Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Tuesday, February 9, 2016 - 2:30pm
Location:
Hart 216
Witnesses
Director
John
Brennan
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
CIA
Director
LtGen Vincent
Stewart
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
DIA
Director
James
Comey
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBI
Director
ADM Michael
Rogers
Director of the National Security Agency
NSA
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 114-623]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-623
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2016
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Vice Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho RON WYDEN, Oregon
DANIEL COATS, Indiana BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida MARK WARNER, Virginia
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ROY BLUNT, Missouri ANGUS KING, Maine
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
----------
Chris Joyner, Staff Director
Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director
Desiree Thompson Sayle, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
----------
FEBRUARY 9, 2016
OPENING STATEMENTS
Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina. 1
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from
California..................................................... 2
WITNESS
Clapper, James R., Director of National Intelligence, Accompanied
by: John Brennan, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; LtGen
Vincent Stewart, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; James
Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Adm
Michael Rogers, Director, National Security Agency............. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 9
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m. in Room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Burr, Feinstein, Coats,
Collins, Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Wyden, Warner, Heinrich,
King, and Hirono.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Chairman Burr. I'd like to call the hearing to order, and
I'd like to welcome our witnesses today: Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper; Director of Central Intelligence
Agency John Brennan; Director of Defense Intelligence Agency
General Vincent Stewart; Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation Jim Comey; and Director of the National Security
Agency Admiral Rogers. To each of you, welcome.
I'd note that Director Clapper and General Stewart have
already appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee
this morning and I appreciate you both suffering through a very
long day of testimony. I also thank our other witnesses for
their attendance and participation.
Today's hearing presents an opportunity for both the
witnesses and the members of the committee. It's my sincere
hope that our discussion will shed some light on the dedicated
and tireless work of our intelligence community professionals,
the men and women represented by our witnesses. Their efforts
to keep America safe often go unrecognized, but that does not
mean it goes unnoticed.
I've spent the better part of 20 years as a member of the
Congressional intelligence committees and have seen the scale,
scope, and type of threats to our Nation evolve greatly. We no
longer live in a world defined by a few distinct and well-
defined threats. Our intelligence professionals are faced with
collecting against and analyzing the threat posed by a range of
actors from nation-states on down to home-grown violent
extremists.
Director Clapper, in your statement you've pulled together
the collective expertise of the intelligence community's
extraordinary men and women. We value your laying out for our
benefit the diverse and evolving and decentralized system of
threats that imperil this Nation and its interests across the
globe. I ask that everyone take a moment to reflect on the
range of expertise required to make sense of this information.
I note in your statement that cyber and, more broadly,
technology headline your global threats. I agree with the
assessment that innovation and increased reliance on
information technology in the next few years will have
significant consequences on society's way of life and, more
specifically, how your officers perform their mission.
I look forward to your highlighting some of the challenges
and consequences as you see them. I also remain concerned by
the technological reach of ISIL and the danger of their using
the information technology, social media, online unlimited
research capabilities we use every day to propagate their
barbaric message. Jim, I do hope you'll dedicate some time to
laying out that particular threat, and I thank you again for
being here today.
I'd like to also highlight for my colleagues that the
Committee will be holding a classified hearing on worldwide
threats later this week. To the degree it needs saying, please
reserve any questions that you think might not be appropriate
for an open session until the Thursday hearing.
With that, again I welcome our witnesses here today and I
turn to the Vice Chairman for any comments she might have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, VICE CHAIRMAN, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Vice Chairman Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. I
join you in welcoming our witnesses and also thanking the
intelligence community for its service to this country. I also
share your sentiment that this annual open hearing is important
to help explain to the American people the threats that face
this Nation and the efforts of the dedicated men and women of
the intelligence community to keep us safe.
I want to open my comments by recognizing the significant
contributions made by you, Director Clapper, as the leader of
this community. You're the longest serving Director of National
Intelligence to date and I think both the Chairman and I
remember when this, the DNI, was developed and put into effect.
Your capable stewardship of the community has driven it to be a
more integrated and capable organization than at any time in
history. So I want to personally thank you for the
contributions you have made to this country's security.
But, as you know, there is no rest for the weary. The
threats that face this Nation and our allies seem only to grow.
The Syrian war is approaching its fifth year. Yet Bashar Al-
Assad is still in power and a refugee crisis is destroying the
lives of millions of innocent families and wreaking havoc
across Europe.
We are witnessing the resurgence of an unpredictable Russia
in Eastern Europe and Syria. North Korea last month conducted
its fourth nuclear bomb test and two days ago conducted what it
called a space launch. Of course, this is actually a thinly
veiled test to develop missiles that could deliver weapons of
mass destruction against a number of countries, including the
United States.
While these threats are significant and troubling, we are
all deeply concerned about the threat from ISIL, the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant, and other terrorist groups. To
us, ISIL is much more than a regional threat within the Syrian
and Iraqi borders. It's a terrorist army, a global exporter of
terrorism, with a presence in a number of countries. The
official count is 11, including ISIL affiliates. But some of
our friends, like the King of Jordan, have said they're in as
many as 17 countries. And ISIL has the ability to spread its
message of hate and violence around the world using social
media in a very sophisticated way.
Director Clapper, I've read your written comments and am
very much interested in your assessment of these global
threats, their status today, and the outlook for the future.
I'd also ask you to comment on how the intelligence
community is positioned to address these threats. Is it better
today than it was, let's say, five years ago? For instance,
while the coalition's air campaign is helping to deny ISIL some
territorial safe havens and financial resources, how do we
degrade it and destroy it if all they need to carry out an
attack on the West is an Internet connection and an encrypted
message application?
I'd like to hear your assessments of how the rise of end-
to-end encryption has impacted our Nation's ability to identify
and track individuals who seek to do us harm. Director Comey
has spoken of this concern often. Director Rogers recently
highlighted it as well. I'm interested in your views today
about its impact and how you recommend we tackle this problem
of terrorists and criminals communicating via these encrypted
message applications.
The U.S. Freedom Act that passed last year eliminated the
bulk collection of telephone communications metadata, and the
new law now requires specific queries, with FISA Court
approval, to individual telecommunication companies. Has this
change affected your ability to discover new threats and
relationships?
I'll save the rest of my comments for questions. But,
gentlemen, thank you very much for being here. We look forward
to discussion.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Vice Chairman.
Before I recognize Director Clapper, let me say to members
it's my intent--hopefully it's been conveyed to all members--
you will be recognized for five minutes in the order that you
appeared, with one exception. If there is no objection, when
Director Clapper's testimony is over I would like to recognize
Senator Lankford for a first set of questions, for the simple
reason that on Tuesdays he has to preside over the Senate, and
he has to preside at 3:20 today and I'd like to let him get a
set of questions in. So, Jim, James, you will be recognized.
With that, the floor is yours, Director Clapper.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE; ACCOMPANIED BY: JOHN BRENNAN, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; LtGen VINCENT STEWART, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; JAMES COMEY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION; AND ADM MICHAEL ROGERS, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY
Director Clapper. Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman
Feinstein, members of the committee: First, Chairman Burr,
thanks very much for the acknowledgment particularly of the
great men and of women of the U.S. intelligence community whom
we represent here today. It's very appropriate that you do that
for the great work that they do. And, Madam Vice Chairman,
thanks very much for acknowledging my long service. It's very
gracious of you.
We're here today to update you on some, but certainly not
all, of the pressing intelligence and national security issues
facing our Nation, many of which you both alluded to, and so
there will be a certain amount of echo here, I guess. In the
interest of time and to get to your questions, we'll cover just
some of the wavetops, and mine will be the only opening
statement so we can go to your questions.
I apologize in advance to the crossover members who were
present this morning at the Senate Armed Services Committee.
But in the highest traditions of that's our story, we're
sticking to it, it'll be the same statement.
As I said last year, unpredictable instability has become
the new normal and this trend will continue for the foreseeable
future. Violent extremists are operationally active in about 40
countries. Seven countries are experiencing a collapse of
central government authority and 14 others face regime-
threatening or violent instability or both. Another 59
countries face a significant risk of instability through 2016.
The record level of migrants, more than one million
arriving in Europe, is likely to grow further this year.
Migration and displacement will strain countries in Europe,
Asia, Africa, and the Americas. There are some 60 million
people worldwide considered displaced. Extreme weather, climate
change, environmental degradation, rising demand for food and
water, poor policy decisions, and inadequate infrastructure
will magnify this instability.
Infectious diseases and vulnerabilities in the global
supply chain for medical countermeasures will continue to pose
threats. For example, the Zika virus, first detected in the
Western Hemisphere in 2014, has reached the U.S. and is
projected to cause up to four million cases in this hemisphere.
With that preface, I want to briefly comment on both
technology and cyber specifically. Technological innovation
during the next few years will have an even more significant
impact on our way of life. This innovation is central to our
economic prosperity, but it will bring new security
vulnerabilities. The Internet of Things will connect tens of
billions of physical devices that could be exploited.
Artificial intelligence will enable computers to make
autonomous decisions about data and physical systems and
potentially disrupt labor markets.
Russia and China continue to have the most sophisticated
cyber programs. China continues cyber espionage against the
United States. Whether China's commitment of last September
moderates its economic espionage remains to be seen.
Iran and North Korea continue to conduct cyber espionage as
they enhance their attack capabilities. Non-state actors also
pose cyber threats. ISIL has used cyber to its great advantage,
not only for recruitment and propaganda, but also to hack and
release sensitive information about U.S. military personnel. As
a non-state actor, ISIL displays unprecedented online
proficiency.
Cyber criminals remain the most pervasive cyber threat to
the U.S. financial sector. They use cyber to conduct theft,
extortion, and other criminal activities.
Turning to terrorism, there are now more Sunni violent
extremist groups, members, and safe havens than at any time in
history. The rate of foreign fighters traveling to the conflict
zones in Syria and Iraq in the past few years is without
precedent. At least 38,200 foreign fighters, including at least
6,900 from western countries, have traveled to Syria from at
least 120 countries since the beginning of the conflict in
2012. As we saw in the November Paris attacks, returning
foreign fighters with firsthand battlefield experience pose a
dangerous operational threat.
ISIL has demonstrated sophisticated attack tactics and
tradecraft. ISIL, including its eight established and several
more emerging branches, has become the preeminent global
terrorist threat. ISIL has attempted or conducted scores of
attacks outside of Syria and Iraq in the last 15 months, and
ISIL's estimated strength globally now exceeds that of Al-
Qaeda.
ISIL's leaders are determined to strike the U.S. homeland
beyond inspiring home-grown violent extremist attacks. Although
the U.S. is a harder target than Europe, ISIL external
operations remain a critical factor in our threat assessment
for 2016.
Al-Qaeda's affiliates also have proven resilient. Despite
counterterrorism pressure that's largely decimated the core
leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al-Qaeda affiliates are
positioned to make gains in 2016. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula and the Al-Nusra Front, the Al-Qaeda chapter in
Syria, are the two most capable Al-Qaeda branches.
The increased use by violent extremists of encrypted and
secure Internet and mobile-based technologies enables terrorist
actors to go dark and serves to undercut intelligence and law
enforcement efforts.
Iran continues to be the foremost state sponsor of
terrorism and exerts its influence in regional crises in the
Middle East through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds
Force, its terrorist partner Lebanese Hezbollah, and proxy
groups. Iran and Hezbollah remain a continuing terrorist threat
to U.S. interests and partners worldwide.
We saw firsthand the threat posed to the United States by
home-grown violent extremists in the July attack in Chattanooga
and the attack in December in San Bernardino. In 2014 the FBI
arrested nine ISIL supporters and in 2015 that number increased
over fivefold.
Turning to weapons of mass destruction, North Korea
continues to conduct test activities of concern to the United
States. On Saturday evening Pyongyang conducted a satellite
launch and subsequently claimed that the satellite was
successfully placed in orbit. Additionally, last month North
Korea carried out its fourth nuclear test, claiming it was a
hydrogen bomb. But the yield was too low for it to have been a
successful test of a thermonuclear device.
Pyongyang continues to produce fissile material and develop
a submarine-launched ballistic missile. It is also committed to
developing a long-range nuclear-armed missile that's capable of
posing a direct threat to the United States, although the
system has not been flight tested.
Despite its economic challenges, Russia continues its
aggressive military modernization program. It has the largest
and most capable foreign nuclear-armed ballistic missile force.
It has developed a cruise missile that violates the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, or INF, Treaty.
China continues to modernize its nuclear missile force and
is striving for a secure second strike capability. It continues
to profess a ``no first use'' doctrine.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, provides
us much greater transparency into Iran's fissile material
production. It increases the time the Iranians would need to
produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon
from a few months to about a year. Iran probably views the
JCPOA as a means to remove sanctions while preserving some
nuclear capability. Iran's perception of how the JCPOA helps it
achieve its overall strategic goals will dictate its level of
adherence or compliance to the agreement over time.
Chemical weapons continue to pose a threat in Syria and
Iraq. Damascus has used chemicals against the opposition on
multiple occasions since Syria joined the Chemical Weapons
Convention. ISIL has also used toxic chemicals in Iraq and
Syria, including the blister agent sulfur mustard--the first
time an extremist group has produced and used a chemical
warfare agent in an attack since Aum Shinrikyo used sarin in
Japan in 1995.
Turning to space and counter-space, there are about 80
countries that are now engaged in the space domain. Russia and
China well understand how our military fights and how heavily
we rely on space. They're each pursuing destructive and
disruptive anti-satellite systems. China continues to make
progress on its anti-satellite missile program.
Moving to counter-intelligence, the threat from foreign
intelligence entities, both state and non-state, is persistent,
complex, and evolving. Targeting collection of U.S. political,
military, economic, and technical information by foreign
intelligence services continues unabated. Russia and China pose
the greatest threat, followed by Iran and Cuba on a lesser
scale. As well, the threat from insiders taking advantage of
their access to collect and remove sensitive national security
information will remain a persistent challenge for us.
With respect to trans-national organized crime, I do want
to touch on one crime issue, specifically drug trafficking.
Southwest border seizures of heroin in the United States have
doubled since 2010. Over 10,000 people died of heroin overdoses
in the United States in 2014, much of it laced with fentanyl,
which is 30 to 50 times more potent than heroin. In that same
year, more than 28,000 died from opiate overdoses. And cocaine
production in Colombia, from which most U.S. supplies
originate, has increased significantly.
Now let me quickly move through a few regional issues. In
East Asia, China's leaders are pursuing an active foreign
policy while dealing with much slower economic growth. Chinese
leaders have also embarked on the most ambitious military
reforms in China's history. Regional tension will continue as
China pursues construction at its outposts in the South China
Sea.
Russia has demonstrated its military capabilities to
project itself as a global power, command respect from the
West, maintain domestic support for the regime, and advance
Russian interests globally. Moscow's objectives in the Ukraine
will probably remain unchanged, including maintaining long-term
influence over Kiev and frustrating its attempts to integrate
into western institutions.
Putin is the first leader since Stalin to expand Russia's
territory. Moscow's military venture into Syria marks its first
use since its foray into Afghanistan of significant
expeditionary combat power outside of the post-Soviet space.
Its interventions demonstrate the improvements in Russian
military capabilities and the Kremlin's confidence in using
them.
Moscow faces the reality, however, of economic recession,
driven in large part by falling oil prices as well as
sanctions. Russia's nearly 4 percent GDP contraction last year
will probably extend well into 2016.
In the Mideast and South Asia, there are more cross-border
military operations under way in the Mideast region than at any
time since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In Iraq, anti-ISIL forces
in Iraq will probably make incremental gains through this
spring similar to those made in Baiji and Ramadi in the past
few months. ISIL is now somewhat on the defensive and its
territory and manpower are shrinking, but it remains a
formidable threat.
In Syria, pro-regime forces have the initiative, having
made some strategic gains near Aleppo and Latakia in the north,
as well as in southern Syria. Manpower shortages, however, will
continue to undermine the Syrian regime's ability to accomplish
its strategic battlefield objectives. The opposition has less
equipment and firepower and its groups lack unity. They
sometimes have competing battlefield interests and fight among
themselves.
Meanwhile, some 250,000 people have been killed as this war
has dragged on. The humanitarian situation in Syria continues
to deteriorate. As of last month, there were approximately 4.4
million Syrian refugees and another 6.5 million internally
displaced persons, which together represent about one-half of
Syria's population.
In Libya, despite the December agreement to form a new
government of national accord, establishing authority and
security across the country will be difficult at best, with
hundreds of militia groups operating throughout the country.
ISIL has established its most developed branch outside of Syria
in Libya--outside of Syria and Iraq, in Libya, and maintains a
presence in Sirte, Benghazi, Tripoli, and other areas of the
country.
In Yemen, the conflict will probably remain stalemated
through at least mid-2016. Meanwhile, AQAP and ISIL's
affiliates in Yemen have exploited the conflict and the
collapse of government authority to recruit and expand
territorial control. The country's economic and humanitarian
situation also continues to deteriorate.
Iran deepened its involvement in the Syria, Iraqi and
Yemeni conflicts in 2015. It also increased military
cooperation with Russia, highlighted by its battlefield
alliance in Syria in support of the regime. Iran's supreme
leader continues to view the United States as a major threat.
We assess his views will not change, despite the implementation
of the JCPOA deal, the exchange of detainees, and the release
of the 10 U.S. sailors.
In South Asia, Afghanistan is at serious risk of a
political breakdown during 2016, occasioned by mounting
political, economic, and security challenges. Waning political
cohesion, increasingly assertive local power brokers, financial
shortfalls, and sustained countrywide Taliban attacks are
eroding stability.
Needless to say there are many more threats to U.S.
interests worldwide that we can address, most of which are
covered in our statement for the record. But I'll stop this
litany of doom and open to your questions.
Before I do that, I do want to answer one question that
Madam Vice Chairman asked about the state of the community now
vs. five years ago. I would like to think that we are better as
a community just from the simple proposition of the sum being
greater than the parts, because we operate as an integrated
enterprise. Others may have a comment on that. None of them are
unwilling to disagree with me, but that's my view.
So I'll stop there and open to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Director Clapper follows.]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Burr. Director Clapper, thank you for that
testimony.
I remind all members that everybody at the witness table is
available for questions directed at them. With that, I'd
recognize Senator Lankford for five minutes.
Senator Lankford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To all of you, thank you. I do remind people back home,
because in Oklahoma we're extremely grateful for many folks in
the armed services that serve us every single day. We recognize
them, see them, recognize them by their uniforms. But I remind
them also that there are a lot of people in the intelligence
community that they won't recognize at all and they'll never
see and they'll never be able to thank personally.
So would you pass on gratitude to them, and we are
incredibly grateful for the very difficult work that they do
every single day.
Director Clapper, you said this morning in your 50 years in
the intelligence business you can't recall a more diverse array
of challenges. And you graced us with a long list of doom as
you listed it just now, whether that be space, whether that be
proliferation, whether that be radical Islamic terrorism and
such.
I want to focus on one of the areas that you talked about
specifically and that's narcotics and the movement into our
country and what we deal with on a day to day basis as a
challenge. Again, this morning you had mentioned you thought
the focus should be more on the interdiction. So my challenge
is for this group and my interest: What are we doing on the
intel gathering to be able to find out what's happening, the
pathways that some of these narcotics are moving into the
United States and the interdiction, and how we're cooperating
among agencies, how's that communication going?
Director Clapper. Well, sir, the challenge, as I indicated
this morning--and I hark back to a series of testimonies by
General Kelly, the former commander of the Southern Command, in
which he made the point that we did have a great deal of
intelligence on drug flow into the United States--our challenge
has been the lack of resources sometimes to react to it, to
actually interdict it.
So in one sense I think that's a plea or a commercial for
more operational assets to respond. I'm a big fan of the Coast
Guard and I think the Coast Guard has done some great work. The
deployment of these new Coast Guard cutters, which has a
national security component to it, has had a dramatic impact
when they've been able to be employed. So to me the big thing
here is the operational resource to respond. I think the
community works very well together on the issue of drug
intelligence and facilitating interdiction.
Senator Lankford. Any comments on that from any of the
other leaders?
[No response.]
Let me move on then as well, because there's been a lot of
conversation about Libya and ISIL and their movement into other
areas they call provinces and moving all around the world.
Libya has been especially large in that. What do you think is
ISIL's intention in Libya?
Director Clapper. Well, I think not unlike what they've
done with Syria and Iraq. What's unique about ISIL, of course,
is its possession and control over territory, and that's been
the case in Syria and Iraq, and of course that presents certain
vulnerabilities when they assume the accoutrements or the
traits of a nation- state.
I think it's similarly their goal in Libya. It's
essentially an ungoverned space and also access to substantial
oil resources, just as they've had in Syria. So I think there
is some commonality.
They're right now kind of centered or headquartered in
Sirte, which is kind of in the center of the coast of Libya,
and they're trying to spread out along the coast and take over
more and more areas. They are present, as I indicated in my
statement, in the major cities, notably Benghazi and Tripoli.
Senator Lankford. You mentioned as well about Iran still
being the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world. How
have you seen that role and that direction towards terrorism
and support of terrorism since the signing of the JCPOA? Since
that has occurred, have you seen a change in Iran's behavior
towards sponsoring terrorism?
Director Clapper. Have not seen a change in the behavior of
the Quds Force. They are right now kind of consumed with the
situation in Iraq and Syria, and as well in supporting the
Houthis in Yemen. So that has been the focus predominantly.
That's not to say they're not interested elsewhere, but that's
where the focus of their efforts has been.
Senator Lankford. Again, you had mentioned this morning
that there have been about 140 missiles launched by Iran in
violation of UN agreements, and then two additional just in the
last few months. Any change in behavior you've seen in their
testing of ballistic missiles?
Director Clapper. No. You're exactly right, Senator
Lankford, that's what I said. Since 2010 and the promulgation
of the UN Security Council Resolution 1929, they've fired about
140 missiles. About half of that took place during the
negotiations. They launched two, one in October and one in
November, which I personally think was a message that they are
still going to continue to develop what is already a very
robust missile force.
Senator Lankford. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Lankford.
The Chair would recognize himself for a couple of
questions.
Director Comey, what's the risk to law enforcement and to
prosecution if, when presented a legal court order, a company
refuses to provide the communications that the court has
ordered them to?
Director Comey. The risk is that we won't be able to make a
case and a really bad guy will go free.
Chairman Burr. Can you for the American people set a
percentage of how much of that is terrorism and how much of
this fear is law enforcement and prosecutions that take place
in every town in America every day?
Director Comey. I'd say this problem we call ``Going
Dark,'' which as Director Clapper mentioned is the growing use
of encryption both to lock devices when they sit there and to
cover communications as they move over fiber optic cables, is
actually overwhelmingly affecting law enforcement, because it
affects cops and prosecutors and sheriffs and detectives trying
to make murder cases, car accident cases, kidnapping cases,
drug cases. It has an impact on our national security work, but
overwhelmingly this is a problem that local law enforcement
sees.
Chairman Burr. This would include pornography, and the list
goes on and on and on, which I think there would be consensus
in America that if that's carried out, that if a court
certifies that the reason is there, that a company ought to
then produce that information. Is that logical?
Director Comey. Yes, especially with respect to devices,
phones, that default lock. That is the overwhelming concern of
state and local law enforcement, because all of our lives are
becoming increasingly digital. Those devices are going to hold
the evidence of child pornography, communications that someone
made before they were killed, before they went missing, the
evidence that will be necessary to solve a crime, and including
things like car accidents.
So it is a big problem for law enforcement, armed with a
search warrant, when you find a device that can't be opened
even though the judge said there's probable cause to open it.
As I said, it affects our counterterrorism work. San
Bernardino, a very important investigation to us; we still have
one of those killers' phones that we have not been able to
open. It's been over two months now. We're still working on it.
But this also occurred on the criminal side. A woman was
murdered in Louisiana last summer, eight months pregnant,
killed. No clues to who did it, except her phone was there when
she's found, killed. They couldn't open it, still can't open
it. So the case remains unsolved.
So this is something I hear about all over the country from
my partners in state and local law enforcement.
Chairman Burr. Is it safe to say that if companies were
required to honor that court order, that law enforcement and
the prosecution element isn't concerned at all at how they
access that--that can be proprietary and within each company--
but supplying the information is absolutely crucial to the
continuation of that investigation and prosecution?
Director Comey. That's one of the aspects of the
conversation, which is healthy. There's a robust debate going
on and there ought to be because these are important issues.
But a part that gets confusing to me is when folks talk like we
want access to companies' servers, we want access to their
source code. What we would like is a world where people are
able to comply with court orders.
Lots of companies do. Both people who make phones are able
to unlock them when judges order it and people who provide
communication services are able to comply with judges' orders.
Others can't and therein lies the problem. But it's not about
us trying to get a back door, a term that confuses me, frankly.
I don't want a door, I don't want a window, I don't want a
sliding glass door. I would like people to comply with court
orders, and that's the conversation we're trying to have.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Director Comey.
Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Brennan, I'd like to ask you a question if I may,
subject Libya. How does the CIA assess ISIL's intrusions into
Libya?
Director Brennan. We see Libya as the most important
theater for ISIL outside of the Syria-Iraq theater. They have
several thousand members there. They have absorbed some of the
groups inside of Libya, including Ansar Al-Sharia, that was
very active prior to ISIL's rise.
Libya has been a place where this form of extremism and
terrorism has grown up over the years. As the borders of the
Syria-Iraq area were being tightened down, we know that some of
those foreign fighters started to divert into Libya. So Libya
has become a magnet for individuals not only inside of Libya,
but from the African continent as well as from outside. So it
is a real issue, a real problem. But we see ISIL in Libya as a
very, very important hub for ISIL activities.
Vice Chairman Feinstein. Second question: Assessment on
North Korea. We know they possess anywhere from 10 to 20 both
uranium and plutonium weapons. We now have seen the recent
launch of the Taepodong 2, which my understanding is is capable
of reaching the United States. And then there's the KN08.
How do you assess the Korean leader's intentions with what
he is doing with respect to these tests and the development of
both a plutonium and uranium stream of weapons?
Director Brennan. I think it's very obvious that Kim Jong
Un is trying to demonstrate to the world that he has capability
both in terms of the nuclear test as well as ballistic missile,
an intercontinental ballistic missile capability, that he wants
to showcase as a way to demonstrate his strength, but also as a
way to market some of his proliferation capabilities. So it is
something that is obviously a key concern to the intelligence
community as a whole. It is a priority collection area for us.
But the assessment, at least from my perspective, is that he
has developed both the nuclear capability as well as developing
this ballistic missile capability, mating them together, so
that he can demonstrate that he has reach far beyond the Korean
Peninsula.
Vice Chairman Feinstein. Third question, a little bit more
time: How do you assess the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan? How much of the territory of Afghanistan today is
controlled by the Taliban?
Director Brennan. It's a difficult question to address
because a lot of times the Taliban control of certain areas is
dynamic and fluid. So they'll go in and take various government
and military outposts, seize it, and then pull back. There's
large parts of that country that fall under Taliban influence,
and we've been working very closely with the Afghan military
and security services, intelligence services, to try to
concentrate their focus on areas that need to be protected,
whether it be critical infrastructure, cities, transit and
transportation routes.
But, as you well know, the Taliban control a lot of terrain
outside of the central government's reach. And Al-Qaeda
continues to have a presence, typically inside of the eastern
part of Afghanistan. They continue to work with the Taliban as
well as with the Haqqanis. Collectively, they present a serious
threat to the stability of the Afghan government, as well as to
our personnel, U.S. personnel, inside of Afghanistan.
Vice Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
That's it for now. Thank you.
Chairman Burr. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, my view is you couldn't have passionate debates
in this room without the great work that the men and women of
the intelligence community do to preserve our freedom. I just
want to start by saying we're very grateful for that.
Director Brennan, in 2014 the CIA conducted an unauthorized
search of Senate files, including the emails of Senate staff
investigating the CIA's use of torture. The CIA Inspector
General later stated that the search involved improper agency
access to Senate files, and a review board that you appointed
concluded that the search resulted in inappropriate access to
the committee's work product.
You initially denied that search took place, but the
reports of both your inspector general and the review board
show that this denial was at odds with the facts. After the
facts were publicly exposed, the CIA even wrote an apology
letter that you did not send.
Now, senior officials from the NSA, the FBI, and the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence have all testified
that it would be inappropriate for their agencies to secretly
search Senate files without external authorization. But we
still have not gotten an acknowledgment from you.
So I think it would be important--I'd like to hear from
you. I'd like to set the record straight that this would never
happen again. Would you agree that the CIA's 2014 search of
Senate files was improper?
Director Brennan. This is the annual threat assessment, is
it not? Yes.
I think, Senator, as you well know, there were very unique
circumstances associated with this whole affair. These were CIA
computers, at a CIA-leased facility. It was a CIA network that
was shared between Senate staffers conducting that
investigation for your report, as well as CIA personnel. When
it became quite obvious to CIA personnel that Senate staffers
had unauthorized access to an internal draft document of CIA,
there was an obligation on the part of CIA officers who had
responsibility for the security of that network to investigate
to see what might have been the reason for that access that the
Senate staffers had to that document.
They conducted that investigation. I spoke to the Chairman
and Vice Chairman about it. I tried to make sure they
understood exactly what the challenge was that we had. We
conducted that investigation. I then subsequently referred the
matter to the IG when the Senate leadership was concerned about
the actions of CIA officers. I also subsequently convened an
accountability board. And I think if you were to read those
reports, including the accountability board, you would see that
it determined that the actions of the CIA were reasonable,
given the very unclear and unwritten or unspecific
understanding between the committee and CIA at the time in
terms of----
Senator Wyden. Mr. Director, my time is short, but that's
not what the inspector general or the----
Director Brennan. I respectfully disagree.
Senator Wyden [continuing]. Or the review board----
Director Brennan. I respectfully disagree with you,
Senator.
Senator Wyden. I'd like to read the exact words. The exact
words of the review board were: ``It resulted in inappropriate
access to SSCI work product.'' And your inspector general
reached the same conclusion.
So the question here is when you're talking about spying on
a committee responsible for overseeing your agency, in my view
that undermines the very checks and balances that protect our
democracy, and it's unacceptable in a free society. And your
compatriots in all of the sister agencies agreed with that.
Now, you disagree?
Director Brennan. Yes. I think you mischaracterized both
their comments as well as what's in those reports. And I
apologized to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman about the de
minimis access and inappropriate access that CIA officers made
to five emails or so of Senate staffers during that
investigation, and I apologized to them for that very specific
inappropriate action that was taken as part of a very
reasonable investigative action.
But do not say that we spied on Senate computers or your
files. We did not do that. We were fulfilling our
responsibilities.
Senator Wyden. I read the exact words of the inspector
general and exact words of the review board. You appointed the
review board. They said nobody ought to be punished, but they
said there was improper access.
My point is, in our system of government we have
responsibilities to do vigorous oversight and we can't do
vigorous oversight if there are improper procedures used to
access our files.
My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Director Brennan. Senator, I would say, do you not agree
that there was improper access that Senate staffers had to CIA
internal deliberative documents? Was that not inappropriate,
unauthorized?
Senator Wyden. I can tell you, having talked at length to
our staff, everything that we determined they did was
appropriate. But I asked about CIA conduct and two reviews, the
inspector general and your review board, said it was improper.
Director Brennan. Yes, and I'm still awaiting the review
that was done by the Senate to take a look at what the
staffers' actions were. Separation of powers between the
Executive and Legislative Branches, Senator, goes both ways. As
I said, I apologized to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman for
the very specific inappropriate access that agency officers who
were investigating this incident made to those emails, very
limited inappropriate actions. Overall, that investigation was
done consistent with our obligations, consistent with the law,
consistent with our responsibilities.
And I do think that you're mischaracterizing the full tenor
of both the accountability board and the inspector general's
report.
Senator Wyden. It's pretty hard to mischaracterize word for
word quotes. They used the words ``improper access.''
Chairman Burr. I'll exercise something here and recognize
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. I want to start by thanking our panelists
for being here and for the continued excellent work that their
respective agencies do every day in providing world-class
strategic analysis and in keeping our country safe in a world
of growing and complex threats that Director Clapper so
eloquently laid out twice today. The work done by your agencies
is critical and I want to thank the men and women of those
agencies who continue to do excellent work.
I also want to thank Chairman Burr for holding this
hearing. It's been two years since we've had one of these and I
hope we don't wait that long next time. I think it's important
that the American people have a chance to hear from these
officials directly, especially since so many of our actions
with these Directors take place behind closed doors. While
that's certainly appropriate in most circumstances, a public
debate I believe benefits tremendously from transparency, and I
appreciate the opportunity today.
I want to start with Admiral Rogers. Admiral, as you know,
the world has seen a truly alarming increase in attacks on
critical infrastructure. For example, in December DHS reported
a 20 percent increase in cyber incidents between fiscal year
2014 and fiscal year 2015. While critical manufacturing was the
most targeted sector in that, energy ranked second in the
number of incidents, with water and waste water systems coming
in third.
On top of that, we've seen recent attacks against Turkish
banks, Ukrainian and Israeli electricity providers, and it was
recently revealed that Iranian hackers infiltrated a dam just
north of New York City in 2013.
So my question for you is this: Does the IC, particularly
NSA, have sufficient insight into the sorts of cyber threats to
U.S. critical infrastructure that we're seeing by foreign
actors, and what can we do to better position ourselves against
those threats specifically to critical infrastructure?
Admiral Rogers. You never have all the insight that you
would like. I don't think you're going to hear an intel
professional tell you, hey, look, I couldn't use more insight.
I think the biggest challenge in some ways is not so much
the level of insight, but it's how do we generate, take that
insight and generate action, and make the changes that I think
we all believe are necessary, given the dynamics of the world
that you've outlined, that I don't think are short-term trends.
I don't see this changing in the near term. I see this as the
nature of the world we're living in and we're likely to be
living in for some period of time. So the challenge I think is
how do we take those insights and generate action. That's the
biggest challenge to me.
Senator Heinrich. Have you thought about, particularly
given the focus of those on things like electrical generation
and water and waste water systems, the ramifications of some of
the changes within those fields, of distributed approaches and
resiliency, as opposed to the very traditional approaches of
sort of one-way generation and large-scale transmission?
Admiral Rogers. Right. And we're watching most of the
sectors in the area trying to go that approach. How can you
build redundancy and resiliency, look at fragmentation and
duplication? I've talked to several elements in power and water
over the course of the last year, and you can see elements
within the sectors trying to go that way. But I'd be the first
to acknowledge, just given the breadth of infrastructure within
our Nation, the amount of time it's going to take to do that
across the entire breadth of our Nation, that is not an
insignificant challenge.
Senator Heinrich. Clearly. Would you agree that some of the
movement towards more distributed purchase, particularly within
electrical generation, things like microgrids, islandable
microgrids, distributed storage, distributed generation, are
helpful in mitigating the potential impact of a large-scale
attack?
Admiral Rogers. Yes. I think that's part of, that should be
a fundamental element of, a broader strategy. I just try to
remind people, there's no silver bullet, if that makes sense.
Senator Heinrich. As a smart Senator said, sometimes
there's silver buckshot when you don't have a silver bullet.
Director Brennan, while the United States is obviously not
addressing the ISIL issue alone in Syria and Iraq, the reality
is that many of our foreign partners in the region are at times
heavily distracted by unrelated conflicts that are sometimes
counterproductive to that fight. For example, as you're well
aware, Turkey is targeting the very Kurds who've been some of
the most engaged fighters in the battle against ISIS. We have
Saudi Arabia pouring money and equipment into the fight in
Yemen instead of focusing on ISIL in Syria.
You've spent a lot of time in the Middle East over the
years. What has the CIA done and what else might be done to get
our regional partners more focused on confronting the threat
posed by ISIL?
Director Brennan. As you point out, Senator, the Middle
East right now I think is racked by more instability and
violence and inter-state conflict than we have seen certainly
in the past 50 years. The amount of bloodshed and the
humanitarian suffering is I think unprecedented.
We, CIA, work very closely with our partners throughout the
region trying to make sure that those intelligence and security
services are fulfilling their responsibilities professionally
as far as making sure that we can share information with them
about the flow of foreign fighters in particular, given that
there is such transit between and among these countries of
individuals who might go to Syria, Iraq, and then down to Libya
or Egypt. We're trying to make sure we give them the
intelligence they need, give them the training they need, but
also give them the professional training that is required,
because there are tremendous obligations on them to make sure
that they are able to carry out their responsibilities while at
the same time respect the human rights obligations that they
have as security services.
So what we're trying to do is to serve as an interlocutor
with many of them and to see whether or not we can enhance
their relationships. Sometimes not only do we have inter-state
conflicts, but we have sort of intramural conflicts among some
of these countries, which then extends to the services.
So I think building up these intelligence and security
services, giving them the wherewithal to address the problems,
but again making sure that they carry out their
responsibilities professionally, is very important.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
The Chair would also make a note that the Senator is
correct, we didn't have an open threats hearing last year. We
had a closed one. But last year we had open hearings with
Admiral Rogers from the NSA, Director Rasmussen from the NCTC,
Director Comey from the FBI. And we had an open hearing
scheduled for Director Brennan and were blitzed by a snowstorm.
Maybe had we had him in he wouldn't have fallen and wrecked his
knee.
It is the intent of the Chair to continue to allow every
agency the opportunity, not just to be here for a worldwide
threat hearing, but to come in and share with the American
people what it is they do, why they do it, but, more
importantly, why the American people should care about their
success. Today is drinking out of a fire hose, trying to
address the entire globe at one time. The rest of it I think is
going to be more constructive. So I think the committee has
attempted to try to increase the amount of open exposure with a
degree of specificity that we haven't had in the past.
With that, Senator Coats.
Senator Coats. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director, I note here on the very first page of the
statement for the record you say: ``The order of topics
presented in this statement does not necessarily indicate the
relative importance or magnitude of the threat in the view of
the intelligence community.'' My question is, is this because
we are dealing with such a complex and ever-expanding level of
threats and it's difficult to prioritize, or is it because
maybe we ought to be talking about this in Thursday's closed
session? If that's the case, please tell me.
But if you had to prioritize--you know, we have to make
decisions here. We have limitations. You have budget
limitations. We want to try to address all these threats
equally, but that's not possible. So it seems to me that as a
committee member and as a member of Congress we need to know
how to best allocate our budgets toward what you need. I know
that this can be ever-changing, but what's your response to
that and how should we best address this?
Director Clapper. Well, the more time I've spent doing
this, I think the more loath I've become to try to rank-order
threats, because any of them can leap up and bite us. So we
don't have the luxury of--I don't like to mislead people that,
well, this one threat is the one that we're going to focus on
at the expense of others.
So that's why the statement there. What does that mean from
a resource standpoint in terms of what funding and resources
we're given to do our job? I think the approach that we've
taken, at least what I've tried to champion in the five and a
half years I've been the DNI, is those resources that enable
resilience and agility, so that we can respond and, hopefully,
anticipate and then respond to a variety of threats.
That's one thing--I said this before in answer to a
question this morning. Again, in my time in the intelligence
business I don't recall a time when we have been confronted
with a more diverse array of threats, whether it's the nation-
state threat posed by Russia and China, and particularly their
substantial nuclear capabilities, or non-nation-states of the
likes of ISIL, Al-Qaeda, etc.
So all these threats are serious, be it terrorism, be it
weapons of mass destruction, or be it cyber. Others may have a
view here. John.
Director Brennan. As it was pointed out, we're facing this
array of threats. The one area that I'm very concerned about is
the increasing concerns about vulnerabilities in that digital
domain and cyber. I do think we as a country need to make sure
that we understand what those vulnerabilities are. Then, I
think to Jim Comey's and others' points, making sure that we
understand that the intelligence and security services and law
enforcement services of this country have a role to help
protect that environment, because our way of life, our future,
really depends on making sure that that is strong. And we have
adversaries overseas, both nation-states as well as sub-
national actors, that have the potential and the capability to
carry out attacks.
Director Clapper. The other part of this, if I may, just a
thought that John keyed here, is the admixture, the combination
of the threats posed to us in the cyber domain and the
connection of that with terrorism. That makes ranking these
discrete threats kind of difficult.
Senator Coats. Maybe that's why you have cyber technology
as number one. I just assume that, and I appreciate the
response on that.
Admiral Rogers, I'd like you to comment on that also,
because this is your domain. Where do we stand on that?
Admiral Rogers. For me, like my counterparts on the panel,
I tell our team I am always leery about this hierarchical
approach to doing business, because I've watched it encourage a
workforce to think very linearly, so we focus on number one,
then we think about number two, then we think about number
three. And the world around us just doesn't work that way.
For me, the way I try to bin it with our team is protection
of U.S. persons and U.S. infrastructure is priority number one.
And I look at this and I see cyber- and the counterterrorism
world in particular bringing those together in a very
concerning way, as you heard from Director Clapper in his
opening statement, and cyber remains so foundational to every
aspect of our daily lives, just in a way that we haven't
necessarily seen as much in the past. It represents both great
opportunity for us as a society, but great vulnerability, with
the potential for great impact. That's what's of concern.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Coats.
Senator King.
Senator King. To follow up that, on that point, I was a
governor during September 11th, and shortly afterwards we
tasked our state police to go to all of what we thought were
the vulnerable pieces of infrastructure in our state,
electrical, chemical plants, and those kind of things, and
assess their level of vulnerability and to in effect red team
them about how they could the attacked.
Do we do that with our critical infrastructure? There's a
lot of talk here about legislation, but it seems to me you
could create a team to go to our power grid, to go to our water
and gas utilities, financial services, and say: Look, this is
what could happen to you; have you thought about this? You
don't really need legislation to do this. In other words, more
proactive, trying to alert them to the risks and to alert them
to some of the protections that may be available.
Admiral Rogers. Now you're really talking outside my lane
as the Director of NSA and more in the lane of the Department
of Homeland Security, so I will not speak for Secretary
Johnson. I share your concern. It's one reason why, speaking
within my lane within DOD, for example, we do just that. We
aggressively attempt to make sure we understand our structures,
their importance to our ability to execute their mission, our
mission, and then their vulnerability.
So we do penetration testing. We do red teams. We do no-
notice inspections, for example, as a way to make sure----
Senator King. It seems to me we ought--and perhaps we ought
to have Jeh Johnson here. But we need to be talking about being
more active and not just wait and hope they are doing the
proper defensive measures, but to alert them to where they're
vulnerable and to help them figure out the defensive measures.
Let me change the subject for a moment to heroin, which is
an absolute epidemic. 10 or 12,000 people a year now dying. The
number's accelerating just astoundingly and tragically.
Director Clapper talked about Mexico and that's where it
seems to be coming from. A specific question. One of the
problems with heroin that we're now seeing is it's often laced
with fentanyl, which makes it more potent and more dangerous.
Where does that come from? Do we know? Do we have intelligence
on where the fentanyl is coming from, where it's being
manufactured, how it gets into this unfortunate stream?
Director Comey.
Director Comey. Senator, I know there's a lot of work being
done on that. We have a pretty good sense that a fair amount of
it is being manufactured in China, but it's also being
manufactured in other places in the developing world. So I know
DEA and FBI and the rest of the intelligence community is
spending a lot of time trying to understand where those sources
are.
Senator King. Well, I think we should know that and it
should be publicity and we should name and shame those
companies--those countries, because this is entirely
unacceptable. It's a trade in death. I would hope that there
would be further analysis of that, and also analysis of the
trade stream that allows it to get to Mexico or Central
America.
Second question: Do we have adequate resources in terms of
intelligence, but also in terms of interdiction, in Mexico and
Central America? My understanding is we have a pretty small
number of people in some of those Central American countries
which also are contributing to this. Do you feel as the
intelligence community that you have adequate resources to this
trade, where it comes from, who's behind it? Then of course
that leads into interdiction. I'll follow up with that.
Mr. Comey, your thoughts?
Director Comey. Surely not, given the size of the tidal
wave of heroin that's washing over from Mexico. And there's two
waves. We talk a lot about the heroin wave, for good reason.
There's another wave washing over the western United States
that's methamphetamine from Mexico, and the two waves are
actually now crashing together in the middle of the United
States.
So surely not is the honest answer. We have built, I think
as Director Clapper said, much more effective relationships
among ourselves in focusing on that problem and with our
partners in Mexico and Central America. But honestly, it's not
good enough, given the size of the threat.
Senator King. Another question is, how's it getting in? Do
we know how much by land and how much by water? My
understanding is a great deal of this is coming by water and
one of the problems is a lack of adequate interdiction
resources, both in terms of the military and the Coast Guard.
Director Comey. A large amount of it comes by water, and it
tends to switch from both sides of the Central American land
mass, Pacific or Atlantic side. But to pick up on what General
Clapper said, what I've heard from the Coast Guard especially
is they have a lack of resources to interdict.
But also a lot of it comes by land, tunnels, smugglers,
trucks. Because it's a tidal wave, it's washing in a lot of
different ways.
Senator King. A tidal wave of death is what we're talking
about. I appreciate your efforts, but I think we have to
realize that this is something that's really exploded almost
literally in the last three or four years and we have to react
to it proportionate to the threat to our people. This is
killing people right now in the United States, in every state.
It's not an abstract concern. It's not a possible virus. It's
something that's happening right now.
So I commend you for your efforts, but I hope that this is
something where the community can work together to develop the
information necessary, but then we can also--it's got to be all
of government to react to take the information and act upon it.
Thank you very much for your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Clapper, I suspect that this may be your last
public global threat hearing before our committee. So let me
join with our colleagues in thanking you for your decades of
service. You and I first met in 2004 when Joe Lieberman and I
wrote the law that created the DNI Office and I take special
pride in the work that you're doing and want to thank you for
all of your years of service.
Director Clapper. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Let me follow up on the questions that my
colleague from Maine just posed. Is there actionable
intelligence that would allow us to disrupt and interdict more
of the heroin and fentanyl-laced heroin that is coming in from
Mexico than we are able to act on because of operational
constraints?
Director Clapper. Well, I just discussed this morning
before the Senate Armed Services Committee the testimony that
General Kelly, former, recently retired as the commander of
Southern Command. I heard him say on more than one occasion
that they had a lot of good intelligence on drug flow into the
United States and he was limited because of his lack of
operational resources to react.
Now, that is getting better. Again, a plug for the Coast
Guard: They do magnificent work. These new cutters that they're
building and deploying are a fantastic capability, ideally
suited for this interdiction mission, particularly with the
seaborne and specifically the semi-submersible vehicles that
the druggies are using to ship large quantities. When those are
caught at sea, you take a lot of drugs off the street.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Director Comey, you talked earlier about encryption and how
difficult it is making the job of both law enforcement and our
efforts to prevent and detect terrorist plots. In fact, you
have been quoted as saying that encryption is at the center of
the terrorist tradecraft. Yet the administration has not
submitted to date any legislative proposal to deal with
encryption.
I would like to know whether you--and I'm going to ask
General Clapper and Director Brennan the same question--have
any of the three made recommendations to the President that he
submit legislation dealing with the encryption problem to
Congress for our consideration?
Director Comey. I'll go first. Thank you, Senator. I would
never--I don't think it would be appropriate for me to share
recommendations that I might have made within the Executive
Branch. But I will tell you this. Encryption is a problem in
our investigations. It is also a great thing. And therein lies
the challenge, which is why this is such a hard problem. That's
why the administration and the private sector have been
struggling so much.
I am optimistic that we'll make progress through our
conversations, but I don't know whether that'll get us far
enough. So I can't quite clearly see what the future looks like
from here, but I'm just not comfortable talking about the
deliberations inside.
Senator Collins. Well, let me change the question then. Do
you believe that we should pass legislation that deals with
encryption?
Director Comey. I'm going to have to dodge that because
that's not the FBI's job, to make recommendations. I do think
that Congress and the American people have to grapple with
this, because there's a collision between something that is
great, encryption, and something that's also great, which is
public safety.
Senator Collins. General Clapper, you're retiring at the
end of the year, so you don't have to be careful in answering
this question in any way.
Director Clapper. Well, I'm not sure we've exhausted all
the possibilities here technologically. I'm not an IT expert by
any means. I would hope that we have not yet exhausted what
could be done voluntarily. As Director Comey indicated,
encryption is a good thing for all kinds of reasons, for
security and privacy and all that. But at the same time, it
enables--it is enabling nefarious activity of all sorts,
whether it's law enforcement or in the national security arena,
to go on, and we're losing information because of it.
So my hope is that the technological solution, we haven't
fully explored the potential there.
I'd also ask Admiral Rogers to comment as well.
Admiral Rogers. Encryption is foundational to the future.
Anyone who thinks we're just going to walk away from that I
think is totally unrealistic. The challenge becomes to me,
given that premise that encryption is foundational to the
future, what's the best way for us to meet both of these
imperatives, to ensure the privacy and the rights of our
citizens and to ensure their protection and safety? Both are
incredibly important to us as a Nation.
The challenge that I've seen in the discussion to date is,
from Mike Rogers' perspective, we're spending a lot of time
talking about what we can't do, and I keep thinking to myself:
We are the most innovative, technologically advanced Nation in
the world; let's start thinking about what can we do. Let's
start trying to figure out how are we going to make this work.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Burr. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Clapper, thank you very much for noting--well,
first of all for your service, and to all of you on the panel.
Thank you for noting that the drug threat is ever growing in
our country and that, while interdiction and enforcement are
very important challenges to us, I suspect that we are not
putting very many resources into the prevention side of the
drug equation. That's just a comment.
Moving on, as North Korea continues its nuclear weapons and
missile programs, do you assess that locating missile defense
systems closer to North Korea or locating another carrier, say
in Yokosuka, Japan, could provide greater deterrence against
North Korean aggression? And I welcome comments also from
Lieutenant General--General Stewart, and anyone else on the
panel who'd like to comment.
Director Clapper. Well, that's a policy call. But, having
said that, I think it would. I think even the discussion about
missile defense certainly gets the Chinese' attention. They
would prefer that THAAD, for example, not be deployed. But the
North Koreans are making it hard, I think, for the Chinese to
sustain that position.
So to the extent that there are force displays, force
presence, missile defense, I think that could possibly have a
deterrent effect on the North Koreans, but it could also incite
them to do more.
Senator Hirono. And with Kim Jong Un it's hard to tell
which way he would go. That's just an editorial comment.
In your statement of record you note that we will monitor
compliance with China's September 2015 commitment to refrain
from conducting or knowingly supporting cyber-enabled theft of
intellectual property with the intent of providing competitive
advantage to companies or commercial sectors. Private security
experts have identified limited ongoing cyber activity from
China, but have not verified state sponsorship or the use of
exfiltrated data for commercial gain.
So, Director Clapper and Admiral Rogers, I understand that
there's much that we can't discuss in this open forum, but can
you help me understand how the September 15th U.S.-China cyber
agreement is helpful when we can't effectively monitor
compliance?
Director Clapper. Well, I think I'll ask Admiral Rogers to
back me up here, but I think that there has been a decline, but
I think we're going to have to have some more time to assess
whether this is a case where these state sponsors, those
elements, cyber actors, that are under the control of the
state, have actually reduced their activity or they were told:
Don't get caught. I think we're going to need some more time to
assess that.
Of course, there's also the challenge of determining
whether, per the agreement, that any information that is
purloined is actually used for economic advantage or not.
Mike, do you want to add to that?
Admiral Rogers. No, I would agree, and I don't think
there's any doubt that we have been able to show in the past
cases where that was the case. I think that's in part what led
to the desire to be very direct with our Chinese counterparts
to say this behavior is unacceptable and we have to work our
way through this, because the status quo, the use of the powers
of the state to generate economic advantage through cyber as a
tool, is not acceptable to us. I think that's what drove the
discussions in September and, as the DNI has said, our view to
date is we have seen some lessening in activity, but we're not
yet prepared to say that's as a result of a systematic policy
choice on the part of our Chinese counterparts.
Senator Hirono. Because it's so hard to determine
attribution in the cyber threat arena, do you believe that
we'll ever be able to resolve this dilemma? I'd ask you two
gentlemen to respond.
Then, General Stewart, would you care to comment on my
first question regarding the assessment question that I had?
General Stewart. I think North Korea has a number of
objectives, one of which is demonstrating strength against the
U.S. and its allies. The second objective is to deter U.S.
actions if they take unilateral actions on the Korean
Peninsula. And third among the objectives is to separate the
U.S. from its South Korean ally.
So the things that we can do that will show that we still
have strength, that we will not be deterred, that we will not
be separated from our ally, will be very beneficial. However,
Kim Jong Un is unpredictable, and therefore I think we should
do all those things to maintain our relationship, show
strength, show that we cannot be deterred from taking action,
but he is still an unpredictable wild card that none of us know
how he will react.
Senator Hirono. Some of our force structure decisions,
though, would also have an impact on China, which is a more I
think reasonable actor.
I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, but could the other two gentlemen
answer briefly the question?
Chairman Burr. They can, briefly.
Admiral Rogers. You never have perfect knowledge. We
historically have been able to put together a fairly good
picture. I'm not going to argue that it's perfect. I'm the
first to acknowledge it's getting harder, not easier, because
we're watching opponents spending a lot of time trying to hurt
or diminish our ability to attribute specific activity to
specific actors.
Senator Hirono. Did you want to add to that?
Director Clapper. No.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. It's going to be a challenge.
Chairman Burr. The correct answer.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Chairman Burr. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start with thanking again all of you for your
service and, equally important, the literally thousands of men
and women who work to keep our country safe. Let me say at the
outset, as a Virginia Senator, the fact that we have the
offices of ODNI, CIA, NRO, NGO, NGA, and a series of other
entities, and, Director Comey, if GSA makes the right decision,
maybe the FBI as well--and Senator Mikulski's not here--I hope
you will relay that message that we give you the credit, and
obviously the men and women, the professionals, don't get the
credit that they appropriately deserve.
Director Clapper, I'm going to--a couple questions for you.
First of all, I want to commend you in terms of your testimony
today, the fact that you've listed cyber and what I would call
digital security first, and the recognition that, while we're
talking somewhat about encryption today, and I'm going to come
back to that in a moment, that we need forward-leaning thinking
about the Internet of Things and artificial intelligence and
virtual reality, and the fact of the matter that foreign data
science is moving ahead very rapidly and tools and challenges
around issues like encryption and going dark--this genie's out
of the bottle.
I particularly commend both Admiral Rogers and Director
Comey's comments. People who want to relitigate the origination
of encryption, that issue is behind us. I think it's
appropriate to point out that when our national security is
threatened also in terms of intellectual capital, personal
information, other kinds of intrusions, encryption--and I
particularly appreciate, Director Comey, your comments as
well--is both an asset and potentially a liability.
I fear that sometimes we have focused just on this piece
rather than the whole encompassing issue around digital
security. Admiral Rogers, again I want to give you kudos for
this notion around innovation.
Director Clapper, I guess what my concern is is that
sometimes, with all of these competing interests, with national
security interests, with intellectual capital security
interests, with civil liberties security, with American
business security, that I'm not sure all of these competing
interests, while there have been efforts, have actually all
come together in a thoughtful, reflective way to try to
challenge folks around American innovation about how we get
this back.
I think there needs to be a real debate between all of
these communities--the tech community, American business,
information security specialists, law enforcement, intel,
advocates for privacy and civil liberties. Director Clapper,
I'd like to see, if we had such kind of a thoughtful approach
would that be of value to this debate, which has already proved
to be quite contentious?
Director Clapper. It certainly would. I think--and I think
you've named most of the key constituencies here. There are
many countervailing interests. There is the pull of the needs
for national security and law enforcement that you've heard.
There are the privacy and civil liberties concerns and our own
security.
So there are a myriad or a welter of countervailing
interests here that are at play. We certainly, we try to sort
our way through all those competing equities. It's a very, very
complex issue, as I think you've heard from the discussion
that's transpired so far.
Senator Warner. Well, I just would say that, as somebody
who spent 20-plus years, 25-plus years, in the telecom
industry, I don't think it is totally equivalent. And the
notion of a kind of top-down solution, which might give us a
static solution for a short period of time, but this is going
to be a constantly evolving challenge and the response is going
to need to be flexible and constantly transitioning.
Again, as you lay out some of the challenges, we're talking
about a piece here on encryption, but digital security is a
much broader issue. I think you've appropriately laid out some
of the buckets that have to be part of this, this conversation.
My time is running out. I just want to add a subject that
the Chair and the Vice Chair have been very helpful on as we
think about on overhead, on our satellite issues. I recently
was out at NGA, had a very good session there on commercial
satellites. Right now the United States, not governmental, has
about 50 commercial satellites. One company alone is going to
go to 250 this year. I guess, Director Clapper--I know your
background here--would you spend a moment in terms of how
commercial is going to fit in with our overall overhead needs?
Director Clapper. Well, I think commercial imagery, I have
been a huge proponent of it since I served as the Director of
NIMA-NGA right after 9-11 as a crucial part of our overall
architecture. It's also important, though, I think, that these
commercial entities remain commercially viable. If they have a
product or service that we can use, we should take advantage of
that from the standpoint of additional coverage, what is it we
can unload from our NTM complex, which I think we'll always
have a need for; and also importantly, for resiliency.
But what I don't think is a good thing is if they become
completely dependent on the government. So we have to find the
balance there, and that's why I would like to make a change in
the architectural responsibility so that that is accounted for
in the totality of our overhead reconnaissance constellation.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman.
General Clapper, all of you who represent the IC community
and the people you work with and the people that work for us,
thank you for what you do.
I'm going to mention a couple of questions I'm not going to
ask, one for the record. But you just mentioned your leadership
at NGA, the geospatial efforts we have. I've been spending a
lot of time lately with Director Cardillo and in those
discussions we've been talking a lot about sort of the
workforce of the future. So one thing I'm going to ask in a
question for all of you that we don't have time to ask today
is: With engineering, with technology, with science, with math,
are we doing the kinds of things we need to do and what can we
do earlier to identify people we want to get on that track of
being able to do these jobs in the IC community generally,
Admiral Rogers, in your field specifically? Some information on
that would be helpful.
I'm also going to not ask a question--I will ask that
question for the record.
With regard to science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics (STEM) disciplines, what are we doing to identify
and nurture STEM talent earlier and attract those people to the
IC in general, and to the NSA in particular?
I won't ask today about Robert Levinson. I think that's
probably more appropriately asked in a closed setting, and I'll
be doing that later. But in that regard, I am concerned that
the transfer of money occurred when it did. A supposed $400
million from a past military sale that we had had happened to
be given back just coincidentally the same time that those
three hostages, as I see them, were released.
Now, this is money, by the way, that the Congress in 2000
said had to go to victims of Iranian-backed terror and it all
did. So this is clearly giving the money away twice, sort of
like the meeting of the church business meeting where they say:
We've got a real problem. We've got a $1,000 deficit. What
should we do? And somebody says: Well, let's give half of it to
the PTA and half of it to the Girl Scouts.
This money was gone, but it was an excuse, a coincidental
excuse I think, to do the right thing in the wrong way.
But what I want to ask you is, you said, Secretary Kerry
said, just in the last few days that undoubtedly some of the
money returned to Iran would go to terrorist groups. You
verified again today that you see no real change in behavior in
this number one sponsor, state sponsor of terror in the world.
Are we doing any analysis? And anybody that wants to answer
this can. What do we think happens when suddenly Iran gets $100
million, $100 billion, or maybe they get half of that? Maybe
they get $50 billion. What do we think happens in places where
not very much money can drive a lot of bad activity? $400
million in Yemen can make lots of bad things happen.
Are we evaluating what happens when Hezbollah, when the
Taliban, when the Houthi get this new infusion of money that I
think everybody understands they are about to get?
Director Clapper. Well, Senator Blunt, I'm a little
constrained here in what can be said about this publicly. But
we are watching to the best of our ability the insight we have
on actually where this money is going. Most of it so far has
been taken up with what I would call encumbrances, in other
words do-outs, loans, and other needs that Iran has. Those fall
mainly in the economic arena. They need to recapitalize their
whole oil infrastructure, which has deteriorated, if they're
going to do something with that. They have a lot of obligations
in debts that they need to pay.
So the actual--we can go into this in more detail in a
classified setting, but what has actually flowed to the Quds
Force, let's say, has not been very much. And bear in mind that
even during the period of heavy sanctions the Quds Force, the
IRGC, the Republican Guards, and the Quds Force specifically,
were--they were funded and the Iranians found a way to sustain
them. And of course, they themselves have business interests by
which they generate their own income.
Senator Blunt. I think that last point is the best point.
Even when Iran didn't have whatever amount of this money they
get--say they get a tenth of the purported $100 billion. Even
when they didn't have money, they were able to fund terrorism.
I think whatever percentage of that money comes back to them,
the argument we sometimes hear that, well, they'll build
schools and hospitals and pay debts--they could have done all
those things before they got this money as well, and they still
found money to finance terror efforts all over the neighborhood
that they're in and outside that neighborhood.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing here.
We frequently get to talk in private, not often in public. So
let me associate myself with the comments of so many other
members of this committee in thanking you, not only for your
service--Director Clapper in particular for your many years of
long service--for the service of the men and women that you
represent.
Director Brennan, you stated earlier, in response to
Senator Heinrich, we have not seen as much violence,
instability, and interstate conflict in the Middle East in, I
believe the time period was, your lifetime?
Director Brennan. I think I said 50 years, which is less
than my lifetime.
Senator Cotton. Why do you think that is? What are the key
drivers that's causing all that?
Director Brennan. Well, I think it's been five years now
since the Arab Spring started to take root, which had a very
traumatic impact on governments throughout the region, and the
street became alive. And Al-Qaeda and terrorist organizations
did not trigger that, but they have taken full advantage of it.
So the instability that we see in Libya and Yemen and Syria
certainly was an outgrowth of the Arab Spring and the turnover
in governments in Libya and Yemen.
So this is pitting individuals from different areas of the
country, of ethnic backgrounds that might be different than the
government's. There are sectarian tensions that are playing
out. All these things that were repressed because of the
authoritarian governments that were in power for many years,
and once their control was shaken I think it then loosed this
popular reaction that now is finding expression in basically
civil war, sectarian conflict, and challenges against the
government.
A lot of these governments do not have the political
institutions, nor the ability to address the many, many
challenges, political, economic, and social in the region.
Finally, as you well know, a lot of these countries were
carved out of previous colonial realms and therefore were
almost patchworks of people of various backgrounds, that now
are finding ways to fight among themselves.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Director Comey, I want to address electronic communication
transaction records. I've introduced legislation to rectify a
problem commonly known as the ``ECTR fix.'' The legislation
would clarify the government can obtain specified sets of
electronic communication transaction records and fix an
oversight made in an earlier law. What's your position and what
is the position of the FBI on the need for this fix?
Director Comey. We need it very much, and it's actually
quite an ordinary fix. It's necessary because of what I believe
is a typo in the 1993 statute that has led to some companies
interpreting it in a way I don't believe Congress ever
intended. So it is ordinary, but it affects our work in a very,
very big and practical way.
Senator Cotton. Would you characterize that as a top
legislative priority for the FBI?
Director Comey. Yes.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
General Stewart, I want to turn to North Korea's recent
nuclear test. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization
has not reported any collection of xenon or other nuclear
particulates. Are you aware of any nuclear particulates
collected from the test?
General Stewart. Thank you for letting me participate.
[Laughter.]
I have 10 questions I'd like to answer and that's not one
of them. But I appreciate the opportunity.
We have not at this point detected any particulates that
would characterize this device.
Senator Cotton. What does that tell us then about North
Korean containment vessels and technology?
General Stewart. Very robust capability to deceive,
contain, hide their full capability and capacity. And I'd like
to talk about this some more in closed hearing about both our
capability and what we're seeing that they're doing.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I believe we'll have a chance to
do that soon.
Director Brennan, I want to return in closing here to your
exchange with Senator Wyden. You mentioned the removal of a CIA
document from the shared space in violation of a memorandum of
understanding with this committee. Has any of this committee or
staffer ever apologized to you for the removal of that
document?
Director Brennan. No, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Do you believe that that was a violation of
the MOU that the agency and this committee had?
Director Brennan. I believe it was inconsistent with the
understanding that we had, the common understanding, yes.
Senator Cotton. Has that document been returned to you?
Director Brennan. I will have to check on that, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Handling of classified information is a
very serious matter, right?
Director Brennan. Yes.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman Burr. I thank all Senators. We're going to have a
second round. It's going to start in the same order as the
first one. The second round will consist of one question or two
minutes, whichever happens fastest. And it's my intent that we
will be out of here shortly. Again, I thank our witnesses.
General Stewart, you were recognized too soon, because I
have a question for you. I'm not sure it's in the 10 questions
that you would like to answer. Assessing where we are today in
Iraq: Share with me what Iraq looks like at the end of this
year as it relates to being different, if at all?
General Stewart. The Kurds in northern Iraq solidify their
positions. They probably won't move any further south because
it's not in their interest to move south. The Shia militia
retains control over the central part of Iraq, moving out west
just a bit. We consolidate our gains in Ramadi. The Sunni
forces and Iraqi forces consolidate their gains in Ramadi,
begin to move in to secure the corridors moving from Hit up to
Haditha, possibly isolating, beginning the isolation effort
around Mosul. But in the western part of Iraq I'm not
optimistic that we will have done much to move ISIL forces out
of that region.
Chairman Burr. And doubtful that Mosul will change hands in
this calendar year?
General Stewart. I am not betting on that, Senator.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, General.
General Stewart. I think it'll be very difficult to both
isolate and conduct a clearing operation that would look like
the securing of Mosul this year.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, General Stewart.
Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Feinstein. Director Comey, I want to thank
you. You really are a man of principle and you stand up for
what you believe, and it's very much appreciated.
Last year, I think some of us received a report from the
FBI in March of 2015 that showed that individuals on the FBI
terrorist watch list attempted over a 10-year period to buy a
gun or explosive over 2,000 times and they were successful 91
percent of the time. Could you describe the standard used by
the FBI to make sure that only individuals who pose a threat to
national security are placed on the FBI's terrorist screening
database?
Director Comey. Thank you, Senator. I'll try and do it
briefly. There's an extensive process to vet the information
around an individual to see if they meet our threshold, which I
think is reason to believe--reasonable basis to believe they're
involved in terrorist activity, to then put them on the watch
list.
Vice Chairman Feinstein. Can you describe here the
safeguards to ensure that the FBI minimizes false positives?
That means making sure that innocent Americans aren't placed on
the terrorist screening database?
Director Comey. Probably in two directions. One from our
own direction is a constant effort to make sure our records are
accurate, because false positives simply waste our resources.
Then from the other direction, in the last year the Department
of Justice has driven the creation of a redress procedure. So
if anyone thinks they were wrongly placed on the list, there's
a process through which they can challenge that.
Vice Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Brennan, I want to go back to Afghanistan for a minute.
Talk a little bit about Al-Qaeda's presence in the country and
whether it's increasing or not, and ISIL's influence in the
country. And how probable is the emergence of an ISIL
stronghold in Afghanistan?
Director Brennan. Al-Qaeda, there's probably about maybe
100 or so, somewhere in that area, of Al-Qaeda members in the
eastern part of Afghanistan. The leader there is an individual
by the name of Farouq Al-Qatari, and they have married up, as I
said, with some of the other militant organizations in the
area, including the Taliban. So they continue to ply their
trade on the ground inside of Afghanistan.
But we're concerned they can regenerate in that Afghan-Pak
border region, which is why we need to maintain the
intelligence collection, as well as working with our Afghan and
Pak partners.
ISIL has been able to take advantage of some elements
within the Taliban that have been disenchanted with the
organization. So ISIL is seen as a threat, certainly by Afghan
officials. When I traveled over to Afghanistan just two months
ago, it was one of the real concerns they had that ISIL is
planting the flag in different parts of Afghanistan and they
are now seen as a competer, a competitor, to some of the
existing militant and terrorist organizations there.
Vice Chairman Feinstein. Stop there. How do you assess
that?
Director Brennan. We assess it based on our----
Vice Chairman Feinstein. No, no, not the methodology. But
in the vernacular, how big a deal is that?
Director Brennan. It's a concern. ISIL probably has several
hundred members or so inside of Afghanistan, I would estimate.
And it is distributed. They have had some setbacks there as
they have gone up against some of the other militant
organizations. But it is a concern. Just like we see these
various franchises growing in places like Indonesia or Nigeria,
Somalia, Yemen, Libya, we see the same thing in South Asia.
Vice Chairman Feinstein. Some time ago we did a four-
corners intelligence trip that went to Afghanistan and I had
the privilege of spending some time with women
parliamentarians. I was amazed at their strength and the fact
that they were going to survive and the Taliban was not going
to come back.
Now, as I watch the developments happening there, the worry
goes up and up and up, and you see these terrible things being
done to women again, and also school children who happen to be
girls.
I wonder whether we can make sufficient progress in the
next decade or so. Do you have any assessment on that?
Director Brennan. As you point out, I think the Afghan
people are a very resilient people. There have been thousands
of Afghans who have given their lives for the future of that
country. That's why we want to continue to work very closely
with them, their intelligence, security, military organizations
that are there. They face a host of challenges. Foreign
assistance is critically important both on the military front
as well as on the economic side.
But President Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah, they need to
make sure that their government is able to address the concerns
of the Afghan people across the broad range of areas. But as
you point out, the Afghan people are some of the bravest people
that we have----
Chairman Burr. As the Vice Chair has worked five questions
into the one-question round, I don't question the strength of
women. I can assure you of that.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not incur
the wrath of the Chairman. I will stick to one.
Director Clapper, I wanted to ask you a question about
encryption. I'm not sure you're familiar with the report. Maybe
already got it. It's brand new, written by an independent
group. It's on encryption and the title of it is ``Don't
Panic.'' Matt Olsen, who we all have enormous respect for, was
very involved, the former Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center.
I'm struck by this because I think when you get into the
nuts and bolts of it, obviously encryption is available all
around the world, often very cheaply. The basic thesis in this
report is that, with wireless connectivity and sensors and the
like, there are going to be more opportunities to prevent our
country from going dark.
My question to you would be: Because of Matt Olsen's
involvement and the experts involved in this, I would like to
have your team take a look at this report and give us an
analysis within an agreed-upon time, maybe 60 days. I would
ideally like an unclassified version. Maybe if it has a
classified annex that would be fine. Would that be something
you could agree today? I think this is really a breakthrough
report in my view, given the cross section of experts involved.
Is that something that you could do for us?
Director Clapper. Sure, we'll do that.
Senator Wyden. Great. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you. I have one quick comment and one
question.
Director Clapper, there's been a lot of praise heaped upon
you today. I'd like to join in that. In my study of American
history, the more I read the more I appreciate Washington, not
for necessarily the war and the presiding over the
Constitutional Convention, but his role as the first President,
establishing precedents and sort of how this whole enterprise
would function.
I realize you're not the first Director of National
Intelligence, but I think by your tenure and your character and
your intelligence and your experience you have served a similar
function in really establishing how this entity should operate
and will operate in the future. For that I want to profoundly
compliment and thank you. I think you've helped to create an
institution that will serve this country well for some period
of time. That's my comment.
My question is a very broad one and I don't think it's one
that we can answer here today. You comment in your report that
Sunni violent extremism has been on an upward trajectory since
the seventies. More groups have more safe havens than in any
other time in history. We've killed 20,000 members of ISIS and
yet we now know that more than 36,000 foreign fighters have
gone to join ISIS.
The point is we're dealing with a hydra here, where we cut
off one head and two grow back. I wonder if it isn't time to
stop and say, do we need a new strategy other than trying to
just kill our enemies as they arise? I'm thinking of George
Kennan and the strategy of containment, not saying that that's
the right strategy, but that there was a sort of comprehensive
strategy rather than an ad hoc dealing with each individual
attack or crisis.
I would just suggest that it seems to me this would be a
role maybe at the end of this administration or the beginning
of the next administration, to think about how do we deal with
Sunni extremism and how do we develop a strategy that involves
other countries, particularly Sunni countries, that can try to
get at the roots of this instead of just the tactics.
Your thoughts?
Director Clapper. Senator King, I think you've hit on a
very important, very crucial point. By the time you get into
our business, where we're trying to track down terrorists who
are bent on doing harm to us, it's way late. What really needs
to be focused on are what are the fundamental systemic
conditions that give rise to this?
You can kind of rattle off: large ungoverned spaces, a
place awash in weapons, the population bulge of young,
unemployed and frustrated males to whom such propaganda
appeals. What has to be gotten at fundamentally while we're
doing our thing of collecting intelligence and taking people
off the battlefield is what are the root causes that give rise
to this phenomenon of extreme jihadism.
Senator King. Thank you. I hope this discussion can
continue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Is it one question or two minutes,
whichever is longer?
Chairman Burr. Whichever comes first.
Senator Cotton. Can I take the Vice Chair?
Vice Chairman Feinstein. Oh, you get no sympathy from me.
Senator Cotton. I had a long series of adversarial,
prosecutorial questions for each of you that I now can't ask
since I'll be stopped after the first one.
Admiral Rogers, I will address briefly Section 702 of FISA,
which expires, if I'm not mistaken, at the end of next year.
Section 702 authorizes the government to target non-U.S.
persons reasonably believed to be outside the U.S. for purposes
of acquiring foreign intelligence information. I believe that
Section 702 is a vital national security tool. It's
constitutional. It has multiple layers of oversight.
In 2012 DNI Clapper wrote to Congress requesting a straight
reauthorization of Title 7, which would include 702. Do you
believe that Congress should pass a straight reauthorization of
Section 702?
Admiral Rogers. I do believe we need to continue 702.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I converted a long series of
adversarial questions into a speech and then asked if you
agreed with my speech.
Chairman Burr. I will follow up the line of questioning
just to say this, that the committee will take up 702 very
quickly, not from the standpoint of the legislation, but from
the standpoint of the preparation that we need to do in
educating and having Admiral Rogers and others bring us up to
speed on the usefulness and any tweaks that might have to be
made. But I daresay this is something that I think Director
Clapper has said before. We cannot do without this. This is
absolutely crucial. It's been at the centerpiece of a lot of
things.
If I could before we end go back to encryption since it was
brought up. I've had more district attorneys come to me about
the encryption issue than I have the individuals at this table.
The district attorneys have come to me because they're
beginning to get to a situation where they can't prosecute
cases. This is town by town, city by city, county by county,
and state by state. It ranges from Cy Vance in New York to a
rural town of 2,000 in North Carolina.
It's something we need to take seriously. One of the
responsibilities of this committee is to make sure those of you
at the table and those that complete the complement of our
intelligence community have the tools through how we authorize
that you need. The traditional tools I see as no different than
I look at encryption and say we need to provide a tool for you
to have the access to that information when the courts give you
permission to do it.
I could care less how that's accomplished. It is I think
the priority--and I think I can speak for the Vice Chairman. It
is the priority of both of us that this be voluntary. But if in
fact it's not something we can achieve the balance on
voluntarily, then I feel like it's the committee's
responsibility to pursue it in any fashion we can, and I intend
personally--I won't commit the committee to do it--to pursue
that, because I think it is invaluable in the future.
I fear that this is not the toughest decision we're going
to make, based upon how technology might impact the world we're
in.
The American people expect us, Director Comey, to this year
exceed 72 individuals that you incarcerate before they commit a
lone wolf event. You're on track to probably do that, based
upon the beginning of this year and based upon intent. I'm not
sure that we can turn around and say, well, we only got 11 of
them because we couldn't see inside the communications of the
other 60-some and, America, you're out of luck. You won't stand
for it, I won't stand for it, the American people won't stand
for it.
So I hope--we're working with the administration and
hopefully we can all work towards the same end goal.
I want to take one last opportunity to thank each of you,
but, more importantly, the folks that work for you and work for
the American people. At any given point in time, everybody at
the table's workforce has been challenged to work 24-7 to
address events that happened over the worst times, I might say.
Over the holidays as we went through Christmas, I can't imagine
what the Bureau was doing. I can't imagine, Admiral Rogers,
what you were going through. John, I can't imagine what the CIA
was going through, trying to track down the number of threat
streams that were out there, and that culminates with Director
Clapper. So I don't think anybody had a real comfortable
holiday season this year. But the fact is we got through it
without an event, and I don't think many of us would have bet
that that would have been the outcome, but we did. And now
we're focused on tomorrow, not yesterday.
My hope is that we will continue to do it and to do it
successfully. With that, I will tell you how much we look
forward to seeing all of you again on Thursday, and this
hearing's adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]