Legislation
[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1790 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]
S.1790
One Hundred Sixteenth Congress
of the
United States of America
AT THE FIRST SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday,
the third day of January, two thousand and nineteen
An Act
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2020 for military activities
of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel
strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2020''.
SEC. 2. ORGANIZATION OF ACT INTO DIVISIONS; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Divisions.--This Act is organized into four divisions as
follows:
(1) Division A--Department of Defense Authorizations.
(2) Division B--Military Construction Authorizations.
(3) Division C--Department of Energy National Security
Authorizations and Other Authorizations.
(4) Division D--Funding Tables.
(5) Division E--Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal Years
2018, 2019, and 2020.
(6) Division F--Other Matters.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Organization of Act into divisions; table of contents.
Sec. 3. Congressional defense committees.
Sec. 4. Budgetary effects of this Act.
...
DIVISION E--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019,
AND 2020
SECTION 5001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ``Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018,
2019, and 2020''.
SEC. 5002. SUBDIVISIONS AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Divisions.--This division is organized into two subdivisions as
follows:
(1) Subdivision 1--Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal Year
2020.
(2) Subdivision 2--Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal Years
2018 and 2019.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this division is
as follows:
DIVISION E--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND
2020
Sec. 5001. Short title.
Sec. 5002. Subdivisions and table of contents.
Sec. 5003. Definitions.
Subdivision 1--Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal Year 2020
Sec. 5100. Table of contents.
TITLE LI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 5101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 5102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 5103. Intelligence community management account.
TITLE LII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 5201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE LIII--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Community Matters
Sec. 5301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 5302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 5303. Expansion of scope of protections for identities of covert
agents.
Sec. 5304. Required counterintelligence assessments, briefings,
notifications, and reports.
Sec. 5305. Inclusion of security risks in program management plans
required for acquisition of major systems in National
Intelligence Program.
Sec. 5306. Intelligence community public-private talent exchange.
Sec. 5307. Assessment of contracting practices to identify certain
security and counterintelligence concerns.
Subtitle B--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 5321. Establishment of Climate Security Advisory Council.
Sec. 5322. Foreign Malign Influence Response Center.
Sec. 5323. Encouragement of cooperative actions to detect and counter
foreign influence operations.
Sec. 5324. Transfer of National Intelligence University to the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.
Subtitle C--Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Sec. 5331. Definitions.
Sec. 5332. Inspector General external review panel.
Sec. 5333. Harmonization of whistleblower processes and procedures.
Sec. 5334. Oversight by Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
over intelligence community whistleblower matters.
Sec. 5335. Report on cleared whistleblower attorneys.
Subtitle D--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 5341. Clarification of certain authority of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
TITLE LIV--SECURITY CLEARANCES
Sec. 5401. Improving visibility into the security clearance process.
Sec. 5402. Making certain policies and execution plans relating to
personnel clearances available to industry partners.
TITLE LV--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia
Sec. 5501. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the
United States by the Russian Federation.
Sec. 5502. Assessment of legitimate and illegitimate financial and other
assets of Vladimir Putin.
Sec. 5503. Assessments of intentions of political leadership of the
Russian Federation.
Subtitle B--Matters Relating to China
Sec. 5511. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the
United States by the Communist Party of China.
Sec. 5512. Report on repression of ethnic Muslim minorities in the
Xinjiang region of the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 5513. Report on efforts by People's Republic of China to influence
election in Taiwan.
Subtitle C--Matters Relating to Other Countries
Sec. 5521. Sense of Congress and report on Iranian efforts in Syria and
Lebanon.
Sec. 5522. Assessments regarding the Northern Triangle and Mexico.
TITLE LVI--FEDERAL EFFORTS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM
Sec. 5601. Definitions.
Sec. 5602. Strategic intelligence assessment of and reports on domestic
terrorism.
TITLE LVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--Reports and Briefings
Sec. 5701. Modification of requirements for submission to Congress of
certain reports.
Sec. 5702. Increased transparency regarding counterterrorism budget of
the United States.
Sec. 5703. Study on role of retired and former personnel of intelligence
community with respect to certain foreign intelligence
operations.
Sec. 5704. Collection, analysis, and dissemination of workforce data.
Sec. 5705. Plan for strengthening the supply chain intelligence
function.
Sec. 5706. Comprehensive economic assessment of investment in key United
States technologies by companies or organizations linked to
China.
Sec. 5707. Report by Director of National Intelligence on fifth-
generation wireless network technology.
Sec. 5708. Report on use by intelligence community of facial recognition
technology.
Sec. 5709. Report on deepfake technology, foreign weaponization of
deepfakes, and related notifications.
Sec. 5710. Annual report by Comptroller General of the United States on
cybersecurity and surveillance threats to Congress.
Sec. 5711. Analysis of and periodic briefings on major initiatives of
intelligence community in artificial intelligence and machine
learning.
Sec. 5712. Report on best practices to protect privacy and civil
liberties of Chinese Americans.
Sec. 5713. Oversight of foreign influence in academia.
Sec. 5714. Report on death of Jamal Khashoggi.
Sec. 5715. Report on terrorist screening database.
Sec. 5716. Report containing threat assessment on terrorist use of
conventional and advanced conventional weapons.
Sec. 5717. Assessment of homeland security vulnerabilities associated
with certain retired and former personnel of the intelligence
community.
Sec. 5718. Study on feasibility and advisability of establishing
Geospatial-Intelligence Museum and learning center.
Subtitle B--Other Matters
Sec. 5721. Whistleblower disclosures to Congress and committees of
Congress.
Sec. 5722. Task force on illicit financing of espionage and foreign
influence operations.
Sec. 5723. Establishment of fifth-generation technology prize
competition.
Sec. 5724. Establishment of deepfakes prize competition.
Sec. 5725. Identification of and countermeasures against certain
International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers.
Sec. 5726. Securing energy infrastructure.
Subdivision 2--Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal Years 2018 and
2019
Sec. 6100. Table of contents.
TITLE LXI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 6101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 6102. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE LXII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 6201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 6202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
TITLE LXIII--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 6301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 6302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 6303. Modification of special pay authority for science,
technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and addition
of special pay authority for cyber positions.
Sec. 6304. Modification of appointment of Chief Information Officer of
the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 6305. Director of National Intelligence review of placement of
positions within the intelligence community on the Executive
Schedule.
Sec. 6306. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task
Force.
Sec. 6307. Consideration of adversarial telecommunications and
cybersecurity infrastructure when sharing intelligence with
foreign governments and entities.
Sec. 6308. Cyber protection support for the personnel of the
intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable to cyber
attack.
Sec. 6309. Elimination of sunset of authority relating to management of
supply-chain risk.
Sec. 6310. Limitations on determinations regarding certain security
classifications.
Sec. 6311. Joint Intelligence Community Council.
Sec. 6312. Intelligence community information technology environment.
Sec. 6313. Report on development of secure mobile voice solution for
intelligence community.
Sec. 6314. Policy on minimum insider threat standards.
Sec. 6315. Submission of intelligence community policies.
Sec. 6316. Expansion of intelligence community recruitment efforts.
TITLE LXIV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 6401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 6402. Designation of the program manager-information-sharing
environment.
Sec. 6403. Technical modification to the executive schedule.
Sec. 6404. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 6405. Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 6411. Central Intelligence Agency subsistence for personnel
assigned to austere locations.
Sec. 6412. Special rules for certain monthly workers' compensation
payments and other payments for Central Intelligence Agency
personnel.
Sec. 6413. Expansion of security protective service jurisdiction of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 6414. Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for
certain senior level positions in the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of Department
of Energy
Sec. 6421. Consolidation of Department of Energy Offices of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence.
Sec. 6422. Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence Executive
Committee and budget reporting requirement.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
Sec. 6431. Plan for designation of counterintelligence component of
Defense Security Service as an element of intelligence
community.
Sec. 6432. Notice not required for private entities.
Sec. 6433. Establishment of advisory board for National Reconnaissance
Office.
Sec. 6434. Collocation of certain Department of Homeland Security
personnel at field locations.
TITLE LXV--ELECTION MATTERS
Sec. 6501. Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments against United
States election infrastructure.
Sec. 6502. Review of intelligence community's posture to collect against
and analyze Russian efforts to influence the Presidential
election.
Sec. 6503. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal
elections.
Sec. 6504. Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats to United
States elections.
Sec. 6505. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns
directed at foreign elections and referenda.
Sec. 6506. Information sharing with State election officials.
Sec. 6507. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and
active measures campaigns directed at elections for Federal
offices.
Sec. 6508. Designation of counterintelligence officer to lead election
security matters.
TITLE LXVI--SECURITY CLEARANCES
Sec. 6601. Definitions.
Sec. 6602. Reports and plans relating to security clearances and
background investigations.
Sec. 6603. Improving the process for security clearances.
Sec. 6604. Goals for promptness of determinations regarding security
clearances.
Sec. 6605. Security Executive Agent.
Sec. 6606. Report on unified, simplified, Governmentwide standards for
positions of trust and security clearances.
Sec. 6607. Report on clearance in person concept.
Sec. 6608. Reports on reciprocity for security clearances inside of
departments and agencies.
Sec. 6609. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.
Sec. 6610. Periodic report on positions in the intelligence community
that can be conducted without access to classified
information, networks, or facilities.
Sec. 6611. Information-sharing program for positions of trust and
security clearances.
Sec. 6612. Report on protections for confidentiality of whistleblower-
related communications.
Sec. 6613. Reports on costs of security clearance background
investigations.
TITLE LXVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia and Other Foreign Powers
Sec. 6701. Limitation relating to establishment or support of
cybersecurity unit with the Russian Federation.
Sec. 6702. Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia.
Sec. 6703. Notification of an active measures campaign.
Sec. 6704. Notification of travel by accredited diplomatic and consular
personnel of the Russian Federation in the United States.
Sec. 6705. Report and annual briefing on Iranian expenditures supporting
foreign military and terrorist activities.
Sec. 6706. Expansion of scope of committee to counter active measures.
Subtitle B--Reports
Sec. 6711. Technical correction to Inspector General study.
Sec. 6712. Reports on authorities of the Chief Intelligence Officer of
the Department of Homeland Security.
Sec. 6713. Review of intelligence community whistleblower matters.
Sec. 6714. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with
respect to certain foreign investments.
Sec. 6715. Report on surveillance by foreign governments against United
States telecommunications networks.
Sec. 6716. Biennial report on foreign investment risks.
Sec. 6717. Modification of certain reporting requirement on travel of
foreign diplomats.
Sec. 6718. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 6719. Congressional notification of designation of covered
intelligence officer as persona non grata.
Sec. 6720. Reports on intelligence community participation in
vulnerabilities equities process of Federal Government.
Sec. 6721. Inspectors General reports on classification.
Sec. 6722. Reports and briefings on national security effects of global
water insecurity and emerging infectious disease and
pandemics.
Sec. 6723. Annual report on memoranda of understanding between elements
of intelligence community and other entities of the United
States Government regarding significant operational activities
or policy.
Sec. 6724. Study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline
and wireless telephone calls.
Sec. 6725. Reports on intelligence community loan repayment and related
programs.
Sec. 6726. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 6727. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community report on
senior executives of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
Sec. 6728. Briefing on Federal Bureau of Investigation offering
permanent residence to sources and cooperators.
Sec. 6729. Intelligence assessment of North Korea revenue sources.
Sec. 6730. Report on possible exploitation of virtual currencies by
terrorist actors.
Subtitle C--Other Matters
Sec. 6741. Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 6742. Technical and clerical amendments to the National Security
Act of 1947.
Sec. 6743. Bug bounty programs.
Sec. 6744. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.
Sec. 6745. Sense of Congress on notification of certain disclosures of
classified information.
Sec. 6746. Sense of Congress on consideration of espionage activities
when considering whether or not to provide visas to foreign
individuals to be accredited to a United Nations mission in
the United States.
Sec. 6747. Sense of Congress on WikiLeaks.
SEC. 5003. DEFINITIONS.
In this division:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given
such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3003).
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
SUBDIVISION 1--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020
SEC. 5100. TABLE OF CONTENTS.
The table of contents for this subdivision is as follows:
Sec. 5100. Table of contents.
TITLE LI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 5101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 5102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 5103. Intelligence community management account.
TITLE LII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 5201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE LIII--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Community Matters
Sec. 5301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 5302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 5303. Expansion of scope of protections for identities of covert
agents.
Sec. 5304. Required counterintelligence assessments, briefings,
notifications, and reports.
Sec. 5305. Inclusion of security risks in program management plans
required for acquisition of major systems in National
Intelligence Program.
Sec. 5306. Intelligence community public-private talent exchange.
Sec. 5307. Assessment of contracting practices to identify certain
security and counterintelligence concerns.
Subtitle B--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 5321. Establishment of Climate Security Advisory Council.
Sec. 5322. Foreign Malign Influence Response Center.
Sec. 5323. Encouragement of cooperative actions to detect and counter
foreign influence operations.
Sec. 5324. Transfer of National Intelligence University to the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.
Subtitle C--Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Sec. 5331. Definitions.
Sec. 5332. Inspector General external review panel.
Sec. 5333. Harmonization of whistleblower processes and procedures.
Sec. 5334. Oversight by Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
over intelligence community whistleblower matters.
Sec. 5335. Report on cleared whistleblower attorneys.
Subtitle D--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 5341. Clarification of certain authority of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
TITLE LIV--SECURITY CLEARANCES
Sec. 5401. Improving visibility into the security clearance process.
Sec. 5402. Making certain policies and execution plans relating to
personnel clearances available to industry partners.
TITLE LV--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia
Sec. 5501. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the
United States by the Russian Federation.
Sec. 5502. Assessment of legitimate and illegitimate financial and other
assets of Vladimir Putin.
Sec. 5503. Assessments of intentions of political leadership of the
Russian Federation.
Subtitle B--Matters Relating to China
Sec. 5511. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the
United States by the Communist Party of China.
Sec. 5512. Report on repression of ethnic Muslim minorities in the
Xinjiang region of the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 5513. Report on efforts by People's Republic of China to influence
election in Taiwan.
Subtitle C--Matters Relating to Other Countries
Sec. 5521. Sense of Congress and report on Iranian efforts in Syria and
Lebanon.
Sec. 5522. Assessments regarding the Northern Triangle and Mexico.
TITLE LVI--FEDERAL EFFORTS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM
Sec. 5601. Definitions.
Sec. 5602. Strategic intelligence assessment of and reports on domestic
terrorism.
TITLE LVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--Reports and Briefings
Sec. 5701. Modification of requirements for submission to Congress of
certain reports.
Sec. 5702. Increased transparency regarding counterterrorism budget of
the United States.
Sec. 5703. Study on role of retired and former personnel of intelligence
community with respect to certain foreign intelligence
operations.
Sec. 5704. Collection, analysis, and dissemination of workforce data.
Sec. 5705. Plan for strengthening the supply chain intelligence
function.
Sec. 5706. Comprehensive economic assessment of investment in key United
States technologies by companies or organizations linked to
China.
Sec. 5707. Report by Director of National Intelligence on fifth-
generation wireless network technology.
Sec. 5708. Report on use by intelligence community of facial recognition
technology.
Sec. 5709. Report on deepfake technology, foreign weaponization of
deepfakes, and related notifications.
Sec. 5710. Annual report by Comptroller General of the United States on
cybersecurity and surveillance threats to Congress.
Sec. 5711. Analysis of and periodic briefings on major initiatives of
intelligence community in artificial intelligence and machine
learning.
Sec. 5712. Report on best practices to protect privacy and civil
liberties of Chinese Americans.
Sec. 5713. Oversight of foreign influence in academia.
Sec. 5714. Report on death of Jamal Khashoggi.
Sec. 5715. Report on terrorist screening database.
Sec. 5716. Report containing threat assessment on terrorist use of
conventional and advanced conventional weapons.
Sec. 5717. Assessment of homeland security vulnerabilities associated
with certain retired and former personnel of the intelligence
community.
Sec. 5718. Study on feasibility and advisability of establishing
Geospatial-Intelligence Museum and learning center.
Subtitle B--Other Matters
Sec. 5721. Whistleblower disclosures to Congress and committees of
Congress.
Sec. 5722. Task force on illicit financing of espionage and foreign
influence operations.
Sec. 5723. Establishment of fifth-generation technology prize
competition.
Sec. 5724. Establishment of deepfakes prize competition.
Sec. 5725. Identification of and countermeasures against certain
International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers.
Sec. 5726. Securing energy infrastructure.
TITLE LI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 5101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2020
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and
the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 5102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to be
appropriated under section 5101 for the conduct of the intelligence
activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of
section 5101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany this division.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the
President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph (3),
the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection
(a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the
executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion
of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 5103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2020 the sum of
$565,637,000.
(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for
fiscal year 2020 such additional amounts as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 5102(a).
TITLE LII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 5201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year
2020.
TITLE LIII--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Community Matters
SEC. 5301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this subdivision shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence
activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the
laws of the United States.
SEC. 5302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this subdivision for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased
by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 5303. EXPANSION OF SCOPE OF PROTECTIONS FOR IDENTITIES OF COVERT
AGENTS.
Section 605(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3126(4)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) by striking clause (ii);
(B) in clause (i), by striking ``, and'' and inserting ``;
or''; and
(C) by striking ``agency--'' and all that follows through
``whose identity'' and inserting ``agency whose identity''; and
(2) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking ``resides and acts
outside the United States'' and inserting ``acts''.
SEC. 5304. REQUIRED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, BRIEFINGS,
NOTIFICATIONS, AND REPORTS.
(a) Foreign Counterintelligence and Cybersecurity Threats to
Federal Election Campaigns.--
(1) Reports required.--
(A) In general.--As provided in subparagraph (B), with
respect to an election for Federal office, the Director of
National Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary
of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall make
publicly available on an internet website an advisory report on
foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to
campaigns of candidates for Federal office. Each such report,
consistent with the protection of sources and methods, shall
include the following:
(i) A description of foreign counterintelligence and
cybersecurity threats to campaigns of candidates for
Federal office.
(ii) A summary of best practices that campaigns of
candidates for Federal office can employ in seeking to
counter such threats.
(iii) An identification of publicly available
resources, including United States Government resources,
for countering such threats.
(B) Schedule for submittal.--
(i) In general.--Except as provided by clause (ii),
with respect to an election for Federal office, a report
under this subsection shall be first made available not
later than the date that is 1 year before the date of such
election, and may be subsequently revised as the Director
of National Intelligence determines appropriate.
(ii) 2020 elections.--With respect to an election for
Federal office that occurs during 2020, the report under
this subsection shall be first made available not later
than the date that is 60 days after the date of the
enactment this Act, and may be subsequently revised as the
Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.
(C) Information to be included.--A report under this
subsection shall reflect the most current information available
to the Director of National Intelligence regarding foreign
counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.
(2) Treatment of campaigns subject to heightened threats.--If
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Under
Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis
jointly determine that a campaign of a candidate for Federal office
is subject to a heightened foreign counterintelligence or
cybersecurity threat, the Director and the Under Secretary,
consistent with the protection of sources and methods, may make
available additional information to the appropriate representatives
of such campaign.
(b) Briefings on Counterintelligence Activities of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.--
(1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``SEC. 512. BRIEFINGS AND NOTIFICATIONS ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
``(a) Quarterly Briefings.--In addition to, and without any
derogation of, the requirement under section 501 to keep the
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of
the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the United
States, not less frequently than once each quarter, or more frequently
if requested by the congressional intelligence committees, the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide to the
congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the
counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Such briefings shall include, at a minimum, an overview and update of--
``(1) the counterintelligence posture of the Bureau;
``(2) counterintelligence investigations; and
``(3) any other information relating to the counterintelligence
activities of the Bureau that the Director determines necessary.
``(b) Notifications.--In addition to the quarterly briefings under
subsection (a), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
shall promptly notify the congressional intelligence committees of any
counterintelligence investigation carried out by the Bureau with
respect to any counterintelligence risk or threat that is related to an
election or campaign for Federal office.
``(c) Guidelines.--
``(1) Development and consultation.--The Director shall develop
guidelines governing the scope of the briefings provided under
subsection (a), the notifications provided under subsection (b),
and the information required by section 5304(a)(2) of the Damon
Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020. The Director shall
consult the congressional intelligence committees during such
development.
``(2) Submission.--The Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees--
``(A) the guidelines under paragraph (1) upon issuance; and
``(B) any updates to such guidelines by not later than 15
days after making such update.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents at the beginning
of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 511 the following new item:
``Sec. 512. Briefings and notifications on counterintelligence
activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.''.
(c) Director of National Intelligence Assessment of Foreign
Interference in Federal Elections.--
(1) Assessments required.--Not later than 45 days after the end
of a Federal election cycle, the Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the heads of such other executive departments
and agencies as the Director considers appropriate, shall--
(A) conduct an assessment of any information indicating
that a foreign government, or any person acting as an agent of
or on behalf of a foreign government, has acted with the intent
or purpose of interfering in elections for Federal office
occurring during the Federal election cycle; and
(B) transmit the findings of the Director with respect to
the assessment conducted under subparagraph (A), along with
such supporting information as the Director considers
appropriate, to the following:
(i) The President.
(ii) The Secretary of State.
(iii) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(iv) The Secretary of Defense.
(v) The Attorney General.
(vi) The Secretary of Homeland Security.
(vii) Congress.
(2) Elements.--An assessment conducted under paragraph (1)(A),
with respect to an act described in such paragraph, shall identify,
to the maximum extent ascertainable, the following:
(A) The nature of any foreign interference and any methods
employed to execute the act.
(B) The persons involved.
(C) The foreign government or governments that authorized,
directed, sponsored, or supported the act.
(3) Publication.--The Director shall, not later than 60 days
after the end of a Federal election cycle, make available to the
public, to the greatest extent possible consistent with the
protection of sources and methods, the findings transmitted under
paragraph (1)(B).
(4) Federal election cycle defined.--In this section, the term
``Federal election cycle'' means the period which begins on the day
after the date of a regularly scheduled general election for
Federal office and which ends on the date of the first regularly
scheduled general election for Federal office held after such date.
(5) Effective date.--This subsection shall apply with respect
to the Federal election cycle that began during November 2018, and
each succeeding Federal election cycle.
SEC. 5305. INCLUSION OF SECURITY RISKS IN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT PLANS
REQUIRED FOR ACQUISITION OF MAJOR SYSTEMS IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
PROGRAM.
Section 102A(q)(1)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3024(q)(1)(A)) is amended by inserting ``security risks,'' after
``schedule,''.
SEC. 5306. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PUBLIC-PRIVATE TALENT EXCHANGE.
(a) Policies, Processes, and Procedures Required.--Not later than
270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall develop policies, processes, and procedures
to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the intelligence community
to the private sector, and personnel from the private sector to the
intelligence community.
(b) Detail Authority.--Under policies developed by the Director
pursuant to subsection (a), pursuant to a written agreement with a
private-sector organization, and with the consent of the employee, a
head of an element of the intelligence community may arrange for the
temporary detail of an employee of such element to such private-sector
organization, or from such private-sector organization to such element
under this section.
(c) Agreements.--
(1) In general.--A head of an element of the intelligence
community exercising the authority of the head under subsection (a)
shall provide for a written agreement among the element of the
intelligence community, the private-sector organization, and the
employee concerned regarding the terms and conditions of the
employee's detail under this section. The agreement--
(A) shall require that the employee of the element, upon
completion of the detail, serve in the element, or elsewhere in
the civil service if approved by the head of the element, for a
period that is at least equal to the length of the detail;
(B) shall provide that if the employee of the element fails
to carry out the agreement, such employee shall be liable to
the United States for payment of all nonsalary and benefit
expenses of the detail, unless that failure was for good and
sufficient reason, as determined by the head of the element;
(C) shall contain language informing such employee of the
prohibition on sharing, using, or otherwise improperly handling
classified or unclassified nonpublic information for the
benefit or advantage of the private-sector organization;
(D) shall contain language governing the handling of
classified information by such employee during the detail; and
(E) shall contain language requiring the employee to
acknowledge the obligations of the employee under section 1905
of title 18, United States Code.
(2) Amount of liability.--An amount for which an employee is
liable under paragraph (1) shall be treated as a debt due the
United States.
(3) Waiver.--The head of an element of the intelligence
community may waive, in whole or in part, collection of a debt
described in paragraph (2) based on a determination that the
collection would be against equity and good conscience and not in
the best interests of the United States, after taking into account
any indication of fraud, misrepresentation, fault, or lack of good
faith on the part of the employee.
(d) Termination.--A detail under this section may, at any time and
for any reason, be terminated by the head of the element of the
intelligence community concerned or the private-sector organization
concerned.
(e) Duration.--
(1) In general.--A detail under this section shall be for a
period of not less than 3 months and not more than 2 years,
renewable up to a total of 3 years.
(2) Longer periods.--A detail under this section may be for a
period in excess of 2 years, but not more than 3 years, if the head
of the element making the detail determines that such detail is
necessary to meet critical mission or program requirements.
(3) Limitation.--No employee of an element of the intelligence
community may be detailed under this section for more than a total
of 5 years, inclusive of all such details.
(f) Status of Federal Employees Detailed to Private-Sector
Organizations.--
(1) In general.--An employee of an element of the intelligence
community who is detailed to a private-sector organization under
this section shall be considered, during the period of detail, to
be on a regular work assignment in the element. The written
agreement established under subsection (c)(1) shall address the
specific terms and conditions related to the employee's continued
status as a Federal employee.
(2) Requirements.--In establishing a temporary detail of an
employee of an element of the intelligence community to a private-
sector organization, the head of the element shall--
(A) certify that the temporary detail of such employee
shall not have an adverse or negative impact on mission
attainment or organizational capabilities associated with the
detail; and
(B) in the case of an element of the intelligence community
in the Department of Defense, ensure that the normal duties and
functions of such employees are not, as a result of and during
the course of such temporary detail, performed or augmented by
contractor personnel in violation of the provisions of section
2461 of title 10, United States Code.
(g) Terms and Conditions for Private-Sector Employees.--An employee
of a private-sector organization who is detailed to an element of the
intelligence community under this section--
(1) shall continue to receive pay and benefits from the
private-sector organization from which such employee is detailed
and shall not receive pay or benefits from the element, except as
provided in paragraph (2);
(2) is deemed to be an employee of the element for the purposes
of--
(A) chapters 73 and 81 of title 5, United States Code;
(B) sections 201, 203, 205, 207, 208, 209, 603, 606, 607,
643, 654, 1905, and 1913 of title 18, United States Code;
(C) sections 1343, 1344, and 1349(b) of title 31, United
States Code;
(D) chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code (commonly
known as the ``Federal Tort Claims Act'') and any other Federal
tort liability statute;
(E) the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.);
and
(F) chapter 21 of title 41, United States Code;
(3) may perform work that is considered inherently governmental
in nature only when requested in writing by the head of the
element;
(4) may not be used to circumvent any limitation or restriction
on the size of the workforce of the element;
(5) shall be subject to the same requirements applicable to an
employee performing the same functions and duties proposed for
performance by the private-sector employee; and
(6) in the case of an element of the intelligence community in
the Department of Defense, may not be used to circumvent the
provisions of section 2461 of title 10, United States Code.
(h) Prohibition Against Charging Certain Costs to the Federal
Government.--A private-sector organization may not charge an element of
the intelligence community or any other agency of the Federal
Government, as direct costs under a Federal contract, the costs of pay
or benefits paid by the organization to an employee detailed to an
element of the intelligence community under this section for the period
of the detail and any subsequent renewal periods.
(i) Additional Administrative Matters.--In carrying out this
section, the Director, pursuant to procedures developed under
subsection (a)--
(1) shall, to the degree practicable, ensure that small
business concerns are represented with respect to details
authorized by this section;
(2) may, notwithstanding any other provision of law, establish
criteria for elements of the intelligence community to use
appropriated funds to reimburse small business concerns for the
salaries and benefits of its employees during the periods when the
small business concern agrees to detail its employees to the
intelligence community under this section;
(3) shall take into consideration the question of how details
under this section might best be used to help meet the needs of the
intelligence community, including with respect to the training of
employees;
(4) shall take into consideration areas of private-sector
expertise that are critical to the intelligence community; and
(5) shall establish oversight mechanisms to determine whether
the public-private exchange authorized by this section improves the
efficiency and effectiveness of the intelligence community.
(j) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Detail.--The term ``detail'' means, as appropriate in the
context in which such term is used--
(A) the assignment or loan of an employee of an element of
the intelligence community to a private-sector organization
without a change of position from the intelligence community
element that employs the individual; or
(B) the assignment or loan of an employee of a private-
sector organization to an element of the intelligence community
without a change of position from the private-sector
organization that employs the individual.
(2) Private-sector organization.--The term ``private-sector
organization'' means--
(A) a for-profit organization; or
(B) a not-for-profit organization.
(3) Small business concern.--The term ``small business
concern'' has the meaning given such term in section 3703(e)(2) of
title 5, United States Code.
SEC. 5307. ASSESSMENT OF CONTRACTING PRACTICES TO IDENTIFY CERTAIN
SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONCERNS.
(a) Assessment.--
(1) Contracting practices.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall conduct an assessment of the authorities,
policies, processes, and standards used by the elements of the
intelligence community to ensure that the elements appropriately
weigh security and counterintelligence risks in awarding a contract
to a contractor that--
(A) carries out any joint research and development
activities with a covered foreign country; or
(B) performs any contract or other agreement entered into
with a covered foreign country.
(2) Elements.--The assessment under paragraph (1) shall include
the following:
(A) An assessment of whether the authorities, policies,
processes, and standards specified in paragraph (1)
sufficiently identify security and counterintelligence
concerns.
(B) Identification of any authority gaps in such
authorities, policies, processes, and standards that prevent
the intelligence community from considering the activities
specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) when
evaluating offers for a contract.
(3) Consultation.--In carrying out paragraph (1), the Director
shall consult with each head of an element of the intelligence
community.
(b) Report.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the assessment
under subsection (a)(1).
(2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) The assessment under subsection (a)(1).
(B) An identification of any known contractors that have--
(i) carried out activities specified in subparagraphs
(A) and (B) of subsection (a)(1); and
(ii) submitted an offer for a contract with an element
of the intelligence community.
(C) A description of the steps that the Director and the
heads of the elements of the intelligence community took to
identify contractors under subparagraph (B).
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) Covered Foreign Country Defined.--In this section, the term
``covered foreign country'' means the government, or any entity
affiliated with the military or intelligence services of, the following
foreign countries:
(1) The People's Republic of China.
(2) The Russian Federation.
(3) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(4) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
(5) Such other countries as the Director considers appropriate.
Subtitle B--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 5321. ESTABLISHMENT OF CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.
(a) Establishment.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following
new section:
``SEC. 120. CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.
``(a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
establish a Climate Security Advisory Council for the purpose of--
``(1) assisting intelligence analysts of various elements of
the intelligence community with respect to analysis of climate
security and its impact on the areas of focus of such analysts;
``(2) facilitating coordination between the elements of the
intelligence community and elements of the Federal Government that
are not elements of the intelligence community in collecting data
on, and conducting analysis of, climate change and climate
security; and
``(3) ensuring that the intelligence community is adequately
prioritizing climate change in carrying out its activities.
``(b) Composition of Council.--
``(1) Members.--The Council shall be composed of the following
individuals appointed by the Director of National Intelligence:
``(A) An appropriate official from the National
Intelligence Council, who shall chair the Council.
``(B) The lead official with respect to climate and
environmental security analysis from--
``(i) the Central Intelligence Agency;
``(ii) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State;
``(iii) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
``(iv) the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy;
``(v) the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence; and
``(vi) the Defense Intelligence Agency.
``(C) Three appropriate officials from elements of the
Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence
community that are responsible for--
``(i) providing decision makers with a predictive
understanding of the climate;
``(ii) making observations of our Earth system that can
be used by the public, policymakers, and to support
strategic decisions; or
``(iii) coordinating Federal research and investments
in understanding the forces shaping the global environment,
both human and natural, and their impacts on society.
``(D) Any other officials as the Director of National
Intelligence or the chair of the Council may determine
appropriate.
``(2) Responsibilities of chair.--The chair of the Council
shall have responsibility for--
``(A) identifying agencies to supply individuals from
elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the
intelligence community;
``(B) securing the permission of the relevant agency heads
for the participation of such individuals on the Council; and
``(C) any other duties that the Director of National
Intelligence may direct.
``(c) Duties and Responsibilities of Council.--The Council shall
carry out the following duties and responsibilities:
``(1) To meet at least quarterly to--
``(A) exchange appropriate data between elements of the
intelligence community and elements of the Federal Government
that are not elements of the intelligence community;
``(B) discuss processes for the routine exchange of such
data and implementation of such processes; and
``(C) prepare summaries of the business conducted at each
meeting.
``(2) To assess and determine best practices with respect to
the analysis of climate security, including identifying publicly
available information and intelligence acquired through clandestine
means that enables such analysis.
``(3) To assess and identify best practices with respect to
prior efforts of the intelligence community to analyze climate
security.
``(4) To assess and describe best practices for identifying and
disseminating climate security indicators and warnings.
``(5) To recommend methods of incorporating analysis of climate
security and the best practices identified under paragraphs (2)
through (4) into existing analytic training programs.
``(6) To consult, as appropriate, with other elements of the
intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate change or
climate security and elements of the Federal Government that are
not elements of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of
climate change or climate security, for the purpose of sharing
information about ongoing efforts and avoiding duplication of
existing efforts.
``(7) To work with elements of the intelligence community that
conduct analysis of climate change or climate security and elements
of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence
community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate
security--
``(A) to exchange appropriate data between such elements,
establish processes, procedures and practices for the routine
exchange of such data, discuss the implementation of such
processes; and
``(B) to enable and facilitate the sharing of findings and
analysis between such elements.
``(8) To assess whether the elements of the intelligence
community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate
security may inform the research direction of academic work and the
sponsored work of the United States Government.
``(9) At the discretion of the chair of the Council, to convene
conferences of analysts and nonintelligence community personnel
working on climate change or climate security on subjects that the
chair shall direct.
``(d) Sunset.--The Council shall terminate on the date that is 4
years after the date of the enactment of this section.
``(e) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Climate security.--The term `climate security' means the
effects of climate change on the following:
``(A) The national security of the United States, including
national security infrastructure.
``(B) Subnational, national, and regional political
stability.
``(C) The security of allies and partners of the United
States.
``(D) Ongoing or potential political violence, including
unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism,
rebellion, revolution, civil war, and interstate war.
``(2) Climate intelligence indications and warnings.--The term
`climate intelligence indications and warnings' means developments
relating to climate security with the potential to--
``(A) imminently and substantially alter the political
stability or degree of human security in a country or region;
or
``(B) imminently and substantially threaten--
``(i) the national security of the United States;
``(ii) the military, political, or economic interests
of allies and partners of the United States; or
``(iii) citizens of the United States abroad.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 119B the following new item:
``Sec. 120. Climate Security Advisory Council.''.
(c) Initial Appointments.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
appoint the members of the Council under section 120 of the National
Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).
SEC. 5322. FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE RESPONSE CENTER.
(a) Establishment.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3001 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 119B the following
new section:
``SEC. 119C. FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE RESPONSE CENTER.
``(a) Establishment.--There is within the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence a Foreign Malign Influence Response Center (in
this section referred to as the `Center').
``(b) Functions and Composition.--The Center shall--
``(1) be comprised of analysts from all elements of the
intelligence community, including elements with diplomatic and law
enforcement functions;
``(2) have access to all intelligence and other reporting
possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to
foreign malign influence;
``(3) serve as the primary organization in the United States
Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed
or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to foreign
malign influence; and
``(4) provide to employees and officers of the Federal
Government in policy-making positions and Congress comprehensive
assessments, and indications and warnings, of foreign malign
influence.
``(c) Director.--
``(1) Appointment.--There is a Director of the Center, who
shall be the head of the Center, and who shall be appointed by the
Director of National Intelligence.
``(2) Role.--The Director of the Center shall--
``(A) report directly to the Director of National
Intelligence;
``(B) carry out the functions under subsection (b); and
``(C) at the request of the President or the Director of
National Intelligence, develop and provide recommendations for
potential responses by the United States to foreign malign
influence.
``(d) Annual Reports.--
``(1) In general.--In addition to the matters submitted
pursuant to subsection (b)(4), at the direction of the Director of
National Intelligence, but not less than once each year, the
Director of the Center shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate a report on foreign malign influence.
``(2) Matters included.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall
include, with respect to the period covered by the report, a
discussion of the following:
``(A) The most significant activities of the Center.
``(B) Any recommendations the Director determines necessary
for legislative or other actions to improve the ability of the
Center to carry out its functions, including recommendations
regarding the protection of privacy and civil liberties.
``(e) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered foreign country.--The term `covered foreign
country' means the following:
``(A) The Russian Federation.
``(B) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
``(C) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
``(D) The People's Republic of China.
``(E) Any other foreign country that the Director of the
Center determines appropriate for purposes of this section.
``(2) Foreign malign influence.--The term `foreign malign
influence' means any hostile effort undertaken by, at the direction
of, or on behalf of or with the substantial support of, the
government of a covered foreign country with the objective of
influencing, through overt or covert means--
``(A) the political, military, economic, or other policies
or activities of the United States Government or State or local
governments, including any election within the United States;
or
``(B) the public opinion within the United States.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents at the beginning of
such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
119B the following new item:
``Sec. 119C. Foreign Malign Influence Response Center.''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 507(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
3106) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(6) An annual report submitted under section 119C(d)(1).''.
SEC. 5323. ENCOURAGEMENT OF COOPERATIVE ACTIONS TO DETECT AND COUNTER
FOREIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Russian Federation, through military intelligence
units, also known as the ``GRU'', and Kremlin-linked troll
organizations often referred to as the ``Internet Research
Agency'', deploy information warfare operations against the United
States, its allies and partners, with the goal of advancing the
strategic interests of the Russian Federation.
(2) One line of effort deployed as part of these information
warfare operations is the weaponization of social media platforms
with the goals of intensifying societal tensions, undermining trust
in governmental institutions within the United States, its allies
and partners in the West, and generally sowing division, fear, and
confusion.
(3) These information warfare operations are a threat to the
national security of the United States and that of the allies and
partners of the United States. As former Director of National
Intelligence Dan Coats stated, ``These actions are persistent, they
are pervasive and they are meant to undermine America's
democracy.''.
(4) These information warfare operations continue to evolve and
increase in sophistication.
(5) Other foreign adversaries and hostile non-state actors are
increasingly adopting similar tactics of deploying information
warfare operations against the West, such as recent state-backed
operations from China around the Hong Kong protests identified by
social media companies.
(6) Technological advances, including artificial intelligence,
will only make it more difficult in the future to detect fraudulent
accounts, deceptive material posted on social media, and malign
behavior on social media platforms.
(7) Because these information warfare operations are deployed
within and across private social media platforms, the companies
that own these platforms have a responsibility to detect and
facilitate the removal or neutralization of foreign adversary
networks operating clandestinely on their platforms.
(8) The social media companies are inherently technologically
sophisticated and adept at rapidly analyzing large amounts of data
and developing software-based solutions to diverse and ever-
changing challenges on their platforms, which makes them well-
equipped to address the threat occurring on their platforms.
(9) Independent analyses confirmed Kremlin-linked threat
networks, based on data provided by several social media companies
to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, thereby
demonstrating that it is possible to discern both broad patterns of
cross-platform information warfare operations and specific
fraudulent behavior on social media platforms.
(10) General Paul Nakasone, Director of the National Security
Agency, emphasized the importance of these independent analyses to
the planning and conducting of military cyber operations to
frustrate Kremlin-linked information warfare operations against the
2018 mid-term elections. General Nakasone stated that the reports
``were very, very helpful in terms of being able to understand
exactly what our adversary was trying to do to build dissent within
our nation.''.
(11) Institutionalizing ongoing robust, independent, and
vigorous analysis of data related to foreign threat networks within
and across social media platforms will help counter ongoing
information warfare operations against the United States, its
allies, and its partners.
(12) Archiving and disclosing to the public the results of
these analyses by the social media companies and trusted third-
party experts in a transparent manner will serve to demonstrate
that the social media companies are detecting and removing foreign
malign activities from their platforms while protecting the privacy
of the people of the United States and will build public
understanding of the scale and scope of these foreign threats to
our democracy, since exposure is one of the most effective means to
build resilience.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the social media companies should cooperate among
themselves and with independent organizations and researchers on a
sustained and regular basis to share and analyze data and
indicators relevant to foreign information warfare operations
within and across their platforms in order to detect and counter
foreign information warfare operations that threaten the national
security of the United States and its allies and partners;
(2) information from law enforcement and the intelligence
community is also important in assisting efforts by these social
media companies to identify foreign information warfare operations;
(3) these analytic efforts should be organized in such a
fashion as to meet the highest standards of ethics,
confidentiality, and privacy protection of the people of the United
States, while still allowing timely research access to relevant
data;
(4) these analytic efforts should be undertaken as soon as
possible to facilitate countering ongoing state or state-backed
foreign information warfare operations and to aid in preparations
for the United States Presidential and congressional elections in
2020 and beyond;
(5) the structure and operations of social media companies make
them well positioned to work with independent organizations and
researchers to address foreign adversary threat networks within and
across their platforms, and these efforts could be conducted
without direct Government involvement, direction, or regulation;
and
(6) if the social media industry fails to take sufficient
action to address foreign adversary threat networks operating
within or across their platforms, Congress would have to consider
additional safeguards for ensuring that this threat is effectively
mitigated.
(c) Authority to Facilitate Establishment of Social Media Data and
Threat Analysis Center.--
(1) Authority.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, may facilitate, by
grant or contract or under an existing authority of the Director,
the establishment of a Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center
with the functions described in paragraph (2) at an independent,
nonprofit organization.
(2) Functions.--The functions described in this paragraph are
the following:
(A) Acting as a convening and sponsoring authority for
cooperative social media data analysis of foreign threat
networks involving social media companies and third-party
experts, nongovernmental organizations, data journalists,
Federally funded research and development centers, academic
researchers, traditional media, and international counterparts,
as appropriate.
(B) Facilitating analysis of foreign influence operation,
within and across the individual social media platforms as well
as hacking and leaking campaigns, and other tactics, and
related unlawful activities that fund or subsidize such
operations.
(C) Developing processes to share information from
government entities on foreign influence operations with the
individual social media companies to inform threat analysis,
and working with the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence as appropriate.
(D) Determining and making public criteria for identifying
which companies, organizations, or researchers qualify for
inclusion in the activities of the Center, and inviting
entities that fit the criteria to join.
(E) Determining jointly with the social media companies
what data and metadata related to indicators of foreign
adversary threat networks from their platforms and business
operations will be made available for access and analysis.
(F) Developing and making public the criteria and standards
that must be met for companies, other organizations, and
individual researchers to access and analyze data relating to
foreign adversary threat networks within and across social
media platforms and publish or otherwise use the results.
(G) Developing and making public the ethical standards for
investigation of foreign threat networks and use of analytic
results and for protection of the privacy of the customers and
users of the social media platforms and of the proprietary
information of the social media companies.
(H) Developing technical, contractual, and procedural
controls to prevent misuse of data, including any necessary
auditing procedures, compliance checks, and review mechanisms.
(I) Developing and making public criteria and conditions
under which the Center shall share information with the
appropriate Government agencies regarding threats to national
security from, or violations of the law involving, foreign
activities on social media platforms.
(J) Hosting a searchable archive aggregating information
related to foreign influence and disinformation operations to
build a collective understanding of the threats and facilitate
future examination consistent with privacy protections.
(K) Developing data standards to harmonize the sharing of
information pursuant to this paragraph.
(d) Reporting and Notifications.--If the Director of National
Intelligence chooses to use funds under subsection (c)(1) to facilitate
the establishment of the Center, the Director of the Center shall--
(1) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, submit to appropriate congressional committees a report
on--
(A) the estimated funding needs of the Center for fiscal
year 2021 and for subsequent years;
(B) such statutory protections from liability as the
Director considers necessary for the Center, participating
social media companies, and participating third-party
analytical participants;
(C) such statutory penalties as the Director considers
necessary to ensure against misuse of data by researchers; and
(D) such changes to the Center's mission to fully capture
broader unlawful activities that intersect with, complement, or
support information warfare tactics; and
(2) not less frequently than once each year, submit to the
Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and
the appropriate congressional committees a report--
(A) that assesses--
(i) degree of cooperation and commitment from the
social media companies to the mission of the Center; and
(ii) effectiveness of the Center in detecting and
facilitating the removal or neutralization of clandestine
foreign information warfare operations from social media
platforms; and
(B) includes such recommendations for legislative or
administrative action as the Center considers appropriate to
carry out the functions of the Center.
(e) Periodic Reporting to the Public.--The Director of the Center
shall--
(1) once each quarter, make available to the public a report on
key trends in foreign influence and disinformation operations,
including any threats to campaigns and elections, to inform the
public of the United States; and
(2) as the Director considers necessary, provide more timely
assessments relating to ongoing disinformation campaigns.
(f) Funding.--Of the amounts appropriated or otherwise made
available to the National Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) in fiscal year
2020 and 2021, the Director of National Intelligence may use up to
$30,000,000 to carry out this section.
(g) Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
(5) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives;
(7) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives;
(8) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(9) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives; and
(10) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
SEC. 5324. TRANSFER OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY TO THE OFFICE
OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Transfer.--Upon the submission of the joint certifications
under subsection (b)(1), the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
National Intelligence shall take such actions that the Director
determines necessary to transfer the National Intelligence University
from the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Director of National
Intelligence.
(b) Joint Certifications.--
(1) Requirement.--Except as provided by paragraph (2), as soon
as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, but not
later than 18 months after the date of such enactment, the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence
shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees
written certifications of each of the following:
(A) The Middle States Commission on Higher Education has
provided regional academic accreditation for the National
Intelligence University before the date of the certification,
or will provide such academic accreditation as of the date on
which the University is transferred under subsection (a).
(B) Members of the Armed Forces attending the University
will be eligible to receive credit for Phase I joint
professional military education.
(C) The Secretary of Education has informed the Director of
National Intelligence that the Secretary has recommended
approval of the degrees to be conferred pursuant to subsection
(e)(2) or will provide such recommended approval as of the date
on which the University is transferred under subsection (a).
(D) The Director of National Intelligence, in collaboration
with the Secretary of Defense, has established an appropriate
governance model for the University.
(E) The Secretary of Defense shall use the University to
provide personnel of the Department of Defense with advanced
intelligence education.
(2) Failure to certify.--
(A) Actions required.--If the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of National Intelligence fail to submit the
certifications under paragraph (1) by the date specified in
such paragraph, the Secretary and the Director shall--
(i) jointly submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on such failure by not later than 21
months after the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(ii) jointly submit such certifications as soon as
practicable.
(B) Contents of report.--The report under subparagraph
(A)(i) shall contain the following:
(i) A description of the progress made toward
fulfilling the conditions described in such paragraph as of
the date of the report.
(ii) A description of any obstacles preventing the
fulfillment of such conditions.
(iii) The estimated dates of completion for the
fulfillment of such conditions and the submission of the
certifications.
(c) Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the President of the
National Intelligence University shall jointly provide to the
appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the plan to carry
out the transfer under subsection (a), including with respect to--
(1) ensuring the provision of services to all elements of the
intelligence community;
(2) employing a military cadre at the University; and
(3) addressing the current accreditation status of the National
Intelligence University with the Middle States Commission on Higher
Education.
(d) Cost Estimates of Transfer.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
National Intelligence shall jointly submit to the appropriate
congressional committees an estimate of--
(A) the annual costs of operating the National Intelligence
University; and
(B) the costs to the Federal Government of transferring the
National Intelligence University to the Director of National
Intelligence.
(2) Inclusion of indirect costs.--The estimate submitted under
paragraph (1) shall include all indirect costs, including with
respect to human resources, security, facilities, and information
technology.
(e) Degree-granting Authority.--
(1) Regulations.--Beginning on the date on which the National
Intelligence University is transferred under subsection (a), under
regulations prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence,
the President of the National Intelligence University may, upon the
recommendation of the faculty of the University, confer appropriate
degrees upon graduates who meet the degree requirements.
(2) Limitation.--A degree may not be conferred under this
section unless--
(A) the Secretary of Education has recommended approval of
the degree in accordance with the Federal Policy Governing
Granting of Academic Degrees by Federal Agencies; and
(B) the University is accredited by the appropriate
civilian academic accrediting agency or organization to award
the degree, as determined by the Secretary of Education.
(f) Congressional Notification Requirements.--
(1) Actions on nonaccreditation.--Beginning on the date on
which the National Intelligence University is transferred under
subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence shall
promptly--
(A) notify the congressional intelligence committees of any
action by the Middle States Commission on Higher Education, or
other appropriate academic accrediting agency or organization,
to not accredit the University to award any new or existing
degree; and
(B) submit to such committees a report containing an
explanation of any such action.
(2) Modification or redesignation of degree-granting
authority.--Beginning on the date on which the National
Intelligence University is transferred under subsection (a), upon
any modification or redesignation of existing degree-granting
authority, the Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report containing the rationale for the
proposed modification or redesignation and any subsequent
recommendation of the Secretary of Education with respect to the
proposed modification or redesignation.
(g) Conforming Repeal.--
(1) In general.--Section 2161 of title 10, United States Code,
is repealed, and the table of sections at the beginning of chapter
108 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to such
section 2161.
(2) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraph (1) shall
take effect on the date on which the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of National Intelligence jointly submit the joint
certifications under subsection (b)(1). The Secretary and the
Director shall jointly notify the Law Revision Counsel of the House
of Representatives of the submission of the certifications so that
the Law Revision Counsel may execute the amendments made by
paragraph (1).
(h) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and
(B) the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
House of Representatives.
(2) Phase i joint professional military education.--The term
``Phase I joint professional military education'' has the meaning
given that term pursuant to section 2154 of title 10, United States
Code.
Subtitle C--Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
SEC. 5331. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:
(1) Whistleblower.--The term ``whistleblower'' means a person
who makes a whistleblower disclosure.
(2) Whistleblower disclosure.--The term ``whistleblower
disclosure'' means a disclosure that is protected under section
1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) or
section 3001(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)).
SEC. 5332. INSPECTOR GENERAL EXTERNAL REVIEW PANEL.
(a) Authority to Convene External Review Panels.--
(1) In general.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 6718, is amended by
adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 1106. INSPECTOR GENERAL EXTERNAL REVIEW PANEL.
``(a) Request for Review.--An individual with a claim described in
subsection (b) may submit to the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community a request for a review of such claim by an external review
panel convened under subsection (c).
``(b) Claims and Individuals Described.--A claim described in this
subsection is any--
``(1) claim by an individual--
``(A) that the individual has been subjected to a personnel
action that is prohibited under section 1104; and
``(B) who has exhausted the applicable review process for
the claim pursuant to enforcement of such section; or
``(2) claim by an individual--
``(A) that he or she has been subjected to a reprisal
prohibited by paragraph (1) of section 3001(j) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50
U.S.C. 3341(j)); and
``(B) who received a decision on an appeal regarding that
claim under paragraph (4) of such section.
``(c) External Review Panel Convened.--
``(1) Discretion to convene.--Upon receipt of a request under
subsection (a) regarding a claim, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community may, at the discretion of the Inspector
General, convene an external review panel under this subsection to
review the claim.
``(2) Membership.--
``(A) Composition.--An external review panel convened under
this subsection shall be composed of three members as follows:
``(i) The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community.
``(ii) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), two
members selected by the Inspector General as the Inspector
General considers appropriate on a case-by-case basis from
among inspectors general of the following:
``(I) The Department of Defense.
``(II) The Department of Energy.
``(III) The Department of Homeland Security.
``(IV) The Department of Justice.
``(V) The Department of State.
``(VI) The Department of the Treasury.
``(VII) The Central Intelligence Agency.
``(VIII) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
``(IX) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
``(X) The National Reconnaissance Office.
``(XI) The National Security Agency.
``(B) Limitation.--An inspector general of an agency may
not be selected to sit on the panel under subparagraph (A)(ii)
to review any matter relating to a decision made by such
agency.
``(C) Chairperson.--
``(i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii),
the chairperson of any panel convened under this subsection
shall be the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community.
``(ii) Conflicts of interest.--If the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community finds cause to recuse himself
or herself from a panel convened under this subsection, the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall--
``(I) select a chairperson from inspectors general
of the elements listed under subparagraph (A)(ii) whom
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
considers appropriate; and
``(II) notify the congressional intelligence
committees of such selection.
``(3) Period of review.--Each external review panel convened
under this subsection to review a claim shall complete review of
the claim no later than 270 days after the date on which the
Inspector General convenes the external review panel.
``(d) Remedies.--
``(1) Panel recommendations.--If an external review panel
convened under subsection (c) determines, pursuant to a review of a
claim submitted by an individual under subsection (a), that the
individual was the subject of a personnel action prohibited under
section 1104 or was subjected to a reprisal prohibited by section
3001(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(1)), the panel may recommend that the
agency head take corrective action--
``(A) in the case of an employee or former employee--
``(i) to return the employee or former employee, as
nearly as practicable and reasonable, to the position such
employee or former employee would have held had the
reprisal not occurred; or
``(ii) reconsider the employee's or former employee's
eligibility for access to classified information consistent
with national security; or
``(B) in any other case, such other action as the external
review panel considers appropriate.
``(2) Agency action.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date on
which the head of an agency receives a recommendation from an
external review panel under paragraph (1), the head shall--
``(i) give full consideration to such recommendation;
and
``(ii) inform the panel and the Director of National
Intelligence of what action the head has taken with respect
to the recommendation.
``(B) Failure to inform.--The Director shall notify the
President of any failures to comply with subparagraph (A)(ii).
``(e) Annual Reports.--
``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once each year, the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees and the Director of National
Intelligence a report on the activities under this section during
the previous year.
``(2) Contents.--Subject to such limitations as the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community considers necessary to
protect the privacy of an individual who has made a claim described
in subsection (b), each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
include, for the period covered by the report, the following:
``(A) The determinations and recommendations made by the
external review panels convened under this section.
``(B) The responses of the heads of agencies that received
recommendations from the external review panels.''.
(2) Table of contents amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by
section 6718, is amended by adding at the end the following new
item:
``Sec. 1106. Inspector General external review panel.''.
(b) Recommendation on Addressing Whistleblower Appeals Relating to
Reprisal Complaints Against Inspectors General.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community, in consultation with the Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a recommendation on how to ensure that--
(A) a whistleblower in the intelligence community who has a
complaint against an inspector general in the intelligence
community and who alleges a reprisal, has available the
adjudication and review provided under section 1104 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234); and
(B) any such whistleblower who has exhausted the applicable
review process may request an external review panel and receive
one, at the discretion of the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community.
(2) Contents.--The recommendation submitted pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A discussion of whether and to what degree section 1106
of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection
(a)(1), provides appropriate authorities and mechanisms to
provide an external review panel as described in paragraph (1)
of this subsection and for the purposes described in such
paragraph.
(B) Such recommendations for legislative or administrative
action as the Inspector General may have with respect to
providing an external review panel as described in paragraph
(1) and for the purposes described in such paragraph.
SEC. 5333. HARMONIZATION OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community, in coordination with the Intelligence Community Inspectors
General Forum, shall develop recommendations, applicable to all
inspectors general of elements of the intelligence community, regarding
the harmonization, where appropriate, of instructions, policies, and
directives relating to processes, procedures, and timelines for claims
and appeals relating to allegations of personnel actions prohibited
under section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 or reprisals
prohibited by section 3001(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(1)).
(b) Transparency and Protection.--In developing recommendations
under subsection (a), the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall make efforts to maximize transparency and protect
whistleblowers.
SEC. 5334. OVERSIGHT BY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
OVER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS.
(a) System for Notification of Information Relating to Complaints
by Whistleblowers Within the Intelligence Community.--Subject to
subsection (b), not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, in
consultation with the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum,
shall establish a system whereby the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community is notified in near real time of the following:
(1) Submission of complaints by whistleblowers to inspectors
general of elements of the intelligence community relating to the
programs and activities under the jurisdiction of the Director of
National Intelligence, and information related to such complaints.
(2) Actions taken by an inspector general of an element of the
Intelligence Community relating to such complaints.
(b) Policies for Implementation.--
(1) In general.--The system established under subsection (a)
may not be implemented until the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, in consultation with the Intelligence
Community Inspectors General Forum, has developed and released to
each of the inspectors general of the elements of the intelligence
community written policies regarding the implementation of such
subsection.
(2) Requirements.--The policies required by paragraph (1)
shall--
(A) protect the privacy of whistleblowers, including by
preventing dissemination without the consent of the
whistleblower, of any information submitted previously by a
whistleblower to an inspector general of an element of the
intelligence community; and
(B) ensure compliance with the requirements of subsection
(a), while--
(i) ensuring that the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community can oversee whistleblower policies
and practices and identify matters that, in the judgment of
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, may be
the subject of an investigation, inspection, audit, or
review by the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community; and
(ii) avoiding the imposition of inappropriate resource
burdens on inspectors general of elements of the
intelligence community.
SEC. 5335. REPORT ON CLEARED WHISTLEBLOWER ATTORNEYS.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in
coordination with the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
and the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on access to cleared
attorneys by whistleblowers in the intelligence community.
(b) Contents.--The report submitted pursuant to subsection (a)
shall include the following with respect to the 3-year period preceding
the date of the report:
(1) The number of whistleblowers in the intelligence community
who requested, through formal submission or verbal request, to
retain a cleared attorney and at what stage they requested an
attorney.
(2) The number of such limited security agreements approved,
rejected, or pending.
(3) The scope and clearance levels of such limited security
agreements.
(4) The number of such whistleblowers represented by cleared
counsel.
(5) Recommendations for legislative or administrative action to
ensure that whistleblowers in the intelligence community have
access to cleared attorneys, including improvements to the limited
security agreement process and such other options as the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community considers appropriate.
(c) Survey.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
shall ensure that the report submitted under subsection (a) is based
on--
(1) data from a survey of whistleblowers whose identity may be
shared, as appropriate, with the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community by means of the system established pursuant
to section 5334;
(2) information obtained from the inspectors general of the
intelligence community; or
(3) information from such other sources as may be identified by
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Subtitle D--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 5341. CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Section 8(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3510(a)(1)) is amended by inserting before ``rental of'' the
following: ``payment of death benefits in cases in which the
circumstances of the death of an employee of the Agency, a detailee of
the Agency or other employee of another department or agency of the
Federal Government assigned to the Agency, or an individual affiliated
with the Agency (as determined by the Director), is not covered by
section 11, other similar provisions of Federal law, or any regulation
issued by the Director providing death benefits, but that the Director
determines such payment appropriate;''.
TITLE LIV--SECURITY CLEARANCES
SEC. 5401. IMPROVING VISIBILITY INTO THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS.
(a) Definition of Security Executive Agent.--In this section, the
term ``Security Executive Agent'' means the officer serving as the
Security Executive Agent pursuant to section 803 of the National
Security Act of 1947, as added by section 6605.
(b) Policy Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent shall issue a
policy that requires the head of each Federal agency to create, not
later than December 31, 2023, an electronic portal that can be used by
human resources personnel and applicants for security clearances to
view information about the status of an application for a security
clearance and the average time required for each phase of the security
clearance process.
SEC. 5402. MAKING CERTAIN POLICIES AND EXECUTION PLANS RELATING TO
PERSONNEL CLEARANCES AVAILABLE TO INDUSTRY PARTNERS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Security executive agent.--The term ``Security Executive
Agent'' means the officer serving as the Security Executive Agent
pursuant to section 803 of the National Security Act of 1947, as
added by section 6605.
(2) Appropriate industry partner.--The term ``appropriate
industry partner'' means a contractor, licensee, or grantee (as
defined in section 101(a) of Executive Order 12829 (50 U.S.C. 3161
note; relating to National Industrial Security Program), as in
effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act)
that is participating in the National Industrial Security Program
established by such Executive Order.
(b) Sharing of Policies and Plans Required.--Each head of a Federal
agency shall share policies and plans relating to security clearances
with appropriate industry partners directly affected by such policies
and plans in a manner consistent with the protection of national
security as well as the goals and objectives of the National Industrial
Security Program administered pursuant to Executive Order 12829 (50
U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to the National Industrial Security
Program).
(c) Development of Policies and Procedures Required.--Not later
than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Security
Executive Agent and the Director of the National Industrial Security
Program shall jointly develop policies and procedures by which
appropriate industry partners with proper security clearances and a
need to know can have appropriate access to the policies and plans
shared pursuant to subsection (b) that directly affect those industry
partners.
TITLE LV--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia
SEC. 5501. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS IN THE
UNITED STATES BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) Reports.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 5511, is further amended by
adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 1108. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS IN
THE UNITED STATES BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
``(a) Requirement.--On an annual basis, the Director of the
National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the influence
operations and campaigns in the United States conducted by the Russian
Federation.
``(b) Contents.--Each report under subsection (a) shall include the
following:
``(1) A description and listing of the Russian organizations
and persons involved in influence operations and campaigns
operating in the United States as of the date of the report.
``(2) An assessment of organizations that are associated with
or receive funding from organizations and persons identified in
paragraph (1), particularly such entities operating in the United
States.
``(3) A description of the efforts by the organizations and
persons identified in paragraph (1) to target, coerce, and
influence populations within the United States.
``(4) An assessment of the activities of the organizations and
persons identified in paragraph (1) designed to influence the
opinions of elected leaders of the United States or candidates for
election in the United States.
``(5) With respect to reports submitted after the first report,
an assessment of the change in goals, tactics, techniques, and
procedures of the influence operations and campaigns conducted by
the organizations and persons identified in paragraph (1).
``(c) Coordination.--In carrying out subsection (a), the Director
shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Director of the National Security Agency, and any other relevant head
of an element of the intelligence community.
``(d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 5511, is
further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1107
the following new item:
``Sec. 1108. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the
United States by the Russian Federation.''.
(c) Initial Report.--The Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees the first report under section
1108 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a),
by not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 5502. ASSESSMENT OF LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE FINANCIAL AND
OTHER ASSETS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should do more to expose the corruption of Vladimir Putin, whose
ill-gotten wealth is perhaps the most powerful global symbol of his
dishonesty and his persistent efforts to undermine the rule of law and
democracy in the Russian Federation.
(b) Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment, based on all
sources of intelligence, on the net worth and financial and other
assets, legitimate as well as illegitimate, of Vladimir Putin and his
family members, including--
(1) the estimated net worth of Vladimir Putin and his family
members;
(2) a description of their legitimately and illegitimately
obtained assets, including all real, personal, and intellectual
property, bank or investment or similar accounts, and any other
financial or business interests or holdings, including those
outside of Russia;
(3) the details of the legitimately and illegitimately obtained
assets, including real, personal, and intellectual property, bank
or investment or similar accounts, and any other financial or
business interests or holdings, including those outside of Russia,
that are owned or controlled by, accessible to, or otherwise
maintained for the benefit of Vladimir Putin, including their
nature, location, manner of acquisition, value, and publicly named
owner (if other than Vladimir Putin);
(4) the methods used by Vladimir Putin or others acting at his
direction, with his knowledge, or for his benefit, to conceal
Putin's interest in his accounts, holdings, or other assets,
including the establishment of ``front'' or shell companies and the
use of intermediaries; and
(5) an identification of the most significant senior Russian
political figures, oligarchs, and any other persons who have
engaged in activity intended to conceal the true financial
condition of Vladimir Putin.
(c) Form.--The assessment required under subsection (b) shall be
submitted either--
(1) in unclassified form to the extent consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, and may include a
classified annex; or
(2) simultaneously as both an unclassified version and a
classified version.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee
on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 5503. ASSESSMENTS OF INTENTIONS OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods, the Director of National Intelligence, and the
head of any element of the intelligence community that the Director
determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees each of the assessments described in subsection (b).
(b) Assessments Described.--The assessments described in this
subsection are assessments based on intelligence obtained from all
sources that assess the current intentions of the political leadership
of the Russian Federation with respect to the following:
(1) Potential military action against members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
(2) Potential responses to an enlarged United States or NATO
military presence in eastern Europe or to increased United States
military support for allies and partners in the region, such as the
provision of additional lethal military equipment to Ukraine or
Georgia.
(3) Potential actions taken for the purpose of exploiting
perceived divisions among the governments of Russia's Western
adversaries.
(c) Form.--Each assessment required under subsection (a) may be
submitted in classified form but shall also include an unclassified
executive summary, consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section, the
term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed Services
of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate.
Subtitle B--Matters Relating to China
SEC. 5511. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS IN THE
UNITED STATES BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.
(a) Reports.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 5332, is further amended by
adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 1107. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS IN
THE UNITED STATES BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.
``(a) Requirement.--On an annual basis, consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director of the
National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate a report on the influence operations and campaigns in the
United States conducted by the Communist Party of China.
``(b) Contents.--Each report under subsection (a) shall include the
following:
``(1) A description of the organization of the United Front
Work Department of the People's Republic of China, or the
successors of the United Front Work Department, and the links
between the United Front Work Department and the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China.
``(2) An assessment of the degree to which organizations that
are associated with or receive funding from the United Front Work
Department, particularly such entities operating in the United
States, are formally tasked by the Chinese Communist Party or the
Government of China.
``(3) A description of the efforts by the United Front Work
Department and subsidiary organizations of the United Front Work
Department to target, coerce, and influence foreign populations,
particularly those of ethnic Chinese descent.
``(4) An assessment of attempts by the Chinese Embassy,
consulates, and organizations affiliated with the Chinese Communist
Party (including, at a minimum, the United Front Work Department)
to influence the United States-based Chinese Student Scholar
Associations.
``(5) A description of the evolution of the role of the United
Front Work Department under the leadership of the President of
China.
``(6) An assessment of the activities of the United Front Work
Department designed to influence the opinions of elected leaders of
the United States, or candidates for elections in the United
States, with respect to issues of importance to the Chinese
Communist Party.
``(7) A listing of all known organizations affiliated with the
United Front Work Department that are operating in the United
States as of the date of the report.
``(8) With respect to reports submitted after the first report,
an assessment of the change in goals, tactics, techniques, and
procedures of the influence operations and campaigns conducted by
the Chinese Communist Party.
``(c) Coordination.--In carrying out subsection (a), the Director
shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Director of the National Security Agency, and any other relevant head
of an element of the intelligence community.
``(d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 5332, is
further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1106
the following new item:
``Sec. 1107. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the
United States by the Communist Party of China.''.
(c) Initial Report.--The Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate the first report under section 1107 of the National
Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), by not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 5512. REPORT ON REPRESSION OF ETHNIC MUSLIM MINORITIES IN THE
XINJIANG REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Report.--Not later than 150 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a report on activity by the People's Republic of China to
repress ethnic Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region of China.
(b) Contents.--The report under subsection (a) shall include the
following:
(1) An assessment of the number of individuals detained in
``political reeducation camps'', and the conditions in such camps
for detainees, in the Xinjiang region of China, including whether
detainees endure torture, forced renunciation of faith, or other
mistreatment.
(2) A description, as possible, of the geographic location of
such camps.
(3) A description, as possible, of the methods used by China to
``reeducate'' detainees and the elements of China responsible for
such ``reeducation''.
(4) A description of any forced labor in such camps, and any
labor performed in regional factories for low wages under the
threat of being sent back to ``political reeducation camps''.
(5) An assessment of the level of access China grants to
foreign persons observing the situation in Xinjiang and a
description of measures used to impede efforts to monitor the
conditions in Xinjiang.
(6) An assessment of the surveillance, detection, and control
methods used by China to target ethnic minorities, including new
``high-tech'' policing models and a description of any civil
liberties or privacy protections provided under such models.
(7) An assessment and identification of the technological and
financial support provided by United States-based companies,
including technological support for the development of facial
recognition capabilities or technologies for digital surveillance,
social control, or censorship, and financial support, including
from financial institutions, investment vehicles, and pension
funds, to China-based companies or Chinese government entities
providing material support to the digital surveillance or
repression of Uyghur and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang by the
Xinjiang authorities.
(c) Coordination.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
carry out subsection (a) in coordination with the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security
Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
and the head of any other agency of the Federal Government that the
Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.
(d) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 5513. REPORT ON EFFORTS BY PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO INFLUENCE
ELECTION IN TAIWAN.
(a) Report.--Consistent with section 3(c) of the Taiwan Relations
Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3302(c)), and consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, not later than 45 days
after the date of the election for the President and Vice President of
Taiwan in 2020, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate a report on any--
(1) influence operations conducted by China to interfere in or
undermine such election; and
(2) efforts by the United States to disrupt such operations.
(b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall include the
following:
(1) A description of any significant efforts by the
intelligence community to coordinate technical and material support
for Taiwan to identify, disrupt, and combat influence operations
specified in subsection (a)(1).
(2) A description of any efforts by the United States
Government to build the capacity of Taiwan to disrupt external
efforts that degrade a free and fair election process.
(3) An assessment of whether and to what extent China conducted
influence operations specified in subsection (a)(1), and, if such
operations occurred--
(A) a comprehensive list of specific governmental and
nongovernmental entities of China that were involved in
supporting such operations and a description of the role of
each such entity; and
(B) an identification of any tactics, techniques, and
procedures used in such operations.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Subtitle C--Matters Relating to Other Countries
SEC. 5521. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT ON IRANIAN EFFORTS IN SYRIA AND
LEBANON.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that,
regardless of the ultimate number of United States military personnel
deployed to Syria, it is a vital interest of the United States to
prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hizballah, and other Iranian-
backed forces from establishing a strong and enduring presence in Syria
that can be used to project power in the region and threaten the United
States and its allies, including Israel.
(b) Report.--
(1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report that assesses--
(A) efforts by Iran to establish long-term influence in
Syria through military, political, economic, social, and
cultural means;
(B) the degree to which Iranian support of proxy forces in
Syria and Lebanon contributes to Iranian strategy with respect
to the region; and
(C) the threat posed by the efforts described in
subparagraph (A) to United States interests and allies.
(2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include
each of the following:
(A) An assessment of--
(i) how Iran and Iranian-backed forces, including the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hizballah, have
provided or are currently providing manpower, training,
weapons, equipment, and funding to the Syrian government
led by President Bashar al-Assad;
(ii) the support provided by Iran and Hizballah to Shia
militias operating in Syria composed of domestic fighters
from Syria and foreign fighters from countries such as
Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan;
(iii) operational lessons learned by Hizballah based on
the recent experiences of Hizballah in Syria;
(iv) the threat posed by Iran and Iranian-backed forces
to--
(I) the al-Tanf garrison; and
(II) areas of northeast Syria that are currently
controlled by local partner forces of the United
States;
(v) the degree to which efforts of the United States to
sustain and strengthen Kurdish forces in Syria may
undermine the influence of Iran and Iranian-backed forces
in Syria;
(vi) how Iran and Iranian-backed forces seek to enhance
the long-term influence of such entities in Syria through
non-military means such as purchasing strategic real estate
in Syria, constructing Shia religious centers and schools,
securing loyalty from Sunni tribes in exchange for material
assistance, and inducing the Assad government to open
Farsi-language departments at Syrian universities;
(vii) whether the prominent role of Iran in Syria,
including the influence of Iran over government
institutions, may increase the likelihood of the
reconstitution of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in
Syria; and
(viii) the provision of goods, services, or technology
transferred by Iran or its affiliates to Hizballah for the
purpose of indigenously manufacturing or otherwise
producing missiles.
(B) An analysis of--
(i) how Iran is working with the Russian Federation,
Turkey, and other countries to increase the influence of
Iran in Syria;
(ii) the goals of Iran in Syria, including, but not
limited to, protecting the Assad government, increasing the
regional influence of Iran, threatening Israel from a more
proximate location, building weapon-production facilities
and other military infrastructure, and securing a land
bridge to connect Iran through Iraq and Syria to the
stronghold of Hizballah in southern Lebanon; and
(iii) the foreign and domestic supply chains that
significantly facilitate, support, or otherwise aid
acquisition or development by Hizballah of missile
production facilities, including the geographic
distribution of such foreign and domestic supply chains.
(C) A description of--
(i) how the efforts of Iran to transfer advanced
weapons to Hizballah and to establish a military presence
in Syria has led to direct and repeated confrontations with
Israel;
(ii) the intelligence and military support that the
United States provides to Israel to help Israel identify
and appropriately address specific threats to Israel from
Iran and Iranian-backed forces in Syria;
(iii) the threat posed to Israel and other allies of
the United States in the Middle East resulting from the
transfer of arms or related material, or other support, by
Iran to Hizballah and other proxies;
(iv) Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel operating
within Syria, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and
Revolutionary Guard Corps forces of Iran, and the number
and geographic distribution of such personnel;
(v) any rocket-producing facilities in Lebanon for
nonstate actors, including whether such facilities were
assessed to be built at the direction of Hizballah
leadership, Iranian leadership, or in consultation between
Iranian leadership and Hizballah leadership; and
(vi) Iranian expenditures in the previous calendar year
on military and terrorist activities outside the country,
including the amount of such expenditures with respect to
each of Hizballah, Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hamas, proxy
forces in Iraq and Syria, ballistic missile research and
testing, and any other entity, country, or activity that
the Director determines as destabilizing to the Middle East
region.
(3) Form of report.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(4) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) Appropriate congressional committees.--the term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(i) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate; and
(ii) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(B) Arms or related material.--The term ``arms or related
material'' means--
(i) nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological
weapons or materials or components of such weapons;
(ii) ballistic or cruise missile weapons or materials
or components of such weapons;
(iii) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced
conventional weapons;
(iv) defense articles or defense services, as those
terms are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively,
of section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2794);
(v) defense information, as that term is defined in
section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2403); or
(vi) items designated by the President for purposes of
the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of
the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
SEC. 5522. ASSESSMENTS REGARDING THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE AND MEXICO.
(a) Assessment.--
(1) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis, the Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research, the Chief of Intelligence of the Drug
Enforcement Administration, and other appropriate officials in the
intelligence community, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report containing a comprehensive
assessment of drug trafficking, human trafficking, and human
smuggling activities in the Northern Triangle and Mexico.
(2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall
include, at a minimum, the following:
(A) An assessment of the effect of drug trafficking, human
trafficking, and human smuggling on the security and economic
situation in the Northern Triangle.
(B) An assessment of the effect of the activities of drug
trafficking organizations on the migration of persons from the
Northern Triangle to the United States-Mexico border.
(C) A summary of any relevant activities by elements of the
intelligence community in relation to drug trafficking, human
trafficking, and human smuggling in the Northern Triangle and
Mexico.
(D) An assessment of methods and routes used by drug
trafficking organizations, human traffickers, and human
smugglers to move drugs, persons, or both from the Northern
Triangle and Mexico to the United States.
(E) An assessment of the intersection between the
activities of drug trafficking organizations, human traffickers
and human smugglers, and other organized criminal groups in the
Northern Triangle and Mexico.
(F) An assessment of the illicit funds and financial
transactions that support the activities of drug trafficking
organizations, human traffickers, and human smugglers, and
connected criminal enterprises, in the Northern Triangle and
Mexico.
(G) A comprehensive review of the current collection
priorities of the intelligence community for the Northern
Triangle and Mexico, as of the date of the enactment of this
Act, in order to identify whether such priorities are
appropriate and sufficient in light of the threat posed by the
activities of drug trafficking organizations and human
traffickers and human smugglers to the security of the United
States and the Western Hemisphere.
(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) may be
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall contain an
unclassified summary.
(4) Availability.--The report under paragraph (1), or the
unclassified summary of the report described in paragraph (3),
shall be made publicly available.
(b) Briefings.--
(1) Semiannual requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the
date on which the report under subsection (a) is submitted, and
every 180 days thereafter for a 5-year period, the Director of
National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional
intelligence committees a briefing on the intelligence community's
collection priorities and activities in the Northern Triangle and
Mexico with a focus on the threat posed by the activities of drug
trafficking organizations and human traffickers and human smugglers
to the security of the United States and the Western Hemisphere.
(2) Matters included.--Each briefing under paragraph (1) shall
include a description of the funds expended by the intelligence
community on the efforts described in such paragraph during the
preceding fiscal year, except the first such briefing shall cover
fiscal years 2018 and 2019.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) Human trafficking.--The term ``human trafficking'' has the
meaning given the term ``severe forms of trafficking in persons''
by section 103 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102).
(3) Northern triangle.--The term ``Northern Triangle'' means El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
TITLE LVI--FEDERAL EFFORTS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM
SEC. 5601. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate.
(2) Domestic terrorism.--The term ``domestic terrorism'' has
the meaning given that term in section 2331 of title 18, United
States Code.
(3) Hate crime.--The term ``hate crime'' means a criminal
offense under--
(A) sections 241, 245, 247, and 249 of title 18, United
States Code; and
(B) section 3631 of title 42, United States Code.
(4) International terrorism.--The term ``international
terrorism'' has the meaning given that term in section 2331 of
title 18, United States Code.
(5) Terms in attorney general's guidelines for domestic fbi
operations.--The terms ``assessments'', ``full investigations'',
``enterprise investigations'', ``predicated investigations'', and
``preliminary investigations'' have the meanings given those terms
in the most recent, approved version of the Attorney General's
Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (or successor).
(6) Terms in fbi budget materials.--The terms ``Consolidated
Strategy Guide'', ``Field Office Strategic Plan'', ``Integrated
Program Management Process'', and ``Threat Review and
Prioritization'' have the meanings given those terms in the
materials submitted to Congress by the Attorney General in support
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation budget for fiscal year 2020.
(7) Terrorism.--The term ``terrorism'' includes domestic
terrorism and international terrorism.
(8) Terrorism information.--The term ``terrorism information''
has the meaning given that term in section 1016(a) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C.
485).
(9) Time utilization and recordkeeping data.--The term ``time
utilization and recordkeeping data'' means data collected on
resource utilization and workload activity of personnel of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with Federal law.
SEC. 5602. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF AND REPORTS ON DOMESTIC
TERRORISM.
(a) Report on Standardization of Terminology and Procedures
Relating to Domestic Terrorism.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation
with the Director of National Intelligence in a manner consistent with
the authorities and responsibilities of such Director, shall jointly--
(1) develop, to the fullest extent feasible and for purposes of
internal recordkeeping and tracking, uniform and standardized--
(A) definitions of the terms ``domestic terrorism'', ``act
of domestic terrorism'', ``domestic terrorism groups'', and any
other commonly used terms with respect to domestic terrorism;
(B) methodologies for tracking incidents of domestic
terrorism; and
(C) descriptions of categories and subcategories of--
(i) domestic terrorism; and
(ii) ideologies relating to domestic terrorism;
(2) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
containing the information developed under paragraph (1).
(b) Report Containing Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on
Domestic Terrorism.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence in a manner
consistent with the authorities and responsibilities of such
Director, shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on domestic terrorism containing the following:
(A) The strategic intelligence assessment under paragraph
(2).
(B) The discussion of activities under paragraph (3).
(C) Data on domestic terrorism under paragraph (4).
(D) Recommendations under paragraph (5).
(2) Strategic intelligence assessment.--
(A) Assessment required.--The Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Secretary of Homeland Security,
in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence in a
manner consistent with the authorities and responsibilities of
such Director, shall prepare and include in the report under
paragraph (1) a strategic intelligence assessment of domestic
terrorism in the United States during fiscal years 2017, 2018,
and 2019.
(B) Standards.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence in a
manner consistent with the authorities and responsibilities of
such Director, shall ensure that the strategic assessment under
subparagraph (A) complies with the analytic integrity and
tradecraft standards of the intelligence community.
(3) Discussion of activities.--The report under paragraph (1)
shall discuss and compare the following with respect to each
applicable element of the intelligence community:
(A) The criteria for opening, managing, and closing
domestic and international terrorism investigations.
(B) Standards and procedures for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation with respect to the review, prioritization, and
mitigation of domestic and international terrorism threats in
the United States.
(C) The planning (including plans of analysis of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland
Security, and National Counterterrorism Center), development,
production, analysis, and evaluation of intelligence and
intelligence products relating to terrorism, noting any
differences with respect to domestic terrorism and
international terrorism.
(D) The sharing of information relating to domestic and
international terrorism by and between--
(i) the Federal Government;
(ii) State, local, Tribal, territorial, and foreign
governments;
(iii) the appropriate congressional committees;
(iv) nongovernmental organizations; and
(v) the private sector.
(E) The criteria and methodology used by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation to identify or assign terrorism
classifications to investigations of domestic terrorism.
(F) Compliance by the Federal Government with privacy,
civil rights, and civil liberties policies and protections
applicable to the production of the report under paragraph (1),
including protections against the public release of names or
other personally identifiable information of individuals
involved in incidents, investigations, indictments,
prosecutions, or convictions for which data is reported under
this section.
(G) Information regarding any training or resources
provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department
of Homeland Security, or the National Counterterrorism Center,
to assist Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement
agencies in understanding, detecting, deterring, and
investigating acts of domestic terrorism, including the date,
type, subject, and recipient agencies of such training or
resources.
(4) Data on domestic terrorism.--
(A) Data required.--In accordance with subparagraph (B),
the report under paragraph (1) shall include the following data
for the period beginning on January 1, 2009, and ending on the
date of the enactment of this Act:
(i) For each completed or attempted incident of
domestic terrorism that has occurred in the United States
during such period--
(I) a description of such incident;
(II) the date and location of such incident;
(III) the number and type of completed and
attempted Federal nonviolent crimes committed during
such incident;
(IV) the number and type of completed and attempted
Federal and State property crimes committed during such
incident, including an estimate of economic damages
resulting from such crimes; and
(V) the number and type of completed and attempted
Federal violent crimes committed during such incident,
including the number of people injured or killed as a
result of such crimes.
(ii) For such period--
(I) an identification of each assessment,
preliminary investigation, full investigation, and
enterprise investigation with a nexus to domestic
terrorism opened, pending, or closed by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation;
(II) the number of assessments or investigations
identified under subclause (I) associated with each
domestic terrorism investigative classification
(including subcategories);
(III) the number of assessments or investigations
described in subclause (II) initiated as a result of a
referral or investigation by a Federal, State, local,
Tribal, territorial, or foreign government, of a hate
crime;
(IV) the number of Federal criminal charges with a
nexus to domestic terrorism, including the number of
indictments and complaints associated with each
domestic terrorism investigative classification
(including subcategories), a summary of the allegations
contained in each such indictment, the disposition of
the prosecution, and, if applicable, the sentence
imposed as a result of a conviction on such charges;
(V) referrals of incidents of domestic terrorism by
or to State, local, Tribal, territorial, or foreign
governments, to or by departments or agencies of the
Federal Government, for investigation or prosecution,
including the number of such referrals associated with
each domestic terrorism investigation classification
(including any subcategories), and a summary of each
such referral that includes the rationale for such
referral and the disposition of the applicable Federal
investigation or prosecution;
(VI) intelligence products produced by the
intelligence community relating to domestic terrorism,
including, with respect to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the number of such products associated
with each domestic terrorism investigative
classification (including any subcategories);
(VII) with respect to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation--
(aa) the number of staff (expressed in terms of
full-time equivalents and positions) working on
matters relating to domestic terrorism described in
subclauses (I) through (VI); and
(bb) a summary of time utilization and
recordkeeping data for personnel working on such
matters, including the number or percentage of such
personnel associated with each domestic terrorism
investigative classification (including any
subcategories) in the FBI Headquarters Operational
Divisions and Field Divisions;
(VIII) with respect to the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security,
the number of staff (expressed in terms of full-time
equivalents and positions) working on matters relating
to domestic terrorism described in subclauses (I)
through (VI); and
(IX) with respect to the National Counterterrorism
Center, the number of staff (expressed in terms of
full-time equivalents and positions) working on matters
relating to domestic terrorism described in subclauses
(I) through (VI), and the applicable legal authorities
relating to the activities of such staff.
(B) Collection and compilation.--The requirement to submit
data under paragraph (1)--
(i) may not be construed to require the creation or
maintenance of any record that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, or the
National Counterterrorism Center, as the case may be, does
not maintain in the ordinary course of business or pursuant
to another provision of law; and
(ii) shall be carried out by collecting, compiling, or
otherwise using data and records that such entities
otherwise maintain or create.
(C) Format.--The information required under subparagraph
(A) may be provided in a format that uses the marking
associated with the Central Records System (or any successor
system) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(5) Recommendations.--
(A) In general.--The report under paragraph (1) shall
include recommendations, including any constitutional analysis
conducted relating to such recommendations, with respect to the
following:
(i) The necessity of changing authorities, roles,
resources, or responsibilities within the Federal
Government to more effectively prevent and counter domestic
terrorism activities.
(ii) Measures necessary to ensure the protection of
privacy and civil liberties in the carrying out of
activities relating to countering domestic terrorism.
(B) Consultation.--In developing recommendations pursuant
to subparagraph (A)(ii), the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, may
seek the advice of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board.
(c) Provision of Other Documents and Materials.--
(1) In general.--Together with the report under subsection
(b)(1), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director
of National Intelligence in a manner consistent with the
authorities and responsibilities of such Director, shall also
submit to the appropriate congressional committees the following
documents and materials in complete and unredacted form:
(A) With respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at
a minimum, the most recent, approved versions of--
(i) the Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI
Operations (or any successor);
(ii) the FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations
Guide (or any successor);
(iii) the FBI Counterterrorism Policy Guide (or any
successor); and
(iv) materials sufficient to show the rankings of
domestic terrorism in relation to other threats within the
Threat Review and Prioritization process, with respect to
the headquarters and each field office of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
(B) With respect to the intelligence community--
(i) a list of all intelligence products described in
subsection (b)(4)(A)(ii)(VI); and
(ii) a means of accessing each such product.
(2) Nonduplication.--If any documents or materials required
under paragraph (1) have been previously submitted to the
appropriate congressional committees under such paragraph and have
not been modified since such submission, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the Director of National Intelligence may provide a
list of such documents or materials in lieu of making the
submission under paragraph (1) for those documents or materials.
(d) Annual Updates.--During the 5-year period following the date of
the submission of the reports under subsections (b) and (c), the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence in a manner consistent with the authorities and
responsibilities of such Director, shall jointly submit to the
appropriate congressional committees annual updates to the reports
submitted under subsections (a), (b), and (c).
(e) Classification and Public Release.--The reports under
subsections (a), (b), and (d) shall be--
(1) unclassified, but may contain a classified annex;
(2) with respect to the unclassified portion of the report,
made available on the public internet websites of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, and
the National Counterterrorism Center--
(A) not later than 30 days after submission to the
appropriate congressional committees; and
(B) in an electronic format that is fully indexed and
searchable; and
(3) with respect to a classified annex, submitted to the
appropriate congressional committees in an electronic format that
is fully indexed and searchable.
(f) Information Quality.--The reports under subsections (a), (b),
and (d), to the extent applicable, shall comply with the guidelines
issued by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget pursuant
to section 515 of title V of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001
(Public Law 106-554; 114 Stat. 2763A-154).
TITLE LVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--Reports and Briefings
SEC. 5701. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS OF
CERTAIN REPORTS.
(a) Modification of Reports Relating to Guantanamo Bay.--
(1) Modification.--Section 506I(b) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3105(b)) is amended by striking ``once every 6
months'' and inserting ``annually''.
(2) Modification.--Section 319(a) of the Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2009 (10 U.S.C. 801 note) is amended by
striking ``every 90 days'' and inserting ``annually''.
(b) Modification to Reports on Analytic Integrity.--Subsection (c)
of section 1019 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``Reports'' and inserting
``Briefings''; and
(2) by striking ``submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the heads of the relevant elements of the intelligence
community, and the heads of analytic training departments a report
containing'' and inserting ``provide to the congressional
intelligence committees, the heads of the relevant elements of the
intelligence community, and the heads of analytic training
departments a briefing with''.
(c) Repeal of Reports Relating to Intelligence Functions.--Section
506J of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3105a) is repealed
and the table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended
by striking the item relating to section 506J.
(d) Modification of Required Reports Relating to Entertainment
Industry.--Section 308 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017 (50 U.S.C. 3332) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(2)--
(A) by striking ``paragraph (1) shall--'' and all that
follows through ``permit an element'' and insert ``paragraph
(1) shall permit an element'';
(B) by striking ``approval; and'' and inserting
``approval.''; and
(C) by striking subparagraph (B); and
(2) by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following new
subsection:
``(c) Information on Prior Year Engagements.--At the written
request of either of the congressional intelligence committees, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to such committees
information with respect to engagements occurring during the calendar
year prior to the year during which such request is made. Such
information may include--
``(1) a description of the nature and duration of each such
engagement;
``(2) the cost incurred by the United States Government for
each such engagement;
``(3) a description of the benefits to the United States
Government for each such engagement;
``(4) a determination of whether any information was
declassified, and whether any classified information was improperly
disclosed, for each such engagement; and
``(5) a description of the work produced through each such
engagement.''.
SEC. 5702. INCREASED TRANSPARENCY REGARDING COUNTERTERRORISM BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Consistent with section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a)), the recent practice of the intelligence community has
been to release to the public--
(A) around the date on which the President submits to
Congress a budget for a fiscal year pursuant to section 1105 of
title 31, United States Code, the ``top-line'' amount of total
funding requested for the National Intelligence Program for
such fiscal year; and
(B) the amount of requested and appropriated funds for the
National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence Program
for certain prior fiscal years, consistent with the protection
of intelligence sources and methods.
(2) The Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning of the
National Counterterrorism Center is responsible for producing an
annual National Counterterrorism Budget report, which examines the
alignment of intelligence and other resources in the applicable
fiscal year budget with the counterterrorism goals and areas of
focus in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) despite the difficulty of compiling and releasing to the
public comprehensive information on the resource commitments of the
United States to counterterrorism activities and programs,
including with respect to such activities and programs of the
intelligence community, the United States Government could take
additional steps to enhance the understanding of the public with
respect to such resource commitments, in a manner consistent with
the protection of intelligence sources and methods and other
national security interests; and
(2) the United States Government should release to the public
as much information as possible regarding the funding of
counterterrorism activities and programs, including activities and
programs of the intelligence community, in a manner consistent with
the protection of intelligence sources and methods and other
national security interests.
(c) Briefing on Public Release of Information.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and not later than 90 days after the
beginning of each fiscal year thereafter, the President shall
ensure that the congressional intelligence committees receive a
briefing from appropriate personnel of the United States Government
on the feasibility of releasing to the public additional
information relating to counterterrorism efforts of the
intelligence community.
(2) Elements.--Each briefing required by paragraph (1) shall
include a discussion of the feasibility of--
(A) subject to paragraph (3), releasing to the public the
National Counterterrorism Budget report described in subsection
(a)(2) for the prior fiscal year; and
(B) declassifying other reports, documents, or activities
of the intelligence community relating to counterterrorism and
releasing such information to the public in a manner consistent
with the protection of intelligence sources and methods and
other national security interests.
(3) Release of national counterterrorism budget report.--The
President may satisfy the requirement under paragraph (2)(A) during
a fiscal year by, not later than 90 days after the beginning of the
fiscal year, releasing to the public the National Counterterrorism
Budget report (with any redactions the Director determines
necessary to protect intelligence sources and methods and other
national security interests) for the prior fiscal year.
SEC. 5703. STUDY ON ROLE OF RETIRED AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS.
(a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a
study on former intelligence personnel providing covered intelligence
assistance.
(b) Elements.--The study under subsection (a) shall include the
following:
(1) An identification of, and discussion of the effectiveness
of, existing laws, policies, procedures, and other measures
relevant to the ability of elements of the intelligence community
to prevent former intelligence personnel from providing covered
intelligence assistance--
(A) without proper authorization; or
(B) in a manner that would violate legal or policy controls
if the personnel performed such assistance while working for
the United States Government; and
(2) Make recommendations for such legislative, regulatory,
policy, or other changes as may be necessary to ensure that the
United States consistently meets the objectives described in
paragraph (1).
(c) Report and Plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Homeland
Security of the House of Representatives--
(1) a report on the findings of the Director with respect to
each element of the study under subsection (a); and
(2) a plan to implement any recommendations made by the
Director that the Director may implement without changes to Federal
law.
(d) Form.--The report and plan under subsection (c) may be
submitted in classified form.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered intelligence assistance.--The term ``covered
intelligence assistance'' means assistance--
(A) provided by former intelligence personnel directly to,
or for the benefit of, the government of a foreign country or
indirectly to, or for the benefit of, such a government through
a company or other entity; and
(B) that relates to intelligence, military, or law
enforcement activities of a foreign country, including with
respect to operations that involve abuses of human rights,
violations of the laws of the United States, or infringements
on the privacy rights of United States persons.
(2) Former intelligence personnel.--The term ``former
intelligence personnel'' means retired or former personnel of the
intelligence community, including civilian employees of elements of
the intelligence community, members of the Armed Forces, and
contractors of elements of the intelligence community.
SEC. 5704. COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND DISSEMINATION OF WORKFORCE DATA.
(a) Modification of Requirement for Annual Report on Hiring and
Retention of Minority Employees.--
(1) Expansion of period of report.--Subsection (a) of section
114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3050) is
amended by inserting ``and the preceding 5 fiscal years'' after
``fiscal year''.
(2) Clarification on disaggregation of data.--Subsection (b) of
such section is amended, in the matter before paragraph (1), by
striking ``disaggregated data by category of covered person from
each element of the intelligence community'' and inserting ``data,
disaggregated by category of covered person and by element of the
intelligence community,''.
(b) Initial Reporting.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and subject to paragraph (3), the Director
of National Intelligence shall make available to the public, the
appropriate congressional committees, and the workforce of the
intelligence community a report which includes aggregate
demographic data and other information regarding the diversity and
inclusion efforts of the workforce of the intelligence community.
(2) Contents.--A report made available under paragraph (1)--
(A) shall include unclassified reports and barrier analyses
relating to diversity and inclusion efforts;
(B) shall include aggregate demographic data--
(i) by segment of the workforce of the intelligence
community and grade or rank;
(ii) relating to attrition and promotion rates;
(iii) that addresses the compliance of the intelligence
community with validated inclusion metrics, such as the New
Inclusion Quotient index score; and
(iv) that provides demographic comparisons to the
relevant nongovernmental labor force and the relevant
civilian labor force;
(C) shall include an analysis of applicant flow data,
including the percentage and level of positions for which data
are collected, and a discussion of any resulting policy changes
or recommendations;
(D) shall include demographic data relating to participants
in professional development programs of the intelligence
community and the rate of placement into senior positions for
participants in such programs;
(E) shall include any voluntarily collected demographic
data relating to the membership of any external advisory
committee or board to which individuals in senior positions in
the intelligence community appoint members; and
(F) may include data in proportions or percentages to
account for concerns relating to the protection of classified
information.
(c) Updates.--After making available a report under subsection (b),
the Director of National Intelligence shall annually provide a report
(which may be provided as part of an annual report required under
another provision of law) to the workforce of the intelligence
community (including senior leadership), the public, and the
appropriate congressional committees that includes--
(1) demographic data and information on the status of diversity
and inclusion efforts of the intelligence community;
(2) an analysis of applicant flow data, including the
percentage and level of positions for which data are collected, and
a discussion of any resulting policy changes or recommendations;
and
(3) demographic data relating to participants in professional
development programs of the intelligence community and the rate of
placement into senior positions for participants in such programs.
(d) Expand the Collection and Analysis of Voluntary Applicant Flow
Data.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
develop a system to collect and analyze applicant flow data for as
many positions within the intelligence community as practicable, in
order to identify areas for improvement in attracting diverse
talent, with particular attention to senior and management
positions.
(2) Phased implementation.--The collection of applicant flow
data may be implemented by the Director of National Intelligence in
a phased approach commensurate with the resources available to the
intelligence community.
(e) Identify Additional Categories for Voluntary Data Collection of
Current Employees.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence may
submit to the Office of Management and Budget and to the
appropriate congressional committees a recommendation regarding
whether the intelligence community should voluntarily collect more
detailed data on demographic categories in addition to the race and
ethnicity categories specified in the statistical policy directive
issued by the Office of Management and Budget entitled ``Standards
for Maintaining, Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race
and Ethnicity''.
(2) Process.--In making a recommendation under paragraph (1),
the Director of National Intelligence shall--
(A) engage in close consultation with internal
stakeholders, such as employee resource or affinity groups;
(B) ensure that there is clear communication with the
workforce of the intelligence community--
(i) to explain the purpose of the potential collection
of such data; and
(ii) regarding legal protections relating to any
anticipated use of such data; and
(C) ensure adherence to relevant standards and guidance
issued by the Federal Government.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Applicant flow data.--The term ``applicant flow data''
means data that tracks the rate of applications for job positions
among demographic categories.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(3) Diversity.--The term ``diversity'' means diversity of
persons based on gender, race, ethnicity, disability status,
veteran status, sexual orientation, gender identity, national
origin, and other demographic categories.
SEC. 5705. PLAN FOR STRENGTHENING THE SUPPLY CHAIN INTELLIGENCE
FUNCTION.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Counterintelligence
and Security Center, in coordination with the Director of the Defense
Counterintelligence and Security Agency and other interagency partners,
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for
strengthening the supply chain intelligence function.
(b) Elements.--The plan submitted under subsection (a) shall
address the following:
(1) The appropriate workforce model, including size, mix, and
seniority, from the elements of the intelligence community and
other interagency partners.
(2) The budgetary resources necessary to implement the plan.
(3) The appropriate governance structure within the
intelligence community and with interagency partners.
(4) The authorities necessary to implement the plan.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and
(2) the Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
SEC. 5706. COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF INVESTMENT IN KEY
UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGIES BY COMPANIES OR ORGANIZATIONS LINKED TO
CHINA.
(a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Director of the National Counterintelligence and
Security Center, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and the heads of such other Federal agencies as the Director
of National Intelligence considers appropriate, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive economic
assessment of investment in key United States technologies, including
emerging technologies, by companies or organizations linked to China,
including the implications of these investments for the national
security of the United States.
(b) Form of Assessment.--The assessment submitted under subsection
(a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 5707. REPORT BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON FIFTH-
GENERATION WIRELESS NETWORK TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(3) Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on--
(1) the threat to the national security of the United States
posed by the global and regional adoption of fifth-generation
wireless network (known as ``5G'') technology built by foreign
companies;
(2) the threat to the national security of the United States
posed by telecommunications companies that are subject to the
jurisdiction of a foreign adversary; and
(3) possible efforts to mitigate the threat.
(c) Contents.--The report under subsection (b) shall include--
(1) the timeline and scale of global and regional adoption of
foreign fifth-generation wireless network technology;
(2) the implications of such global and regional adoption on
the cyber and espionage threat to the United States, the interests
of the United States, and the cyber and collection capabilities of
the United States;
(3) the threat to the national security of the United States
from acquisition, importation, transfer, installation, or use of
any communications technology by any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States that involves communications
technology designed, developed, manufactured or supplied by,
controlled by, or subject to, the jurisdiction of a foreign
adversary; and
(4) the effect of possible mitigation efforts, including with
respect to--
(A) a policy of the United States Government promoting the
use of strong, end-to-end encryption for data transmitted over
fifth-generation wireless networks;
(B) a policy of the United States Government promoting or
funding free, open-source implementation of fifth-generation
wireless network technology;
(C) subsidies or incentives provided by the United States
Government that could be used to promote the adoption of secure
fifth-generation wireless network technology developed by
companies of the United States or companies of allies of the
United States; and
(D) a strategy by the United States Government to reduce
foreign influence and political pressure in international
standard-setting bodies.
(d) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 5708. REPORT ON USE BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF FACIAL
RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the use of facial recognition technology for the purpose of
suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent, or for
disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender,
sexual orientation, or religion, is contrary to the values of the
United States;
(2) the United States Government should not engage in the sale
or transfer of facial recognition technology to any country that is
using such technology for the suppression of human rights; and
(3) it is incumbent upon the intelligence community to develop
clear policies and procedures that prevent the abuse of facial
recognition technology.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the use
of facial recognition technology by the intelligence community. Such
report shall include each of the following:
(1) An analysis of the current use of facial recognition
technology by the intelligence community.
(2) An analysis of the accuracy of facial recognition
technology, including a discussion of the appropriate threshold for
use, and data disaggregated by race, gender, ethnicity, and age.
(3) Whether the Government has adequate procedures in place to
audit or test technology they purchase to assess its accuracy,
including on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, and age.
(4) The extent to which the intelligence community has codified
policies governing the use of facial recognition technology that
adequately prevent adverse impacts on privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties.
(5) An analysis of the ability of the intelligence community to
use facial recognition technology to identify individuals in a way
that respects constitutional rights, civil rights, civil liberties,
and privacy of such individuals.
(6) Identification of risks and safeguards to uphold the
constitutional rights, civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy
of individuals, including for communities of color and religious
minorities.
(7) Whether such technology is deployed in public areas or on
photos of public areas in a manner that could raise First Amendment
concerns.
(8) An identification of existing policies, procedures, or
practices that permit the sharing of facial recognition data and
technology with foreign governments or other non-United States
Government entities.
(9) An identification of measures in place to protect data
security.
(10) An identification of any redress procedures to address
complaints in cases where the use of facial recognition resulted in
harm to an individual.
(11) An analysis of existing transparency, oversight, and
audits of the use of facial recognition to measure the efficacy of
the technology on an ongoing basis, as measured against the cost
and impact on individual rights.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Facial Recognition Data Defined.--In this section, the term
``facial recognition data'' means any unique attribute or feature of
the face of an end user that is used by facial recognition technology
to assign a unique, persistent identifier, or for the unique personal
identification of a specific individual.
SEC. 5709. REPORT ON DEEPFAKE TECHNOLOGY, FOREIGN WEAPONIZATION OF
DEEPFAKES, AND RELATED NOTIFICATIONS.
(a) Report on Foreign Weaponization of Deepfakes and Deepfake
Technology.--
(1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report on--
(A) the potential national security impacts of machine-
manipulated media (commonly known as ``deepfakes''); and
(B) the actual or potential use of machine-manipulated
media by foreign governments to spread disinformation or engage
in other malign activities.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report under subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(A) An assessment of the technical capabilities of foreign
governments, including foreign intelligence services, foreign
government-affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, with
respect to machine-manipulated media, machine-generated text,
generative adversarial networks, and related machine-learning
technologies, including--
(i) an assessment of the technical capabilities of the
People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation with
respect to the production and detection of machine-
manipulated media; and
(ii) an annex describing those governmental elements
within China and Russia known to have supported or
facilitated machine-manipulated media research,
development, or dissemination, as well as any civil-
military fusion, private-sector, academic, or
nongovernmental entities which have meaningfully
participated in such activities.
(B) An updated assessment of how foreign governments,
including foreign intelligence services, foreign government-
affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, could use or are
using machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text to
harm the national security interests of the United States,
including an assessment of the historic, current, or potential
future efforts of China and Russia to use machine-manipulated
media, including with respect to--
(i) the overseas or domestic dissemination of
misinformation;
(ii) the attempted discrediting of political opponents
or disfavored populations; and
(iii) intelligence or influence operations directed
against the United States, allies or partners of the United
States, or other jurisdictions believed to be subject to
Chinese or Russian interference.
(C) An updated identification of the countertechnologies
that have been or could be developed and deployed by the United
States Government, or by the private sector with Government
support, to deter, detect, and attribute the use of machine-
manipulated media and machine-generated text by foreign
governments, foreign-government affiliates, or foreign
individuals, along with an analysis of the benefits,
limitations and drawbacks of such identified counter-
technologies, including any emerging concerns related to
privacy.
(D) An identification of the offices within the elements of
the intelligence community that have, or should have, lead
responsibility for monitoring the development of, use of, and
response to machine-manipulated media and machine-generated
text, including--
(i) a description of the coordination of such efforts
across the intelligence community;
(ii) a detailed description of the existing
capabilities, tools, and relevant expertise of such
elements to determine whether a piece of media has been
machine manipulated or machine generated, including the
speed at which such determination can be made, the
confidence level of the element in the ability to make such
a determination accurately, and how increasing volume and
improved quality of machine-manipulated media or machine-
generated text may negatively impact such capabilities; and
(iii) a detailed description of planned or ongoing
research and development efforts intended to improve the
ability of the intelligence community to detect machine-
manipulated media and machine-generated text.
(E) A description of any research and development
activities carried out or under consideration to be carried out
by the intelligence community, including the Intelligence
Advanced Research Projects Activity, relevant to machine-
manipulated media and machine-generated text detection
technologies.
(F) Updated recommendations regarding whether the
intelligence community requires additional legal authorities,
financial resources, or specialized personnel to address the
national security threat posed by machine-manipulated media and
machine-generated text.
(G) Other additional information the Director determines
appropriate.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) Requirement for Notification.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of any other relevant
departments or agencies of the Federal Government, shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees each time the Director of
National Intelligence determines--
(1) there is credible information or intelligence that a
foreign entity has attempted, is attempting, or will attempt to
deploy machine-manipulated media or machine-generated text aimed at
the elections or domestic political processes of the United States;
and
(2) that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a
foreign government, a foreign government-affiliated entity, or a
foreign individual.
(d) Annual Update.--Upon submission of the report in subsection
(a), on an annual basis, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees any significant updates with
respect to the matters described in subsection (a).
(e) Definitions.--
(1) Machine-generated text.--The term ``machine-generated
text'' means text generated using machine-learning techniques in
order to resemble writing in natural language.
(2) Machine-manipulated media.--The term ``machine-manipulated
media'' has the meaning given that term in section 5724.
SEC. 5710. ANNUAL REPORT BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES ON
CYBERSECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE THREATS TO CONGRESS.
(a) Annual Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once each
year thereafter, the Comptroller General of the United States shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on
cybersecurity and surveillance threats to Congress.
(b) Statistics.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall
include statistics on cyber attacks and other incidents of espionage or
surveillance targeted against Senators or the immediate families or
staff of the Senators, and Representatives, Delegates, and the Resident
Commissioner, or the immediate families or staff of the
Representatives, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner, in which the
nonpublic communications and other private information of such targeted
individuals were lost, stolen, or otherwise subject to unauthorized
access.
(c) Consultation.--In preparing a report to be submitted under
subsection (a), the Comptroller General shall consult with the Director
of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, and the Sergeant at
Arms and Doorkeeper of the Senate.
(d) Form.--The report under subsection (a), including the contents
of the report in subsection (b), shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may include a classified annex to protect sources and methods
and any appropriate redactions of personally identifiable information.
SEC. 5711. ANALYSIS OF AND PERIODIC BRIEFINGS ON MAJOR INITIATIVES OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING.
(a) Analysis.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall,
in coordination with the heads of such elements of the intelligence
community as the Director considers appropriate--
(A) complete a comprehensive analysis of the major
initiatives of the intelligence community in artificial
intelligence and machine learning; and
(B) provide to the congressional intelligence committees a
briefing on the findings of the Director with respect to the
analysis conducted pursuant to subparagraph (A).
(2) Elements.--The analysis conducted under paragraph (1)(A)
shall include analyses of how the initiatives described in such
paragraph--
(A) correspond with the strategy of the intelligence
community entitled ``Augmenting Intelligence Using Machines'';
(B) complement each other and avoid unnecessary
duplication;
(C) are coordinated with the efforts of the Defense
Department on artificial intelligence, including efforts at the
Joint Artificial Intelligence Center and Project Maven; and
(D) leverage advances in artificial intelligence and
machine learning in the private sector.
(b) Periodic Briefings.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, not less frequently than twice each year
thereafter until the date that is 2 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than once each year
thereafter until the date that is 7 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director and the Chief Information Officer
of the Department of Defense shall jointly provide to the congressional
intelligence committees and congressional defense committees (as
defined in section 101 of title 10, United States Code) briefings with
updates on activities relating to, and the progress of, their
respective artificial intelligence and machine learning initiatives,
particularly the Augmenting Intelligence Using Machines initiative and
the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center.
SEC. 5712. REPORT ON BEST PRACTICES TO PROTECT PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES OF CHINESE AMERICANS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the People's Republic of China appears to be specifically
targeting the Chinese-American community for intelligence purposes;
(2) such targeting carries a substantial risk that the loyalty
of such Americans may be generally questioned and lead to
unacceptable stereotyping, targeting, and racial profiling;
(3) the United States Government has a duty to warn and protect
all Americans including those of Chinese descent from these
intelligence efforts by the People's Republic of China;
(4) the broad stereotyping, targeting, and racial profiling of
Americans of Chinese descent is contrary to the values of the
United States and reinforces the flawed narrative perpetuated by
the People's Republic of China that ethnically Chinese individuals
worldwide have a duty to support the People's Republic of China;
and
(5) the United States efforts to combat the People's Republic
of China's intelligence activities should actively safeguard and
promote the constitutional rights of all Chinese Americans.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting
through the Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency, in
coordination with the civil liberties and privacy officers of the
elements of the intelligence community, shall submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees containing--
(1) a review of how the policies, procedures, and practices of
the intelligence community that govern the intelligence activities
and operations targeting the People's Republic of China affect
policies, procedures, and practices relating to the privacy and
civil liberties of Americans of Chinese descent who may be targets
of espionage and influence operations by China; and
(2) recommendations to ensure that the privacy and civil
liberties of Americans of Chinese descent are sufficiently
protected.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (b) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 5713. OVERSIGHT OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN ACADEMIA.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered institution of higher education.--The term
``covered institution of higher education'' means an institution
described in section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1002) that receives Federal funds in any amount and for any
purpose.
(2) Sensitive research subject.--The term ``sensitive research
subject'' means a subject of research that is carried out at a
covered institution of higher education that receives funds that
were appropriated for--
(A) the National Intelligence Program; or
(B) any Federal agency the Director of National
Intelligence deems appropriate.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once each year
thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with
such elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers
appropriate and consistent with the privacy protections afforded to
United States persons, shall submit to congressional intelligence
committees a report on risks to sensitive research subjects posed by
foreign entities in order to provide Congress and covered institutions
of higher education with more complete information on these risks and
to help ensure academic freedom.
(c) Contents.--The report required by subsection (b) shall include
the following:
(1) A list of sensitive research subjects that could affect
national security.
(2) A list of foreign entities, including governments,
corporations, nonprofit organizations and for-profit organizations,
and any subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity, that the
Director determines pose a counterintelligence, espionage
(including economic espionage), or other national security threat
with respect to sensitive research subjects.
(3) A list of any known or suspected attempts by foreign
entities to exert pressure on covered institutions of higher
education, including attempts to limit freedom of speech, propagate
misinformation or disinformation, or to influence professors,
researchers, or students.
(4) Recommendations for collaboration between covered
institutions of higher education and the intelligence community to
mitigate threats to sensitive research subjects associated with
foreign influence in academia, including any necessary legislative
or administrative action.
(d) Congressional Notifications Required.--Not later than 30 days
after the date on which the Director identifies a change to either list
described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (c), the Director shall
notify the congressional intelligence committees of the change.
SEC. 5714. REPORT ON DEATH OF JAMAL KHASHOGGI.
(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to Congress a report on the death of Jamal Khashoggi, consistent
with protecting sources and methods. Such report shall include
identification of those who carried out, participated in, ordered, or
were otherwise complicit in or responsible for the death of Jamal
Khashoggi.
(b) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form.
SEC. 5715. REPORT ON TERRORIST SCREENING DATABASE.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a report on the terrorist screening database of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall
identify the following:
(1) Which foreign countries receive access to the terrorist
screening database.
(2) Which foreign countries have successfully petitioned to add
individuals to the terrorist screening database.
(3) What standards exist for determining which countries get
access to the terrorist screening database.
(4) The extent to which the human rights record of the
government of a foreign country is considered in the determination
to give the country access to the terrorist screening database.
(5) What procedures, if any, exist to remove access to the
terrorist screening database from a foreign country.
(6) What procedures, if any, exist to inform an individual, or
the legal counsel of an individual, of the placement of the
individual on the terrorist screening database.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 5716. REPORT CONTAINING THREAT ASSESSMENT ON TERRORIST USE OF
CONVENTIONAL AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period of 4 years,
the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis,
in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, shall develop and submit to the entities in accordance
with subsection (b) a report containing a threat assessment regarding
the availability of conventional weapons, including conventional
weapons lacking serial numbers, and advanced conventional weapons, for
use in furthering acts of terrorism, including the provision of
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization and
to individuals or groups supporting or engaging in domestic terrorism.
(b) Dissemination of Report.--Consistent with the protection of
classified and confidential unclassified information, the Under
Secretary shall--
(1) submit the initial report required under subsection (a) to
Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement officials,
including officials who operate within State, local, and regional
fusion centers under the Department of Homeland Security State,
Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative established by section
210A of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h); and
(2) submit each report required under subsection (a) to the
appropriate congressional committees.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate.
(2) Domestic terrorism.--The term ``domestic terrorism'' has
the meaning given that term in section 2331 of title 18, United
States Code.
(3) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term ``foreign
terrorist organization'' means an organization designated as a
foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).
SEC. 5717. ASSESSMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY VULNERABILITIES ASSOCIATED
WITH CERTAIN RETIRED AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) Assessment Required.--Not later than the date that is 120 days
after submission of the report required under section 5703, and
annually thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of the
homeland security vulnerabilities associated with retired and former
personnel of the intelligence community providing covered intelligence
assistance.
(b) Form.--The assessment under subsection (a) may be submitted in
classified form.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Covered intelligence assistance.--The term ``covered
intelligence assistance'' has the meaning given that term in
section 5703.
SEC. 5718. STUDY ON FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF ESTABLISHING
GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM AND LEARNING CENTER.
(a) Study Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency shall complete a study on the feasibility and
advisability of establishing a Geospatial-Intelligence Museum and
learning center.
(b) Elements.--The study required by subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) Identifying the costs, opportunities, and challenges of
establishing the museum and learning center as described in such
subsection.
(2) Developing recommendations concerning such establishment.
(3) Identifying and reviewing lessons learned from the
establishment of the Cyber Center for Education and Innovation-Home
of the National Cryptologic Museum under section 7781(a) of title
10, United States Code.
(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees (as
defined in section 101 of title 10, United States Code) a report on the
findings of the Director with respect to the study completed under
subsection (a).
Subtitle B--Other Matters
SEC. 5721. WHISTLEBLOWER DISCLOSURES TO CONGRESS AND COMMITTEES OF
CONGRESS.
Section 2302 of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(8)--
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``; or'' and inserting
a semicolon;
(B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking the semicolon at
the end and inserting ``; or''; and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new
subparagraph:
``(C) any disclosure to Congress (including any committee
of Congress) by any employee of an agency or applicant for
employment at an agency of information described in
subparagraph (B) that is--
``(i) not classified; or
``(ii) if classified--
``(I) has been classified by the head of an agency
that is not an element of the intelligence community
(as defined by section 3 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)); and
``(II) does not reveal intelligence sources and
methods.''; and
(2) in subsection (c)(2)(C)(iii)(III), by inserting after
``Congress'' the following: ``(including any committee of Congress
with respect to information that is not classified or, if
classified, has been classified by the head of an agency that is
not an element of the intelligence community and does not reveal
intelligence sources and methods)''.
SEC. 5722. TASK FORCE ON ILLICIT FINANCING OF ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.
(a) Establishment.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
establish a task force to study and assess the illicit financing of
espionage and foreign influence operations directed at the United
States.
(b) Membership.--The task force shall be composed of the following
individuals (or designees of the individual):
(1) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(3) The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence
and Analysis.
(4) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research.
(5) Such other heads of the elements of the intelligence
community that the Director of National Intelligence determines
appropriate.
(c) Chairperson; Meetings.--
(1) Chairperson.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
appoint a senior official within the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence to serve as the chairperson of the task
force.
(2) Meetings.--The task force shall meet regularly but not less
frequently than on a quarterly basis.
(d) Reports.--
(1) Initial report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the task force shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on the illicit
financing of espionage and foreign influence operations directed at
the United States. The report shall address the following:
(A) The extent of the collection by the intelligence
community, from all sources (including the governments of
foreign countries), of intelligence and information relating to
illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence operations
directed at the United States, and any gaps in such collection.
(B) Any specific legal, regulatory, policy, or other
prohibitions, or financial, human, technical, or other resource
limitations or constraints, that have affected the ability of
the Director of National Intelligence or other heads of
relevant elements of the intelligence community in collecting
or analyzing intelligence or information relating to illicit
financing of espionage and foreign influence operations
directed at the United States.
(C) The methods, as of the date of the report, by which
hostile governments of foreign countries or foreign
organizations, and any groups or persons acting on behalf of or
with the support of such governments or organizations, seek to
disguise or obscure relationships between such governments,
organizations, groups, or persons and United States persons,
for the purpose of conducting espionage or foreign influence
operations directed at the United States, including by
exploiting financial laws, systems, or instruments, of the
United States.
(D) The existing practices of the intelligence community
for ensuring that intelligence and information relating to the
illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence operations
is analyzed and shared with other elements of the intelligence
community, and any recommendations for improving such analysis
and sharing.
(2) Annual update.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and each year thereafter through the date
specified in subsection (e), the task force shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees an update on the report.
(3) Form.--Each report submitted under this subsection may be
submitted in classified form, but if submitted in such form, shall
include an unclassified summary.
(e) Termination.--The task force shall terminate on January 1,
2025.
(f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
(3) The Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
SEC. 5723. ESTABLISHMENT OF FIFTH-GENERATION TECHNOLOGY PRIZE
COMPETITION.
(a) Prize Competition.--Pursuant to section 24 of the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3719), the Director
of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency, shall carry out a
program to award prizes competitively to stimulate research and
development relevant to fifth-generation technology.
(b) Prize Amount.--In carrying out the program under subsection
(a), the Director may award not more than a total of $5,000,000 to one
or more winners of the prize competition.
(c) Consultation.--In carrying out the program under subsection
(a), the Director may consult with the heads of relevant departments
and agencies of the Federal Government.
(d) Fifth-generation Technology Defined.--In this section, the term
``fifth-generation technology'' means hardware, software, or other
technologies relating to fifth-generation wireless networks (known as
``5G'').
SEC. 5724. ESTABLISHMENT OF DEEPFAKES PRIZE COMPETITION.
(a) Prize Competition.--Pursuant to section 24 of the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3719), the Director
of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency, shall carry out a
program to award prizes competitively to stimulate the research,
development, or commercialization of technologies to automatically
detect machine-manipulated media.
(b) Prize Amount.--In carrying out the program under subsection
(a), the Director may award not more than a total of $5,000,000 to one
or more winners of the prize competition.
(c) Consultation.--In carrying out the program under subsection
(a), the Director may consult with the heads of relevant departments
and agencies of the Federal Government.
(d) Machine-Manipulated Media Defined.--In this section, the term
``machine-manipulated media'' means video, image, or audio recordings
generated or substantially modified using machine-learning techniques
in order to falsely depict events, to falsely depict the speech or
conduct of an individual, or to depict individuals who do not exist.
SEC. 5725. IDENTIFICATION OF AND COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST CERTAIN
INTERNATIONAL MOBILE SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY-CATCHERS.
(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence and the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in collaboration with
the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis,
and the heads of such other Federal, State, or local agencies as the
Directors determine appropriate, and in accordance with applicable law
and policy, may--
(1) undertake an effort to identify International Mobile
Subscriber Identity-catchers operated within the United States by--
(A) hostile foreign governments; and
(B) individuals who have violated a criminal law of the
United States or of any State, or who have committed acts that
would be a criminal violation if committed within the
jurisdiction of the United States or any State; and
(2) when appropriate, develop countermeasures against such
International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers, with
prioritization given to such International Mobile Subscriber
Identity-catchers identified in the National Capital Region.
(b) Briefing Required.--Prior to developing countermeasures under
subsection (a)(2), the Director of National Intelligence and the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide a
briefing to the appropriate congressional committees on--
(1) the use of International Mobile Subscriber Identity-
catchers operated within the United States by the individuals and
governments described in subsection (a)(1);
(2) potential countermeasures by the intelligence community
against such International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers; and
(3) any legal or policy limitations with respect to the
development or carrying out of such countermeasures.
(c) Definitions.--
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(C) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
(2) International mobile subscriber identity-catcher.--The term
``International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catcher'' means a device
used for intercepting mobile phone identifying information and
location data.
SEC. 5726. SECURING ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of
the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on
Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
(2) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity'' means an
entity identified pursuant to section 9(a) of Executive Order No.
13636 of February 12, 2013 (78 Fed. Reg. 11742), relating to
identification of critical infrastructure where a cybersecurity
incident could reasonably result in catastrophic regional or
national effects on public health or safety, economic security, or
national security.
(3) Exploit.--The term ``exploit'' means a software tool
designed to take advantage of a security vulnerability.
(4) Industrial control system.--The term ``industrial control
system'' means an operational technology used to measure, control,
or manage industrial functions, and includes supervisory control
and data acquisition systems, distributed control systems, and
programmable logic or embedded controllers.
(5) National laboratory.--The term ``National Laboratory'' has
the meaning given the term in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act of
2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801).
(6) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the pilot program
established under subsection (b).
(7) Secretary.--Except as otherwise specifically provided, the
term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Energy.
(8) Security vulnerability.--The term ``security
vulnerability'' means any attribute of hardware, software, process,
or procedure that could enable or facilitate the defeat of a
security control.
(b) Pilot Program for Securing Energy Infrastructure.--Not later
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary shall establish a 2-year control systems implementation pilot
program within the National Laboratories for the purposes of--
(1) partnering with covered entities in the energy sector
(including critical component manufacturers in the supply chain)
that voluntarily participate in the Program to identify new classes
of security vulnerabilities of the covered entities; and
(2) evaluating technology and standards, in partnership with
covered entities, to isolate and defend industrial control systems
of covered entities from security vulnerabilities and exploits in
the most critical systems of the covered entities, including--
(A) analog and nondigital control systems;
(B) purpose-built control systems; and
(C) physical controls.
(c) Working Group To Evaluate Program Standards and Develop
Strategy.--
(1) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish a working
group--
(A) to evaluate the technology and standards used in the
Program under subsection (b)(2); and
(B) to develop a national cyber-informed engineering
strategy to isolate and defend covered entities from security
vulnerabilities and exploits in the most critical systems of
the covered entities.
(2) Membership.--The working group established under paragraph
(1) shall be composed of not fewer than 10 members, to be appointed
by the Secretary, at least 1 member of which shall represent each
of the following:
(A) The Department of Energy.
(B) The energy industry, including electric utilities and
manufacturers recommended by the Energy Sector coordinating
councils.
(C)(i) The Department of Homeland Security; or
(ii) the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency
Response Team.
(D) The North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
(E) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
(F)(i) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
or
(ii) the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).
(G)(i) The Department of Defense; or
(ii) the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Security and America's Security Affairs.
(H) A State or regional energy agency.
(I) A national research body or academic institution.
(J) The National Laboratories.
(d) Reports on the Program.--
(1) Interim report.--Not later than 180 days after the date on
which funds are first disbursed under the Program, the Secretary
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an interim
report that--
(A) describes the results of the Program;
(B) includes an analysis of the feasibility of each method
studied under the Program; and
(C) describes the results of the evaluations conducted by
the working group established under subsection (c)(1).
(2) Final report.--Not later than 2 years after the date on
which funds are first disbursed under the Program, the Secretary
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a final
report that--
(A) describes the results of the Program;
(B) includes an analysis of the feasibility of each method
studied under the Program; and
(C) describes the results of the evaluations conducted by
the working group established under subsection (c)(1).
(e) Exemption From Disclosure.--Information shared by or with the
Federal Government or a State, Tribal, or local government under this
section--
(1) shall be deemed to be voluntarily shared information;
(2) shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title
5, United States Code, or any provision of any State, Tribal, or
local freedom of information law, open government law, open
meetings law, open records law, sunshine law, or similar law
requiring the disclosure of information or records; and
(3) shall be withheld from the public, without discretion,
under section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code, and any
provision of any State, Tribal, or local law requiring the
disclosure of information or records.
(f) Protection From Liability.--
(1) In general.--A cause of action against a covered entity for
engaging in the voluntary activities authorized under subsection
(b)--
(A) shall not lie or be maintained in any court; and
(B) shall be promptly dismissed by the applicable court.
(2) Voluntary activities.--Nothing in this section subjects any
covered entity to liability for not engaging in the voluntary
activities authorized under subsection (b).
(g) No New Regulatory Authority for Federal Agencies.--Nothing in
this section authorizes the Secretary or the head of any other
department or agency of the Federal Government to issue new
regulations.
(h) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) Pilot program.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$10,000,000 to carry out subsection (b).
(2) Working group and report.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $1,500,000 to carry out subsections (c) and (d).
(3) Availability.--Amounts made available under paragraphs (1)
and (2) shall remain available until expended.
SUBDIVISION 2--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND
2019
SEC. 6100. TABLE OF CONTENTS.
The table of contents for this subdivision is as follows:
Sec. 6100. Table of contents.
TITLE LXI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 6101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 6102. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE LXII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 6201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 6202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
TITLE LXIII--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 6301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 6302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 6303. Modification of special pay authority for science,
technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and addition
of special pay authority for cyber positions.
Sec. 6304. Modification of appointment of Chief Information Officer of
the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 6305. Director of National Intelligence review of placement of
positions within the intelligence community on the Executive
Schedule.
Sec. 6306. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task
Force.
Sec. 6307. Consideration of adversarial telecommunications and
cybersecurity infrastructure when sharing intelligence with
foreign governments and entities.
Sec. 6308. Cyber protection support for the personnel of the
intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable to cyber
attack.
Sec. 6309. Elimination of sunset of authority relating to management of
supply-chain risk.
Sec. 6310. Limitations on determinations regarding certain security
classifications.
Sec. 6311. Joint Intelligence Community Council.
Sec. 6312. Intelligence community information technology environment.
Sec. 6313. Report on development of secure mobile voice solution for
intelligence community.
Sec. 6314. Policy on minimum insider threat standards.
Sec. 6315. Submission of intelligence community policies.
Sec. 6316. Expansion of intelligence community recruitment efforts.
TITLE LXIV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 6401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 6402. Designation of the program manager-information-sharing
environment.
Sec. 6403. Technical modification to the executive schedule.
Sec. 6404. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 6405. Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 6411. Central Intelligence Agency subsistence for personnel
assigned to austere locations.
Sec. 6412. Special rules for certain monthly workers' compensation
payments and other payments for Central Intelligence Agency
personnel.
Sec. 6413. Expansion of security protective service jurisdiction of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 6414. Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for
certain senior level positions in the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of Department
of Energy
Sec. 6421. Consolidation of Department of Energy Offices of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence.
Sec. 6422. Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence Executive
Committee and budget reporting requirement.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
Sec. 6431. Plan for designation of counterintelligence component of
Defense Security Service as an element of intelligence
community.
Sec. 6432. Notice not required for private entities.
Sec. 6433. Establishment of advisory board for National Reconnaissance
Office.
Sec. 6434. Collocation of certain Department of Homeland Security
personnel at field locations.
TITLE LXV--ELECTION MATTERS
Sec. 6501. Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments against United
States election infrastructure.
Sec. 6502. Review of intelligence community's posture to collect against
and analyze Russian efforts to influence the Presidential
election.
Sec. 6503. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal
elections.
Sec. 6504. Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats to United
States elections.
Sec. 6505. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns
directed at foreign elections and referenda.
Sec. 6506. Information sharing with State election officials.
Sec. 6507. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and
active measures campaigns directed at elections for Federal
offices.
Sec. 6508. Designation of counterintelligence officer to lead election
security matters.
TITLE LXVI--SECURITY CLEARANCES
Sec. 6601. Definitions.
Sec. 6602. Reports and plans relating to security clearances and
background investigations.
Sec. 6603. Improving the process for security clearances.
Sec. 6604. Goals for promptness of determinations regarding security
clearances.
Sec. 6605. Security Executive Agent.
Sec. 6606. Report on unified, simplified, Governmentwide standards for
positions of trust and security clearances.
Sec. 6607. Report on clearance in person concept.
Sec. 6608. Reports on reciprocity for security clearances inside of
departments and agencies.
Sec. 6609. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.
Sec. 6610. Periodic report on positions in the intelligence community
that can be conducted without access to classified
information, networks, or facilities.
Sec. 6611. Information-sharing program for positions of trust and
security clearances.
Sec. 6612. Report on protections for confidentiality of whistleblower-
related communications.
Sec. 6613. Reports on costs of security clearance background
investigations.
TITLE LXVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia and Other Foreign Powers
Sec. 6701. Limitation relating to establishment or support of
cybersecurity unit with the Russian Federation.
Sec. 6702. Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia.
Sec. 6703. Notification of an active measures campaign.
Sec. 6704. Notification of travel by accredited diplomatic and consular
personnel of the Russian Federation in the United States.
Sec. 6705. Report and annual briefing on Iranian expenditures supporting
foreign military and terrorist activities.
Sec. 6706. Expansion of scope of committee to counter active measures.
Subtitle B--Reports
Sec. 6711. Technical correction to Inspector General study.
Sec. 6712. Reports on authorities of the Chief Intelligence Officer of
the Department of Homeland Security.
Sec. 6713. Review of intelligence community whistleblower matters.
Sec. 6714. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with
respect to certain foreign investments.
Sec. 6715. Report on surveillance by foreign governments against United
States telecommunications networks.
Sec. 6716. Biennial report on foreign investment risks.
Sec. 6717. Modification of certain reporting requirement on travel of
foreign diplomats.
Sec. 6718. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 6719. Congressional notification of designation of covered
intelligence officer as persona non grata.
Sec. 6720. Reports on intelligence community participation in
vulnerabilities equities process of Federal Government.
Sec. 6721. Inspectors General reports on classification.
Sec. 6722. Reports and briefings on national security effects of global
water insecurity and emerging infectious disease and
pandemics.
Sec. 6723. Annual report on memoranda of understanding between elements
of intelligence community and other entities of the United
States Government regarding significant operational activities
or policy.
Sec. 6724. Study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline
and wireless telephone calls.
Sec. 6725. Reports on intelligence community loan repayment and related
programs.
Sec. 6726. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 6727. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community report on
senior executives of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
Sec. 6728. Briefing on Federal Bureau of Investigation offering
permanent residence to sources and cooperators.
Sec. 6729. Intelligence assessment of North Korea revenue sources.
Sec. 6730. Report on possible exploitation of virtual currencies by
terrorist actors.
Subtitle C--Other Matters
Sec. 6741. Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 6742. Technical and clerical amendments to the National Security
Act of 1947.
Sec. 6743. Bug bounty programs.
Sec. 6744. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.
Sec. 6745. Sense of Congress on notification of certain disclosures of
classified information.
Sec. 6746. Sense of Congress on consideration of espionage activities
when considering whether or not to provide visas to foreign
individuals to be accredited to a United Nations mission in
the United States.
Sec. 6747. Sense of Congress on WikiLeaks.
TITLE LXI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 6101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Fiscal Year 2019.--Funds that were appropriated for fiscal year
2019 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the following elements of the United States Government
are hereby authorized:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and
the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
(b) Fiscal Year 2018.--Funds that were appropriated for fiscal year
2018 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the elements of the United States set forth in subsection
(a) are hereby authorized.
SEC. 6102. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
The amounts that were appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
years 2018 and 2019 are hereby authorized.
TITLE LXII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY
SYSTEM
SEC. 6201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
The amounts that were appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal years 2018 and 2019
are hereby authorized.
SEC. 6202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Computation of Annuities.--
(1) In general.--Section 221 of the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period at the
end and inserting ``, as determined by using the annual rate of
basic pay that would be payable for full-time service in that
position.'';
(B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking ``12-month''
and inserting ``2-year'';
(C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ``one year'' and
inserting ``two years'';
(D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking ``one year'' each
place such term appears and inserting ``two years'';
(E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k), and
(l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m), respectively;
and
(F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:
``(h) Conditional Election of Insurable Interest Survivor Annuity
by Participants Married at the Time of Retirement.--
``(1) Authority to make designation.--Subject to the rights of
former spouses under subsection (b) and section 222, at the time of
retirement a married participant found by the Director to be in
good health may elect to receive an annuity reduced in accordance
with subsection (f)(1)(B) and designate in writing an individual
having an insurable interest in the participant to receive an
annuity under the system after the participant's death, except that
any such election to provide an insurable interest survivor annuity
to the participant's spouse shall only be effective if the
participant's spouse waives the spousal right to a survivor annuity
under this Act. The amount of the annuity shall be equal to 55
percent of the participant's reduced annuity.
``(2) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The annuity payable
to the participant making such election shall be reduced by 10
percent of an annuity computed under subsection (a) and by an
additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the designated
individual is younger than the participant. The total reduction
under this subparagraph may not exceed 40 percent.
``(3) Commencement of survivor annuity.--The annuity payable to
the designated individual shall begin on the day after the retired
participant dies and terminate on the last day of the month before
the designated individual dies.
``(4) Recomputation of participant's annuity on death of
designated individual.--An annuity that is reduced under this
subsection shall, effective the first day of the month following
the death of the designated individual, be recomputed and paid as
if the annuity had not been so reduced.''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--
(A) Central intelligence agency retirement act.--The
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 et
seq.) is amended--
(i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 2052(b)(1)), by
striking ``221(h),'' and inserting ``221(i),''; and
(ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 2082(h)(4)), by
striking ``221(k)'' and inserting ``221(l)''.
(B) Central intelligence agency act of 1949.--Subsection
(a) of section 14 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is amended by striking ``221(h)(2),
221(i), 221(l),'' and inserting ``221(i)(2), 221(j), 221(m),''.
(b) Annuities for Former Spouses.--Subparagraph (B) of section
222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C.
2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by striking ``one year'' and inserting ``two
years''.
(c) Prior Service Credit.--Subparagraph (A) of section 252(b)(3) of
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C.
2082(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking ``October 1, 1990'' both places
that term appears and inserting ``March 31, 1991''.
(d) Reemployment Compensation.--Section 273 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c)
and (d), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Part-Time Reemployed Annuitants.--The Director shall have the
authority to reemploy an annuitant on a part-time basis in accordance
with section 8344(l) of title 5, United States Code.''.
(e) Effective Date and Application.--The amendments made by
subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as if enacted
on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to computations or participants,
respectively, as of such date.
TITLE LXIII--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 6301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this subdivision shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence
activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the
laws of the United States.
SEC. 6302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this subdivision for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased
by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 6303. MODIFICATION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, OR MATHEMATICS POSITIONS AND ADDITION OF
SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR CYBER POSITIONS.
Section 113B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3049a)
is amended--
(1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:
``(a) Special Rates of Pay for Positions Requiring Expertise in
Science, Technology, Engineering, or Mathematics.--
``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding part III of title 5, United
States Code, the head of each element of the intelligence community
may, for one or more categories of positions in such element that
require expertise in science, technology, engineering, or
mathematics--
``(A) establish higher minimum rates of pay; and
``(B) make corresponding increases in all rates of pay of
the pay range for each grade or level, subject to subsection
(b) or (c), as applicable.
``(2) Treatment.--The special rate supplements resulting from
the establishment of higher rates under paragraph (1) shall be
basic pay for the same or similar purposes as those specified in
section 5305(j) of title 5, United States Code.'';
(2) by redesignating subsections (b) through (f) as subsections
(c) through (g), respectively;
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Special Rates of Pay for Cyber Positions.--
``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsection (c), the Director
of the National Security Agency may establish a special rate of
pay--
``(A) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for level
II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313 of title 5,
United States Code, if the Director certifies to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in consultation with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, that
the rate of pay is for positions that perform functions that
execute the cyber mission of the Agency; or
``(B) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for the
Vice President of the United States under section 104 of title
3, United States Code, if the Director certifies to the
Secretary of Defense, by name, individuals that have advanced
skills and competencies and that perform critical functions
that execute the cyber mission of the Agency.
``(2) Pay limitation.--Employees receiving a special rate under
paragraph (1) shall be subject to an aggregate pay limitation that
parallels the limitation established in section 5307 of title 5,
United States Code, except that--
``(A) any allowance, differential, bonus, award, or other
similar cash payment in addition to basic pay that is
authorized under title 10, United States Code, (or any other
applicable law in addition to title 5 of such Code, excluding
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.))
shall also be counted as part of aggregate compensation; and
``(B) aggregate compensation may not exceed the rate
established for the Vice President of the United States under
section 104 of title 3, United States Code.
``(3) Limitation on number of recipients.--The number of
individuals who receive basic pay established under paragraph
(1)(B) may not exceed 100 at any time.
``(4) Limitation on use as comparative reference.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, special rates of pay
and the limitation established under paragraph (1)(B) may not be
used as comparative references for the purpose of fixing the rates
of basic pay or maximum pay limitations of qualified positions
under section 1599f of title 10, United States Code, or section 226
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 147).'';
(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
striking ``A minimum'' and inserting ``Except as provided in
subsection (b), a minimum'';
(5) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
inserting ``or (b)'' after ``by subsection (a)''; and
(6) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (2)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017'' and inserting ``Not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Damon
Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019''; and
(B) in paragraph (2)(A), by inserting ``or (b)'' after
``subsection (a)''.
SEC. 6304. MODIFICATION OF APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 103G(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3032(a)) is amended by striking ``President'' and inserting
``Director''.
SEC. 6305. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW OF PLACEMENT OF
POSITIONS WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
(a) Review.--The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination
with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, shall conduct
a review of positions within the intelligence community regarding the
placement of such positions on the Executive Schedule under subchapter
II of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code. In carrying out such
review, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management, shall determine--
(1) the standards under which such review will be conducted;
(2) which positions should or should not be on the Executive
Schedule; and
(3) for those positions that should be on the Executive
Schedule, the level of the Executive Schedule at which such
positions should be placed.
(b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date on which the
review under subsection (a) is completed, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the
Senate, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of
Representatives an unredacted report describing the standards by which
the review was conducted and the outcome of the review.
SEC. 6306. SUPPLY CHAIN AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RISK MANAGEMENT TASK
FORCE.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(3) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland
Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Requirement to Establish.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall establish a Supply Chain and Counterintelligence
Risk Management Task Force to standardize information sharing between
the intelligence community and the acquisition community of the United
States Government with respect to the supply chain and
counterintelligence risks.
(c) Members.--The Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk
Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall be
composed of--
(1) a representative of the Defense Security Service of the
Department of Defense;
(2) a representative of the General Services Administration;
(3) a representative of the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy of the Office of Management and Budget;
(4) a representative of the Department of Homeland Security;
(5) a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(6) the Director of the National Counterintelligence and
Security Center; and
(7) any other members the Director of National Intelligence
determines appropriate.
(d) Security Clearances.--Each member of the Supply Chain and
Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established under
subsection (b) shall have a security clearance at the top secret level
and be able to access sensitive compartmented information.
(e) Annual Report.--The Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk
Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees an annual report that
describes the activities of the Task Force during the previous year,
including identification of the supply chain, cybersecurity, and
counterintelligence risks shared with the acquisition community of the
United States Government by the intelligence community.
SEC. 6307. CONSIDERATION OF ADVERSARIAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
CYBERSECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE WHEN SHARING INTELLIGENCE WITH FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS AND ENTITIES.
Whenever the head of an element of the intelligence community
enters into an intelligence-sharing agreement with a foreign government
or any other foreign entity, the head of the element shall consider the
pervasiveness of telecommunications and cybersecurity infrastructure,
equipment, and services provided by adversaries of the United States,
particularly China and Russia, or entities of such adversaries in the
country or region of the foreign government or other foreign entity
entering into the agreement.
SEC. 6308. CYBER PROTECTION SUPPORT FOR THE PERSONNEL OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN POSITIONS HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO CYBER ATTACK.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Personal accounts.--The term ``personal accounts'' means
accounts for online and telecommunications services, including
telephone, residential internet access, email, text and multimedia
messaging, cloud computing, social media, health care, and
financial services, used by personnel of the intelligence community
outside of the scope of their employment with elements of the
intelligence community.
(2) Personal technology devices.--The term ``personal
technology devices'' means technology devices used by personnel of
the intelligence community outside of the scope of their employment
with elements of the intelligence community, including networks to
which such devices connect.
(b) Authority To Provide Cyber Protection Support.--
(1) In general.--Subject to a determination by the Director of
National Intelligence, the Director may provide cyber protection
support for the personal technology devices and personal accounts
of the personnel described in paragraph (2).
(2) At-risk personnel.--The personnel described in this
paragraph are personnel of the intelligence community--
(A) who the Director determines to be highly vulnerable to
cyber attacks and hostile information collection activities
because of the positions occupied by such personnel in the
intelligence community; and
(B) whose personal technology devices or personal accounts
are highly vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile information
collection activities.
(c) Nature of Cyber Protection Support.--Subject to the
availability of resources, the cyber protection support provided to
personnel under subsection (b) may include training, advice,
assistance, and other services relating to cyber attacks and hostile
information collection activities.
(d) Limitation on Support.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed--
(1) to encourage personnel of the intelligence community to use
personal technology devices for official business; or
(2) to authorize cyber protection support for senior
intelligence community personnel using personal devices, networks,
and personal accounts in an official capacity.
(e) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the provision of cyber protection
support under subsection (b). The report shall include--
(1) a description of the methodology used to make the
determination under subsection (b)(2); and
(2) guidance for the use of cyber protection support and
tracking of support requests for personnel receiving cyber
protection support under subsection (b).
SEC. 6309. ELIMINATION OF SUNSET OF AUTHORITY RELATING TO MANAGEMENT OF
SUPPLY-CHAIN RISK.
Section 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 (Public Law 112-87; 50 U.S.C. 3329 note) is amended by striking
subsection (g).
SEC. 6310. LIMITATIONS ON DETERMINATIONS REGARDING CERTAIN SECURITY
CLASSIFICATIONS.
(a) Prohibition.--An officer of an element of the intelligence
community who has been nominated by the President for a position that
requires the advice and consent of the Senate may not make a
classification decision with respect to information related to such
officer's nomination.
(b) Classification Determinations.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), in a case
in which an officer described in subsection (a) has been nominated
as described in such subsection and classification authority rests
with the officer or another officer who reports directly to such
officer, a classification decision with respect to information
relating to the officer shall be made by the Director of National
Intelligence.
(2) Nominations of director of national intelligence.--In a
case described in paragraph (1) in which the officer nominated is
the Director of National Intelligence, the classification decision
shall be made by the Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence.
(c) Reports.--Whenever the Director or the Principal Deputy
Director makes a decision under subsection (b), the Director or the
Principal Deputy Director, as the case may be, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report detailing the reasons
for the decision.
SEC. 6311. JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.
(a) Meetings.--Section 101A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3022(d)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``regular''; and
(2) by inserting ``as the Director considers appropriate''
after ``Council''.
(b) Report on Function and Utility of the Joint Intelligence
Community Council.--
(1) In general.--No later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Executive Office of the President and members
of the Joint Intelligence Community Council, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the function and
utility of the Joint Intelligence Community Council.
(2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) The number of physical or virtual meetings held by the
Council per year since the Council's inception.
(B) A description of the effect and accomplishments of the
Council.
(C) An explanation of the unique role of the Council
relative to other entities, including with respect to the
National Security Council and the Executive Committee of the
intelligence community.
(D) Recommendations for the future role and operation of
the Council.
(E) Such other matters relating to the function and utility
of the Council as the Director considers appropriate.
(3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 6312. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ENVIRONMENT.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Core service.--The term ``core service'' means a capability
that is available to multiple elements of the intelligence
community and required for consistent operation of the intelligence
community information technology environment.
(2) Intelligence community information technology
environment.--The term ``intelligence community information
technology environment'' means all of the information technology
services across the intelligence community, including the data
sharing and protection environment across multiple classification
domains.
(b) Roles and Responsibilities.--
(1) Director of national intelligence.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating the
performance by elements of the intelligence community of the
intelligence community information technology environment,
including each of the following:
(A) Ensuring compliance with all applicable environment
rules and regulations of such environment.
(B) Ensuring measurable performance goals exist for such
environment.
(C) Documenting standards and practices of such
environment.
(D) Acting as an arbiter among elements of the intelligence
community related to any disagreements arising out of the
implementation of such environment.
(E) Delegating responsibilities to the elements of the
intelligence community and carrying out such other
responsibilities as are necessary for the effective
implementation of such environment.
(2) Core service providers.--Providers of core services shall
be responsible for--
(A) providing core services, in coordination with the
Director of National Intelligence; and
(B) providing the Director with information requested and
required to fulfill the responsibilities of the Director under
paragraph (1).
(3) Use of core services.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
each element of the intelligence community shall use core
services when such services are available.
(B) Exception.--The Director of National Intelligence may
provide for a written exception to the requirement under
subparagraph (A) if the Director determines there is a
compelling financial or mission need for such exception.
(c) Management Accountability.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall designate and maintain one or more accountable
executives of the intelligence community information technology
environment to be responsible for--
(1) management, financial control, and integration of such
environment;
(2) overseeing the performance of each core service, including
establishing measurable service requirements and schedules;
(3) to the degree feasible, ensuring testing of each core
service of such environment, including testing by the intended
users, to evaluate performance against measurable service
requirements and to ensure the capability meets user requirements;
and
(4) coordinate transition or restructuring efforts of such
environment, including phaseout of legacy systems.
(d) Security Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
develop and maintain a security plan for the intelligence community
information technology environment.
(e) Long-Term Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and during each of the second and fourth
fiscal quarters thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a long-term roadmap
that shall include each of the following:
(1) A description of the minimum required and desired core
service requirements, including--
(A) key performance parameters; and
(B) an assessment of current, measured performance.
(2) Implementation milestones for the intelligence community
information technology environment, including each of the
following:
(A) A schedule for expected deliveries of core service
capabilities during each of the following phases:
(i) Concept refinement and technology maturity
demonstration.
(ii) Development, integration, and demonstration.
(iii) Production, deployment, and sustainment.
(iv) System retirement.
(B) Dependencies of such core service capabilities.
(C) Plans for the transition or restructuring necessary to
incorporate core service capabilities.
(D) A description of any legacy systems and discontinued
capabilities to be phased out.
(3) Such other matters as the Director determines appropriate.
(f) Business Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and during each of the second and fourth fiscal
quarters thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a business plan that
includes each of the following:
(1) A systematic approach to identify core service funding
requests for the intelligence community information technology
environment within the proposed budget, including multiyear plans
to implement the long-term roadmap required by subsection (e).
(2) A uniform approach by which each element of the
intelligence community shall identify the cost of legacy
information technology or alternative capabilities where services
of the intelligence community information technology environment
will also be available.
(3) A uniform effort by which each element of the intelligence
community shall identify transition and restructuring costs for
new, existing, and retiring services of the intelligence community
information technology environment, as well as services of such
environment that have changed designations as a core service.
(g) Quarterly Presentations.--Beginning not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees
quarterly updates regarding ongoing implementation of the intelligence
community information technology environment as compared to the
requirements in the most recently submitted security plan required by
subsection (d), long-term roadmap required by subsection (e), and
business plan required by subsection (f).
(h) Additional Notifications.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall provide timely notification to the congressional
intelligence committees regarding any policy changes related to or
affecting the intelligence community information technology
environment, new initiatives or strategies related to or impacting such
environment, and changes or deficiencies in the execution of the
security plan required by subsection (d), long-term roadmap required by
subsection (e), and business plan required by subsection (f).
(i) Sunset.--The section shall have no effect on or after September
30, 2024.
SEC. 6313. REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT OF SECURE MOBILE VOICE SOLUTION FOR
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and
the Director of the National Security Agency, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a classified report on the
feasibility, desirability, cost, and required schedule associated with
the implementation of a secure mobile voice solution for the
intelligence community.
(b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include,
at a minimum, the following:
(1) The benefits and disadvantages of a secure mobile voice
solution.
(2) Whether the intelligence community could leverage
commercially available technology for classified voice
communications that operates on commercial mobile networks in a
secure manner and identifying the accompanying security risks to
such networks.
(3) A description of any policies or community guidance that
would be necessary to govern the potential solution, such as a
process for determining the appropriate use of a secure mobile
telephone and any limitations associated with such use.
SEC. 6314. POLICY ON MINIMUM INSIDER THREAT STANDARDS.
(a) Policy Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
establish a policy for minimum insider threat standards that is
consistent with the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum
Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs.
(b) Implementation.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence
community shall implement the policy established under subsection (a).
SEC. 6315. SUBMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICIES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Electronic repository.--The term ``electronic repository''
means the electronic distribution mechanism, in use as of the date
of the enactment of this Act, or any successor electronic
distribution mechanism, by which the Director of National
Intelligence submits to the congressional intelligence committees
information.
(2) Policy.--The term ``policy'', with respect to the
intelligence community, includes unclassified or classified--
(A) directives, policy guidance, and policy memoranda of
the intelligence community;
(B) executive correspondence of the Director of National
Intelligence; and
(C) any equivalent successor policy instruments.
(b) Submission of Policies.--
(1) Current policy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees using the
electronic repository all nonpublicly available policies issued by
the Director of National Intelligence for the intelligence
community that are in effect as of the date of the submission.
(2) Continuous updates.--Not later than 15 days after the date
on which the Director of National Intelligence issues, modifies, or
rescinds a policy of the intelligence community, the Director
shall--
(A) notify the congressional intelligence committees of
such addition, modification, or removal; and
(B) update the electronic repository with respect to such
addition, modification, or removal.
SEC. 6316. EXPANSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RECRUITMENT EFFORTS.
In order to further increase the diversity of the intelligence
community workforce, not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with heads of elements of the Intelligence Community,
shall create, implement, and submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a written plan to ensure that rural and underrepresented
regions are more fully and consistently represented in such elements'
employment recruitment efforts. Upon receipt of the plan, the
congressional committees shall have 60 days to submit comments to the
Director of National Intelligence before such plan shall be
implemented.
TITLE LXIV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 6401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES OF
THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking ``such personnel of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of
National Intelligence may designate;'' and inserting ``current and
former personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
and their immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence
may designate;''.
SEC. 6402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER-INFORMATION-SHARING
ENVIRONMENT.
(a) Information-sharing Environment.--Section 1016(b) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C.
485(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``President'' and inserting
``Director of National Intelligence''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``President'' both places
that term appears and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''.
(b) Program Manager.--Section 1016(f)(1) of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(f)(1)) is amended by
striking ``The individual designated as the program manager shall serve
as program manager until removed from service or replaced by the
President (at the President's sole discretion).'' and inserting
``Beginning on the date of the enactment of the Damon Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
2018, 2019 and 2020, each individual designated as the program manager
shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.''.
SEC. 6403. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding
at the end the following:
``Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center.''.
SEC. 6404. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 103I(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3034(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence:
``The Chief Financial Officer shall report directly to the Director of
National Intelligence.''.
SEC. 6405. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 103G(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3032(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence:
``The Chief Information Officer shall report directly to the Director
of National Intelligence.''.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 6411. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SUBSISTENCE FOR PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED TO AUSTERE LOCATIONS.
Subsection (a) of section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``(50 U.S.C. 403-4a).,'' and
inserting ``(50 U.S.C. 403-4a),'';
(2) in paragraph (6), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(3) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(8) Upon the approval of the Director, provide, during any
fiscal year, with or without reimbursement, subsistence to any
personnel assigned to an overseas location designated by the Agency
as an austere location.''.
SEC. 6412. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN MONTHLY WORKERS' COMPENSATION
PAYMENTS AND OTHER PAYMENTS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PERSONNEL.
(a) In General.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 19 the
following new section:
``SEC. 19A. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INJURED BY REASON
OF WAR, INSURGENCY, HOSTILE ACT, TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, OR
INCIDENTS DESIGNATED BY THE DIRECTOR.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered dependent.--The term `covered dependent' means a
family member (as defined by the Director) of a covered employee
who, on or after September 11, 2001--
``(A) accompanies the covered employee to an assigned duty
station in a foreign country; and
``(B) becomes injured by reason of a qualifying injury.
``(2) Covered employee.--The term `covered employee' means an
officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency who, on or
after September 11, 2001, becomes injured by reason of a qualifying
injury.
``(3) Covered individual.--The term `covered individual' means
an individual who--
``(A)(i) is detailed to the Central Intelligence Agency
from other agencies of the United States Government or from the
Armed Forces; or
``(ii) is affiliated with the Central Intelligence Agency,
as determined by the Director; and
``(B) who, on or after September 11, 2001, becomes injured
by reason of a qualifying injury.
``(4) Qualifying injury.--The term `qualifying injury' means
the following:
``(A) With respect to a covered dependent, an injury
incurred--
``(i) during a period in which the covered dependent is
accompanying the covered employee to an assigned duty
station in a foreign country;
``(ii) in connection with war, insurgency, hostile act,
terrorist activity, or an incident designated for purposes
of this section by the Director; and
``(iii) that was not the result of the willful
misconduct of the covered dependent.
``(B) With respect to a covered employee or a covered
individual--
``(i) an injury incurred--
``(I) during a period of assignment to a duty
station in a foreign country;
``(II) in connection with war, insurgency, hostile
act, or terrorist activity; and
``(III) that was not the result of the willful
misconduct of the covered employee or the covered
individual; or
``(ii) an injury incurred--
``(I) in connection with an incident designated for
purposes of this section by the Director; and
``(II) that was not the result of the willful
misconduct of the covered employee or the covered
individual.
``(b) Adjustment of Compensation for Certain Injuries.--
``(1) Increase.--The Director may increase the amount of
monthly compensation paid to a covered employee under section 8105
of title 5, United States Code. Subject to paragraph (2), the
Director may determine the amount of each such increase by taking
into account--
``(A) the severity of the qualifying injury;
``(B) the circumstances by which the covered employee
became injured; and
``(C) the seniority of the covered employee.
``(2) Maximum.--Notwithstanding chapter 81 of title 5, United
States Code, the total amount of monthly compensation increased
under paragraph (1) may not exceed the monthly pay of the maximum
rate of basic pay for GS-15 of the General Schedule under section
5332 of such title.
``(c) Costs for Treating Qualifying Injuries.--The Director may pay
the costs of treating a qualifying injury of a covered employee, a
covered individual, or a covered dependent, or may reimburse a covered
employee, a covered individual, or a covered dependent for such costs,
that are not otherwise covered by chapter 81 of title 5, United States
Code, or other provision of Federal law.''.
(b) Regulations.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall--
(1) prescribe regulations ensuring the fair and equitable
implementation of section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a); and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees such
regulations.
(c) Application.--Section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a), shall apply with respect to--
(1) payments made to covered employees (as defined in such
section) under section 8105 of title 5, United States Code,
beginning on or after the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(2) treatment described in subsection (b) of such section 19A
occurring on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 6413. EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICE JURISDICTION OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Subsection (a)(1) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)(1)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``500 feet;'' and
inserting ``500 yards;''; and
(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``500 feet.'' and
inserting ``500 yards.''.
SEC. 6414. REPEAL OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT FOR
CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Repeal of Foreign Language Proficiency Requirement.--Section
104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3036) is amended
by striking subsection (g).
(b) Conforming Repeal of Report Requirement.--Section 611 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-
487) is amended by striking subsection (c).
Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of
Department of Energy
SEC. 6421. CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICES OF
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General.--Section 215 of the Department of Energy
Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b) is amended to read as follows:
``office of intelligence and counterintelligence
``Sec. 215. (a) Definitions.--In this section, the terms
`intelligence community' and `National Intelligence Program' have the
meanings given such terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
``(b) In General.--There is in the Department an Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Such office shall be under the
National Intelligence Program.
``(c) Director.--(1) The head of the Office shall be the Director
of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, who shall be an
employee in the Senior Executive Service, the Senior Intelligence
Service, the Senior National Intelligence Service, or any other Service
that the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence, considers appropriate. The Director of the Office shall
report directly to the Secretary.
``(2) The Secretary shall select an individual to serve as the
Director from among individuals who have substantial expertise in
matters relating to the intelligence community, including foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence.
``(d) Duties.--(1) Subject to the authority, direction, and control
of the Secretary, the Director shall perform such duties and exercise
such powers as the Secretary may prescribe.
``(2) The Director shall be responsible for establishing policy for
intelligence and counterintelligence programs and activities at the
Department.''.
(b) Conforming Repeal.--Section 216 of the Department of Energy
Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144c) is hereby repealed.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents at the beginning of
the Department of Energy Organization Act is amended by striking the
items relating to sections 215 and 216 and inserting the following new
item:
``Sec. 215. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.''.
SEC. 6422. REPEAL OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE AND BUDGET REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
Section 214 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C.
7144a) is amended--
(1) by striking ``(a)''; and
(2) by striking subsections (b) and (c).
Subtitle D--Other Elements
SEC. 6431. PLAN FOR DESIGNATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COMPONENT OF
DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE AS AN ELEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of National Intelligence and Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services
of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives a plan to designate the counterintelligence component
of the Defense Security Service of the Department of Defense as an
element of the intelligence community by not later than January 1,
2021. Such plan shall--
(1) address the implications of such designation on the
authorities, governance, personnel, resources, information
technology, collection, analytic products, information sharing, and
business processes of the Defense Security Service and the
intelligence community; and
(2) not address the personnel security functions of the Defense
Security Service.
SEC. 6432. NOTICE NOT REQUIRED FOR PRIVATE ENTITIES.
Section 3553 of title 44, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (j) as subsection (k); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (i) the following:
``(j) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to require the Secretary to provide notice to any private
entity before the Secretary issues a binding operational directive
under subsection (b)(2).''.
SEC. 6433. ESTABLISHMENT OF ADVISORY BOARD FOR NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE.
(a) Establishment.--Section 106A of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a) is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
``(d) Advisory Board.--
``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the National
Reconnaissance Office an advisory board (in this section referred
to as the `Board').
``(2) Duties.--The Board shall--
``(A) study matters relating to the mission of the National
Reconnaissance Office, including with respect to promoting
innovation, competition, and resilience in space, overhead
reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters; and
``(B) advise and report directly to the Director with
respect to such matters.
``(3) Members.--
``(A) Number and appointment.--
``(i) In general.--The Board shall be composed of five
members appointed by the Director from among individuals
with demonstrated academic, government, business, or other
expertise relevant to the mission and functions of the
National Reconnaissance Office.
``(ii) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after the
date on which the Director appoints a member to the Board,
the Director shall notify the congressional intelligence
committees and the congressional defense committees (as
defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code)
of such appointment.
``(B) Terms.--Each member shall be appointed for a term of
2 years. Except as provided by subparagraph (C), a member may
not serve more than three terms.
``(C) Vacancy.--Any member appointed to fill a vacancy
occurring before the expiration of the term for which the
member's predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only for
the remainder of that term. A member may serve after the
expiration of that member's term until a successor has taken
office.
``(D) Chair.--The Board shall have a Chair, who shall be
appointed by the Director from among the members.
``(E) Travel expenses.--Each member shall receive travel
expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in
accordance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of
chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.
``(F) Executive secretary.--The Director may appoint an
executive secretary, who shall be an employee of the National
Reconnaissance Office, to support the Board.
``(4) Meetings.--The Board shall meet not less than quarterly,
but may meet more frequently at the call of the Director.
``(5) Reports.--Not later than March 31 of each year, the Board
shall submit to the Director and to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on the activities and significant findings of
the Board during the preceding year.
``(6) Nonapplicability of certain requirements.--The Federal
Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the
Board.
``(7) Termination.--The Board shall terminate on the date that
is 3 years after the date of the first meeting of the Board.''.
(b) Initial Appointments.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office shall appoint the initial five members to the
advisory board under subsection (d) of section 106A of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a), as added by subsection (a).
SEC. 6434. COLLOCATION OF CERTAIN DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
PERSONNEL AT FIELD LOCATIONS.
(a) Identification of Opportunities for Collocation.--Not later
than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under
Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall
identify, in consultation with the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, the Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration, the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and the heads of such other elements of the Department of
Homeland Security as the Under Secretary considers appropriate,
opportunities for collocation of officers of the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis in the field outside of the greater Washington, District
of Columbia, area in order to support operational units from U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and other
elements of the Department of Homeland Security.
(b) Plan for Collocation.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report that includes a plan for
collocation as described in subsection (a).
TITLE LXV--ELECTION MATTERS
SEC. 6501. REPORT ON CYBER ATTACKS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST
UNITED STATES ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives;
(D) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(3) State.--The term ``State'' means any State of the United
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
and any territory or possession of the United States.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis shall submit to congressional leadership and
the appropriate congressional committees a report on cyber attacks and
attempted cyber attacks by foreign governments on United States
election infrastructure in States and localities in connection with the
2016 Presidential election in the United States and such cyber attacks
or attempted cyber attacks as the Under Secretary anticipates against
such infrastructure. Such report shall identify the States and
localities affected and shall include cyber attacks and attempted cyber
attacks against voter registration databases, voting machines, voting-
related computer networks, and the networks of Secretaries of State and
other election officials of the various States.
(c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 6502. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S POSTURE TO COLLECT
AGAINST AND ANALYZE RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION.
(a) Review Required.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
(1) complete an after action review of the posture of the
intelligence community to collect against and analyze efforts of
the Government of Russia to interfere in the 2016 Presidential
election in the United States; and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the findings of the Director with respect to such review.
(b) Elements.--The review required by subsection (a) shall include,
with respect to the posture and efforts described in paragraph (1) of
such subsection, the following:
(1) An assessment of whether the resources of the intelligence
community were properly aligned to detect and respond to the
efforts described in subsection (a)(1).
(2) An assessment of the information sharing that occurred
within elements of the intelligence community.
(3) An assessment of the information sharing that occurred
between elements of the intelligence community.
(4) An assessment of applicable authorities necessary to
collect on any such efforts and any deficiencies in those
authorities.
(5) A review of the use of open source material to inform
analysis and warning of such efforts.
(6) A review of the use of alternative and predictive analysis.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a)(2) shall
be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees in a
classified form.
SEC. 6503. ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREATS TO FEDERAL
ELECTIONS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(3) Security vulnerability.--The term ``security
vulnerability'' has the meaning given such term in section 102 of
the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501).
(b) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
heads of other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall--
(1) commence not later than 1 year before any regularly
scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, and
complete not later than 180 days before such election, an
assessment of security vulnerabilities of State election systems;
and
(2) not later than 180 days before any regularly scheduled
Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, submit a report
on such security vulnerabilities and an assessment of foreign
intelligence threats to the election to--
(A) congressional leadership; and
(B) the appropriate congressional committees.
(c) Update.--Not later than 90 days before any regularly scheduled
Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, the Director of
National Intelligence shall--
(1) update the assessment of foreign intelligence threats to
that election; and
(2) submit the updated assessment to--
(A) congressional leadership; and
(B) the appropriate congressional committees.
SEC. 6504. STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING RUSSIAN CYBER THREATS TO UNITED
STATES ELECTIONS.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(3) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(4) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(5) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Requirement for a Strategy.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall develop a whole-
of-government strategy for countering the threat of Russian cyber
attacks and attempted cyber attacks against electoral systems and
processes in the United States, including Federal, State, and local
election systems, voter registration databases, voting tabulation
equipment, and equipment and processes for the secure transmission of
election results.
(c) Elements of the Strategy.--The strategy required by subsection
(b) shall include the following elements:
(1) A whole-of-government approach to protecting United States
electoral systems and processes that includes the agencies and
departments indicated in subsection (b) as well as any other
agencies and departments of the United States, as determined
appropriate by the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
(2) Input solicited from Secretaries of State of the various
States and the chief election officials of the States.
(3) Technical security measures, including auditable paper
trails for voting machines, securing wireless and internet
connections, and other technical safeguards.
(4) Detection of cyber threats, including attacks and attempted
attacks by Russian government or nongovernment cyber threat actors.
(5) Improvements in the identification and attribution of
Russian government or nongovernment cyber threat actors.
(6) Deterrence, including actions and measures that could or
should be undertaken against or communicated to the Government of
Russia or other entities to deter attacks against, or interference
with, United States election systems and processes.
(7) Improvements in Federal Government communications with
State and local election officials.
(8) Public education and communication efforts.
(9) Benchmarks and milestones to enable the measurement of
concrete steps taken and progress made in the implementation of the
strategy.
(d) Congressional Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly brief the appropriate
congressional committees on the strategy developed under subsection
(b).
SEC. 6505. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS
DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA.
(a) Russian Influence Campaign Defined.--In this section, the term
``Russian influence campaign'' means any effort, covert or overt, and
by any means, attributable to the Russian Federation directed at an
election, referendum, or similar process in a country other than the
Russian Federation or the United States.
(b) Assessment Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate a report containing an analytical
assessment of the most significant Russian influence campaigns, if any,
conducted during the 3-year period preceding the date of the enactment
of this Act, as well as the most significant current or planned such
Russian influence campaigns, if any. Such assessment shall include--
(1) a summary of such significant Russian influence campaigns,
including, at a minimum, the specific means by which such campaigns
were conducted, are being conducted, or likely will be conducted,
as appropriate, and the specific goal of each such campaign;
(2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such
Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the
elections or referenda;
(3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the
intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of assisting the
government of such foreign state in defending against or responding
to such Russian influence campaigns; and
(4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and
responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) may be submitted
in classified form, but if so submitted, shall contain an unclassified
summary.
SEC. 6506. INFORMATION SHARING WITH STATE ELECTION OFFICIALS.
(a) State Defined.--In this section, the term ``State'' means any
State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.
(b) Security Clearances.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
support the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence
and Analysis, and any other official of the Department of Homeland
Security designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
sponsoring a security clearance up to the top secret level for each
eligible chief election official of a State or the District of
Columbia, and additional eligible designees of such election
official as appropriate, at the time that such election official
assumes such position.
(2) Interim clearances.--Consistent with applicable policies
and directives, the Director of National Intelligence may issue
interim clearances, for a period to be determined by the Director,
to a chief election official as described in paragraph (1) and up
to one designee of such official under such paragraph.
(c) Information Sharing.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
assist the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence
and Analysis and the Under Secretary responsible for overseeing
critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and other
related programs of the Department (as specified in section
103(a)(1)(H) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
113(a)(1)(H))) with sharing any appropriate classified information
related to threats to election systems and to the integrity of the
election process with chief election officials and such designees
who have received a security clearance under subsection (b).
(2) Coordination.--The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis shall coordinate with the Director of
National Intelligence and the Under Secretary responsible for
overseeing critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and
other related programs of the Department (as specified in section
103(a)(1)(H) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
113(a)(1)(H))) to facilitate the sharing of information to the
affected Secretaries of State or States.
SEC. 6507. NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN CYBER INTRUSIONS AND
ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT ELECTIONS FOR FEDERAL OFFICES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Active measures campaign.--The term ``active measures
campaign'' means a foreign semi-covert or covert intelligence
operation.
(2) Candidate, election, and political party.--The terms
``candidate'', ``election'', and ``political party'' have the
meanings given those terms in section 301 of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
(3) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(4) Cyber intrusion.--The term ``cyber intrusion'' means an
electronic occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes,
without lawful authority, electronic election infrastructure, or
the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of information
within such infrastructure.
(5) Electronic election infrastructure.--The term ``electronic
election infrastructure'' means an electronic information system of
any of the following that is related to an election for Federal
office:
(A) The Federal Government.
(B) A State or local government.
(C) A political party.
(D) The election campaign of a candidate.
(6) Federal office.--The term ``Federal office'' has the
meaning given that term in section 301 of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
(7) High confidence.--The term ``high confidence'', with
respect to a determination, means that the determination is based
on high-quality information from multiple sources.
(8) Moderate confidence.--The term ``moderate confidence'',
with respect to a determination, means that a determination is
credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or
corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.
(9) Other appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``other appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) Determinations of Significant Foreign Cyber Intrusions and
Active Measures Campaigns.--The Director of National Intelligence, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall jointly carry out subsection (c) if such
Directors and the Secretary jointly determine--
(1) that on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, a
significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign
intended to influence an upcoming election for any Federal office
has occurred or is occurring; and
(2) with moderate or high confidence, that such intrusion or
campaign can be attributed to a foreign state or to a foreign
nonstate person, group, or other entity.
(c) Briefing.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 14 days after making a
determination under subsection (b), the Director of National
Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly provide a
briefing to the congressional leadership, the congressional
intelligence committees and, consistent with the protection of
sources and methods, the other appropriate congressional
committees. The briefing shall be classified and address, at a
minimum, the following:
(A) A description of the significant foreign cyber
intrusion or active measures campaign, as the case may be,
covered by the determination.
(B) An identification of the foreign state or foreign
nonstate person, group, or other entity, to which such
intrusion or campaign has been attributed.
(C) The desirability and feasibility of the public release
of information about the cyber intrusion or active measures
campaign.
(D) Any other information such Directors and the Secretary
jointly determine appropriate.
(2) Electronic election infrastructure briefings.--With respect
to a significant foreign cyber intrusion covered by a determination
under subsection (b), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall offer to the
owner or operator of any electronic election infrastructure
directly affected by such intrusion, a briefing on such intrusion,
including steps that may be taken to mitigate such intrusion. Such
briefing may be classified and made available only to individuals
with appropriate security clearances.
(3) Protection of sources and methods.--This subsection shall
be carried out in a manner that is consistent with the protection
of sources and methods.
SEC. 6508. DESIGNATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICER TO LEAD ELECTION
SECURITY MATTERS.
(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
designate a national counterintelligence officer within the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, manage, and coordinate
counterintelligence matters relating to election security.
(b) Additional Responsibilities.--The person designated under
subsection (a) shall also lead, manage, and coordinate
counterintelligence matters relating to risks posed by interference
from foreign powers (as defined in section 101 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801)) to the
following:
(1) The Federal Government election security supply chain.
(2) Election voting systems and software.
(3) Voter registration databases.
(4) Critical infrastructure related to elections.
(5) Such other Government goods and services as the Director of
National Intelligence considers appropriate.
TITLE LXVI--SECURITY CLEARANCES
SEC. 6601. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate;
(E) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives;
(F) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives;
(G) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives; and
(H) the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Appropriate industry partner.--The term ``appropriate
industry partner'' means a contractor, licensee, or grantee (as
defined in section 101(a) of Executive Order No. 12829 (50 U.S.C.
3161 note; relating to National Industrial Security Program)) that
is participating in the National Industrial Security Program
established by such Executive order.
(3) Continuous vetting.--The term ``continuous vetting'' has
the meaning given such term in Executive Order No. 13467 (50 U.S.C.
3161 note; relating to reforming processes for determining
suitability for government employment, fitness for contractor
employees, and eligibility for access to classified national
security information).
(4) Council.--The term ``Council'' means the Security,
Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council
established pursuant to such Executive order, or any successor
entity.
(5) Reciprocity.--The term ``reciprocity'' means reciprocal
recognition by Federal departments and agencies of eligibility for
access to classified information.
(6) Security executive agent.--The term ``Security Executive
Agent'' means the officer serving as the Security Executive Agent
pursuant to section 803 of the National Security Act of 1947, as
added by section 6605.
(7) Suitability and credentialing executive agent.--The term
``Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent'' means the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management acting as the
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent in accordance with
Executive Order No. 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to
reforming processes related to suitability for Government
employment, fitness for contractor employees, and eligibility for
access to classified national security information), or any
successor entity.
SEC. 6602. REPORTS AND PLANS RELATING TO SECURITY CLEARANCES AND
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) ensuring the trustworthiness and security of the workforce,
facilities, and information of the Federal Government is of the
highest priority to national security and public safety;
(2) the President and Congress should prioritize the
modernization of the personnel security framework to improve its
efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability;
(3) the current system for background investigations for
security clearances, suitability and fitness for employment, and
credentialing lacks efficiencies and capabilities to meet the
current threat environment, recruit and retain a trusted workforce,
and capitalize on modern technologies; and
(4) changes to policies or processes to improve this system
should be vetted through the Council to ensure standardization,
portability, and reciprocity in security clearances across the
Federal Government.
(b) Accountability Plans and Reports.--
(1) Plans.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Council shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry
partners the following:
(A) A plan, with milestones, to reduce the background
investigation inventory to 200,000, or an otherwise sustainable
steady-level, by the end of year 2020. Such plan shall include
notes of any required changes in investigative and adjudicative
standards or resources.
(B) A plan to consolidate the conduct of background
investigations associated with the processing for security
clearances in the most effective and efficient manner in the
Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency. Such plan
shall address required funding, personnel, contracts,
information technology, field office structure, policy,
governance, schedule, transition costs, and effects on
stakeholders.
(2) Report on the future of personnel security.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the Council, in
coordination with the members of the Council, shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees and make available to
appropriate industry partners a report on the future of
personnel security to reflect changes in threats, the
workforce, and technology.
(B) Contents.--The report submitted under subparagraph (A)
shall include the following:
(i) A risk framework for granting and renewing access
to classified information.
(ii) A discussion of the use of technologies to
prevent, detect, and monitor threats.
(iii) A discussion of efforts to address reciprocity
and portability.
(iv) A discussion of the characteristics of effective
insider threat programs.
(v) An analysis of how to integrate data from
continuous vetting, insider threat programs, and human
resources data.
(vi) Recommendations on interagency governance.
(3) Plan for implementation.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the Council, in
coordination with the members of the Council, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees and make available to
appropriate industry partners a plan to implement the report's
framework and recommendations submitted under paragraph (2)(A).
(4) Congressional notifications.--Not less frequently than
quarterly, the Security Executive Agent shall make available to the
public a report regarding the status of the disposition of requests
received from departments and agencies of the Federal Government
for a change to, or approval under, the Federal investigative
standards, the national adjudicative guidelines, continuous
vetting, or other national policy regarding personnel security.
SEC. 6603. IMPROVING THE PROCESS FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES.
(a) Reviews.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent, in coordination
with the members of the Council, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry
partners a report that includes the following:
(1) A review of whether the information requested on the
Questionnaire for National Security Positions (Standard Form 86)
and by the Federal Investigative Standards prescribed by the
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent and the Security
Executive Agent appropriately supports the adjudicative guidelines
under Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (known as the ``National
Security Adjudicative Guidelines''). Such review shall include
identification of whether any such information currently collected
is unnecessary to support the adjudicative guidelines.
(2) An assessment of whether such Questionnaire, Standards, and
guidelines should be revised to account for the prospect of a
holder of a security clearance becoming an insider threat.
(3) Recommendations to improve the background investigation
process by--
(A) simplifying the Questionnaire for National Security
Positions (Standard Form 86) and increasing customer support to
applicants completing such Questionnaire;
(B) using remote techniques and centralized locations to
support or replace field investigation work;
(C) using secure and reliable digitization of information
obtained during the clearance process;
(D) building the capacity of the background investigation
workforce; and
(E) replacing periodic reinvestigations with continuous
vetting techniques in all appropriate circumstances.
(b) Policy, Strategy, and Implementation.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive
Agent shall, in coordination with the members of the Council, establish
the following:
(1) A policy and implementation plan for the issuance of
interim security clearances.
(2) A policy and implementation plan to ensure contractors are
treated consistently in the security clearance process across
agencies and departments of the United States as compared to
employees of such agencies and departments. Such policy shall
address--
(A) prioritization of processing security clearances based
on the mission the contractors will be performing;
(B) standardization in the forms that agencies issue to
initiate the process for a security clearance;
(C) digitization of background investigation-related forms;
(D) use of the polygraph;
(E) the application of the adjudicative guidelines under
Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (known as the ``National
Security Adjudicative Guidelines'');
(F) reciprocal recognition of clearances across agencies
and departments of the United States, regardless of status of
periodic reinvestigation;
(G) tracking of clearance files as individuals move from
employment with an agency or department of the United States to
employment in the private sector;
(H) collection of timelines for movement of contractors
across agencies and departments;
(I) reporting on security incidents and job performance,
consistent with section 552a of title 5, United States Code
(commonly known as the ``Privacy Act of 1974''), that may
affect the ability to hold a security clearance;
(J) any recommended changes to the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR) necessary to ensure that information
affecting contractor clearances or suitability is appropriately
and expeditiously shared between and among agencies and
contractors; and
(K) portability of contractor security clearances between
or among contracts at the same agency and between or among
contracts at different agencies that require the same level of
clearance.
(3) A strategy and implementation plan that--
(A) provides for periodic reinvestigations as part of a
security clearance determination only on an as-needed, risk-
based basis;
(B) includes actions to assess the extent to which
automated records checks and other continuous vetting methods
may be used to expedite or focus reinvestigations; and
(C) provides an exception to the requirement under
subparagraph (A) for certain populations if the Security
Executive Agent--
(i) determines such populations require
reinvestigations at regular intervals; and
(ii) provides written justification to the appropriate
congressional committees for any such determination.
(4) A policy and implementation plan for agencies and
departments of the United States, as a part of the security
clearance process, to accept automated records checks generated
pursuant to a security clearance applicant's employment with a
prior employer.
(5) A policy for the use of certain background information on
individuals collected by the private sector for background
investigation purposes.
(6) Uniform standards for agency continuous vetting programs to
ensure quality and reciprocity in accepting enrollment in a
continuous vetting program as a substitute for a periodic
investigation for continued access to classified information.
SEC. 6604. GOALS FOR PROMPTNESS OF DETERMINATIONS REGARDING SECURITY
CLEARANCES.
(a) In General.--The Council shall reform the security clearance
process with the objective that, by December 31, 2021, 90 percent of
all determinations, other than determinations regarding populations
identified under section 6603(b)(3)(C), regarding--
(1) security clearances--
(A) at the secret level are issued in 30 days or fewer; and
(B) at the top secret level are issued in 90 days or fewer;
and
(2) reciprocity of security clearances at the same level are
recognized in 2 weeks or fewer.
(b) Certain Reinvestigations.--The Council shall reform the
security clearance process with the goal that by December 31, 2021,
reinvestigation on a set periodicity is not required for more than 10
percent of the population that holds a security clearance.
(c) Equivalent Metrics.--
(1) In general.--If the Council develops a set of performance
metrics that it certifies to the appropriate congressional
committees should achieve substantially equivalent outcomes as
those outlined in subsections (b) and (c), the Council may use
those metrics for purposes of compliance within this provision.
(2) Notice.--If the Council uses the authority provided by
paragraph (1) to use metrics as described in such paragraph, the
Council shall, not later than 30 days after communicating such
metrics to departments and agencies, notify the appropriate
congressional committees that it is using such authority.
(d) Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Council shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and make available to appropriate industry partners a plan
to carry out this section. Such plan shall include recommended interim
milestones for the goals set forth in subsections (b) and (c) for 2019,
2020, and 2021.
SEC. 6605. SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.
(a) In General.--Title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.) is amended--
(1) by redesignating sections 803 and 804 as sections 804 and
805, respectively; and
(2) by inserting after section 802 the following:
``SEC. 803. SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.
``(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, or such
other officer of the United States as the President may designate,
shall serve as the Security Executive Agent for all departments and
agencies of the United States.
``(b) Duties.--The duties of the Security Executive Agent are as
follows:
``(1) To direct the oversight of investigations,
reinvestigations, adjudications, and, as applicable, polygraphs for
eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to
hold a sensitive position made by any Federal agency.
``(2) To review the national security background investigation
and adjudication programs of Federal agencies to determine whether
such programs are being implemented in accordance with this
section.
``(3) To develop and issue uniform and consistent policies and
procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, timely, and secure
completion of investigations, polygraphs, and adjudications
relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified
information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position.
``(4) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the final
authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to conduct
investigations of persons who are proposed for access to classified
information or for eligibility to hold a sensitive position to
ascertain whether such persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining
and retaining access to classified information or eligibility to
hold a sensitive position, as applicable.
``(5) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the final
authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to determine
eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to
hold a sensitive position in accordance with Executive Order No.
12968 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to access to classified
information).
``(6) To review and approve the policies of the Federal
agencies that ensure reciprocal recognition of eligibility for
access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive
position among Federal agencies, and to act as the final authority
to arbitrate and resolve disputes among such agencies involving the
reciprocity of investigations and adjudications of eligibility.
``(7) To execute all other duties assigned to the Security
Executive Agent by law.
``(c) Authorities.--The Security Executive Agent shall--
``(1) issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of Federal
agencies to ensure appropriate uniformity, centralization,
efficiency, effectiveness, timeliness, and security in processes
relating to determinations by such agencies of eligibility for
access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive
position, including such matters as investigations, polygraphs,
adjudications, and reciprocity;
``(2) have the authority to grant exceptions to, or waivers of,
national security investigative requirements, including issuing
implementing or clarifying guidance, as necessary;
``(3) have the authority to assign, in whole or in part, to the
head of any Federal agency (solely or jointly) any of the duties of
the Security Executive Agent described in subsection (b) or the
authorities described in paragraphs (1) and (2), provided that the
exercise of such assigned duties or authorities is subject to the
oversight of the Security Executive Agent, including such terms and
conditions (including approval by the Security Executive Agent) as
the Security Executive Agent determines appropriate; and
``(4) define and set standards for continuous vetting for
continued access to classified information and for eligibility to
hold a sensitive position.''.
(b) Report on Recommendations for Revising Authorities.--Not later
than 30 days after the date on which the Chairman of the Council
submits to the appropriate congressional committees the report required
by section 6602(b)(2)(A), the Chairman shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees such recommendations as the Chairman may have
for revising the authorities of the Security Executive Agent.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 103H(j)(4)(A) of such Act (50
U.S.C. 3033(j)(4)(A)) is amended by striking ``in section 804'' and
inserting ``in section 805''.
(d) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the matter
preceding section 2 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3002) is amended by striking
the items relating to sections 803 and 804 and inserting the following:
``Sec. 803. Security Executive Agent.
``Sec. 804. Exceptions.
``Sec. 805. Definitions.''.
SEC. 6606. REPORT ON UNIFIED, SIMPLIFIED, GOVERNMENTWIDE STANDARDS FOR
POSITIONS OF TRUST AND SECURITY CLEARANCES.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing
Executive Agent, in coordination with the other members of the Council,
shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees and
make available to appropriate industry partners a report regarding the
advisability and the risks, benefits, and costs to the Government and
to industry of consolidating to not more than three tiers for positions
of trust and security clearances.
SEC. 6607. REPORT ON CLEARANCE IN PERSON CONCEPT.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that to reflect
the greater mobility of the modern workforce, alternative methodologies
merit analysis to allow greater flexibility for individuals moving in
and out of positions that require access to classified information,
while still preserving security.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees and make available to appropriate
industry partners a report that describes the requirements,
feasibility, and advisability of implementing a clearance in person
concept described in subsection (c).
(c) Clearance in Person Concept.--The clearance in person concept--
(1) permits an individual who once held a security clearance to
maintain his or her eligibility for access to classified
information, networks, and facilities for up to 3 years after the
individual's eligibility for access to classified information would
otherwise lapse; and
(2) recognizes, unless otherwise directed by the Security
Executive Agent, an individual's security clearance and background
investigation as current, regardless of employment status,
contingent on enrollment in a continuous vetting program.
(d) Contents.--The report required under subsection (b) shall
address--
(1) requirements for an individual to voluntarily remain in a
continuous vetting program validated by the Security Executive
Agent even if the individual is not in a position requiring access
to classified information;
(2) appropriate safeguards for privacy;
(3) advantages to government and industry;
(4) the costs and savings associated with implementation;
(5) the risks of such implementation, including security and
counterintelligence risks;
(6) an appropriate funding model; and
(7) fairness to small companies and independent contractors.
SEC. 6608. REPORTS ON RECIPROCITY FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES INSIDE OF
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.
(a) Reports to Security Executive Agent.--The head of each Federal
department or agency shall submit an annual report to the Security
Executive Agent that, with respect to the period covered by the
report--
(1) identifies the number of individuals whose security
clearances took more than 2 weeks for reciprocity recognition after
such individuals move to another part of such department or agency;
and
(2) breaks out the information described in paragraph (1) by
type of clearance and the reasons for any delays.
(b) Annual Report.--Not less frequently than once each year, the
Security Executive Agent shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and make available to industry partners a report that
summarizes the information received pursuant to subsection (b) during
the period covered by such report.
SEC. 6609. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY CLEARANCES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) despite sustained efforts by Congress and the executive
branch, an unacceptable backlog in processing and adjudicating
security clearances persists, both within elements of the
intelligence community and in other departments of the Federal
Government, with some processing times exceeding a year or even
more;
(2) the protracted clearance timetable threatens the ability of
elements of the intelligence community to hire and retain highly
qualified individuals, and thus to fulfill the missions of such
elements;
(3) the prospect of a lengthy clearance process deters some
such individuals from seeking employment with the intelligence
community in the first place, and, when faced with a long wait
time, those with conditional offers of employment may opt to
discontinue the security clearance process and pursue different
opportunities;
(4) now more than ever, therefore, the broken security
clearance process badly needs fundamental reform; and
(5) in the meantime, to ensure the ability of elements of the
intelligence community to hire and retain highly qualified
personnel, elements should consider, to the extent possible and
consistent with national security, permitting new employees to
enter on duty immediately or nearly so, and to perform, on a
temporary basis pending final adjudication of their security
clearances, work that either does not require a security clearance
or requires only a low-level interim clearance.
(b) Reports Required.--Section 506H of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by adding ``and'' at the end;
(B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a period; and
(C) by striking subparagraph (C);
(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Intelligence Community Reports.--(1)(A) Not later than March
1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a
report to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee
on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, and the Committee
on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives regarding the
security clearances processed by each element of the intelligence
community during the preceding fiscal year.
``(B) The Director shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services
of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives such portions of the report submitted under
subparagraph (A) as the Director determines address elements of the
intelligence community that are within the Department of Defense.
``(C) Each report submitted under this paragraph shall separately
identify security clearances processed for Federal employees and
contractor employees sponsored by each such element.
``(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1)(A) shall include,
for each element of the intelligence community for the fiscal year
covered by the report, the following:
``(A) The total number of initial security clearance background
investigations sponsored for new applicants.
``(B) The total number of security clearance periodic
reinvestigations sponsored for existing employees.
``(C) The total number of initial security clearance background
investigations for new applicants that were adjudicated with notice
of a determination provided to the prospective applicant,
including--
``(i) the total number of such adjudications that were
adjudicated favorably and granted access to classified
information; and
``(ii) the total number of such adjudications that were
adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation
of a security clearance.
``(D) The total number of security clearance periodic
background investigations that were adjudicated with notice of a
determination provided to the existing employee, including--
``(i) the total number of such adjudications that were
adjudicated favorably; and
``(ii) the total number of such adjudications that were
adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation
of a security clearance.
``(E) The total number of pending security clearance background
investigations, including initial applicant investigations and
periodic reinvestigations, that were not adjudicated as of the last
day of such year and that remained pending, categorized as follows:
``(i) For 180 days or shorter.
``(ii) For longer than 180 days, but shorter than 12
months.
``(iii) For 12 months or longer, but shorter than 18
months.
``(iv) For 18 months or longer, but shorter than 24 months.
``(v) For 24 months or longer.
``(F) For any security clearance determinations completed or
pending during the year preceding the year for which the report is
submitted that have taken longer than 12 months to complete--
``(i) an explanation of the causes for the delays incurred
during the period covered by the report; and
``(ii) the number of such delays involving a polygraph
requirement.
``(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations,
including initial and periodic reinvestigations, that resulted in a
denial or revocation of a security clearance.
``(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations that
resulted in incomplete information.
``(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations that
did not result in enough information to make a decision on
potentially adverse information.
``(3) The report required under this subsection shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''; and
(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated, by striking
``subsection (a)(1)'' and inserting ``subsections (a)(1) and (b)''.
SEC. 6610. PERIODIC REPORT ON POSITIONS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
THAT CAN BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION,
NETWORKS, OR FACILITIES.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act
and not less frequently than once every 5 years thereafter, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report that reviews the intelligence
community for which positions can be conducted without access to
classified information, networks, or facilities, or may only require a
security clearance at the secret level.
SEC. 6611. INFORMATION-SHARING PROGRAM FOR POSITIONS OF TRUST AND
SECURITY CLEARANCES.
(a) Program Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall establish and
implement a program to share between and among agencies of the
Federal Government and industry partners of the Federal Government
relevant background information regarding individuals applying for
and currently occupying national security positions and positions
of trust, in order to ensure the Federal Government maintains a
trusted workforce.
(2) Designation.--The program established under paragraph (1)
shall be known as the ``Trusted Information Provider Program'' (in
this section referred to as the ``Program'').
(b) Privacy Safeguards.--The Security Executive Agent and the
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall ensure that the
Program includes such safeguards for privacy as the Security Executive
Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent consider
appropriate.
(c) Provision of Information to the Federal Government.--The
Program shall include requirements that enable investigative service
providers and agencies of the Federal Government to leverage certain
pre-employment information gathered through private-sector means during
the employment or military recruiting process, and other relevant
security or human resources information obtained during employment with
or for the Federal Government, that satisfy Federal investigative
standards, while safeguarding personnel privacy.
(d) Information and Records.--The information and records
considered under the Program shall include the following:
(1) Date and place of birth.
(2) Citizenship or immigration and naturalization information.
(3) Education records.
(4) Employment records.
(5) Employment or social references.
(6) Military service records.
(7) State and local law enforcement checks.
(8) Criminal history checks.
(9) Financial records or information.
(10) Foreign travel, relatives, or associations.
(11) Social media checks.
(12) Such other information or records as may be relevant to
obtaining or maintaining national security, suitability, fitness,
or credentialing eligibility.
(e) Implementation Plan.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly submit
to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to
appropriate industry partners a plan for the implementation of the
Program.
(2) Elements.--The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include
the following:
(A) Mechanisms that address privacy, national security,
suitability or fitness, credentialing, and human resources or
military recruitment processes.
(B) Such recommendations for legislative or administrative
action as the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and
Credentialing Executive Agent consider appropriate to carry out
or improve the Program.
(f) Plan for Pilot Program on Two-way Information Sharing.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly submit
to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to
appropriate industry partners a plan for the implementation of a
pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of
expanding the Program to include the sharing of information held by
the Federal Government related to contract personnel with the
security office of the employers of those contractor personnel.
(2) Elements.--The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include
the following:
(A) Mechanisms that address privacy, national security,
suitability or fitness, credentialing, and human resources or
military recruitment processes.
(B) Such recommendations for legislative or administrative
action as the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and
Credentialing Executive Agent consider appropriate to carry out
or improve the pilot program.
(g) Review.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and
Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly submit to the appropriate
congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry
partners a review of the plans submitted under subsections (e)(1) and
(f)(1) and utility and effectiveness of the programs described in such
plans.
SEC. 6612. REPORT ON PROTECTIONS FOR CONFIDENTIALITY OF WHISTLEBLOWER-
RELATED COMMUNICATIONS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Security Executive Agent shall, in coordination with the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the controls
employed by the intelligence community to ensure that continuous
vetting programs, including those involving user activity monitoring,
protect the confidentiality of whistleblower-related communications.
SEC. 6613. REPORTS ON COSTS OF SECURITY CLEARANCE BACKGROUND
INVESTIGATIONS.
(a) Reports.--Not later than March 1, 2020, and each year
thereafter through 2022, the Security Executive Agent, in coordination
with the Council, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the resources expended by each agency of the
Federal Government during the fiscal year prior to the date of the
report for processing security clearance background investigations and
continuous vetting programs, disaggregated by tier and whether the
individual was a Government employee or contractor.
(b) Contents.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall
include, for the period covered by the report--
(1) the costs of background investigations;
(2) the costs of reinvestigations;
(3) the costs associated with background investigations and
reinvestigations for Government personnel;
(4) the costs associated with background investigations and
reinvestigations for contract personnel;
(5) costs associated with continuous evaluation initiatives
monitoring for personnel for whom a background investigation or
reinvestigation was conducted, other than costs associated with
adjudication;
(6) the average cost per person for each type of background
investigation; and
(7) a summary of transfers and reprogrammings that were
executed to support the processing of security clearances.
TITLE LXVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia and Other Foreign Powers
SEC. 6701. LIMITATION RELATING TO ESTABLISHMENT OR SUPPORT OF
CYBERSECURITY UNIT WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b) Limitation.--
(1) In general.--No amount may be expended by the Federal
Government, other than the Department of Defense, to enter into or
implement any bilateral agreement between the United States and the
Russian Federation regarding cybersecurity, including the
establishment or support of any cybersecurity unit, unless, at
least 30 days prior to the conclusion of any such agreement, the
Director of National Intelligence submits to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on such agreement that includes
the elements required by subsection (c).
(2) Department of defense agreements.--Any agreement between
the Department of Defense and the Russian Federation regarding
cybersecurity shall be conducted in accordance with section 1232 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public
Law 114-328), as amended by section 1231 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91).
(c) Elements.--If the Director submits a report under subsection
(b) with respect to an agreement, such report shall include a
discussion of each of the following:
(1) The purpose of the agreement.
(2) The nature of any intelligence to be shared pursuant to the
agreement.
(3) The expected value to national security resulting from the
implementation of the agreement.
(4) Such counterintelligence concerns associated with the
agreement as the Director may have and such measures as the
Director expects to be taken to mitigate such concerns.
(d) Rule of Construction.--This section shall not be construed to
affect any existing authority of the Director of National Intelligence,
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or another head of an
element of the intelligence community, to share or receive foreign
intelligence on a case-by-case basis.
SEC. 6702. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO RUSSIA.
(a) Threat Finance Defined.--In this section, the term ``threat
finance'' means--
(1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence
campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation,
terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;
(2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move, raise,
conceal, or launder money or value, on behalf of threat actors;
(3) sanctions evasion; and
(4) other forms of threat finance activity domestically or
internationally, as defined by the President.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a report containing an assessment of Russian threat finance. The
assessment shall be based on intelligence from all sources, including
from the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the
Department of the Treasury.
(c) Elements.--The report required by subsection (b) shall include
each of the following:
(1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period
preceding the date of the submittal of the report of threat finance
activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at the behest of--
(A) officials of the Government of Russia;
(B) persons subject to sanctions under any provision of law
imposing sanctions with respect to Russia;
(C) Russian nationals subject to sanctions under any other
provision of law; or
(D) Russian oligarchs or organized criminals.
(2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in
threat finance activities relating to Russia, including common
methods of conducting such activities and global nodes of money
laundering used by Russian threat actors described in paragraph (1)
and associated entities.
(3) An assessment of any connections between Russian
individuals involved in money laundering and the Government of
Russia.
(4) A summary of engagement and coordination with international
partners on threat finance relating to Russia, especially in
Europe, including examples of such engagement and coordination.
(5) An identification of any resource and collection gaps.
(6) An identification of--
(A) entry points of money laundering by Russian and
associated entities into the United States;
(B) any vulnerabilities within the United States legal and
financial system, including specific sectors, which have been
or could be exploited in connection with Russian threat finance
activities; and
(C) the counterintelligence threat posed by Russian money
laundering and other forms of threat finance, as well as the
threat to the United States financial system and United States
efforts to enforce sanctions and combat organized crime.
(7) Any other matters the Director determines appropriate.
(d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (b) may
be submitted in classified form.
SEC. 6703. NOTIFICATION OF AN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;
and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(b) Requirement for Notification.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in cooperation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the head of any other relevant agency, shall notify
the congressional leadership and the chairman and vice chairman or
ranking member of each of the appropriate congressional committees, and
of other relevant committees of jurisdiction, each time the Director of
National Intelligence determines there is credible information that a
foreign power has, is, or will attempt to employ a covert influence or
active measures campaign with regard to the modernization, employment,
doctrine, or force posture of the nuclear deterrent or missile defense.
(c) Content of Notification.--Each notification required by
subsection (b) shall include information concerning actions taken by
the United States to expose or halt an attempt referred to in
subsection (b).
SEC. 6704. NOTIFICATION OF TRAVEL BY ACCREDITED DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR
PERSONNEL OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE UNITED STATES.
In carrying out the advance notification requirements set out in
section 502 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
(division N of Public Law 115-31; 131 Stat. 825; 22 U.S.C. 254a note),
the Secretary of State shall--
(1) ensure that the Russian Federation provides notification to
the Secretary of State at least 2 business days in advance of all
travel that is subject to such requirements by accredited
diplomatic and consular personnel of the Russian Federation in the
United States, and take necessary action to secure full compliance
by Russian personnel and address any noncompliance; and
(2) provide notice of travel described in paragraph (1) to the
Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation within 1 hour of receiving notice of such
travel.
SEC. 6705. REPORT AND ANNUAL BRIEFING ON IRANIAN EXPENDITURES
SUPPORTING FOREIGN MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
(a) Report.--
(1) Report required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report,
and not less frequently than once each year thereafter provide a
briefing to Congress, describing Iranian expenditures in the
previous calendar year on military and terrorist activities outside
the country, including each of the following:
(A) The amount spent in such calendar year on activities by
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including activities
providing support for--
(i) Hizballah;
(ii) Houthi rebels in Yemen;
(iii) Hamas;
(iv) proxy forces in Iraq and Syria; or
(v) any other entity or country the Director determines
to be relevant.
(B) The amount spent in such calendar year for ballistic
missile research and testing or other activities that the
Director determines are destabilizing to the Middle East
region.
(2) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(b) Annual Briefing.--Following the submission of the report under
subsection (a), the Director shall annually provide a briefing to the
congressional intelligence committees on the information described in
such subsection.
SEC. 6706. EXPANSION OF SCOPE OF COMMITTEE TO COUNTER ACTIVE MEASURES.
(a) Scope of Committee to Counter Active Measures.--Section 501 of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law
115-31; 50 U.S.C. 3001 note) is amended--
(1) in subsections (a) through (h)--
(A) by inserting ``, the People's Republic of China, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, or other nation state'' after ``Russian Federation''
each place it appears; and
(B) by inserting ``, China, Iran, North Korea, or other
nation state'' after ``Russia'' each place it appears; and
(2) in the section heading, by inserting ``, the people's
republic of china, the islamic republic of iran, the democratic
people's republic of korea, or other nation state'' after ``russian
federation''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of
such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 501 and
inserting the following new item:
``Sec. 501. Committee to counter active measures by the Russian
Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
and other nation states to exert covert influence over peoples
and governments.''.
Subtitle B--Reports
SEC. 6711. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO INSPECTOR GENERAL STUDY.
Section 11001(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Audit'' and
inserting ``Review'';
(2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``audit'' and inserting
``review''; and
(3) in paragraph (2), by striking ``audit'' and inserting
``review''.
SEC. 6712. REPORTS ON AUTHORITIES OF THE CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Homeland security intelligence enterprise.--The term
``Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise'' has the meaning given
such term in Department of Homeland Security Instruction Number
264-01-001, or successor authority.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a report on the authorities of the Under Secretary.
(c) Elements.--The report required by subsection (b) shall include
each of the following:
(1) An analysis of whether the Under Secretary has the legal
and policy authority necessary to organize and lead the Homeland
Security Intelligence Enterprise, with respect to intelligence,
and, if not, a description of--
(A) the obstacles to exercising the authorities of the
Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department and the Homeland
Security Intelligence Council, of which the Chief Intelligence
Officer is the chair; and
(B) the legal and policy changes necessary to effectively
coordinate, organize, and lead intelligence activities of the
Department of Homeland Security.
(2) A description of the actions that the Secretary has taken
to address the inability of the Under Secretary to require
components of the Department, other than the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis of the Department to--
(A) coordinate intelligence programs; and
(B) integrate and standardize intelligence products
produced by such other components.
SEC. 6713. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS.
(a) Review of Whistleblower Matters.--The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, in consultation with the inspectors general for
the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review
of the authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other
practices and procedures relating to intelligence community
whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors general.
(b) Objective of Review.--The objective of the review required
under subsection (a) is to identify any discrepancies, inconsistencies,
or other issues, which frustrate the timely and effective reporting of
intelligence community whistleblower matters to appropriate inspectors
general and to the congressional intelligence committees, and the fair
and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters.
(c) Conduct of Review.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall take such measures as the Inspector General determines
necessary in order to ensure that the review required by subsection (a)
is conducted in an independent and objective fashion.
(d) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
written report containing the results of the review required under
subsection (a), along with recommendations to improve the timely and
effective reporting of intelligence community whistleblower matters to
inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence committees and
the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters.
SEC. 6714. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WITH
RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the role of the
Director in preparing analytic materials in connection with the
evaluation by the Federal Government of national security risks
associated with potential foreign investments into the United States.
(b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall include--
(1) a description of the current process for the provision of
the analytic materials described in subsection (a);
(2) an identification of the most significant benefits and
drawbacks of such process with respect to the role of the Director,
including the sufficiency of resources and personnel to prepare
such materials; and
(3) recommendations to improve such process.
SEC. 6715. REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST UNITED
STATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(3) The Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in
coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing--
(1) any attempts known to the intelligence community by foreign
governments to exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities in United
States telecommunications networks (including Signaling System No.
7) to target for surveillance United States persons, including
employees of the Federal Government; and
(2) any actions, as of the date of the enactment of this Act,
taken by the intelligence community to protect agencies and
personnel of the United States Government from surveillance
conducted by foreign governments.
SEC. 6716. BIENNIAL REPORT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISKS.
(a) Intelligence Community Interagency Working Group.--
(1) Requirement to establish.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall establish an intelligence community interagency
working group to prepare the biennial reports required by
subsection (b).
(2) Chairperson.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
serve as the chairperson of such interagency working group.
(3) Membership.--Such interagency working group shall be
composed of representatives of each element of the intelligence
community that the Director of National Intelligence determines
appropriate.
(b) Biennial Report on Foreign Investment Risks.--
(1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once every 2
years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on
foreign investment risks prepared by the interagency working group
established under subsection (a).
(2) Elements.--Each report required by paragraph (1) shall
include identification, analysis, and explanation of the following:
(A) Any current or projected major threats to the national
security of the United States with respect to foreign
investment.
(B) Any strategy used by a foreign country that such
interagency working group has identified to be a country of
special concern to use foreign investment to target the
acquisition of critical technologies, critical materials, or
critical infrastructure.
(C) Any economic espionage efforts directed at the United
States by a foreign country, particularly such a country of
special concern.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 6717. MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENT ON TRAVEL OF
FOREIGN DIPLOMATS.
Section 502(d)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017 (Public Law 115-31) is amended by striking ``the number'' and
inserting ``a best estimate''.
SEC. 6718. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered official.--The term `covered official' means--
``(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence
community; and
``(B) the inspectors general with oversight responsibility
for an element of the intelligence community.
``(2) Investigation.--The term `investigation' means any
inquiry, whether formal or informal, into the existence of an
unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.
``(3) Unauthorized disclosure of classified information.--The
term `unauthorized disclosure of classified information' means any
unauthorized disclosure of classified information to any recipient.
``(4) Unauthorized public disclosure of classified
information.--The term `unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information' means the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information to a journalist or media organization.
``(b) Intelligence Community Reporting.--
``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 6
months, each covered official shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on investigations of unauthorized
public disclosures of classified information.
``(2) Elements.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include, with respect to the preceding 6-month period, the
following:
``(A) The number of investigations opened by the covered
official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information.
``(B) The number of investigations completed by the covered
official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information.
``(C) Of the number of such completed investigations
identified under subparagraph (B), the number referred to the
Attorney General for criminal investigation.
``(c) Department of Justice Reporting.--
``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 6
months, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security of the
Department of Justice, in consultation with the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the
Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives a report on the status of each referral made to the
Department of Justice from any element of the intelligence
community regarding an unauthorized disclosure of classified
information made during the most recent 365-day period or any
referral that has not yet been closed, regardless of the date the
referral was made.
``(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include, for each referral covered by the report, at a
minimum, the following:
``(A) The date the referral was received.
``(B) A statement indicating whether the alleged
unauthorized disclosure described in the referral was
substantiated by the Department of Justice.
``(C) A statement indicating the highest level of
classification of the information that was revealed in the
unauthorized disclosure.
``(D) A statement indicating whether an open criminal
investigation related to the referral is active.
``(E) A statement indicating whether any criminal charges
have been filed related to the referral.
``(F) A statement indicating whether the Department of
Justice has been able to attribute the unauthorized disclosure
to a particular entity or individual.
``(d) Form of Reports.--Each report submitted under this section
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may have a classified
annex.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 1104 the following new item:
``Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.''.
SEC. 6719. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF DESIGNATION OF COVERED
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AS PERSONA NON GRATA.
(a) Covered Intelligence Officer Defined.--In this section, the
term ``covered intelligence officer'' means--
(1) a United States intelligence officer serving in a post in a
foreign country; or
(2) a known or suspected foreign intelligence officer serving
in a United States post.
(b) Requirement for Reports.--Not later than 72 hours after a
covered intelligence officer is designated as a persona non grata, the
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a notification of that
designation. Each such notification shall include--
(1) the date of the designation;
(2) the basis for the designation; and
(3) a justification for the expulsion.
SEC. 6720. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN
VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Vulnerabilities equities policy and process document.--The
term ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document'' means
the executive branch document entitled ``Vulnerabilities Equities
Policy and Process'' dated November 15, 2017.
(2) Vulnerabilities equities process.--The term
``Vulnerabilities Equities Process'' means the interagency review
of vulnerabilities, pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy
and Process document or any successor document.
(3) Vulnerability.--The term ``vulnerability'' means a weakness
in an information system or its components (for example, system
security procedures, hardware design, and internal controls) that
could be exploited or could affect confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of information.
(b) Reports on Process and Criteria Under Vulnerabilities Equities
Policy and Process.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written
report describing--
(A) with respect to each element of the intelligence
community--
(i) the title of the official or officials responsible
for determining whether, pursuant to criteria contained in
the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or
any successor document, a vulnerability must be submitted
for review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
(ii) the process used by such element to make such
determination; and
(B) the roles or responsibilities of that element during a
review of a vulnerability submitted to the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process.
(2) Changes to process or criteria.--Not later than 30 days
after any significant change is made to the process and criteria
used by any element of the intelligence community for determining
whether to submit a vulnerability for review under the
Vulnerabilities Equities Process, such element shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report describing such
change.
(3) Form of reports.--Each report submitted under this
subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
a classified annex.
(c) Annual Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once each calendar
year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a classified report
containing, with respect to the previous year--
(A) the number of vulnerabilities submitted for review
under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process;
(B) the number of vulnerabilities described in subparagraph
(A) disclosed to each vendor responsible for correcting the
vulnerability, or to the public, pursuant to the
Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
(C) the aggregate number, by category, of the
vulnerabilities excluded from review under the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process, as described in paragraph 5.4 of the
Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document.
(2) Unclassified information.--Each report submitted under
paragraph (1) shall include an unclassified appendix that
contains--
(A) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed to
vendors or the public pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities
Process; and
(B) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed to
vendors or the public pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities
Process known to have been patched.
(3) Nonduplication.--The Director of National Intelligence may
forgo submission of an annual report required under this subsection
for a calendar year, if the Director notifies the intelligence
committees in writing that, with respect to the same calendar year,
an annual report required by paragraph 4.3 of the Vulnerabilities
Equities Policy and Process document already has been submitted to
Congress, and such annual report contains the information that
would otherwise be required to be included in an annual report
under this subsection.
SEC. 6721. INSPECTORS GENERAL REPORTS ON CLASSIFICATION.
(a) Reports Required.--Not less than once per year in each of the
three fiscal years immediately following the date of the enactment of
this Act, each Inspector General listed in subsection (b) shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report that includes,
with respect to the department or agency of the Inspector General,
analyses of the following with respect to the prior fiscal year:
(1) The accuracy of the application of classification and
handling markers on a representative sample of finished reports,
including such reports that are compartmented.
(2) Compliance with declassification procedures.
(3) The effectiveness of processes for identifying topics of
public or historical importance that merit prioritization for a
declassification review.
(b) Inspectors General Listed.--The Inspectors General listed in
this subsection are as follows:
(1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
(2) The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Inspector General of the National Security Agency.
(4) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance
Office.
(6) The Inspector General of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.
SEC. 6722. REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON NATIONAL SECURITY EFFECTS OF GLOBAL
WATER INSECURITY AND EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND PANDEMICS.
(a) Global Water Insecurity.--
(1) Report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a report on the implications of water insecurity on the
national security interests of the United States, including
consideration of social, economic, agricultural, and
environmental factors.
(B) Assessment scope and focus.--The report submitted under
subparagraph (A) shall include an assessment of water
insecurity described in such subsection with a global scope,
but focus on areas of the world--
(i) of strategic, economic, or humanitarian interest to
the United States--
(I) that are, as of the date of the report, at the
greatest risk of instability, conflict, human
insecurity, or mass displacement; or
(II) where challenges relating to water insecurity
are likely to emerge and become significant during the
5-year or the 20-year period beginning on the date of
the report; and
(ii) where challenges relating to water insecurity are
likely to imperil the national security interests of the
United States or allies of the United States.
(C) Consultation.--In researching the report required by
subparagraph (A), the Director shall consult with--
(i) such stakeholders within the intelligence
community, the Department of Defense, and the Department of
State as the Director considers appropriate; and
(ii) such additional Federal agencies and persons in
the private sector as the Director considers appropriate.
(D) Form.--The report submitted under subparagraph (A)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(2) Quinquennial briefings.--Beginning on the date that is 5
years after the date on which the Director submits the report under
paragraph (1), and every 5 years thereafter, the Director shall
provide to the committees specified in such paragraph a briefing
that updates the matters contained in the report.
(b) Emerging Infectious Disease and Pandemics.--
(1) Report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the anticipated geopolitical effects of
emerging infectious disease (including deliberate, accidental,
and naturally occurring infectious disease threats) and
pandemics, and their implications on the national security of
the United States.
(B) Contents.--The report under subparagraph (A) shall
include an assessment of--
(i) the economic, social, political, and security
risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious diseases
on the United States and the international political and
economic system;
(ii) the economic, social, political, and security
risks, costs, and impacts of a major transnational pandemic
on the United States and the international political and
economic system; and
(iii) contributing trends and factors to the matters
assessed under clauses (i) and (ii).
(C) Examination of response capacity.--In examining the
risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious disease and a
possible transnational pandemic under subparagraph (B), the
Director of National Intelligence shall also examine in the
report under subparagraph (A) the response capacity within
affected countries and the international system. In considering
response capacity, the Director shall include--
(i) the ability of affected nations to effectively
detect and manage emerging infectious diseases and a
possible transnational pandemic;
(ii) the role and capacity of international
organizations and nongovernmental organizations to respond
to emerging infectious disease and a possible pandemic, and
their ability to coordinate with affected and donor
nations; and
(iii) the effectiveness of current international
frameworks, agreements, and health systems to respond to
emerging infectious diseases and a possible transnational
pandemic.
(2) Quinquennial briefings.--Beginning on the date that is 5
years after the date on which the Director submits the report under
paragraph (1), and every 5 years thereafter, the Director shall
provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing
that updates the matters contained in the report.
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) and the briefings
under paragraph (2) may be classified.
(4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives;
and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
SEC. 6723. ANNUAL REPORT ON MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ELEMENTS
OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND OTHER ENTITIES OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT REGARDING SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES OR POLICY.
Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 (50 U.S.C. 3313) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and
(2) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:
``(a) In General.--Each year, concurrent with the annual budget
request submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of
title 31, United States Code, each head of an element of the
intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report that lists each memorandum of understanding or
other agreement regarding significant operational activities or policy
entered into during the most recently completed fiscal year between or
among such element and any other entity of the United States
Government.
``(b) Provision of Documents.--Each head of an element of an
intelligence community who receives a request from the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives for a copy of a memorandum
of understanding or other document listed in a report submitted by the
head under subsection (a) shall submit to such committee the requested
copy as soon as practicable after receiving such request.''.
SEC. 6724. STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ENCRYPTING UNCLASSIFIED WIRELINE
AND WIRELESS TELEPHONE CALLS.
(a) Study Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
complete and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline and
wireless telephone calls between personnel in the intelligence
community.
(b) Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date on which the
Director submits the study required by subsection (a), the Director
shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing
on the Director's findings with respect to such study.
SEC. 6725. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY LOAN REPAYMENT AND RELATED
PROGRAMS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) there should be established, through the issuing of an
Intelligence Community Directive or otherwise, an intelligence-
community-wide program for student loan repayment, student loan
forgiveness, financial counseling, and related matters, for
employees of the intelligence community;
(2) creating such a program would enhance the ability of the
elements of the intelligence community to recruit, hire, and retain
highly qualified personnel, including with respect to mission-
critical and hard-to-fill positions;
(3) such a program, including with respect to eligibility
requirements, should be designed so as to maximize the ability of
the elements of the intelligence community to recruit, hire, and
retain highly qualified personnel, including with respect to
mission-critical and hard-to-fill positions; and
(4) to the extent possible, such a program should be uniform
throughout the intelligence community and publicly promoted by each
element of the intelligence community to both current employees of
the element as well as to prospective employees of the element.
(b) Report on Potential Intelligence Community-Wide Program.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
cooperation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community and the heads of any other appropriate department or
agency of the Federal Government, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on potentially establishing and
carrying out an intelligence-community-wide program for student
loan repayment, student loan forgiveness, financial counseling, and
related matters, as described in subsection (a).
(2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall
include, at a minimum, the following:
(A) A description of the financial resources that the
elements of the intelligence community would require to
establish and initially carry out the program specified in
paragraph (1).
(B) A description of the practical steps to establish and
carry out such a program.
(C) The identification of any legislative action the
Director determines necessary to establish and carry out such a
program.
(c) Annual Reports on Established Programs.--
(1) Covered programs defined.--In this subsection, the term
``covered programs'' means any loan repayment program, loan
forgiveness program, financial counseling program, or similar
program, established pursuant to title X of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) or any other provision of law
that may be administered or used by an element of the intelligence
community.
(2) Annual reports required.--Not less frequently than once
each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report on the covered
programs. Each such report shall include, with respect to the
period covered by the report, the following:
(A) The number of personnel from each element of the
intelligence community who used each covered program.
(B) The total amount of funds each element expended for
each such program.
(C) A description of the efforts made by each element to
promote each covered program pursuant to both the personnel of
the element of the intelligence community and to prospective
personnel.
SEC. 6726. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Correcting Long-Standing Material Weaknesses.--Section 368 of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law
110-259; 50 U.S.C. 3051 note) is hereby repealed.
(b) Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group.--Section
210D of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124k) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (d) through (i) as subsections
(c) through (h), respectively; and
(3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (8), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
period; and
(B) by striking paragraph (9).
(c) Inspector General Report.--Section 8H of the Inspector General
Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (g); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as subsections (g)
and (h), respectively.
SEC. 6727. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORT ON
SENIOR EXECUTIVES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Senior Executive Service Position Defined.--In this section,
the term ``Senior Executive Service position'' has the meaning given
that term in section 3132(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, and
includes any position above the GS-15, step 10, level of the General
Schedule under section 5332 of such title.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
number of Senior Executive Service positions in the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.
(c) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (b) shall
include the following:
(1) The number of required Senior Executive Service positions
for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) Whether such requirements are reasonably based on the
mission of the Office.
(3) A discussion of how the number of the Senior Executive
Service positions in the Office compare to the number of senior
positions at comparable organizations.
(d) Cooperation.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
provide to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community any
information requested by the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community that is necessary to carry out this section by not later than
14 calendar days after the date on which the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community makes such request.
SEC. 6728. BRIEFING ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OFFERING
PERMANENT RESIDENCE TO SOURCES AND COOPERATORS.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide to
the congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the ability of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to offer, as an inducement to
assisting the Bureau, permanent residence within the United States to
foreign individuals who are sources or cooperators in
counterintelligence or other national-security-related investigations.
The briefing shall address the following:
(1) The extent to which the Bureau may make such offers,
whether independently or in conjunction with other agencies and
departments of the United States Government, including a discussion
of the authorities provided by section 101(a)(15)(S) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(S)), section
7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act (50 U.S.C. 3508), and any
other provision of law under which the Bureau may make such offers.
(2) An overview of the policies and operational practices of
the Bureau with respect to making such offers.
(3) The sufficiency of such policies and practices with respect
to inducing individuals to cooperate with, serve as sources for
such investigations, or both.
(4) Whether the Director recommends any legislative actions to
improve such policies and practices, particularly with respect to
the counterintelligence efforts of the Bureau.
SEC. 6729. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF NORTH KOREA REVENUE SOURCES.
(a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence
and Analysis, shall produce an intelligence assessment of the revenue
sources of the North Korean regime. Such assessment shall include
revenue from the following sources:
(1) Trade in coal, iron, and iron ore.
(2) The provision of fishing rights to North Korean territorial
waters.
(3) Trade in gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, copper, silver,
nickel, zinc, or rare earth minerals, and other stores of value.
(4) Trade in textiles.
(5) Sales of conventional defense articles and services.
(6) Sales of controlled goods, ballistic missiles, and other
associated items.
(7) Other types of manufacturing for export, as the Director of
National Intelligence considers appropriate.
(8) The exportation of workers from North Korea in a manner
intended to generate significant revenue, directly or indirectly,
for use by the government of North Korea.
(9) The provision of nonhumanitarian goods (such as food,
medicine, and medical devices) and services by other countries.
(10) The provision of services, including banking and other
support, including by entities located in the Russian Federation,
China, and Iran.
(11) Online commercial activities of the Government of North
Korea, including online gambling.
(12) Criminal activities, including cyber-enabled crime and
counterfeit goods.
(b) Elements.--The assessment required under subsection (a) shall
include an identification of each of the following:
(1) The sources of North Korea's funding.
(2) Financial and nonfinancial networks, including supply chain
management, transportation, and facilitation, through which North
Korea accesses the United States and international financial
systems and repatriates and exports capital, goods, and services;
and
(3) the global financial institutions, money services business,
and payment systems that assist North Korea with financial
transactions.
(c) Submittal to Congress.--Upon completion of the assessment
required under subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a copy of such assessment.
SEC. 6730. REPORT ON POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES BY
TERRORIST ACTORS.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Stop Terrorist
Use of Virtual Currencies Act''.
(b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation
with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to Congress a
report on the possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist
actors. Such report shall include the following elements:
(1) An assessment of the means and methods by which
international terrorist organizations and State sponsors of
terrorism use virtual currencies.
(2) An assessment of the use by terrorist organizations and
state sponsors of terrorism of virtual currencies compared to the
use by such organizations and states of other forms of financing to
support operations, including an assessment of the collection
posture of the intelligence community on the use of virtual
currencies by such organizations and states.
(3) A description of any existing legal impediments that
inhibit or prevent the intelligence community from collecting
information on or helping prevent the use of virtual currencies by
international terrorist organizations and state sponsors of
terrorism and an identification of any gaps in existing law that
could be exploited for illicit funding by such organizations and
States.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Dissemination to State and Local Partners.--Consistent with the
protection of classified and confidential unclassified information, the
Under Secretary shall share the report required by subsection (b) with
State, local, and regional officials who operate within State, local,
and regional fusion centers through the Department of Homeland Security
State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative established in
section 210A of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h).
Subtitle C--Other Matters
SEC. 6741. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.
(a) Meetings.--Section 703(e) of the Public Interest
Declassification Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-567; 50 U.S.C. 3161 note)
is amended by striking ``funds.'' and inserting ``funds, but shall meet
in person not less frequently than on a quarterly basis.''.
(b) Removal of Sunset.--Section 710 of the Public Interest
Declassification Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-567; 50 U.S.C. 3161 note)
is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (b);
(2) in the section heading, by striking ``; sunset''; and
(3) by striking ``(a) Effective Date.--''.
(c) Status of Board.--Notwithstanding section 710(b) of the Public
Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-567; 50 U.S.C.
3161 note) as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of
this Act--
(1) the Public Interest Declassification Board shall be deemed
to not have terminated for purposes of the appointment of members
to the Board;
(2) section 703(h) of such Act shall not apply with respect to
the period beginning on December 31, 2018, and ending on the day
before the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(3) the length of the terms of the members serving on the Board
as of December 30, 2018, shall be calculated by not counting the
period specified in paragraph (2).
SEC. 6742. TECHNICAL AND CLERICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ACT OF 1947.
(a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents at the beginning of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended--
(1) by inserting after the item relating to section 2 the
following new item:
``Sec. 3. Definitions.'';
(2) by striking the item relating to section 107;
(3) by striking the item relating to section 113B and inserting
the following new item:
``Sec. 113B. Special pay authority for science, technology, engineering,
or mathematics positions.'';
(4) by striking the items relating to sections 202, 203, 204,
208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, and 214; and
(5) by inserting after the item relating to section 311 the
following new item:
``Sec. 312. Repealing and saving provisions.''.
(b) Other Technical Corrections.--Such Act is further amended--
(1) in section 102A--
(A) in subparagraph (G) of paragraph (1) of subsection (g),
by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left;
and
(B) in paragraph (3) of subsection (v), by moving the
margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left;
(2) in section 106--
(A) by inserting ``Sec. 106.'' before ``(a)'' and
conforming the typeface and typestyle accordingly; and
(B) in subparagraph (I) of paragraph (2) of subsection (b),
by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left;
(3) by striking section 107;
(4) in section 108(c), by striking ``in both a classified and
an unclassified form'' and inserting ``to Congress in classified
form, but may include an unclassified summary'';
(5) in section 112(c)(1), by striking ``section 103(c)(7)'' and
inserting ``section 102A(i)'';
(6) by amending section 201 to read as follows:
``SEC. 201. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
``Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
or other provisions of law, the provisions of title 5, United States
Code, shall be applicable to the Department of Defense.'';
(7) in section 205, by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as
subsections (a) and (b), respectively;
(8) in section 206, by striking ``(a)'';
(9) in section 207, by striking ``(c)'';
(10) in section 308(a), by striking ``this Act'' and inserting
``sections 2, 101, 102, 103, and 303 of this Act'';
(11) by redesignating section 411 as section 312;
(12) in section 503--
(A) in paragraph (5) of subsection (c)--
(i) by moving the margins of such paragraph 4 ems to
the left; and
(ii) by moving the margins of subparagraph (B) of such
paragraph 2 ems to the left; and
(B) in paragraph (2) of subsection (d), by moving the
margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left; and
(13) in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of
section 504, by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to
the right.
SEC. 6743. BUG BOUNTY PROGRAMS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(2) Bug bounty program.--The term ``bug bounty program'' means
a program under which an approved computer security specialist or
security researcher is temporarily authorized to identify and
report vulnerabilities within the information system of an agency
or department of the United States in exchange for compensation.
(3) Information system.--The term ``information system'' has
the meaning given that term in section 3502 of title 44, United
States Code.
(b) Bug Bounty Program Plan.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to
appropriate committees of Congress a strategic plan for appropriate
agencies and departments of the United States to implement bug
bounty programs.
(2) Contents.--The plan required by paragraph (1) shall
include--
(A) an assessment of--
(i) the ``Hack the Pentagon'' pilot program carried out
by the Department of Defense in 2016 and subsequent bug
bounty programs in identifying and reporting
vulnerabilities within the information systems of the
Department of Defense; and
(ii) private sector bug bounty programs, including such
programs implemented by leading technology companies in the
United States; and
(B) recommendations on the feasibility of initiating bug
bounty programs at appropriate agencies and departments of the
United States.
SEC. 6744. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.
(a) National Nuclear Security Administration Act.--Section 3233(b)
of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2423(b))
is amended--
(1) by striking ``Administration'' and inserting
``Department''; and
(2) by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``the Office of''.
(b) Atomic Energy Defense Act.--Section 4524(b)(2) of the Atomic
Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended by inserting
``Intelligence and'' after ``The Director of''.
(c) National Security Act of 1947.--Paragraph (2) of section 106(b)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting ``and
Counterintelligence'' after ``Office of Intelligence'';
(2) by striking subparagraph (F); and
(3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as
subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively.
SEC. 6745. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURES OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Adversary foreign government.--The term ``adversary foreign
government'' means the government of any of the following foreign
countries:
(A) North Korea.
(B) Iran.
(C) China.
(D) Russia.
(E) Cuba.
(2) Covered classified information.--The term ``covered
classified information'' means classified information that was--
(A) collected by an element of the intelligence community;
or
(B) provided by the intelligence service or military of a
foreign country to an element of the intelligence community.
(3) Established intelligence channels.--The term ``established
intelligence channels'' means methods to exchange intelligence to
coordinate foreign intelligence relationships, as established
pursuant to law by the Director of National Intelligence, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the
National Security Agency, or other head of an element of the
intelligence community.
(4) Individual in the executive branch.--The term ``individual
in the executive branch'' means any officer or employee of the
executive branch, including individuals--
(A) occupying a position specified in article II of the
Constitution;
(B) appointed to a position by an individual described in
subparagraph (A); or
(C) serving in the civil service or the Senior Executive
Service (or similar service for senior executives of particular
departments or agencies).
(b) Findings.--Congress finds that section 502 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires elements of the
intelligence community to keep the congressional intelligence
committees ``fully and currently informed'' about all ``intelligence
activities'' of the United States, and to ``furnish to the
congressional intelligence committees any information or material
concerning intelligence activities * * * which is requested by either
of the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out its
authorized responsibilities.''.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3092), together with other intelligence community authorities,
obligates an element of the intelligence community to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees written notification, by not
later than 7 days after becoming aware, that an individual in the
executive branch has disclosed covered classified information to an
official of an adversary foreign government using methods other
than established intelligence channels; and
(2) each such notification should include--
(A) the date and place of the disclosure of classified
information covered by the notification;
(B) a description of such classified information;
(C) identification of the individual who made such
disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure was made;
and
(D) a summary of the circumstances of such disclosure.
SEC. 6746. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CONSIDERATION OF ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES
WHEN CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT TO PROVIDE VISAS TO FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS
TO BE ACCREDITED TO A UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE UNITED STATES.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of State, in
considering whether or not to provide a visa to a foreign individual to
be accredited to a United Nations mission in the United States, should
consider--
(1) known and suspected intelligence activities, espionage
activities, including activities constituting precursors to
espionage, carried out by the individual against the United States,
foreign allies of the United States, or foreign partners of the
United States; and
(2) the status of an individual as a known or suspected
intelligence officer for a foreign adversary.
SEC. 6747. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON WIKILEAKS.
It is the sense of Congress that WikiLeaks and the senior
leadership of WikiLeaks resemble a nonstate hostile intelligence
service often abetted by state actors and should be treated as such a
service by the United States.