Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Wednesday, June 28, 2017 - 10:00am
Location:
Hart 216
Witnesses
Ambassador
Nicholas
Burns
Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations
Harvard Kennedy School of Government
Director
Janis
Sarts
Director of NATO Strategic Communication Center of Excellence
NATO Strategic Communication Center of Excellence
Ambassador
Vesko
Garcevic
Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations
Frederick Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 115-105]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-105
RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN ELECTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
MARCO RUBIO, Florida RON WYDEN, Oregon
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ROY BLUNT, Missouri ANGUS KING, Maine
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KAMALA HARRIS, California
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CHARLES SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
----------
Chris Joyner, Staff Director
Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
----------
JUNE 28, 2017
OPENING STATEMENTS
Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina. 1
Warner, Hon. Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia 2
WITNESSES
Burns, Ambassador Nicholas, Professor of Diplomacy, Harvard
Kennedy School of Government................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Garcevic, Ambassador Vesko, Professor of Diplomacy, Pardee School
of Global Studies, Boston University........................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Sarts, Janis, Director, Nato Strategic Communication Center of
Excellence..................................................... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Stelzenmueller, Constanze, Ph.D., Bosch Senior Fellow, Brookings
Institution.................................................... 35
Prepared statement........................................... 37
RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN ELECTIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Burr (presiding),
Warner, Risch, Rubio, Collins, Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Cornyn,
McCain, Feinstein, Wyden, Heinrich, King, Manchin, Harris, and
Reed.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Chairman Burr. I'd like to call the hearing to order.
Today, the Committee convenes its seventh open hearing of
2017 to examine Russian interference in the 2016 U.S.
elections, and the twelfth open hearing this year.
To date, our open hearings have largely focused on the
domestic impact of Russia's activities. Today's witnesses,
however, will highlight for the Committee and for the American
people Russia's interference in the European elections. We hope
to gain additional understanding of Russian efforts to
undermine democratic institutions worldwide as the Committee
continues its inquiry.
The Intelligence Committee assessed in January that Moscow
will apply lessons learned from its campaign aimed at the
United States presidential election to further influence
efforts worldwide. It further assessed that Russia has sought
to influence elections across Europe. Director of National
Intelligence Coats echoed those words as recently as May when
he testified before the Senate that Russia is seeking to
influence elections in Europe, including France, Germany and
the United Kingdom.
The intelligence community assesses that the Russian
messaging strategy blends covert intelligence operations such
as cyber activity with overt efforts by Russian government
agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and
paid social media users, or trolls. Russia is employing a
whole-of-government approach to undermining democratic
institutions globally.
Facing down Russia's malicious activity is no longer just a
bipartisan issue. To successfully protect our institutions and
the integrity of our electoral systems, we must work as a
global community to share our experience. Collective awareness
of Moscow's intentions spanning borders and continents will
help us to enhance our security measures and thwart these
disinformation campaigns.
Just as Germany is learning from the recent events in
France and Montenegro, we will lean on our allies to inform our
approach of the 2018 elections. We must advance more quickly
than our adversaries and only together will we do so.
I'd like to welcome our distinguished witnesses today:
Ambassador Nick Burns, the Roy and Barbara Goodman Family
Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International
Relations at Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Nick, that's
a mighty long title there that you've got. We're delighted to
have you.
Janis Sarts, Director of NATO's Strategic Communications
Center of Excellence. Hopefully, I'm getting these names right.
I'm trying my best.
Ambassador Vesko Garcevic, Professor of the Practice of
Diplomacy and International Relations at Boston University
Frederick Pardee School of Global Studies.
And Constanze Stelzenmueller, the inaugural Robert Bosch
Senior Fellow in the Brookings Institute Center on United
States and Europe.
Thank you all four for being here to help us better
understand Russia's activities and the underlying intentions
that Russia might have.
With that, I will turn to the Vice Chairman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
VIRGINIA
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me
commend you on your--on your brilliant introduction of our
witnesses. And welcome, witnesses.
Today's hearing continues the Committee's efforts to
address the issues surrounding Russia's active interference in
our democratic process and in the 2016 elections here in
America, as well as Russia's similar and in some cases ongoing
efforts to undermine democratic institutions amongst many of
our closest allies.
At this point, I believe we have a pretty good
understanding of the Russian playbook. Russia's goal is to sow
chaos and confusion, to fuel internal disagreements, and to
undermine democracies whenever possible, really to basically
cast doubt on the democratic process wherever it exists.
There's nothing unusual about Russia's scheming to
influence the American elections. We all know their efforts
date back to the Cold War. But Russia's blatant interference in
the United States' 2016 presidential elections was
unprecedented in both scale and scope.
And we've seen it replicated across Europe. In fact,
Russia's active measures are only growing bolder and more
brazen in the digital age. Russia has interfered or attempted
to interfere in elections from France to the Netherlands, from
the Balkans to the Baltics. We've seen Mr. Putin's government
use of quote-unquote, ``active measures,'' including support
for far-right and far-left parties opposed to historically
successful European institutions and post-World War II Western
alliances.
For example, Russia has provided support and financial
assistance to the far-right party of Marine Le Pen in France in
a very blatant and obvious way. Russia has launched cyber
attacks against political parties and government institutions
in several Western countries. They've also released stolen
information in an effort to steer elections in a particular
direction, as we saw in the French elections with their release
of information about then-candidate Macron.
Germany's parliament has been cyber-attacked with members'
e-mails hacked and stolen. Most observers expect this stolen
information to be utilized before this fall's national
elections in Germany.
As in the United States, Russia aggressively uses trolls
and bots to spread fake news and disinformation, with the goal
of weakening European institutions and driving a wedge between
the United States and Europe. These active measures have been
supported by state-controlled Russian media, including RT and
Sputnik.
So far, these Russian efforts have not been as successful
in Europe as perhaps they were here in the United States. For
instance, in France the Macron campaign and the French
government were prepared to push back on cyber leaks as they
released that information in the 48-hour blackout period. And
we've seen companies such as Facebook actually take down a
series of fake accounts to help blunt those efforts.
In the Netherlands, earlier this spring officials actually
hand-counted paper ballots to ensure that there would be no
electronic interference in the vote count. Across Europe,
government and media have pushed back against fake news stories
and have established such institutions such as the E.U.'s
Strategic Communications Division and the NATO Strategic
Communications Center of Excellence to educate the public in
identifying and correcting Russian propaganda.
Frankly, we have learned a thing or two from our allies in
Europe about proactively protecting ourselves against these
threats posed by Russia. Months ago, I would have assumed this
hearing would have been a good opportunity for the United
States to actually import some lessons learned to our European
friends. Unfortunately, to date we've not yet as a government
in the whole taken to heart many of those lessons.
Unfortunately, as we've heard in testimony before our
Committee, our President and his Administration have frankly
demonstrated little interest in determining how the Russians
did what they did or how we might better protect ourselves
going forward. Instead, we've seen the President repeatedly
deny that Russia was responsible for U.S. election
interference, even in the face of unanimous agreement among our
Nation's intelligence agencies.
He's consistently questioned the integrity of our
intelligence professionals and he's been all over the map in
discussing the United States' commitment to the trans-Atlantic
alliances such as NATO.
As several of my colleagues on the Committee have
previously noted, in 2016 the Russians targeted Democrats. Who
is to say which party will be in the crosshairs next time? The
one thing we know is that Vladimir Putin is not a Democrat nor
a Republican. His interests are to advance Russia's interests
and undermine the United States. In 2016, I believe that Russia
got its money's worth in sowing doubt, distrust, and dissension
in the heart of the American political process. And my fear is,
with that rate of return, that Russia will continue to return
to those tactics.
I don't believe anyone believes that Russia will stop and I
believe, as a State that has statewide elections in 2017, we
have to be alert now. That's why last week when we had DHS
before this Committee, we asked them to share, even if they
have to share confidentially, the names of the 21 states that
were attacked by the Russians in 2016.
I have written and spoken with Secretary Kelly on this
matter. As the oversight Committee, I believe we are entitled
to that information and we need to work through a process so
that State election officials have the security clearances to
at least be read in.
And my fear is, as we heard last week, when the top
election official from Indiana and the top election official
from Wisconsin--both of those states could not acknowledge
whether they were part of those 21 states.
And what was also remarkable was we heard from the State of
Illinois, which has testified openly that they were attacked on
a regular basis, yet they had not been informed until last week
that those attacks originated from Russia.
That's why the testimony we hear today is so important to
learn lessons from what's happening in Europe and around the
world and how on a going-forward basis Western alliances, our
Western allies, can stop this very critical 21st century
threat.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of
our witnesses.
Chairman Burr. I thank the Vice Chairman.
At this time, I'd make members aware that we will recognize
members by seniority for five minutes.
And I'd also like to make a note to members that when we
return from next week's Fourth of July recess, we will
immediately consider the nomination of David Glawe, Under
Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of
Homeland Security. If members have additional questions for Mr.
Glawe, they need to be in quickly, so that they can be acted on
while we're out. I intend--the Vice Chairman and I intend to
move that nomination as quickly as we possibly can when we get
back.
Again, I thank our witnesses for being here today. I will
recognize from my left to my right, and we'll start with you,
Ambassador Burns. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR NICHOLAS BURNS, PROFESSOR OF DIPLOMACY,
HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
Ambassador Burns. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, members
of the Committee: Thank you very much for this opportunity to
testify. I appreciate very much the bipartisan commitment that
your Committee has shown to investigate Russia's interference
in the European elections and in our own elections.
There is no doubt about Russia's systematic campaign to
undermine our 2016 presidential election, the Montenegrin,
Dutch, French and German elections this year, and Russia
seeking to diminish the confidence that the citizens of all
these countries have in their democracies. In this sense,
Russia's actions pose an existential threat to the democratic
nations of the West and it requires a swift and serious
response by Europeans as well as Americans.
You asked for our recommendations, Mr. Chairman, so I have
just three.
First, the United States and Europe need to work much more
closely together to identify Russia's cyber and disinformation
attacks as they are being launched; and then we need to work
together actually to do something about it, to respond in
tandem to discredit Russia's actions. You saw the campaign of
Emmanuel Macron do that very effectively. You have not seen
that in other countries.
We on both sides of the Atlantic should also make it clear
to the Russian government that we have our own capabilities
that can be injurious to Moscow and that we will use them if
Moscow doesn't cease and desist.
With this in mind and with the benefit of hindsight,
President Obama in my own view should have been more
transparent and specific with the American people during the
campaign about the nature of the Russian threat. He should have
reacted earlier and much more vigorously.
Now, to be fair to him, this was an extraordinarily
difficult choice. It was a new and unexpected threat. President
Obama would have likely been accused in the heat of the
campaign for intervening in the contest between Secretary
Clinton and Donald Trump. And he did make the right call in the
end by imposing sanctions on Moscow.
But we in America and Europe have to learn from this
experience and try to avoid that in the future.
Second, the U.S. and Europe should adopt stronger sanctions
against Russia for its actions to weaken our elections. We
learned an important lesson in the Iran nuclear negotiations in
the Obama and George W. Bush Administrations: The sanctions
were much more effective when the United States and the E.U.
aligned them together, specifically the financial sanctions.
I hope the House of Representatives will back and not
dilute in this sense the very strong Senate sanctions bill
against Moscow that you passed by a 97-to-2 margin two weeks
ago. In my view, it would be a grave mistake of President Trump
to veto such a bill. And with our long national two-century
debate about the separation of powers in mind, I do think that
Congress--it's time for the Congress, and not the President, to
lead the American response to Russia's cyber attack on the
United States.
The President has shown that he's unwilling to act against
Russia and that is why the Congressional review provision in
your Senate bill makes eminent sense, so that the
Administration cannot ease or lift the sanctions on Russia
until Putin's attacks on our democratic elections has ceased
and until he's met the provisions of the two Minsk agreements
on Ukraine and Crimea.
Third, Congress and the President must make resistance to
Russian interference in the European elections, as well as
ours, an urgent national priority. I served in the government
for a long time. I served both parties as a Foreign Service
officer. And I find it dismaying and objectionable that
President Trump continues to deny the undeniable fact that
Russia launched a major cyber attack against the United States,
regardless of what party he launched it against.
He's done the same thing in Europe, very systematically.
And yet, in response to that President Trump has refused to
launch an investigation of his own. He's not made this an issue
in our relationship with the Russians. He's taken no steps, at
least that I'm aware of, with the Congress and State and local
governments to strengthen our voting systems from future
Russian hacking of our midterm elections in 2018 and of the
next presidential election in 2020. There is no indication he's
asked his senior Cabinet officials to develop a plan to protect
the United States and to deter the Russians.
And his failure to act--and I'm a former U.S. Ambassador to
NATO, I was President George W. Bush's Ambassador--we have a
political responsibility in NATO to protect each other, not
just from armed conventional attacks, but from cyber attacks as
well. That's a clear failure.
I've worked for both parties. It's inconceivable to me that
any of President Trump's predecessors would deny the gravity of
such an open attack on our democratic system. I don't believe
any previous American President would argue that your own
hearings in the Senate are a waste of time or, in the words of
President Trump, a witch hunt. They're not; you're doing your
duty that the people elected you to do.
It is his duty--President Trump's--to be skeptical of
Russia. It's his duty to investigate and defend our country
against a cyber offensive, because Russia's our most dangerous
adversary in the world today; and if he continues to refuse to
act, it's a dereliction of the basic duty to defend the
country.
And Russia's going to do this again. You heard Director
Comey at this Committee say that he felt that Russia would be
back maybe against the Republican or Democratic Party. Our
elections will be at risk when that happens and the sanctity of
our elections will be compromised in the minds of our citizens.
Let me just close by saying that Russia is really testing
the leadership and resolve of the West. Americans and Europeans
are far stronger in our democratic traditions and our values
than the Russians. And with this in mind, we need to be more
effective in countering them.
And we can do that by building bipartisan unity in the
Congress. And I do want to commend you, Mr. Chairman and Mr.
Vice Chairman. You've set a bipartisan tone, which is deeply
appreciated. We can do that by encouraging the President to
act. We can do that by being very closely aligned with the
Europeans to take common action. And I think if we can achieve
those three things, we can defeat President Putin and the
Russian intelligence services.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burns follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Ambassador, and thank you for
your service for a long time to this country.
Ambassador Garcevic.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR VESKO GARCEVIC, PROFESSOR OF DIPLOMACY,
PARDEE SCHOOL OF GLOBAL STUDIES, BOSTON UNIVERSITY
Ambassador Garcevic. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Burr, Mr. Vice
Chairman Warner, distinguished members of the Committee. Thank
you very much for giving me the opportunity to speak on
Russia's interference in Montenegro's home affairs.
On October 16, 2016, Montenegro held its parliamentary
elections. The plotters, disguised in police uniforms, were
preparing to storm the Montenegrin Parliament and provoke a
turmoil by shooting at citizens waiting for the election
results. In the final stage, the plotters intended to detain or
assassinate the Prime Minister. Acting on a tip from an
informant, Montenegrin police were able to arrest most of the
plot suspects.
In the indictment filed recently, 14 people were charged,
including two opposition politicians and two Russian agents,
Vladimir Popov and Eduard Shirokov, members of the Russian
Military Intelligence Service who are identified as the
ringleaders of the operation.
How do we know that? For example, Shirokov, alias Sismakov,
was posted as the assistant military attache at the Russian
embassy in Warsaw until Poland declared him persona non grata
for espionage. The whereabouts of Shirokov and Popov are
unknown, while Russian authorities never replied or provided
information about the suspects.
The coup plot is the culmination of more than 18 months
long-synchronized actions against Montenegro, which include an
aggressive media campaign, coupled with open support to pro-
Russian political parties in Montenegro.
While Russia has been consistent in making threatening
gestures over Montenegro's NATO bid, they never--they have
never specified what their intentions are. But for example,
when Montenegro joined NATO recently, at the beginning of June,
Moscow commented that in response to Montenegro's anti-Russian
hysteria and hostile policy, Russia reserves the right to take
reciprocal measures.
There are more than 100 Moscow-backed organizations and
media outlets at this moment in the region. In an anti-
Montenegro media campaign, the NATO invitation is described as
a move to challenge Moscow. The Montenegrin government is
labeled as treacherous and corrupted, a pawn in the hands of
the U.S. and NATO; and Russia, stronger than ever, is the only
state standing in their way.
The Orthodox Church too is utilized to promote the values
of Orthodox Christianity and present them as fundamentally
different, that fundamentally contradicts the Western world.
The Russian government fully backs democratic fronts and an
anti-NATO political coalition dominated by Serbian Nationalist
Party, known for their pro-Russian affiliation. The primary
goal of the front and its supporters in Russia was to get the
Montenegrin opposition united around its political platform and
prevent the formation of a new pro-NATO government in
Montenegro.
Moscow has made no progress in Montenegro and it has
seemingly lost a possibility of having a strategically
significant outlet on the Adriatic coast. But Moscow will
continue exploiting loopholes that exist in most of the Balkan
states: democratic incapacity, corruption, ethnic tensions,
countries' economic and military needs, and growing feelings of
marginalization of those countries on their part to the E.U.
and NATO.
The rule of law, independent institutions, and efficient
law enforcement agencies are the precondition for stability and
effective protection from Russia's influence. The best way to
restrain Russian interference is a proactive approach from the
U.S. and the E.U. side and energetic support for democratic
reforms in the Balkan states. The door of NATO and the E.U.
must remain open for states wishing to join those
organizations. And further American retreat may have a lasting
adverse implication for Balkan and European security.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'm looking forward for your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Garcevic follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Sarts.
STATEMENT OF JANIS SARTS, DIRECTOR, NATO STRATEGIC
COMMUNICATION CENTER OF EXCELLENCE
Mr. Sarts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman.
From the time our Center has been established two and a
half years ago, we've been closely watching Russian information
operations and influence operations across Europe. We've
produced 18 different studies on the methodology, ways how
Russia tries to affect the outcomes of our democratic processes
and our choices.
In the election process typically there are three venues
they try to pursue. First, to support the candidate of their
choice. To do that, they use the money and they give the
support of all the media, traditional media networks that they
are controlling, to the candidate, to the proportion as nowhere
near of a normal democratic process, with lies, with fakes,
etcetera.
Secondly, they try to get the sensitive information on the
other candidates to undermine their credibilities. Typically,
they try to achieve it through hacking into the systems, but
that is not the only way. They use very large segments of
disinformation. Fake news is one of the instruments of choice.
They're disseminating that through the same information
networks they operate within, but they also use fake news site
at the networks. They use trolls, both human as well as
robotic, to amplify the message. All of that was seen in the
recent French election.
Let me just go through quickly what was the French response
and what I think we should take note of. First, there was media
cooperation. Media were teaming together, and very different
sorts of media teaming together to work to verify what is a
factual reality. They were supported by the online activist
groups like CrossCheck and also big Internet companies like a
Facebook and Google joint effort to make sure that the facts
also in the digital space take the preeminence over the
falsehoods.
Secondly, they were assuming and knowing they were going to
be hacked. There were many hack attempts. And of course, all of
us who have been in the cyber-security business know you can
design only as strong response as possible. There is always a
human factor. So what the French idea has been, they trapped
the hackers. They fed them the irrelevant information in large
amounts, making the dumped information irrelevant as well.
And thirdly, that was how both media, public, and the
authorities treated the hack. First, the authorities, based on
the French law, said it is illegal to use these hacks for
further circulation.
Secondly, most of the media refrained for going for these
hacks, understanding the way they are trying to be manipulated
into the election process.
Based on that, I'll share some recommendations. First,
societal awareness. That is a critical thing to be achieved.
The nation that is aware it's under attack is far more
resilient than the one that is oblivious of that.
Secondly, as demonstrated by the French case, working with
the media is essential, both for their role, but also for their
understanding how they might be manipulated in the process.
Thirdly, we still treat it, the information environment, as
a game of golf. It is not any more. It's rugby. In rugby, you
need to have a very good situational awareness. We have to
build tools to know what are the echo chambers, what are the
information bubbles, who is trying to penetrate them, what are
the robotic networks trying to push, what are the third parties
or the outside governments, what kind of data they're looking
into your social, societal systems. That is one of the key
elements that we have to possess to be able to respond
effectively to that game of rugby.
Next, cyber defense. It is a must. Every single element of
the election process has to be able to do a good cyber defense,
both with two elements, the technical piece and the human
piece. These have to be there.
And lastly, we cannot succeed if we don't work together
with the technology companies. That's the area where most of
the activity takes place and where it is most successful. And I
think we can make them one of the good partners in making sure
that the facts and truths are much more preeminent in that
environment than any falsehood.
Lastly, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, the reason the
Russian activity succeeds is because we have not paid
attention. They're using their old tricks and borrowed know-how
from our technologies and our marketing know-how. Therefore, I
see no reason why they should keep winning. To me, it's about
focusing on the problem, bringing different actors across a
society together, and then collectively I do believe we have
all the potential to win this for us.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sarts follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Mr. Sarts.
Dr. Stelzenmueller.
STATEMENT OF DR. CONSTANZE STELZENMUELLER, BOSCH SENIOR FELLOW,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Dr. Stelzenmueller. Thank you and good morning. Chairman
Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, distinguished members of this
Committee: It's an honor for me to be invited here today to
testify before you on the critical issue before this panel,
Russian interference on the European elections and specifically
on the federal election on September 24 in my country, Germany.
Russian interference in the European political space is
strategic and is aimed at destabilizing the European project.
Germany is the fulcrum with which to achieve this goal. Weaken
Germany and you diminish the E.U. and the European project. And
conversely, because Germany has orchestrated the European
consensus on sanctions against Russia, it has become the main
obstacle for Russia in pursuing its interest in Europe and
Ukraine.
Russian interference in Germany, as we know, has occurred
for a long time. It is not limited to these elections, nor will
it stop thereafter. As for the election itself, there is a
general consensus in my country that there will be meddling;
the only question is when and in what form that will take.
Technical manipulation of the elections, however, is
unlikely. We use paper ballots and we have hardened the
computer infrastructure that we use to aggregate the data. The
real target of Russian interference in Germany is voters'
heads. They're trying to hack our political consciousness. For
this, they use a broad spectrum of tools, from propaganda, to
disinformation, to hacking and denial-of-service attacks to, of
course, more classical means, such as individual or
institutional agents of influence.
Attribution and intent, of course, remain elusive. This is
one of the most difficult problems, not least because not even
the Russian authorities ordering interference are monolithic or
cohesive. And execution is often outsourced or delegated,
including to what President Putin has called ``patriotic
hackers.''
The impact of Kremlin interference, if we're honest here,
is also hit and miss, often miss. In many ways, its meddling in
European elections over the past year has produced the exact
opposite of what was intended. It has produced stable,
democratic, and non-populist governments that are pro-European
Union and indeed pro-NATO and pro-American. The populists have
lost out almost everywhere and NATO and the E.U., I'm happy to
say, are experiencing a renaissance of purpose. And in the
German race, what looked a neck-to-neck race for a while at the
beginning of the year is now looking quite different.
Chancellor Merkel is holding a steady 14-point lead.
But that does not mean--and I urge you to consider this--
that Russia cannot still do significant damage.
As for countermeasures, Germany has certainly taken a while
to take note of the threat, but it has been making up, racing
to make up for lost time over the past two years by hardening
its defenses and creating more resilience. That's not to say
there's still not much more to be done, particularly on the
civil society front. And German politicians certainly need to
do better at articulating their narrative against Kremlin
disinformation.
And, of course, it helps that Germany is not the first
country to face this threat. In fact, we come at the end of a
long string of elections, and we can learn from our friends and
allies, particularly from the French case just explained by
Janis Sarts.
That said, we have no reason whatsoever as Germans or as
Europeans to be complacent. In fact, the successes of Russian
interference, such as they are, are a measure of our failures
and we need to examine those.
Now, what form could Russian interference in the September
24 elections take? Obviously, if there were a major terrorist
attack, if there were a return of the refugee crisis, that
could be exploited by propaganda. It's conceivable that there
would be further severe DDoS attacks, or further hacks or, in
fact, a leak of the 2015 hack substance. Sixteen gigabytes were
taken away; we haven't seen them yet.
But it is just as likely that a visible Russian attempt to
use such events would backfire, as it has before. So they need
to tread carefully there. And interference could just as well
take the form of ongoing careful probing and testing of our
vulnerabilities, combined with a continuous slow drip of toxic
disinformation, as is happening now, all the time.
So Germany will have to remain vigilant, but also flexible
and relaxed. We mustn't overdramatize the scope, intent, or
coherence of the threat. That would be to walk in to the main
psychological threat of this propaganda, which is to think the
threat is bigger than it actually is. We are a strong and
vibrant democracy and we can fight this in the marketplace,
too. However, it is beyond any doubt that Germany and all of
Europe are experiencing a phase of historical volatility and
drift. And in such a time, friends and allies matter more than
ever. And here, our relationship with America, is key.
We understand that Europe needs to do more for its own
defense and take on more of the burden of transatlantic
security relationship off the United States. And we have, as
many here know, and as Nick knows, we have already taken many
steps towards this goal. But the alliance as such, our
political, economic, military, and intelligence partnership, is
crucial for the preservation of the European project. And an
America that feels ambiguous about the value of this alliance
could be perceived by the Kremlin as the ultimate
encouragement.
I therefore respectfully have only one recommendation for
you, or rather it is a request: Stand by us.
Thank you very much and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Stelzenmueller follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Doctor, and thank you, all of our
witnesses.
A reminder that we will recognize members by seniority for
up to five minutes. The Chair recognizes himself.
Two questions to all of you. They are yes and no, yes or
no. Do you have any doubt that Russian interference is driven
by Putin himself?
Start with you, Ambassador Burns.
Ambassador Burns. No doubt about it.
Chairman Burr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Garcevic. The same answer. No doubt.
Mr. Sarts. No doubt.
Dr. Stelzenmueller. None.
Chairman Burr. Any doubt that Russian interference is or
has happened in the U.S. and European elections?
Ambassador Burns. It has happened systematically.
Ambassador Garcevic. It happened, it happens, and it is
going to happen.
Mr. Sarts. It has happened.
Dr. Stelzenmueller. A little difficult to vary on this, but
yes.
Chairman Burr. Ambassador Garcevic, what would have
happened in Montenegro had Russia succeeded in the
parliamentary elections?
Ambassador Garcevic. You can imagine, I would say, first
what could have happened is that The democratic front would
withdraw sanctions which were imposed by my country on Russia,
because my country was among the few in the region to impose
sanctions immediately after they were imposed by the E.U. in
order to show, to demonstrate, full alliance with the E.U.
Common Foreign and Security Policy. That could be the first
immediate step to be taken.
The second, in terms of far-reaching goals, they would turn
the direction of the country from Western-leaning to Eastern-
leaning, which means that I can imagine that in years from now
Montenegro would become a satellite of Russia in the Balkans.
Chairman Burr. Mr. Sarts, was there any evidence of Russian
involvement in the U.K. most recent elections?
Mr. Sarts. Of course, both RT and Sputnik made their effort
to have an effect on the election. But I would not say--I would
not say that there has been a significant pattern of Russian
involvement in the U.K. election that we have seen. I would
also argue that it is always--we have a pattern that Russia
requires time to construct elaborate operations to attack the
election systems. So where there's very little preparatory time
for enhancing the networks, activating the networks, and
planning for these things, they are not really efficient.
Chairman Burr. I took from your testimony that media
outlets are directed in many cases by Russian government as to
how they cover elections, what they say or don't say about
candidates. So just the fact that maybe RT and Sputnik had a
narrative that was different in Britain than maybe the
mainstream press, that would be a sign of Russia trying to
influence the outcome, would it not?
Mr. Sarts. I have no direct evidence to say that the
particular narratives as we see in these outlets during the
election period in the U.K. would have been directly directed
from Kremlin, although there is a regular monthly meeting
between all the key editors of media in Russia with the Kremlin
officials, where reportedly they coordinate the messaging.
Chairman Burr. So it's not a news outlet as we would define
in the United States, independent?
Mr. Sarts. No.
Chairman Burr. If I understood your testimony, again, I
think there was a suggestion that America's social media
platforms knew that they were part of a coordinated attack,
especially as it related to France. Did I hear you correctly?
Mr. Sarts. The media platforms have the data to see where
the information originates, and I know they've been also
assisting the French media to make sure that within these
platforms the information that these consortiums find as
factually correct have the preeminence.
Chairman Burr. Media outlets have the ability to understand
whether a bot has been used to make it look like there's
tremendous public support for an issue versus real public
support. Is that an accurate statement?
Mr. Sarts. Well, yes, it is. Actually it is more than just
the media themselves. There is increased number of research--
and also we are about to publish a regular report on robotic
networks and social media--that these robotic systems are
pushing the specific narratives. What we've seen is the same
robotic networks working on the Dutch elections, pushing the
RT-Sputnik-Russian narrative, or for that matter also in a
French election pushing the Le Pen narrative, or country, also
pushing all the fake stories about Emmanuel Macron.
Chairman Burr. Last question. Nick Burns, what should the
U.S. response be? And should that response to election
integrity and intrusion by the Russians be coordinated with our
European partners?
Ambassador Burns. I think it should. I think there are
three things we can do, Mr. Chairman. And I hope the
Administration is beginning to do some of this. First is our
intelligence agencies have to be linked up to understand the
threat as it's happening.
Second, if laws are being broken in both Europe and the
United States, our judicial authorities ought to be working
together to prosecute people and put them behind bars.
And third--and this will probably happen through Secretary
Tillerson and others and our ambassadors overseas--in the
response--and you saw this brilliant response by the Macron
campaign to push back--we can be lashed up with the Europeans
in a response to an attack, whether it's in Europe or the
United States. We're in the same NATO alliance, all the
countries represented here today are. It's a political alliance
as well as a military alliance. We ought to be working
together.
And finally, I think that the Senate is on the right track
with your sanctions bill. It's a tough bill. I know it's caused
some controversy in some countries in Europe. But frankly,
American companies--European companies shouldn't have
advantages to sell into the Russian market that American
companies do not have. And I think your bill makes that point.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Ambassador.
Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me again thank all the witnesses for their testimony,
and thank you again for your unanimous agreement on the nature
of the Russian threat and the attacks that were created here in
the United States.
I want to go back. In our March public hearing, one of our
witnesses, Clint Watts, testified that then-candidate Trump,
quote, ``used Russian active measures at times against his
opponents,'' end of quote. He cited then-candidate Trump's
coordination or use in calling out WikiLeaks. We saw candidate
Trump continue to use terms like the elections being
``rigged,'' the same type of terms that were used by the
Kremlin in their propaganda efforts.
Do you agree with what Mr. Watts drew as a conclusion,
that, at least inadvertently, candidate Trump was actually
advancing the goals of the Russian propaganda efforts? I'd like
to hear any of your comments on that, starting with you,
Ambassador Burns.
Ambassador Burns. Senator, just two quick points. First, I
don't have any independent knowledge about the Trump campaign
working with----
Vice Chairman Warner. I'm not asking that. I'm just asking
whether his comments about elections being rigged, calling on
WikiLeaks--it appeared, and Mr. Watts drew the conclusion,
that, at least inadvertently, it seemed that then-candidate
Trump was actually aligned with some of what Russia's
propaganda efforts were trying to sow the same kind of chaos
and questioning of our democratic processes.
Ambassador Burns. Right. I thought it was just important to
say I don't have information. But when candidate Trump did
encourage the Russian government to find more of Secretary
Clinton's e-mails, I thought that was an irresponsible
statement.
Vice Chairman Warner. Anybody else want to comment?
[No response.]
You're taking a safe diplomatic effort, all of you. I
appreciate that.
I imagine I will get the same response, because I again
share very much, Ambassador Burns, your comments earlier that
the lack of interest shown by the President of even
acknowledging this threat or taking this threat--urging his
Administration to take this threat seriously and lay out a
coordinated whole-of-government approach to what will be a
threat in 2017, 2018. I would argue that Putin and his cronies
had a pretty darn good rate of return on the number of rubles
invested in their activities to kind of take on our election
system.
Mr. Sarts, one of the questions--I want to go back to
commend you for your good work on the 18 reports that you've
done on the robot trolling and how the Russians are using
technology tools to exponentially increase the power of their
fake news.
You've said--you've cited reports that at least 8 percent
of Twitter accounts are actually bot accounts and thereby do
not represent an actual person. Facebook--I was out recently
with Facebook, and they pointed out the fact that in the French
elections they took down about 30,000 fake accounts right
before the election. I commend them because right after the
American election Facebook acted like they had no
responsibility for policing fake news. I think they've moved
into a more responsible position.
But I'd love to hear from all of you what role you feel
these platform companies that control so much information--
Google, Facebook, Twitter, et al.--have in this new world. And
again, we'll go down the list, starting with you, Ambassador
Burns.
Ambassador Burns. Senator, very briefly, I had the
opportunity to be at Stanford for 5 months last year; met a lot
of these people who work in this space. And I was impressed by
the number of people--take YouTube for example--that they now
dedicate to try to filter out hate speech. And that's
commendable.
If that's the case, there ought to be an ongoing dialogue
between the U.S. Government, our national security agencies,
and these companies to try to filter out Russian propaganda.
It's a direct assault on our country.
I was impressed by Mr. Sarts' testimony. I thought it was
quite convincing that there has to be an integration of the
technology companies and our government on this issue.
Vice Chairman Warner. I concur. I'd love to hear the rest
of your comments, please.
Mr. Sarts. Well, first, I also just came yesterday back
from Silicon Valley, where we talked with a lot of these
companies on these issues. First, there's a growing market,
black market, for robotics in social media. Some of it is
rather innocent, but much of that is of some kind of criminal
activity. And that is going to be a growing concern for people
in a digital environment to actually understand that they're
really interacting with a human being, instead of large numbers
of robots supported by artificial intelligence.
To counter that, the companies that have these platforms
are one of the key players. I was heartened by the discussion
back there. They are taking it seriously, probably slightly too
late. But there are--most of these big companies are investing
in and thinking about how they can be an active supporter of a
democratic process, not a disrupter.
And secondly, there is a growing number of the technology
research on the subject that we can rely on. And as Ambassador
Burns said, and I've said in my initial statement, that is a
must that we work together. If we don't, we will not succeed in
the digital environment.
Vice Chairman Warner. Have seen any cooperation in Germany?
My time is expired.
Dr. Stelzenmueller. Yes, sir. German politicians and
policy-makers have made trips to Silicon Valley to talk to the
big media companies and tech companies like Google, Facebook
and Twitter. I've been told the initial conversations were less
than, shall we say, less than cooperative. There seemed to be
no inclination to self-police and there also was no inclination
to help. That has significantly changed, I gather.
Now, the German justice minister has just put out a draft
of a law called the Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz--and we use
these long words to annoy our allies. But, basically, it's a
draft law to help in enforcing hate speech rules in Germany,
which are quite strong, obviously, with roots in our history.
I as a trained constitutional lawyer and other critics of
this law, have mixed feelings about this. I would like the
political marketplace to regulate itself. But if significant
actors, very powerful actors that have control over algorithms
that can really shape the marketplace without citizens even
noticing if they refuse to self-police, I believe such laws
become necessary. I think this has to be an ongoing
conversation between business, citizens and the state, to
decide where responsibility for regulation properly lies.
Chairman Burr. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Ambassador Burns, you know, we're pretty used to dealing
with hyperbole in this Committee with the kind of things that
we hear, and I want to talk to you for a minute about your
statement that Russia is the most dangerous adversary that we
have. With all due respect, if you sat on this Committee I'm
not sure you'd reach that conclusion.
I think there's a lot of us, with what we hear about what's
going on in North Korea and some of our other adversaries, that
Russia certainly is a dangerous adversary, but when you have
someone running a country like Kim Jong Un and with what we
know about what he's probably going to do if his administration
is threatened, I've got to tell you that you might be slightly
off mark when you say that that Russia's the most dangerous
adversary that we face.
But don't take that as a criticism that I think that Russia
is not a dangerous adversary. I would just caution that it
falls in a group of countries, and there's others that are more
dangerous.
You were critical of or are critical of President Trump and
what he's thinking right now. You would agree with me that the
Russians have taken no active measures in an election while
Donald Trump has been President? Is that a fair statement?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, thank you. May I just say in
response to your first comment, if you would allow it?
Senator Risch. Please.
Ambassador Burns. I agree with everything you said about
North Korea, but Russia can do greater damage to us from a
nuclear weapons perspective and certainly in trying to draw a
new dividing line in Europe. So it's a respectful disagreement.
Senator Risch. I appreciate that and let me ask you this.
Do you think it's more likely that that would come--assuming
that North Korea had nuclear weapons that they could deliver,
is it more likely that it would come from Russia or from North
Korea?
Ambassador Burns. Well, I think the problem--the threat
from Russia is multifaceted. It's not just from nuclear
weapons. It's also about dividing Europe.
Senator Risch. No question about that.
Ambassador Burns. So I think they are both a problem----
Senator Risch. I agree with that.
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. A big problem for the United
States. I just made the statement--I was echoing General
Dunford, when he was confirmed.
Senator Risch. Back to my last question, you would agree
with me that the Russians have taken no active measures in an
American election while Donald Trump has been President? Is
that a fair statement?
Ambassador Burns. Well, I think it might--I actually don't
know. I don't know what have----
Senator Risch. Have we had any elections since he's been
President?
Ambassador Burns. Yes, we've had Congressional elections.
Senator Risch. And you think that the Russians have taken
some active measures in those elections?
Ambassador Burns. I don't know the answer to that question.
Senator Risch. We do know that the Russians took active
measures in the last presidential election?
Ambassador Burns. Well, I think the intelligence
communities of the United States are confirmed on that, yes.
Senator Risch. I think we're all in agreement with that.
That--and who was President of the United States when that
occurred?
Ambassador Burns. That was President Obama, as you know.
Senator Risch. And you know he was aware that this was
going on?
Ambassador Burns. Yes.
Senator Risch. Indeed, he's admitted that he talked to Mr.
Putin about that, is that correct?
Ambassador Burns. So you heard my testimony about President
Obama. I have great respect for President Obama. This was a
difficult decision.
Senator Risch. I hear that.
Ambassador Burns. I think that President Obama, with the
benefit of hindsight, should have acted more resolutely,
quickly, to be transparent with the American people. But he did
take action. And what disturbs me about President Trump is that
he's not investigating, has taken no action.
Senator Risch. Got that. But I'm talking about somebody
that could have done something about this while it was going
on. You're aware that President Obama talked to Mr. Putin about
that, are you not, in the summer of 2016?
Ambassador Burns. That's what the news reports say. I also
know that the Obama Administration briefed the eight senior
members of Congress early on, that there were public statements
made by Jeh Johnson, I think on October 7th. So they did take
action. It's not as if the Obama Administration just was silent
on this issue.
Senator Risch. And indeed, when Mr.--or when President
Obama told Mr. Putin that we knew that they were taking active
measures, that was indeed a classified--that was classified
information, was it not?
Ambassador Burns. Well, you know, I think if you're the
President of United States and you're trying to deliver a stiff
diplomatic mission, you're well within your rights to tell
Putin what you think he may be doing.
Senator Risch. I couldn't agree with you more.
Ambassador Burns. In fact, that's the object of the
conversation.
Senator Risch. Couldn't agree with you more. And that's
actually the purpose of classified information. It's no good if
you collect it and don't use it. Fair statement?
Ambassador Burns. Well, not always. Sometimes you don't
want that information ever to see the light of day.
Senator Risch. What else should--what else should President
Obama have done?
Ambassador Burns. You know--and this is Monday morning
quarterbacking by me
Senator Risch. I understand that.
Ambassador Burns. And I appreciate the fact that he finally
did take action on the sanctions. I think if you go back and
look at it, the American people in my judgment deserved to know
what was happening clearly. You have to ring the village bell.
And we should have had a more immediate response that was
painful to the Russians, whether that was immediate sanctions
or some type of offensive action that we could have taken by
covert means against them. And so I think, there are a variety
of options. I wasn't there, so I don't want to micromanage
this.
Senator Risch. I appreciate that.
Ambassador Burns. But I do think that he could have done
more. But my testimony clearly shows that President Trump has
taken no action whatsoever and I think that's irresponsible.
Senator Risch. Got that. But the description you gave, you
would agree with me that the Obama Administration did not take
significantly--the significant action that was needed,
including informing the American people, which would have gone
a long ways to countering what the Russians did? Fair
statement?
Ambassador Burns. Well, I think that the Obama
Administration should have taken greater action, but the more
pertinent question today is what our current President is not
doing, and that has implications for Europe and they're very
negative.
Senator Risch. To you it's the more pertinent. To me,
what's more pertinent is what should have been done by the
commander-in-chief who was in charge at that time.
My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Many have said this is actually the crime of the century.
If you think about it, it is. If you think about the fact that
it's conducted by intelligence agencies, we know Russian
intelligence to be relentless and ruthless, and it all
happened, and it contributed toward the defeat of an American
presidential candidate, who happened to be the first woman
running for that office. Well, that's not true, but in a very
serious, ineluctable way it is. They targeted 21 states. They
went into 21 states.
I've been sitting here, Nick, listening to you, listening
to your colleagues. I have great respect for you. My own view
is that if in fact this is the crime of the century, if in fact
it's going to lead to other crimes being committed in the
future, that we together have a responsibility to hit back. The
question comes, are sanctions really the effective way to do it
or do we do it in the cyber world?
But I don't think that we can sit here and see the amount
of destruction that has been done, the defeat of a candidate,
the intrusion into 21 State systems, the continuation even now
with spear phishing, what's happening in Europe, and, you know,
the Iron Bear is on a march.
How do you stop that? And we have had certain abilities
discussed of how to develop a hit-back. And it's hard for me to
believe that--sanctions make them angry, but sanctions don't
really do anything. There is a downside to a cyber war. On the
other hand, the United States of America cannot see the
critical infrastructure of an American democratic election
destroyed by Russia.
What--I'd be very interested if anyone would be prepared to
talk about what Europe and America could do together to plan,
to prepare, and to hit back.
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I'd just say briefly, our
sanctions have to be aligned. They'll be much stronger if we
actually work together with the Europeans to align what they do
in sanctions with us, number one.
Number two, it's my impression we can do much more in the
way of intelligence, but also in active work together to
respond verbally to the propaganda.
But number three, I think you're right, and I so testified,
that we have to think of other means. And we have capacity that
if we wanted to use it, we could. And that has to be aligned
with Europe.
Senator Feinstein. Bear in mind, these aren't fringe
people. These are two, at least two of the three intelligence
services of Russia. That's a big deal. The President of Russia
committed his intelligence services to hit our election system.
Do we just, oh, well, maybe we shut off this sanction or that
sanction? Maybe we think it's going to just go away? They show
no signs of going away.
I've been on this Committee for a long time. I have never
seen a time when, with full confidence, every single one of
America's intelligence agencies have come together and say they
have--they have full confidence that this was orchestrated by
Putin and he used his intelligence services to do it.
Mr. Sarts. Well, if I may, I think the first thing that we
have to do is cover our backs. And that is building the
resilience. That was the things that we all three talk--four
talked about.
Senator Feinstein. Could you define ``resilience''?
Mr. Sarts. Ability of the democratic process to withstand
the attacks, overt or covert, to influence, with a malicious
intent from outside, the societal choices within the election
system, within the political process. And being able to,
irrespective, of these----
Senator Feinstein. With what acts, sir? We do stand in a--
there's no question about that. But----
Mr. Sarts. Well, I can go through the things that I
recommended: society being aware; cyber defense being on a high
level; having been able to operationalize the information
battlespace, and many of these.
Secondly, I wanted to say in fact, if you look at Russian
documents, they believe we are attacking them, and I think they
really believe that. So--which is, I think, a paradox.
What we have to really look for is that we're not attacked
by Russians, we're attacked by Kremlin. And what we can do is
actually help also people within Russia to recognize what is
the actual realities. I think that is the most powerful weapon,
the truth, the truth that Kremlin is hiding away from their own
citizens. And that is I think the weapon that we have which is
the most mighty.
Senator Feinstein. My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Burr. Senator Rubio.
Ambassador Garcevic. Excuse me. May I add a few words? I
personally lived in a country which was under sanctions and I
have my personal experience of being a citizen of a country and
living a normal life in a country under sanctions. For
sanctions to start working and to start bearing fruits, you
need time. It took like nine years for Yugoslavia, which was
smaller, in economic terms very smaller than Russia, to see
sanctions working.
I can imagine that in the case of Russia, we have to
endure. Perseverance is needed, and sanctions will start
bearing fruits at certain point. So, I don't think that we
should stop or rethink this strategy.
On top of it, someone mentioned, I think the Ambassador,
mentioned importance of NATO, because NATO is not only military
organization. NATO is security and political organization.
Since it was formed in 1949, U.S. has seen NATO as a pillar of
Euro-Atlantic bond. And the countries who are members of NATO
are there because of a set of values that they share, which
means that we have to keep ourselves together and strong
through NATO, which includes a number of measures. Not only a
deterrence, which is taking place right now in Europe, but also
a number of other measures, because it's not only that Europe
is under attack. Its values are under attack. Values are under
attack, values of democracy, values of parliamentary democracy,
value of liberal democracies are under attack.
Russia is backing those groups in Europe, leftist or
rightist, those who challenge the very core values of liberal
democracy, because those who challenge from within those
democratic systems and would like to see those systems and
values eroding.
So in power with some hard-core or hard power measures, we
have to put emphasis also on soft power, because this is what
Russia uses against democratic systems. I think democratic
systems in soft-power are much better off than Russia and may
offer more than Russia can offer to countries.
Chairman Burr. Doctor.
Dr. Stelzenmueller. Madam Senator, I would like to add one
small remark to what's already been said, and that is, if I may
say as an ally and a citizen of your ally of over 60 years: Do
no harm. Do not question the alliance. Do not question the
alliance that is greatly in your strategic interest with
Europe, but that is also in our interest. It is of existential
importance for us. And an American government, a White House,
that questions the validity of that alliance, that questions
the validity of the Article 5 mutual defense commitment, does
more to undermine our security and our safety than many things
that the Kremlin does.
We are all vibrant Western democracies. That's not to say
we don't have flaws and vulnerabilities. And we should not only
address those, but we I think as Western democracies can
address them together. We can look at them together.
And I would add only one thing. Sanctions do work, perhaps
even more as a political statement of cohesion and will, and as
such they have had a tremendous impact on Russia. They have
left a deep impression on the Kremlin. They have also done some
economic damage, but they have above all been an expression of
Europe's and America's will to stand together against the
threat toward Ukraine and its neighbors and the threat against
the European project and American interests there. So they do
work.
Thank you.
Chairman Burr. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Thank you all for being here.
My hope is that this Committee's work will produce a
document that doesn't simply detail what happened, but how they
did it, so that we can prevent--so that we can take steps,
preventive steps to address this in the future, because I don't
believe it's going away any time soon, for one simple reason:
It worked.
And I think we're all--a lot of people are focused on a
particular electoral outcome. I think the broader design was to
sow instability, chaos, division in a country that already had
great political division. I don't think anybody can doubt that
that's the case.
I mean, just the sheer amount of time and energy that's
been spent by this Committee, this Congress, the press and
everybody else on this issue of Russia alone must be deeply
gratifying to the people who authorized these measures. And the
way it's exacerbated our ability to get work done on a number
of other things has been deeply impactful.
And so I really, truly hope that as we do our work we will
learn what are the best ways to confront it, within the
confines of the following. We have a First Amendment. So I
understand that places like France are able to block out. You
know, when the stuff came out about Macron they had a blackout
at the end period, and so a lot of that was not widely
reported.
I don't mean this in a--I'm not attacking the media. I'm
just saying, one of the most powerful unwitting agents of
Russian influence was the mainstream media, that when these e-
mails were being leaked from WikiLeaks there was a lot of focus
on what was in the gossipy aspects of it and not so much the
origins of what it was all about.
And, because it's a--we have the First Amendment in this
country, and so the people who did this understood that certain
information would get widespread coverage. I'm not advocating
censorship. I'm telling you, that is what they'll use against
us. So, we have that different from what they have in Europe
and the like.
I want to know, what has worked? Has anyone successfully
confronted this threat and proven to us things you can do to
alleviate the sting of these efforts? I point to an article in
``The New York Times'' by several authors on May 9th of 2017.
It talks about steps taken by Macron's campaign, including
creating dozens of false e-mail accounts, complete with phony
documents, to confuse the attackers.
I'm curious, Ambassador Garcevic, about the efforts in
Montenegro, a small country that has far closer historical,
cultural, and religious ties to Russia, and where Russian state
media and propaganda run rampant. They were unable to dissuade
the people there from electing a pro-NATO government. What
works? Because--has anyone begun to figure this out? Because we
need to do it.
Mr. Sarts. Well, first, what works is people don't like to
be manipulated, and when they know somebody's out there for
them to change their mind and get under their skin they become
more cautious. That's the first thing. And we've seen in a
number of countries where the public becomes aware, it's much
harder, like instantly, to get the effect the Russians are
trying to achieve.
Secondly, it is I think very important in these, especially
misinformation. The Marcon case, you know it is going to
happen; you do a contingency plan. And I would say your
contingency is not that they're not going to break in. There's
always a way through the human fault you can get into the
systems.
You actually, as they did, you do a trap. You do a trap.
That's another thing that has clearly worked. And that takes
also the knowledge, preparation, and acceptance that it is
happening.
And thirdly, in the fake news cycles we see it is always
that the fake news comes in first, creates emotion and gets
wider. If you are able to get into that cycle first, you are
limiting the effect, if not taking it away as such. And we've
seen cases in Lithuania where the fake stories about German
soldiers raping a teenage girl were trying to circulate, where
the government and media actually made sure the first news
somebody ever sees was: There is the fake news news that this
and this. And they, those government and the media worked their
part, and that never got traction.
So there are quite a number of good, successful, tactical
and strategic examples that one can look at.
Ambassador Garcevic. If I may add two things. What was
Russia's goal? What is Russia's goal in the region? It goes
beyond Montenegro. Russia's goal is to prevent the expansion of
NATO and the E.U. It's not only about Montenegro. It's about
other countries that are wavering or that are not fully on
either side.
You know, if Montenegro is considered or can be considered
now as a lost case for Russia, others are not lost case yet.
And Russia is trying to, by making example in Montenegro, is
trying to send a signal to others: what we are willing to do or
what we can do if you even dare to go the same way. This is
really from a strategical point of view, it comes through the
Balkans, this corner of Europe, important for Russia.
But it comes to how media campaign was carried out in
Montenegro also speaks that Russia has really a diversified
approach. And it adopted its approach toward Montenegro how to
reach out to people in Montenegro, and not only Montenegro, but
in the region.
Montenegro, first of all, we are not used to watching
Russian TV. We are not used to reading Russian newspapers in
Russian. We are not like people in Ukraine, for example. We
don't have Russian communities living in Montenegro. So they
therefore decided to open, to establish, a number of offices of
Russian media in the region that would broadcast news in all
local language, and then to use local networks to republish
those news. First fabricate news, make either fake or false
news, then those news will be broadcasted or republished
further by local news. Then people will trust local news or
local media, if not Russian media. After some time Sputnik and
Russia Today have become the most popular among local
population.
And finally, because of cultural and historical and
religious closeness between two nations, they really
effectively use church and state. My society is in principle a
traditional society and people trust priests and trust church.
And since we are also Orthodox population, as Russians are, so
they use church to propagate Orthodox style of life or Eastern
Orthodox style of life and to present to the people, to
citizens of my country, that it's about identity and it's about
cultural roots and it's about dignity; and that Eastern
Christianity is fundamentally different than Western world. And
if we join NATO or the E.U., at the end of the day we're going
to lose our identity, and it's about dignity.
So, this is how effectively Russia uses different channels,
different mechanisms, in order to reach our people and to send
message which will be, how to say, in order to earn the hearts
of people they would like to have on their side.
Chairman Burr. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you.
And thank the four of you. This has been a very valuable
panel.
Here in our inquiry, I've focused on what I called the
follow-the-money issues, and concerns about Moscow's funding of
pro-Russia political parties and groups in Europe, of course,
is not new. Two years ago, the Committee directed the National
Intelligence Office to submit an intelligence assessment on
this issue. What is different now is we are looking at this
attack on European democracies to help us understand what has
happened to our democracy.
So, Director Sarts, I want to start with you because you
have studied Moscow's financing of pro-Russian political
figures. And let me just kind of see if we can go through a few
questions here. Have you been able to determine if Vladimir
Putin employs particular strategies to develop relationships
and curry favor with political figures in Europe? And if so,
what would those strategies be?
Mr. Sarts. First, there are two strategies to incite
different political actors across Europe into cooperating with
Russia. First is financial incentives. It can work both through
the opening of business opportunities vis-a-vis Kremlin-
controlled companies, or it can work also through a number of
funds controlled by Kremlin that send in further the money to
different Russia-controlled NGOs, and then, therefore, further
on, disseminating the financial means to incite people into
cooperating.
The other venue is nonfinancial, which is giving the
Russian information power as the backdrop to whoever's message
they're trying to promote and whose political point of view
they are trying to use for whatever their strategy----
Senator Wyden. Does President Putin make the decision
himself to support political figures in Europe, based again on
what you know?
Mr. Sarts. Well, we as a center look explicitly at the open
source. So I would not be able on my available information to
make that conclusion.
Senator Wyden. Does Russian assistance to its allies in
Europe involve helping political parties, individual political
figures, associates of individual political figures, or all of
these different approaches?
Mr. Sarts. They do.
Senator Wyden. They use all of the above.
And is there any information available on what mechanisms
Putin prefers to provide financial assistance to political
figures in Europe?
Mr. Sarts. In an open space, there have been a number of
reports from the European intelligence agencies sketching out
without great detail some of these practices. But of course,
there is much more which is not within the open public space
that is known on these activities.
Senator Wyden. And one last one for you, Director Sarts.
Your statement referred to Russian cyber-attacks, including the
2015 Russian hack of the German Bundestag. Last week, the U.K.
Parliament came under what British authorities called a
sustained and determined attack on all parliamentary user
accounts, although the source of the attack has not been
identified.
The reason I ask is my understanding with respect to these
issues is every attack is going to be different. Every attack
is going to be different because once you've engaged in one
particular strategy, you've got people preparing for that and
they move on to the next. What's your advice to us, based on
your analysis in Europe, for how we deal with this
extraordinarily important issue of developing a cyber-attack
strategy, a preventive cyber-attack strategy?
Mr. Sarts. Well, first, I think you give too much credit to
the Kremlin operations. In fact, what our research says, much
of the tool set remains the same. There is a variation and
there is an experimentation, but it is not more than the 20
percent of the overall activity.
The generic advice is that we have to think slightly
differently about what the cyber-attack is. We typically think
of it as a venue to get into the infrastructure and get the
data. But I would argue that we have to think of two
parameters: of course technical as very important; but at the
end of the day, the purpose of the attack to get into the
minds. And we have to actually, when employing our own
countering strategies, focus both on technical as well as in
the cognitive aspects of the defense.
Senator Wyden. My time is up. I'm glad you think that the
Russians are less clever than cyber-attackers elsewhere. I have
reservations about that.
I just want to make one last point. I know my time is up,
Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Burns, I'm a fan of yours, and I just heard one
word that concerned me with respect to the relationship of
government and the technology companies. I think, and probably
you didn't really really mean it--you talked about integrating
the companies and the government. I think what you were meaning
was better communication between the government and the
companies, and I just wanted to make that point.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Oh, if you would like to respond.
Ambassador Burns. Very quickly. Thank you. I meant that
there should be communication, not that there be formally
integrative efforts. Thank you.
Senator Wyden. I understand.
Chairman Burr. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Ambassador Burns, it's good to see you.
Thank you for joining this panel this morning.
I'm struck as I listen to the testimony of all the
witnesses that the approach that was used in Montenegro, in
France, in Germany has been much more proactive. It's bolder.
It exposes the falsehoods that are out there. And it is a far
more visible effort.
Ambassador, you were somewhat critical of President Obama,
and I would be even more critical of his response. And I would
call it behind the scenes, ineffective, and tardy. It wasn't
really until after the election that sanctions were imposed and
that the January 6th, 2017, report on the extensiveness and the
scope of Russian interference in our elections was released by
the intelligence community.
So there seems to me to be a big difference in the approach
that's taken by our allies and the approach that was taken by
President Obama. And as you pointed out rightly, President
Trump's Administration does not seem to have any strategy to
deal with this going forward at this point.
But then I hear about the efforts taken in France, for
example, where there was a coordinated effort among government,
the media, the campaigns, and even the technology companies.
And there's one headline that says ``French newsrooms unite to
fight election misinformation.'' I just can't even imagine a
headline in the United States saying ``American newsrooms unite
to fight election misinformation.''
So are our systems so different that, while we can learn
from our allies much more successful efforts to counter Russian
active measures, is that even possible in our country, given
the very different role of the media here? And I'm asking
Ambassador Burns that question.
Ambassador Burns. Thank you, Senator. You know, I think
we're learning the lessons as we go along. And I think Director
Comey was right when the Committee asked him about this, that
he thinks that the next target in our country could be either
party. And I applaud the bipartisan effort to try to learn the
lessons.
The Europeans have learned lessons from what went wrong in
our election. And what seems to have worked well in the Macron
campaign is speed and decisive action and transparency so that
actually all the French people were made aware of the threat.
And they have a right to that information.
That was the basis of my criticism. And I just want to say
this. I have tremendous respect for President Obama. This is
Monday morning quarterback by somebody who is not in the
government, but you're asked to testify and I think this is one
of the lessons that we have to learn from the Europeans, how
they've done.
And what's missing, it seems, is formal integration of
effort by the governments of Canada, the United States and
Europe. That's a step that the Trump Administration could
decide to take, which would be very helpful both in analysis
and also in action.
Senator Collins. I completely agree with you that
visibility and transparency are absolutely critical, and that
is an important lesson from what happened last fall.
Ambassador Garcevic, I want to ask you about Montenegro
because the State of Maine has a special relationship with
Montenegro, and I can see by your smile that you're aware of
that. We're part of the State Partnership Program and our
National Guard has members stationed in Montenegro to assist
the military and we like to think we were helpful in getting
you ready for your NATO accession, which I strongly supported.
But Montenegro is a really interesting example, because
Russia was not able, despite a tremendous effort, to dissuade
the people there from electing a pro-NATO government last
October. So my question to you is this: Why were the Russian
influence efforts unsuccessful in Montenegro, which is a small
country that has far closer historical and cultural, religious
ties to Russia, and where the Russian state media and
propaganda are prevalent, even as their efforts appeared to be
much more successful--that's probably an overstatement, but to
have some success--in sowing the seeds of doubt and discord in
the 2016 election in our country?
Ambassador Garcevic. That's very difficult to answer in a
couple of minutes. Sometimes--yes, we are a small country.
Russia is big. I would say that Russia looked down on us as
just peanuts in the Balkans that they can put in order easily.
But it turned out not to be the case. Sometimes we had simply
luck when one of the computers of one of our people in the
mission to NATO was hacked by Russia. Simply, we were lucky
because another mission--I don't want to mention name--which
had been under attack with the same virus, computer virus,
helped us register--detect that virus even before it started
working, you know? And then we turned to NATO and then, with
the help of NATO people, we checked all computers, not only in
the mission to NATO, but also in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Military Defense, and government offices, and so
now that we were not affected.
Sometimes, as I said, we had luck. But in more broader
terms, I would say that Russia didn't penetrate economically,
though at the first glance, on the surface, many seeked out
Montenegro to explain how Montenegro was packed with Russians
living there and with Russian money pouring in for years. But
actually, Russian investments in Montenegro were mostly
investments in real estate. We are not dependent on energy. The
Russians didn't invest in banking sector. There are no
investments in any of our important industrial branches in
Montenegro, so they couldn't simply sway us easily.
Even when we imposed sanctions on them, they didn't know
how to react economically on us, so they turned to some
political measures in order to show that they are angry because
of it.
And then, I would say, government, though we were small,
what we tried to do, particularly when it comes to cyber
attacks, we are not capable to hit back, definitely, but we
tried to build a partnership with our NATO partners and we seek
help from them.
Then, at the end of the day, when it comes to cyber
attacks, it's about a human factor. And then we tried to build
up vigilance and, you know, government issuing warning signs to
its agencies to be careful how to deal with sensitive
information.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Ambassador Burns, you've talked a lot
about the sanctions bill we passed here in the Senate. If
Speaker Ryan and the House of Representatives doesn't take up
that Russia sanctions bill, what kind of message do you think
that that would send to Vladimir Putin?
Ambassador Burns. I think a message of weakness, because
the Senate by a huge margin has teed this up. It's the right
thing to do to have a painful type of leverage against the
Russians. And if it's diluted in the House and if the Trump
Administration encourages the House to do that, which is what
one hears, then I think the Russians are going to receive a
mixed message here, not a stiff message, which they need to
receive.
Senator Heinrich. Do you think it will send--make him more
or less likely to interfere in the 2018 and 2020 elections?
Ambassador Burns. You know, I read the transcript of your
hearing with Director Comey. He told you that he thinks it's
going to continue.
Senator Heinrich. Yes.
Ambassador Burns. Until we have better defenses, until
we've gone on the offense.
I think that President Trump should consider, maybe
Secretary Tillerson should do this--exactly what President
Obama did. Go to Putin directly, as President Obama did. It was
after our election, as Senator Collins pointed out, and just
say, there are going to be consequences, and spell them out.
That's actually probably the most effective thing that the
Trump Administration should do.
Senator Heinrich. Should we take these kinds of
cyberattacks and election manipulation as seriously as we would
take a military action or an economic threat to our country?
Ambassador Burns. Well, as you know, they're different.
Obviously, a military action is immediate, consequential. You
have to respond within hours.
I actually think this is--what they try to do
systematically to the Dutch, the Montenegrins, the French, the
Germans and the Americans is discredit democracy in the eyes of
our citizens. I use the word ``existential'' in my testimony. I
don't think it was hyperbole. I think it was the right word to
use. So I think we need to meet squarely. And all of us have
suggested a multitude of ways that we can do that.
Senator Heinrich. I don't disagree. I think one of the
challenges that you've mentioned is that the current President
has been unwilling to respond or even acknowledge the validity
of the Russian hostile actions in the election. I'm curious
what that means for what we as members of the Senate can or
should do to advance a conversation with our European allies
about sanctions. And I would certainly like your opinion on
that, but I would open it to the other members on the panel as
well.
Ambassador Burns. That conversation has to be held.
Normally in this situation, as you know, the State Department
and the White House would be talking to the Germans, the
Austrians about the consequences of the Senate bill. I don't
know if this happened this time. But we're in this phase--we've
talked about the separation of powers for 200 years--where it's
my own view that Congress needs to play the leading role
because I perceive Congress to be tougher against Russia.
Senator Heinrich. Nature abhors a vacuum.
Do any of you want to add to that? Dr. Stelzenmueller.
Dr. Stelzenmueller. Of course. It's well known that German
politicians, senior German politicians, the chancellor and the
foreign minister, have protested the sanctions bill. And this
is, of course, because German companies, and not just German
companies, other Europeans as well, are invested in Nord Stream
2.
I'm not a big fan of this project, frankly. But I'm far
more concerned about unilateral American sanctions that aren't
discussed with the Europeans, that are just put out there and
we have to deal with them. The fact of the matter is that we
had actually for years been asking America to allow the export
of American LNG to the European market, and that it had been
Congress that was resisting this.
So I think the lesson of this experience is for us to, as
allies, discuss what is in the interest of the alliance and
where we can work together. And I think that would be of
significant importance as a deterrent towards Russia.
Senator Heinrich. While I have you, Doctor, when President
Trump questioned the value, the relevance of NATO, whether we
should even keep it as a structure, who do you think benefitted
most from that?
Dr. Stelzenmueller. Well, I've already said that. I think
that that helps the Kremlin, and it's not great. I also don't
think it's in America's self-interest to question that alliance
because you have significant interests in Europe and in
Europe's periphery, and the alliance with us Europeans helps
you pursue those national self-interests.
Senator Heinrich. I could not agree more.
Mr. Sarts, before my time runs out, you talked a little
about how we should try to take the truth directly to the
Russian people because of the filter that they receive so much
of their information through. How can we cut out Vladimir Putin
and speak directly to the Russian people?
Mr. Sarts. Well, I think it is very clear and evident that
is the same environment, which is the digital one. And if one
takes note of the recent protests in Russia against the
corruption, it was very striking how young the crowd was. And
it was also very clear that these people don't anymore get
their world view from the TV. It's all about also social
networks. And yes, that's the way you can get the truth back to
them. And I'm sure Kremlin will try to put up new elements to
block us. But I think that is an environment where we can get
back to them.
Senator Heinrich. I want to thank you all for your
testimony today.
Chairman Burr. Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman.
Let's try a yes-no question first, just in the interest of
time. You know, the Russian economy is failing, not nearly the
country it could or should be. Does Putin benefit in Russia
from getting credit for interfering with elections in our
countries? Ambassador.
Ambassador Burns. I think he does. I think it builds him
up.
Ambassador Garcevic. Yes, politically he does.
Mr. Sarts. It is one significant part for his domestic
policy to benefit from it.
Dr. Stelzenmueller. Sorry, I can't do a yes or no. I'd say
it's both. In the short term, he benefits. In the long term, he
loses and Russia loses.
Senator Blunt. But the short-term benefit is?
Dr. Stelzenmueller. The short-term benefit is it validates
the narrative that we're all just as bad as Russia and,
frankly, Russians are better off living in Russia because their
life at least is stable.
The reality is that a lot of Kremlin interference has
backfired and backfired visibly, and we've been learning from
that. And it has taught us to review our complacencies. It's
taught us to defend our democracies. That's a good thing. But
we also are up against a significant enemy and one that has a
lot of energy and patience.
Senator Blunt. And in terms of--I was going to ask what we
should do about these channels of miscommunication like in our
country Sputnik and RT. Starting with you, Dr. Stelzenmueller:
What have you--what, if anything, have you done to try to
respond or immediately contradict information coming in? I
mean, you're much closer to this than we are, but it's no
harder to keep out here than it is there.
Dr. Stelzenmueller. Well, can I just say, I arrived here in
November of 2014 to start working at Brookings, and I was
stunned by the amount of RT commercials--sorry--posters,
advertisements around Washington. There were these big,
expensive ones, the back-lighted ones on the bus stops, and
then there were the ones that were plastered all over
construction site fences. Amazing. I'd never seen anything
quite like that.
So clearly, there was a big investment here directed at
normal Washingtonians, and that----
Senator Blunt. Is there no investment like that in Germany,
or----
Dr. Stelzenmueller. Not in the same way, but there is
investment.
Senator Blunt. Would you allow it if they wanted to do
that?
Dr. Stelzenmueller. You know, I tend to think that they
can, if they want to buy advertisement, you know, it's a free
country, okay? And these are companies. They can do this. I'm
not a big fan of nanny state endeavors to protect us from
things that we can perfectly well see through. And I believe
that Americans can see through this as well.
Where it becomes more insidious is where they're doing
covert stuff, where they're buying people, where they're buying
institutions. And so I have faith----
Senator Blunt. Your view is that's more insidious than so-
called ``fake news''?
Dr. Stelzenmueller. Well, fake news is insidious if our
consumers, if our citizens, are not media-literate.
Senator Blunt. Well, let's go on down the line. Mr. Sarts,
what--in other countries, what do they do about RT and other
Russian outlets?
Mr. Sarts. Well, in the information space it's actually
quite simple. If somebody doesn't have the credibility, they
may message as much they want. There is no effect from that.
And I think there is an interesting example where Sputnik
opened their offices in the Scandinavian countries, and then
within a year's time they had to close it. Nobody listened to
them.
Senator Blunt. What about in Montenegro?
Ambassador Garcevic. Sputnik has no office in Montenegro. I
think that--I barely can remember that any of those Russia-
based media have offices in Montenegro itself. But they have
offices in neighboring Serbia and from there they penetrate
Montenegro, because they know that in the case, in the
Montenegrin case, government may revoke a license at any
moment. So it is not the case in Serbia. Because we speak more
or less the same language, they can do that easily. And then
from there, their news will be rebroadcasted or reprinted and
published in Montenegro.
Senator Blunt. And Ambassador, what, if anything, should we
do about these known mediums that they use of miscommunication?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I think two things. One is
always attach an adjective, a couple, before when we talk about
them: ``the Russian government propaganda station RT.'' So
expose them for who they are, because they are Russian
government.
Second, be very careful if you ever go on it, because
they'll distort what you say. Don't give them the platform that
they want.
Senator Blunt. Let me try to get one more question in to
you. I actually agree with your current position on
Congressionally binding sanctions. I assume you were much more
inclined to have a flexible position when you were at the State
Department?
Ambassador Burns. That's absolutely true. I am a creature
of the Executive Branch. I always thought it's better to
preserve the President's authority to act. But in this
particular case, since the President is not acting, I think the
Congress has to take that responsibility.
Chairman Burr. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Starting with just a couple of comments. One, I want to
associate myself with Senator Rubio's question, which I think
is the real key question of this hearing. What can we do to
defend ourselves? And I'd like to ask each of you--you've
already testified, talked about it--to submit a written, very
short, half a page, bing, bing, bing, here are the five things
that we can do to defend ourselves. I think that would be very
helpful.
Secondly, what we are seeing here, it seems to me, is the
invention and expansion and implementation of a new kind of
warfare. And it's a kind of warfare that is particularly
effective against democracies. Valeriy Gerasimov, who's the
chief of the general staff of Russia, calls it ``weaponizing
information,'' and said in 2013 that he believes this is--we
are engaged now in informational conflict.
Putin's defense budget is one eighth of ours, but he is
playing a weak hand very well and has found a cheap way--and
when I say peculiarly effective against democracies, because
this is where public opinion matters. In many other countries,
public opinion doesn't have that great a role in how policy is
formed.
So a couple of short questions. And I think, Ambassador
Burns, you just answered this. Any doubt that RT is an arm of
the Russian government?
[No response.]
Senator King. No doubt. Everybody agrees.
Secondly, I have heard in a previous hearing in a different
committee that the Russians were looking around, sniffing
around buying commercial TV outlets in Europe. Have any of you
heard of that? Is that----
Mr. Sarts. Yes, there have been in Baltic states the cases
where they've tried, but governments have tried to block these
possibilities.
Senator King. Well, that certainly it seems to me, is one
of the--one of the things that we have to watch.
Another--I think this is a yes or no question. Was what was
done here in 2016 absolutely consistent with what the Russians
have been doing in Europe for some years? Essentially the same
modus operandi? Mr.--go ahead.
Mr. Sarts. Well, it was, but there were a number of new
elements and some more risk-taking than we used to see.
Senator King. So they're getting more sophisticated. Is
that that accurate?
I think, Mr. Sarts, you have said something several times
that's consistent with my understanding. Some members of this
Committee were in Eastern Europe over a year ago in the spring
of 2016. We were in Ukraine and Poland. When we asked them how
they--and the first thing they wanted to tell us is, ``Watch
out for the Russians in your elections.'' And we didn't
understand how prescient that was at the time.
But in any case, then we said, ``How do you defend
yourself?'' And the answer was, I think, exactly what you've
said. They said, ``The best defense is if the people know
what's happening, and they can say, oh, it's just the
Russians.''
And that you've characterized as societal awareness, and
that's what I think is one of the most important roles of this
Committee, is to educate the American people that, whatever we
do, whatever defenses we come up with, this is going to keep
happening. And the best defense is for them to be, I think you
used the word, ``digitally literate,'' or I can't recall the
term. But we need to understand that they're going to keep
doing this and we need to learn to shrug it off.
Ambassador Burns, do you have any thoughts on that?
Ambassador Burns. I much agree, and I think that's the
lesson to learn from what happened to the Obama Administration.
They were caught unawares. It was new. They didn't appreciate
the extent of it, and it was a lack of speed and lack of
transparency. That is a problem.
Senator King. Well, but I do think it should be noted,
because there's been some discussion here, they did release on
October 9 a comprehensive memo that this was going on, that
really listed all the elements that were later listed in the
January. And in the heat of the campaign, nobody paid much
attention to it. And I understand. I think the dilemma they had
was, do we go public in a big way and be accused of putting our
thumb on the scale of the election and those kind of things?
But I agree, I think a more aggressive response would've
been--would've been appropriate in 20-20 hindsight.
One thing that hasn't been mentioned too much is the use of
kompromat. Is that not part of the Russian strategy, use of
salacious material against candidates they don't like? That has
happened in other countries, has it not?
Dr. Stelzenmueller. Well, it's one of the open questions
about the 2015 Bundestag leak, the German federal legislature,
whether they were looking for kompromat and found it. They have
not posted anything yet. But, you know, that's kind of the
James Bond version. They may just have--also have done this for
the simple purpose of espionage. The point about kompromat is
that often you don't find out because you're not supposed to.
Senator King. Exactly.
Yes, sir?
Mr. Sarts. Just kompromat has been very heavily used
typically by USSR. I think the relative importance has
decreased because they've learned actually having one is not
always essential. You might make it up.
Senator King. Oh, I see. You don't even have to have the
data. You can just make something up, ``King Kicks Dogs Every
Morning,'' and then I'm denying it for the next three months,
or much worse.
Well, I want to thank you again for your testimony. This
has been very informative and I hope you will give us some
written responses about defenses because that's an important
role of this Committee, to prepare ourselves for what everyone
has suggested is not a one-off in 2016.
It will continue to happen and it will continue to happen
on both sides of our political divide in this country. Putin is
not a Republican. He is an opportunist. And the next time, this
attack could come in the opposite direction, but it's still a
corruption of our democracy.
Thank you all very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Lankford.
Senator Lankford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I've learned
several things today, including that Senator King kicks dogs
every morning, and I was completely unaware of that.
[Laughter.]
Let me ask this panel a quick question, and it goes back to
one of the heart of the questions Senator King was just
bringing up before, is the deterrence. Let me ask in a more
specific way: What price should Russia pay for this type of
interference? It's one thing to say we're informing our people,
we're trying to do it rapidly. I've heard that from several of
you to say, the speed of the information and the response is
exceptionally important. Finding cooperation between legitimate
media sites, that they will actually help identify here's--
here's false, here's true, try to get that out.
But what price should they pay? And let me bring up why.
When the Russians were cheating and doping their athletes, in a
very short period of time Russia paid a very big price for that
by their athletes not going to the 2016 Olympics and saying, I
know you trained, but you doped your athletes and you were
caught for that. It's just within the last 24 hours, that their
doping authority is even allowed to start testing their
athletes again, they've been on suspension that long. They paid
a price for that. We would hope that that would be a deterrent.
What price should they pay for this type of aggression?
Yes, ma'am?
Dr. Stelzenmueller. This is a really difficult question,
politically, legally, militarily. And the main reason why it's
so difficult is attribution. And even when intelligence
services know how to attribute, they may not want to make that
public. And that is the largest conundrum that we are dealing
with here.
So we may, I think, be looking at asymmetrical retaliation,
as it were, political, economic. And I think the biggest price
that Russia can and should pay is failure--failure to undermine
us, failure to undermine our democracies, failure to undermine
our alliances. That is something we can do, and I think it is
even more important because it's a consistently--it's a
remaining vulnerability that is even more important than the
question of retaliation.
Of course, we--and American and German and European
officials have been doing this all the time, is to make it very
clear to the Russians that we know what they're doing, that we
want them to stop, and that we have ways of reacting.
But the actual legality and viability of symmetrical
reaction is a huge legal and military problem, as I'm sure you
know.
Senator Lankford. Yes, and one of the things you mentioned
before, Dr. Stelzenmueller, is the export of LNG. That's
something that was debated extensively here in Congress and a
large part of that conversation was--the conversation became
this is about American energy companies somehow being more
profitable while the Europeans were saying this is about
geopolitical power. If you don't sell us LNG, then the Russians
can turn the valve on and off and they control a large part of
Europe. For geopolitical influence, we need to do that. That
became debated long-term here and then was finally determined,
yes, we're going to sell LNG, and now Europe has another outlet
and Russia has competition on it and is a benefit to our
alliance and our long-term connection.
Other ideas that anyone would share as far as the price
that Russia should pay?
Mr. Sarts. Well, if I may, actually one of the things that
they expect us to talk soft about these things. That's kind of,
you know, part of their plan: There'll not be direct, strong
response. I thought when Emmanuel Macron met Putin and the way
he did it in Versailles was not a pleasant experience for
Putin. So, being direct, instead of what they thought will be
this polite talk.
Secondly, the machinery they're using against us is
extremely important for Kremlin to control their own
population. So if we are able to dismantle it, then we--we
actually, as I've said, we bring in more truth into the
internal Russian discourse.
Senator Lankford. Other ideas and thoughts?
Ambassador Burns. I would just say, Senator, it's a really
tough question for both President Trump as it was for President
Obama. Can we find a pressure point as important to Putin as
the integrity of our elections are to us? And I think Constanze
is right, that's probably going to be asymmetric.
Senator Lankford. Okay.
Ambassador Garcevic. Maybe to add a sentence, that in the
introductory it was mentioned that Russia's goal is to drive a
wedge between the E.U. and the U.S. I think that one of the
things that must be done is that actually this Euro-Atlantic
bond must exist and unity between the E.U. and the U.S. must
remain. On top of what was said, asymmetric threats ask for
asymmetric response.
Senator Lankford. Great. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you for being here. First of all, I was
very impressed in seeing our NATO allies, what all you have
done in trying to thwart what Russia has done as far as
meddling in your affairs. Sweden has launched a nationwide
school program to teach students to identify Russian
propaganda. In Lithuania, 100 citizen cyber sleuths, dubbed
``elves,'' link up digitally to identify the feedback that
people employ on social media to spread Russian disinformation.
They call their daily skirmishes ``elves versus trolls.''
France and Britain have successfully pressured Facebook to
disable tens of thousands of automated fake accounts used to
sway voters close to election time, and it has doubled to 6,000
the number of monitors empowered to remove defamatory and hate
filled posts.
All of this, I mean, it's amazing, I think that you all
have been dealing with this. And it says here, Latvia has
undertaken to ferret out clandestine Russian meddling since it
broke free of the Soviet Union in 1991.
I think it goes back to what, Mr. Sarts, you just had said.
They have been controlling their people by misinforming them,
by basically not giving them the facts, giving them what they
want them to know. When you all broke, when Latvia broke in
1991, you were able at that time to set your people free by the
truth.
Have you been able to have any insurgency into Russia,
getting the truth in there, using their own weapons against
them, their own networks against them?
Mr. Sarts. Well, none of the governments that I know of
have made a decision to do that. There are civic society groups
that try to do that and bring in the different tools that might
be there. Some of them--and I would argue in front of this
Committee, humor, as awkward as it might be, is one of the best
tools I would suggest to penetrate the control system. We in
fact recently produced a report on humor as a tool of
communication. In five hours since, we had a response from
Maria Zakharova. And it went on for whole months, including
President of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov doing a video as a
response to our research of humor. I think that tells you a
story.
So, there are many ways you can get in.
Senator Manchin. Okay. Let me ask this question then.
There's been reports--it's open source--that Putin was directly
involved giving direction in the United States elections, the
last presidential election. Our intelligence basically said he
was directly involved. He gave the order to do what was done.
Do you have that same verification in your countries and in
NATO allies that Putin was directly involved? And have you
identified him as being directly involved so that people would
know where it's coming from?
Dr. Stelzenmueller. If I had that information, I probably
wouldn't be sitting here. But there is a general assumption in
Germany that the President's office is directly and copiously
involved in giving orders to Russian interference. The actual
execution is delegated very broadly to a variety of actors.
Senator Manchin. Anybody.
Ambassador Garcevic. When it comes to Montenegro, I can
only repeat or quote what our state prosecutor mentioned just
like a few weeks ago. He said that behind these events in
Montenegro are nationalist structures from Russia and that
certain Russian authorities were involved at a certain level.
But we at this moment, we cannot make that conclusion that
Putin himself was giving orders to what was going on there.
Senator Manchin. If I can follow up with one. The rhetoric
coming from our White House under this Administration, has it
caused our NATO allies to start moving toward contributing two
percent to the defense spending? Or is it because of their
concern of Russia's aggression?
We'll let all of you answer. I want Ambassador Burns too to
get in on this.
Dr. Stelzenmueller. Yes. The chancellor has said repeatedly
that we will achieve the two percent by 2024, which is the date
at which it was promised. And we're increasing our defense
budget by 8 percent this year.
We're also doing a lot of other things which are working
toward----
Senator Manchin. What was the cause?
Dr. Stelzenmueller. I think the proximate cause was Russian
hostility----
Senator Manchin. More so than the White House rhetoric?
Dr. Stelzenmueller. I'd say that the policies and rhetoric
of this Administration have been contributing to reinforcing a
sense of urgency.
Senator Manchin. Got you. Ambassador Burns?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I think 20 of the 29 NATO allies
have increased defense spending since the Russian invasion of
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014. That was the primary cause.
But I must say, President Trump's been right to raise this
issue, as all of our Presidents have. And I think he has had an
impact on the internal debate. Canada is one country. They
spend barely one percent of their GDP in defense. So, I think
he's gone about it sometimes in a way that's not effective.
Senator Manchin. Unconventional.
Ambassador Burns. Unconventional. But he's right to raise
it.
Senator Manchin. Thank you very much.
Yes, sir.
Ambassador Garcevic. Just to add that last year only, other
members of NATO increased defense spending by around $2 billion
U.S.
Chairman Burr. Sen. Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
This hearing has been informative on the specific question
of Russian active measures in the United States and in Europe.
Of course, that's just one small part of Russia's efforts over
the decades to undermine Western democracies, to try to divide
our alliance. I think we explored most of those points today.
So I want to respond more broadly to what I think are two
myths that have been propagated here, mostly by my Democratic
colleagues, but by some of these witnesses. And those myths are
that somehow President Trump is weaker on Russia than was
President Obama; and second, that somehow NATO and deterrence
is undermined by the United States, rather than by Europe.
So first, let's review what's happened in the first five
months of this Administration. President Trump has bombed the
Khan Sheikhun military base in Syria. He has shot down Syrian
planes. They have shot down Iranian drones, thereby showing
that Russia is unable to protect its two main clients in the
Middle East.
We're on the verge of deploying more troops to Afghanistan,
where Russia has been meddling with ever-greater intensity in
recent years. And we finally proposed a budget that increases
our military spending, albeit not enough, that accelerates
ballistic missile defense. And our domestic agencies are doing
everything they can to promote more oil and gas production in
the United States.
By contrast, President Obama famously pushed the reset
button a few weeks into his tenure, six months after Russia
invaded Georgia. He mocked Mitt Romney for calling Russia our
number one geopolitical foe. He asked Dmitry Medvedev in a hot
mic moment to wait until after the election to discuss missile
defenses because he would have, quote, ``more flexibility.''
Despite bipartisan support in the Congress, President Obama
refused to send lethal weapons to Ukraine. He stood idly by as
Russia returned into the Middle East for the first time in 40
years in Syria. And he stood idly by, as we've heard today, in
the 2016 election.
So, I would dispute the premise that somehow President
Obama was any tougher or stronger in defense of U.S. interests
as against Russia.
Second, the myth that somehow NATO and deterrence is at
risk because of the United States, not Europe. Talk is cheap.
Deterrence is about the military balance of power. It's not
about magic words. National leaders can call Article 5 sacred
or sacrosanct or inviolate or any other pretty word they want.
But Europe's collective failure to meet the two percent goal of
defense spending has underinvested in our common defense by
something on the magnitude of $100 billion to $120 billion per
year. Vladimir Putin can see the reality of what national
leaders in Europe think about our common defense, no matter
what words they use.
Moreover, it's well known that Russia is in flagrant
violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
They're also in violation of the Open Skies Treaty. But
European leaders continue to resist the Trump Administration's
efforts to bring Russia back into compliance with those
treaties.
Dr. Stelzenmueller, as you noted, the German foreign
minister has protested the Russian sanctions bill that passed
the Senate 97 to 2, because Germany does business with Russian
companies in the construction of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline,
which by the way they shouldn't be building in the first place
if they are that worried about Russia and want to deter Russia
in Europe.
While we're on the topic of the German foreign minister, he
said a few months ago that the 2 percent goal is unlikely to be
obtained and politicians shouldn't make promises they can't
keep. Sadly, I'm afraid he's right. Germany increased its
budget last year by 8 percent. This year its defense budget is
proposed to be increased by only 4 percent, yet a Forza Agency
poll suggested that a majority of Germans oppose such an
increase.
More alarmingly, a Pew poll from last month asked
Europeans: If Russia got into a serious military conflict with
one of its neighboring countries that is our NATO ally, do you
think our country should or should not use military force to
defend that country? Here were their responses. The Dutch said,
72 percent yes, 23 percent no. That is great for the Dutch.
They are good allies. Poles, 62 to 26; Americans 62 to 31--by a
2 to 1 margin, very proud of our country. Canada, 56--58 to 31;
France, 53 to 43; Spain, 46 to 46--not great. Brits, 45 to 43.
Germans, 40 to 53 would defend a NATO ally.
So my time is almost expired. I'll just ask one question.
Given that so many of my remarks have focused on Germany and,
Dr. Stelzenmueller, you're obviously the subject matter expert
on that country, what is the matter with Germany?
Dr. Stelzenmueller. Thank you, Senator, for your questions
and for your remarks. I've already said that I am not a fan of
the Nord Stream 2 project, and I think a number of many of my
German experts, friends, agree with me. There is a substantial
debate within German politics about the use of this project,
politically.
On the German defense budget, I think, again--I can only
reiterate what Chancellor Merkel has said, who looks likely to
win this election again, that Germany is on course to fulfill
this promise by the time it is supposed to fulfill it. Anybody
who has ever looked at defense budgets and attempted to
increase them knows how many past dependencies, complications,
there are in actually expanding forces. We would have to double
our defense budget to do this.
But I can assure you from my personal experience, many
conversations last week in Berlin, we are racing to do this. In
fact, only last week--or two weeks ago, I was on the stage in
Koblenz together with the German chairman of the chief--the
equivalent of the chairman of the joint chiefs, at the bidding
of the Defense Ministry, to explain to Germany's armament
bureaucracies why they have to work faster, more flexibly, and
more creatively to accomplish the promises that we have made to
NATO. And I assure you that this was a very serious discussion.
Now, it will also not have escaped you, because we've been
talking about this all day, that we're in an election, and that
Gabriel is a member of the opposite party, although he is in a
coalition with the chancellor, and therefore he has to say
these things. He has also said other things. For example, the
first time he went to Moscow he told Foreign Minister Lavrov,
his counterpart, that he did not believe in the post-Western
world Lavrov had spoken of in that Munich Security Conference,
that this was wrong, that we very much stand by the idea of the
Western--of the West and Western alliances, and that this is a
question of shared values and not of geopolitical location.
So, as for the Pew poll, I'm as unhappy about that as you
are and I know many Germans who are unhappy about it as well.
Maybe that is also rooted in our cultural memory of the Cold
War. I am old enough to remember the Cold War, where we knew
that if the Article 5 came to pass, there would be three weeks
of conventional warfare, then it would move to nuclear, and
then my country would be a heap of ashes. I think that that is
a memory that informs that kind of judgment.
But I know that German politicians of all parties have made
it clear beyond a shadow of a doubt to Russia, to Moscow, and
to the Kremlin and Mr. Putin himself that any violation of
Article 5 will have us all standing there as one, as allies, to
defend an attack on NATO territory.
Chairman Burr. Senator Harris.
Senator Harris. Ambassador Burns, can you tell me what you
believe has been the impact on our reputation with our allies,
in Europe in particular, as a result of this Administration's
failure to acknowledge that Russia hacked and attempted to
manipulate the election of the President of the United States?
And if you believe there has been an impact in terms our
standing with our allies in Europe, do you believe that it's
going to have an impact on our ability to protect ourselves and
guard against what should be a predictable attack in our 2018
elections by Russia?
Ambassador Burns. Thank you, Senator. I think the basic
problem is that the Europeans are accustomed to looking
toward--for the United States to lead on any big issue. This is
a big issue, and the hearing is central to it, because all of
us are under attack from a systematic Russian campaign. But
they don't see the United States leading.
And if you combine--and this is partly in response to
Senator Cotton's very good question as well. President Trump
has not been strong on the sanctions against Ukraine. He's not
an advocate for the territorial independence of Ukraine. He's
not spoken out on interference and he's been very ambivalent,
even hostile, to NATO, and seems to look at Germany as a
strategic economic competitor, not as an ally.
If you put all that together, I think it is the first time
since 1945 that Europeans might likely see Angela Merkel right
now as leader of the West, not President Trump. I don't say
that lightly and I think it's a sad statement to make, but I
think it's a true statement. And so we need to recover our
leadership role, and you do that by actions.
And on this subject, it's by aligning yourself with the
Europeans on the sanctions issue. That's why I support what the
Senate has done on a bipartisan basis. And it's by trying to
raise our defenses, as Janis has talked about here, in a very
effective way.
Senator Harris. And can any of the other panelists offer
that?
Mr. Chairman and Vice Chairman, I appreciate you having
this hearing and an open hearing on the issue. I think the
American people should have a better sense of how our
reputation and standing in the global community has been
impacted by our failure to acknowledge that Russia attempted to
manipulate an election for the President of the United States.
Do any of the other panelists want to add to the
Ambassador's point?
Ambassador Garcevic. I will add, just to remind you that
the Article 5 has been invoked only once in the history of
NATO, in the situation when the U.S. was under attack after
September 11th, and that all our allies from Europe stood up
and stand behind U.S. at that time. And we've been in
Afghanistan for years now together, alongside, fighting the
same cause.
Dr. Stelzenmueller. I'll just add one number to that. More
than 800 Europeans have died alongside American troops fighting
in Afghanistan, for a joint cause.
Senator Harris. Thank you.
Mr. Sarts, you mentioned a couple of points about the
French elections. And I was curious about--and Senator Collins
I think raised this point also--you talked about media as a
partner and their cooperation with the French government, and
that they actually were very active in verifying the factual
accuracy of misinformation.
You also discussed the importance of assuming that a
country will be hacked and then trapping hackers, and arguably
then at some point being able to prosecute them in France and
get some consequence and accountability.
How would you propose that that would be applied in the
United States? You know that, for example, I won't name the
stations, but there are two cable networks that if you watch
them at the same time on the same subject, you will hear two
completely different versions of what's happening. And so we
have to acknowledge that we have a culture around the media in
this country as it relates to politics at least that may not be
as coordinated as some of the media in Europe.
How would you propose--again looking at the 2018 election
as a goal for protecting ourselves, how would we work with the
media to inoculate or prevent harm or to be resilient once we
know we've been hacked?
Mr. Sarts. Well, truth and facts matter. Facts matter. We
don't build bridges on false facts. We want to then get them
straight. It is very hard to have a functional democracy
without facts as a basis for it.
We tend to go into different directions because of
opinions, and that's okay. That's what the democratic process
is. But at the end of the day, all we have to agree is that if
we don't value the factual basis of our reality, democracy
would not work.
Senator Harris. I'm sorry, I only have a couple of seconds.
How did the French media expose a misstatement of fact to be
without factual basis? How did they expose the fake news, if
you will? What did they do?
Mr. Sarts. There are a whole set of ways how you verify
what the information is in front of them. The journalists
should be very good at it. And actually, the whole--the biggest
point is actually value and understand the role, as it is
called, soft power. It is both also the power and the
responsibility. And understand that within the responsibility
of that for media in a democratic society, to have it
functional is to value the factual basis. That's I think the
understanding upon which the French media were able to come
together to actually work together.
I wouldn't classify there was a cooperation between media
and the government. Media cooperated in between themselves
irrespective of different political viewpoints, valuing that
the democratic system is based on fact.
Senator Harris. I agree with that. And I would just say
that it's important to value a free and independent press in
order to allow them to do their job. Thank you.
Chairman Burr. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Mr. Garcevic, do you believe that the
United States has a strategy to respond to the cyber warfare
that we're in today?
Ambassador Garcevic. I think yes.
Senator McCain. Could you tell me that strategy?
Ambassador Garcevic. That's a very difficult question. I
would say that I can see that strategy through NATO and what I
also----
Senator McCain. Through NATO?
Ambassador Garcevic. Yes, because when it comes to cyber
attacks, you remember that as a result of the first cyber
attack on a large scale, which happened years ago when Russia
attacked Estonia, a Center of Excellence was established in
Estonia, which was supposed to be----
Senator McCain. That didn't have anything to do with an
American strategy. I was there at the opening of it.
Ambassador Garcevic. Yes, but I think that there is a--in
our case, in our case, if I can just return to our case, you
know, thanks to--when we found out that it would be difficult,
at least as far as I know, it would be difficult to clarify the
case, we turned to and asked for help from the U.S. and the
U.K. agencies.
I would like to believe that, you know, that strategy
exists. I can only--I cannot comment on it because I'm not--I'm
not in the loop. I didn't read it. I didn't talk to people who
can explain. But what I can see that's happening every day
there is that through your embassies and through your
diplomatic network, a network that exists in NATO at the
working level, countries like Montenegro if in need receive
assistance.
Senator McCain. Well, that's a great answer. Thank you.
Should we expect similar aggressive behavior as we saw in
the attempt to overthrow the government of Montenegro at other
NATO aspirants, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia,
Kosovo?
Ambassador Garcevic. What I mentioned in my introductory,
I'm sure that this is just one case and I'm sure that Russia
will continue doing something similar in our neighborhood.
Senator McCain. That's pretty exciting. They recruited
people. They were----
Ambassador Garcevic. Yes.
Senator McCain [continuing]. Willing to kill people. They
were willing to send people in uniform to kill the Prime
Minister. I mean, it's--it reads out of a novel.
Ambassador Garcevic. That's why I think that U.S. and
European partners must remain active in the region. And if
there were any retreat from the region would be detrimental for
democracies in our part of----
Senator McCain. They came awfully close to succeeding. If
we hadn't had an informant from the inside, they might have
succeeded.
Ambassador Garcevic. What I answered--what I answered
previously, that in some cases we simply hit luck. I cannot say
that we were capable to fight back. Simply it happened as a
result of certain circumstances. One of them you mentioned. And
that helped us a lot.
Senator McCain. Like an informant on the inside.
Ambassador Garcevic. Yes, this was an informant who came
to--who was aware of the proportion of bloodshed that would
happen if this action succeeded. And he turned to--he turned
and showed up in police to report.
Senator McCain. Mr. Sarts, should we be concerned about
that level of violence that the GRU is willing to engage in in
order to overthrow a freely elected government?
Mr. Sarts. It is concerning and we should be concerned.
Senator McCain. Why do you think we haven't heard more
about it?
Mr. Sarts. I'm quite surprised about that as well, because
I think that is a very, very telling story that we have to
reflect upon.
I have one hope, and that is the fact that it all failed.
Russians, like everybody else, do their lessons learned. So I
hope the lesson that they learned, it's not really that
effective. And in these cases, they tend to lose what they like
to have, that is plausible deniability, at least----
Senator McCain. What has been publicly actioned in
Montenegro about this failed coup?
Ambassador Garcevic. I would say reaction was mixed, even
including me, at the beginning. I was at that time in the U.S.,
not working any more for government. And the first reaction was
a mix of feelings, whether this was staged or not, whether it
is true or not.
But time goes on and we are more and more aware of the
proportion of the action and what was behind this action and
how the action was organized. And then, also, as a result of
two suspects decided to cooperate with the police and they
disclosed in their verdicts how action was planned, who
financed it, who were the people for contacts in Serbia, those
two agents that I mentioned at the beginning.
Senator McCain. What--go ahead.
Ambassador Garcevic. The Russian agents. Then this actually
helped us make this picture completed, putting pieces one by
one so then now we have clear picture what was happening----
Senator McCain. What's the reaction in the Baltics, Mr.
Sarts?
Mr. Sarts. In the Baltics, I think currently all the
governments are looking at--there's a great concern at the big-
scale Russian military exercise that is planned for September,
Zapad 2017. We, from all----
Senator McCain. Are you talking about the reaction to what
was clearly a very complex, detailed plot to violently
overthrow a freely elected government?
Mr. Sarts. Well, there were all kinds of political
statements condemning that. There was a discussion within the
countries, both--within the government's closed circles as well
as openly, of what has been the parameters of it. And I would
tell that governments have taken very great care to look into
elements of what made it, and what was the plan, to make
adjustments for their own planning in the case of this
particular crisis.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, panel, for an excellent discussion. Ambassador
Burns, thank you for your distinguished service to the country
in so many ways, and your wise counsel. And thank you for
promoting us to the best hope of fixing this problem. But I
think we're the second best, frankly. I share your concern that
the President really has to take the lead here for obvious
reasons. Commander-in-chief, chief diplomat, the most
recognized public figure.
There was a missed opportunity at the NATO conference.
Forget what was said. What wasn't said was the common threat we
face today, the most significant one, not the only one, is this
deliberate action by the Russians.
And my sense at least, that the most immediate game changer
would be if the President, standing next to the Chancellor and
to the President of France and to the British Prime Minister,
took that position. I assume you might have an opinion on that.
Ambassador Burns. Well, I do. I was Ambassador to NATO, as
you know, Senator. And every American President has been the
leader of that alliance, has affirmed that bedrock commitment.
And we know it was in the President's speech and it came out,
and so it had a devastating impact on American leadership.
What we haven't talked about today is that, in addition to
the intelligence and judicial and political measures to take to
defend against the interference in our elections, you and
Chairman McCain lead another Committee. We have to keep funding
the rebuilding of the U.S. military in Europe; I hope
permanently station the NATO battalions in Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and Poland, because we're into containment of Russian
power. We're back into containment on multiple levels. And this
hearing exposes one of those levels.
Senator Reed. In that spirit, though, not only the
reaffirmation of Article 5, but also a positive statement about
the common threat of cyber against the United States. We missed
one opportunity, but if the President could stand with the
leadership of NATO and the Prime Minister of Canada and many
other interested parties and make that declaration, that would
do as much to stop this process as anything. Is that fair?
Ambassador Burns. Well, it would, because the immediate
threat now is this threat. It's the cyber attacks on the
electoral processes. It's a much bigger threat than the
conventional threat.
He has the opportunity. He'll be in Germany the week after
next. He'll be at a summit hosted by Chancellor Merkel. There
are opportunities for the President to get back into this
leadership role and to try to build some bridges with the
European leaders.
My sense is that Secretary Tillerson and Secretary Mattis
want us to go in that direction. They've been talking publicly
about trying to play a bigger leadership role, a more concerted
one.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you.
Mr. Sarts, we have had discussions about the
vulnerabilities of our electoral system, our information,
social media, all of these things. We know, as several people
have suggested, that they're coming back.
From your perspective, are the Russians working on--you
know, already working on, in our case the 2016 campaign and the
2018 campaign in the United States? Are they going to deploy
more sophisticated cyber operations against our registration
and electoral systems?
There's been some reports, in Great Britain, within the
context of the Brexit vote, that there was an attack on
registration systems. And, I guess the biggest question of them
all is, are they already there and we don't know it because of
the ability to use some tools that have fallen into their
hands? So, if you could.
Mr. Sarts. One thing that we've registered, Russians do
experimentation. Sometimes you see an odd pattern that is
inconsequential in the given circumstances and you kind of
dismiss it because it has no effect. But when you look forward
or retrospectively when you see these cases, you see that has
been the test case for a particular tool.
So they're doing it right now. It's not necessarily that
they test it in the theater they're going to deploy it. It
might be a very different place. So, yes, there will be
elaborate--more elaborate tools, both from technical, but also
from a cognitive perspective. I would expect there'll be more.
But I think the choices whether to and how to do that would be
made pretty close within the contextual circumstances of the
moment.
Senator Reed. Now, your Center for Strategic Communication,
are you actually dealing with this issue of, in Germany, for
example, the upcoming election, trying to help them in the
United States, trying to give advice? Is NATO taking the
position, with we hope U.S. leadership, of proactively dealing
with this? Or are you caught up in this kind of paralysis that
we see in the United States?
Mr. Sarts. Well, NATO is facing now this from a very
different--well, not very, but slightly different angle, where
the NATO is putting troops in the three Baltics and Poland.
They are bombarded with disinformation, with fake news. Robotic
networks are trying to attack. So NATO is taking different
trends of response, capability build-up, practical steps,
etcetera, etcetera.
We at the Center, we are not part of the military
structure. We are run by the countries that made our Center, so
we respond to them; and if they ask, and they do, to give our
advice, knowledge, or methodology, how they can counter
specific cases, including election, we are there to support
them.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
My time is expired. Thank you all very much.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Thank you to all members for their participation today. And
more importantly, thank you to each and every one of you. Your
expertise is invaluable to us. Your testimony today is crucial,
as I shared with all of you before this panel, at our ability
not only to work through the current investigation that we're
in, but to create a road map for the appropriate committees of
jurisdiction, both at home to figure out how we can change
elections to build defensive mechanisms or to make it less
vulnerable and to work globally with our partners to make sure
that any changes, any best practices might at least be shared
and offered to be implemented.
Just a couple of comments I've got. I was challenged from
the beginning with the names today. I remain as challenged
trying to figure out exactly what we do to stop Russian
interference. But as we complete this process, I think we'll
have a clearer and clearer picture.
You've been asked today to submit some things. I would also
ask you to think about the challenges that we've got and that
you have in your respective areas of expertise and provide any
additional input to us that you feel is pertinent to the
decisions we'll make.
Ambassador Burns, again I go back to something that you
said and it's what Jim Comey said: Next time it could be the
other party. As a matter of fact, when this whole effort
started it wasn't targeted at one party or the other. I know
you know that because you know the root of when this started,
and it was a mere phishing expedition that probably encompassed
hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals and nonprofits and
organizations.
It turned into a data-rich environment for Russia to be
involved in an election. No question they would have been
involved, but maybe not in the same direct way. They just
happened to have accumulated the data. So right at the heart of
it is this cyber security issue that the world continues to
deal with and try to figure out what the silver bullet is. And
the answer is there's not a silver bullet.
The second thing is, I'm glad you admit it: You are a
product of the State Department. And, you know, I can't
envision the day that there would be a Secretary of any State
Department that would be in favor of sanctions from the U.S. to
a foreign entity because it's inherent that that makes their
job tougher.
But even though I don't think Secretary Tillerson is out
there calling for Russian sanctions, I wouldn't expect any
Secretary to do it. But there has to be--there has to be
leadership. And I think that's what the world's crying for
right now, is for leadership. And I hope that we do what we
have historically done and we fill that vacuum, not because
we're better at it. It's because I think as I travel the world,
the world's waiting for us to do it because we provide a
liability umbrella for a lot of countries. Because our
elections have certainty and most other elections don't have
the length of time certainty that we do.
So there are things that are unique to the United States
and we have to realize how that aids our partners around the
world at leveraging that certainty of U.S. elections.
So here's where I end up. I believe voters in Asheville,
North Carolina and Houston, Texas deserve the same thing and
that's to vote with no interference. Just as voters in Berlin
and Paris deserve elections that have confidence that their
votes and the integrity of their election systems are intact.
As the Committee continues its investigation, it's
increasingly clear that Russian activities fell into what I
would refer to as a seam. It was domestic activity by a foreign
power, so the intelligence community wasn't quite sure how to
approach it. It involved what I might informally call pseudo-
government, organizations and the political party, so that it
confused our government's approach somewhat.
Lastly, the intelligence community diligently avoids
political issues. So that added to the additional complexity of
this problem.
Here's where we are today. This Committee's got a charge
from the leadership and that's to thoroughly review Russia's
meddling in the 2016 election. And the Committee has committed
to finish that investigation no matter how long it takes, no
matter what the results are.
I'm not sure that Russia's involvement in our election will
change much from our initial assessment, which was the ICA that
was produced by the Obama Administration. But what this
Committee can do and should do is to make sure that every
American and every person globally that cares about the
integrity of elections, reviews what we find, embraces what's
needed to assure that elections are fair and there's no
interference in the future, and that we collectively commit to
make sure that we carry that out.
So the Committee's work is vitally important to how this
difficult time in our history ends. But I'm confident that we
can come out of this with a report that not only spells it out
for those of us that are members of Congress, but spells it out
for the American people and our partners abroad in a way that
can be understood and can be received with confidence.
Your contribution today has been incredibly helpful to our
ability to put that report together.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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