Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Thursday, March 10, 2022 - 10:00am
Location:
Hart 216
Witnesses
Director
Avril
Haines
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
ODNI
Director
William J.
Burns
Central Intelligence Agency
CIA
Director
Lieutenant General Scott D.
Berrier
Defense Intelligence Agency
DIA
Director
General Paul
Nakasone
National Security Agency
NSA
Director
Christopher
Wray
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBI
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 117-307]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-307
OPEN HEARING:
2022 ANNUAL WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT
OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 10, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-985 WASHINGTON : 2023
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.]
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
RON WYDEN, Oregon JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
ANGUS KING, Maine ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado TOM COTTON, Arkansas
BOB CASEY, Pennsylvania JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York BEN SASSE, Nebraska
CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio
----------
Michael Casey, Staff Director
Brian Walsh, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
MARCH 10, 2022
OPENING STATEMENTS
Page
Warner, Hon. Mark R., a U.S. Senator from Virginia............... 1
Rubio, Hon. Marco, a U.S. Senator from Florida................... 4
WITNESSES
Haines, Avril, Director of National Intelligence, accompanied by:
William J. Burns, Director, Central Intelligence Agency;
Lieutenant General Scott D. Berrier, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency; General Paul Nakasone, Director, National
Security Agency; and Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation............................................... 6
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Report titled ``Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
Community''.................................................... 43
OPEN HEARING: 2022 ANNUAL WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 2022
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room SH-216 in the Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark R.
Warner, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Warner, Rubio, Feinstein, Wyden,
Heinrich, King, Bennet, Casey, Gillibrand, Burr, Risch,
Collins, Blunt, Cotton, Cornyn, and Sasse.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER,
A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Chairman Warner. Good morning. I call this hearing to
order.
I want to welcome our witnesses: Director of National
Intelligence, Avril Haines; the CIA Director, Bill Burns; the
FBI Director, Chris Wray; Director of the National Security
Agency and the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, General Paul
Nakasone; and DIA Director, Lieutenant General Scott Berrier.
Thank you all for being here today, and thank you also to
the literally thousands of dedicated IC professionals who help
do the good work that allows you to appear before this
Committee.
The annual worldwide threats hearing is critically
important. It is not only an opportunity for the intelligence
agencies to inform our Members of the many threats and
opportunities facing the United States, it's also really one of
the only times when the combined leadership of the IC comes
together to actually inform the American public
It's why last year, after there was no worldwide threats
hearing in 2020, Congress codified this briefing requirement in
law. This dialog and transparency is a fundamental pillar of
democracy. It allows the American people to appreciate the IC's
usually secret mission and also to hold our Nation's security
agencies accountable.
In that light, I want to first express, though, my
enormous, enormous gratitude for the accuracy with which the IC
predicted Putin's plans to invade Ukraine. Those warnings made
plain for all to see that the lies of the Kremlin, which was
attempting to put together false flag operations to somehow
legitimize Putin's actions, were totally false. And your
forward-leaningness--and, candidly, I know for some of you,
probably outside your traditional comfort zone--I think was
critically, critically important in throwing Putin off guard,
but also showing to our allies, and not just our traditional
allies but people across the world, the nefarious intent of
Vladimir Putin.
Right now, Putin is waging an illegal and disastrous war in
Ukraine. And as we saw yesterday, the bombing of the Children's
and Maternal Hospital, with horrific humanitarian consequences.
We all know that Putin had this aspiration to restore Russia's
greatness, but what he got is that now Russia is even further
viewed as a pariah state and his invasion has been virtually
unanimously condemned. Truth is, right now, NATO is more
unified than ever.
Russia's economy suffers under crippling sanctions from a
global coalition, not only Five Eyes or NATO, but the E.U.,
Japan, Sweden, Finland. And as we've all indicated a number of
times, it's a pretty remarkable action when even Switzerland
gets out of its traditional neutral position.
Truth is, businesses are fleeing Russia. We've seen
international energy companies and others, the pictures in the
last couple of days of McDonald's. And I still remember the
very first McDonald's going into Moscow. What an event that
was. But the fact is that, at least on a short-term basis,
McDonald's is closing down all its stores.
All the while, the people of Ukraine demonstrate a bravery
and a commitment to defend their country against the madness of
Putin's attempt at authoritarian subjugation. We've also been,
I think, all inspired by President Zelensky's courage and his
willingness to stand up against Putin's efforts. I also want to
take a moment, and I've shared this with my colleagues, you
know, democracy is sometimes messy.
The way we sometimes go about passing our laws is messy. In
the last few years in our country, whether it was grappling
with the January 6th intervention, whether it was COVID,
whether it was the ability of social media to pit us against
each other on a tribal basis, I think it sometimes made us
question whether traditional liberal democracy and its values
can be successful against an authoritarian regime.
And I believe with all my heart that the people of Ukraine
are literally voting with their lives, embracing the values
that we take for granted every day. And maybe we all want to
take a deep breath at some point and recognize, with all our
flaws, our system is still the best in the world, and people
are willing to die to try to touch some of the freedoms that we
take on a daily basis.
And as we focus on this enormous crisis and as Russia axed
up in the relative stability of the post-World War II order in
Europe, I don't think we can take our eyes off one of the other
great challenges our country and the world face, and that is
the strategic competitor that the Chinese Communist Party of
President Xi presents. And I think it is always important--I
know I say this always--to make the point that our beef,
particularly when it comes to China, is not with the Chinese
people or the Chinese diaspora, but is with the Communist
Party, because the failure to do so simply plays into Xi's
efforts that are broadcasted on all of the Chinese social media
platforms that somehow this is an anti-Asian, anti-China
effort. We see this not only here; I had a conversation with
our Australian counterpart just recently on this same topic.
And the truth is, China is unlike any adversary that we've
faced, I believe, since the Second World War. It's demonstrated
not only its ability to try to compete with us on a military
basis, but compete with us on an economic basis. Russia, the
Soviet Union, was a military threat an ideological threat but
was never truly an economic threat.
And one area that is of enormous concern to me is China's
competition with us in the technology realm. I got my start in
telecom about 40 years ago, and I could never have imagined all
the innovations that have come about from technology. Social
media, satellites, high performance computing, semiconductors--
the list goes on and on. Technology has become so incredibly
integral to our lives and our national security. I truly
believe that whoever wins the technology race in the 21st
century will lead to economic and other levels of dominance.
I think that ability to compete against China--and it will
require, frankly, not only the United States, but it will
require great working with our allies around the world--is
critically important in a clear intelligence and national
security threat. One of the things I think that the
Administration has done quite well is in terms of rallying
forces against Russia. We see China on a daily basis continue
to compete in those domains. Truth is, China is relying on
strategic investments, cyber, and traditional espionage. I
think the FBI Director has indicated close to $500 billion a
year of intellectual property theft. The truth is, China is not
trying to have a dual-win circumstance. They intend to win and
dominate in technology domain after technology domain.
Unlike the United States, I believe China will use that
power to spread its authoritarian ideas, whether through
economic coercion like the Belt and Road Initiative, or in an
area that, again, we've talked with many of you about, in terms
of China infiltrating those critically-important, technology-
setting bodies that sometimes have been not viewed with
appropriate focus.
And that's, again, why I want to thank the ODNI, the CIA,
and all of you for refocusing your agencies on this critical
competition in the technology domain. A rising China and a
ruthless Russia, both headed by authoritarian regimes seeking
to undermine the cause of democratic governments worldwide
again, are a stark reminder that what we take for granted here
in this country, freedom of the press, freedom to vote,
democracy--as messy as it is--that order is not guaranteed. It
requires conviction, leadership, and sometimes sacrifice,
again, as we see that sacrifice play out on a daily basis with
the people of Ukraine.
Now, while I focus today on China and Russia, I know there
are a multitude of other threats that I haven't addressed from
rogue states like Iran and North Korea, the persistent threat
of terrorism, the ongoing global pandemic and future emerging
global health threats, and the obviously continued and pressing
threat of global warming, which looms closer and closer. We see
the floods playing out right now in Australia. Suffice it to
say, I can't think of a time when the worldwide threats were
more voluminously complex. I can't think of a better group of
people, though, to come forward to present the Intelligence
Community's view on these issues. I look forward to the day's
very important discussion, and I appreciate you being here.
I'll turn now to my friend, the Vice Chairman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
A U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all
for being here.
This is, I imagine, probably the most important and most
watched worldwide threats hearing in my time in the U.S.
Senate. I was raised in the final decade of a long Cold War, in
which the struggle between the two global superpowers and two
ideologies really threatened to end life on the Earth. I came
into adulthood and I witnessed the collapse of an evil empire,
a vision and an image unimaginable to anyone just a few short
years before it happened. And it seemed at that time that the
world had reached the end of history, that liberal democracy
had won and was destined to spread to every corner of the
globe, and the connections of a globalized economy would, from
here on out, prevent war between great powers forever.
The truth is that, in every era, leaders, nations, and
civilizations have struggled with the same feature of our
fallen nature, and that is the desire of the powerful to
conquer, to enslave, to rule over those that are weaker than
themselves. Western civilization in general--our Nation, the
United States of America, in particular--embraced moral
principles that stigmatized this part of our nature. And we
created rules and institutions both at home and around the
world to control it. But it's now clear that the last 30 years
were but a brief respite from the rhythms of human history
because, while much has changed about humanity and our species,
there is one thing that will never change: human nature.
Putin's invasion of Ukraine has especially horrified the
Western world because we had grown accustomed to war and
brutality being what happens in other regions, troubled
regions, far away, or the stuff of grainy black and white
videos. But now the victims are people who are familiar to us.
They're people who just a month ago had jobs. They had lives.
They had trips planned. They had weddings on the books. They
lived much like we do on this very day. And then overnight,
they have no home to return to, no job to resume. And we see
the images of wives and children boarding busses and trains and
unsure that they will ever see their husband or father alive
again.
This man's barbarism is a shocking opening chapter in the
return of history, and now we must prepare ourselves for this
new era, for frankly, greater dangers lie ahead. Vladimir
Putin's claim is both meritless but familiar: that his is a
powerful country and therefore he has the right to make vassals
of his neighbors. But it is not his claim alone. In the Middle
East, Iran considers its Ayatollah to be the leader of the
entire Muslim world, Shia and Sunni alike, and it seeks an arc
of power extending to Lebanon to Syria to Iraq and eventually
to Bahrain. It seeks the weapons to gain them immunity from the
world doing anything about it.
And in the Far East, we find the most audacious and
consequential claim of all: an assertive China which believes
that all roads must one day lead to Beijing, and that their
smaller neighbors must accept their place in the world as
tributary states. Standing in the way of this axis of
totalitarianism is an imperfect yet very powerful living
rejection of their claims. The United States of America--we
face no shortages of challenges here at home. We're divided
over issues that range from the consequential to, frankly, the
trivial, but we cannot avoid the fork in the road before us
now. We will either awaken from complacency, build our national
strength, and confront this century's version of
authoritarianism, or it will one day come for us and the world
will enter a new Dark Age.
In this new conflict, the agencies each of you have been
entrusted to lead will play a role more pivotal than ever.
Conflict now between competing powers and worldviews is no
longer just a domain of soldiers and sailors. In this new era,
our adversaries engage us daily on the battlefield of
information and cyberspace and technology and in the heavens.
They infiltrate our schools to steal our research and our
laboratories to steal our science. They enter our computers to
take our data and our companies to take our industries. And
they embed themselves in our social media to divide us against
one another and to confuse us and in our critical
infrastructure to one day hold us hostage.
There is not a single American soldier on the ground in
Ukraine; not a single American airman patrols the skies. We may
not be at war with Russia, but we are most certainly in
conflict with Putin. When Putin was denying any intention of
invading Ukraine, it was your work--the work of our
Intelligence Community--that prepared a skeptical world to get
ready and immunized it from the virus of disinformation. When
it came time to inflict damage on his economy, it was our
intelligence that identified the ones that would have the
greatest impact.
And all of us, as the Chairman has pointed out, have been
inspired by the bravery of President Zelensky. But every
American deserves and needs to know that neither his people nor
the world would have been able to witness this bravery on a
daily, real-time basis had it not been for the hard work of the
men and women of our Intelligence Community, often days and
weeks before the storm.
And so today, even as we hear about the conflict before us
now, I hope we will hear about how our intelligence agencies
are evolving to meet the new challenges of a new era and
specifically how twenty-first century intelligence was applied
to the crisis in Ukraine.
Today, we discuss the various threats confronting our
Nation. But in all of this, let's not lose sight of the central
threat before us now, because the spirit of totalitarianism has
never left us. But it now possesses and lives inside great
powers. And it's not looking for an off-ramp, it's not looking
for a face-saving exit, it's not looking for its security
interest to be respected or their rightful place in the world
to be recognized. It is looking to fulfill the darkest impulse
of our fallen nature: to conquer, to dominate, and to enslave.
This is no time to forget the lessons of history, for this
is a monster you cannot make a deal with. This is a monster
that has to be defeated.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Rubio. And before I go
to the Director, I just want to remind Members that we will
have a classified briefing after this. So I would ask everyone
to please respect that in terms of the form of your questions.
And unlike the traditional way we approach this, order of
arrival at the gavel, today we're going to go on a strict
seniority basis down the dais, and I am going to ask Members to
respect the five-minute rule.
With that, Director Haines the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF AVRIL HAINES, DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY: WILLIAM J. BURNS,
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; LIEUTENANT GENERAL SCOTT
D. BERRIER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; GENERAL PAUL
NAKASONE, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; AND CHRISTOPHER
WRAY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Director Haines. Thank you very much, Chairman Warner, Vice
Chairman Rubio, for your kind words. And Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you
today and provide testimony alongside my wonderful colleagues
and on behalf of the Intelligence Community on the IC's 2022
Annual Assessment of Worldwide Threats to U.S. national
security.
Before I start, I just want to take a moment to express to
you how much I've appreciated your thoughtful support and
partnership this last year and to publicly thank the men and
women of the Intelligence Community for their extraordinary
work to keep us safe. I know how privileged I am to be part of
this community, truly, of talented people and to be given a
chance to do something useful in service to my country, and I
thank you for the opportunity.
Broadly speaking, this year's assessment focuses on
adversaries and competitors, critical transnational threats,
and conflicts and instability. And these categories often
overlap, and one of the key challenges of this era is assessing
how various threats and trends are likely to intersect so as to
identify where their interactions may result in fundamentally
greater risk to our interests than one might otherwise expect
or where they introduce new opportunities.
The 2022 Annual Threat Assessment highlights some of these
connections as it provides the IC's baseline of the most
pressing threats to U.S. national interests. I'll try to do so
today as I provide a summary of our work. The assessment starts
with threats from key state actors, beginning with the People's
Republic of China, which remains an unparalleled priority for
the Intelligence Community, and then turns to Russia, Iran, and
North Korea.
All four governments have demonstrated the capability and
intent to promote their interests in ways that cut against U.S.
and allied interests. The PRC is coming ever closer to being a
pure competitor in areas of relevance to national security, is
pushing to revise global norms and institutions to its
advantage, and is challenging the United States in multiple
arenas, but particularly economically, militarily, and
technologically. China is especially effective at bringing
together a coordinated whole-of-government approach to
demonstrate its strength and to compel neighbors to acquiesce
in its preferences, including its territorial and maritime
claims and assertions of sovereignty over Taiwan.
President Xi Jinping is determined to force unification
with Taiwan on Beijing's terms, and China would prefer coerced
unification that avoids armed conflict. And it has been
stepping up diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on the
island for years to isolate it and weaken confidence in its
leaders. At the same time, Beijing is preparing to use military
force if it decides that that is necessary. PRC is also engaged
in the largest ever nuclear force expansion and arsenal
diversification in its history, and is working to match or
exceed U.S. capabilities in space, presenting the broadest,
most active and persistent cyber espionage threat to U.S.
government and private sector networks.
Russia, of course, also remains a critical priority and is
a significant focus right now. In light of President Putin's
recent and tragic invasion of Ukraine, which has produced a
shock to the geopolitical order with implications for the
future that we are only beginning to understand and are sure to
be consequential.
And the IC, as you know, provided warning of President
Putin's plans, but this is a case where I think all of us wish
we had been wrong. Nevertheless, the invasion has proceeded
consistent with the plan we assessed the Russian military would
follow, only they are facing significantly more resistance from
heroic Ukrainians than they expected and encountering serious
military shortcomings.
Russia's failure to rapidly seize Kyiv and overwhelm
Ukrainian forces has deprived Moscow of the quick military
victory that it probably had originally expected would prevent
the United States and NATO from being able to provide
meaningful military aid to Ukraine. Moreover, we assess Moscow
underestimated the strength of Ukraine's resistance and the
degree of internal military challenges we are observing in the
Russian military, which include an ill-constructed plan, morale
issues, and considerable logistical challenges.
What is unclear at this stage is whether Russia will
continue to pursue a maximalist plan to capture all or most of
Ukraine, which we assess would require more resources even as
the Russian military has begun to loosen its rules of
engagement to achieve their military objectives. If they pursue
the maximalist approach, we judge it will be especially
challenging for the Russians to hold and control Ukrainian
territory and install a sustainable pro-Russian regime to Kyiv
in the face of what we assess is likely to be a persistent and
significant insurgency. And of course, the human toll of the
conflict is already considerable and only increasing.
Thus far, the Russian and Ukrainian militaries have
probably suffered thousands of casualties along with numerous
civilian deaths, and of course, well more than a million people
have fled Ukraine since Russia invaded. Moreover, Russian
forces are at the very least operating with reckless disregard
for the safety of civilians as Russian units launch artillery
and airstrikes into urban areas as they have done in cities
across Ukraine, including the Chairman's mention of the
hospital and near critical infrastructure such as the Enerhodar
nuclear plant. The IC is engaged across the interagency to
document and hold Russia and Russian actors accountable for
their actions.
The reaction to the invasion from countries around the
world has been extraordinarily severe. Western unity in
imposing far-reaching sanctions, and export controls as well as
foreign commercial decisions are having cascading effects on
the Russian economy. The economic crisis that Russia is
experiencing is also exacerbating the domestic political
opposition to Putin's decision to invade.
NATO's unified response, the significant resistance that
the Ukrainians have demonstrated on the battlefield, Europe's
rapid response to Russia's invasion--not just in terms of
economic measures but also actions long thought to be off the
table, such as the provision of lethal aid to Ukraine and
shutting down EU airspace to Russian planes--all almost
certainly surprised Moscow. In particular, while Putin probably
anticipated many of the current sanctions to be imposed when he
weighed the cost of the invasion, we judge that he did not
anticipate either the degree to which the United States and its
allies and partners would take steps to undermine his capacity
to mitigate western sanctions or the pull-back from Russia
initiated by the private sector.
Nevertheless, our analysts assessed that Russia, that
Putin, is unlikely to be deterred by such setbacks and instead
may escalate the conflict, essentially doubling down to achieve
Ukrainian disarmament and neutrality to prevent it from further
integrating with the United States and NATO. We assess Putin
feels aggrieved the West does not give him proper deference and
perceives this as a war he cannot afford to lose. But what he
might be willing to accept as a victory may change over time,
given the significant costs he is incurring. Putin's nuclear
saber-rattling is very much in line with this assessment.
Putin's public announcement that he ordered Russia's strategic
nuclear forces to go on special alert in response to aggressive
statements from NATO leaders was extremely unusual. We have not
seen a public announcement from the Russians regarding a
heightened nuclear alert status since the 1960s; But we have
also not observed force-wide nuclear posture changes that go
beyond what we have seen in prior moments of heightened
tensions during the last few decades. Our analysts assess that
Putin's current posturing in this arena is probably intended to
deter the West from providing additional support to Ukraine as
he weighs an escalation of the conflict. And Putin probably
still remains confident that Russia can militarily defeat
Ukraine and wants to prevent Western support from tipping the
balance and forcing a conflict with NATO.
Regardless, our number one intelligence priority is defense
of the homeland, and we will remain vigilant in monitoring
every aspect of Russia's strategic nuclear forces. With
tensions this high, there is always an enhanced potential for
miscalculation, unintended escalation, and we hope that our
intelligence can help to mitigate those concerns.
Beyond its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow presents a serious
cyber threat, a key space competitor, and one of the most
serious foreign influence threats to the United States. Using
its intelligence services, proxies, and wide-ranging influence
tools, the Russian government seeks to not only pursue its own
interests, but also to divide Western alliances, undermine U.S.
global standing, amplify discord inside the United States, and
influence U.S. voters and decision making.
And to finish with our state actors, Iran continues to
threaten U.S. interests. It tries to erode U.S. influence in
the Middle East, entrench its influence and project power in
neighboring states, minimize threats to regime stability.
Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un continues to steadily expand and
enhance Pyongyang's nuclear conventional capabilities,
targeting the United States and its allies, periodically using
aggressive and potentially destabilizing actions to reshape the
regional security environment in his favor, and to reinforce
his status as a de facto nuclear power.
The assessment focuses next on a number of key global and
transnational threats, including global health security,
transnational organized crime, the rapid development of
destabilizing technologies, climate migration, terrorism. I
raise these because they pose challenges of a fundamentally
different nature to our national security than those posed by
the actions of nation-states, even powerful ones like China. We
look at the Russia-Ukraine war and can imagine outcomes to
resolve the crisis and the steps needed to get there, even
though unpalatable and difficult. And similarly, we view the
array of challenges China actions pose and can discuss what is
required, how to think about tradeoffs involved. And
transnational issues are more complex, requiring significant
and sustained multilateral effort, and that we can discuss ways
of managing them. All of them pose a set of choices that will
be more difficult to untangle and perhaps require more
sacrifice to bring about meaningful change.
This reflects not just the interconnected nature of the
problems, but also the significant impact increasingly-
empowered non-state actors have on the outcomes and the reality
that some of the countries who are key to mitigating threats
posed by nation-states are also the ones we will be asking to
do more in the transnational space. For example, the lingering
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic is putting a strain on
governments and societies, fueling humanitarian and economic
crises, political unrest, and geopolitical competition as
countries such as China and Russia seek to exploit the crisis
to their own advantage.
And no country has been completely spared. Even when a
vaccine is widely distributed globally, the economic and
political aftershocks will be felt for years. Low income
countries with high debts face particularly challenging
recoveries, and the potential for cascading crises that lead to
regional instability whereas others turn inward or will be
distracted by other challenges. These shifts will spur
migration around the world, including on our southern border.
The economic impact has set many poor and middle income
countries back years in terms of economic development, and is
encouraging some in Latin America, Africa, and Asia to look to
China and Russia for quick economic and security assistance to
manage their new reality.
We see the same complex mix of interlocking challenges
stemming from climate change, which is exacerbating risk to
U.S. national security interests across the board, but
particularly as it intersects with environmental degradation
and global health challenges.
And terrorism of course remains a persistent threat to U.S.
persons and interests at home and abroad, but the implications
of the problem are evolving. In Africa, for example, where
terrorist groups are clearly gaining strength, the growing
overlap between terrorism, criminal activity, smuggling
networks has undermined stability, contributed to coups and an
erosion of democracy, and resulted in countries turning to
Russian entities to help manage these problems.
And global transnational criminal organizations continue to
pose a direct threat to the United States through the
production and trafficking of lethal illicit drugs, massive
theft including cyber-crime, human trafficking, and financial
crimes and money laundering schemes. In particular, the threat
from illicit drugs is at historic levels, with more than
100,000 American drug overdose deaths for the first time
annually, driven mainly by a robust supply of synthetic opioids
from Mexican transnational criminal organizations.
In short, the interconnected global security environment is
marked by the growing specter of great power competition and
conflict, while transnational threats to all nations and actors
compete for our attention and also our finite resources.
And finally, the assessment turns to conflicts and
instability, highlighting a series of regional challenges of
importance to the United States: iterative violence between
Israel and Iran. Conflicts in other areas, including Africa,
Asia, and the Middle East, have the potential to escalate or
spread, fueling humanitarian crises and threatening U.S.
persons. Africa, for example, has seen six irregular transfers
of power since 2020 and probably will see new bouts of conflict
in the coming year as the region becomes increasingly strained
by a volatile mixture of democratic backsliding, inter-communal
violence, and the continued threat of cross-border terrorism.
Of course, we are also focused on our workforce and their
families. The IC continues to contribute to the government-wide
effort to better understand potential causal mechanisms of
anomalous health incidents and remains committed to ensuring
afflicted individuals receive the quality care they need. The
safety and well-being of our workforce is our highest priority,
and we are grateful to Members of your Committee for your
continued support on these efforts.
In closing, I just want to note how much effort has gone
into improving our capability to share intelligence and
analysis with our partners and allies across the Intelligence
Community. As we have seen in our approach to the threat to
Ukraine, as you've noted, the sharing of intelligence and
analysis has paid real dividends in helping facilitate
collective action against the renewed threat of nation-state
aggression. And while such efforts must be done with care to
ensure we are able to protect our sources and methods, we are
laying the groundwork to broaden our work where doing so
creates the conditions for a more united focus on other
emerging challenges. We appreciate your support in these
efforts.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Director Haines, and thank you
on behalf of the other members of the panel on deferring to
only have you do the opening statement.
My first question is on the cyber domain and I want to ask
Director Haines and General Nakasone. And I want to just again
compliment the Members of this Committee. When we saw the
Russians launch the SolarWinds attack, it was this Committee
that first focused on that issue. And in a broadly bipartisan
way, we recognized that only about 30 percent of our cyber-
attacks are actually being reported to the government. I'm
proud to say that in the budget bill that hopefully we'll take
up the next day or two--it's already passed the House--we
finally have put in place a cyber-notification process,
something that I would recognize that Senator Collins has been
working on literally for years and years and years. We are this
close to the finish line. Since only about 30 percent of our
cyber incidents are reported, we need to make sure that
information gets to the FBI, gets to CISA, gets to our private-
sector partners in a real-time way.
One of the things I've been surprised at is that the
Russian cyber capabilities, while we've not seen a very
efficient military so far, I don't think any of us think that
Russia does not have extraordinarily critical and first-rate
cyber tools. The fact that they have not launched much beyond
traditional malware--they've not launched the kind of worm-
driven NotPetya attacks that we saw in 2017--my concern has
been that that type of attack could literally go beyond the
geographic boundaries of Ukraine, bleed into Poland where it
could affect American troops or shut down Polish hospitals, and
result in the death of Polish citizens, which could potentially
move us into Article 5 territory.
General Nakasone, I'd like to start with you. You're the
best expert on this topic. Have you been a bit surprised that
they haven't launched their full array of attacks? And how
concerned are you, as Russia gets more and more stymied on the
military front, that they may unleash some of their additional
cyber tools?
General Nakasone. Chairman, thank you very much for the
question. I begin by saying that we remain vigilant. We're 15
days into this conflict. By no means are we sitting back and
taking this casually. We are watching every single day for any
type of unusual activity. And I would just build on the
scenario that you talked about. This idea of malware spreading
is one scenario that we look at. But there are three other
scenarios that also come into our thinking.
One might be the use of ransomware, broad use of ransomware
that our adversaries might use.
The next would be scenario proxies, those that necessarily
may not be part of the Russian government but are functioning
as a proxy or as a non-nation-state actor due to this type of
activity to perhaps launch malware.
And the final one is this idea of a disruptive or
destructive attack on a country in Eastern Europe that could
take place.
As I said, we're 15 days into this. We've seen three to
four attacks. The reasons in terms of why there haven't been
more, I think--obviously, this is part of Russia's own
strategic calculus. But secondly, a tremendous amount of work
was done prior to the actual invasion, work that was done by my
agency, work that was done by Cyber Command, by the
interagency, by a series of private sector partners that harden
the infrastructure of Ukraine. I think that that was part of
it. And the final thing is there have been actions since then
that I think that have contributed to the Russians in terms of
the way that they approach the future.
I would just conclude by saying not only are we vigilant,
we're prepared, and most importantly, we're sharing information
and sharing our expertise with our partners.
Chairman Warner. Let me get to my second question. I want
to honor my own commitment to try to keep within five minutes.
One of the things that my friend, Senator Burr, often mentioned
is we don't have a technology committee in the Senate. In many
ways, the Intelligence Committee has become the technology
committee.
I think a lot of the competition going forward,
particularly vis-a-vis China, will be around technology. I
think we were all surprised at their enormous success in the 5G
domain. Again, many of us are working on making sure we make
the kind of investments that China is making on semiconductors.
Candidly, shutting off semiconductors to Russia will be as
effective as any tool in shutting down their military
industrial complex.
Director Burns, you have made this a priority. How do we
make sure that across the IC, we both monitor and incent
policymakers and the balance of the government to make the
necessary investments in technology?
Director Burns. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Nothing is going to matter more to the future of CIA and, I
think, the U.S. Intelligence Community more broadly than our
ability to compete technologically. It's the main arena, as you
said before, Mr. Chairman, for competition with China.
So just in the last couple of months, we've established a
new mission center at the CIA alongside a new mission center on
China, and equally important, a mission center focused on
technology issues to make sure that we're anticipating, keeping
pace, getting out ahead of the pace of innovation to deepen
partnerships with the private sector, because that's absolutely
essential, I think, to our future as we look at competition and
technology.
We've just created the position of Chief Technology Officer
for the first time at CIA. So all of that, I think, reflects
the enormously high priority that we will continue to attest to
that set of issues.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator Rubio.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you all for being here.
I'll direct this to you, Director Haines. But anybody who
wants to answer it can do so. I think we've learned from all
this, the best way to combat disinformation is through
transparency. So I want to walk through some component pieces
of a particular topic involving labs and Ukraine and then allow
you or anyone to expand who could provide greater insight.
As you're all well aware, Russia has been laying out this
argument for a number of months now about how there are these
labs in Ukraine that are developing chemical and biological
weapons, that the U.S. is involved, that they've discovered it.
And they've been making that argument for a period of time. And
it's the argument they usually make before they use that kind
of stuff themselves against someone.
So let me just start with a question on the component
pieces, and then allow you to expand more on the important
parts of it. There is a difference between a biological
research facility and a biological weapons research facility,
correct?
Director Haines. Correct.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Okay. Does Ukraine have any biological
weapons research facilities?
Director Haines. No, but let me be clear, we do not assess
that Ukraine is pursuing either biological weapons or nuclear
weapons, which has been some of the propaganda that Russia is
putting out.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Okay. So they do have the biological
research facilities. What is our government's role in their
biological research programs?
Director Haines. So as I understand it, Ukraine operates
about a little over a dozen essentially bio labs. And what they
are involved in is Ukraine's biodefense and their public health
response. And that's essentially what they're intended to do.
And I think that the U.S. government provides assistance, or at
least has in the past provided assistance, really in the
context of biosafety, which is something that we've done
globally with a variety of different countries.
So I would defer, obviously, the details of that assistance
to the agencies involved.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Well, I guess that's the important
component. How do we define biosafety or biodefense? Is it the
ability to have antidotes or responses if someone were to use
an agent against you if you were having an outbreak? What
exactly is that?
Director Haines. I will quickly get out of my area of
expertise. But I'll give you a generic answer that I
understand.
So it is essentially for biodefense. You can think about
things like medical countermeasures, for example, things that
will help you to address a pandemic that is an outbreak in your
country, things along those lines; things that prevent
spreading of pandemics and other health issues, things along
those lines. And the kinds of biosafety pieces that you would
be providing assistance for are things like making sure that,
as you're producing medical countermeasures, that you're taking
appropriate precautions, that you're letting the medical
community internationally know, notifying when appropriate.
So that's the kind of assistance. But again, I just want to
be absolutely clear that we do not believe that Ukraine is
pursuing biological or nuclear weapons, that we've seen no
evidence of that. And frankly, this influence campaign is
completely consistent with longstanding Russian efforts to
accuse the United States of sponsoring bio-weapons work in the
former Soviet Union.
So this is a classic move by the Russians.
Vice Chairman Rubio. So, I think the one thing that's
piqued a lot of people's interest, and I hope we can address,
is that Assistant Secretary Nuland said a couple of days ago,
in response to my question in another hearing--this is a quote:
``The U.S. government is concerned about preventing any of
these research materials from falling into the hands of Russian
forces should they approach.''
So people will hear that and say, well, that means that
there must be something in these labs that's very dangerous.
They possess pathogens or something that must be very
dangerous. Look, we're all coming off the trauma of COVID-19,
the possibility that there might have been an accident or a
leak out of a lab there that we still don't know the answer to.
And so it's in that context that people read that statement or
hear it and say, okay, it sounds to me like they have labs,
these labs are working on dangerous things, and if the Russian
were worried that it's going to get out of the laboratory, how
should people assess that statement? Why are we so concerned?
And again, I know I'm asking you some questions regarding
medicine and biology and research and so forth. But it's really
important for this effort to understand what exactly is in
these labs that we're so worried about them getting their hands
on.
Director Haines. Medical facilities that I've certainly
been in, done research in high school type of thing, in
college--all have equipment for pathogens or other things that
you have to have restrictions around, because you want to make
sure that they're being treated and handled appropriately.
And I think that's the kind of thing that probably Victoria
Nuland was describing and thinking about in the context of
that. We have to be concerned in the same way that we have to
be concerned about in the Enerhodar nuclear power plant or
other facilities that, when they're seized and if they're
seized, that there may be damage done or theft. And they may in
fact misuse some of the material that's there that's not
intended for weapons purposes but, nevertheless, can be used in
dangerous ways or that can create challenges for the local
populations.
Vice Chairman Rubio. All right. Thanks.
Chairman Warner. Senator Rubio, thank you for raising this.
I think we've seen some of these reports, that this may be
another area where Russia is trying to offer a false flag
signal, and really appreciate your line of questioning.
I want to turn to Senator Feinstein. But I do want to
acknowledge that Dianne has served the longest on this
Committee. And we appreciate very much the challenges, the
personal challenges you've been going through, and your
attendance here always.
I remember one time you literally had come, I think, from a
medical procedure. You were still here showing up at one of
these hearings, and we're grateful for your leadership. And I
call on you now for five minutes.
Senator Feinstein. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
In an unclassified annual threat assessment you state that,
quote, ``Individuals and small cells inspired by a variety of
ideologies and personal motivation include Sunni violent
extremism, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism,
and militia violent extremism probably represent the greatest
terrorist threat to the United States.''
Now, while we have no interest in giving Al-Qaeda or ISIS
an opportunity to recover, you're making the clear point that
individuals and small cells represent the greatest threat to
the United States.
So here's the question. How are you allocating your
resources for counterterrorism? It appears that most of the
funding for counterterrorism goes into efforts focused against
specific groups instead of attempting to locate individuals.
How do you justify that allocation compared against the
assessed threat?
Director Haines. I'm happy to start, but I suspect Director
Wray and others may have some thoughts on this.
I think from at least the Intelligence Community
perspective, it's true that we focus in on groups that are
critical to our national security, groups such as al-Shabab and
ISIS and Al-Qaeda Khor in these contexts, as examples. But it
is also true that we are looking at, consistently across the
board, how it is that the ideologies that they propagate and
that others propagate that are of concern and reflected in our
assessment are creating violent extremism in a variety of
places including in small groups and even for individuals.
And our system is set up in such a way as to identify not
simply the networking that we see with respect to such groups,
but also to essentially create the opportunity for us to try to
provide as much warning as we can with respect to individuals
and others that----
Senator Feinstein. Could the military respond as well?
Director Haines. Absolutely. Yes. And it's challenging
obviously when you have somebody that's disconnected from a
system. Yes.
Director Wray. I would just add that from the FBI's end, of
course, the types of terrorist threats that you referenced,
Senator, are at the top of our priority list. And through our
Joint Terrorism Task Forces in every Field Office, we're
prioritizing those. And the reason why the Jihadist-inspired
homegrown violent extremists, and then the domestic violent
extremists, are such a high priority is because unlike the more
classic, post-9/11 sleeper cells where you have a large group
of people plotting, planning, preparing, fundraising, training,
there are a lot of dots to connect in a plot like that. With
the kind of terrorist threat we're talking about here, you're
talking about an individual going after an easily-accessible
target with a very crude weapon, which means there's a lot
fewer dots to connect. And so the key is getting the eyes and
ears out in the community.
And that's why the growth in the Joint Terrorism Task
Forces with task force officers from state and local police
departments all over the country has been such an important
development.
Senator Feinstein. Anyone, please. I'd like other comments.
Director Burns. All I would add, Senator, is even at CIA,
even as we focus more and more attention and resources on major
power adversaries like China and Russia for all the obvious
reasons, we remain sharply focused on the counterterrorism
challenge, as well. I think it's notable that in the same
month--last month in February--when all of us had to deal with
renewed Russian aggression in Ukraine, we played a central role
along with our partners in the U.S. military in finding the
former Emir of ISIS, Hajji Abdullah, locating him, and then
cooperating with our military partners in a successful
operation against him. So we'll remain very sharply focused.
Senator Feinstein. So if I understand what you're saying,
you're changing the allocation of resources to individuals from
groups. Is that correct or not?
Director Burns. No. What I was suggesting, Senator, is that
even as we focus more attention and resources on major power
adversaries like China and Russia at CIA, where we're focused
on external terrorist threats, we remain sharply focused on the
threats posed to the homeland by everyone from ISIS--and I
mentioned the successful operation against the former ISIS
Emir--as well as Al-Qaeda and its affiliates like al-Shabab,
like Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
That was my only point.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. I will hear from the
military, please.
General Berrier. Senator, DIA's Defense Counterterrorism
Center, DCTC, is focused on foreign terrorist threats. They
continue to operate as they have for the last 20 years, focused
on organizations' foreign transnational terrorist threats.
Thank you.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Burr.
Senator Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to take this opportunity to highlight what's already
been pointed out: the success of our intelligence and the
analysis of that intelligence product. Your thousands of
employees deserve the thanks of this Committee, of this
Congress, and of the American people. Likewise, President
Zelensky and the Ukrainian people have reminded us that
democracy does not come without a cost.
It has to be protected. This democracy, the independence of
Ukraine, demands that democracies around the world respond with
everything needed to preserve Ukraine's independence and
democracies that are threatened. Likewise, leaders like Putin
don't want their people to have the freedoms that we cherish
and that we strive to protect.
This would not be possible without the men and women who
work for you on behalf of not just this country, but
democracies around the world. We are eternally grateful for all
the work that they do, but more importantly, the response that
they've had to this current challenge.
Mr. Chairman, I have no questions in open session.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Burr, for once again
acknowledging the great work of this community. I appreciate
it.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I share
Senator Burr's view. And let me thank you particularly,
Director, for your professionalism and dedication. We've talked
on a number of subjects and I have appreciated it.
Now let me turn to cybersecurity. In a recent unclassified
briefing from my office, government cybersecurity experts
reconfirmed that a technology known as SS7, which allows phones
to roam from one network to another, could also allow foreign
actors to get into our networks and intercept American's calls
and texts. These experts also identified Russia as one of the
top threats for this kind of surveillance.
Now, fortunately, there's a way to prevent this that
doesn't get in the way of communications between our country
and Russia. U.S. carriers could simply block roaming requests
from Russian phone networks. The only inconvenience would be
that anyone with the U.S. phone in Russia would need to buy a
local phone card.
Director Haines, my question would be: would this policy
make it harder for the Russian government to spy on Americans?
Director Haines. Thank you so much, Senator Wyden. And I
think it's an excellent question, obviously. I asked my folks
what they thought about this. And basically, I think we want to
explore it, if you're willing to give us a little bit of time.
I gather it really would require a little bit of research to
understand what the consequences would be of doing that exact
kind of blocking.
So I'd like to be able to come back to you. I think it's a
really worthy question and appreciate the interest.
Senator Wyden. Good.
And you inherited this problem because I've been asking you
about it for some time. But you're new on the beat and you've
been responsive and I appreciate it.
Director Burns, the public knows far less about
intelligence activities conducted under Executive Order 12333
than under the FISA law. So I want to express my appreciation
to you and to the Director for being more forthcoming and
transparent about this subject than your predecessors.
Here's my question. The CIA released a portion of a report
from the Privacy Board that raised the concern that when CIA
analysts searched their records for information on Americans.
There was no requirement to justify it. No requirement, for
example, to write down the justification for a search.
My question--and we've been talking with your folks--is:
will you commit this morning to requiring CIA analysts to write
down their requests for conducting searches on Americans so
those searches can be reviewed?
Director Burns. The short answer, Senator, is yes. I can
assure you that CIA will comply with our Attorney General
guidelines on documentation requirements for conducting
queries. In fact, I met last Friday with the new Chair of the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to talk about this
issue. And I stressed my personal commitment to working with
her and the rest of the Board very effectively in the years
ahead.
Senator Wyden. So when could we expect that this reform
would actually be implemented?
Director Burns. Well, as I said, you have my commitment
that we'll review our current procedures and ensure that all
our systems are compliant, and I'd be glad to report back to
you in six months on that.
Senator Wyden. Okay, let's see if we can speed it up,
because we've been waiting a long time for this one as well.
We'll talk further about it. You've been responsive as well.
Let me go to you, Director Wray, if I might. You testified
on Tuesday that the FBI bought a license for the NSO hacking
tools to evaluate them and determine what security concerns
they raise.
Did the FBI inform anybody else in the government about
what it learned from that evaluation?
Director Wray. I think I'd have to defer to closed session
about anything on the--. I think what you're getting at is the
so-called VEP, the vulnerabilities process that's interagency.
And while we participate in that, whether or not it applied
here is a different question. But we could maybe talk a little
bit more about that in closed session.
Senator Wyden. I'm glad to do that. Here's what I'm
interested in. I'm just asking whether the government believes
that the FBI's operational use of these tools would be legal
and whether that's still on the table. The public deserves to
know that. Even if the FBI decided against using NSO's hacking
tools, the Department of Justice Inspector General has
confirmed that the FBI does use hacking in investigations.
I do think the public deserves some information on this.
Let's continue the discussion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Wyden.
And I just want to again acknowledge if Congress had just
followed Senator Collins ten or eleven years ago, we might be
further along on the cyber issue.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Director Haines, following up on the Chairman's leadership
here. Before I begin my questioning, I just want to personally
thank you for working with the Chairman and me and other
Members of this Committee on the Cyber Security Bill. We very
much valued and appreciated your support, which was critical.
Director Burns, you have always shown extraordinary insight
into Putin's thinking. We all read about the Russian Defense
Ministry publicly accusing Ukraine of possibly planning a
false-flag chemical weapon attack. What do you make of that?
Does that signal that Putin intends to launch a chemical or
biological weapon attack on the Ukrainians?
Director Burns. Well, thanks very much, Senator. I think it
underscores the concern that all of us need to focus on those
kind of issues, whether it's the potential for a use of
chemical weapons, either as a false flag operation or against
Ukrainians. This is something, as all of you know very well, is
very much a part of Russia's playbook.
They've used those weapons against their own citizens.
They've at least encouraged the use in Syria and elsewhere. So
it's something we take very seriously. And it's one of the
reasons, as Director Haines said earlier, that I am convinced
that our efforts at selective declassification to preempt those
kinds of false-flag efforts and the creation of false
narratives have been so important. In all the years I spent as
a career diplomat, I saw too many instances in which we lost
information wars with the Russians.
In this case, I think we have had a great deal of effect in
disrupting their tactics and their calculations, and
demonstrating to the entire world that this is a premeditated
and unprovoked aggression built on a body of lies and false
narratives. So this is one information war that I think Putin
is losing.
Senator Collins. General Berrier, I feel very strongly that
the Ukrainians should be able to defend their own airspace. But
obviously, they need planes, they need manned drones. What is
the current status of the battle for control of the Ukrainian
airspace? And what is your assessment of what additional
aircraft or manned drones would mean for Ukraine?
General Berrier. Senator, thank you for that question.
My assessment is that the Ukrainians have been somewhat
effective with the assets and resources that they have. The
Russians have not achieved what I would call air dominance or
air superiority over the country of Ukraine right now. That
said, they are taking some losses and they do need additional
assets.
Weapons like Stingers have moved in and they have been used
with effect. I think the Ukrainians will continue to be able to
use those in small unit tactics with great effect. Certainly,
additional assets and resources with UAVs and aircraft, I'm
sure they could make very good use of that.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Director Berrier, I want to switch to a different issue. I
believe that we have a very strong moral obligation to welcome
those Afghans who have risked their lives, their families'
lives, their livelihoods, to help our troops, our diplomats,
and our intelligence professionals. Nevertheless, fulfilling
that obligation does not require compromising a thorough,
comprehensive vetting process for those Afghans who managed to
get on to airplanes before the last U.S. aircraft left the
runway. Unfortunately, a report from the Department of Defense
IG found that Afghan evacuees have not been screened
appropriately, using all available DoD databases. And as a
result, at least 50 individuals with security concerns already
are in the United States, and most of those cannot be located
right now.
Do you know whether the NGIC, the National Ground
Intelligence Center, has completed a biometric analysis as part
of this vetting process?
General Berrier. Senator, I don't know the answer to that
question right now, but I will take it for the record and get
back to you.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Collins. You know, we
mentioned the fact that this Committee has really taken on a
major focus on technology. And I want to acknowledge the fact
that on some of the very sophisticated areas of technology,
Senator Heinrich may be the only one that actually brings real
expertise to those issues. So I appreciate that.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Director Burns, I actually want to reiterate my colleague's
statement of thanks to you for working with us on increasing
some of the transparency around CIA's activities under 12333. I
think this is all about ensuring we just understand how
Americans' privacy and civil liberties are protected under
those authorities, and I know that's something you care about
as well.
I want to ask about the current situation in Chernobyl and
how concerned we should be about that. I know there's been a
lot of reporting that Ukraine's grid operator was concerned
about the reserve diesel generators potentially running out of
fuel once that was disconnected from the larger power grid.
How concerned should we be, and what do we know about the
situation there that can be discussed in this setting?
Director Haines. I'm happy to start. From my perspective,
my understanding of it is that we should be concerned but that
we haven't yet seen anything that brings us from concern to
it's a complete crisis. And I think if you want further
details, what I should do is come back to you in writing on it
and give you our best sense of it. But I don't know if others
have anything to add.
Senator Heinrich. I look forward to that.
Director, you talked a little bit about Russia's strategic
nuclear posture. And I want to pivot from that for just a
moment and ask about tactical--some people have even referred
to them as small nuclear weapons, almost as if they're
something we don't need to be overly concerned about.
But folks who work with nuclear weapons today know that
even tactical nuclear warheads have yields many times larger
than what we used at the end of World War II. How concerned
should we be about Russia's potential use of a tactical nuclear
weapon in Ukraine? What would that look like? And what can we
do to prevent that from happening, especially given how Putin
seems to be in a posture where he needs some sort of a reset
and has proven himself to be very unpredictable?
Director Haines. I think, probably, we can have a further
conversation about this in the closed session. But, as a
general matter, as I indicated, we're obviously very concerned.
We want to make sure that we're monitoring everything that may
be going on with respect to Russia's strategic nuclear forces.
But as I indicated, we have not yet seen posture changes that
are beyond what we've seen previously during moments of tension
such as in relation to Crimea or in 2016 vis-a-vis Syria, and
so on. They have made certain posture changes and they're
consistent with what we are seeing now. It's nothing
unprecedented in a sense.
Senator Heinrich. The international community's sanctions
and economic work with respect to Russia have resulted in quite
impressive outcomes. Obviously, Putin is trying to find
workarounds for these sanctions, to include relying on energy
sales, on the country's reserves and gold, and Chinese currency
as well as cryptocurrency. I've read that while there are
mitigating actions the Russian government can take to try to
get around the worst of the sanctions, they can't really
recreate their financial system.
Director Wray, do you agree with that assessment? And also,
what avenues do we have to combat Russia's misuse of
cryptocurrency to evade the current sanctions regime?
Director Wray. I think Director Haines may want to weigh in
a little bit on this as well, but I think the top line takeaway
is that the Russians' ability to circumvent the sanctions with
cryptocurrency is probably highly overestimated on the part of
maybe them and others. We are, as a community and with our
partners overseas, far more effective on that than I think
sometimes they appreciate.
And there's a lot of expertise in terms of tools and
strategies to help block that kind of effort. Ultimately, what
they really need to do is get access to some form of fiat
currency, which becomes more challenging. I don't know,
Director Haines, if you want to----
Senator Heinrich. And you are utilizing those tools?
Director Wray. Absolutely. We have built up significant
expertise both at the FBI and with some of our partners. And
there have been some very significant seizures and other
efforts that I think have exposed the vulnerability of
cryptocurrency as a way to get around sanctions.
Director Haines. The only thing I'd add to what Director
Wray said is just with respect to the first part of your
question, which is the enormous economic impact that's been had
as a consequence of the sanctions. In that part of what we've
seen is, as I indicated in my opening statement, we expected
President Putin anticipated to some extent what the sanctions
would be and how we would approach this given our past practice
in these areas. He built up a reserve fund that was really
intended to help him defend his currency in the context of
sanctions. But through the actions of our Treasury Department
and others in Europe and the West, what they've done is
actually make it very hard for him to access that money in
order to defend his currency. And we've seen it in freefall. I
believe it's lost about 40 percent of its value. It is
extraordinary to watch the stock markets--the fact that they've
had to close down so much of their economy, industry. Also the
private sector impact has been extraordinary and I think really
exacerbates the challenge for them in a pretty extraordinary
way.
Director Burns. The only thing I would add very briefly,
Senator, is that I think among the many profoundly-flawed
assumptions that President Putin made in launching this
invasion was his assumption that he had built a sanctions-proof
economy. That by building, as Director Haines said, a very
large war chest of foreign currency reserves and gold reserves,
and by not anticipating there'd be sanctions against the
Russian Central Bank, by not anticipating that the German
leadership would show such resolve, in particular, I think he
deeply underestimated the economic consequences. And I think
they're just now being felt in Russia and that's going to
intensify.
Chairman Warner. Senator Heinrich, I think some of your
crypto issues are really important. I've got some questions on
that in the closed session.
Senator Blunt this is going to be your last Worldwide
Threat Assessment briefing and we really thank you for your
service on this Committee.
Senator Blunt. Well, there are things I'll miss about the
Senate next year, but one of them will probably not be the
worldwide threat discussions that we have publicly and every
week on this fine Committee, Chairman, and thanks for your
leadership.
I just want to say that I'm working on NGS issues, and
we'll address some of that in the classified briefing.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you.
Let's follow up, Director Burns, on your other idea about
the economy. Do you think Putin overestimated what the Chinese
might be able to do to offset the sanctions and other economic
activities? Or, do you think the Chinese will step in in a way
that he might have anticipated?
Director Burns. Thanks very much for the question, Senator.
I think he may be overestimating the extent to which the
Chinese leadership will be able or willing to help him deal
with quite severe economic consequences of his invasion of
Ukraine. It remains to be seen how this will play out. But, you
know, I recall after the sanctions that were levied against
Russia after his prior aggression in Crimea, the Chinese drove
a very hard bargain over pipelines that the Russians were
trying to negotiate.
So they weren't particularly flexible or sympathetic, in a
way, during that period as well. So I suspect there's not going
to be any easy out for President Putin as he looks at trying to
deal with those economic consequences--not from the Chinese,
not from anyone else.
Senator Blunt. Do we have any sense of how the Chinese have
reacted to recent locking arms with the Russians right before
all of these events happened?
Director Burns. I think, Senator, that the Chinese
leadership, first, has invested a lot in partnership with
Russia, and I don't expect that to change anytime soon. I do,
however, believe that the Chinese leadership, President Xi in
particular, is unsettled by what he's seen, partly, because his
own intelligence doesn't appear to have told him what was going
to happen.
Second, because of the reputational damage that China
suffers by association with the ugliness of Russia's aggression
in Ukraine.
Third, by the economic consequences at a time when growth
rates in China, as you look over the rest of this year, are
lower than they've been in 30 years.
And fourth, I think because President Xi is probably a
little bit unsettled as he watches the way in which President
Putin has driven Americans and Europeans more closely together
and strengthened the transatlantic alliance in ways that would
have been a little bit hard to imagine before the invasion
began.
I think the Chinese leadership looks at Europe, not just as
a market, but as a kind of player with whom they can have an
independent relationship and try to look for ways in which they
can drive wedges between us and our European allies. And what
President Putin has so successfully done is to make that much
less likely.
Senator Blunt. I didn't intend to dwell in this public
session on China as much as I'm going to wind up doing in my
five minutes, but you know the Chinese have also announced
their plans, their intention, their capability devoted to
biotech. Underlying those activities, I think, is something,
Director Wray, we should be really focused on: how much that
may impact Americans as Chinese try to get more information
about Americans in various ways, as they develop their own
biotech potential to impact populations.
I'll let you start, and then, Director Haines, I'll come to
you.
Director Wray. So certainly, the Chinese have shown that
they are willing to pursue our personal data at a scale unlike
anything anywhere else in the world. They have stolen more of
our personal and corporate data than every other nation
combined. And one of the other lessons we saw from the COVID
period is their aggressive targeting of COVID research, whether
it was vaccines or other forms of medical treatment. And you
could almost clock any company's announcement that they were
making progress on something. Almost within days, you could
then see Chinese targeting or trying to steal that research.
Senator Blunt. Right. We certainly know they've done that
with personal data, financial data. I'm wondering about their
biotech focus, Director Haines. Do we need to be now concerned
about genetic data in ways that we might not have been at an
earlier time?
Director Haines. Yes, we do have concerns with bio data
across the board and I think not just genetic data, as you
point out. But that's a critical aspect of it. The collection
of that by China, in particular, but by other countries as
well, and how that can be used in the future, particularly as
the technology develops. So, absolutely.
Senator Blunt. I've noticed some of the reporting here and
the studies here. You could take a biotechnology look at
populations here or Africa or other places, and decide to do
things that specifically have impact on just a segment of the
population that has the genetic code that may be susceptible to
that, where their surrounding neighbors and others in the
country don't have. I think it's an area we'll be talking more
about, and I look forward to discussing that further.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
Senator Bennett, again, I just want to publicly thank you
for what were able to do last week in looking at some of our
overhead assets. You're up.
Senator Bennet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very
much for coming to Colorado.
I want to start by lending my thanks to all of you and to
the people that work for you. While Putin was lying to us and
to the Ukrainians and his own people, your people were
ascertaining the truth, and we were warning the world.
And that could not have happened without the work that
you've done. So I deeply, deeply appreciate it. We were on the
phone on Saturday, most of us, I guess, with President
Zelensky. He started the call by saying, we're just fighting to
be able to live our lives like you. And he ended the call by
saying, the world should live in peace, the world should live
in a pluralistic way, by which he meant with freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, self-determination--and that's what's at
stake here. And I think we've got a chance to win this fight,
in part, because of the people that work for all of you. So I
want to say thank you.
Director Haines, Putin's aggression against Ukraine and
against international rules and norms demonstrates the urgency
of maintaining American superiority in emerging domains,
including space and cyber, two domains that really I think the
American people have not heard enough about.
Last week, as the Chairman mentioned, he joined me in
Colorado for a series of briefings with Space Command, the
National Space Defense Center, and NRO leadership. Our
conversation reinforced for me that our military and
Intelligence Community missions are inextricably linked. And we
are concerned that the decision to relocate Space Command does
not fully account for the Intelligence Community missions that
are in Colorado, the depth of the private sector which is so
critical to building resilience in space.
It's my view that we should be spending money on the
mission in space, not on moving Space Command and starting from
scratch. Could you explain how strengthening the integration of
our military and intelligence missions is critical to
maintaining our superiority in space?
Director Haines. Yes, absolutely. I couldn't agree more
with the overall sentiment, which is that we have to integrate
these areas. I do think that it's a domain in which obviously
the Defense Department, but also other parts of the government
such as NASA and so on are occupying, and it's increasingly
crowded with commercial satellites as well.
And all of us have to be able to integrate together in
order to effectively manage things. But no two entities more
than, I suppose, the Department of Defense and the IC in order
for us to do our jobs. And as we've been doing--we have a
number of mechanisms that we use for that kind of coordination.
There's obviously the Joint Space Warfighter Forum which
has the USSPACECOM Commander and the NRO Director as co-chairs
and leading that. And that's an example of DoD and the IC
coming together on these issues. And we have a number of other
things: SPACECOM, the National Space Defense Center, an
integrated protection strategy, that are intended to do this.
I would just say that, as I know you already know, but just
to acknowledge it, we have work to do in this area to make sure
that, frankly, as compartmented as some aspects of our work is,
that we integrate that as well, effectively, so that we can
actually work across this domain in a sensible and strategic
way. I really appreciate your support and others for this area
because I think it's obviously critically important to our
future.
Senator Bennet. We heard some unbelievable things while we
were there, which obviously we can't talk about in open
session. But it is very clear--I think the Chairman would agree
with this assessment--that we do not have a moment to lose here
in space.
I just have a minute left.
Director Burns, could I just ask you to talk a little bit
while we're in public session? Just give the American people a
sense of how Russia is using disinformation across the world.
How it's using it in its own country, but also how it's using
it across the democracies to try to pit us against one another
and divide us from one another?
These are things that appear to the American people
sometimes to look like just another person's Twitter feed when,
in fact, the Russians can be behind it. So could you spend a
minute on that?
Director Burns. Sure. Thanks, Senator, and I'll focus on
the ways in which I think President Putin has worked
methodically over the last two decades to turn Russian society
into a kind of propaganda bubble. He's used financial
pressures, he's used lethal actions. I remember vividly when I
was Ambassador in Russia some years ago, going to the funeral
of a very courageous independent Russian journalist named
Politkovskaya in the fall of 2006. And that's just one part of
the pressure that he's brought against open information in
Russia. He's intensified his domination of the state-run media
and in his strangulation of independent media, especially in
recent years, and particularly since the invasion of Ukraine
began.
But I guess the last thing I'd say is I don't believe that
he's going to be able to seal Russians off entirely from the
truth. There are lots of Russians who have VPN accounts, who
have access to YouTube to this day, who have access to
information. And I don't believe he can wall off indefinitely
Russians from the truth, especially as realities began to
puncture that bubble. The realities of killed and wounded
coming home, an increasing number. The realities of the
economic consequences for ordinary Russians as I was discussing
before. The realities of the horrific scenes of hospitals and
schools being bombed next door in Ukraine and of civilian
casualties there as well.
I don't think he can bottle up the truth indefinitely.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Cotton, thank you as well, also,
for your constant willingness to press this Committee and
frankly the IC leadership both on the unclassified and
classified sections of collaboration between the DoD projects
and the IC projects. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Director Haines, I want to address the Administration's
fiasco of failing to help Poland transfer its aircraft to
Ukraine. The Pentagon spokesman yesterday cited your
Intelligence Community, quote, ``the Intelligence Community has
assessed the transfer of MiG-29s to Ukraine may be mistaken as
escalatory and could result in significant Russian reaction
that might increase the prospects of a military escalation with
NATO.''
The State Department spokesman said essentially the same
thing earlier today. Since Administration policymakers are
justifying their hesitancy to help Poland transfer these
aircraft by pointing to your Intelligence Community, could you
tell us what is the basis for this alleged assessment that the
transfer of these aircrafts would be viewed as escalatory?
Director Haines. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
So, it is our analysts' assessment that the transfer of
these airplanes could be perceived as a significant escalation
by the Russians. They are obviously an advanced and
considerable weapon.
Senator Cotton. I'm sorry. Director, I'm sorry. So I
appreciate your analysts and their deep expertise and knowledge
about this. I'm asking what specific evidence, information,
intelligence do they have that the transfer of these aircrafts,
as opposed to anti-aircraft missiles that shoot Russian jets
out of the sky, is going to be viewed as escalatory?
Director Haines. Why don't I provide to you a written
product that will give you the basis for that?
Senator Cotton. So the Pentagon spokesman also said that
this is the same intelligence that they had last year that
delayed the transfer of many of those missiles as well; that
there's no new intelligence. He said it was the same
intelligence he's had last year. Was that the case?
Director Haines. No, Senator, I'm not aware of what it is
that he was referencing, but this is a recent assessment that
was done by the Intelligence Community. I'm very happy to
provide that--
Senator Cotton. I understand you didn't do assessments. I'm
saying, do you have new intelligence?
Director Haines. So when analysts--I know you know this--
but obviously, they're looking at a body of intelligence and
then they're also providing their own knowledge and experience.
And I don't know whether or not there is----
Senator Cotton. So we can address this in a closed setting.
But here's my opinion. You don't have new intelligence. This is
opinion. And in many cases, this is policymakers who are
looking to the Intelligence Community to provide them cover for
their hesitancy.
General Berrier, could you explain, as an intelligence
officer, how Vladimir Putin might be A-OK with us transferring
missiles that turned their tanks into burning piles of rubbish
or shoot their jets out of the sky, yet transferring tactical
aircraft is going to be unacceptable? Why is the latter
escalatory and the former not escalatory?
General Berrier. Senator Cotton, thank you. I will take a
stab at that in open session here. I think when you look at
anti-tank weapons and air defense, Sir, shoulder fired kinds of
weapons, there is a range of escalation. And I think in our
view that escalation ladder doesn't get checked higher with
those weapons versus something like combat aircraft.
Senator Cotton. I've got to say, I don't think there's a
lot of common sense between this distinction. And a lot of
farmers in Arkansas wouldn't understand it either. I mean your
own written assessment, Ms. Haines, says that Russia, quote,
``doesn't want a direct conflict with the United States,'' end
quote. That was from January 21st. That assessment said Russia
doesn't want a conflict with the United States.
You think they're more likely to want a conflict now after
Vladimir Putin has seen the performance of his army? Not just
against the Ukrainian army, but with moms with Molotov
cocktails and grandmas with AK-47s. You think they're more
likely to want a piece of us now than they were two months ago?
Director Haines. I don't think it's an issue of whether or
not they're more likely to want to conflict. It's whether or
not they perceive us as being in that conflict with them. I
think we're in a very challenging position, where we are
obviously providing enormous amounts of support to the
Ukrainians, as we should and need to do, but at the same time
trying not to escalate the conflict into a full-on NATO or U.S.
war with Russia.
And that's a challenging space to manage. And the analysts,
I think, are just trying to provide their best assessment of
what is likely to be perceived as that kind of escalation in
this circumstance.
Senator Cotton. I mean, I've got to say, it seems to me
that Vladimir Putin simply deterred the U.S. government from
providing these aircraft by saying they would view this as
escalatory. And if that's going to be our position, we might as
well call the commanding general at Fort Lewis, outside
Seattle, and tell him to take the flag down and surrender our
position because he's not going to stop in Ukraine. He's not
going stop in Europe. Is going to go all the way to the West
Coast. And every time he raises a threat, we immediately back
off.
One other question I want to ask in this area as well about
intelligence sharing. Last Thursday, the House Armed Services
Committee Chairman Adam Smith said, quote, ``we are providing
some intelligence. We're not providing the kind of real-time
targeting because that, you know, steps over the line that
makes us participate in the war,'' end quote. Just a few hours
later, the White House press secretary contradicted him saying,
we have consistently been sharing intelligence that includes
information the Ukrainians can use to inform and develop their
military response to Russia's invasion. That has been ongoing
and reports that suggest otherwise are inaccurate.
So who is correct? The Democratic Chairman of the House
Armed Service Committee or the White House press secretary? Are
we not providing that kind of real-time targeting intelligence
to Ukraine?
Director Haines. We are providing an enormous amount of
intelligence to Ukraine. I'd be happy to get into in closed
sessions the details of what we're providing. Maybe if there's
anything else that people would like to add?
Senator Cotton. Can you at least tell me who is correct
between the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and
the White House press secretary?
Director Haines. Honestly, Senator, I think getting into
this in closed session would be easier so that we can actually
explain to you what it is that we're providing. But I'm happy
to defer to my colleagues who may have additional----
Senator Cotton. I'm sure we'll address it in closed
session.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Blunt, last worldwide threat. Senator Casey, your
first worldwide hearing. Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thanks very much. I think I
join a chorus of gratitude and commendation for the work of the
Intelligence Community, not only with respect to what's
happening in Ukraine, but I think more generally. And so I want
to thank both Director Haines and Director Burns for the work
they and their teams have done, not just most recently, but in
many cases for years and even decades. So many dedicated
professionals.
I think that gratitude, though, is extended to every member
of this panel: Director Wray, General Nakasone, General
Berrier. It might be that you're the collective public service
of the people that work in each of your areas of
responsibility--that that public service might be more
consequential today than it's ever been. So I want to extend
that thank you more broadly.
I want to try to get maybe to two issues. One is on food
security, or I should say food insecurity, across the world at
this time and how it's exacerbated by what's playing out in
Ukraine. But also to get to a question on China. We're told
that in 2019, the number of people across the world who were on
the edge of famine was about 27 million.
That was in 2019. It's a hell of a lot worse right now: 45
million people across the world on the edge of famine. So in
just two or three years, two years really, from '19 to '21, up
from 27 million to 45 million. We know that Ukraine itself, its
farmlands, provide food for the whole world, especially to
places like the Middle East and South Asia and North Africa.
Here's the data on wheat, corn, and barley: 12 percent of
the wheat of the world provided by Ukraine, 16 percent of corn,
18 percent of barley. So you have both an exacerbating problem
on food insecurity and Ukraine providing all that support. So
with this state of food insecurity in mind, how does the IC
incorporate food insecurity into its various analyses of
threats in the United States and beyond.
Director Haines, if you could start. Or anyone else.
Director Haines. Of course, Senator. Thank you very much
for the question. And I agree with you. This is a really
incredibly important issue and one that we are following.
We assess that Russia's invasion, which as you point out
has caused energy prices to rise, which also has a dynamic
relationship to the food security issue and has put upward
pressure on global food prices. And this is what poses
essentially the additional risk to food security globally. It
could disrupt food supplies, particularly wheat for the reasons
that you identified, because Ukraine, having been known as the
breadbasket of Europe in many respects, is critical to that.
And both Russia and Ukraine are important food suppliers to the
global market. This is part of what I think we're going to be
seeing as a challenge moving forward.
And as a consequence, we perceive that there is an
increasing challenge through 2022, particularly with developing
countries that rely on many of the food supplies at particular
prices for them to manage those, so we are doing work on this.
If you're interested in additional material, I'll definitely
get that to you from the real experts, as opposed to me. But
others may have more to add on this.
Senator Casey. Thanks very much. I wanted to get to a
question on China.
The China section of the threat assessment says, and I'm
quoting in pertinent part, quote, ``Beijing's willingness to
use espionage subsidies, trade policy to give its firms a
competitive advantage, represents not just an ongoing challenge
for the U.S. economy and its workers, but also advances
Beijing's ability to assume leadership of the world's
technological advancement and standards,'' unquote.
As many of you know, Senator Cornyn and I have worked for a
good while now on a piece of legislation which would institute
as a matter of law, a committee to review outbound investment,
especially the offshoring of critical U.S. supply chains.
How's the IC working to better understand both the Chinese
government's surreptitious efforts to gain an unfair
competitive advantage over U.S. firms and workers?
Director Haines. I'll start and others should weigh in. I
think we are obviously following this very closely, and we
recognize that Beijing targets U.S. private sector companies in
a variety of ways. Cyber is one aspect of it but it's not the
only way in which they do it. And we've observed China
targeting company insiders, not just for their access to
computer networks, but also because of the opportunity for
essentially economic and other espionage in these spaces. And
really other individuals that have access to critical
technologies, to your point.
We've also observed China engage in theft of trade secrets,
U.S. export-control violations, hacking ransomware, cyber
pieces. All of this leads to grave concerns, obviously, with
respect to their capacity to steal from American companies and
innovation, and to ultimately use that to bolster their
capabilities to promote their own technological advancement in
areas that are of critical national security interest to us.
And we've also seen how they've created an essential legal
framework that provides them with access to companies that
invest or that move to Beijing in order to allow for that
information to be used by the Chinese government and to advance
their technological innovation.
So let me leave it to others who probably have more to add.
Chairman Warner. Director Wray.
Director Wray. I would just add that some of the reforms
that have taken place thanks to this Committee's leadership on
the CFIUS process, for example, have been extremely important.
And we've dedicated now, collectively, significantly more
resources to trying to be more proactive, which is what some of
the new authorities enable us to do. Certainly at the FBI, we
now have about a 1,300 percent increase in economic espionage
investigations tying back to the Chinese government from, say,
a decade ago. And we are finding that more and more, much as
Director Haines referenced more broadly in her opening
statement, that sharing information through a variety of ways
with private sector partners often enables them to make
responsible decisions that maybe in the past, in a shortsighted
way, they would not have made. I think that's ultimately going
to have to be a key part of this as we go forward. We can't
just investigate or disrupt our way out of it. We need the
private sector engaged too.
Chairman Warner. Senator Casey, thank you for your and
Senator Cornyn's leadership on this. And I also want to
acknowledge Senator Cornyn's leadership on the CFIUS reform a
few years back that really has given Director Wray and others
the tools they need.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you. I want to join my colleagues in
thanking you and the people you represent for your service to
our country.
I want to talk about Russian propaganda. We all know that
in 2016, there had been extensive work of this Committee and
the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence
Community writ large, on Russian propaganda. I want to talk not
about their role in our elections, but now, when it comes to
energy. John McCain, our former colleague, used to say that
Russia was a gas station masquerading as a country, which is a
humorous way of talking about how Russia is economically
dependent on energy exports and is doing everything it can to
keep Europe and the rest of the world dependent on Russian
energy exports.
Many of us have pointed out that the high price of oil that
Putin is reaping today is being used to fund this horrific
invasion in Ukraine. I just want to point out, I think it's the
Energy Information Administration predicts that by 2050 that
the world will still continue to need fossil fuels and its role
in providing energy will, to the world, will be four times what
renewables can provide. And this is not meant to denigrate the
role of renewables. It plays an important part in our
portfolio. But I do worry that Russia's ability to provide a
monopoly and to weaponize energy when it comes to Europe could
well undermine the sanctions that we are trying to impose. It
would certainly seem to make the other countries in Europe who
are reliant on Russia for their oil and gas more pliable or
compliant with Russia's wishes.
Back in 2017, Director Haines, the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, the office you now hold, reported on
page 8 in annex A to a document called ``Assessing Russian
Activities and Intentions in Recent Elections.'' But there's a
piece about how ``Russia Today,'' which I believe now is a
registered foreign agent of the Russian Federation, was
conducting anti-fracking messages with the intended impact of
weakening political support for U.S. production of our natural
resources and diminishing any challenge to Russia's preeminent
role when it comes to providing oil and gas and energy to
Europe and the rest of the world.
So it seems to me that Russia has been, for some time,
trying to discredit any energy initiatives which threaten its
preeminent position, whether it's attacking American or
European fossil fuels or funding green groups to spread
disinformation.
Can you elaborate, Director Haines, on how extensive
Russia's propaganda campaign has been in this area?
Director Haines. Not with precision, and I'm not familiar
with the specific report that you're referencing. But it
certainly is consistent with what we've seen, and therefore,
don't doubt it. And we could definitely provide you a further
assessment that gives you a sense of what scale we've seen and
whether there are any particular trends in that area.
But I think your overall conclusions are ones that we
share, which is to say that they would use their information
campaign and influence in order to promote their own energy
industry and in order to divide us on these issues as well.
General Nakasone. The only thing I would add, Director, is
that this is the methodology we've seen when the Russians find
the divisive issue, find the two groups that you can both feed
this, use social media as an influence, and then be able to
continually pursue that message.
Senator Cornyn. Director Burns, isn't Putin's monopoly on
providing energy to Europe a boot on the neck of the Europeans?
And doesn't this threaten their willingness to cooperate when
it comes to these economic sanctions? Because he can just turn
the gas off, right?
Director Burns. Senator, one of the most striking,
unintended consequences from Putin's point of view is the
extent to which a number of leading European governments seem
to be belatedly realizing what you just described: the threat
that they face by overdependence on Russian energy resources.
You have not just the demise of Nord Stream 2, but also the
fact the Germans just announced the construction of an LNG
facility clearly aimed at diversifying, beyond Russia, their
sources of energy. And so I think that's something that
President Putin certainly did not anticipate when he began this
invasion. But it could have a quite significant, long-term,
strategic effect as well.
Chairman Warner. Senator King, I just want to also
acknowledge the great work that you and Senator Sasse have done
on the Cyber Symposium. A number of us have raised some of
those questions, but thank you for your good work.
Senator King. Thank you very much. I apologize for being
late. If we could apply AI to the Senate schedule, we might not
have three hearings scheduled at exactly the same time.
Thank you very much for your testimony here today. I think
one of my first questions in a large strategic sense for you,
Director Haines, is China-Russia cooperation. It seems to me in
the last couple of years, really in the last year, we've seen a
closer cooperation and communication between those two
countries. How do we assess that? It seems to me if you're
talking worldwide threats, that's one of them.
Director Haines. Yes, absolutely, Senator King. I think
your assessment is our assessment, which is to say that we are
seeing them cooperate more. And we anticipate that it will
strengthen over the coming years. And it's across a variety of
sectors: economic, political, military. In fact, the
announcements that were made during the Olympics are an
indication of how close they're becoming.
At the same time, we do see it as not yet at the point
where we are, for example, with allies. They have not achieved
that kind of level of cooperation. And we anticipate it is
unlikely in the next five years that they will, in fact, become
the way we are an ally with our other NATO members in that
context. But others may have things to add to this.
Senator King. Director Burns.
Director Burns. The only thing to add, Senator, is as
Director Haines said, the joint statement that President Xi and
President Putin issued on the 4th of February, at the beginning
of the Winter Olympics, was the most sweeping expression of
their commitment to partnership we've seen.
But I would only add that I think what's unfolded in
Ukraine, the ugliness of it, the flawed assumptions that
underpinned it from the point of view of President Putin have
unsettled the Chinese leadership a little bit. They're
unsettled by the reputational damage that could come from that.
Senator King. And the Chinese seem more concerned about
reputational damage than Russia just generally?
Director Burns. Russia, President Putin, has a low bar in
terms of concern about reputational damage, I think. But I do
think they're concerned about that. I think they're concerned
about economic consequences at a time when their own projected
growth rates are lower than they've been in quite some time.
And I think as I mentioned earlier, they're concerned about
the way in which President Putin is driving Europeans and
Americans closer together at a moment when I think the Chinese
have always valued their independent relationships with the
Germans and other leading Europeans as offering opportunities
to drive wedges between them and the United States, which, I
think, President Putin's actions have helped to deprive them.
So I think they're concerned by all that.
Senator King. One more unintended consequence of what Mr.
Putin has done.
General Nakasone, one thing that has surprised me in
Ukraine is the lack of a strong, consistent Russian cyber
attack on Ukraine. I expected to see the grid go down and
communications, and that hasn't happened. Do you have any
assessment of why?
I thought that would be in the first couple of days.
General Nakasone. Senator, I think that you know, as we
look at this--and we're only 15 days in, and so much can still
occur--we're very vigilant to make sure nothing does occur.
But, with that said, I think that there are several things that
are important to note. We've worked very, very hard with
Ukraine over the past several years, really since the shutdown
of energy in 2015. We had Hunt Forward teams from U.S.
CYBERCOMMAND in Kyiv. We worked very, very closely with a
series of partners at NSA and the private sector to be able to
provide that information; the interagency. These are all
impacts that I think have played out positively early on. And I
think, to a degree, there's still obviously a Russian calculus
that will play out here. We will be very, very vigilant to see
what occurs there.
Senator King. Finally, Director Haines, one of the
learnings from the Ukraine experience, from our point of view,
is the value of sharing intelligence. I don't mean sharing
necessarily between allies, but I mean with the American
people, with the people of the world. I've always thought that
we classify too much and that we really blunt the impact that
we could have on international relations by not sharing, as
long as we don't compromise sources and methods.
It appears that a conscious decision was made to share
more. Is that the case?
Director Haines. Yes, we have, all of us, I think, engaged
in this, and it has been an extraordinary team effort, to be
honest, in trying to promote more mechanisms for sharing,
finding ways to make sure that we're integrating our work
across the Intelligence Community and providing that
Information to partners and allies in this context, and also
disclosing certain things publicly, as you've indicated.
And I think it really has been, at least from my
perspective, critical to the diplomatic effort. I think it has
helped to galvanize the response and also, I hope, helped to
prepare the Ukrainians to some extent, even though I think,
honestly, it's obviously tragic that despite all of the
information we put out, that we still see the Russians invade
Ukraine.
And so it's a bit bittersweet in this moment, but I think
we've learned a lot of lessons from it, and I think it will
allow us to continue to do that in places where we see the
need.
General Nakasone. Senator, if I might, just on top of what
the Director said. We share a lot of intelligence, but here's
the difference. The intelligence that we're sharing is
accurate, it's relevant, and it's actionable. I think when we
look back at this, that's the key piece of what we've been able
to do as an Intelligence Community.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman
Chairman Warner. Senator Sasse, even though you claim to be
the longest serving rookie on this Committee, I want to
personally thank you for your relentless focus on China and
holding the IC's feet to the fire, that it's not just language
but dollars that flow that.
Senator Sasse.
Senator Sasse. Thanks, Chairman, and thanks to all five of
you for being here. I have a bunch of questions about self-
deterrence, around the MiG U-turn, around real-time sharing of
lethal targeting information, but I think I'm not going to do
that here. I'm going to save it for the classified setting,
because I think Senator Cotton's exchange is the most important
part of this hearing so far today.
Vladimir Putin will embrace the idea that we might self-
deter every time he issues a press release, and lawyerly
hairsplitting about providing this kind of weaponry is not
escalatory, but providing that kind of weaponry is escalatory.
I don't think we really believe that. I think the
Administration is pushing the Intelligence Community to give
them cover for lean-forward decisions they don't want to be
making.
So I applaud Senator Cotton on his line of questioning, and
I suspect it'll be the heart of a lot of what we do in the
classified setting.
I want to stay on the China point that the Chairman just
mentioned--. And Director Burns, first of all, kudos. Kudos to
all of you. It's been said many times today, but believe me, I
associate myself with the praise for the pre-textual rebuttal
of Putin's lies about why he was going to invade. The whole IC
did great work.
Director Burns, since you arrived, standing up the China
Mission Center as you pledged to do is a really important
development.
So thank you. Could you explain to us how Chairman Xi views
Putin and this invasion; a month ago, today, and a month from
now?
Director Burns. I think, as I said, I think the Chinese
leadership, President Xi, has invested a lot in partnership
with President Putin and Russia. I don't think that's going to
change any time soon. It's for a lot of very cold-blooded
reasons. I do, however, think that President Xi is unsettled by
what he's seen transpire in the last 15 days in Ukraine. I
don't think they anticipated that the Russian military was
going to prove largely ineffective so far. I don't think they
anticipated that the West would react with such resolve, in
terms of not only military support for the Ukrainians, but also
in terms of economic consequences, as well. I think they are
worried about reputational damage, and I think they're worried
about the wider economic consequences.
At a time when, especially in 2022, with the Chinese
leadership preoccupied by the party congress in November,
they're looking for relative stability and predictability in
the global economy. This unsettles that as well. So I think
that's raised some question marks, you know, in the minds of
the Chinese leadership as they look at what is going to be an
enduring partnership, but maybe with a few more concerns than
they had 16 days ago.
Senator Sasse. That's helpful. I have heard from multiple
foreign ministers and defense ministers and other NATO leaders
over the course of the last month that one of the--you can't
say there are any silver linings to the evil of what Putin is
doing in targeting women and children and civilians. There is
no moral limit to what the guy will do. But if you made a list
a year from now of developments that happened in the world
because of this invasion, the horror list is a mile long.
But one of the only things on the good side of the ledger
is that I think many European leaders are going to get more
steely-eyed-realist about who Chairman Xi is, because the guy
greenlit this invasion. Russia has eleven time zones and they
were able to move almost all their troops back from the Far
East, because Xi wants to see the West destabilized. He wants
to see Europe and the U.S. humiliated and embarrassed, and
there are a whole bunch of European corporate executives that
lust for the 550 million middle-class consumers of the 1.4
billion Chinese. And a lot of European political leaders who
are willing to provide cover for that and pretend that Xi is a
sort of benign figure, and he is not. And the fact that he
greenlit this by Putin, I think, is a pretty important
development for our allies to get more serious about.
General Berrier, I wonder if you could help us understand
what are the most important needs the Ukrainian military has to
extend this fight? And how can the U.S. do more and faster?
General Berrier. So, Senator, thanks for the question.
We'll go into much more detail in the closed session. Right
now, they do need support in the cities where the combat
operations are going on right now, in the major cities. They
need humanitarian support as well as small arms, ammunition,
artillery rockets. The entire panoply, if you will, of ground
forces kind of support.
The anti-tank weapons are very important. The air defense
weapons, as we've talked about it, are very important. I would
like to go back to the escalation ladder, though, with these
types of weapons. I do believe that there is an escalation
ladder, and there is a difference between an anti-tank weapon,
a shoulder-fired air defense weapon, and a combat aircraft and
a jet that could cross a border and actually conduct operations
on Russian soil.
So in terms of analytical thinking, that's where that's at.
Senator Sasse. I know we're at time, but I just want to
underscore one historical point. In World War II, there were
planes dragged across the U.S.-Canadian border. So this
conversation has been had before, and it's not impossible to
figure out a way to solve the problem if we wanted to solve the
problem.
Women and children are being bombed. Nobody on this
Committee is calling for U.S. boots on the ground in Ukraine.
But there's more we can do, and we should be going faster. The
answers the American public hears, particularly from State
Department and White House press briefings, is often process
about process about a meeting. There's a war going on, and
Zelensky is a hero on behalf of 44 million Ukrainians. He's
asking for more help, and the Administration should be doing
more faster.
Chairman Warner. I know we're going to closed session, but
I think a couple of Members want to at least ask one more
question.
I want to simply reemphasize what Senator Rubio's line of
questioning would be, about things that are already floating in
the Internet around the possibilities of bio tools being used.
And I think Director Haines did most of this effort. I do
think, in the public session, Director Burns, if you could
address this. And clearly, there is a difference between
bioresearch centers and bioweapons centers.
Anything you can do to help clarify some of the things that
are already floating, because I'm fearful that this could be
the new direction of a Russian false-flag operation.
Director Burns. The first thing I'd say, Senator, is that
unlike Russia, which does have chemical weapons and has used
them and does do biological weapons research and has for years,
Ukraine has neither. And second, as Director Haines said, in
any public health system around the world, there's going to be
work done in the interests of wider public health to ensure
that we have a grip on issues like that. But that's in no way
threatening.
That's not something that can be weaponized in the way that
the Russians have clearly demonstrated by their own actions
against their citizens and people outside their country. Their
willingness to use--. And when you couple that with their
demonstrated willingness to create false-flag operations and
try to create the impression that somehow Ukrainians are
responsible for this, that should give us all pretty serious
reason for concern about their propaganda.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator Rubio.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Just to follow up on that, trying to
put it in perspective. So as Assistant Secretary Nuland said,
there are these facilities there and there's something in those
facilities. It's dangerous because we're afraid the Russians
will get a hold of it. Now I understand that there's a
difference between a bioweapons facility and one that's doing
research. A bio research facility is a totally different thing
from a bioweapon facility, because you could have samples of a
deadly or serious pathogen. But that doesn't mean you could
weaponize it or that you're working on weaponizing it. But
people ask themselves if there are these facilities there and
there's a lot at play here, I mean there is a lot we should
have and this is none of you but a long time ago this should
have been acknowledged like, yes, there are these labs. This is
what they do because a lot of these fact checkers just said,
don't even mention labs, because it's--they don't even exist.
They do. They exist all over the world.
There's labs like that right here. So what I think got some
people fired up is when she said, we're worried that the
Russians will get a hold of these facilities, because that
implies that there's something in those facilities that's very
dangerous. So I don't know if you could shed some light on how
there can be things in the lab that are dangerous, but they not
be weapons labs.
Director Burns. All I would say, Senator, is that the
danger here, it seems to me, is the capacity the Russians have
developed and that they've used in the past, and their interest
in trying to create false narratives here, as well. You have to
be careful about any of those substances you've talked about,
what you see in public health or research systems around the
world for civilian purposes. Why you have to be careful about
that that is in no way akin to the kind of threats that would
be posed by weapons research and development or weapons
facilities.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Yes. I just think that the answer is
what piqued a lot of people's--. And look, the latching onto it
is my point. I think there's been such a good job done at
defeating them in the information space, but this is one where
they seem to have latched on. I don't think anyone believes per
se that if there's some very serious attack, or even a fake
one, that they're going to convince the American public that
the Ukrainians are behind it. But it's the confusion around it
that I worry about debilitating the debate and allowing them to
deflect it.
I do want to ask you in particular, Director Burns, because
you have been involved with Russia issues for a very long time.
I think, as much as anyone involved today in this issue,
you've had an opportunity to watch Vladimir Putin through the
years. This whole thing about they're having negotiations or
parent negotiations today in Turkey with the foreign ministers.
It's my view that he uses negotiations as just another tool on
his toolbox.
What is your view of why he continues to agree to these
talks and put these talks forward if we know they're not
resulting in anything and in fact he's violating whatever they
even nominally agree to?
Director Burns. Senator, yours is a fair assumption that
these sometimes are just used tactically as well. I think the
core issue here is that President Putin does not have a
sustainable endgame in Ukraine right now. So the question is,
is he simply going to continue to double down and grind down
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population? Or at some
point, does he recognize that reality that he doesn't have a
sustainable endgame and look for ways to end the bloodshed to
cut his losses and to reaffirm the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Ukraine? Now, given Putin's track record, given
the fact that he's someone who hates to act out of what he
believes to be weakness--that he hates to concede or admit
mistakes--that's probably a long shot.
But that's our hope at least that at some point he
recognizes that because, absent that, off-ramps become just
rhetoric.
Chairman Warner. Thank you for raising the bio issue,
Senator Rubio.
Senator King.
Senator King. General Berrier, we see these horrendous
pictures of apartment blocks being hit, hospitals being hit in
Ukraine. My question is what's hitting them? The use of the
term bombing is very common, but my impression is it's mostly
missiles and artillery.
Is it bombing from aircraft or missiles and artillery?
General Berrier. It a combination of mostly missiles,
artillery, multiple rocket launchers. There are some precision
guided munitions that are being dropped from aircraft, but that
number is small.
Senator King. So the talk about a no-fly zone wouldn't
really impact what's causing the damage currently, is that
correct?
General Berrier. The Air Force is having a tough time
flying in Ukraine right now. They're conducting surveillance
and reconnaissance. They're using their assets to do a bunch of
different things. And quite honestly, a no-fly zone is a combat
operation that requires manned and unmanned aircraft, ISR
assets, resources, and, on the escalation ladder, that is
escalatory.
Senator King. I understand that, but my point is, a no-fly
zone wouldn't inhibit missiles, rockets, and artillery.
General Berrier. That is correct.
Senator King. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Burr.
Senator Burr. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'm going to direct
it to Director Haines. This is really precipitated by Senator
Cotton's question on the transfer of aircraft.
We gave a green light to Poland to transfer MIGs. The
United States. Publicly. When Poland came back and said we'd
like to transfer these over to a U.S. facility and have
Ukrainian pilots fly from there, all of a sudden the American
line was: we think that would be a escalatory.
We're all part of the same thing called NATO, and under
that agreement, when one of NATO's member's geography is
challenged, the rest respond. Now, we can get into whatever we
want to in closed session. I as much as anybody really respect
the analytic product that comes out of the Intelligence
Community. It should be questioned; that's why we have analysts
in every area and outside of the Intel community. But when the
U.S. publicly gives Poland a green light to transfer aircraft,
and then changes their mind when the aircrafts are transferred
off of our space, our geography, as a member of NATO as well.
And we say that that would make it escalatory, but if Poland
transferred it, we didn't consider it to be escalatory. Then I
draw this conclusion. This is a policy decision. It's a policy
decision made by the Administration. And I remind all of you at
the table, intelligence is never supposed to influence policy.
It's the reason that we tried desperately--we don't always
succeed--but we try desperately not to present you with a
policy question, as part of the Intelligence Community. By the
same token, we expect that if intelligence is inappropriately
being used to reach a policy decision, that it's the
Intelligence Community that pushes back on that.
So I look forward to your explanation, but I remind you
that there is a bright line that the Intelligence Community has
always maintained between policy and the advice you give about
what the intelligence says.
My hope is we haven't, as an Intelligence Community, put
our finger on the scale of a policy decision that's been made.
Because, clearly, this is confusing to the American people--how
America could say, Poland, it's okay for you to transfer, but
you can't transfer it off of our geography.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Collins.
Director Haines. Can I respond? Just to say Senator Burr,
obviously you know this, but analytic objectivity, and for all
of us here, is an absolutely core ethic for the Intelligence
Community. And I do not believe that there is any issue here
with respect to political or policy pressure being put on the
analysts. They were asked the question of whether or not
providing these airplanes would be perceived by the Russians in
an escalatory way. And they answered the question. I don't know
when the timing was with respect to the policy--things that
were made----
Senator Burr. Director, I'm not questioning what the
analysts came to a conclusion on. But if the analyst came to a
conclusion that the transfer of aircraft was escalatory, then
it would apply to Poland's transfer, not just a transfer off of
United States geography. And that was not used as a reason when
Poland was given the green light. But it was used when it was
thrown into our laps, which leads me to believe that there is a
policy decision that we're not going to be involved in. I only
throw it out there to you for the thought process of going
through it. We can get into it in closed session.
Director Haines. Okay.
Senator Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Director Haines, I want to switch to Iran.
Your predecessors at every single Worldwide Threat Hearing
since 2016 have labeled Iran as the foremost state sponsor of
terrorism. Is that your assessment as well?
Director Haines. Senator Collins, there's no question that
Iran continues to support terrorism.
Senator Collins. There's widespread speculation that, in
exchange for a new nuclear agreement with Iran, that the
Administration is considering lifting sanctions on Iranian
organizations or individuals, including those that are tied
directly to Iran's terrorist activity. And there's one
speculation that the Administration may go so far as to rescind
the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation of Iran's
primary arm to foment terror in the region, the IRGC.
Now, I'm not going to ask you whether sanctions should be
lifted or not, recognizing that is a policy decision. But I do
believe that it's fair to ask you which Iranian entities are
actively supporting the regime's malign activity today. So let
me pull on that thread a bit. Tony Blair's Institute for Global
Change said in a report last year that the IRGC acts as an
institutionalized militia and uses its vast resources to spread
a mission of Jihad through an ideological army of recruits and
proxies.
So, with respect to the IRGC, do you agree that it
continues to conduct, support, and facilitate terrorism
throughout the Middle East?
Director Haines. Thank you, Senator. The regime as a whole
has supported destabilizing activities throughout the Middle
East and continues to be a concern, and IRGC is among entities
that do-- that are part of the regime's overall strategy. But I
think if you want detail on particular entities, we should
provide that to you separately and in writing. But I don't know
if others have anything.
Senator Collins. Is there any evidence that the Central
Bank of Iran has stopped financing terrorist activity?
Director Haines. I think if you mean money that goes
through the Central Bank of Iran may be ultimately used by
Iran----
Senator Collins. Yes.
Director Haines. In the context of the things, I don't have
details. But we can certainly look at whether or not it's
increasing or decreasing based on our assessments.
Senator Collins. Is it fair to say that the assessment of
the IC is that advances made by Iran related to launching
missiles into space have an inherent dual-use technology as a
delivery vehicle for a nuclear or a conventional ballistic
missile?
Director Haines. Absolutely. Senator, we obviously have had
concerns about their ballistic missile technology and their
advancements in this areas. And obviously, over the course of
many bipartisan Administrations, sanctions have been enacted as
a consequence of that.
Senator Collins. And finally, I would just note, and I
commend you for this, that in your confirmation hearing we
discussed the prospect of a renegotiation of the JCPOA. And one
of your points was that there should be more opportunity to
consult with Congress on issues related to any new agreement.
And I've appreciated the IC's attentiveness to keeping a focus
on Iranian activity. But I've been disappointed in the lack of
transparency and outreach from the policy community regarding
the status of the negotiations. And I would just ask that you
take that back to the White House. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. So, we're going to move through, and
everybody obviously gets this last round. As a--maybe--
incentive to limit this to one or two questions, in an
unprecedented move, the Committee is providing lunch directly
after this. And unfortunately, for our panel, there will be no
breaks or we will go over. And if you guys answer briefly, you
will also get lunch.
Senator Cotton. [Laughter.]
Senator Cotton. Senator Burr raised an excellent point.
It's a second arbitrary distinction about these Polish MiGs.
Apparently, the U.S.-government position was they go from
Poland, okeydokey. That's A-Okay. They go from the United
States, nope. Vladimir Putin views that as escalatory. I still
don't think there's any intelligence to justify that
distinction.
I want to return, General Berrier, to what you said to
Senator Sasse. You said that you believe that there is a
difference in escalation between anti-tank missiles and anti-
aircraft missiles on the one hand, and aircraft on the other
hand. I understand you believe that. I understand that Director
Haynes believes that, and she claims that the analysts believe
that. I don't believe it. I don't believe it, and I don't
believe there's intelligence to support it. I bet the Russian
pilot that gets shot out of the air by an anti-aircraft missile
as opposed to the aircraft doesn't believe it either. But it's
not really a matter of what you believe or I believe. It's a
matter of what we can prove and what we can prove that Vladimir
Putin believes. And I just don't think the proof is there.
We'll know in a few minutes, I guess, if there is.
I want to address a bigger point, and I want to join with a
lot of my colleagues to commend the Intelligence Community and
especially the DIA for the outstanding work it did leading up
to the invasion. In my seven years on the Committee, it's the
best I've seen the Intelligence Community perform--between
September until February 24th. Director Haines, you testified
that you think Vladimir Putin underestimated the Ukrainians'
skill and their will to fight and he overestimated his own
military's ability. Is it fair to say our Intelligence
Community made the same mistakes based on the testimony we've
heard here?
Director Haines. So, we assessed, prior to the invasion,
that he was underestimating the Ukrainians' resistance, likely
resistance, too. So I think we did well there. We did not do as
well in terms of predicting the military challenges that he has
encountered with his own military.
Senator Cotton. General Berrier, could you address this?
General Berrier. Senator, I will address that. My view was
that, based on a variety of factors, that the Ukrainians were
not as ready as I thought they should be. Therefore, I
questioned their will to fight. That was a bad assessment on my
part, because they have fought bravely and honorably and are
doing the right thing. So that was an issue for me as the
Director of DIA.
Senator Cotton. And I understand that. But assessing a
people's will to fight is one of the hardest things an
intelligence agency could do. In some ways, it's a moral or a
psychological question, not an intelligence question. But in
other things, like how long Kyiv would hold out or these other
major cities, or how long Ukraine would still have an Air Force
or air defense systems, did we make mistakes about those
assessments as well?
General Berrier. Well, we made some assumptions about his
assumptions, which proved to be very, very flawed. And so, his
actual activity as he got into this fight turned his operation
kind of on its head. And what we've seen is a devolvement, if
you will, of the operations that he has going on now. And I'd
like to save the rest of this for a closed session.
Senator Cotton. To the extent we can address it here, could
you say why you think we made those mistakes?
General Berrier. I think assessing will, morale, and a will
to fight is a very difficult analytical task. We had different
inputs from different organizations, and we, at least from my
perspective as the Director, I did not do as well as I could
have.
Senator Cotton. Director Haines, could you give your
opinion on why the IC made those mistakes?
Director Haines. I don't think I have anything to add in
open session. I'm trying to--we can discuss further.
Senator Cotton. Okay. I just want to say because, and I'm
not--I just don't want to be critical, but these mistakes had
potentially real-world policy implications about the
willingness of the President or other NATO leaders to provide
weapons that they thought might have fallen into the hands of
Russians in a matter of hours, or to impose sanctions for
something that might have been a fait accompli.
And we need to ask ourselves, if we made mistakes about the
first two weeks of this war, are we making mistakes about the
next two weeks or the next two months, and the policy
implications those might have? And furthermore, to Richard
Burr's point about the use of policy to influence intelligence,
I have to say I have concerns that part of the reason the
Administration went relatively soft on Russia and was hesitant
in Ukraine in 2021 is they were relying on Russia to get the
bad nuclear deal that Susan Collins was talking about?
I have the unavoidable conclusion that influenced part of
it.
Chairman Warner. Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. I wanted to just ask the question,
recognizing intelligence is not science--it's an art. What do
we think that Putin would do if the United States or the Poles
provided these MiGs to the Ukrainians?
General Berrier. Senator, we have run through a number of
scenarios as the escalation ladder continues to unfold. I'd
like to answer that question in closed session.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Sasse.
Senator Sasse. Thank you, Chairman.
I'll save most of my questions for classified, too. I want
to make one comment and then ask General Nakasone one small
question about the pre-textual work that you all did.
The comment is, at many White House briefings and a number
of State Department briefings over the course of the last week
and a half, the phrase has been used that the U.S. did or NATO
did, or the U.S. hypothetically did or NATO hypothetically did
escalatory things or aggressive things. I think we should get
the language right, which is there are claims by Putin that we
did escalatory or aggressive things, or are hypothesizing about
aggressive things.
There's only one aggressor here, and that's the jackass
who's killing women and children. There's one aggressor.
There's one person targeting civilians. And us trying to figure
out what our obligations are to our allies and our obligations
are to the world and to humanity when civilians are being
targeted, is a really important debate that we should be having
more aggressively, leaning farther forward. And we shouldn't
accept the idea that because Putin calls us aggressive when we
figure out how we try to stop the guy, we are not the
aggressor.
General Nakasone, you all have done some really great work
on sharing intelligence to expose what Putin was up to. What do
you think the implications will be, one or two or three years
from now, from what we've learned from this more aggressive,
promiscuous, healthily promiscuous sharing of intel in advance?
General Nakasone. I think we'll redefine sharing, Senator.
You talk about sharing with our partners, that that had an
impact, about being able to bring our coalition together. We
talk about sharing with the Ukrainians actionable intelligence
that allows them to be able to take combat operations to a new
level.
And then I think the other piece is being able to shine a
light on disinformation. We've seen this in the elections--
2018, 2020. When we take on an adversary, when we work with a
series of partners being able to shine a light on these mis-
stories and these false-flag operations, it suddenly isn't as
big a deal. And I think that's what we'll learn from sharing.
Chairman Warner. Let me just make two quick comments. One,
you know, I remember when many of us were in Munich a few weeks
back and some of the, I think, very legitimate questions that
Senator Cotton's asking about what we got right or wrong post-
conflict starting. I just recall all of the interactions I had,
and some of us who were with us there had, with all of our
European partners who candidly had the same assessments,
particularly around control of the skies.
I think the more global comment I'd make, and it's one of
the reasons why I think it's so important that we do this in
public. You've heard from both sides of the aisle that Members
are pressing the leaders of the IC on their analysts'
assessment, the quality of their intelligence, decision making.
This is a Committee that robustly asks hard questions.
I want to assure the public, at least, that this same level
of questions, if not higher, are raised in closed settings.
Frankly, the fact that Senator Wyden didn't ask for those
returns in his normal 30-day period as opposed to a week
period--. I don't think you have a Committee here that is
captured by the community. We have great respect for the
community. I think virtually everyone here has commended their,
I believe, excellent work, I would argue, both leading up to
the invasion and continuing to keep us informed. The people
should know that this Committee operates in the same way behind
closed doors as it does in open session.
And I hope people will take some solace from that. And
recognizing because we're moving on and I know there's a host
of questions for the closed setting, we will move directly next
door. And again, lunch will be served.
We stand in recess.
[Whereupon at 12:25 p.m. the hearing was recessed subject
to the call of the Chairman.]
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