Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Tuesday, December 1, 2009 - 2:30pm
Location:
Hart 216
Witnesses
Philip S.
Goldberg
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 111-556]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-556
NOMINATION OF CARYN A. WAGNER
TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS
AND NOMINATION OF PHILIP S. GOLDBERG
TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 1, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
Virginia OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BILL NELSON, Florida
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
----------
David Grannis, Staff Director
Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
----------
DECEMBER 1, 2009
OPENING STATEMENTS
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1
Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from
Missouri....................................................... 3
WITNESSES
Wagner, Caryn A., Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis-Designate............................ 4
Goldberg, Philip S., Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research-Designate............................ 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees for Caryn
A. Wagner...................................................... 20
Prehearing Questions for the Record and Responses of Ms. Wagner.. 33
Questions for the Record and Responses of Ms. Wagner............. 53
Letter from Robert I. Cusick, Office of Government Ethics, Dated
November 17, 2009, Transmitting Public Financial Disclosure
Report for Ms. Wagner.......................................... 59
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees for Philip
S. Goldberg.................................................... 69
Prehearing Questions for the Record and Responses of Mr. Goldberg 90
Questions for the Record and Responses of Mr. Goldberg........... 105
Letter from Robert I. Cusick, Office of Government Ethics, Dated
November 2, 2009, Transmitting Public Financial Disclosure
Report for Mr. Goldberg........................................ 110
NOMINATION OF CARYN A. WAGNER
TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND
ANALYSIS AND NOMINATION OF
PHILIP S. GOLDBERG TO BE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
----------
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne
Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Wyden,
Feingold, Whitehouse, Bond, and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Chairman Feinstein. The meeting will come to order.
The committee meets today to consider two nominations to
the intelligence community in positions that require Senate
confirmation. They are Ambassador Philip Goldberg, nominated to
be the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, which we fondly know as INR, and Ms.
Caryn Wagner, nominated to be Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis, or I&A.
I'd like to welcome both of you and say congratulations.
Both individuals were nominated by President Obama on
October 26th. They have since met with me and other members of
the committee and have responded to numerous prehearing
questions. Their responses are now posted on the Intelligence
Committee's website for public view.
Interestingly enough, both nominees come from different
backgrounds and are nominated to lead two very different
intelligence organizations.
Ambassador Goldberg is nominated to lead an organization
with a very distinguished and respected history. The State
Department Bureau of Intelligence & Research conducts all-
source intelligence analysis to advise the Secretary of State
and other senior department officials and serves as an active
participant in intelligence community-wide analytic products.
Its analysts, while far fewer in number than the all-source
analysis organizations at the CIA and DIA, are highly expert in
their fields and have no qualms about vocally dissenting from
judgments they believe to be incorrect or unsubstantiated, and
that's very much appreciated.
One example of importance to me was INR's view in the 2002
NIE on Iraq that Iraq was not reconstituting nuclear weapons,
especially due to INR's different view on the use of aluminum
tubes in centrifuges. That obviously proved to be correct.
Ambassador Goldberg himself has been long involved in
national security issues and has received intelligence
throughout his career but has no past experience inside the
intelligence community. We will be very interested in hearing
Ambassador Goldberg's views on his preparations to assume the
responsibility.
Ambassador Goldberg is a career Foreign Service officer. He
has distinguished himself over a 20-year period, including
Charge d'affaires and Deputy Chief of mission in Santiago,
Chile, Chief of Mission in Pristina, Kosovo, and United States
Ambassador to Bolivia. Since June he has served as the
coordinator for the implementation of United Nations
resolutions on North Korea. Earlier in his career he served in
Bogota, Colombia, and Pretoria, South Africa. Of particular
note is his being declared persona non grata by Bolivian
President Evo Morales in September of 2008. The committee has
looked at this incident, and members may have a few questions,
but it's pretty clear to me that Ambassador Goldberg had no
blame in this matter.
Ms. Wagner, by contrast, is a career intelligence
professional, beginning as an Army SIGINT officer and rising to
the level of captain. After three years on the House
Intelligence Committee, Ms. Wagner joined the senior ranks of
the DIA before becoming Director of the Intelligence Community
Management staff, and subsequently the Assistant Deputy DNI and
chief financial officer. She returned to the House Intelligence
Committee as budget director and is now a faculty member of the
Intelligence and Security Academy, LLC.
She is being nominated to head the Office of Intelligence &
Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security, which, unlike
INR, is a young intelligence organization and one that has
struggled to identify a clear mission and bring together an
appropriate workforce. We have discussed that earlier.
The committee's report accompanying the FY 2010
intelligence authorization bill noted some of these concerns.
They include that, as of this summer, contract personnel make
up a staggering 63 percent of the workforce of the Office of
Intelligence & Analysis, including a large percentage of its
intelligence analysts. In my view, this is an inherently
governmental function and should be done by the government, not
by contractors.
The office has written analysis that inappropriately
analyzed legitimate activities of U.S. persons based in part on
highly questionable and non-credible open-source information.
In addition, the office has numerous and unclear missions, some
of which overlap with work being done by other departments.
According to the Homeland Security Institute, the office is
unstable and lacks structures for budget and management
accountability. I discussed that this morning with Mrs. Wagner,
and I actually believe she's up to it. So we'll see what comes.
I'm told that the Office of Intelligence & Analysis has
been drafting a plan to restructure and refine its mission, but
the plan won't be finalized until a new Under Secretary is
confirmed. So that will be clearly, Ms. Wagner, your first big
job. I think this committee will be very interested in your
views as a professional on what the office should be doing and
how it should be structured or restructured.
Again, I welcome both witnesses, and I will turn to the
Vice Chairman for any opening comments he might have.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
You've laid down a tough gauntlet. We welcome both of the
nominees and ask, do you have family members here or close
friends who are supporting you today? Ms. Wagner?
Ms. Wagner. Yes. Thank you, Senator Bond. My husband, Chad
Lash, is here with me. And I have numerous friends which I
won't name, because I will no doubt forget one. But I thank
you.
Vice Chairman Bond. We will recognize your husband.
Welcome, sir.
Ambassador.
Ambassador Goldberg. I have my colleagues from the State
Department.
Vice Chairman Bond. Well, thank you very much.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE CHAIRMAN, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Vice Chairman Bond. While the public of ten hears about
other elements of the intelligence community, the office each
of you is nominated to head, INR at State and Intelligence &
Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security, can and should
be making valuable contributions to the community and to our
national security.
As the Chairman said, I also have had conversations with
you and pointed out some things where we think you can enhance
and improve the operations of intelligence.
Now, Ambassador Goldberg, the Chair stole one of my best
lines, but I wanted to say that few people in history can claim
the honor of being expelled by the likes of Evo Morales. So
it's clear that you've already chalked up a major
accomplishment, at least in my book, and I congratulate you on
that. I'm interested to hear how you expect your experiences in
Bolivia and other diplomatic posts will help you head an
analytic shop.
Ms. Wagner, a few months ago at a reception I had the
pleasure of sitting next to a former MI-5 official who shared
some insights on the importance in this war on terror of
forging solid and productive relationships among federal, state
and local law enforcement agencies. His point to me was that
what the Brits do and we do not do is use the contacts we have,
the continuing contacts we have with state and local officials,
to task them to bring information up the chain of command. We
send information down, but a local police department or a local
sheriff's office is far more likely to know when or hear when
something amiss is going on in their community and report that
back up the chain.
So we've talked about that. And I think that while it's
very important--and I hear complaints that not enough
intelligence is being pushed downstream--there may not be
enough intelligence coming upstream from thousands of
communities. And we hope that you will pursue that.
We can make fusion centers work, but there's a lot of
intelligence, I believe, that can be best gathered at the local
level. On the federal level, we need to make a firmer
commitment to training these local authorities to identify and
collect the intelligence.
Now, Ms. Wagner, if you're confirmed, I expect you'll work
closely with Director Mueller and the Attorney General in the
coming months to make better training programs a reality. They
can be done without a lot of additional cost, but the benefits
will more than compensate for any price they cost.
Madam Chair, I'm sure that both of these nominees are
anxiously awaiting our questions, and even more importantly,
their exit strategy from Hart 216. So with that, I congratulate
them on their nominations and look forward to hearing from them
today.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Ms. Wagner, why don't we begin with you, if that's all
right?
STATEMENT OF CARYN A. WAGNER, UNDER SECRETARY
OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE
AND ANALYSIS-DESIGNATE
Ms. Wagner. Thank you very much, Senator Feinstein, Senator
Bond. I'm honored to appear before you today as the nominee for
Under Secretary for Intelligence & Analysis at the Department
of Homeland Security. I believe this position occupies a unique
mission space between the national intelligence and law
enforcement communities and the state, local, tribal and
private sector entities that are the front lines of homeland
security. There's nothing more important than forging and
fostering those connections.
If confirmed, I believe I have the right skills to continue
building on the foundation laid by Pat Hughes, Charlie Allen
and the current acting Under Secretary, Bart Johnson.
I began my intelligence career as a signals intelligence
officer in the United States Army, serving eight years on
active duty. In the years since, I have spent seven and a half
years at DIA, five years on the staff at the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, three years in the private
sector and three years with the ODNI.
I've had a mixture of staff and line management jobs,
including leading a 2,000-person analytic organization within
the Defense Intelligence Agency. I've also had a great deal of
experience in an interagency environment, and I'm familiar with
all facets of the intelligence community.
While my experience with law enforcement has been more
limited, I have had significant exposure while working at the
DNI and in Congress to the capabilities and contributions of
national law enforcement and homeland security agencies.
I know I have much to learn about state, local and tribal
law enforcement, which is why, if confirmed, I'm eager to get
started with the help of Principal Deputy Under Secretary for
Intelligence & Analysis Bart Johnson, who's a highly respected
and decorated veteran of the New York State police force and
who's done an outstanding job as acting Under Secretary for the
past six months.
I've had the opportunity to observe the Office of
Intelligence & Analysis from the outside while I served in the
Office of the DNI and on the HPSCI staff, and I am aware of the
many challenges that the organization faces. Since my
nomination, I've learned more about I&A's statutory mission,
its ongoing activities, and the Secretary's vision about where
she would like to take the department. I've formed some
preliminary views on what needs to be done to enhance I&A's
support to its customers and to the department and to improve
its standing within the intelligence community and with its
congressional overseers.
If confirmed, I plan to focus my initial efforts in three
main areas: First, creating a true Homeland Security
information-sharing enterprise through greater focus on the
state and local fusion centers; second, creating a DHS
intelligence enterprise as the chief intelligence officer for
the department; and third, putting in place the management
processes necessary to improve the morale, efficiency and
professionalism of I&A as an organization.
The unique niche that DHS I&A occupies is best defined by
its responsibility to share information with state, local and
tribal authorities and the private sector on the full range of
threats to the homeland, often referred to as all threats, all
hazards. First responders at the state and local level are the
nation's first line of defense. They are uniquely able to
identify anomalous or criminal behavior that could have a
terrorist nexus. It's critical to educate them on terrorist
indicators as they are identified, to capture information that
is lawfully obtained while strictly adhering to privacy, civil
rights and civil liberties regulations, and share it with the
wider enterprise.
This is a multi-faceted challenge that requires adapting
analytic methodologies and product lines, a great deal of
training at all levels of the enterprise and IT and
information-sharing solutions to enable two-way information
flow. It also requires an approach that is tailored to the
different threat and operational realities of the individual
fusion centers.
If confirmed, I intend to develop a comprehensive multi-
year strategic plan for supporting the state and local fusion
centers that can be used to guide resource and analytic
planning.
The role of the Chief Intelligence Officer for the
Department was created by Secretary Chertoff to empower the
Under Secretary to create a DHS intelligence enterprise that
was more than the sum of its parts. DHS' operational components
have intelligence elements that support their individual
missions and they also have data and expertise that can be
leveraged by I&A in support of departmental priorities or
national, state, local and tribal clients, while strictly
adhering to privacy, civil rights and civil liberties
regulations.
In addition, the components may have intelligence or
information requirements that are not adequately being met. I&A
can help to meet these requirements by leveraging the rest of
the intelligence community on their behalf, producing tailored
products for or with them, providing analytic training and
mentoring, and serving as an advocate for increasing their
capabilities. By leveraging both the components' and I&A
capabilities, we can build on recent progress to create a true
intelligence enterprise that enables I&A and the Department to
achieve their full potential and best serve their customers.
If confirmed, I will view the role of Chief Intelligence
Officer for the Department as one of the most important of my
missions, and put in place a staff structure to manage it.
Finally, in the management arena, I&A is still a young
organization, and several recent studies have suggested that it
suffers from a lack of institutionalized processes and from
poor morale. If confirmed, one of my biggest priorities will be
developing and formalizing internal processes for planning,
programming and budgeting, for performance measurement and
human capital management, measurement, and most certainly I
will be taking a hard look at contractors. I believe that
communicating clear mission guidance, implementing fair and
transparent processes for hiring, promoting, and rewarding
people and developing a structured and inclusive process for
building the budget will go a long way towards improving
morale.
If confirmed, I also plan to make training a centerpiece of
my agenda. I've already mentioned the importance of training to
building information-sharing and intelligence enterprises, but
it is equally important for professional development and morale
within I&A. If confirmed, I will focus on ensuring that I&A
analysts receive the tradecraft training they need.
Finally, if confirmed, I will work hard to establish and
maintain constructive partnerships, particularly with the
Office of the DNI, the National Counterterrorism Center, the
FBI and the Congress. If confirmed, I pledge to keep you fully
informed of I&A's progress and activities.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. Mr. Goldberg--
Ambassador I should say.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PHILIP S. GOLDBERG,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH-DESIGNATE
Ambassador Goldberg. Madam Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman,
it is a great honor to appear before you today as President
Obama's nominee to be Assistant Secretary of State for the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research. I am grateful to the
President and Secretary of State Clinton for their confidence
in nominating me for this position, as well as to the Director
of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, for his support in my
nomination. If confirmed by the Senate, I pledge to work
closely with this Committee as it plays a vital role in the
oversight of the intelligence community.
Madam Chairman, INR has been a treasured source of
information and analysis for policymakers for more than 60
years. INR is also a deeply respected voice within the
intelligence community. INR's success has not been based on its
size or budget. Rather, it has been based on the extraordinary
experience, judgment and analytical skill of its personnel.
INR's well-earned reputation for insight and
professionalism is based on a mix of civil and foreign service
personnel, a combination of those who spend years and often
decades on an issue, buttressed by those with recent experience
in our embassies overseas. If confirmed, I will work to enhance
the ability of these fine professionals to do their jobs
through training, academic opportunities, and service overseas.
And I will work to recruit the finest people available.
I will also defend both the process of independent and
unbiased analysis as well as the people who produce it. As you
point out, Madam Chairman, the people of INR have in recent
times won praise for the quality of their work as well as
sticking to their analytic conclusions when necessary.
INR has another essential role: assuring that intelligence
activities are consistent with, and supportive of, our foreign
policy and national security objectives. In this area too, INR
is fortunate to have a staff of professionals who have special
expertise and years of experience in often very technical
areas.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with these
professionals to support the Secretary and Department in
assuring that foreign policy concerns are a central
consideration in intelligence community decisions and
activities. I will also work with the relevant committees of
Congress as they carry out their essential oversight roles.
Madam Chairman, I believe that, if confirmed, I would bring
a set of skills and experience to the job of Assistant
Secretary for Intelligence and Research that will add to the
value of the bureau. While I have not previously served in a
position in the intelligence community, I've had extensive and
relevant experience in almost all aspects of INR's core
functions.
I have worked closely with analysts in the intelligence
community as a political, economic and biographic officer at
embassies overseas in helping to produce analytical products.
In addition, I have myself produced analytic products for
policymakers, from assignments in embassies as well as in
Washington. This experience has given me a strong appreciation
for the independence, intellectual rigor, experience and
personal integrity that contribute to good analytical products.
Having worked on policy matters in four geographic bureaus and
on the seventh floor of the department, I have a strong
appreciation for how intelligence can best support diplomacy
and its practitioners. This is INR's primary mission.
As a Charge d'affaires and two-time chief of mission, I
have ensured that intelligence and law enforcement activities
were carried out in support of foreign policy and national
security objectives. Most recently, I have served as
Coordinator for Implementation of U.N. Security Council
Resolutions on North Korea, a job that requires analysis of
intelligence information and close coordination with other
intelligence community members. My experience leading large and
complex missions overseas, as well as managerial assignments at
the State Department, have prepared me to lead this large
bureau.
Madam Chairman, we live in a time of enormous foreign
policy and national security challenges. On issues of war and
peace, nonproliferation, climate change, and the economic and
financial situation around the globe, our leaders need and
deserve the very best information and analysis before making
difficult decisions. If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward
to working with you and your colleagues to make sure that
happens.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Goldberg follows.]
Prepared Statement of Philip S. Goldberg, Nominee for Assistant
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research
Madam Chairman and Members of the Committee, it is a great honor to
appear before you today as President Obama's nominee to be Assistant
Secretary of State for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). I
am grateful to the President and Secretary of State Clinton for their
confidence in nominating me for this position, as well as to the
Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, for his support of my
nomination. If confirmed by the Senate, I pledge to work closely with
this Committee as it plays a vital role in dealing with the many
difficult and complex issues that confront the United States around the
world.
Madam Chairman, INR has been a treasured source of information and
analysis for policymakers for more than 60 years. INR is also a deeply
respected voice within the Intelligence Community. INR's success has
not been based on its size or budget. Rather, it has been based on the
extraordinary experience, judgment and analytical skill of its
personnel. The Bureau's personnel define expertise--an average of 10
years on account among all analysts, a third of the analytical body
with PhDs in their areas, and most analysts with command of the
language or languages relevant to their portfolios. INR's well-earned
reputation for insight and professionalism is based on a mix of Civil
and Foreign Service personnel--a combination of those who spend years
and often decades on an issue, buttressed by those with recent
experience in the field. If confirmed, I will work to enhance the
ability of these fine professionals to do their jobs through training,
academic opportunities, and service overseas. I will work to recruit
the finest people available. I will work to defend both the process of
independent and unbiased analysis as well as the people who produce it.
If confirmed, I would be proud to lead a group of people who have in
recent times won praise for both the quality of its work as well as its
willingness to stick to its analytic conclusions when necessary.
INR has another essential role: assuring that intelligence
activities are consistent with, and supportive of, our foreign policy
and national security objectives. In this area too, INR is fortunate to
have a staff of professionals who have special expertise and years of
experience in often very technical areas. If confirmed, I look forward
to working with these professionals to support the Secretary and
Department in assuring that foreign policy concerns are a central
consideration in Intelligence Community decisions and activities. I
will also work with the relevant committees of Congress as they carry
out their essential oversight roles.
Madam Chairman, I believe that, if confirmed, I would bring a set
of skills and experience to the job of Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence and Research that will add to the value of the bureau.
While I have not previously served in a position in the Intelligence
Community, I have had extensive and relevant experience in almost all
aspects of INR's core functions. As a political, economic and
biographic officer at embassies overseas, I have worked closely with
analysts in the Intelligence Community to produce analytical products.
In addition, I have myself produced analytic reports for policymakers,
from assignments in embassies overseas as well as in Washington. This
experience has given me a strong appreciation for the independence,
intellectual rigor, experience and personal integrity that contribute
to good analytical products. Having worked on policy matters in four
geographic bureaus and on the seventh floor of the department, I have a
strong appreciation for how intelligence can best support diplomacy and
its practitioners. This is INR's primary mission.
As a Charge d'affaires and two-time chief of mission, I have
ensured that intelligence and law enforcement activities were carried
out in support of foreign policy and national security objectives. Most
recently, I have served as Coordinator for Implementation of United
Nations Security Council Resolutions on North Korea, a job that
requires analysis of intelligence information and close coordination
with other IC members. My experience leading large and complex missions
overseas, as well as managerial assignments at the State Department,
have prepared me to lead this large bureau.
Madam Chairman, we live in a time of enormous foreign policy and
national security challenges. On issues of war and peace, non-
proliferation, climate change, and the economic and financial situation
around the globe, our leaders need and deserve the very best
information and analysis before making difficult decisions. If
confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working with you and your
colleagues to make sure that happens.
Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you both very, very
much.
I have a list of four questions that we ask all nominees,
if you would just respond yes or no to each of them. The first
is do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other
venues when invited?
Ambassador Goldberg. Yes.
Ms. Wagner. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. I often wonder what we would do if
someone said no. Okay.
Vice Chairman Bond. We would confirm them.
Chairman Feinstein. Yes.
Vice Chairman Bond. I gather Ms. Wagner nodded yes.
Chairman Feinstein. She said yes.
Vice Chairman Bond. I didn't hear her up here.
Chairman Feinstein. I heard her. Do you agree to send
officials from your respective organizations to appear before
the committee and designated staff when requested?
Ms. Wagner. Yes.
Ambassador Goldberg. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to provide documents and
any other material requested by the committee in order for it
to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
Ms. Wagner. To the best of my ability yes.
Ambassador Goldberg. The same, to the best of my ability
yes.
Chairman Feinstein. What does that mean?
Ambassador Goldberg. As far as the INR bureau goes and as
far as I'm concerned, I will share whatever we can. There are
some issues that from time to time might come up about document
executive privilege and the rest that might be beyond my
control to share.
Chairman Feinstein. Well, let me just say this is the first
time anybody has qualified their answer, and that's going to
have to be looked into more deeply because this committee
expects to get documents it requests. We are the oversight
committee and to have intelligence agencies without the ability
to conduct oversight is not acceptable to us.
Ambassador Goldberg. No, I----
Vice Chairman Bond. Madam Chair, I might add that the
President has a right to declare things at higher security
levels and we would, before we would accept that, we would need
to know from the White House that this was something over which
they're exercising their national security authority.
Chairman Feinstein. Well, that's right, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Bond. And we would carry our argument down to
1600.
Chairman Feinstein. That's right. And executive privilege
can't be a drift net to pick up everything that people don't
want to have oversight about. And that's where we become the
guardian angel, so to speak.
Ambassador Goldberg [continuing]. Absolutely.
Chairman Feinstein. Just so you understand that.
Ambassador Goldberg. Madam Chairman, I didn't at all mean
to say otherwise. We, from our point of view and from my point
of view, would share all information requested by the
committee. That was the qualification and it really isn't a
qualification; it's something that would be beyond my control.
Chairman Feinstein. Well, I just want everybody to know if
the committee were to ask for it, we expect to get it unless
there's not a good reason----
Ambassador Goldberg. I understand.
Chairman Feinstein [continuing]. Or you're going to have to
tangle with us and you don't want to do that.
Ambassador Goldberg. No.
Chairman Feinstein. Okay. Last question. Will you ensure
that your respective offices provide such material to the
committee when requested?
Ambassador Goldberg. Yes.
Ms. Wagner. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Okay. Let me ask each one of you one
question and then I'll move on. Ms. Wagner, in testimony before
the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on
September 30 of this year, DHS Secretary Napolitano noted that
I&A is ``currently undergoing an important realignment to
strengthen the delivery of useful, actionable intelligence to
state and local law enforcement based on their particular
needs.'' Here's the question. Have you been briefed on this
realignment and do you support it?
Ms. Wagner. Yes, Madam Chairman, I have been briefed.
And the realignment is still ongoing. It has not been
finalized, but Bart Johnson did brief me on what he is
proposing to do at the top level. I think it makes sense, but I
would like to reserve the right, if confirmed, to be able to
make adjustments to that, and so I would prefer to come up and
brief you after I'm confirmed, if I'm confirmed, on where that
is.
Chairman Feinstein. Well, if I understand you correctly,
you're saying that you will have some input into the
realignment.
Ms. Wagner. Yes, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. And therefore it is not finalized and
that you would----
Ms. Wagner. It is not finalized.
Chairman Feinstein [continuing]. Well, we will take you at
your word because I think it's fair to say that there's some
weaknesses in your area and we'd like to see them corrected, so
the correction that you can bring about could be very important
and we'd like to have you discuss that with us, if that's
agreeable with you.
Ms. Wagner. Yes, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Let me move to Mr. Goldberg. We talked this morning about
the fact that you have not previously worked in an intelligence
agency or produced intelligence analysis. Now, you do have
significant experience in a lot of different areas--in
receiving it in particular. And so, in my view at least, you're
clearly qualified for this work. But can you give the committee
some specific examples from your background of when you have
provided judgments that run counter to policy preferences?
Ambassador Goldberg. I think the kinds of policy analysis
and just plain analytical work that I've done, particularly on
the Balkans in the 1990s, oftentimes was in a difficult
atmosphere. When we were debating within the United States
government about whether to intervene first in Bosnia, later in
Kosovo, and those kinds of issues were ones that I was
fortunate enough to be able to weigh in on and give my
unvarnished view on, I think in part because of the people I
worked for, but also because I felt that it was important to do
so.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. I'm not going to ask you
what your views were, but I think it's very important. One of
the things that we want to see are really independent
intelligence agencies that give policymakers the unvarnished
truth as they see it and are not swayed by what they perceive
an administration or anybody else for that matter might want.
Ambassador Goldberg. Absolutely. I agree.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Following up, Ms. Wagner, on the questions from the Chair,
what do you think should be the primary focus of I&A--
operational support of its components and fusion centers,
disseminating finished intelligence products and unclassified
information, or some other thing? And what would be your
priorities?
Ms. Wagner. Senator Bond, I think that the primary mission
of I&A is spelled out in the legislation. What Congress expects
of it is to share information with the state, local, tribal,
and private sector entities. And I&A, as far as I can tell, is
the only element of the intelligence community that views those
people as its primary customer set. It also, as a departmental
intelligence element, has the responsibility to support the
other elements of the department and to sort of orchestrate the
intelligence symphony, if you will, of the intelligence
elements within the various components.
So I think those two things are key, but it also goes back
to what you had said in your opening comments, that sharing
flows both ways. We need to make sure that they're the clients,
but we also need to be aware that they have a wealth of
information that needs to be synthesized and analyzed and
shared with the larger intelligence community to support
national intelligence as well.
Vice Chairman Bond. Do you think you'd be able to provide
training for the representatives of the local law enforcement
agencies so they will be able to carry back to their forces, to
their teams, what information, what activities may be useful?
Do you see that being----
Ms. Wagner. I do. I think that the department and I&A can
do a lot by providing training. I know the Secretary wants to
support analytic excellence at the fusion centers. That's
certainly an area where I&A can help with training, and the
department is already helping with developing training on
ensuring that privacy, civil rights and civil liberties are
protected. And at the fusion centers there's a great deal that
can be done, and I think training is a key element.
Vice Chairman Bond [continuing]. Thank you, Ms. Wagner.
Ambassador, you said, ``On issues of war and peace,
nonproliferation, climate change and the economic and financial
situation around the globe, our leaders need and deserve the
very best information and analysis before making difficult
decisions.'' Do you really believe that studying climate change
is really the best use of our limited intelligence analysis
resources?
Ambassador Goldberg. I believe that it is one area. It is
largely a scientific issue and probably not INR's--necessarily
its competence to judge. But we are involved in negotiations in
the climate change area, and policymakers would need
information and analysis on the positions of others and how
they would approach these issues. And so it would be more in
line with our more traditional diplomatic role.
Vice Chairman Bond. All right. Well, I assume, given recent
revelations, you might be looking into the process of some of
the analysis that came out of certain so-called scientific
institutions. But that may be beyond your scope.
I mentioned to you that INR has developed a reputation for
being a dissenting voice in intelligence community products.
And I think some INR analysts believe this is a positive, but
I've heard from others that it may be a negative because
continuing dissent may make those views ignored. What's your
view about this type of reputation? Is it a problem? What could
you do to change the perception without impacting INR's
independence?
Ambassador Goldberg. I think, Mr. Vice Chairman, that the
reputation of INR is also for feistiness and independence,
which is something to be encouraged in the production of
intelligence analysis.
I took your statement very much to heart when we had a
chance to meet, and I went back to look at estimates this year.
And without going into the details of the estimates, there was
less than--I think it was three out of 13 that there were
either--two of them were dissents in part and one was more or
less a more general dissent. So I don't know that it's a huge
issue, but certainly I want to encourage our analysts to use
their best judgment and to put their best thoughts forward.
That's I think my responsibility.
Vice Chairman Bond. Finally, one of the responses you made
to the committee's questions--you said the role of the
Assistant Secretary is ``to play a key role in assuring that
diplomatic and foreign policy positions are represented in the
formulation of intelligence policy and activities.'' Can you
explain what that means?
Ambassador Goldberg. It means, Mr. Vice Chairman, that we
have a responsibility to assure that foreign policy concerns
are one consideration and that the regional assistant
secretaries and the Secretary have a voice in that process. I
would view INR's role as very much that of an honest broker
because we have a responsibility certainly to the intelligence
community and we want to make sure that the intelligence flow
continues. But foreign policy is one consideration, and that is
a role that is designated to INR and to the State Department,
so it's one that within the councils of the IC is one of many
factors that would be taken into consideration.
Vice Chairman Bond. So policy positions would affect
intelligence operations?
Ambassador Goldberg. No, sir. Maybe I didn't express it
well. It's more of a risk-reward kind of issue, to point out
the possible downsides, possible damage, the possible
consequences if something happens so that that's known up front
before something would occur so that it can be taken into
account at that time.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Senator Whitehouse.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein.
Could I ask each of you, first of all, about cyber security
issues? It does not appear in either of your statements as a
matter of concern, and I'm interested in knowing, A--briefly,
because my time is short--what type of a priority you think it
is, and, B, whether additional efforts on the part of your
agency should, you think, be required.
Ms. Wagner. Thank you, Senator. I'll take that one. I think
it is obviously a critical issue and it is something that I've
already looked into in the limited time I've had as a nominee.
I know there are ongoing analytic efforts as part of the
Critical Infrastructure Protection Analysis effort at the
department. I don't know yet whether those are sufficient. I
would expect, if I'm confirmed, one of the first things that I
plan to do is to go talk to Phil Reitinger, who is the Deputy
Under Secretary responsible for cyber, and talk to him about
how I&A can effectively team with him to make sure he gets the
analytic support that he needs.
And I know that as this issue continues to evolve there's
probably room to sort out exactly who's going to do what. But
it's an area I expect to focus on. I was the cyber security
coordinator for the HPSCI before I retired, so I'm very
familiar with some of those issues.
Senator Whitehouse. Good. Ambassador Goldberg.
Ambassador Goldberg. Senator, I agree. It is an absolutely
critical issue. It's one that INR has taken the lead role in at
the State Department in organizing us to deal with a critical
issue. We are still in a bit of a state of flux on some of the
cyber issues in terms of organization because INR, as the link
with the intelligence community, has a very large role, but
some of the issues that may be coming up in the years to come
will be diplomatic missions, as well, and that's not a
traditional INR role.
We are organized to deal with the internal issues for the
State Department in terms of our cyber issues. I have already
had a discussion, a brief one, with General Alexander about
some of the larger issues involved. It's going to be a very
important foreign policy issue, as well. So we're on it, and we
need to continue to follow it very closely and we will.
Senator Whitehouse. On a second point, I think there is a
strong bipartisan consensus on the part of this committee that
we are sick to death of leaks out of the Executive Branch of
government. And not only is it a bipartisan concern of this
committee, but it's a bipartisan issue. There was leaking like
a sieve in the Bush administration. It doesn't seem to have
stopped with the change of administrations. And over and over
again we are subjected to the unhelpful spectacle of, you know,
having our staffs cleared out of a room for some hyper-secure
briefing that we then read about a day later in The New York
Times.
And I would like to hear what--leaking is politics in
Washington. It's the way people expand their turf and make
their moves, and so a tolerance for it has developed that I
think, frankly, needs to be adjusted. And I would like to hear
both of you put yourselves on record on the subject of leaks,
how seriously you will take their investigations, whether you
will engage in them yourselves and how you consider that
problem. Again, Ms. Wagner, if you could go first.
Ms. Wagner. Well, Senator, I share your concern about leaks
and also your perspective on why they happen. I do take them
seriously. If I am confirmed and I have reason to believe that
anyone in my organization is leaking, I will deal with that as
a matter of management accountability. If it rises to a level
that it requires that a crimes report be submitted, I would
certainly support doing that.
So I share your concern, and I'll take every action that I
can to ensure that the leaks do not come from I&A if I'm
confirmed.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you. Ambassador.
Ambassador Goldberg. I share Ms. Wagner's statement. I
would add that the personnel at INR are not involved in
politics, and they shouldn't be involved in politics. They have
no business being involved in politics, and if a leak were to
be seen to be coming even from our general direction, it's
something I would take very seriously.
Senator Whitehouse. And each of you may very well be called
upon to be witnesses or to make your staff available as
witnesses in investigations of leaks that may take place higher
up, but the trail is back through information developed by your
organization. I assume I can hear you say that you will provide
your full cooperation unstintingly to such investigations?
Ambassador Goldberg. Yes.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Before recognizing Senator Wyden, I'd like to point out
that I have appointed a task force on cyber, which is a very
serious concern to this committee. Senator Whitehouse heads
that task force. Senator Mikulski and Senator Snowe are
members, and they will be probably talking with you in a more
serious nature at a later time. But it is of major importance
to this committee, and I just wanted to have the opportunity to
say that.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair, and welcome to both
nominees.
Ms. Wagner, it seems to me there are some very serious
problems that are now facing the Department of Homeland
Security's intelligence unit and I want to ask you specifically
about your response to several of those. And let me start by
reading you a brief excerpt from a report that the committee
approved unanimously earlier this year.
And I quote here: ``The committee has raised a number of
concerns with reports issued by the Department of Homeland
Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis that
inappropriately analyzed the legitimate activities of U.S.
persons. These reports raised fundamental questions about the
mission of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and often
used certain questionable open source information as a basis of
their conclusions.''
Now the committee is not talking here about one instance.
They are talking about a pattern, and this report was approved
unanimously by the entire committee. So my first question is,
if you're approved, what specific steps would you take to make
sure that the office stops this inappropriate analysis of the
legitimate activities of law-abiding Americans?
Ms. Wagner. Well, Senator Wyden, I am aware of some of the
troubling products that have been released from I&A in the
past. And, if I'm confirmed, I intend to attack that several
different ways. There are a couple of issues that are reflected
in this product. One is basically poor tradecraft, lack of
analytical rigor.
The other is the problem with the failure to take into
proper account privacy, civil rights, civil liberties and First
Amendment-protected speech. And the problem with the
definitions in one particular product was it did not draw a
sufficient distinction between beliefs and actions. So I would
put in place a very strict tradecraft training program, to
include mentoring for the analysts.
I would also ensure that there is training for everyone on
the guidelines that we are to follow that flow from E.O. 12333
and have been coordinated with the Justice Department to make
sure that all of those concerns vis-a-vis privacy, civil rights
and civil liberties are built into the products early on. And,
finally, as a sort of insurance measure, I will make sure that
there is in place a very thorough vetting process for review
before those products are actually released.
Senator Wyden. Do you believe that it is ever appropriate
for your office to analyze the legitimate activities of law-
abiding Americans?
Ms. Wagner. No, Senator, I do not.
Senator Wyden. Okay. Now, the Homeland Security Institute--
and they're federally funded as a research center--conducted an
independent evaluation of the office. The evaluation gave the
office an overall ranking of 1.5 out of five with regard--I
gather it's called ``general functionality.'' In particular it
noted: ``Back office processes are ill-defined, inconsistent
and ad hoc.'' And they stated, ``Planning, programming and
budget processes are ill-defined and lack division manager
involvement.'' Now you are a former chief financial officer for
the agency, the budget director for the House Intelligence
Committee. I assume you're up on these general issues.
Do you agree with the independent evaluation?
Ms. Wagner. Senator Wyden, I haven't had an opportunity to
be briefed on all these processes in detail, but as far as I
know, the evaluation is accurate, and I expect to make
addressing those management issues and processes one of my top
priorities if I'm confirmed.
Senator Wyden. Since I'm running out of time, based on what
you know now, what specific steps would you take to address
these concerns from the independent analysis?
Ms. Wagner. It seems to me that the primary problem is a
lack of repeatable and transparent processes that give people
trust in the organization and their leadership. And I think I
would take steps to put those processes in place. I have done
that before as the director for analysis and production at DIA
leading a large analytic organization, and I think that I have
the ability to address some of those issues. It will take a
little bit of time, but I am going to make it a priority.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. I thank the Chair and I want to thank the
nominees for your willingness to serve in these positions. Last
month, I had the pleasure of chairing a nomination hearing for
Ambassador Goldberg at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
so I'm going to address my questions to Ms. Wagner today.
As Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, you'll
have responsibility for setting policies related to the
collection, analysis, mining, dissemination and retention of
open-source information, including on Americans. And, as I know
you're aware, this is an important Homeland Security
responsibility, but it's also fraught with privacy and civil
liberties implications. For example, DHS sent open-source
information to the Maryland state police about the First
Amendment-protected protest activities of local anti-war
groups, something that Senators Mikulski and Cardin and I
expressed concerns about earlier this year.
Ms. Wagner, what in your mind constitutes open-source
information on Americans? And what is I&A's role in setting
policies for how that information can be used?
Ms. Wagner. Senator Feingold, I believe there are well-
established guidelines and processes already in place that just
need to be followed, and the analysts need to be rigorously
trained. The language in E.O. 12333 that protects U.S. persons'
data hasn't changed since 1981. There are guidelines that I&A
is using, should be using, that flow from that, and that,
again, have been coordinated with the Department of Justice.
I believe that training, oversight and review-and-release
mechanisms are critical to ensure that we are only using data
that it is appropriate and lawful for us to use in accordance
with all applicable laws and regulations.
Senator Feingold. Well, Director Blair has said it is one
thing for a private company to have detailed private
information. It is another for the U.S. government, with all
its power and authority, to have the same information. So when
is it appropriate for the government to purchase from private
companies data on Americans not suspected of any wrongdoing?
And should that information be considered open source?
Ms. Wagner. I don't believe so, Senator. I think that for
us to have information, it needs to be tied to a legitimate
intelligence requirement that we can defend. It needs to be
consistent with our legal authorities and it needs to be
handled consistent with the privacy guidelines that are laid
out in the documents that I mentioned earlier.
Senator Feingold. Okay. Then would it be fair to say--
because a lot of Americans voluntarily put a lot of information
on the Internet to be read by everyone, including government
officials, would it be fair to say that there are limits to how
much of that information can be retained and when it can be
subjected to data mining?
Ms. Wagner. Yes, I think there are limits, and, again, I
think there are some very crucial legal tests that need to be
met in dealing with that information.
Senator Feingold. The FBI's authority to collect, retain,
and use information on Americans are subject to statute and the
Attorney General's guidelines and oversight. This and other
committees periodically debate whether those authorities are
too broad or not broad enough and whether the checks and
balances are adequate, but members of Congress generally know
where to look to understand the legal framework for what the
FBI does. I&A, on the other hand, is a new institution. It has
operated with little specific legal guidance governing
intelligence activities that have a potential impact on
Americans.
Ms. Wagner, as I&A policies continue to take shape, where
should this guidance come from? Is there a role for the
Department of Justice and have you identified unresolved
constitutional or statutory questions or other gaps in the
legal guidance currently available to I&A? And if you
identified those gaps, how would you go about resolving them?
Ms. Wagner. I have not yet identified any gaps, but if I'm
confirmed and I do, I think I intend to rely heavily on the
department's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the
Privacy Office. I&A is in the process of hiring its own
dedicated privacy officer.
I would first look in-house for guidance on how to deal
with appropriate information or programs, and then I would
expect that we would deal with the Department of Justice if it
required any changes to the guidelines that we currently
operate under, which we did negotiate and consult with them on.
Senator Feingold. Okay.
I've long been concerned about the lack of a meaningful
standard governing the seizure of travelers' laptop computers
by the Department of Homeland Security. Can you tell me what
I&A's policy is for obtaining, retaining, analyzing, and
disseminating the contents of seized laptops?
Ms. Wagner. Senator, as you know, I&A doesn't actually
seize the laptops, but under certain circumstances if data that
was in the laptops was provided to I&A, we'll treat it in
accordance with all of the applicable laws and regulations on
analyzing and storing that data.
Senator Feingold. Would you commit to considering a policy
whereby DHS must seek to obtain a warrant before it can hold
the contents of a seized laptop for more than 24 hours?
Ms. Wagner. Senator Feingold, I really don't feel I'm in a
position to answer that question right now. I just don't know
enough to answer it, but I'd be happy to come back and discuss
that with you further if I am confirmed.
Senator Feingold. Could you get back to me as soon as you
can with your response on that?
Ms. Wagner. Yes, I can.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
I thank the Chair.
Senator Wyden [presiding]. I thank my colleague.
Senator Risch, welcome.
No questions?
Senator Risch. Pass.
Senator Wyden. Senator Whitehouse, additional questions?
Senator Whitehouse. I'm good.
Senator Wyden. Ambassador Goldberg, one question for you.
What role, in your view, Ambassador, do you believe the
Assistant Secretary should play in ensuring that intelligence-
sharing relationships support broader diplomatic relationships
and, obviously, vice versa?
Ambassador Goldberg. Senator, I think intelligence
relationships, among others that take place with foreign
governments, are very important and very strong contributors to
our national security. They have to be done, obviously, with
great care. Our particular interest in INR is that the chief of
mission and his or her authorities as delegated by the
President and the authorities conferred by the President be
respected as the oversight for the executive branch at the
embassy. That is the particular State Department interest.
Senator Wyden. I thank you for that.
My colleagues, still no questions?
[No response.]
Senator Wyden. We don't have anything further. Either of
you, is there anything else the two of you would like to add?
[No response.]
Senator Wyden. The committee is going to have additional
questions for the record. So it's clear to all Senators and
staff, we ask that Members submit questions by 2:00 on Friday
so it will be possible to send them to the nominees. It's the
committee's intent to review your responses, and it will be our
desire to vote this month.
So, with that, the committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]