (3) of subsection (d) of such section 304, as
added by subsection (c)(1) of this section, within which such
personnel may opt out of a covered intelligence position and
the accompanying obligations imposed by subsection (a)(1)(A) of
such section 304, as amended by subsection (a) of this section.
(4) Certification.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees--
(A) a written certification for each head of an element of
the intelligence community who has issued new or updated
regulations pursuant to paragraph (2); and
(B) for each head of an element of the intelligence
community who has not issued such new or updated regulations,
an explanation for the failure to issue such new or updated
regulations.
(e) Effective Date of Permanent Restrictions.--Subsection (a)(1)(A)
of such section 304, as amended by subsection (a) of this section,
shall apply only to persons who occupy a covered intelligence position
on or after the date that is 45 days after the date on which new or
updated regulations are issued under subsection (d)(2) of this section.
(f) Repeal.--Section 402 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-293) is hereby repealed.
SEC. 6302. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY PROTECTIONS FOR
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY GRANT FUNDING.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 121. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY PROTECTIONS
FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY GRANT FUNDING.
``(a) Disclosure as Condition for Receipt of Grant.--The head of an
element of the intelligence community may not award a grant to a person
or entity unless the person or entity has certified to the head of the
element that the person or entity has disclosed to the head of the
element any material financial or material in-kind support that the
person or entity knows, or should have known, derives from the People's
Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of
Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or the Republic of
Cuba, during the 5-year period ending on the date of the person or
entity's application for the grant.
``(b) Process for Review of Grant Applicants Prior to Award.--
``(1) In general.--The head of an element of the intelligence
community may not award a grant to a person or entity who submitted
a certification under subsection (a) until such certification is
received by the head of an element of the intelligence community
and submitted to the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to
the process set forth in paragraph (2).
``(2) Process.--
``(A) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence,
in coordination with such heads of elements of the intelligence
community as the Director considers appropriate, shall
establish a process to review the awarding of a grant to an
applicant who submitted a certification under subsection (a).
``(B) Elements.--The process established under subparagraph
(A) shall include the following:
``(i) The immediate transmission of a copy of each
applicant's certification made under subsection (a) to the
Director of National Intelligence.
``(ii) The review of the certification and any
accompanying disclosures submitted under subsection (a) as
soon as practicable.
``(iii) Authorization for the heads of the elements of
the intelligence community to take such actions as may be
necessary, including denial or revocation of a grant, to
ensure a grant does not pose an unacceptable risk of--
``(I) misappropriation of United States
intellectual property, research and development, and
innovation efforts; or
``(II) other counterintelligence threats.
``(c) Annual Report Required.--Not later than 1 year after the date
of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2023 and not less frequently than once each year thereafter, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an annual report identifying the following for
the 1-year period covered by the report:
``(1) The number of applications for grants received by each
element of the intelligence community.
``(2) The number of such applications that were reviewed using
the process established under subsection (b)(2), disaggregated by
element of the intelligence community.
``(3) The number of such applications that were denied and the
number of grants that were revoked, pursuant to the process
established under subsection (b)(2), disaggregated by element of
the intelligence community.''.
(b) Applicability.--Subsections (a) and (b) of section 121 of such
Act, as added by subsection (a), shall apply only with respect to
grants awarded by an element of the intelligence community after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents preceding section 2
of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
120 the following:
``Sec. 121. Counterintelligence and national security protections for
intelligence community grant funding.''.
SEC. 6303. EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY LAW ENFORCEMENT
JURISDICTION TO FACILITIES OF OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General.--Section 15(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E);
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following:
``(D) within an installation owned, or contracted to be
occupied for a period of one year or longer, by the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence; and''; and
(D) in subparagraph (E), as redesignated by subparagraph
(B), by inserting ``or (D)'' after ``in subparagraph (C)'';
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or (D)'' and inserting ``or
(E)''; and
(3) in paragraph (4), by striking ``in subparagraph (A) or
(C)'' and inserting ``in subparagraph (A), (C), or (D)''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 5(a)(4) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
3506(a)(4)) is amended by inserting ``and Office of the Director of
National Intelligence'' after ``protection of Agency''.
SEC. 6304. ANNUAL REPORTS ON STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Definition of Open Recommendations.--In this section, the term
``open recommendations'' refers to recommendations of the Comptroller
General of the United States that the Comptroller General has not yet
designated as closed.
(b) Annual Lists by Comptroller General of the United States.--Not
later than September 30, 2023, and each September 30 thereafter through
2028, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees and the Director of National
Intelligence a list of all open recommendations made to the Director,
disaggregated by report number and recommendation number.
(c) Annual Reports by Director of National Intelligence.--Not later
than 120 days after the date on which the Director receives a list
under subsection (b), the Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a
report on the actions taken by the Director and actions the Director
intends to take, alone or in coordination with the heads of other
Federal agencies, in response to each open recommendation identified in
the list, including open recommendations the Director determines are
closed and recommendations the Director determines do not require
further action, as well as the basis for such determinations.
SEC. 6305. TIMELY SUBMISSION OF CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION MATERIALS.
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et
seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506I the following new
section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such
Act accordingly):
``SEC. 506J. CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE BUDGET JUSTIFICATION MATERIALS.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Budget.--The term `budget' has the meaning given the term
`budget of the President' in section 506A.
``(2) Classified intelligence budget justification materials.--
The term `classified intelligence budget justification materials'
means, with respect to a fiscal year, the materials submitted to
Congress by the Director of National Intelligence in support of the
budget for that fiscal year that are classified or otherwise
protected from public disclosure.
``(b) Timely Submission.--Not later than 5 days after the date on
which the President submits to Congress the budget for each fiscal year
pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees the classified intelligence budget
justification materials for the element for that budget.''.
SEC. 6306. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR CIVILIAN FACULTY OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY.
Section 105 of title 17, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating the second subsection (c) as subsection
(d);
(2) by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following:
``(c) Use by Federal Government.--
``(1) Secretary of defense authority.--With respect to a
covered author who produces a covered work in the course of
employment at a covered institution described in subparagraphs (A)
through (L) of subsection (d)(2), the Secretary of Defense may
direct the covered author to provide the Federal Government with an
irrevocable, royalty-free, worldwide, nonexclusive license to
reproduce, distribute, perform, or display such covered work for
purposes of the United States Government.
``(2) Director of national intelligence authority.--With
respect to a covered author who produces a covered work in the
course of employment at the covered institution described in
subsection (d)(2)(M), the Director of National Intelligence may
direct the covered author to provide the Federal Government with an
irrevocable, royalty-free, world-wide, nonexclusive license to
reproduce, distribute, perform, or display such covered work for
purposes of the United States Government.''; and
(3) in paragraph (2) of subsection (d), as so redesignated, by
adding at the end the following:
``(M) National Intelligence University.''.
SEC. 6307. MODIFICATIONS TO FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE RESPONSE CENTER.
(a) Renaming.--
(1) In general.--Section 119C of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059) is amended--
(A) in the section heading, by striking ``response''; and
(B) in subsection (a), by striking ``Response''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the matter
preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by striking the item
relating to section 119C and inserting the following:
``Sec. 119C. Foreign Malign Influence Center.''.
(3) Conforming amendment.--Section 589E(d)(2) of the William M.
(Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021 (Public Law 116-283; 10 U.S.C. 2001 note prec.) is amended by
striking ``Response''.
(4) Reference.--Any reference in law, regulation, map,
document, paper, or other record of the United States to the
``Foreign Malign Influence Response Center'' shall be deemed to be
a reference to the Foreign Malign Influence Center.
(b) Director of National Intelligence Authority to Terminate.--
Section 119C of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3059) is further amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
``(e) Termination.--After December 31, 2028, the Director of
National Intelligence may terminate the Center, but only if the
Director of National Intelligence submits to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a
determination that the termination of the Center is appropriate, which
includes--
``(1) a detailed description that other offices or entities
within the intelligence community--
``(A) have the capabilities to perform the functions of the
Center; and
``(B) will exercise the functions of the Center upon the
termination of the Center; and
``(2) a detailed description of--
``(A) the actions the Director of National Intelligence
will take to conduct an orderly wind-down of the activities of
the Center; and
``(B) the proposed timeline for such actions.''.
(c) Report.--
(1) Definition of appropriate committees of congress.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives.
(2) In general.--Not later than December 31, 2025, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a report assessing the continued need for operating the
Foreign Malign Influence Center.
SEC. 6308. REQUIREMENT TO OFFER CYBER PROTECTION SUPPORT FOR PERSONNEL
OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN POSITIONS HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO CYBER
ATTACK.
(a) In General.--Section 6308(b) of the Damon Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334d(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) by striking ``may provide'' and inserting ``shall
offer'';
(B) by inserting ``and shall provide such support to any
such personnel who request'' before the period at the end; and
(2) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Authority'' and
inserting ``Requirement''.
(b) Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations
of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives an implementation plan for providing the support
described section 6308(b) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334d(b)), as amended by subsection (a), including a
description of the training and resources needed to implement the
support and the methodology for determining the personnel described in
paragraph (2) of such section.
SEC. 6309. ENFORCEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY SYSTEMS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Cybersecurity requirements for national security systems.--
The term ``cybersecurity requirements for national security
systems'' means the minimum cybersecurity requirements established
by the National Manager, consistent with the direction of the
President and in consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence, that applies to all national security systems
operated by, on the behalf of, or administered by the head of an
element of the intelligence community.
(2) National manager.--The term ``National Manager'' means the
National Manager for National Security Systems designated by the
President.
(3) National security systems.--The term ``national security
systems'' includes--
(A) national security systems (as defined in section
3552(b) of title 44, United States Code); and
(B) information systems described in paragraph (2) or (3)
of section 3553(e) of such title.
(b) Implementation Deadline.--The cybersecurity requirements for
national security systems shall include appropriate deadlines by which
all elements of the intelligence community shall have fully implemented
the requirements.
(c) Reevaluation and Updates.--Not less frequently than once every
2 years, the National Manager shall reevaluate and update the
cybersecurity requirements for national security systems.
(d) Resources.--Each head of an element of the intelligence
community that owns or operates a national security system shall update
plans of the element to prioritize resources in such a manner as to
fully implement the cybersecurity requirements for national security
systems by the deadline established pursuant to subsection (b) for the
next 10 fiscal years.
(e) Exemptions.--
(1) In general.--The head of an element of the intelligence
community may exempt a national security system owned or operated
by the element from the cybersecurity requirements for national
security systems if done so in accordance with the procedures
established under paragraph (2).
(2) Exemption procedures.--The National Manager shall,
consistent with the direction of the President, establish
procedures that govern--
(A) the circumstances under which the head of an element of
the intelligence community may exempt a national security
system under paragraph (1); and
(B) the process for implementing the exemption.
(3) Annual reports on exemptions.--
(A) In general.--Each year, the National Manager and the
Director of National Intelligence shall--
(i) submit to the congressional intelligence committees
an annual report documenting all exemptions made under
paragraph (1) during the period covered by the report,
along with the justifications for the exemptions; and
(ii) in the case of an exemption made by the Assistant
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research under such
paragraph, submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives a separate report describing the
exemption and the justification for it.
(B) Manner.--Each report submitted under subparagraph (A)
shall be submitted with such classification as the Director
considers appropriate and with due regard for the protection of
sensitive intelligence sources and methods.
SEC. 6310. REVIEW AND BRIEFING ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333.
(a) Review and Briefing Required.--No later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall--
(1) conduct a review to ascertain the feasibility and
advisability of compiling and making public information relating to
activities of the intelligence community under Executive Order
12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence
activities); and
(2) provide the congressional intelligence committees, the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives with a briefing on
the findings of the Director with respect to the review conducted
under paragraph (1).
(b) Matters Addressed.--The review and briefing required by
subsection (a) shall address the feasibility and advisability of making
available to the public information relating to the following:
(1) Data on activities described in subsection (a)(1),
including the following:
(A) The amount of United States person information
collected pursuant to such activities.
(B) Queries of United States persons pursuant to such
activities.
(C) Dissemination of United States person information
pursuant to such activities, including masking and unmasking.
(D) The use of United States person information in criminal
proceedings.
(2) Quantitative data and qualitative descriptions of incidents
in which the intelligence community violated Executive Order 12333
and associated guidelines and procedures.
(c) Considerations.--In conducting the review under subsection
(a)(1), the Director shall consider--
(1) the public transparency associated with the use by the
intelligence community of the authorities provided under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.), including relevant data and compliance incidents; and
(2) the application of the transparency model developed in
connection with such Act to activities conducted under Executive
Order 12333.
(d) Disaggregation for Public Release.--In conducting the review
under subsection (a)(1), the Director shall address whether the
relevant data and compliance incidents associated with the different
intelligence community entities can be disaggregated for public
release.
SEC. 6311. ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OPEN-SOURCE SUPPORT FOR
EXPORT CONTROLS AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT SCREENING.
(a) Pilot Program to Assess Open Source Support for Export Controls
and Foreign Investment Screening.--
(1) Pilot program authorized.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall designate an element of the intelligence
community to carry out a pilot program to assess the feasibility
and advisability of providing enhanced intelligence support,
including intelligence derived from open source, publicly and
commercially available information--
(A) to the Department of Commerce to support the export
control and investment screening functions of the Department;
and
(B) to the Department of Homeland Security to support the
export control functions of the Department.
(2) Authority.--In carrying out the pilot program required by
paragraph (1), the element designated by the Director under such
paragraph--
(A) shall establish a process for the provision of
information as described in such paragraph; and
(B) may--
(i) acquire and prepare data, consistent with
applicable provisions of law and Executive orders;
(ii) modernize analytic systems, including through the
acquisition, development, or application of automated
tools; and
(iii) establish standards and policies regarding the
acquisition, treatment, and sharing of open source,
publicly and commercially available information.
(3) Duration.--The pilot program required by paragraph (1)
shall be carried out during a 3-year period.
(b) Plan and Report Required.--
(1) Definition of appropriate committees of congress.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial
Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Plan.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, in coordination
with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
plan to carry out the pilot program required by subsection
(a)(1).
(B) Contents.--The plan submitted under subparagraph (A)
shall include the following:
(i) A list, developed in consultation with the
Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, of the activities of the Department of Commerce
and the Department of Homeland Security that will be
supported by the pilot program.
(ii) A plan for measuring the effectiveness of the
pilot program and the value of open source, publicly and
commercially available information to the export control
and investment screening missions.
(3) Report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 540 days after the date on
which the Director submits the plan under paragraph (2)(A), the
Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
a report on the findings of the Director with respect to the
pilot program.
(B) Contents.--The report submitted under subparagraph (A)
shall include the following:
(i) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability
of providing information as described in subsection (a)(1).
(ii) An assessment of the value of open source,
publicly and commercially available information to the
export control and investment screening missions, using the
measures of effectiveness under paragraph (2)(B)(ii).
(iii) Identification of opportunities for and barriers
to more effective use of open source, publicly and
commercially available information by the intelligence
community.
SEC. 6312. ANNUAL TRAINING REQUIREMENT AND REPORT REGARDING ANALYTIC
STANDARDS.
(a) Policy for Training Program Required.--Consistent with sections
1019 and 1020 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364 and 3364 note), the Director of National
Intelligence shall issue a policy that requires each head of an element
of the intelligence community, that has not already done so, to create,
before the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, an annual training program on the standards set forth in
Intelligence Community Directive 203, Analytic Standards (or successor
directive).
(b) Conduct of Training.--Training required pursuant to the policy
required by subsection (a) may be conducted in conjunction with other
required annual training programs conducted by the element of the
intelligence community concerned.
(c) Certification of Completion of Training.--Each year, each head
of an element of the intelligence community shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a certification as to whether all
of the analysts of that element have completed the training required
pursuant to the policy required by subsection (a) and if the analysts
have not, an explanation of why the training has not been completed.
(d) Reports.--
(1) Annual report.--In conjunction with each briefing provided
under section 1019(c) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364(c)), the Director shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the
number and themes of compliance incidents reported to intelligence
community analytic ombudspersons relating to the standards set
forth in Intelligence Community Directive 203 (relating to analytic
standards), or successor directive.
(2) Report on performance evaluation.--Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of analysis
at each element of the intelligence community that conducts all-
source analysis shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a
report describing how compliance with the standards set forth in
Intelligence Community Directive 203 (relating to analytic
standards), or successor directive, is considered in the
performance evaluations and consideration for merit pay, bonuses,
promotions, and any other personnel actions for analysts within the
element.
(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to prohibit the Director from providing training described in
this section as a service of common concern.
(f) Sunset.--This section shall cease to be effective on the date
that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 6313. REVIEW OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.
(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
conduct a review of the Joint Intelligence Community Council
established by section 101A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3022).
(b) Elements.--The review conducted under subsection (a) shall
cover the following:
(1) The number of meetings the Council has held, by year.
(2) An analysis of the issues the Council has addressed.
(3) The effect the Council has had on the decisionmaking of the
Director of National Intelligence.
(4) Potential revision to the membership or functions of the
Council.
(c) Briefing.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
provide the congressional intelligence committees and the subcommittees
on defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a briefing
on the review conducted pursuant to subsection (a).
SEC. 6314. REQUIRED POLICY FOR MINIMUM INSIDER THREAT STANDARDS.
(a) Requirement.--Section 102A(f) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(f)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (8) and (9) as paragraphs (9)
and (10), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new
paragraph:
``(8) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure there is
established a policy for minimum insider threat standards for the
intelligence community and ensure compliance by the elements of the
intelligence community with that policy.''.
(b) Compliance and Reporting.--Title III of such Act (50 U.S.C.
3071 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``SEC. 313. INSIDER THREAT POLICY COMPLIANCE AND REPORTING.
``The head of each element of the intelligence community shall--
``(1) implement the policy established in accordance with
section 102A(f)(8); and
``(2) concurrent with the submission to Congress of budget
justification materials in support of the budget of the President
for a fiscal year that is submitted to Congress under section
1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, submit to Congress a
certification as to whether the element is in compliance with such
policy.''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 102A(x)(3) of such Act (50
U.S.C. 3024(x)(3)) is amended by inserting ``, including the policy
under subsection (f)(8),'' after ``policies of the intelligence
community''.
(d) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents preceding section 2
of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
312 the following new item:
``Sec. 313. Insider threat policy compliance and reporting.''.
SEC. 6315. UNFUNDED PRIORITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section (and
conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act
accordingly):
``SEC. 514. UNFUNDED PRIORITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY:
ANNUAL REPORT.
``(a) Annual Report.--Not later than 10 days after the date on
which the budget of the President for a fiscal year is submitted to
Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the
head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the
Director of National Intelligence, the congressional intelligence
committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on
the unfunded priorities of the programs under the jurisdiction of such
head.
``(b) Elements.--
``(1) In general.--Each report under subsection (a) shall
specify, for each unfunded priority covered by such report, the
following:
``(A) A summary description of such priority, including the
objectives to be achieved if such priority is funded (whether
in whole or in part).
``(B) Whether such priority will satisfy a covert action or
support collection against requirements identified in the
National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (or any successor mechanism
established for the prioritization of programs and activities),
including a description of such requirements and the related
prioritization level.
``(C) The additional amount of funds recommended in
connection with the objectives under subparagraph (A).
``(D) Budget information with respect to the unfunded
priority, including--
``(i) the appropriation account;
``(ii) the expenditure center; and
``(iii) the project and, if applicable, subproject.
``(2) Prioritization of priorities.--Each report shall present
the unfunded priorities covered by such report in overall order of
urgency of priority among unfunded priorities.
``(c) Unfunded Priority Defined.--In this section, the term
`unfunded priority', in the case of a fiscal year, means a program,
activity, or mission requirement of an element of the intelligence
community that--
``(1) is not funded in the budget of the President for the
fiscal year as submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of
title 31, United States Code;
``(2) is necessary to fulfill a covert action or to satisfy an
information requirement associated with the collection, analysis,
or dissemination of intelligence that has been documented within
the National Intelligence Priorities Framework; and
``(3) would have been recommended for funding by the head of
the element of the intelligence community if--
``(A) additional resources had been available for the
budget to fund the program, activity, or mission requirement;
or
``(B) the program, activity, or mission requirement has
emerged since the budget was formulated.''.
SEC. 6316. SUBMISSION OF COVERED DOCUMENTS AND CLASSIFIED ANNEXES.
(a) Requirement.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), as amended by section 6315, is further amended by
adding at the end the following new section (and conforming the table
of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):
``SEC. 515. SUBMISSION OF COVERED DOCUMENTS AND CLASSIFIED ANNEXES.
``(a) Covered Document Defined.--In this section, the term `covered
document' means any executive order, memorandum, or policy directive
issued by the President, including national security Presidential
memoranda and Presidential policy directives, or such successor
memoranda and directives.
``(b) Requirement.--Not later than 7 days after the date on which
the President issues or amends a covered document, the President,
acting through the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense
of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives the covered document and any classified annex
accompanying that document if such covered document or annex contains a
direction to, establishes a requirement for, or includes a restriction
on any element of the intelligence community.''.
(b) Initial Submission.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives each covered document and classified annex required
under section 515 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by
subsection (a), in effect as of the date of enactment of this Act.
(c) Repeal.--Section 310 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 115-31; 50 U.S.C. 3312) is hereby
repealed.
SEC. 6317. IMPROVEMENTS TO PROGRAM ON RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING.
Section 1022 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3222)
is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 1022. PROGRAM ON RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING.
``(a) Program.--
``(1) Requirement.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community, shall carry out a program to ensure that selected
individuals are provided funds for academic training (including
with respect to both undergraduate and postgraduate education), or
to reimburse for academic training previously obtained--
``(A) in capabilities, missions, or skillsets, especially
in the fields of science, technology, math, and engineering, to
address workforce requirements in which the intelligence
community is deficient or likely to be deficient in the future;
or
``(B) for such individuals who have backgrounds or
experiences that the Director has identified as--
``(i) contributing to capabilities, missions, or
skillsets in which the intelligence community is deficient
or likely to be deficient in future; and
``(ii) being underrepresented in the intelligence
community or likely to be underrepresented in the future.
``(2) Commitment.--An individual selected for participation in
the program shall commit to employment with an element of the
intelligence community for a period that the Director determines is
commensurate with the amount of funding provided to the individual
under the program and under such terms and conditions as the
Director considers appropriate.
``(3) Designation.--The program shall be known as the Pat
Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program.
``(4) Outreach.--The Director, in consultation with the heads
of the elements of the intelligence community, shall maintain a
publicly available internet website on the program that describes--
``(A) the intent of the program;
``(B) the conditions and requirements for selection and
participation;
``(C) application instructions;
``(D) the areas covered by the program pursuant to the
review conducted under subsection (b)(2); and
``(E) any other details the Director determines
appropriate.
``(b) Elements.--In carrying out the program under subsection (a),
the Director shall--
``(1) establish such requirements relating to the academic
training of participants as the Director considers appropriate to
ensure that participants are prepared for employment as
intelligence professionals; and
``(2) on an annual basis, review the areas that will contribute
to the capabilities, missions, and skillsets in which the
intelligence community is deficient or is likely to be deficient in
the future.
``(c) Use of Funds.--Funds made available for the program under
subsection (a) shall be used--
``(1) to provide a monthly stipend for each month that a
participant is pursuing a course of study;
``(2) to pay the partial or full tuition of a participant for
the completion of such course of study;
``(3) to reimburse a participant for tuition paid by the
participant before becoming an employee of an element of the
intelligence community, including with respect to providing
payments for student loans used for such tuition;
``(4) to pay for books and materials that the participant
requires or required to complete such course of study;
``(5) to pay the expenses of the participant for travel
requested by an element of the intelligence community in relation
to such program; or
``(6) for such other purposes the Director considers reasonably
appropriate to carry out such program.''.
SEC. 6318. MEASURES TO MITIGATE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THREATS FROM
PROLIFERATION AND USE OF FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SPYWARE.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered device.--The term ``covered device'' means any
electronic mobile device including smartphones, tablet computing
devices, or laptop computing devices, that is issued by an element
of the intelligence community for official use.
(2) Foreign commercial spyware; foreign company; spyware.--The
terms ``foreign commercial spyware'', ``foreign company'', and
``spyware'' have the meanings given those terms in section 1102A of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as
added by this section.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to act decisively against counterintelligence threats posed by
foreign commercial spyware, as well as the individuals who lead
entities selling foreign commercial spyware and who are reasonably
believed to be involved, have been involved, or pose a significant risk
to being or becoming involved, in activities contrary to the national
security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
(c) Measures to Mitigate Counterintelligence Threats.--Title XI of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended
by inserting after section 1102 the following new section (and
conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act
accordingly):
``SEC. 1102A. MEASURES TO MITIGATE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THREATS FROM
PROLIFERATION AND USE OF FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SPYWARE.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
`appropriate congressional committees' means--
``(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee
on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee
on the Judiciary, the Committee on Appropriations, and the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the
Senate; and
``(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services,
the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on the
Judiciary, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on
Homeland Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of
the House of Representatives.
``(2) Covered entity.--The term `covered entity' means any
foreign company that either directly or indirectly develops,
maintains, owns, operates, brokers, markets, sells, leases,
licenses, or otherwise makes available spyware.
``(3) Foreign commercial spyware.--The term `foreign commercial
spyware' means spyware that is developed (solely or in partnership
with a foreign company), maintained, sold, leased, licensed,
marketed, sourced (in whole or in part), or otherwise provided,
either directly or indirectly, by a foreign company.
``(4) Foreign company.--The term `foreign company' means a
company that is incorporated or domiciled outside of the United
States, including any subsidiaries or affiliates wherever such
subsidiaries or affiliates are domiciled or incorporated.
``(5) Spyware.--The term `spyware' means a tool or set of tools
that operate as an end-to-end system of software to provide an
unauthorized user remote access to information stored on or
transiting through an electronic device connected to the Internet
and not owned or operated by the unauthorized user, including end-
to-end systems that--
``(A) allow an unauthorized user to remotely infect
electronic devices with malicious software, including without
any action required by the user of the device;
``(B) can record telecommunications or other audio captured
on a device not owned by the unauthorized user;
``(C) undertake geolocation, collect cell site location
information, or otherwise track the location of a device or
person using the internal sensors of an electronic device not
owned by the unauthorized user;
``(D) allow an unauthorized user access to and the ability
to retrieve information on the electronic device, including
text messages, files, e-mails, transcripts of chats, contacts,
photos, and browsing history; or
``(E) any additional criteria described in publicly
available documents published by the Director of National
Intelligence, such as whether the end-to-end system is used
outside the context of a codified lawful intercept system.
``(b) Annual Assessments of Counterintelligence Threats.--
``(1) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the enactment
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, and
annually thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report with an accompanying
classified annex containing an assessment of the
counterintelligence threats and other risks to the national
security of the United States posed by the proliferation of foreign
commercial spyware. The assessment shall incorporate all credible
data, including open-source information.
``(2) Elements.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall include
the following, if known:
``(A) A list of the most significant covered entities.
``(B) A description of the foreign commercial spyware
marketed by the covered entities identified under subparagraph
(A) and an assessment by the intelligence community of the
foreign commercial spyware.
``(C) An assessment of the counterintelligence risk to the
intelligence community or personnel of the intelligence
community posed by foreign commercial spyware.
``(D) For each covered entity identified in subparagraph
(A), details of any subsidiaries, resellers, or other agents
acting on behalf of the covered entity.
``(E) Details of where each covered entity identified under
subparagraphs (A) and (D) is domiciled.
``(F) A description of how each covered entity identified
under subparagraphs (A) and (D) is financed, where the covered
entity acquired its capital, and the organizations and
individuals having substantial investments or other equities in
the covered entity.
``(G) An assessment by the intelligence community of any
relationship between each covered entity identified in
subparagraphs (A) and (D) and any foreign government, including
any export controls and processes to which the covered entity
is subject.
``(H) A list of the foreign customers of each covered
entity identified in subparagraphs (A) and (D), including the
understanding by the intelligence community of the
organizations and end-users within any foreign government.
``(I) With respect to each foreign customer identified
under subparagraph (H), an assessment by the intelligence
community regarding how the foreign customer is using the
spyware, including whether the foreign customer has targeted
personnel of the intelligence community.
``(J) With respect to the first report required under
paragraph (1), a mitigation plan to reduce the exposure of
personnel of the intelligence community to foreign commercial
spyware.
``(K) With respect to each report following the first
report required under paragraph (1), details of steps taken by
the intelligence community since the previous report to
implement measures to reduce the exposure of personnel of the
intelligence community to foreign commercial spyware.
``(3) Classified annex.--In submitting the report under
subsection (2), the Director shall also include an accompanying but
separate classified annex, providing a watchlist of companies
selling, leasing, or otherwise providing foreign commercial spyware
that the Director determines are engaged in activities that pose a
counterintelligence risk to personnel of the intelligence
community.
``(4) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted
in classified form.
``(5) Dissemination.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall separately distribute each report under paragraph (1) and
each annex under paragraph (3) to the President, the heads of all
elements of the intelligence community, the Secretary of State, the
Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the National Cyber Director, and the heads of
any other departments or agencies the Director of National
Intelligence determines appropriate.
``(c) Authority to Prohibit Purchase or Use by Intelligence
Community.--
``(1) Foreign commercial spyware.--
``(A) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence
may prohibit any element of the intelligence community from
procuring, leasing, or otherwise acquiring on the commercial
market, or extending or renewing a contract to procure, lease,
or otherwise acquire, foreign commercial spyware.
``(B) Considerations.--In determining whether and how to
exercise the authority under subparagraph (A), the Director of
National Intelligence shall consider--
``(i) the assessment of the intelligence community of
the counterintelligence threats or other risks to the
United States posed by foreign commercial spyware;
``(ii) the assessment of the intelligence community of
whether the foreign commercial spyware has been used to
target United States Government personnel.
``(iii) whether the original owner or developer retains
any of the physical property or intellectual property
associated with the foreign commercial spyware;
``(iv) whether the original owner or developer has
verifiably destroyed all copies of the data collected by or
associated with the foreign commercial spyware;
``(v) whether the personnel of the original owner or
developer retain any access to data collected by or
associated with the foreign commercial spyware;
``(vi) whether the use of the foreign commercial
spyware requires the user to connect to an information
system of the original owner or developer or information
system of a foreign government; and
``(vii) whether the foreign commercial spyware poses a
counterintelligence risk to the United States or any other
threat to the national security of the United States.
``(2) Company that has acquired foreign commercial spyware.--
``(A) Authority.--The Director of National Intelligence may
prohibit any element of the intelligence community from
entering into any contract or other agreement for any purpose
with a company that has acquired, in whole or in part, any
foreign commercial spyware.
``(B) Considerations.--In considering whether and how to
exercise the authority under subparagraph (A), the Director of
National Intelligence shall consider--
``(i) whether the original owner or developer of the
foreign commercial spyware retains any of the physical
property or intellectual property associated with the
spyware;
``(ii) whether the original owner or developer of the
foreign commercial spyware has verifiably destroyed all
data, and any copies thereof, collected by or associated
with the spyware;
``(iii) whether the personnel of the original owner or
developer of the foreign commercial spyware retain any
access to data collected by or associated with the foreign
commercial spyware;
``(iv) whether the use of the foreign commercial
spyware requires the user to connect to an information
system of the original owner or developer or information
system of a foreign government; and
``(v) whether the foreign commercial spyware poses a
counterintelligence risk to the United States or any other
threat to the national security of the United States.
``(3) Notifications of prohibition.--Not later than 30 days
after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence
exercises the authority to issue a prohibition under subsection
(c), the Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees of such exercise of
authority. Such notice shall include--
``(A) a description of the circumstances under which the
prohibition was issued;
``(B) an identification of the company or product covered
by the prohibition;
``(C) any information that contributed to the decision of
the Director of National Intelligence to exercise the
authority, including any information relating to
counterintelligence or other risks to the national security of
the United States posed by the company or product, as assessed
by the intelligence community; and
``(D) an identification of each element of the intelligence
community to which the prohibition has been applied.
``(4) Waiver authority.--
``(A) In general.--The head of an element of the
intelligence community may request from the Director of
National Intelligence the waiver of a prohibition made under
paragraph (1) or (2).
``(B) Director of national intelligence determination.--The
Director of National Intelligence, upon receiving the waiver
request in subparagraph (A), may issue a waiver for a period
not to exceed one year in response to the request from the head
of an element of the intelligence community if such waiver is
in the national security interest of the United States.
``(C) Notice.--Not later than 30 days after approving a
waiver request pursuant to subparagraph (B), the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives a written notification. The notification shall
include--
``(i) an identification of the head of the element of
the intelligence community that requested the waiver;
``(ii) the details of the waiver request, including the
national security interests of the United States;
``(iii) the rationale and basis for the determination
that the waiver is in the national security interests of
the United States;
``(iv) the considerations that informed the ultimate
determination of the Director of National Intelligence to
issue the wavier; and
``(v) and any other considerations contributing to the
determination, made by the Director of National
Intelligence.
``(D) Waiver termination.--The Director of National
Intelligence may revoke a previously granted waiver at any
time. Upon revocation of a waiver, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit a written notification to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives not later than 30 days after
making a revocation determination.
``(5) Termination of prohibition.--The Director of National
Intelligence may terminate a prohibition made under paragraph (1)
or (2) at any time. Upon termination of a prohibition, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit a notification of the
termination to the congressional intelligence committees, the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives not later than 30
days after terminating a prohibition, detailing the basis for the
termination, including any United States national security
interests that may be affected by such termination.''.
(d) Protection of Covered Devices.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall--
(A) issue standards, guidance, best practices, and policies
for elements of the intelligence community to protect covered
devices from being compromised by foreign commercial spyware;
(B) survey elements of the intelligence community regarding
the processes used by the elements to routinely monitor covered
devices for indicators of compromise associated with foreign
commercial spyware; and
(C) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the sufficiency of the measures in place to routinely
monitor covered devices for indicators of compromise associated
with foreign commercial spyware.
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1)(C) may be submitted
in classified form.
(3) Counterintelligence notifications.--Not later than 30 days
after the date on which an element of the intelligence community
becomes aware that a covered device was targeted or compromised by
foreign commercial spyware, the Director of National Intelligence,
in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, shall notify the congressional intelligence
committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives of
such determination, including--
(A) the component of the element and the location of the
personnel whose covered device was targeted or compromised;
(B) the number of covered devices compromised or targeted;
(C) an assessment by the intelligence community of the
damage to national security of the United States resulting from
any loss of data or sensitive information;
(D) an assessment by the intelligence community of any
foreign government, or foreign organization or entity, and, to
the extent possible, the foreign individuals, who directed and
benefitted from any information acquired from the targeting or
compromise; and
(E) as appropriate, an assessment by the intelligence
community of the capacity and will of such governments or
individuals to continue targeting personnel of the United
States Government.
(4) Private sector partnerships.--Section 904(d)(7) of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383(d)(7))
is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(E) Vulnerabilities from foreign commercial spyware.--
``(i) Consultation.--In carrying out efforts to secure
covered devices, to consult with the private sector of the
United States and reputable third-party researchers to
identify vulnerabilities from foreign commercial spyware
(as defined in section 1102A(a) of the National Security
Act of 1947) and maintain effective security measures for
such devices.
``(ii) Covered device defined.--In this subparagraph,
the term `covered device' means any electronic mobile
device including smartphones, tablet computing devices, or
laptop computing devices, that is issued by an element of
the intelligence community for official use.''.
(e) No Enhanced Authorities.--Nothing in this section or an
amendment made by this section shall be construed as enhancing, or
otherwise changing, the authorities of the intelligence community to
target, collect, process, or disseminate information regarding United
States Government personnel.
(f) Report on Harmonization Among Allied Countries.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the
potential for the United States to lead an effort to devise and
implement a common approach with allied countries as the Director
determines appropriate, including the Five Eyes Partnership, to
mitigate the counterintelligence risks posed by the proliferation
of foreign commercial spyware, including by seeking commitments to
implement measures similar to the requirements under this section
and section 1102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3231 et seq.), as added by this section.
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex, consistent
with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
SEC. 6319. PERSONNEL VETTING PERFORMANCE MEASURES.
(a) Definitions of Continuing Vetting; Council; Security Executive
Agent.--In this section, the terms ``continuous vetting'', ``Council'',
and ``Security Executive Agent'' have the meanings given those terms in
section 6601 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020
(50 U.S.C. 3352).
(b) Measures.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and consistent with section 807 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-
103), the Director of National Intelligence, acting as the Security
Executive Agent, and in coordination with the Chair and other
principals of the Council, shall develop performance measures to assess
the vetting of personnel, including measures to assess continuous
vetting and the quality of each phase of the personnel vetting process,
including the initiation, investigation, and adjudication phases.
(c) Report.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to Congress a report describing the performance measures
developed under subsection (b).
(2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include the
following:
(A) A description of how departments and agencies of the
United States Government have implemented Security Executive
Agent Directive 6 titled ``Continuous Evaluation'' and related
personnel vetting performance measures to ensure that
implementation is efficient and effective, including the
resources expended by each department or agency for continuous
vetting and whether departments and agencies are identifying
security-relevant information in a timely manner.
(B) A description of the performance measures the Director
of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense use to
assess the quality of each phase of the personnel vetting
process, including initiation, investigation, adjudication,
reinvestigation, and continuous vetting.
(C) How such performance measures meet key attributes for
successful performance measures as described in the report of
the Comptroller General of the United States titled ``Personnel
Vetting: Actions Needed to Implement Reforms, Address
Challenges, and Improve Planning'' (GAO-22-104093).
(D) Any impediments or constraints relating to the
implementation of Security Executive Agent Directive 6 or the
development of such performance measures to assess the quality
of the personnel vetting process.
SEC. 6320. PROACTIVE CYBERSECURITY.
(a) Survey of Elements.--Pursuant to section 103G(b)(1) of the
National Security Act (50 U.S.C. 3032(b)(1)), not later than 1 year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Information
Officer of the Intelligence Community shall conduct a survey of each
element of the intelligence community on the use by that element of
proactive cybersecurity initiatives, continuous activity security
testing, and active defense techniques.
(b) Report by Chief Information Officer.--
(1) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
completion of the survey under subsection (a), the Chief
Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives a report on proactive cybersecurity
initiatives, continuous activity security testing, and active
defense techniques. Such report shall include the following:
(A) The results of the survey of each element of the
intelligence community conducted under subsection (a),
including--
(i) examples of any successes against attackers who
breached an information system of an element of the
intelligence community; and
(ii) concerns, limitations, and associated
recommendations relating to innovative uses of proactive
cybersecurity initiatives.
(B) An analysis of the feasibility, costs, and benefits of
consolidating oversight and implementation of such methods
within the intelligence community, including whether such
consolidation would significantly enhance defense.
(C) An analysis of any statutory or policy limitations on
the ability of the Director of National Intelligence, or the
head of any element of the intelligence community, to carry out
such methods on behalf of an element of the intelligence
community or multiple such elements.
(D) An analysis of the relationships between and among the
intelligence community, the Department of Defense, the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the
Department of Homeland Security, national laboratories, and the
private sector, and whether such relationships should be
enhanced to protect national security systems of the
intelligence community through proactive cybersecurity
measures.
(E) With respect to active defense techniques, a discussion
of the effectiveness of such techniques to protect the
information systems of the elements of the intelligence
community, any constraints that hinder such techniques, and
associated recommendations.
(F) With respect to continuous activity security testing, a
discussion of--
(i) how an information system operates under normal and
intended use, compared to how such system operates under a
variety of adverse conditions and scenarios; and
(ii) the feasibility of the adoption of continuous
activity security testing among the intelligence community.
(G) Recommendations for legislative action and further
resources relating to the successful use of proactive
cybersecurity initiatives, deception environments, and
continuous activity security testing.
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) may be submitted in
classified form.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Active defense technique.--The term ``active defense
technique'' means an action taken on an information system of an
element of the intelligence community to increase the security of
such system against an attacker, including--
(A) the use of a deception technology or other purposeful
feeding of false or misleading information to an attacker
accessing such system; or
(B) proportional action taken in response to an unlawful
breach.
(2) Continuous activity security testing.--The term
``continuous activity security testing'' means continuous
experimentation conducted by an element of the intelligence
community on an information system of such element to evaluate the
resilience of such system against a malicious attack or condition
that could compromise such system for the purpose of improving
design, resilience, and incident response with respect to such
system.
(3) Deception technology.--The term ``deception technology''
means an isolated digital environment, system, or platform
containing a replication of an active information system with
realistic data flows to attract, mislead, and observe an attacker.
(4) Intelligence community information environment.--The term
``intelligence community information environment'' has the meaning
given the term in Intelligence Community Directive 121, or any
successor document.
(5) National laboratory.--The term ``national laboratory'' has
the meaning given that term in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801).
(6) National manager for national security systems.--The term
``National Manager for National Security Systems'' means the
Director of National Security, or successor official, serving as
the National Manager for National Security Systems pursuant to
National Security Directive 42, or any successor document.
(7) National security system.--The term ``national security
system'' has the meaning given that term in section 3552 of title
44, United States Code.
(8) Proactive cybersecurity initiatives.--The term ``proactive
cybersecurity initiatives'' means actions performed periodically
and continuously within an organization, focused on identifying and
eliminating vulnerabilities within the network infrastructure,
preventing security breaches, and evaluating the effectiveness of
the business security posture in real-time, including threat
hunting, endpoint and network monitoring, and cybersecurity
awareness and training.
TITLE LXIV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 6401. MODIFICATIONS TO RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024),
as amended by section 6314, is further amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(5)(C), by striking ``may'' and inserting
``shall'';
(2) in subsection (h)--
(A) in paragraph (1)(A)--
(i) by striking ``encourage'' and inserting
``require''; and
(ii) by inserting ``, independent of political
considerations,'' after ``tradecraft''; and
(B) by amending paragraph (3) to read as follows;
``(3) ensure that substantial differences in analytic judgment
are fully considered, brought to the attention of policymakers, and
documented in analytic products; and'';
(3) in subsection (i)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, and shall establish
and enforce policies to protect,'' after ``protect'';
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``guidelines'' and
inserting ``requirements''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4)(A) Each head of an element of the intelligence community
shall ensure that any congressionally mandated report submitted to
Congress by the head, other than such a report submitted solely to the
congressional intelligence committees, shall be consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods in accordance with the
policies established by the Director under paragraph (1), regardless of
whether the provision of law mandating the report explicitly requires
such protection.
``(B) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to alter any
congressional leadership's or congressional committee's jurisdiction or
access to information from any element of the intelligence community
under the rules of either chamber of Congress.''; and
(4) in subsection (x), in the matter preceding paragraph (1),
by striking ``the head of each department of the Federal Government
that contains an element of the intelligence community and the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency'' and inserting ``the
heads of the elements of the intelligence community''.
SEC. 6402. ANNUAL SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
PRIORITIES FRAMEWORK.
Section 102A(p) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3024(p)) is amended by inserting at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(3) Not later than October 1 of each year, the President, acting
through the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives a copy of the most recently updated National
Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (or any such successor mechanism).''.
SEC. 6403. DISPOSITION OF RECORDS OF OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.
Section 1096(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 50 U.S.C. 3001 note) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``Upon'';
(2) by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``Any
records of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that
are maintained by the agency as a service for the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence under section 1535 of title 31,
United States Code, (popularly known as the `Economy Act') may be
treated as the records of the agency when dispositioned as required
by law, and any disclosure of such records between the two agencies
shall not be subject to any otherwise applicable legal consent
requirements or disclosure accounting requirements.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) The records of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence may not be dispositioned pursuant to paragraph (1) without
the authorization of the Director of National Intelligence.''.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 6411. CLARIFICATION REGARDING PROTECTION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY FUNCTIONS.
Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
3507) is amended by striking ``, functions'' and inserting ``or
functions of the Agency, or of the''.
SEC. 6412. EXPANSION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO AUTHORITY TO
PAY PERSONNEL OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR CERTAIN INJURIES TO
THE BRAIN.
Section 2(d)(1) of the Helping American Victims Afflicted by
Neurological Attacks Act of 2021 (Public Law 117-46) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``and not less frequently
than once each year thereafter for 5 years'' after ``Not later than
365 days after the date of the enactment of this Act'';
(2) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the end the following:
``(iv) Detailed information about the number of covered
employees, covered individuals, and covered dependents who
reported experiencing vestibular, neurological, or related
injuries, including those broadly termed `anomalous health
incidents'.
``(v) The number of individuals who have sought
benefits under any provision of section 19A of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b).
``(vi) The number of covered employees, covered
individuals, and covered dependents who are unable to
perform all or part of their professional duties as a
result of injuries described in clause (iv).
``(vii) An updated analytic assessment coordinated by
the National Intelligence Council regarding the potential
causes and perpetrators of anomalous health incidents, as
well as any and all dissenting views within the
intelligence community, which shall be included as
appendices to the assessment.''; and
(3) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``The'' and inserting
``Each''.
SEC. 6413. HISTORICAL ADVISORY PANEL OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that Congress
expresses its appreciation--
(1) to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for
reconstituting the Historical Advisory Panel; and
(2) for the important work of the Historical Advisory Panel,
especially for--
(A) the efforts of the Panel to aid with the
declassification of materials that enrich the historical
national security record; and
(B) the assistance of the Panel in liaison with the
scholarly community.
(b) Reporting Requirement.--The Historical Advisory Panel shall
report directly to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(c) Historical Advisory Panel Defined.--The term ``Historical
Advisory Panel'' means the panel of the Central Intelligence Agency,
regardless of the name of the panel, that assists in conducting
declassification reviews and providing other assistance with respect to
matters of historical interest.
SEC. 6414. AUTHORITY OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO PROVIDE
PROTECTION FOR CERTAIN PERSONNEL.
(a) Authority.--Paragraph (4) of section 5(a) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)), as amended by
section 6303, is further amended to read as follows:
``(4) Authorize personnel designated by the Director to carry
firearms to the extent necessary for the performance of the Agency's
authorized functions, except that, within the United States, such
authority shall be limited to the purposes of--
``(A) the training of Agency personnel and other authorized
persons in the use of firearms;
``(B) the protection of classified materials and information;
``(C) the protection of installations and property of the
Agency;
``(D) the protection of--
``(i) current and former Agency personnel and their
immediate families;
``(ii) individuals nominated by the President to the
position of Director (including with respect to an individual
whom a President-elect (as defined in section 3(c) of the
Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note) has
declared an intent to nominate) and their immediate families;
and
``(iii) defectors and their immediate families, and other
persons in the United States under Agency auspices; and
``(E) with respect to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the protection of--
``(i) installations and property of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence;
``(ii) the Director of National Intelligence and the
immediate family of the Director;
``(iii) current and former personnel of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence and their immediate families
as the Director of National Intelligence may designate; and
``(iv) individuals nominated by the President to the
position of Director of National Intelligence (including with
respect to an individual whom a President-elect has declared an
intent to nominate) and their immediate families;''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 15(d)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
3515(d)(1)) is amended by striking ``designated by the Director under
section 5(a)(4) to carry firearms for the protection of current or
former Agency personnel and their immediate families, defectors and
their immediate families, and other persons in the United States under
Agency auspices,'' and inserting the following: ``designated by the
Director to carry firearms under subparagraph (D) or (E) of section
5(a)(4),''.
(c) Technical Amendment.--Paragraphs (7) and (8) of section 5(a) of
such Act (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)) are amended by adjusting the margins to
conform with the other paragraphs in such section.
SEC. 6415. NOTIFICATION OF USE OF CERTAIN EXPENDITURE AUTHORITIES.
(a) CIA.--Section 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 3510) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(c) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which
the Director makes a novel and significant expenditure pursuant to
subsection (a), the Director shall notify the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Subcommittee on Defense of
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives of such expenditure.''.
(b) Other Elements.--Section 102A of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024), as amended by section 6402, is further amended--
(1) in subsection (m)(1), by inserting before the period at the
end the following: ``, including with respect to the notification
requirement under section 8(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3510(c))'';
and
(2) in subsection (n), by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(5) Any authority provided to the Director of National
Intelligence or the head of an element of the intelligence community
pursuant to this subsection to make an expenditure referred to in
subsection (a) of section 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3510) is subject to the notification requirement under
subsection (c) of such section. If the Director of National
Intelligence is required to make a notification for a specific
expenditure pursuant to both this paragraph and paragraph (4)(G), the
Director may make a single notification.''.
SEC. 6416. OFFICE SUPPORTING CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WORKFORCE
WELLBEING.
(a) Establishment.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``SEC. 29. OFFICE OF WELLNESS AND WORKFORCE SUPPORT.
``(a) Establishment.--The Director shall establish within the
Agency an office (in this section referred to as the `Office') to
provide support for the physical health, mental health, and wellbeing
of eligible individuals under subsection (d).
``(b) Chief Wellbeing Officer; Assigned Staff.--
``(1) Chief wellbeing officer.--The head of the Office is the
Chief Wellbeing Officer, who shall provide to the Director regular
updates on the operations of the Office.
``(2) Assigned staff.--To assist in performing the functions
under subsection (c), the Director shall assign to the Office a
sufficient number of individuals, who shall have no official duties
other than duties related to the Office while so assigned.
``(c) Functions of Office.--
``(1) Functions.--The Director shall establish the functions
and role of the Office, which shall include the following:
``(A) Providing to eligible individuals under subsection
(d) advice and assistance on health and wellbeing, including
with respect to--
``(i) physical health and access to physical health
care;
``(ii) mental health and access to mental health care;
and
``(iii) other related programs and benefits for which
the individual may be eligible.
``(B) In providing advice and assistance to individuals
under subparagraph (A), assisting such individuals who are
applying for, and navigating the process to obtain, benefits
furnished by the United States Government for which the
individual is eligible, including, at a minimum--
``(i) health care and benefits described in such
subparagraph; and
``(ii) benefits furnished pursuant to section 19A.
``(C) Maintaining, and making available to eligible
individuals under subsection (d), the following:
``(i) A list of physicians and mental health care
providers (including from the private sector, as
applicable), who have experience with the physical and
mental health care needs of the Agency workforce.
``(ii) A list of chaplains and religious counselors who
have experience with the needs of the Agency workforce,
including information regarding access to the Chaplain
Corps established under section 26.
``(iii) Information regarding how to select and retain
private attorneys who have experience with the legal needs
of the Agency workforce, including detailed information on
the process for the appropriate sharing of information with
retained private attorneys.
``(D) Any other functions the Director determines
appropriate.
``(2) Rule of construction.--The inclusion of any person on a
list maintained or made available pursuant to paragraph (1)(C)
shall not be construed as an endorsement of such person (or any
service furnished by such person), and the Director shall not be
liable, as a result of such inclusion, for any portion of
compensable injury, loss, or damage attributable to such person or
service.
``(3) Confidentiality.--
``(A) Requirement.--The Director shall ensure that, to the
extent permitted by law, the advice and assistance provided by
the Office to eligible individuals under subsection (d) is
provided in a confidential manner.
``(B) Regulations.--The Director may prescribe regulations
regarding the requirement for confidentiality under this
paragraph. The Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees (as defined in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives any such
regulations not later than 30 days after prescribing such
regulations.
``(d) Eligibility.--
``(1) In general.--An individual described in paragraph (2) may
receive a service under the Office at the election of the
individual.
``(2) Individuals described.--An individual described in this
paragraph is--
``(A) a current or former officer or employee of the
Agency; or
``(B) an individual affiliated with the Agency, as
determined by the Director.''.
(b) Deadline for Establishment.--The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall establish the Office under section 29 of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (as added by subsection (a))
(in this section referred to as the ``Office'') by not later than 120
days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Biannual Briefings.--On a biannual basis during the three-year
period beginning on the date of the establishment of the Office, the
Director shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives a briefing on the status
of the Office, including on--
(1) the number of individuals assigned to the Office pursuant
to subsection (b)(2) of section 29 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (as added by subsection (a)); and
(2) the number of eligible individuals under subsection (d) of
such section 29 who have received services under the Office, and
the type of services so received.
Subtitle C--Elements of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise
SEC. 6421. INCLUSION OF SPACE FORCE AS ELEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
Section 3(4)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003(4)(H)) is amended by inserting ``the Space Force,'' after ``the
Marine Corps,''.
SEC. 6422. OVERSIGHT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CULTURE.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(E) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Workforce climate survey.--The term ``workforce climate
survey''--
(A) means a workforce engagement or climate survey
conducted at the agency, directorate, career field, or
integrated intelligence center level, without regard to whether
the survey is conducted on an annual or ad-hoc basis; and
(B) does not include an exit survey specified in subsection
(c).
(b) Findings.--Congress finds that the Defense Intelligence Agency
has committed to improving Agency culture and leadership; however,
actions taken by the Agency as of the date of the enactment of this Act
have not enabled a full assessment of the extent of workforce culture
issues and potential management abuses, and require additional
Congressional oversight to ensure concerns are both understood and
addressed.
(c) Mandatory Provision of Exit Survey or Interview.--
(1) In general.--The Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency shall ensure that each employee of such Agency who leaves
employment with such Agency (but not including any detail
assignment) completes an exit survey or exit interview prior to
such departure, to the extent practicable.
(2) Annual submissions to congress.--On an annual basis during
the 3-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit
to the appropriate committees of Congress a written analysis of the
results of the exit surveys or exit interviews completed pursuant
to paragraph (1) during the year covered by the report together
with a plan of the Director to address any issues identified
pursuant to such results to improve retention and culture.
(d) Congressional Oversight Relating to Workforce Climate
Surveys.--
(1) Notifications of ad-hoc workforce climate surveys.--Not
later than 14 days after the date on which the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency conducts an ad-hoc workforce climate
survey (including in response to a specific incident or concern),
the Director shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress.
(2) Reports on final results.--Not later than 90 days after the
date on which the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
concludes the conduct of any workforce climate survey, the Director
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report
containing the final results of such workforce climate survey. Such
report shall include the following:
(A) The topic of the workforce climate survey, and the
workforce level surveyed.
(B) The rationale for conducting the workforce climate
survey.
(C) The measures in place to ensure the accessibility of
the workforce climate survey.
(D) The lead official or entity conducting the workforce
climate survey.
(E) Any actions the Director intends to take, or is
considering, in response to the results of the workforce
climate survey.
(3) Accessibility of workforce climate surveys.--The Director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall ensure that, to the extent
practicable, and consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods, workforce climate surveys are accessible to
employees of such Agency on classified and unclassified systems.
(e) Feasibility Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report
containing an analysis of the feasibility (including the anticipated
cost, personnel requirements, necessary authorities, and such other
matters as may be determined appropriate by the Director for purposes
of analyzing feasibility) of--
(1) conducting 360-degree performance reviews among employees
of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and
(2) including leadership suitability assessments (including
personality evaluations, communication style assessments, and
emotional intelligence aptitude assessments) for promotions of such
employees to a position within grade GS-14 or above of the General
Schedule.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
SEC. 6431. MODIFICATION OF ADVISORY BOARD IN NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE.
Section 106A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3041a(d)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3)(A)(i), by inserting ``, in consultation
with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of
Defense,'' after ``Director''; and
(2) in paragraph (7), by striking ``the date that is 3 years
after the date of the first meeting of the Board'' and inserting
``September 30, 2024''.
SEC. 6432. ESTABLISHMENT OF ADVISORY BOARD FOR NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Establishment.--There is established in the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency an advisory board (in this section
referred to as the ``Board'').
(b) Duties.--The Board shall--
(1) study matters relating to the mission of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, including with respect to
integration of commercial capabilities, promoting innovation,
advice on next generation tasking, collection, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination capabilities, strengthening
functional management, acquisition, and such other matters as the
Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency considers
appropriate; and
(2) advise and report directly to the Director with respect to
such matters.
(c) Members.--
(1) Number and appointment.--
(A) In general.--The Board shall be composed of 6 members
appointed by the Director from among individuals with
demonstrated academic, government, business, or other expertise
relevant to the mission and functions of the Agency.
(B) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after the date on
which the Director appoints a member to the Board, the Director
shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a)
of title 10, United States Code) of such appointment.
(C) Initial appointments.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall
appoint the initial 6 members to the Board.
(2) Terms.--Each member shall be appointed for a term of 3
years.
(3) Vacancy.--Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring
before the expiration of the term for which the member's
predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only for the remainder
of that term.
(4) Chair.--The Board shall have a Chair, who shall be
appointed by the Director from among the members.
(5) Travel expenses.--Each member shall receive travel
expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance
with applicable provisions under subchapter I of chapter 57 of
title 5, United States Code.
(6) Executive secretary.--The Director may appoint an executive
secretary, who shall be an employee of the Agency, to support the
Board.
(d) Meetings.--The Board shall meet not less than quarterly, but
may meet more frequently at the call of the Director.
(e) Reports.--Not later than March 31 of each year, the Board shall
submit to the Director and to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on
the activities and significant findings of the Board during the
preceding year.
(f) Nonapplicability of Certain Requirements.--The Federal Advisory
Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Board.
(g) Termination.--The Board shall terminate on the date that is 5
years after the date of the first meeting of the Board.
SEC. 6433. ELEVATION OF THE COMMERCIAL AND BUSINESS OPERATIONS OFFICE
OF THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Beginning not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the head of the commercial and business operations office of
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall report directly to
the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
SEC. 6435. STUDY ON PERSONNEL UNDER STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PARTNERSHIP
PROGRAM.
(a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Director
of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department
of Energy, in consultation with the National Laboratories Directors'
Council and in coordination with such other entities, agencies, and
departments as the Directors consider appropriate, shall jointly
conduct a study of the skills, recruitment, and retention of the
personnel at the national laboratories who carry out projects under the
Strategic Intelligence Partnership Program.
(b) Elements.--The study under subsection (a) shall address the
following:
(1) The degree to which the personnel at the national
laboratories who carry out projects under the Strategic
Intelligence Partnership Program have the requisite training,
skillsets, or expertise in critical science, technology, and
engineering areas to support ongoing and anticipated projects under
such Program, and the sufficiency of such personnel.
(2) Whether such personnel have compensation, benefits, and pay
scales that are competitive with comparable roles in the private
sector in the geographic market in which the relevant national
laboratory is located.
(3) Any challenges associated with the retention of such
personnel.
(4) The talent composition of such personnel, broken down by
career phase and degree status, to include any relevant exit survey
data.
(5) A description of current or previous programs to enabling
such personnel to rotate between elements of the intelligence
community and the national laboratories, including the number of
personnel on nonreimbursable or reimbursable assignment to an
element of the intelligence community.
(6) The degree to which such projects and personnel support or
augment other ongoing mission areas and capacities at the national
laboratories.
(c) Recommendations.--Upon completing the study under subsection
(a), the Directors shall jointly develop findings and recommendations
based on the results of the study regarding the recruitment and
retention of personnel at the national laboratories who carry out
projects under the Strategic Intelligence Partnership Program,
including with respect to the following:
(1) New or alternative business models, sponsorship
arrangements, or work scope agreements.
(2) Extending eligibility for existing, or establishing new,
recruitment, retention, or other career incentive programs,
including student loan repayment and forgiveness programs, to such
personnel.
(3) Initiating geographically flexible or remote work
arrangements for such personnel.
(4) Enabling such personnel to participate in training at
elements of the intelligence community, or obtain academic training
at the National Intelligence University.
(5) Establishing new, or enhancing existing, opportunities for
detailee or rotational programs among the intelligence community
and the national laboratories.
(6) Using a compensation system modeled on the Cyber Talent
Management System of the Department of Homeland Security for such
personnel.
(7) Any other recommendations the Directors determine relevant.
(d) Report.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Directors shall jointly submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense
of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives a report containing the study under
subsection (a) and the recommendations under subsection (c).
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(e) National Laboratories Defined.--In this section, the term
``national laboratories'' means--
(1) each national security laboratory (as defined in section
3281(1) of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50
U.S.C. 2471(1))); and
(2) each national laboratory of the Department of Energy.
SEC. 6436. BRIEFING ON COORDINATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND
BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) Classified Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and
the Secretary of Commerce, or their designees, shall jointly provide a
classified briefing to the appropriate congressional committees
regarding--
(1) coordination between the intelligence community and the
Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce;
(2) existing processes of the Bureau for the access to, storage
of, transmission of, and use of information provided to the Bureau
by an element of the intelligence community; and
(3) such recommendations as the Director and the Secretary may
have to enhance such access, storage, transmission, and use.
TITLE LXV--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Subtitle A--Intelligence Matters Relating to the People's Republic of
China
SEC. 6501. REPORT ON WEALTH AND CORRUPT ACTIVITIES OF THE LEADERSHIP OF
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY.
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, shall make available to the public an unclassified
report on the wealth and corrupt activities of the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party, including the General Secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party and senior leadership officials in the Central
Committee, the Politburo, the Politburo Standing Committee, and any
other regional Party Secretaries.
SEC. 6502. IDENTIFICATION AND THREAT ASSESSMENT OF COMPANIES WITH
INVESTMENTS BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Subcommittee
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with such heads of elements of the intelligence community
as the Director considers appropriate, the Chairperson of the Federal
Communication Commission, and the Administrator of the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, shall provide to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the risk to national
security of the use of--
(1) telecommunications companies with a 10% or greater direct
or indirect foreign investment by an entity or person owned or
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of, the
People's Republic of China that is operating in the United States
or providing services to affiliates and personnel of the
intelligence community; and
(2) hospitality and conveyance companies with substantial
investment by the People's Republic of China by affiliates and
personnel of the intelligence community for travel on behalf of the
United States Government.
SEC. 6503. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKING GROUP FOR MONITORING THE
ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA.
(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with such heads of elements of the intelligence community
as the Director considers appropriate, shall establish a cross-
intelligence community analytical working group (in this section
referred to as the ``working group'') on the economic and technological
capabilities of the People's Republic of China.
(b) Monitoring and Analysis.--The working group shall monitor and
analyze--
(1) the economic and technological capabilities of the People's
Republic of China;
(2) the extent to which those capabilities rely on exports,
financing, or services from the United States and other foreign
countries;
(3) the links of those capabilities to the military-industrial
complex of the People's Republic of China; and
(4) the threats those capabilities pose to the national
security and values of the United States.
(c) Annual Assessment.--
(1) Definition of appropriate committees of congress.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) In general.--Not less frequently than once each year, the
working group shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress an assessment of the economic and technological strategy,
efforts, and progress of the People's Republic of China to become
the dominant military, technological, and economic power in the
world and undermine the rules-based world order.
(3) Elements.--Each assessment required by paragraph (2) shall
include the following:
(A) An unclassified overview of the major goals,
strategies, and policies of the People's Republic of China to
control, shape, or develop self-sufficiency in key technologies
and control related supply chains and ecosystems, including--
(i) efforts to acquire United States and other foreign
technology and recruit foreign talent in technology sectors
of the People's Republic of China, including the extent to
which those efforts relate to the military-industrial
complex of the People's Republic of China;
(ii) efforts related to incentivizing offshoring of
United States and foreign manufacturing to China,
influencing global supply chains, and creating supply chain
vulnerabilities for the United States, including China's
financing or potential financing in foreign countries to
create monopolies in the processing and exporting of rare
earth and other critical materials necessary for renewable
energy, including cobalt, lithium, and nickel;
(iii) related tools and market access restrictions or
distortions imposed by the People's Republic of China on
foreign firms and laws and regulations of the People's
Republic of China that discriminate against United States
and other foreign firms; and
(iv) efforts of the People's Republic of China to
attract or restrict financing from the United States and
other foreign countries to build self-sufficient national
defense capabilities, an evaluation of the relative
contribution of foreign financing to China's economic
support for such capabilities, and the type of capital
flows from the United States into China's national defense
capabilities from the specific actions taken by the
Government of the People's Republic of China to attract or
restrict financing to the outcome of such efforts for
entities and persons of the People's Republic of China.
(B) An unclassified assessment of the progress of the
People's Republic of China to achieve its goals, disaggregated
by economic sector.
(C) An unclassified assessment of the impact of the
transfer of capital, technology, data, talent, and technical
expertise from the United States to China on the economic,
technological, and military capabilities of the People's
Republic of China.
(D) An unclassified list of the top 200 businesses,
academic and research institutions, or other entities of the
People's Republic of China that are--
(i) developing, producing, or exporting to other
countries the technologies that are strategically important
to the People's Republic of China or supporting entities of
the People's Republic of China that are subject to
sanctions imposed by the United States;
(ii) supporting the military-civil fusion program or
the military industrial complex of the People's Republic of
China; or
(iii) otherwise supporting the goals and efforts of the
Chinese Communist Party and Chinese government entities,
including the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of
Public Security, and the People's Liberation Army.
(E) An unclassified list of the top 100 development,
infrastructure, or other strategic projects that the People's
Republic of China is financing abroad that--
(i) advance the technology goals and strategies of the
Chinese Communist Party; or
(ii) evade financial sanctions, export controls, or
import restrictions imposed by the United States.
(F) An unclassified list of the top 100 businesses,
research institutions, or other entities of the People's
Republic of China that are developing surveillance, smart
cities, or related technologies that are--
(i) exported to other countries, undermining democracy
worldwide; or
(ii) provided to the security services of the People's
Republic of China, enabling them to commit severe human
rights abuses in China.
(G) An unclassified list of the top 100 businesses or other
entities of the People's Republic of China that are--
(i) operating in the genocide zone in Xinjiang; or
(ii) supporting the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau,
the Xinjiang Bureau of the Ministry of State Security, the
People's Armed Police, or the Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps.
(H) A list of investment funds, public companies, or
private or early-stage firms of the People's Republic of China
that have received more than $100,000,000 in capital flows from
the United States during the 10-year period preceding the date
on which the assessment is submitted.
(4) Preparation of assessments.--In preparing each assessment
required by paragraph (2), the working group shall use open source
documents in Chinese language and commercial databases.
(5) Format.--An assessment required by paragraph (2) may be
submitted in the format of a National Intelligence Estimate.
(6) Form.--Each assessment required by paragraph (2) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(7) Publication.--The unclassified portion of each assessment
required by paragraph (2) shall be published on the publicly
accessible website of the Director of National Intelligence.
(d) Briefings to Congress.--Not less frequently than quarterly, the
working group shall provide to Congress a classified briefing on the
economic and technological goals, strategies, and progress of the
People's Republic of China, especially on the information that cannot
be disclosed in the unclassified portion of an assessment required by
subsection (c)(2).
(e) Classified Analyses.--Each classified annex to an assessment
required by subsection (c)(2) or corresponding briefing provided under
subsection (d) shall include an analysis of--
(1) the vulnerabilities of the People's Republic of China,
disaggregated by economic sector, industry, and entity; and
(2) the technological or supply chain chokepoints of the
People's Republic of China that provide leverage to the United
States.
(f) Sunset.--This section shall cease to be effective on the date
that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 6504. ANNUAL REPORT ON CONCENTRATED REEDUCATION CAMPS IN THE
XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Covered camp.--The term ``covered camp'' means a detention
camp, prison, forced labor camp, or forced labor factory located in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of
China, referred to by the Government of the People's Republic of
China as ``concentrated reeducation camps'' or ``vocational
training centers''.
(b) Annual Report Required.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such heads of
elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers
appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report on the status of covered camps.
(c) Elements.--Each report required by subsection (b) shall include
the following:
(1) An identification of the number and geographic location of
covered camps and an estimate of the number of victims detained in
covered camps.
(2) A description of--
(A) the types of personnel and equipment in covered camps;
(B) the funding received by covered camps from the
Government of the People's Republic of China; and
(C) the role of the security services of the People's
Republic of China and the Xinjiang Production and Construction
Corps in enforcing atrocities at covered camps.
(3) A comprehensive list of--
(A) the entities of the Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps, including subsidiaries and affiliated
businesses, with respect to which sanctions have been imposed
by the United States;
(B) commercial activities of those entities outside of the
People's Republic of China; and
(C) other Chinese businesses, including in the artificial
intelligence, biotechnology, and surveillance technology
sectors, that are involved with the atrocities in Xinjiang or
supporting the policies of the People's Republic of China in
the region.
(d) Form.--Each report required by subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(e) Publication.--The unclassified portion of each report required
by subsection (b) shall be published on the publicly accessible website
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
SEC. 6505. ASSESSMENTS OF PRODUCTION OF SEMICONDUCTORS BY THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Homeland Security, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Legacy semiconductor.--The term ``legacy semiconductor''
has the meaning given such term in section 9902(a)(6)(A) of the
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 4652(a)(6)(A)).
(b) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress an assessment of progress by the People's
Republic of China in global competitiveness in the production of
semiconductors by Chinese firms, including any subsidiary, affiliate,
or successor of such firms.
(c) Consultation.--In carrying out subsection (b), the Director
shall consult with the Secretary of Commerce and the heads of such
other Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate.
(d) Elements.--Each assessment submitted under subsection (b) shall
include the following:
(1) The progress of the People's Republic of China toward self-
sufficiency in the supply of semiconductors, including globally
competitive Chinese firms competing in the fields of artificial
intelligence, cloud computing, autonomous vehicles, next-generation
and renewable energy, advanced life sciences and biotechnology, and
high-performance computing.
(2) The progress of the People's Republic of China in
developing indigenously or accessing foreign sources of
intellectual property critical to the design and manufacturing of
leading edge process nodes, including electronic design automation
technology.
(3) Activity of Chinese firms with respect to the production of
semiconductors that are not legacy semiconductors, including any
identified export diversion to evade export controls.
(4) Any observed stockpiling efforts by Chinese firms with
respect to semiconductor manufacturing equipment, substrate
materials, silicon wafers, or other necessary inputs for
semiconductor production.
(5) An analysis of the relative market share of different
Chinese semiconductor manufacturers at different process nodes and
the estimated increase or decrease of market share by that
manufacturer in each product category during the preceding year.
(6) A comprehensive summary of recruitment activity of the
People's Republic of China targeting semiconductor manufacturing
engineers and managers from non-Chinese firms.
(7) An analysis of the capability of the workforce of the
People's Republic of China to design, produce, and manufacture of
semiconductors that are not legacy semiconductors and relevant
equipment.
(e) Form of Assessments.--Each assessment submitted under
subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form and include a
classified annex.
(f) Additional Reporting.--Each assessment submitted under
subsection (b) shall also be transmitted to the Secretary of Commerce,
to inform, among other activities of the Department of Commerce,
implementation of section 103 of the CHIPS Act of 2022 (Public Law 117-
167) and title XCIX of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 4651 et seq.).
Subtitle B--Miscellaneous Authorities, Requirements, and Limitations
SEC. 6511. NOTICE OF DEPLOYMENT OR TRANSFER OF CONTAINERIZED MISSILE
SYSTEMS BY RUSSIA, CHINA, OR IRAN.
Section 501 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2016 (division M of Public Law 114-113; 129 Stat. 2923) is amended--
(1) by striking ``the Russian Federation'' each place it
appears and inserting ``a covered country'';
(2) by striking ``Club-K container missile system'' each place
it appears and inserting ``missile launcher disguised as or
concealed in a shipping container'';
(3) in subsection (a)(1)--
(A) by striking ``deploy, the'' and inserting ``deploy,
a''; and
(B) by striking ``the Russian military'' and inserting
``the military of the covered country'';
(4) by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following new
subsection:
``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
`appropriate congressional committees' means the following:
``(A) The congressional intelligence committees.
``(B) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
``(C) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
``(D) The Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate.
``(2) Covered country.--The term `covered country' means the
following:
``(A) Russia.
``(B) China.
``(C) Iran.
``(D) North Korea.''; and
(5) in the heading, by striking ``club-k container missile
system by the russian federation'' and inserting ``containerized
missile system by russia or certain other countries''.
SEC. 6512. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COORDINATOR FOR RUSSIAN ATROCITIES
ACCOUNTABILITY.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Atrocity.--The term ``atrocity'' means a war crime, crime
against humanity, or genocide.
(3) Commit.--The term ``commit'', with respect to an atrocity,
includes the planning, committing, aiding, and abetting of such
atrocity.
(4) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a person
that is not a United States person.
(5) Russian atrocity.--The term ``Russian atrocity'' means an
atrocity that is committed by an individual who is--
(A) a member of the armed forces, or the security or other
defense services, of the Russian Federation;
(B) an employee of any other element of the Russian
Government; or
(C) an agent or contractor of an individual specified in
subparagraph (A) or (B).
(6) United states person.--The term ``United States person''
has the meaning given that term in section 105A(c) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3039).
(b) Intelligence Community Coordinator for Russian Atrocities
Accountability.--
(1) Designation.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
designate a senior official of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence to serve as the intelligence community
coordinator for Russian atrocities accountability (in this section
referred to as the ``Coordinator'').
(2) Duties.--The Coordinator shall oversee the efforts of the
intelligence community relating to the following:
(A) Identifying, and (as appropriate) disseminating within
the United States Government, intelligence relating to the
identification, location, or activities of foreign persons
suspected of playing a role in committing Russian atrocities in
Ukraine.
(B) Identifying analytic and other intelligence needs and
priorities of the intelligence community with respect to the
commitment of such Russian atrocities.
(C) Addressing any gaps in intelligence collection relating
to the commitment of such Russian atrocities and developing
recommendations to address any gaps so identified, including by
recommending the modification of the priorities of the
intelligence community with respect to intelligence collection.
(D) Collaborating with appropriate counterparts across the
intelligence community to ensure appropriate coordination on,
and integration of the analysis of, the commitment of such
Russian atrocities.
(E) Identifying intelligence and other information that may
be relevant to preserve evidence of potential war crimes by
Russia, consistent with the public commitments of the United
States to support investigations into the conduct of Russia.
(F) Ensuring the Atrocities Early Warning Task Force and
other relevant departments and agencies of the United States
Government receive appropriate support from the intelligence
community with respect to the collection, analysis,
preservation, and, as appropriate, dissemination, of
intelligence related to Russian atrocities in Ukraine.
(3) Plan required.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress--
(A) the name of the official designated as the Coordinator
pursuant to paragraph (1); and
(B) the strategy of the intelligence community for the
collection of intelligence related to Russian atrocities in
Ukraine, including a detailed description of how the
Coordinator shall support, and assist in facilitating the
implementation of, such strategy.
(4) Annual report to congress.--
(A) Reports required.--Not later than May 1, 2023, and
annually thereafter until May 1, 2026, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report detailing, for the year covered by the
report--
(i) the analytical findings and activities of the
intelligence community with respect to Russian atrocities
in Ukraine; and
(ii) the recipients of information shared pursuant to
this section for the purpose of ensuring accountability for
such Russian atrocities, and the date of any such sharing.
(B) Form.--Each report submitted under subparagraph (A) may
be submitted in classified form, consistent with the protection
of intelligence sources and methods.
(C) Supplement.--The Director of National Intelligence may
supplement an existing reporting requirement with the
information required under subparagraph (A) on an annual basis
to satisfy that requirement with prior notification of intent
to do so to the appropriate committees of Congress.
(c) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have effect on the date
that is 4 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 6513. LEAD INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERING AND
NEUTRALIZING PROLIFERATION OF IRAN-ORIGIN UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Five eyes partnership.--The term ``Five Eyes Partnership''
means the intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
(3) Unmanned aircraft system.--The term ``unmanned aircraft
system'' includes an unmanned powered aircraft (including
communication links and the components that control the unmanned
aircraft), that--
(A) does not carry a human operator;
(B) may fly autonomously or be piloted remotely;
(C) may be expendable or recoverable; and
(D) may carry a lethal payload or explode upon reaching a
designated location.
(b) Coordinator.--
(1) Designation.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
designate an official from an element of the intelligence community
to serve as the lead intelligence community coordinator for
countering and neutralizing the proliferation of Iran-origin
unmanned aircraft systems (in this section referred to as the
``Coordinator'').
(2) Plan.--Not later than 120 days after the date on which the
Coordinator is designated under paragraph (1), the Coordinator
shall--
(A) develop a comprehensive plan of action, driven by
intelligence information, for countering and neutralizing the
threats posed by the proliferation of Iran-origin unmanned
aircraft systems; and
(B) provide to appropriate committees of Congress a
briefing on such plan of action.
(3) Final report.--
(A) Submission.--Not later than January 1, 2024, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a final report on the
activities and findings of the Coordinator.
(B) Matters.--The report under subparagraph (A) shall
include the following:
(i) An assessment of the threats posed by Iran-origin
unmanned aircraft systems, including the threat to
facilities and personnel of the United States Government in
the greater Middle East, particularly in the areas of such
region that are located within the area of responsibility
of the Commander of the United States Central Command.
(ii) A detailed description of intelligence sharing
efforts, as well as other joint efforts driven by
intelligence information, with allies and partners of the
United States, to assist in countering and neutralizing of
such threats.
(iii) Recommendations for any changes in United States
policy or legislative authorities to improve the capacity
of the intelligence community to assist in countering and
neutralizing such threats.
(C) Form.--The report under subparagraph (A) may be
submitted in classified form.
(D) Annex.--In submitting the report under subparagraph (A)
to the congressional intelligence committees, the Director
shall also include an accompanying annex, which shall be
classified, that separately details all efforts supported
exclusively by National Intelligence Program funds.
(c) Collaboration With Five Eyes Partnership and Israel.--Taking
into account the findings of the final report under subsection (b)(3),
the Director of National Intelligence shall seek to--
(1) develop and implement a common approach among the Five Eyes
Partnership toward countering the threats posed by Iran-origin
unmanned aircraft systems, including by leveraging the unique
intelligence capabilities and information of the members of the
Five Eyes Partnership; and
(2) intensify cooperation with Israel for the purpose of
countering Iran-origin unmanned aircraft systems, including by
strengthening and expanding existing cooperative efforts conducted
pursuant to section 1278 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92; 133 Stat. 1702; 22 U.S.C.
8606 note).
(d) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have effect on the date on
which the final report is submitted under subsection (b)(3).
SEC. 6514. COLLABORATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE TO COUNTER FOREIGN COMMERCIAL THREATS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
and
(C) the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Foreign commercial threat.--
(A) In general.--The term ``foreign commercial threat''
means a rare commercial item or service that is produced by,
offered by, sold by, licensed by, or otherwise distributed
under the control of a strategic competitor or foreign
adversary in a manner that may provide the strategic competitor
or foreign adversary leverage over an intended recipient.
(B) Determinations by working group.--In determining
whether an item or service is a foreign commercial threat, the
Working Group shall consider whether the strategic competitor
or foreign adversary could--
(i) withhold, or threaten to withhold, the rare
commercial item or service;
(ii) create reliance on the rare commercial item or
service as essential to the safety, health, or economic
wellbeing of the intended recipient; or
(iii) have its rare commercial item or service easily
replaced by a United States entity or an entity of an ally
or partner of the United States.
(3) Rare commercial item or service.--The term ``rare
commercial item or service'' means a good, service, or intellectual
property that is not widely available for distribution.
(b) Working Group.--
(1) Establishment.--Unless the Director of National
Intelligence and the Secretary of Commerce make the joint
determination specified in subsection (c), the Director and the
Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall
jointly establish a working group to counter foreign commercial
threats (in this section referred to as the ``Working Group'').
(2) Membership.--The composition of the Working Group may
include any officer or employee of a department or agency of the
United States Government determined appropriate by the Director or
the Secretary.
(3) Duties.--The duties of the Working Group shall be the
following:
(A) To identify current foreign commercial threats.
(B) To identify probable future foreign commercial threats.
(C) To identify goods, services, or intellectual property
that, if produced by entities within the United States, or
allies or partners of the United States, would mitigate foreign
commercial threats.
(4) Meetings.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and on a regular basis that is not less
frequently than quarterly thereafter until the date of termination
under paragraph (5), the Working Group shall meet.
(5) Termination.--Beginning on the date that is 2 years after
the date of the establishment under paragraph (1), the Working
Group may be terminated upon the Director of National Intelligence
and the Secretary of Commerce jointly--
(A) determining that termination of the Working Group is
appropriate; and
(B) submitting to the appropriate congressional committees
a notification of such determination (including a description
of the justification for such determination).
(6) Reports.--
(A) Submission to congress.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, and biannually
thereafter until the date of termination under paragraph (5),
the Working Group shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the activities of the Working Group.
(B) Matters.--Each report under subparagraph (A) shall
include a description of the following:
(i) Any current or future foreign commercial threats
identified by the Working Group.
(ii) The strategy of the United States Government, if
any, to mitigate any current foreign commercial threats or
future foreign commercial threats so identified.
(iii) The plan of the intelligence community to provide
to the Department of Commerce and other nontraditional
customers of the intelligence community support in
addressing foreign commercial threats.
(iv) Any other significant activity of the Working
Group.
(c) Option to Discharge Obligation Through Other Means.--If the
Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Commerce make a
joint determination that the requirements of the Working Group under
subsection (b) (including the duties under paragraph (3) and the
reporting requirement under paragraph (6) of such subsection) may be
appropriately filled by an existing entity or structure, and submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a notification of such
determination (including a description of the justification for such
determination), the Director and Secretary may task such entity or
structure with such requirements in lieu of establishing the Working
Group.
SEC. 6515. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT ON FOREIGN WEAPONIZATION OF
ADVERTISEMENT TECHNOLOGY DATA.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Advertisement technology data.--The term ``advertisement
technology data'' means commercially available data derived from
advertisement technology that is used, or can be used, to geolocate
individuals or gain other targeting information on individuals.
(2) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(E) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) Assessment.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
conduct an intelligence assessment of the counterintelligence risks of,
and the exposure of intelligence community and Department of Defense
personnel and activities to, tracking by foreign adversaries through
advertisement technology data.
(c) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report on the intelligence assessment under subsection (b).
SEC. 6516. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT REGARDING RUSSIAN GRAY
ZONE ASSETS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(E) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Gray zone activity.--The term ``gray zone activity'' has
the meaning given that term in section 825 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-103).
(3) Gray zone asset.--The term ``gray zone asset''--
(A) means an entity or proxy that is controlled, in whole
or in part, by a foreign adversary of the United States and is
used by such foreign adversary in connection with a gray zone
activity; and
(B) includes a state-owned enterprise of a foreign
adversary that is so used.
(b) Intelligence Community Assessment Regarding Russian Gray Zone
Assets.--
(1) Intelligence community assessment.--The Director of
National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence
Council, shall produce an intelligence community assessment that
contains--
(A) a description of the gray zone assets of Russia;
(B) an identification of any opportunities to hold such
gray zone assets at risk, as a method of influencing the
behavior of Russia; and
(C) an assessment of the risks and potential benefits, with
respect to the interests of the United States, that may result
from the seizure of such gray zone assets to hold the assets at
risk.
(2) Considerations.--In identifying opportunities to hold a
gray zone asset of Russia at risk under paragraph (1)(B), the
National Intelligence Council shall consider the following:
(A) The effect on civilians of holding the gray zone asset
at risk.
(B) The extent to which the gray zone asset is
substantially state-owned or substantially controlled by
Russia.
(C) The likelihood that holding the gray zone asset at risk
will influence the behavior of Russia.
(D) The likelihood that holding the gray asset at risk, or
degrading the asset, will affect any attempt of Russia to use
force to change existing borders or undermine the political
independence or territorial integrity of any state, including
Ukraine.
(E) Such other factors as the National Intelligence Council
may determine appropriate.
(3) Appendix.--The intelligence community assessment under
paragraph (1) shall include an appendix that contains a list of the
categories of gray zone assets of Russia, with specific examples
of--
(A) gray zone assets in each category; and
(B) for each such gray zone asset listed, the ways in which
Russia uses the asset to advance its gray zone activities.
(4) Submission.--The Director, consistent with the protection
of sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress the intelligence community assessment under paragraph
(1).
(5) Form.--The intelligence community assessment under
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
contain a classified annex.
Subtitle C--Reports and Other Matters
SEC. 6521. REPORT ON ASSESSING WILL TO FIGHT.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
(A) The congressional intelligence committees.
(B) The Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
(C) The Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Military will to fight.--The term ``military will to
fight'' means, with respect to the military of a country, the
disposition and decision to fight, act, or persevere as needed.
(3) National will to fight.--The term ``national will to
fight'' means, with respect to the government of a country, the
resolve to conduct sustained military and other operations for an
objective even when the expectation of success decreases or the
need for significant political, economic, and military sacrifices
increases.
(b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) According to a study by the RAND corporation, ``will to
fight'' is poorly analyzed and the least understood aspect of war.
(2) In testimony before the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate in May 2022, top intelligence officials of the United
States indicated that although the intelligence community
accurately anticipated Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the
intelligence community did not accurately assess the will of
Ukrainian forces to fight in opposition to a Russian invasion or
that the Ukrainian forces would succeed in averting a rapid Russian
military occupation of Kyiv.
(3) According to the RAND corporation, the intelligence
community estimated that the Afghan government's forces could hold
out against the Taliban for as long as 2 years if all ground forces
of the United States were withdrawn. This estimate was revised in
June 2021 to reflect an intelligence community view that
Afghanistan's military collapse could come in 6 to 12 months. In
August 2021, the Afghan government fell within days after the
ground forces of the United States were withdrawn.
(4) Similarly, the rapid advance of the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria and near-total collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces in
2014 appeared to take the policymakers of the United States by
surprise.
(5) The apparent gaps in these analyses had important
implications for policy decisions of the United States toward
Russia and Afghanistan, and suggest a need for further examination
of how the intelligence community assesses a foreign military's
will to fight.
(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting
through the National Intelligence Council and in coordination with the
heads of the elements of the intelligence community that the Director
determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report examining the extent to which analyses of the
military will to fight and the national will to fight informed the all-
source analyses of the intelligence community regarding how the armed
forces and governments of Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Iraq would perform
at key junctures.
(d) Elements.--The report under subsection (c) shall include the
following:
(1) The methodology of the intelligence community for measuring
the military will to fight and the national will to fight of a
foreign country.
(2) The extent to which analysts of the intelligence community
applied such methodology when assessing the military will to fight
and the national will to fight of--
(A) Afghanistan following the April 2021 announcement of
the full withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces;
(B) Iraq in the face of the rapid emergence and advancement
in 2014 of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; and
(C) Ukraine and Russia during the initial phase of the
invasion and march toward Kyiv by Russia in February 2022.
(3) The extent to which--
(A) the assessments described in paragraph (2) depended on
the observations of personnel of the United States Armed Forces
who had trained Afghan, Iraqi, and Ukrainian armed forces; and
(B) such observations reflected any standardized, objective
methodology.
(4) Whether shortcomings in assessing the military will to
fight and the national will to fight may have affected the capacity
of the intelligence community to provide ``early warning'' about
the collapse of government forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
(5) The extent to which ``red teaming'' was used to test the
assessments described in paragraph (2).
(6) The extent to which dissenting opinions of intelligence
analysts were highlighted in final written products presented to
senior policymakers of the United States.
(7) The extent to which analysts and supervisors adhered to the
policies, procedures, directives, and best practices of the
intelligence community.
(8) Recommendations for analyses by the intelligence community
going forward to incorporate lessons learned and enhance the
quality of future analytical products to more accurately reflect
the military will to fight and the national will to fight and
improve the capacity of the intelligence community to accurately
predict the success or failure of the armed forces of a foreign
country.
(e) Annex.--In submitting the report under subsection (c) to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, the Director shall also include an accompanying annex,
which shall be classified, providing an inventory of the following:
(1) Collection gaps and challenges that may have affected the
analysis of the collapse of government forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
(2) Actions that the Director of National Intelligence has
taken to mitigate such gaps and challenges.
(f) Form.--The report under subsection (c) may be submitted in
classified form, but if so submitted, shall include an unclassified
summary of key findings, consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods.
SEC. 6522. REPORT ON THREAT FROM HYPERSONIC WEAPONS.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing an
assessment of the threat to the United States, and to allies and
partners of the United States, from hypersonic weapons in light of the
use of such weapons by Russia in Ukraine.
(c) Elements.--The assessment under subsection (b) shall include
the following:
(1) The information learned by the United States regarding the
hypersonic weapons capabilities of Russia.
(2) Insights into the doctrine of Russia regarding the use of
hypersonic weapons.
(3) An assessment of how allies and partners of the United
States view the threat of hypersonic weapons.
(4) An assessment of the degree to which the development of
missiles with similar capabilities as hypersonic weapons used by
Russia would enhance or reduce the ability of the United States to
deter Russia from threatening the national security of the United
States.
(d) Form.--The report under subsection (b) may be submitted in
classified form.
SEC. 6523. REPORT ON ORDNANCE OF RUSSIA AND CHINA.
(a) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional defense committees a report on ordnance of Russia and
China, including the technical specificity required for the safe
handling and disposal of such ordnance.
(b) Coordination.--The Director shall carry out subsection (a) in
coordination with the head of any element of the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise that the Director determines appropriate.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Congressional defense committees.--The term ``congressional
defense committees'' has the meaning given that term in section
101(a) of title 10, United States Code.
(2) Defense intelligence enterprise.--The term ``Defense
Intelligence Enterprise'' has the meaning given that term in
section 426(b) of title 10, United States Code.
SEC. 6524. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF CHINA AND RUSSIA TARGETING LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Foreign malign influence.--The term ``foreign malign
influence'' means any hostile effort undertaken by, at the
direction of, or on behalf of or with the substantial support of,
the government of a foreign country with the objective of
influencing, through overt or covert means--
(A) the political, military, economic, or other policies or
activities of the government of the country that is the target
of the hostile effort, including any election within such
target country; or
(B) the public opinion within such target country.
(3) Latin america and the caribbean.--The term ``Latin America
and the Caribbean'' means the countries and non-United States
territories of South America, Central America, the Caribbean, and
Mexico.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting
through the National Intelligence Council and in coordination with the
Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report on activities undertaken by China and Russia in Latin
America and the Caribbean that are intended to increase the influence
of China and Russia, respectively, therein. Such report shall include a
description of the following:
(1) Foreign malign influence campaigns by China and Russia
targeting Latin America and the Caribbean.
(2) Financial investments intended to increase Chinese or
Russian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.
(3) Efforts by China and Russia to expand diplomatic, military,
or other ties to Latin America and the Caribbean.
(4) Any other activities determined appropriate by the
Director.
(c) Matters.--With respect to the description of foreign malign
influence campaigns under subsection (b), the report shall include an
assessment of the following:
(1) The objectives of any such campaign.
(2) The themes and messaging used in any such campaign.
(3) The scale and nature of the threat posed by any such
campaign.
(4) The effect of such threat on the national security,
diplomatic, military, or economic interests of the United States.
(d) Form.--The report under subsection (b) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 6525. REPORT ON SUPPORT PROVIDED BY CHINA TO RUSSIA.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed
Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
on Ways and Means, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, consistent with
the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of elements of
the intelligence community that the Director determines appropriate,
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on
whether and how China, including with respect to the Government of the
People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, any Chinese
state-owned enterprise, and any other Chinese entity, has provided
support to Russia with respect to the unprovoked invasion of and full-
scale war by Russia against Ukraine.
(c) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (b) shall
include a discussion of support provided by China to Russia with
respect to--
(1) helping the Government of Russia or Russian entities evade
or circumvent sanctions by the United States or multilateral
sanctions and export controls;
(2) deliberately inhibiting onsite United States Government
export control end-use checks, including interviews and
investigations, in China;
(3) providing Russia with any technology, including
semiconductors classified as EAR99, that supports Russian
intelligence or military capabilities;
(4) establishing economic or financial arrangements that will
have the effect of alleviating the effect of sanctions by the
United States or multilateral sanctions; and
(5) providing any material, technical, or logistical support,
including to Russian military or intelligence agencies and state-
owned or state-linked enterprises.
(d) Form.--The report under subsection (c) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(e) Sunset.--The requirement to submit the report under subsection
(b) shall terminate on the earlier of--
(1) the date on which the Director of National Intelligence
determines the conflict in Ukraine has ended; or
(2) the date that is 2 years after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
SEC. 6526. REPORT ON GLOBAL CCP FINANCING OF PORT INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense,
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
documenting all Chinese financing of port infrastructure globally,
during the period beginning on January 1, 2012, and ending on the date
of the submission of the report, and the commercial and economic
implications of such investments. The report shall also include the
following:
(1) A review of existing and potential or planned future
Chinese financing, including financing by government entities, and
state-owned enterprises, in port infrastructure at such ports.
(2) Any known Chinese interest in establishing a military or
intelligence presence at or near such ports.
(3) An assessment of China's current and potential future
ability to leverage commercial ports for military or intelligence
collection purposes and the implications of such ability for the
national security of the United States and allies and partners of
the United States.
(4) A description of activities undertaken by the United States
and allies and partners of the United States to help identify and
provide alternatives to Chinese investments in port infrastructure.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted
in unclassified form but may include a classified annex produced
consistent with the protection of sources and methods.
SEC. 6527. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PROVISION OF SUPPORT BY INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY FOR ATROCITY PREVENTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Atrocities.--The term ``atrocities'' has the meaning given
that term in section 6 of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities
Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-441; 132 Stat. 5586).
(2) Atrocity crime scene.--The term ``atrocity crime scene''
means 1 or more locations that are relevant to the investigation of
an atrocity, including buildings or locations (including bodies of
water) where physical evidence may be collected relating to the
perpetrators, victims, and events of the atrocity, such as mass
graves and other sites containing deceased individuals.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
efforts of the United States Government regarding atrocity prevention
and response through interagency coordination, such as the Atrocity
Warning Task Force, are critically important and that the Director of
National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should, as
appropriate and in compliance with the American Servicemembers'
Protection Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7421 et seq.), do the following:
(1) Require each element of the intelligence community to
support the Atrocity Warning Task Force in its mission to prevent
genocide and atrocities through policy formulation and program
development by--
(A) collecting and analyzing intelligence identified as an
atrocity, as defined in the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities
Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-441; 132 Stat. 5586);
(B) preparing unclassified intelligence data and geospatial
imagery products for coordination with appropriate domestic,
foreign, and international courts and tribunals prosecuting
persons responsible for crimes for which such imagery and
intelligence may provide evidence (including genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes, including with respect to
missing persons and suspected atrocity crime scenes); and
(C) reassessing archived geospatial imagery containing
indicators of war crimes, other atrocities, forced
disappearances, and atrocity crime scenes.
(2) Continue to make available inputs to the Atrocity Warning
Task Force for the development of the Department of State Atrocity
Early Warning Assessment and share open-source data to support pre-
atrocity and genocide indicators and warnings to the Atrocity
Warning Task Force.
(3) Provide the President and Congress with recommendations to
improve policies, programs, resources, and tools relating to
atrocity intelligence collection and interagency coordination.
(4) Regularly consult and participate with designated
interagency representatives of relevant agencies and departments of
the United States Government.
(5) Ensure resources are made available for the policies,
programs, and tools relating to atrocity intelligence collection
and coordination with the Atrocity Warning Task Force.
TITLE LXVI--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE MATTERS
SEC. 6601. IMPROVING ONBOARDING OF PERSONNEL IN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Definition of Onboard Period.--In this section, the term
``onboard period'' means the period beginning on the date on which an
individual submits an application for employment and ending on--
(1) the date on which the individual is offered one or more
entrance on duty dates; or
(2) the date on which the individual enters on duty.
(b) Policy Guidance.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
establish policy guidance appropriate for all elements of the
intelligence community that can be used to measure, consistently and
reliably, the onboard period.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives a report on the time it takes to
onboard personnel in the intelligence community.
(2) Elements.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
cover the mean and median time it takes to onboard personnel in the
intelligence community, disaggregated by mode of onboarding and
element of the intelligence community.
(d) Plan.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director, in coordination with the heads
of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives a plan to reduce the onboard period
for personnel in the intelligence community, for elements of the
intelligence community that currently have median onboarding times
that exceed 180 days.
(2) Elements.--The plan submitted under paragraph (1) shall
include milestones to achieve certain specific goals with respect
to the mean, median, and mode time it takes to onboard personnel in
the elements of the intelligence community described in such
paragraph, disaggregated by element of the intelligence community.
(e) Implementation.--The heads of the elements of the intelligence
community, including the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
shall implement the plan submitted under subsection (d) and take all
such actions each head considers appropriate and necessary to ensure
that by December 31, 2023, the median duration of the onboard period
for new employees at each element of the intelligence community is
equal to less than 180 days.
SEC. 6602. REPORT ON LEGISLATIVE ACTION REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT TRUSTED
WORKFORCE 2.0 INITIATIVE.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Deputy Director for Management of the Office
of Management and Budget shall, in the Deputy Director's capacity as
the Chair of the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance
Accountability Council pursuant to section 2.4 of Executive Order 13467
(50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to reforming processes related to
suitability for Government employment, fitness for contractor
employees, and eligibility for access to classified national security
information), submit to Congress a report on the legislative action
required to implement the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative.
(b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) Specification of the statutes that require amendment in
order to implement the initiative described in subsection (a).
(2) For each statute specified under paragraph (1), an
indication of the priority for enactment of an amendment.
(3) For each statute specified under paragraph (1), a
description of the consequences if the statute is not amended.
SEC. 6603. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT
OF ADMINISTRATION OF POLYGRAPHS IN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Assessment Required.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall conduct an assessment of the administration of
polygraph evaluations that are needed in the intelligence community to
meet current annual personnel hiring requirements.
(b) Elements.--The assessment completed under subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) Identification of the number of polygraphers currently
available at each element of the intelligence community to meet the
requirements described in subsection (a).
(2) If the demand described in subsection (a) cannot be met, an
identification of the number of polygraphers that would need to be
hired and certified to meet it.
(3) A review of the effectiveness of alternatives to the
polygraph, including methods being researched by the National
Center for Credibility Assessment.
(c) Briefing.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall brief the congressional intelligence committees, the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives on the preliminary
findings of the Inspector General with respect to the assessment
conducted pursuant to subsection (a).
(d) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall submit to the committees described in subsection (c) a
report on the findings of the Inspector General with respect to the
assessment conducted pursuant to subsection (a).
SEC. 6604. TIMELINESS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF POLYGRAPHS.
(a) Standards Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall,
in the Director's capacity as the Security Executive Agent pursuant
to section 803(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3162a(a)), issue standards for timeliness for Federal agencies to
administer polygraphs conducted for the purpose of--
(A) adjudicating decisions regarding eligibility for access
to classified information (as defined in the procedures
established pursuant to section 801(a) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161(a))); and
(B) granting reciprocity pursuant to Security Executive
Agent Directive 2, or successor directive.
(2) Publication.--The Director shall publish the standards
issued under paragraph (1) in the Federal Register or such other
venue as the Director considers appropriate.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to Congress a report
on how Federal agencies will comply with the standards issued under
subsection (a). Such plan shall specify the resources required by
Federal agencies to comply with such standards and the timeline for
doing so.
SEC. 6605. POLICY ON SUBMITTAL OF APPLICATIONS FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION FOR CERTAIN PERSONNEL.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in the Director's
capacity as the Security Executive Agent pursuant to section 803(a) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162a(a)), issue a policy
that allows a private person to submit a certain number or proportion
of applications, on a nonreimbursable basis, for employee access to
classified information for personnel who perform key management and
oversight functions who may not merit an application due to their work
under any one contract.
SEC. 6606. TECHNICAL CORRECTION REGARDING FEDERAL POLICY ON SHARING OF
COVERED INSIDER THREAT INFORMATION.
Section 806(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2022 (Public Law 117-103) is amended by striking ``contracting
agency'' and inserting ``contractor that employs the contractor
employee''.
SEC. 6607. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORT ON
USE OF SPACE CERTIFIED AS SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
FACILITIES.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
utilization of space owned or sponsored by an element of the
intelligence community, located in the continental United States, that
is certified as a sensitive compartmented information facility under
intelligence community or Department of Defense policy.
SEC. 6608. IMPROVING PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN PERSONNEL PRACTICES IN
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES.
Section 1104(c)(1)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3234(c)(1)(A)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``a supervisor of the contracting agency'' and
inserting ``a supervisor of the employing or contracting agency or
employing contractor'';
(2) by striking ``contracting agency (or an employee designated
by the head of that agency for such purpose)'' and inserting
``employing or contracting agency (or an employee designated by the
head of that agency for that purpose) or employing contractor'';
and
(3) by striking ``appropriate inspector general of the
contracting agency'' and inserting ``appropriate inspector general
of the employing or contracting agency''.
SEC. 6609. DEFINITIONS REGARDING WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS AND
INFORMATION OF URGENT CONCERN RECEIVED BY INSPECTORS GENERAL OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) National Security Act of 1947.--Section 103H(k)(5)(G)(i)(I) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)(G)(i)(I)) is
amended by striking ``within the'' and all that follows through
``policy matters.'' and inserting the following: ``of the Federal
Government that is--
``(aa) a matter of national security; and
``(bb) not a difference of opinion concerning
public policy matters.''.
(b) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H(h)(1)(A)(i) of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking
``involving'' and all that follows through ``policy matters.'' and
inserting the following: ``of the Federal Government that is--
``(I) a matter of national security; and
``(II) not a difference of opinion concerning
public policy matters.''.
(c) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--Section
17(d)(5)(G)(i)(I)(aa) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)(G)(i)(I)(aa)) is amended by striking
``involving'' and all that follows through ``policy matters.'' and
inserting the following: ``of the Federal Government that is--
``(AA) a matter of national security; and
``(BB) not a difference of opinion
concerning public policy matters.''.
TITLE LXVII--MATTERS RELATING TO EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Subtitle A--General Matters
SEC. 6701. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Artificial intelligence.--The term ``artificial
intelligence'' has the meaning given that term in section 5002 of
the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (15
U.S.C. 9401).
(2) Authorization to operate.--The term ``authorization to
operate'' has the meaning given that term in Circular Number A-130
of the Office of Management and Budget, ``Managing Information as a
Strategic Resource'', or any successor document.
(3) Code-free artificial intelligence enablement tools.--The
term ``code-free artificial intelligence enablement tools'' means
software that provides an environment in which visual drag-and-drop
applications, or similar tools, allow one or more individuals to
program applications without linear coding.
(4) Commercial product.--The term ``commercial product'' has
the meaning given that term in section 103 of title 41, United
States Code.
(5) Commercial service.--The term ``commercial service'' has
the meaning given that term in section 103a of title 41, United
States Code.
(6) Covered item or service.--The term ``covered item or
service'' means a product, system, or service that is not a
commercially available off-the-shelf item, a commercial service, or
a nondevelopmental item, as those terms are defined in title 41,
United States Code.
(7) Covered product.--The term ``covered product'' means a
commercial software product that involves emerging technologies or
artificial intelligence.
(8) Emerging technology.--The term ``emerging technology''
means--
(A) technology that is in a developmental stage or that may
be developed during the 10-year period beginning on January 1,
2022; or
(B) any technology included in the Critical and Emerging
Technologies List published by the White House in February
2022, or any successor document.
SEC. 6702. ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE POLICIES, STANDARDS, AND
GUIDANCE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Responsibilities of Director of National Intelligence.--The
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of
the elements of the intelligence community or the officials designated
under subsection (b), shall--
(1) establish, and periodically conduct reviews of, policies,
standards, and procedures relating to the acquisition, adoption,
development, use, coordination, and maintenance of artificial
intelligence capabilities and associated data, frameworks,
computing environments, and other enablers by the intelligence
community (including by incorporating and updating such policies
based on emerging technology capabilities), to accelerate and
increase the adoption of artificial intelligence capabilities
within the intelligence community;
(2) ensure policies established or updated pursuant to
paragraph (1) are consistent with--
(A) the principles outlined in the guidance of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence titled ``Principles of
Artificial Intelligence Ethics for the Intelligence Community
and its Artificial Intelligence Ethics Framework for the
Intelligence Community'', or any successor guidance; and
(B) any other principles developed by the Director relating
to the governance, documentation, auditability, or evaluation
of artificial intelligence systems or the accurate, secure,
ethical, and reliable adoption or use of artificial
intelligence; and
(3) provide to the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community guidance for developing the National Intelligence Program
budget pertaining to such elements to facilitate the acquisition,
adoption, development, use, and maintenance of element-specific
artificial intelligence capabilities, and to ensure the associated
data, frameworks, computing environments, and other enablers are
appropriately prioritized.
(b) Designated Leads Within Each Element of the Intelligence
Community.--Each head of an element of the intelligence community, in
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall identify
a senior official within the element to serve as the designated element
lead responsible for overseeing and coordinating efforts relating to
artificial intelligence, including through the integration of the
acquisition, technology, human capital, and financial management
aspects necessary for the adoption of artificial intelligence
solutions. Such designated element leads shall meet regularly to
consult and coordinate with the Director of National Intelligence
regarding the implementation of this section and this title.
SEC. 6703. DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Emerging Technology Adoption.--The Director of Science and
Technology may--
(1) conduct reviews of the policies, standards, and procedures
of the intelligence community that relate to emerging technologies
and, as appropriate, recommend to the Director of National
Intelligence changes to such policies, standards, and procedures,
to accelerate and increase the adoption of emerging technologies by
the intelligence community;
(2) make recommendations, in coordination with the heads of the
elements of the intelligence community, to the Director of National
Intelligence with respect to the budgets of such elements, to
accelerate and increase the adoption of emerging technologies by
such elements; and
(3) coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering on initiatives, policies, and programs carried out
jointly between the intelligence community and the Department of
Defense to accelerate and increase the adoption of emerging
technologies.
(b) Appointment Criteria.--Section 103E(b) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3030(b)) is amended by adding at the end the
following: ``In making such appointment, the Director of National
Intelligence may give preference to an individual with experience
outside of the United States Government.''.
SEC. 6704. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CHIEF DATA OFFICER.
Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et
seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103J the following new
section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such
Act accordingly):
``SEC. 103K. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CHIEF DATA OFFICER.
``(a) Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer.--There is an
Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence who shall be appointed by the
Director of National Intelligence.
``(b) Requirement Relating to Appointment.--An individual appointed
as the Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer shall have a
professional background and experience appropriate for the duties of
the Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer. In making such
appointment, the Director of National Intelligence may give preference
to an individual with experience outside of the United States
Government.
``(c) Duties.--The Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer
shall--
``(1) act as the chief representative of the Director of
National Intelligence for data issues within the intelligence
community;
``(2) coordinate, to the extent practicable and advisable, with
the Chief Data Officer of the Department of Defense to ensure
consistent data policies, standards, and procedures between the
intelligence community and the Department of Defense;
``(3) assist the Director of National Intelligence regarding
data elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence; and
``(4) perform other such duties as may be prescribed by the
Director of National Intelligence or specified in law.''.
Subtitle B--Improvements Relating to Procurement
SEC. 6711. ADDITIONAL TRANSACTION AUTHORITY.
(a) Annual Reports; Feasibility and Advisability Study.--
(1) Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives a report on the use of the authority under
paragraph (5) of section 102A(n) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(n)), as added by subsection (b).
(2) Feasibility and advisability study.--
(A) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
conduct a feasibility and advisability study on whether to
provide to the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community an additional transaction authority that is not
restricted only to basic, applied, and advanced research
projects and prototype projects (similar to such less
restrictive additional transaction authorities of the
Transportation Security Administration and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration).
(B) Submission.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives the findings of
the study conducted under subparagraph (A), including, if the
Director determines a less restrictive additional transaction
authority is advisable pursuant to such study, an
identification of any legislative solutions or other actions
necessary to implement such authority.
(b) Additional Transaction Authority.--Section 102A(n) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(n)) is amended by adding
at the end the following:
``(5) Other Transaction Authority.--
``(A) In general.--In addition to other acquisition
authorities, the Director of National Intelligence may exercise the
acquisition authorities referred to in sections 4021 and 4022 of
title 10, United States Code, subject to the provisions of this
paragraph.
``(B) Delegation.--(i) The Director shall delegate the
authorities provided by subparagraph (A) to the heads of elements
of the intelligence community.
``(ii) The heads of elements of the intelligence community
shall, to the maximum extent practicable, delegate the authority
delegated under clause (i) to the official of the respective
element of the intelligence community responsible for decisions
with respect to basic, applied, or advanced research activities or
the adoption of such activities within such element.
``(C) Intelligence community authority.--(i) For purposes of
this paragraph, the limitation in section 4022(a)(1) of title 10,
United States Code, shall not apply to elements of the intelligence
community.
``(ii) Subject to section 4022(a)(2) of such title, the
Director may enter into transactions and agreements (other than
contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants) of amounts not to
exceed $75,000,000 under this paragraph to carry out basic,
applied, and advanced research projects and prototype projects in
support of intelligence activities.
``(iii) For purposes of this paragraph, the limitations
specified in section 4022(a)(2) of such title shall apply to the
intelligence community in lieu of the Department of Defense, and
the Director shall--
``(I) identify appropriate officials who can make the
determinations required in subparagraph (B)(i) of such section
for the intelligence community; and
``(II) brief the congressional intelligence committees, the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives in lieu of the
congressional defense committees, as specified in subparagraph
(B)(ii) of such section.
``(iv) For purposes of this paragraph, the limitation in
section 4022(a)(3) of such title shall not apply to elements of the
intelligence community.
``(v) In carrying out this paragraph, section 4022(d)(1) of
such title shall be applied by substituting `Director of National
Intelligence' for `Secretary of Defense'.
``(vi) For purposes of this paragraph, the limitations in
section 4022(d)(2) of such title shall not apply to elements of the
intelligence community.
``(vii) In addition to the follow-on production contract
criteria in section 4022(f)(2) of such title, the following
additional criteria shall apply:
``(I) The authorizing official of the relevant element of
the intelligence community determines that Government users of
the proposed production product or production service have been
consulted.
``(II) In the case of a proposed production product that is
software, there are mechanisms in place for Government users to
provide ongoing feedback to participants to the follow-on
production contract.
``(III) In the case of a proposed production product that
is software, there are mechanisms in place to promote the
interoperability and accessibility with and between Government
and commercial software providers, including by the promotion
of open application programming interfaces and requirement of
appropriate software documentation.
``(IV) The award follows a documented market analysis as
mandated by the Federal Acquisition Regulations surveying
available and comparable products.
``(V) In the case of a proposed production product that is
software, the follow-on production contract includes a
requirement that, for the duration of such contract (or such
other period of time as may be agreed to as a term of such
contract)--
``(aa) the participants provide the most up-to-date
version of the product that is available in the commercial
marketplace and is consistent with security requirements;
``(bb) there are mechanisms in place for the
participants to provide timely updates to the production
product; and
``(cc) the authority specified in section 4022(f)(5) of
such title shall be exercised by the Director in lieu of
the Secretary of Defense.
``(D) Implementation policy.--The Director, in consultation
with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community,
shall--
``(i) not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2023, establish and implement an intelligence community-wide
policy prescribing the use and limitations of the authority
under this paragraph, particularly with respect to the
application of subparagraphs (B) and (C);
``(ii) periodically review and update the policy
established under clause (i); and
``(iii) submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives
the policy when established under clause (i) or updated under
clause (ii).
``(E) Annual report.--
``(i) In general.--Not less frequently than annually, the
Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives
a report detailing the use by the intelligence community of the
authority provided by this paragraph.
``(ii) Elements.--
``(I) Required elements.--Each report required by
clause (i) shall detail the following:
``(aa) The number of transactions.
``(bb) The participants to such transactions.
``(cc) The purpose of the transaction.
``(dd) The amount of each transaction.
``(ee) Concerns with the efficiency of the policy.
``(ff) Any recommendations for how to improve the
process.
``(II) Other elements.--Each report required by clause
(i) may describe such transactions which have been awarded
follow-on production contracts either pursuant to the
authority provided by this paragraph or another acquisition
authority available to the intelligence community.''.
SEC. 6712. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND ADVISABILITY STUDY FOR OFFICES OF
COMMERCIAL INTEGRATION.
(a) Plan and Study.--
(1) Submission.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives--
(A) a plan for the establishment of a centralized office or
offices within each appropriate element of the intelligence
community, to be known as the ``Office of Commercial
Integration'', for the purpose of--
(i) assisting persons desiring to submit an offer for a
contract with the intelligence community; and
(ii) assisting with the procurement of commercial
products and commercial services; and
(B) the findings of a study conducted by the Director into
the advisability of implementing such plan, including an
assessment of--
(i) whether there should be a single Office of
Commercial Integration for the intelligence community or
whether each element of the intelligence community shall
establish such an Office;
(ii) the costs and benefits of the implementation of
such plan; and
(iii) whether there is within any element of the
intelligence community an existing office or program
similar to the proposed Office of Commercial Integration.
(2) Elements.--The materials submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include the following:
(A) A recommendation by the Director, based on the findings
of the study under paragraph (1)(B), on--
(i) how the plan under paragraph (1)(A) compares to
specific alternative actions of the intelligence community
that could be taken to assist persons desiring to submit an
offer for a contract with the intelligence community and
assist with the procurement of commercial products and
commercial services; and
(ii) whether to implement such plan.
(B) A proposal for the designation of a senior official of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who would
be responsible for the coordination across the intelligence
community or across the Offices of Commercial Integration,
depending on the findings of the study under paragraph (1)(B).
(C) Draft guidelines that would require the coordination
and sharing of best practices and other information across the
intelligence community.
(D) A timeline of the steps that would be necessary to
establish each Office of Commercial Integration by the date
that is not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment
of this Act.
(E) An assessment of the personnel requirements, and any
other resource requirements, that would be necessary to
establish the Office or Offices of Commercial Integration by
such date, including--
(i) the amount of personnel necessary for the
establishment of the Office or Offices of Commercial
Integration; and
(ii) the necessary qualifications of any such
personnel.
(F) Policies regarding the types of assistance that, if an
Office or Offices of Commercial Integration were to be
established, could be provided to contractors by the Director
of such Office, taking into account the role of such assistance
as an incentive for emerging technology companies to enter into
contracts with the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community.
(G) Eligibility criteria for determining the types of
offerors or contractors that would be eligible to receive
assistance provided by each Office of Commercial Integration.
(H) Policies regarding outreach efforts that would be
required to be conducted by the Office or Offices of Commercial
Integration with respect to eligible contractors.
(I) Policies regarding how the intelligence community would
coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to provide proactive counterintelligence risk
analysis and assistance to entities in the private sector.
(J) Draft guidelines that would require the Office or
Offices of Commercial Integration to appoint and assign
personnel with expertise in a range of disciplines necessary
for the accelerated integration of commercial technologies into
the intelligence community (as determined by the Office or
Offices of Commercial Integration), including expertise in the
following:
(i) Authorizations to operate.
(ii) Contracting.
(iii) Facility clearances.
(iv) Security clearances.
(K) Such other intelligence community-wide policies as the
Director of National Intelligence may prescribe relating to the
improvement of commercial integration (and the coordination of
such improvements) by and among the elements of the
intelligence community.
(b) Public Website on Commercial Integration.--
(1) Establishment.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the head of the relevant
elements of the intelligence community (as determined by the
Director) and the designated element leads under section 6702(b),
shall establish a publicly accessible website that includes
relevant information necessary for offerors or contractors to
conduct business with each element of the intelligence community.
(2) Inclusion of certain information.--If there is established
an Office or Offices of Commercial Integration in accordance with
subsection (a), the website under paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) information, as appropriate, on the elements under
subsection (a)(2) relating to that Office; and
(B) contact information for the relevant senior officers of
the Office or Offices.
SEC. 6713. PILOT PROGRAM ON DESIGNATED EMERGING TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION
PROJECTS.
(a) Pilot Program.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
carry out a pilot program to more effectively transition promising
prototypes or products in a developmental stage to a production stage,
through designating eligible projects as ``Emerging Technology
Transition Projects''.
(b) Designation.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
issue guidelines to implement the pilot program under subsection
(a).
(2) Requirements.--The guidelines issued pursuant to paragraph
(1) shall include the following requirements:
(A) Each head of an element of the intelligence community
shall submit to the Director of National Intelligence a
prioritized list of not more than 10 eligible projects per year
to be considered for designation by the Director of National
Intelligence as Emerging Technology Transition Projects during
the budget formulation process.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall designate
not more than 10 eligible projects per year as Emerging
Technology Transition Projects.
(C) No eligible project may be designated by the Director
of National Intelligence as an Emerging Technology Transition
Project unless the head of an element of the intelligence
community includes the project in the prioritized list under
subparagraph (A) and submits to the Director of National
Intelligence, with respect to the project, each of the
following:
(i) A justification of why the product was nominated
for transition, including a description of the importance
of the proposed product to the mission of the intelligence
community and the nominating agency.
(ii) A certification that the project provides new
technologies or processes, or new applications of existing
technologies, that shall enable more effective alternatives
to existing programs, systems, or initiatives of the
intelligence community.
(iii) A certification that the project provides future
cost savings, significantly reduces the time to deliver
capabilities to the intelligence community, or
significantly improves a capability of the intelligence
community.
(iv) A certification that funding is not proposed for
the project in the budget request of the respective covered
element for the fiscal year following the fiscal year in
which the project is submitted for consideration.
(v) A certification in writing by the nominating head
that the project meets all applicable criteria and
requirements of the respective covered element for
transition to production and that the nominating head would
fund the project if additional funds were made available
for such purpose.
(vi) A description of the means by which the proposed
production product shall be incorporated into the
activities and long-term budget of the respective covered
element following such transition.
(vii) A description of steps taken to ensure that the
use of the product shall reflect commercial best practices,
as applicable.
(D) A clear description of the selection of eligible
projects, including specific criteria, that shall include, at a
minimum, the requirements specified in subparagraph (C).
(E) The designation of an official responsible for
implementing this section and coordinating with the heads of
the elements of the intelligence community with respect to the
guidelines issued pursuant to paragraph (1) and overseeing the
awards of funds to Emerging Technology Transition Projects with
respect to that element.
(3) Revocation of designation.--The designation of an Emerging
Technology Transition Project under subsection (b) may be revoked
at any time by--
(A) the Director of National Intelligence; or
(B) the relevant head of a covered element of the
intelligence community that previously submitted a project
under subsection (b), in consultation with the Director of
National Intelligence.
(c) Benefits of Designation.--
(1) Inclusion in multiyear national intelligence program
plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall include in the
relevant multiyear national intelligence program plan submitted to
Congress under section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 3301) the planned expenditures,
if any, of each designated project during the period of its
designation.
(2) Inclusion under separate exhibit.--The heads of elements of
the intelligence community shall ensure that each designated
project is included in a separate budget exhibit in the relevant
multiyear national intelligence program plan submitted to Congress
under such section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 3301) for the period of the
designation of such project.
(3) Consideration in programming and budgeting.--Each
designated project shall be taken into consideration by the
nominating head in the programming and budgeting phases of the
intelligence planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation
process during the period of its designation.
(d) Reports to Congress.--
(1) Annual reports.--On an annual basis for each fiscal year
during which the pilot program under subsection (a) is carried out,
concurrently with the submission of the budget of the President for
that fiscal year under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States
Code, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate a
report that includes the following:
(A) A description of each designated project.
(B) A summary of the potential of each designated project,
as specified in subsection (b)(2)(C).
(C) For each designated project, a description of the
progress made toward delivering on such potential.
(D) A description of any funding proposed for the
designated project in the future-years intelligence program,
including by program, appropriation account, expenditure
center, and project.
(E) Such other information on the status of such pilot
program as the Director considers appropriate.
(2) Final report.--In the final report submitted under
paragraph (1) prior to the date of termination under subsection
(e), the Director of National Intelligence shall include a
recommendation on whether to extend the pilot program under
subsection (a) and the appropriate duration of such extension, if
any.
(e) Termination Date.--The authority to carry out the pilot program
under subsection (a) shall terminate on December 31, 2027.
(f) Definition of Covered Element of the Intelligence Community.--
In this section, the term ``covered element of the intelligence
community'' means the following:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The National Security Agency.
(4) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(6) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
SEC. 6714. HARMONIZATION OF AUTHORIZATIONS TO OPERATE.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(5) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Protocol.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of the
elements of the intelligence community, shall develop and submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a single protocol setting forth
policies and procedures relating to authorizations to operate for
Department of Defense or intelligence community systems held by
industry providers.
(c) Limitation.--The protocol under subsection (b) shall be limited
to authorizations to operate for Department of Defense and intelligence
community systems.
(d) Elements.--The protocol under subsection (b) shall include, at
a minimum, the following:
(1) A policy for reciprocal recognition, as appropriate, among
the elements of the intelligence community and the Department of
Defense of authorizations to operate held by commercial providers.
Such reciprocal recognition shall be limited to authorizations to
operate for systems that collect, process, maintain, use, share,
disseminate, or dispose of data classified at an equal or lower
classification level than the original authorization.
(2) Procedures under which, subject to such criteria as may be
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence jointly with
the Secretary of Defense, a provider that holds an authorization to
operate for a Department of Defense or intelligence community
system may provide to the head of an element of the intelligence
community or the Department of Defense the most recently updated
version of any software, data, or application for use on such
system without being required to submit an application for new or
renewed authorization.
(3) Procedures for the review, renewal, and revocation of
authorizations to operate held by commercial providers, including
procedures for maintaining continuous authorizations to operate,
subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by the Director of
National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of
Defense. Such procedures may encourage greater use of modern
security practices already being adopted by the Department of
Defense and other Federal agencies, such as continuous
authorization with system security focused on continuous monitoring
of risk and security controls, active system defense, and the use
of an approved mechanism for secure and continuous delivery of
software (commonly referred to as ``DevSecOps'').
(4) A policy for the harmonization of documentation
requirements for commercial providers submitting applications for
authorizations to operate, with the goal of a uniform requirement
across the Department of Defense and the elements of the
intelligence community (subject to exceptions established by the
Director and the Secretary). Such policy shall include the
following requirements:
(A) A requirement for the full disclosure of evidence in
the reciprocity process across the Department of Defense and
the elements of the intelligence community.
(B) With respect to a system with an existing authorization
to operate, a requirement for approval by the Chief Information
Officer or a designated official (as the head of the respective
element of the intelligence community determines appropriate)
for such system to operate at an equal or higher level
classification level, to be granted prior to the performance of
an additional security assessment with respect to such system,
and regardless of which element of the intelligence community
or Department of Defense granted the original authorization.
(5) A requirement to establish a joint secure portal of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department
of Defense for the maintenance of records, applications, and system
requirements for authorizations to operate.
(6) A plan to examine, and if necessary, address, the shortage
of intelligence community and Department of Defense personnel
authorized to support and grant an authorization to operate. Such
plan shall include--
(A) a report on the current average wait times for
authorizations to operate and backlogs, disaggregated by each
element of the intelligence community and the Department of
Defense;
(B) appropriate recommendations to increase pay or
implement other incentives to recruit and retain such
personnel; and
(C) a plan to leverage independent third-party assessment
organizations to support assessments of applications for
authorizations to operate.
(7) Procedures to ensure data security and safety with respect
to the implementation of the protocol.
(8) A proposed timeline for the implementation of the protocol
by the deadline specified in subsection (g).
(e) Coordinating Officials.--Not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act--
(1) the Director of National Intelligence shall designate an
official of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
responsible for implementing this section on behalf of the Director
and leading coordination across the intelligence community for such
implementation;
(2) the Secretary of Defense shall designate an official of the
Department of Defense responsible for implementing this section on
behalf of the Secretary and leading coordination across the
Department of Defense for such implementation; and
(3) each head of an element of the intelligence community shall
designate an official of that element responsible for implementing
this section and overseeing implementation of the protocol under
subsection (b) with respect to the element.
(f) Documentation Requirements.--Under the protocol under
subsection (b), no head of a Federal agency may commence the operation
of a system using an authorization to operate granted by another
Federal agency without possessing documentation of the original
authorization to operate.
(g) Implementation Required.--The protocol under subsection (b)
shall be implemented not later than January 1, 2025.
SEC. 6715. PLAN TO EXPAND SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITY
ACCESS BY CERTAIN CONTRACTORS; REPORTS ON EXPANSION OF SECURITY
CLEARANCES FOR CERTAIN CONTRACTORS.
(a) Plan; Briefing.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the
heads of such other elements of the intelligence community as the
Director of National Intelligence may determine appropriate,
shall--
(A) develop a plan to expand access by contractors of small
emerging technology companies to sensitive compartmented
information facilities for the purpose of providing such
contractors with a facility to securely perform work; and
(B) provide to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed
Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives a briefing on such plan.
(2) Matters.--The plan under paragraph (1) shall include the
following:
(A) An overview of the existing sensitive compartmented
information facilities, if any, that may be available for the
purpose specified in paragraph (1).
(B) An assessment of the feasibility of building additional
sensitive compartmented information facilities for such
purpose.
(C) An assessment of the relative costs and benefits of
repurposing existing, or building additional, sensitive
compartmented information facilities for such purpose.
(D) The eligibility criteria for determining which
contractors under this section may be granted access to
sensitive compartmented information facilities for such
purpose.
(E) An estimate of the maximum number of contractors that
may be provided access to sensitive compartmented information
facilities for such purpose, taking into account the matters
specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(F) Policies to ensure the efficient and narrow use of
sensitive compartmented information facilities for such
purpose, including a timeline for the length of such use by a
contractor under this section and a detailed description of the
process to terminate access to the sensitive compartmented
information facility by such contractor upon--
(i) the expiration of the contract or agreement of the
contractor; or
(ii) a determination that the contractor no longer has
a need for such access to fulfill the terms of such
contract or agreement.
(G) Pricing structures for the use of sensitive
compartmented information facilities by contractors for the
purpose specified in paragraph (1). Such pricing structures--
(i) may include free use (for the purpose of
incentivizing future contracts), with the potential for
pricing to increase dependent on the length of the contract
or agreement, the size of the contractor, and the need for
such use; and
(ii) shall ensure that the cumulative cost for a
contractor to rent and independently certify a sensitive
compartmented information facility for such purpose does
not exceed the market average for the Director of National
Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense to build, certify,
and maintain a sensitive compartmented information
facility.
(H) A security plan for vetting each contractor prior to
the access of a sensitive compartmented information facility by
the contractor for the purpose specified in paragraph (1), and
an assessment of potential security concerns regarding such
access.
(I) A proposed timeline for the expansion of access to
sensitive compartmented information facilities in accordance
with paragraph (1).
(J) Such other matters as the Director of National
Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense considers relevant to
such expansion.
(b) Eligibility Criteria for Contractors.--Unless the Director of
National Intelligence determines the source of the financing of a
contractor poses a national security risk, such source of financing may
not be taken into consideration in making a determination as to the
eligibility of the contractor in accordance with subsection (a)(2)(D).
(c) Reports on Expansion of Security Clearances for Certain
Contractors.--
(1) Reports.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the
Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense
shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report on the
extent to which security clearance requirements delay, limit, or
otherwise disincentivize emerging technology companies from
entering into contracts with the United States Government.
(2) Matters.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the
following:
(A) Statistics on the periods of time between the
submission of applications for security clearances by employees
of emerging technology companies and the grant of such security
clearances, disaggregated by the size of the respective
company.
(B) The number of security clearances granted to employees
of small emerging technology companies during the period
covered by the report.
(C) The number of applications for security clearances
submitted by employees of emerging technology companies that
have yet to be adjudicated as of the date on which the report
is submitted.
(D) A projection, for the year following the date on which
the report is submitted, of the number of security clearances
necessary for employees of emerging technology companies to
perform work on behalf of the intelligence community during
such year, and an assessment of the capacity of the
intelligence community to meet such demand.
(E) An identification of each occurrence, during the period
covered by the report, in which an emerging technology company
withdrew from or declined to accept a contract with the United
States Government on the sole basis of delays, limitations, or
other issues involving security clearances, and a description
of the types of business the United States Government has lost
as a result of such occurrences.
(F) Recommendations for expediting the grant of security
clearances to employees of emerging technology companies,
including with respect to any additional resources,
authorities, or personnel that the Director of National
Intelligence determines may be necessary for such expedition.
(3) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) may be submitted in
classified form, but if so submitted shall include an unclassified
executive summary.
(d) Proposal Concurrent With Budget Submission.--At the time that
the President submits to Congress the budget for fiscal year 2024
pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a proposal to improve the capacity of the workforce
responsible for the investigation and adjudication of security
clearances, with the goal of reducing the period of time specified in
subsection (c)(2)(A) to fewer than 60 days. Such proposal shall include
an identification of any resources the Director of National
Intelligence determines necessary to expand the number of individuals
authorized to conduct polygraphs on behalf of the intelligence
community, including by furnishing necessary training to such
individuals.
(e) Applicability.--The plan, briefing, reports, and proposal
required by this section shall apply only with respect to the
intelligence community and the Department of Defense.
SEC. 6716. COMPLIANCE BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WITH REQUIREMENTS OF
FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION RELATING TO COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE OFF-
THE-SHELF ITEMS AND COMMERCIAL SERVICES.
(a) Compliance Policy.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
implement a policy to ensure that each element of the intelligence
community complies with parts 10 and 12 of the Federal Acquisition
Regulation with respect to any Federal Acquisition Regulation-based
procurements.
(2) Elements.--The policy under paragraph (1) shall include the
following:
(A) Written criteria for an element of the intelligence
community to evaluate when a procurement of a covered item or
service is permissible, including--
(i) requiring the element to conduct an independent
market analysis to determine whether a commercially
available off-the-shelf item, nondevelopmental item, or
commercial service is viable; and
(ii) a description of the offeror for such covered item
or service and how the covered item or service to be
acquired will be integrated into existing systems of the
intelligence community.
(B) A detailed set of performance measures for the
acquisition personnel of the intelligence community that--
(i) prioritizes adherence to parts 10 and 12 of the
Federal Acquisition Regulation;
(ii) encourages acquisition of commercially available
off-the-shelf items, nondevelopmental items, or commercial
services; and
(iii) incentivizes such personnel of the intelligence
community that enter into contracts for covered items or
services only when necessary.
(3) Submission.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives--
(A) the policy developed pursuant to paragraph (1); and
(B) the plan to implement such policy by not later than 1
year after the date of such enactment.
(4) Market analysis.--In carrying out the independent market
analysis pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)(i), the Director may enter
into a contract with an independent market research group with
qualifications and expertise to find available commercial products
or commercial services to meet the needs of the intelligence
community.
(b) Annual Reports.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 2 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the
Director, in consultation with the head of each element of the
intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives a report on the policy developed under subsection
(a).
(2) Elements.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall include,
with respect to the period covered by the report, the following:
(A) An evaluation of the success of the policy, including
with respect to the progress the elements have made in
complying with parts 10 and 12 of the Federal Acquisition
Regulation.
(B) A description of how any market analyses are conducted
pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(A)(i).
(C) Any recommendations to improve compliance with such
parts 10 and 12.
SEC. 6717. POLICY ON REQUIRED USER ADOPTION METRICS IN CERTAIN
CONTRACTS FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY SOFTWARE
PRODUCTS.
(a) Policy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
establish a policy regarding user adoption metrics for contracts and
other agreements for the procurement of covered products as follows:
(1) With respect to a contract or other agreement entered into
between the head of an element of the intelligence community and a
commercial provider for the procurement of a covered product for
users within the intelligence community, a requirement that each
such contract or other agreement include, as a term of the contract
or agreement, an understanding of the anticipated use of the
covered product with a clear metric for success and for collecting
user adoption metrics, as appropriate, for assessing the adoption
of the covered product by such users.
(2) Such exceptions to the requirements under paragraph (1) as
may be determined appropriate pursuant to guidance established by
the Director of National Intelligence.
(3) A requirement that prior to the procurement of, or the
continuation of the use of, any covered product procured by the
head of an element of the intelligence community, the head has
determined a method for assessing the success of the covered
product from user adoption metrics.
(b) Submission.--Not later than 60 days after the date on which the
policy under subsection (a) is established, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives such policy.
SEC. 6718. CERTIFICATION RELATING TO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
SOFTWARE SYSTEMS.
(a) Certifications Required.--Prior to the date on which the head
of an element of the intelligence community enters into, renews, or
extends a contract for the acquisition of an information technology or
software system, the head shall certify to the Director of National
Intelligence the following:
(1) That the information technology or software system is the
most up-to-date version of the system available or, if it is not,
why a more out of date version was chosen.
(2) That the information technology or software system is
compatible with integrating new and emerging technologies, such as
artificial intelligence.
(3) That the information technology or software system was
thoroughly reviewed and alternative products are not superior to
meet the requirements of the element.
(b) Exemption.--The Director of National Intelligence may exempt
elements of the intelligence community, as appropriate, from the
requirements under (a) if meeting such requirements may pose security
or operational risks.
(c) Guidance.--The Director shall issue to the heads of the
elements of the intelligence community, and submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, guidance
to--
(1) establish guidelines that the heads of the relevant
elements of the intelligence community shall use to evaluate the
criteria required for the certifications under subsection (a);
(2) incentivize each such head to adopt and integrate new and
emerging technology within information technology and software
systems of the element and to decommission and replace outdated
systems, including through potential funding enhancements; and
(3) incentivize, and hold accountable, personnel of the
intelligence community with respect to the integration of new and
emerging technology within such systems, including through the
provision of appropriate training programs and evaluations.
Subtitle C--Reports
SEC. 6721. REPORTS ON INTEGRATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WITHIN
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Reports by Elements of Intelligence Community.--Not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, each senior
official within an element of the intelligence community identified as
a designated element lead pursuant to section 6702(b) shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense
of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives a report on the efforts of that element to develop,
acquire, adopt, and maintain artificial intelligence to improve
intelligence collection and analysis and optimize internal work flows.
Each such report shall include the following:
(1) A description of the authorities of the element relating to
the use of artificial intelligence.
(2) A list of any resource or authority necessary to accelerate
the adoption by the element of artificial intelligence solutions,
including commercial products, or personnel authorities.
(3) A description of the element's roles, responsibilities, and
authorities for accelerating the adoption by the element of
artificial intelligence solutions.
(4) The application of the policies and principles described in
section 6702(a)(2) to paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).
(b) Audits by Inspectors General.--
(1) Audits.--Not later than 2 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act, each inspector general with oversight
responsibility for an element of the intelligence community shall
conduct and audit, and brief congressional intelligence committees,
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives the findings of the
audit, to evaluate the following:
(A) The efforts of such element to develop, acquire, adopt,
and maintain artificial intelligence capabilities for the
purpose of improving intelligence collection and analysis in a
timely manner and the extent to which such efforts are
consistent with the policies and principles described in
section 6702(a)(2);
(B) The degree to which the element has implemented each of
the provisions of this title.
(C) Any administrative or technical barriers to the
accelerated adoption of artificial intelligence by such
element.
(2) Input required.--The results of each audit under paragraph
(1) shall be disaggregated by, and include input from,
organizational units of the respective element of the intelligence
community that focus on the following:
(A) Acquisitions and contracting.
(B) Personnel and workforce matters.
(C) Financial management and budgeting.
(D) Operations and capabilities.
(3) Audit of office of director of national intelligence.--With
respect to the audit of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence conducted by the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community under paragraph (1), the Inspector General shall also
audit the extent to which the Director of National Intelligence
coordinates across the intelligence community for the purpose of
ensuring the adoption of best practices, the use of shared
contracting vehicles for products and services that meet common
requirements, the sharing of information, and the efficient use of
resources, relating to artificial intelligence.
(c) Annual Report by Director of National Intelligence.--
(1) Reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads
of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense
of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives a report on the progress of the adoption
of artificial intelligence within the intelligence community.
(2) Matters.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall include,
with respect to the year covered by the report, the following:
(A) A detailed description of the progress of each element
of the intelligence community in the adoption and maintenance
of artificial intelligence during such year, including a
detailed description of any--
(i) artificial intelligence programs or systems adopted
by the element;
(ii) contracts entered into by the head of the element
with small- or medium-sized emerging technology companies
for commercial products involving artificial intelligence;
and
(iii) relevant positions established or filled within
the element.
(B) A description of any policies of the intelligence
community issued during such year that relate to the adoption
of artificial intelligence within the intelligence community,
including an assessment of the compliance with such policies by
the elements of the intelligence community.
(C) A list of recommendations for the efficient,
accelerated, and comprehensive adoption of artificial
intelligence across the intelligence community during the year
following the year covered by the report, including any
technological advances in artificial intelligence that the
intelligence community should leverage from industry actors.
(D) An overview of the advances of foreign adversaries in
the field of artificial intelligence, and steps that may be
taken to ensure the United States Government outpaces foreign
adversaries in such field.
(E) Any gaps in resource or authorities, or other
administrative or technical barriers, to the adoption of
artificial intelligence by the intelligence community.
(F) Such other matters as the Director may determine
appropriate.
(3) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) may be submitted in
classified form.
(4) Entry by chief data officer.--Each report under paragraph
(1) shall include an entry by the Intelligence Community Chief Data
Officer that addresses each of the matters specified in paragraph
(2) with respect to the organization of data for the accelerated
adoption of artificial intelligence solutions.
SEC. 6722. REPORT ON POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF ESTABLISHMENT OF ICWERX.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the
National Security Agency, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives an
assessment of whether the intelligence community would benefit from the
establishment of a new organization to be known as ``ICWERX'', the
mission and activities of which would incorporate lessons learned from
AFWERX of the Air Force (or such successor program), the Defense
Innovation Unit of the Department of Defense, In-Q-Tel, and other
programs sponsored by the Federal Government with a focus on
accelerating the adoption of emerging technologies for mission-relevant
applications or innovation.
(b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall include the
following:
(1) A review of the existing avenues for small- and medium-
sized emerging technology companies to provide to the intelligence
community artificial intelligence or other technology solutions,
including an identification, for each of the 5 years preceding the
year in which the report is submitted, of the annual number of such
companies that have provided the intelligence community with such
solutions.
(2) A review of the existing processes by which the heads of
the elements of the intelligence community acquire and transition
commercial research of small- and medium-sized emerging technology
companies in a prototype or other early developmental stage.
(3) An assessment of--
(A) whether the intelligence community is currently
postured to incorporate the technological innovations of
emerging technology companies, including in software and
hardware; and
(B) any areas in which the intelligence community lacks
resources, authorities, personnel, expertise, or institutional
mechanisms necessary for such incorporation.
(4) An assessment of whether a potential ICWERX would be
positioned to--
(A) assist small emerging technology companies, and
potentially medium-sized emerging technology companies, in
accelerating the procurement and fielding of innovative
technologies; and
(B) provide the intelligence community with greater access
to innovative companies at the forefront of emerging
technologies.
(5) An assessment of the potential costs and benefits
associated with the establishment of ICWERX in accordance with
subsection (a).
SEC. 6723. REQUIREMENTS AND REPORT ON WORKFORCE NEEDS OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY RELATING TO SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATH, AND
RELATED AREAS.
(a) Requirements.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the heads of human capital from each element of the
intelligence community, shall--
(1) develop a plan for the recruitment and retention of
personnel to positions the primary duties of which involve the
integration, maintenance, or use of artificial intelligence (and
the retention and training of personnel serving in such positions),
including with respect to the authorities and requirements under
section 6732(b);
(2) develop a plan for the review and evaluation, on a
continuous basis, of the expertise necessary to accelerate the
adoption of artificial intelligence and other emerging technology
solutions; and
(3) coordinate and share information and best practices
relating to such recruitment and retention within the element and
across the intelligence community.
(b) Report.--
(1) Submission.--Not later than January 1, 2024, the Director
of National Intelligence, in coordination with heads of human
capital from each element of the intelligence community, shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives a single report on
the workforce needs of each element of the intelligence community
relating to emerging technologies, with a specific focus on
artificial intelligence.
(2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include,
with respect to each element of the intelligence community, the
following:
(A) A description of the number and types of personnel in
work roles whose primary official duties include artificial
intelligence responsibilities.
(B) A detailed description of the plans for each element
developed pursuant to subsection (a).
(3) Other matters.--The report under paragraph (1) shall also
include an assessment of the quality and sustainability of the
talent pipeline of the intelligence community with respect to
talent in emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence.
Such assessment shall include the following:
(A) A description of the education, recruitment, and
retention programs (including skills-based training and career
and technical educational programs) available to personnel of
the intelligence community, regardless of whether such programs
are administered by the head of an element of the intelligence
community or the head of another Federal department or agency,
and an analysis of how such programs support the quality and
sustainability of such talent pipeline.
(B) A description of the relevant authorities available to
the heads of the elements of the intelligence community to
promote the quality and sustainability of such talent pipeline.
(C) An assessment of any gaps in authorities, resources,
recruitment or retention incentives, skills-based training, or
educational programs, that may negatively affect the quality or
sustainability of such talent pipeline.
(4) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in
classified or unclassified form, as appropriate.
(c) Information Access.--The heads of the elements of the
intelligence community shall furnish to the Director of National
Intelligence such information as may be necessary for the development
of the report under subsection (b).
Subtitle D--Talent, Education, and Training
SEC. 6731. REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION CADRE.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives a report containing a feasibility and advisability
study on establishing a cadre of personnel who are experts in emerging
technologies, software development, systems integration, and
acquisition, to improve the adoption of commercial solutions for
emerging technologies across the intelligence community, particularly
as the technologies relate to artificial intelligence.
(b) Elements.--The study under subsection (a) shall include the
following:
(1) An examination regarding whether a cadre of personnel
described in subsection (a) would be an effective and efficient
means to substantially improve and accelerate the adoption of
commercial artificial intelligence and other emerging technology
products and services in support of the missions of the
intelligence community if the cadre has the capacity and relevant
expertise to--
(A) accelerate the adoption of emerging technologies,
including with respect to artificial intelligence;
(B) assist with software development and acquisition; and
(C) develop training requirements for acquisition
professionals within the elements of the intelligence
community.
(2) An assessment of--
(A) whether the establishment of the cadre would require
additional statutory authorities or resources, including to
recruit, hire, and retain the talent and expertise needed to
establish the cadre;
(B) the benefits, costs, and risks associated with the
establishment of a cadre;
(C) a recommendation on whether to establish the cadre; and
(D) if a recommendation to establish the cadre is made, a
plan for implementation of the cadre, including the proposed
size of the cadre, how the cadre would be resourced, managed,
and organized, and whether the cadre should be centrally
managed or reside at individual elements of the intelligence
community.
SEC. 6732. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION AND TRAINING.
(a) Training Curriculum.--
(1) Requirement.--No later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the President of the
Defense Acquisition University and the heads of the elements of the
intelligence community that the Director and Secretary determine
appropriate, shall jointly establish a training curriculum for
members of the acquisition workforce in the Department of Defense
(as defined in section 101 of title 10, United States Code) and the
acquisition officials within the intelligence community focused on
improving the understanding and awareness of contracting
authorities and procedures for the acquisition of emerging
technologies.
(2) Provision of training.--The Director shall ensure that the
training curriculum under paragraph (1) is made available to each
element of the intelligence community not later than 60 days after
the completion of the curriculum.
(3) Report.--Not later than January 1, 2024, the Director and
Secretary shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a
report containing an update on the status of the curriculum under
paragraph (1).
(b) Agreements Officers.--Not later than October 1, 2024, the
Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that at least 75 percent
of the contracting staff within the intelligence community whose
primary responsibilities include the acquisition of emerging
technologies shall have received the appropriate training to become
warranted as agreements officers who are given authority to execute and
administer the transactions authorized by paragraph (5) of section
102A(n) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(n)), as
added by section 6711. The training shall include--
(1) the appropriate courses offered by the Defense Acquisition
University;
(2) the training curriculum established under subsection (a);
and
(3) best practices for monitoring, identifying, and procuring
emerging technologies with potential benefit to the intelligence
community, including commercial services and products.
(c) Establishment of Emerging Technology Training Activities.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than January 1, 2024, the Director
of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the
elements of the intelligence community that the Director determines
relevant, shall establish and implement training activities
designed for appropriate mid-career and senior managers across the
intelligence community to train the managers on how to identify,
acquire, implement, and manage emerging technologies as such
technologies may be applied to the intelligence community.
(2) Certification.--Not later than 2 years after the date on
which the Director establishes the training activities under
paragraph (1), each head of an element of the intelligence
community shall certify to the Director whether the managers of the
element described in paragraph (1) have successfully completed the
education activities.
(3) Briefing.--Not later than January 1, 2024, the Director of
National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives a briefing regarding the training activities
established under paragraph (1), including--
(A) an overview of--
(i) the managers described in paragraph (1) who
participated in the training activities; and
(ii) what technologies were included in the training
activities; and
(B) an identification of other incentives, activities,
resources, or programs the Director determines may be necessary
to ensure the managers are generally trained in the most
emerging technologies and able to retain and incorporate such
technologies across the intelligence community.
Subtitle E--Other Matters
SEC. 6741. IMPROVEMENTS TO USE OF COMMERCIAL SOFTWARE PRODUCTS.
(a) Policy Regarding Procurement of Commercial Software Products.--
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of
the elements of the intelligence community and appropriate
nongovernmental experts that the Director determines relevant, shall
issue an intelligence community-wide policy to ensure the procurement
of commercial software products by the intelligence community is
carried out--
(1) using, to the extent practicable, standardized terminology;
and
(2) in accordance with acquisition and operation best practices
reflecting modern software as a service capabilities.
(b) Elements.--The policy issued under subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) Guidelines for the heads of the elements of the
intelligence community to determine which contracts for commercial
software products are covered by the policy, including with respect
to agreements, authorizations to operate, and other acquisition
activities.
(2) Guidelines for using standardized terms in such contracts,
modeled after commercial best practices, including common
procedures and language regarding--
(A) terms for the responsible party and timelines for
system integration under the contract;
(B) a mechanism included in each contract to ensure the
ability of the vendor to provide, and the United States
Government to receive, continuous updates and version control
for the software, subject to appropriate security
considerations;
(C) automatic technological mechanisms for security and
data validation, including security protocols that are
predicated on commercial best practices; and
(D) procedures to provide incentives, and a technical
framework, for system integration for new commercial software
solutions to fit within existing workflows and information
technology infrastructure.
(3) Guidelines and a timeline for enforcing the policy.
(c) Report.--Not later than January 1, 2025, and annually
thereafter through 2028, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the policy
issued under subsection (a), including the following with respect to
the period covered by the report:
(1) An evaluation of compliance with such policy by each of the
elements of the intelligence community.
(2) Additional recommendations to better coordinate system
integration throughout the intelligence community using best
practices.
SEC. 6742. CODE-FREE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ENABLEMENT TOOLS POLICY.
(a) Draft Policy.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office, the Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and any additional heads of the elements of the intelligence
community that the Director of National Intelligence determines
appropriate, shall draft a potential policy to promote the intelligence
community-wide use of code-free artificial intelligence enablement
tools.
(b) Elements.--The draft policy under subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) The objective for the use by the intelligence community of
code-free artificial intelligence enablement tools.
(2) A detailed set of incentives for using code-free artificial
intelligence enablement tools.
(3) A plan to ensure coordination throughout the intelligence
community, including consideration of designating an official of
each element of the intelligence community to oversee
implementation of the policy and such coordination.
(c) Submission.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives the following:
(1) The draft policy under subsection (a).
(2) A recommendation regarding the feasibility and advisability
of implementing the draft policy, including an assessment of the
costs and advantages and disadvantages of such implementation.
(3) An assessment of whether any element of the intelligence
community already has a similar existing policy.
(4) A specific plan and timeline of the steps that would be
necessary to implement the draft policy.
(5) An assessment of the personnel requirements, budget
requirements, and any other resource requirements, that would be
necessary to implement the draft policy in the timeline identified
in paragraph (4).
TITLE LXVIII--OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 6801. IMPROVEMENTS RELATING TO CONTINUITY OF PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD MEMBERSHIP.
Paragraph (4) of section 1061(h) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(h)) is amended to
read as follows:
``(4) Term.--
``(A) Commencement.--Each member of the Board shall serve a
term of 6 years, commencing on the date of the appointment of
the member to the Board.
``(B) Reappointment.--A member may be reappointed to one or
more additional terms.
``(C) Vacancy.--A vacancy on the Board shall be filled in
the manner in which the original appointment was made.
``(D) Extension.--Upon the expiration of the term of office
of a member, the member may continue to serve for up to one
year after the date of expiration, at the election of the
member--
``(i) during the period preceding the reappointment of
the member pursuant to subparagraph (B); or
``(ii) until the member's successor has been appointed
and qualified.''.
SEC. 6802. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR OFFICE TO ADDRESS
UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA.
(a) In General.--Section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373), as amended by title XVI of
this Act, is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 1683. ESTABLISHMENT OF ALL-DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE.
``(a) Establishment of Office.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2023, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director
of National Intelligence, shall establish an office within a
component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or within a
joint organization of the Department of Defense and the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, to carry out the duties of
the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, as in effect on
December 26, 2021, and such other duties as are required by this
section, including those pertaining to unidentified anomalous
phenomena.
``(2) Designation.--The office established under paragraph (1)
shall be known as the `All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office' (in
this section referred to as the `Office').
``(b) Director and Deputy Director of the Office.--
``(1) Appointment of director.--The head of the Office shall be
the Director of the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (in this
section referred to as the `Director of the Office'), who shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the
Director of National Intelligence.
``(2) Appointment of deputy director.--The Deputy Director of
the Office shall be appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence in coordination with the Secretary of Defense.
``(3) Reporting.--
``(A) In general.--The Director of the Office shall report
directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Principal
Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
``(B) Administrative and operational and security
matters.--The Director of the Office shall report--
``(i) to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security on all administrative matters of
the Office; and
``(ii) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence on all
operational and security matters of the Office.
``(c) Duties.--The duties of the Office shall include the
following:
``(1) Developing procedures to synchronize and standardize the
collection, reporting, and analysis of incidents, including adverse
physiological effects, regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena
across the Department of Defense and the intelligence community, in
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, which
shall be provided to the congressional defense committees, the
congressional intelligence committees, and congressional
leadership.
``(2) Developing processes and procedures to ensure that such
incidents from each component of the Department and each element of
the intelligence community are reported and stored in an
appropriate manner that allows for the integration of analysis of
such information.
``(3) Establishing procedures to require the timely and
consistent reporting of such incidents.
``(4) Evaluating links between unidentified anomalous phenomena
and adversarial foreign governments, other foreign governments, or
nonstate actors.
``(5) Evaluating the threat that such incidents present to the
United States.
``(6) Coordinating with other departments and agencies of the
Federal Government, as appropriate, including the Federal Aviation
Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
the Department of Homeland Security, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, the National Science Foundation, and
the Department of Energy.
``(7) As appropriate, and in coordination with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National
Intelligence, consulting with allies and partners of the United
States to better assess the nature and extent of unidentified
anomalous phenomena.
``(8) Preparing reports for Congress, in both classified and
unclassified form, including under subsection (j).
``(d) Response to and Field Investigations of Unidentified
Anomalous Phenomena.--
``(1) Designation.--The Secretary of Defense and the Director
of National Intelligence shall jointly designate from within their
respective organizations an official, to be under the direction of
the Director of the Office, responsible for ensuring the
appropriate expertise, authorities, accesses, data, systems,
platforms, and capabilities are available for the rapid response
to, and support for, the conduct of field investigations of
incidents involving unidentified anomalous phenomena.
``(2) Ability to respond.--The Secretary of Defense and the
Director of National Intelligence shall ensure field investigations
are supported by personnel with the requisite expertise, equipment,
transportation, and other resources necessary to respond rapidly to
incidents or patterns of observations involving unidentified
anomalous phenomena.
``(e) Scientific, Technological, and Operational Analyses of Data
on Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena.--
``(1) Designation.--The Secretary of Defense, in coordination
with the Director of National Intelligence, shall designate one or
more line organizations that will be primarily responsible for
scientific, technical, and operational analysis of data gathered by
field investigations conducted pursuant to subsection (d) and data
from other sources, including with respect to the testing of
materials, medical studies, and development of theoretical models,
to better understand and explain unidentified anomalous phenomena.
``(2) Authority.--The Secretary of Defense and the Director of
National Intelligence shall each issue such directives as are
necessary to ensure that each line organization designated under
paragraph (1) has authority to draw on the special expertise of
persons outside the Federal Government with appropriate security
clearances.
``(f) Data; Intelligence Collection.--
``(1) Availability of data and reporting on unidentified
anomalous phenomena.--
``(A) Availability of data.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense,
shall ensure that each element of the intelligence community
with data relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena makes
such data available immediately to the Office.
``(B) Reporting.--The Director of National Intelligence and
the Secretary of Defense shall each, in coordination with one
another, ensure that military and civilian personnel of the
Department of Defense or an element of the intelligence
community, and contractor personnel of the Department or such
an element, have access to procedures by which the personnel
shall report incidents or information, including adverse
physiological effects, involving or associated with
unidentified anomalous phenomena directly to the Office.
``(2) Intelligence collection and analysis plan.--The Director
of the Office, acting in coordination with the Secretary of Defense
and the Director of National Intelligence, shall supervise the
development and execution of an intelligence collection and
analysis plan to gain as much knowledge as possible regarding the
technical and operational characteristics, origins, and intentions
of unidentified anomalous phenomena, including with respect to the
development, acquisition, deployment, and operation of technical
collection capabilities necessary to detect, identify, and
scientifically characterize unidentified anomalous phenomena.
``(3) Use of resources and capabilities.--In developing the
plan under paragraph (2), the Director of the Office shall consider
and propose, as appropriate, the use of any resource, capability,
asset, or process of the Department and the intelligence community.
``(g) Science Plan.--The Director of the Office, on behalf of the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall
supervise the development and execution of a science plan to develop
and test, as practicable, scientific theories to--
``(1) account for characteristics and performance of
unidentified anomalous phenomena that exceed the known state of the
art in science or technology, including in the areas of propulsion,
aerodynamic control, signatures, structures, materials, sensors,
countermeasures, weapons, electronics, and power generation; and
``(2) provide the foundation for potential future investments
to replicate or otherwise better understand any such advanced
characteristics and performance.
``(h) Assignment of Priority.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with and with the recommendation of the
Secretary of Defense, shall assign an appropriate level of priority
within the National Intelligence Priorities Framework to the
requirement to understand, characterize, and respond to unidentified
anomalous phenomena.
``(i) Detailees From Elements of the Intelligence Community.--The
heads of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, the Department of Energy, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the intelligence elements of
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Coast
Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, and such other elements of
the intelligence community as the Director of the Office considers
appropriate may provide to the Office a detailee of the element to be
physically located at the Office.
``(j) Historical Record Report.--
``(1) Report required.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 540 days after the date
of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023, the Director of the Office shall submit to
the congressional defense committees, the congressional
intelligence committees, and congressional leadership a written
report detailing the historical record of the United States
Government relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena,
including--
``(i) the records and documents of the intelligence
community;
``(ii) oral history interviews;
``(iii) open source analysis;
``(iv) interviews of current and former Government
officials;
``(v) classified and unclassified national archives
including any records any third party obtained pursuant to
section 552 of title 5, United States Code; and
``(vi) such other relevant historical sources as the
Director of the Office considers appropriate.
``(B) Other requirements.--The report submitted under
subparagraph (A) shall--
``(i) focus on the period beginning on January 1, 1945,
and ending on the date on which the Director of the Office
completes activities under this subsection; and
``(ii) include a compilation and itemization of the key
historical record of the involvement of the intelligence
community with unidentified anomalous phenomena,
including--
``(I) any program or activity that was protected by
restricted access that has not been explicitly and
clearly reported to Congress;
``(II) successful or unsuccessful efforts to
identify and track unidentified anomalous phenomena;
and
``(III) any efforts to obfuscate, manipulate public
opinion, hide, or otherwise provide incorrect
unclassified or classified information about
unidentified anomalous phenomena or related activities.
``(2) Access to records of the national archives and records
administration.--The Archivist of the United States shall make
available to the Office such information maintained by the National
Archives and Records Administration, including classified
information, as the Director of the Office considers necessary to
carry out paragraph (1).
``(k) Annual Reports.--
``(1) Reports from director of national intelligence and
secretary of defense.--
``(A) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023, and annually thereafter for four years, the
Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense
shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on unidentified anomalous phenomena.
``(B) Elements.--Each report submitted under subparagraph
(A) shall include, with respect to the year covered by the
report, the following information:
``(i) All reported unidentified anomalous phenomena-
related events that occurred during the one-year period.
``(ii) All reported unidentified anomalous phenomena-
related events that occurred during a period other than
that one-year period but were not included in an earlier
report.
``(iii) An analysis of data and intelligence received
through each reported unidentified anomalous phenomena-
related event.
``(iv) An analysis of data relating to unidentified
anomalous phenomena collected through--
``(I) geospatial intelligence;
``(II) signals intelligence;
``(III) human intelligence; and
``(IV) measurement and signature intelligence.
``(v) The number of reported incidents of unidentified
anomalous phenomena over restricted airspace of the United
States during the one-year period.
``(vi) An analysis of such incidents identified under
clause (v).
``(vii) Identification of potential aerospace or other
threats posed by unidentified anomalous phenomena to the
national security of the United States.
``(viii) An assessment of any activity regarding
unidentified anomalous phenomena that can be attributed to
one or more adversarial foreign governments.
``(ix) Identification of any incidents or patterns
regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena that indicate a
potential adversarial foreign government may have achieved
a breakthrough aerospace capability.
``(x) An update on the coordination by the United
States with allies and partners on efforts to track,
understand, and address unidentified anomalous phenomena.
``(xi) An update on any efforts underway on the ability
to capture or exploit discovered unidentified anomalous
phenomena.
``(xii) An assessment of any health-related effects for
individuals that have encountered unidentified anomalous
phenomena.
``(xiii) The number of reported incidents, and
descriptions thereof, of unidentified anomalous phenomena
associated with military nuclear assets, including
strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships and
submarines.
``(xiv) In consultation with the Administrator for
Nuclear Security, the number of reported incidents, and
descriptions thereof, of unidentified anomalous phenomena
associated with facilities or assets associated with the
production, transportation, or storage of nuclear weapons
or components thereof.
``(xv) In consultation with the Chairman of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, the number of reported incidents,
and descriptions thereof, of unidentified anomalous
phenomena or drones of unknown origin associated with
nuclear power generating stations, nuclear fuel storage
sites, or other sites or facilities regulated by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
``(xvi) The names of the line organizations that have
been designated to perform the specific functions under
subsections (d) and (e), and the specific functions for
which each such line organization has been assigned primary
responsibility.
``(xvii) A summary of the reports received using the
mechanism for authorized reporting established under
section 1673 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023.
``(2) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
``(l) Semiannual Briefings.--
``(1) Requirement.--Not later than December 31, 2022, and not
less frequently than semiannually thereafter until December 31,
2026, the Director of the Office shall provide to the appropriate
congressional committees classified briefings on unidentified
anomalous phenomena.
``(2) First briefing.--The first briefing provided under
paragraph (1) shall include all incidents involving unidentified
anomalous phenomena that were reported to the Unidentified Aerial
Phenomena Task Force or to the Office established under subsection
(a) after June 24, 2021, regardless of the date of occurrence of
the incident.
``(3) Subsequent briefings.--Each briefing provided subsequent
to the first briefing described in paragraph (2) shall include, at
a minimum, all events relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena
that occurred during the previous 180 days, and events relating to
unidentified anomalous phenomena that were not included in an
earlier briefing.
``(4) Instances in which data was not shared.--For each
briefing period, the Director of the Office shall jointly provide
to the chairman or chair and the ranking member or vice chairman of
the congressional committees specified in subparagraphs (A) and (D)
of subsection (n)(1) an enumeration of any instances in which data
relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena was not provided to
the Office because of classification restrictions on that data or
for any other reason.
``(m) Task Force Termination.--Not later than the date on which the
Secretary of Defense establishes the Office under subsection (a), the
Secretary shall terminate the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force.
``(n) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
`appropriate congressional committees' means the following:
``(A) The Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives.
``(B) The Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
the House of Representatives.
``(C) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
``(D) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives.
``(E) The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of
the House of Representatives.
``(F) The Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives.
``(2) Congressional defense committees.--The term
`congressional defense committees' has the meaning given such term
in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code.
``(3) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
`congressional intelligence committees' has the meaning given such
term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003).
``(4) Congressional leadership.--The term `congressional
leadership' means--
``(A) the majority leader of the Senate;
``(B) the minority leader of the Senate;
``(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
``(D) the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
``(5) Intelligence community.--The term `intelligence
community' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
``(6) Line organization.--The term `line organization' means,
with respect to a department or agency of the Federal Government,
an organization that executes programs and activities to directly
advance the core functions and missions of the department or agency
to which the organization is subordinate, but, with respect to the
Department of Defense, does not include a component of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense.
``(7) Transmedium objects or devices.--The term `transmedium
objects or devices' means objects or devices that are--
``(A) observed to transition between space and the
atmosphere, or between the atmosphere and bodies of water; and
``(B) not immediately identifiable.
``(8) Unidentified anomalous phenomena.--The term `unidentified
anomalous phenomena' means--
``(A) airborne objects that are not immediately
identifiable;
``(B) transmedium objects or devices; and
``(C) submerged objects or devices that are not immediately
identifiable and that display behavior or performance
characteristics suggesting that the objects or devices may be
related to the objects described in subparagraph (A).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 2(b) of
such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 1683 of
division A and inserting the following new item:
``Sec. 1683. Establishment of All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office.''.
SEC. 6803. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AUDITS AND
BRIEFINGS ON UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA HISTORICAL RECORD REPORT.
(a) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``congressional
leadership'' and ``Office'' have the meanings given such terms in
section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373), as amended by section 6802.
(b) Audit.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States
shall identify appropriately cleared personnel of the Government
Accountability Office to audit the historical record report process
described in section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373), as amended by section 6802,
including personnel to conduct work on-site as appropriate.
(2) Provision of information.--On a quarterly basis, and as
appropriate and consistent with Government Auditing Standards, the
Comptroller General of the United States shall provide the Office
with information on the findings of any audits conducted by the
personnel identified under paragraph (1).
(c) Verbal Briefings.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the Comptroller
General of the United States shall verbally brief the congressional
intelligence committees, the congressional defense committees, and
congressional leadership on the progress of the Office with respect to
the historical record report described in section 1683 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373), as
amended by section 6802, and compliance with legislative requirements.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to restrict access of a committee of Congress under section
719(f) of title 31, United States Code, to an audit under subsection
(b).
SEC. 6804. REPORT ON PRECURSOR CHEMICALS USED IN THE PRODUCTION OF
SYNTHETIC OPIOIDS.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland
Security, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy
and Commerce, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on licit
precursor chemicals originating abroad, including in the People's
Republic of China and any other country the Director considers
appropriate, that are bound for use in the illicit production of
synthetic opioids intended for distribution in the United States.
(c) Form of Report.--The report submitted under subsection (b)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex produced consistent with the protection of sources and methods.
SEC. 6805. ASSESSMENT AND REPORT ON MASS MIGRATION IN THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on the
Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the
Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
assess, and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report
on--
(1) the threats to the interests of the United States created
or enhanced by, or associated with, the mass migration of people
within the Western Hemisphere, particularly to the southern border
of the United States; and
(2) the use of or the threat of using mass migration in the
Western Hemisphere by the regimes of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua,
Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, and the regime of Miguel Diaz-Canel
and Raul Castro in Cuba--
(A) to effectively curate populations so that people who
remain in those countries are powerless to meaningfully
dissent; and
(B) to enable the increase of remittances from migrants
residing in the United States as a result of the mass migration
to help finance the regimes in Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba.
(c) Form of Report.--The report submitted under subsection (b)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 6806. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL NORMS, RULES, AND PRINCIPLES
APPLICABLE IN SPACE.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the congressional defense committees;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of
the House of Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Chair of the National Space Council, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the
Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and
the heads of any other agencies as the Chair considers necessary, shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on voluntary,
non-legally binding responsible international norms, rules, and
principles applicable in space.
(c) Elements.--The report submitted under subsection (b) shall--
(1) identify threats to the interests of the United States in
space that may be mitigated by voluntary, non-legally binding
responsible international norms, rules, and principles;
(2) identify opportunities for the United States to influence
voluntary, non-legally binding responsible international norms,
rules, and principles applicable in space, including through
bilateral and multilateral engagement;
(3) assess the willingness of space faring foreign nations to
adhere to voluntary, non-legally-binding responsible international
norms, rules, or principles applicable in space;
(4) include a list and description of known or suspected
adversary offensive weapon systems that could be used to degrade or
destroy satellites in orbit during the previous five years;
(5) include a list and description of known or suspected
adversary offensive weapon systems in development that could be
used to degrade or destroy satellites that are anticipated to be
put operational during the course of the next five years; and
(6) include an analysis of the extent to which adversary space
faring foreign nations use civilian and commercial space assets,
and civilian and commercial space relationship, to advance military
and intelligence programs and activities.
(d) Input From Commercial Space Sector.--In identifying threats
under subsection (c)(1), the Chair of the National Space Council shall
obtain input from the commercial space sector.
(e) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 6807. ASSESSMENTS OF THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT
TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S INVASION OF UKRAINE.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed
Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
on Ways and Means, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives.
(b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for 2 years, the
Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of
such other government agencies as the Director considers appropriate,
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment of the
cumulative and material effects of the sanctions imposed by the United
States, European countries, and the international community with
respect to the Russian Federation in response to the February 24, 2022,
full-scale invasion of Ukraine and subsequent actions by the Russian
Federation.
(c) Elements.--Each assessment submitted under subsection (b) shall
include the following:
(1) A description of efforts by the Russian Federation to evade
or circumvent sanctions imposed by the United States, European
countries, or the international community through direct or
indirect engagement or direct or indirect assistance from--
(A) the regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua and the regime of
Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela;
(B) the People's Republic of China;
(C) the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
(D) any other country the Director considers appropriate.
(2) An assessment of the cumulative effect of the efforts
described in paragraph (1), including on the Russian Federation's
strategic relationship with the regimes and countries described in
such paragraph.
(3) A description of the material effect of the sanctions
described in subsection (b), including the effect of those
sanctions on individual sectors of the economy of Russia, senior
leadership, senior military officers, state-sponsored actors, and
other state-affiliated actors in the Russian Federation that are
either directly or incidentally subject to such sanctions. Such
description shall include a discussion of those sanctions that had
significant effects, as well as those that had no observed effects.
(4) Methodologies for assessing the effects of different
categories of financial and economic sanctions on the targets of
such action, including with respect to specific industries,
entities, individuals, and transactions.
(5) A description of evasion techniques, including the use of
digital assets, used by the Government of Russia, entities and
persons covered by the sanctions, and by other governments,
entities, and persons who have assisted in the use of such
techniques, in response to the sanctions.
(6) A description of any developments by other countries in
creating alternative payment systems as a result of the invasion of
Ukraine.
(7) An assessment of how countries have assessed the risk of
holding reserves in United States dollars since the February 24,
2022, invasion of Ukraine.
(8) If sufficient collection allows, an assessment of the
impact of any general licenses issued in relation to the sanctions
described in subsection (b), including--
(A) the extent to which authorizations for internet-based
communications have enabled continued monetization by Russian
influence actors, while not silencing human-right activists and
independent media; and
(B) the extent to which licenses authorizing energy-related
transactions have affected the Russian Federation's ability to
earn hard currency.
(d) Form of Assessments.--Each assessment submitted under
subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form and include a
classified annex.
SEC. 6808. ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT OF RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE ON FOOD
SECURITY.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed
Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed
Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Assessment.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall,
in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research and such other heads of elements of the
intelligence community as the Director determines appropriate,
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment of
the current and potential impact of the invasion by Russia of
Ukraine on global food security.
(2) Elements.--The assessment under paragraph (1) shall include
the following:
(A) An assessment of the current and potential impact of
the invasion by Russia of Ukraine on food security,
disaggregated by region.
(B) An analysis of the potential for political instability
and security crises to occur as a result of such food
insecurity, disaggregated by region.
(C) A description of the factors that could reduce or
increase the effects of such food insecurity on political
stability and security, disaggregated by region.
(D) An assessment of the efforts of Russia to steal grain
from illegally occupied territories in Ukraine and a list of
customers who have purchased such stolen grain.
(E) An assessment of whether Russia has taken intentional
steps to cause a global food shortage.
(3) Form.--The assessment under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) Briefing.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which the
assessment prepared under subsection (b)(1) is completed, the Director
of National Intelligence shall brief the appropriate committees of
Congress on the findings of the Director with respect to the
assessment.
SEC. 6809. PILOT PROGRAM FOR DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION TO UNDERTAKE AN EFFORT TO IDENTIFY INTERNATIONAL MOBILE
SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY-CATCHERS.
Section 5725 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020
(50 U.S.C. 3024 note; Public Law 116-92) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), in the matter before paragraph (1)--
(A) by striking ``The Director of National Intelligence and
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation'' and
inserting ``The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation'';
(B) by inserting ``the Director of National Intelligence,''
before ``the Under Secretary''; and
(C) by striking ``Directors determine'' and inserting
``Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation determines'';
(2) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (d)
and (e), respectively;
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Pilot Program.--
``(1) In general.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, in collaboration with the Director of National
Intelligence, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis, and the heads of such other Federal,
State, or local agencies as the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation determines appropriate, and in accordance with
applicable law and policy, shall conduct a pilot program designed
to implement subsection (a)(1)(A) with respect to the National
Capital Region.
``(2) Commencement; completion.--The Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation shall--
``(A) commence carrying out the pilot program required by
paragraph (1) not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2023; and
``(B) complete the pilot program not later than 2 years
after the date on which the Director commences carrying out the
pilot program under subparagraph (A).
``(c) Notifications Required.--The Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation shall notify the majority leader of the Senate, the
minority leader of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the minority leader of the House of Representatives,
and the Capitol Police Board of--
``(1) the placement of sensors designed to identify
International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers capable of
conducting surveillance against the United States Capitol or
associated buildings and facilities; and
``(2) the discovery of any International Mobile Subscriber
Identity-catchers capable of conducting surveillance against the
United States Capitol or associated buildings and facilities and
any countermeasures against such International Mobile Subscriber
Identity-catchers.''; and
(4) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (2)--
(A) in the matter before paragraph (1), by striking
``Prior'' and all that follows through ``Investigation'' and
inserting ``Not later than 180 days after the date on which the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation determines that
the pilot program required by subsection (b)(1) is operational,
the Director'';
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``within the United
States''; and
(C) in paragraph (2), by striking ``by the intelligence
community'' and inserting ``deployed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation''.
SEC. 6810. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
ASSESSMENT OF ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Assessment Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress an assessment of the findings relating to the events that have
been collectively labeled as ``anomalous health incidents''.
(c) Contents.--The assessment submitted under subsection (b) shall
include the following:
(1) Any diplomatic reporting or other relevant information on
the causation of anomalous health incidents.
(2) Any diplomatic reporting or other relevant information on
any person or entity who may be responsible for such incidents.
(3) Detailed plans, including metrics, timelines, and
measurable goals, for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to
understand anomalous health incidents and share findings with other
elements of the intelligence community.
SEC. 6811. REPEAL AND MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING AND BRIEFING
REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Reports on Security Services of the People's Republic of China
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.--Section 1107A of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3237a) is repealed.
(b) Annual Update to Report on Foreign Weaponization of Deepfakes
and Deepfake Technology.--Section 5709 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3369a) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (d); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (d).
(c) Information Sharing Performance Management Reports.--
(1) In general.--Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) is amended--
(A) by striking subsection (h); and
(B) by redesignating subsections (i) through (l) as
subsections (h) through (k), respectively.
(2) Conforming amendment.--Section 210(b) of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124g(b)) is amended by striking
``section 1016(i) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(i))'' and inserting ``section
1016(h) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(h))''.
(d) Periodic Reports on Activities of Privacy Officers and Civil
Liberties Officers.--Section 1062(f)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee-1(f)(1)) is amended,
in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``semiannually''
and inserting ``annually''.
(e) Briefing on Hizballah's Assets and Activities Related to
Fundraising, Financing, and Money Laundering World-wide.--Section
204(b) of the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015
(Public Law 114-102; 129 Stat. 2212) is amended by striking ``every 180
days'' and inserting ``annually''.
(f) Inspectors General Reports on Classification.--Section 6721(a)
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public
Law 116-92; 133 Stat. 2231) is amended by striking ``per year in each
of the three'' and inserting ``every two years in each of the six''.
(g) Report on Efforts of State Sponsors of Terrorism, Other Foreign
Countries, or Entities to Illicitly Acquire Satellites and Related
Items.--Section 1261(e)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239; 126 Stat. 2019) is amended by
striking ``annually'' and inserting ``once every two years''.
(h) Reports and Briefings on Director of National Intelligence
Program on Use of Intelligence Resources in Efforts to Sanction Foreign
Opioid Traffickers.--Section 7231(c) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (21 U.S.C. 2331(c)) is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by inserting ``and Briefings''
after ``Reports''; and
(2) in paragraph (1)--
(A) by striking ``(1) Quarterly reports on program.--Not
later than'' and inserting the following:
``(1) Reports and briefings on program.--
``(A) Annual reports.--Not later than'';
(B) in subparagraph (A), as designated by subparagraph (A)
of this paragraph--
(i) by striking ``every 90 days'' and inserting
``annually'';
(ii) by striking ``90-day period'' and inserting
``year''; and
(iii) by striking ``under this paragraph'' and
inserting ``under this subparagraph''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) Semiannual briefings.--On a semiannual basis, the
Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy shall jointly brief the
appropriate congressional committees and leadership on the
status and accomplishments of the program required by
subsection (a).''.
SEC. 6812. INCREASED INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ENGINEERING, RESEARCH, AND
DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITIES OF MINORITY INSTITUTIONS.
(a) Plan.--
(1) Requirement.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
develop a plan to promote intelligence-related engineering,
research, and development activities at covered institutions for
the purpose of contributing toward the research necessary to
achieve the intelligence advantage of the United States.
(2) Elements.--The plan under paragraph (1) shall include the
following:
(A) An assessment of opportunities to support engineering,
research, and development at covered institutions in computer
sciences, including artificial intelligence, quantum computing,
and machine learning, and synthetic biology and an assessment
of opportunities to support the associated workforce and
physical research infrastructure of such institutions.
(B) An assessment of opportunities to enhance the ability
of covered institutions--
(i) to participate in intelligence-related engineering,
research, and development activities; and
(ii) to effectively compete for intelligence-related
engineering, research and development contracts in support
of the most urgent research requirements of the
intelligence community.
(C) An assessment of the activities and investments the
Director determines necessary--
(i) to expand opportunities for covered institutions to
partner with other research organizations and educational
institutions that the intelligence community frequently
partners with to conduct research; and
(ii) to increase participation of covered institutions
in intelligence-related engineering, research, and
development activities.
(D) Recommendations identifying actions that may be taken
by the Director, Congress, covered institutions, and other
organizations to increase participation of such institutions in
intelligence-related engineering, research, and development
activities and contracts.
(E) Specific goals, incentives, and metrics to increase and
measure the capacity of covered institutions to address the
engineering, research, and development needs of the
intelligence community.
(3) Consultation.--In developing the plan under paragraph (1),
the Director shall consult with covered institutions and other
departments or agencies of the United States Government or private
sector organizations that the Director determines appropriate.
(4) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense
of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives, and make publicly available on the
internet website of the Director, a report containing the plan
under paragraph (1).
(b) Activities to Support Research and Engineering Capacity.--
Subject to the availability of appropriations for such purpose, the
Director may establish a program to award contracts, grants, or other
agreements, on a competitive basis, and to perform other appropriate
activities, for any of the following purposes:
(1) Developing the capability, including the workforce and the
research infrastructure, for covered institutions to more
effectively compete for intelligence-related engineering, research,
and development activities and contracts.
(2) Any other purposes the Director determines appropriate to
enhance the capabilities of covered institutions to carry out
intelligence-related engineering, research, and development
activities and contracts.
(c) Increased Partnerships Between IARPA and Covered
Institutions.--The Director shall establish goals and incentives to
encourage the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity to--
(1) partner with covered institutions to advance the research
and development needs of the intelligence community through
partnerships and collaborations with the Intelligence Advanced
Research Projects Activity; and
(2) if the Director determines appropriate, foster the
establishment of similar relationships between such institutions
and other organizations that have partnerships with the
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity.
(d) Covered Institution Defined.--In this section, the term
``covered institution'' means the following:
(1) A part B institution (as defined in section 322 of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1061)).
(2) An institution of higher education (as defined in section
101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965(20 U.S.C. 1001)) not
covered by paragraph (1) at which not less than 50 percent of the
total student enrollment consists of students from ethnic groups
that are underrepresented in the fields of science and engineering,
as determined by the Director of National Intelligence.
SEC. 6813. REPORTS ON PERSONNEL VETTING PROCESSES AND PROGRESS UNDER
TRUSTED WORKFORCE 2.0 INITIATIVE.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Authorized adjudicative agency; authorized investigative
agency; personnel security investigation; periodic
reinvestigation.--The terms ``authorized adjudicative agency'',
``authorized investigative agency'', ``personnel security
investigation'', and ``periodic reinvestigation'' have the meanings
given those terms in section 3001(a) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(a)).
(2) Continuous vetting; council; security executive agent.--The
terms ``continuous vetting'', ``Council'', and ``Security Executive
Agent'' have the meanings given those terms in section 6601 of the
Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C.
3352).
(b) Reports.--Not later than September 30, 2023, and annually
thereafter until September 30, 2027, the Security Executive Agent, in
coordination with the Chair and other Principals of the Council, shall
submit to Congress a report on the personnel vetting processes of the
United States Government.
(c) Elements.--Each report under subsection (b) shall include, with
respect to the preceding fiscal year, the following:
(1) An analysis of the timeliness, costs, and other related
information for the initiations, investigations (including initial
investigations and any required periodic reinvestigations), and
adjudications for personnel vetting purposes. Such analysis shall
include the following:
(A) The average periods of time taken (from the date of an
agency's receipt of a completed security clearance application
to the date of the ultimate disposition and notification to the
subject and the employer of the subject) by each authorized
investigative agency and authorized adjudicative agency, to the
greatest extent practicable, to initiate investigations,
conduct investigations, and adjudicate security clearances, as
compared with established timeliness objectives.
(B) The number of initial investigations and periodic
reinvestigations initiated and adjudicated by each authorized
investigative agency and authorized adjudicative agency, to the
extent practicable.
(C) The number of initial investigations and periodic
reinvestigations carried over to the fiscal year covered by the
report from a prior fiscal year by each authorized
investigative agency and authorized adjudicative agency, to the
greatest extent practicable.
(D) The number of initial investigations and periodic
reinvestigations that resulted in a denial or revocation of a
security clearance by each authorized adjudicative agency.
(E) The costs to the executive branch relating to personnel
security clearance initiations, investigations, adjudications,
revocations, and continuous vetting with respect to such
clearances.
(F) A discussion of any impediments, including with respect
to resources, personnel, or authorities, to the timely
processing of personnel security clearances.
(G) The number of individuals who hold a personnel security
clearance and are enrolled in a program of continuous vetting
with respect to such clearance, and the numbers and types of
adverse actions taken by each authorized adjudicative agency as
a result of such continuous vetting.
(H) The number of personnel security clearances awaiting or
under investigation (including initial investigation and
periodic reinvestigation) by the Director of the Defense
Counterintelligence and Security Agency and each authorized
investigative agency.
(I) Such other information as the Security Executive Agent
may determine appropriate, including any recommendations to
improve the effectiveness, timeliness, and efficiency of
personnel security clearance initiations, investigations, and
adjudications.
(2) An analysis of the status of the implementation of the
Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative sponsored by the Council,
including the following:
(A) A list of the policies issued by the Council for the
Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative, and a list of expected
issuance dates for planned policies of the Council for such
initiative.
(B) A list of the departments and agencies of the executive
branch that have identified a senior implementation official to
be accountable for the implementation of the Trusted Workforce
2.0 initiative, in accordance with the memorandum on
transforming Federal personnel vetting issued by the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs on December 14,
2021, including an identification of the position of such
senior implementation official within the respective department
or agency.
(C) A list of the departments and agencies of the executive
branch that have submitted implementation plans, and subsequent
progress reports, with respect to the Trusted Workforce 2.0
initiative, as required by the memorandum specified in
subparagraph (B).
(D) A summary of the progress that the departments and
agencies of the executive branch have made implementing the
Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative.
(3) An analysis of the transfers between, and reciprocal
recognition among, the heads of the departments and agencies of the
executive branch of security clearance background investigations
and determinations and other investigations and determinations
relating to personnel vetting (including with respect to trust,
suitability, fitness, credentialing, and access). Such analysis
shall include, with respect to such investigations and
determinations, the following:
(A) The number of employees for whom a prior such
investigation or determination was recognized and accepted by
the head of a department or agency without the head requiring
additional investigative or adjudicative steps, disaggregated
by department or agency, to the greatest extent practicable.
(B) The number of employees for whom a prior such
investigation or determination was not recognized or accepted
by the head of a department or agency without the head
requiring additional investigative or adjudicative steps,
disaggregated by department or agency, to the greatest extent
practicable.
(C) The reasons most frequently cited by such heads for the
failure to recognize or accept a prior such investigation or
determination, disaggregated by department or agency.
(D) The average number of days for the head of a department
or agency to recognize and accept a prior such investigation or
determination (from the date the head initiates the process to
consider the prior investigation or determination for
recognition and acceptance, to the date the head makes a final
determination on such recognition and acceptance),
disaggregated by agency, to the greatest extent practicable.
(4) A discussion of any impediments, constraints, and
opportunities relating to--
(A) the timeliness of the personnel security clearance
process across the United States Government;
(B) the implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0
initiative;
(C) the transfer and reciprocal recognition of
determinations relating to personnel vetting between and among
departments and agencies; and
(D) the completeness and provision of data from elements of
the intelligence community, pursuant to paragraphs (1), (2),
and (3) of this subsection.
SEC. 6814. REPORTS RELATING TO PROGRAMS OF RECORD OF NATIONAL
GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The comprehensive identification of National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency programs and activities, to include
significant, enduring programs determined by the Agency to be
``programs of record'', is a critical element for enabling budget
auditability and oversight by the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, the Office of Management and Budget, and the
congressional intelligence committees.
(2) In order to improve how the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency justifies and oversees resources in support of
core missions and authorities, the Agency has committed to
establish a deliberate acquisition structure, modeled after
Department of Defense best practices, with programs and activities
aligned under a Program Executive Office structure.
(3) Establishing an effective Program Executive Office
structure at the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency will
ensure clearly articulated acquisition efforts that have defined
requirements and program scope with traceability from capabilities
to deliverables to Programs of Record to budget materials.
(b) Reports Required.--
(1) Reports to congressional intelligence committees and
defense subcommittees of congressional appropriations committees.--
Not later than February 1, 2023, the Director of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, consistent with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives reports on the programs and activities of the
Agency. Such reports shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(A) An identification of any definition for the term
``program of record'' used by the Agency during the period
beginning October 1, 2017, and ending on the date of the
submission of the report.
(B) A detailed description of each current program and
activity of the Agency, including each current program of
record of the Agency.
(C) A detailed explanation of how funding and other
information relating to each such program of record or other
program or activity may be located within the budget
justification materials submitted to Congress.
(D) An in-process review of the program element office
planning and implementation efforts.
(E) Identification of limitations and additional support
required by the Agency to implement program element offices and
related changes to financial management systems.
(2) Report to congressional intelligence and defense
committees.--
(A) Definition of appropriate congressional committees.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(i) the congressional intelligence committees; and
(ii) the Committee on Armed Services and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations
of the Senate; and
(iii) the Committee on Armed Services and Subcommittee
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives.
(B) Report required.--Not later than February 1, 2023, the
Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and
methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the programs and activities of the
Agency that are funded in full or in part under the Military
Intelligence Program. Such report shall include, at a minimum,
the following:
(i) An identification of any definition for the term
``program of record'' used by the Agency during the period
beginning October 1, 2017 and ending on the date of the
submission of the report.
(ii) A detailed description of each current program and
activity of the Agency funded in full or in part under the
Military Intelligence Program, including each current
program of record of the Agency funded in full or in part
under the Military Intelligence Program.
(iii) A detailed explanation of how funding and other
information relating to each such program of record or
other program or activity funded in full or in part under
the Military Intelligence Program may be located within the
budget justification materials submitted to Congress.
(3) Form.--Each report under this subsection may be submitted
in classified form.
SEC. 6815. PLAN REGARDING SOCIAL MEDIA DATA AND THREAT ANALYSIS CENTER.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' has the
meaning given that term in section 5323(h) of the Damon Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3369(h)).
(b) Plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a plan to operationalize the
Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center in accordance with section
5323 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C.
3369).
(c) Elements.--The plan under subsection (b) shall include a
description of how the Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center
shall--
(1) coordinate with social media companies, independent
organizations and researchers, and other public-facing internet-
based platforms to determine--
(A) what categories of data and metadata are useful
indicators of internet-based foreign malign influence
activities; and
(B) how such data and metadata may be shared effectively
with the Center and with independent organizations and
researchers while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of
United States users of social media platforms and other public-
facing internet-based platforms; and
(2) develop criteria under which social media companies and
other public-facing internet-based platforms share indicators of
internet-based foreign malign influence activities with the Center
and independent organizations and researchers, including a
description of--
(A) the timeliness and consistency of such sharing of
indicators;
(B) the categories of indicators to be shared; and
(C) the protection, in consultation with the head of the
Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency as may be
appropriate, of privacy, civil liberties, and constitutionally
protected activities of users of social media platforms and
other public-facing internet-based platforms.
SEC. 6816. REPORT ON USE OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE SOCIAL MEDIA INFORMATION
IN PERSONNEL VETTING DETERMINATIONS.
(a) Definitions of Continuous Vetting, Council, and Security
Executive Agent.--In this section, the terms ``continuous vetting'',
``Council'', and ``Security Executive Agent'' have the meanings given
those terms in section 6601 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020 (50 U.S.C. 3352).
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with other heads of the elements of the intelligence
community that the Director determines appropriate, and in consultation
with the other principal members of the Council, shall submit to
Congress a report regarding the current and planned use of publicly
available social media information in the personnel vetting and
security clearance processes.
(c) Elements.--The report under subsection (b) shall include the
following:
(1) A description of how departments and agencies of the United
States Government have implemented Security Executive Agent
Directive 5 titled ``Collection, Use, and Retention of Publicly
Available Social Media Information in Personnel Security Background
Investigations and Adjudications'', and relevant agency
implementing guidance, including Department of Defense Instruction
1325.06 titled ``Handling Protest, Extremist, and Criminal Gang
Activities among Members of the Armed Forces''.
(2) A description of how the use of publicly available social
media in personnel vetting determinations and security clearance
investigations and adjudications is, or will be, captured in the
National Background Investigation Services system and other
information technology systems used in the personnel vetting
process.
(3) A description of how publicly available social media
information is used, and will be used, in continuous vetting and
security clearances processes and insider threat programs.
(4) A description of any privacy or civil liberties concerns
with the use of publicly available social media information in
personnel vetting or security clearance determinations, including a
discussion of the risks, benefits, and drawbacks of allowing for
the voluntary provision of, or voluntary access to, nonpublicly
available social media information in the regular course of
personnel vetting and security clearance processes.
(5) A discussion of the extent to which officials and entities
of the United States Government responsible for privacy and civil
liberties matters, including the Chief of the Office of Civil
Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence and the civil liberties officers of
departments and agencies of the United States Government, are
involved in the development and operation of programs to use social
media information in personnel vetting and security clearance
processes.
(6) A discussion of any impediments, constraints, risks, or
drawbacks relating to the use of publicly available social media
information in personnel vetting and security clearance processes,
including--
(A) challenges associated with implementation of Security
Executive Agent Directive 5, Department of Defense Instruction
1325.06, and other relevant guidance;
(B) the resources required, including with respect to
personnel, funding, and information systems, to gather, assess,
and make use of such information; and
(C) an analysis of the costs and benefits of the use of
publicly available social media information.
(7) An implementation plan for the future use of publicly
available social media information, based on relevant findings
under paragraphs (1) through (6).
SEC. 6817. REPORT ON STRENGTHENING WORKFORCE DIVERSITY PLANNING AND
OVERSIGHT.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report discussing
steps to enhance the strategic planning for, measure the progress of,
and assess barriers to workforce diversity in the intelligence
community.
(b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall include the
following:
(1) A discussion of existing, updated, or new guidance
requiring all elements of the intelligence community to maintain
current and complete diversity strategic plans that contain
specific objectives, timeframes, and responsibilities.
(2) A discussion of progress made by individual elements toward
maintaining such plans.
(3) A discussion of existing, updated, or new guidance to
ensure individual elements develop performance measures to assess
the contribution of activities toward achieving diversity goals and
overall progress.
(4) A discussion of progress made by individual elements toward
developing measures to assess progress toward achieving diversity
management efforts.
(5) A discussion of existing, updated, or new guidance ensuring
that each element routinely identifies and takes steps toward
eliminating barriers to workforce diversity.
(6) A discussion of steps taken by the Director to ensure that
individual elements are routinely completing required assessments
to identify and eliminate barriers to diversity.
(7) A discussion of steps taken by the Director to establish
specific implementation objectives and timeframes for the elements
that support intelligence community-wide diversity goals to ensure
the elements are held accountable for making progress.
SEC. 6818. REPORT ON TRANSITION OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE TO
DIGITAL ENGINEERING ENVIRONMENT.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Potential foreign adversaries are outpacing the United
States in the fielding of new generations of space systems that
dull the edge the United States has enjoyed in space.
(2) A digital engineering environment, also known as digital
systems engineering, reduces the time to field new space systems.
(3) Digital engineering environment tools enable the rapid
iterations of requirements and architectures into digital system
depictions capable of use by private industry to further the design
and development of space systems.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that, to
maintain a competitive advantage in space, the National Reconnaissance
Office should transition to a digital engineering environment by not
later than 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Report.--
(1) Submission.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report that contains the following:
(A) A plan for the transition of the National
Reconnaissance Office to a digital engineering environment.
(B) An identification of the date by which such transition
shall be completed.
(C) A description of the metrics the Director plans to use
to measure progress made with respect to such transition and
resulting efficiencies gained.
(D) A description of the initial pilot programs of the
National Reconnaissance Office relating to digital engineering
and the plans to expand such pilot programs in scale and scope
with respect to acquisition carried out under such pilot
programs.
(E) A description of any training requirements or
certifications necessary to advance a digital engineering
environment within the National Reconnaissance Office.
(F) A description of how the Director plans to incorporate
input and best practices from private industry to facilitate
and accelerate the transition of the National Reconnaissance
Office to a digital engineering environment.
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and
(2) the congressional defense committees (as defined in section
101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code).
SEC. 6819. BRIEFING ON DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
(A) The congressional intelligence committees.
(B) The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
(C) The Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Component of the department of homeland security.--The term
``component of the Department of Homeland Security'' means the
following components of the Department of Homeland Security:
(A) The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Threat Management Division.
(B) The Federal Emergency Management Agency Protection and
National Preparedness, Office of Counterterrorism and Security
Preparedness.
(C) The Transportation Security Administration Office of
Intelligence and Analysis.
(D) The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, Field
Operations Directorate, and Collateral Duty Intelligence.
(E) The United States Customs and Border Protection Office
of Intelligence.
(F) The United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Homeland Security Investigations, Office of Intelligence, and
Special Agent in Charge Intelligence Program.
(3) Intelligence activity.--The term ``intelligence activity''
shall be interpreted consistent with how such term is used in
section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092).
(b) Briefing on Intelligence Activities.--Consistent with section
501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091), not later
than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief
Intelligence Officer of the Department of Homeland Security shall
provide the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the
intelligence activities of elements of the Department of Homeland
Security that are not elements of the intelligence community. Such
briefing shall include the following:
(1) A comprehensive description of all intelligence activities
conducted during the period beginning on January 1, 2018, and
ending on the date of the briefing, by any component of the
Department of Homeland Security that conducts intelligence
activities.
(2) With respect to each such intelligence activity, a
description of the activity, including, at a minimum--
(A) the nature of the activity;
(B) the component undertaking the activity;
(C) the legal authority for such activity; and
(D) the source of funding for such activity.
(3) A description and the quantity of any types of finished
intelligence products, or intelligence information reports,
produced or contributed to by a component of the Department of
Homeland Security that conducts intelligence activities during the
period specified in paragraph (1).
(4) An identification of any external or internal guidelines,
policies, processes, practices, or programs governing the
collection, retention, analysis, or dissemination by such a
component of information regarding United States citizens, lawful
permanent residents of the United States, or individuals located
within the United States.
(c) Form.--The briefing under subsection (b) may be provided in
classified form.
(d) Additional Briefings.--Not later than 1 year after the date on
which the Chief Intelligence Officer provides the briefing under
subsection (b) and not less frequently than once each year thereafter,
the Chief Intelligence Officer shall provide the appropriate
congressional committees a briefing on any new intelligence activities
commenced by any component of the Department of Homeland Security and
any that have been terminated.
SEC. 6820. REPORT ON DECLASSIFICATION EFFORTS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY.
Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives a report on the declassification efforts of the
Central Intelligence Agency. Such report shall include--
(1) an identification of the resources that are dedicated to
such efforts; and
(2) an assessment as to whether such resources are sufficient.
SEC. 6821. REPORT ON NATIONAL SPACE INTELLIGENCE CENTER.
(a) Report.--Not later than March 1, 2023, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the
National Space Intelligence Center.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) A description of the status of the National Space
Intelligence Center since the activation of the Center and the
implications of the Center being aligned under a Field Command
rather than a field operating agency aligned to the Director of
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance of the Space Force.
(2) A review of the ability of the Center to address the full
set of national space intelligence analytical demands (including
with respect to acquisition and operational mission requirements of
the Space Force, the Department of Defense, the intelligence
community, and other national customers) while being assigned as a
subordinate to Space Operations Command, a Field Command,
including--
(A) an assessment of the ability of the Center to respond
to the broadest space intelligence requirements as compared to
a service specific need; and
(B) a review specifically addressing any perceived mission
misalignment, potential mitigating measures, or other
structural organization concerns.
(3) An assessment of--
(A) the current resourcing posture, including any
additional personnel required as a result of subordination to a
Field Command; and
(B) the resourcing posture if the Center were aligned to
the Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
of the Space Force as described in paragraph (1).
(4) Lessons learned since unit activation, including with
respect to--
(A) organizational efficiencies and inefficiencies;
(B) financial implications;
(C) organizational redundancy;
(D) parity mismatch and synergies with other service
intelligence centers; and
(E) lessons learned through comparisons to other service
intelligence centers organized as a field operating agency and
aligned under the senior intelligence officer of the respective
Armed Force.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section, the
term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The congressional defense committees (as defined in section
101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code).
SEC. 6822. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13556, REGARDING
CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in
coordination with the heads of other elements of the intelligence
community, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report on the implementation by the intelligence community of Executive
Order 13556 (44 U.S.C. 3501 note; relating to controlled unclassified
information).
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
National Security Council should accelerate the process of revising or
replacing Executive Order 13556.
SEC. 6823. NATIONAL MUSEUM OF INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS.
(a) Recognition.--The privately-funded museum to honor the
intelligence community and special operations forces that is planned to
be constructed in Ashburn, Virginia, may be recognized, upon
completion, as the ``National Museum of Intelligence and Special
Operations''.
(b) Purposes.--The purpose of recognizing the National Museum of
Intelligence and Special Operations under subsection (a) are to--
(1) commemorate the members of the intelligence community and
special operations forces who have been critical to securing the
Nation against enemies of the United States for nearly a century;
(2) preserve and support the historic role that the
intelligence community and special operations forces have played,
and continue to play, both in secrecy as well as openly, to keep
the United States and its values and way of life secure; and
(3) foster a greater understanding of the intelligence
community and special operations forces to ensure a common
understanding, dispel myths, recognize those who are not otherwise
able to be publicly recognized, and increase science, technology,
engineering, and math education through museum programs designed to
promote more interest and greater diversity in recruiting with
respect to the intelligence and special operations career field.
SEC. 6824. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.
(a) National Security Act of 1947.--The National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.), as amended by this Act, is further
amended as follows:
(1) In section 105(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 3038(a)(1)), by striking
``chairman'' and inserting ``Chairman''.
(2) In section 113B(b) (50 U.S.C. 3049a(b))--
(A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence'' and inserting ``Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and Security''; and
(B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``section 226 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 147)'' and inserting
``section 2208 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
658)''.
(3) In section 118(a) (50 U.S.C. 3055(a)), by striking ``a
annual'' and inserting ``an annual''.
(4) In section 301(j) (50 U.S.C. 3071(j)), by striking ``and
includes'' and inserting ``and including''.
(5) In section 506G(c) (50 U.S.C. 3103(c)), by striking
``pursuant section'' and inserting ``pursuant to section''.
(6) In section 507(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 3106(a)(1)), by striking
``Generals'' and inserting ``General''.
(7) In section 1024(g)(7)(A) (50 U.S.C. 3224(g)(7)(A)), by
striking ``places'' and inserting ``place''.
(8) In section 1104(b)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 3234(b)(1)(B)), by
striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon.
(b) Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020.--The Damon
Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (division E of Public Law 116-92)
is amended--
(1) in section 5704(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 3334b(b)(1)), by striking
``, and subject to paragraph (3)'';
(2) in section 6316 (50 U.S.C. 3334b note), by striking
``congressional committees'' and inserting ``congressional
intelligence committees''; and
(3) in section 6604 (50 U.S.C. 3352c), by striking
``subsections (b) and (c)'' both places it appears and inserting
``subsections (a) and (b)''.
(c) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.--Section
309(a)(5) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012
(50 U.S.C. 3334e) is amended by striking ``section 3542(b)'' and
inserting ``section 3552''.
(d) Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000.--The Public
Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (50 U.S.C. 3355 et seq.) is
amended--
(1) in section 703(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 3355a(a)(2)), by striking
``Executive Order 12958'' and inserting ``Executive Order 13526'';
(2) in section 704(e)(3) (50 U.S.C. 3355b(e)(3)), by striking
the comma before ``shall'';
(3) in section 705(c) (50 U.S.C. 3355c(c)), by striking
``section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3(c)(6))'' and inserting ``section 102A(i) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(i))''; and
(4) in section 706 (50 U.S.C. 3355d), by striking ``Executive
Order No. 12958'' both places it appears and inserting ``Executive
Order 13526''.