Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Thursday, November 20, 2014 - 2:30pm
Location:
Dirksen 562
Witnesses
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 113-609]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-609
HEARING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION
OF MR. NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN TO SERVE
AS DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
Virginia JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RON WYDEN, Oregon DANIEL COATS, Indiana
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
MARK WARNER, Virginia TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ANGUS KING, Maine
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
----------
David Grannis, Staff Director
Martha Scott Poindexter, Minority Staff Director
Desiree Thompson-Sayle, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
----------
NOVEMBER 20, 2014
OPENING STATEMENTS
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1
WITNESS
Rasmussen, Nicholas, Nominee to be Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center........................................ 18
Prepared statement........................................... 22
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Letter dated November 15, 2014, from Michael Leiter supporting
the nomination................................................. 3
Letter dated November 16, 2014, from Matthew Olsen supporting the
nomination..................................................... 5
Letter dated November 14, 2014, from Admiral William McRaven
supporting the nomination...................................... 7
Letter dated November 14, 2014, from Sean Joyce supporting the
nomination..................................................... 9
Letter dated November 17, 2014, from Juan Zarate supporting the
nomination..................................................... 10
Letter dated November 18, 2014, from Thomas E. Donilon supporting
the nomination................................................. 13
Letter dated November 18, 2014, from Kenneth Wainstein supporting
the nomination................................................. 15
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 38
Additional Prehearing Questions.................................. 61
Questions for the Record......................................... 84
HEARING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION
OF MR. NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN TO SERVE
AS DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:22 p.m. in Room
SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne
Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Chambliss,
Warner, Heinrich, King, Burr, Risch, Rubio, and Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Chairman Feinstein. Let me just say to the soon-to-be
Chairman of this Committee that this is not my usual way of
operation. I like to be on time. We got into a bit of a problem
in the caucus, and I just wanted to say that to you.
The Committee will come to order. We meet today in open
session to consider the President's nomination of Mr. Nick
Rasmussen to be the Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center or, as we call it, NCTC. Mr. Rasmussen is well known and
respected by the Committee. He has appeared numerous times in
closed session as the Deputy Director of NCTC and, since Matt
Olsen's resignation, as the Acting Director. It is my
intention, pending today's session, to move this nomination
quickly to the Senate and seek his confirmation before our
adjournment in December.
Mr. Rasmussen has been the Deputy Director of NCTC since
2012. Prior to this, he served from 2007 to 2012 as the Senior
Director for Counterterrorism at the National Security Council.
He is well versed in terrorist threats to the United States and
the growth of terrorist groups around the country.
Mr. Rasmussen's government service goes back to 1991, with
a series of positions at the Department of State, the NSC, and
NCTC. Mr. Rasmussen, I enjoyed reading in the background
materials for this hearing that public service is part of your
family, and I'm pleased to welcome your family here who have
been in public service as well.
I know that I speak for the Vice Chairman of the Committee,
Senator Chambliss, who regrets he can't be here with us today,
and for myself when I say that we need a full-time, Senate-
confirmed Director of the National Counterterrorism Center as
soon as possible. I won't go into the threats to our Nation,
but they will go into the record, and it's clear I think to all
of us who deal in this situation, with the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL in Iraq and Syria, we continue our
efforts to defeat Al-Qaeda in the FATA of Pakistan, and the
number of AQ affiliates and other terrorist groups across the
world is growing.
So it is a real problem and it is escalating. These groups
now have safe havens in Syria, in Libya, across other parts of
North Africa, and in many places on line. The threat from ISIL,
the Khorasan Group, AQAP in particular, pose a direct threat to
the United States homeland, both from external attack and from
directed and inspired lone wolf attacks from within the United
States.
The NCTC needs to be at the front of our efforts to
identify these attacks, as it has done many times in the past.
At the same time, the Director of NCTC is the National
Intelligence Manager for Counterterrorism and the official in
charge of government-wide strategic operational planning to
defeat terrorism.
So, Mr. Rasmussen, you have a big job before you. I've gone
through the answers to the questions that you've submitted. I
see no problem whatsoever, but it's a great pleasure to welcome
you and your family here today.
I would like to ask unanimous consent to put into the
record the letter of support for Nick's nomination from former
NCTC Directors Mike Leiter and Matt Olsen, Admiral William
McRaven, former Director, FBI--former Deputy FBI Director Sean
Joyce, and former Deputy National Security Adviser Juan Zarate.
In the interest of moving forward, let me stop, welcome the
nominee, and ask Senator Burr for his opening statement.
[Letters received by the Committee regarding the nomination
of Mr. Rasmussen follow:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Burr. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Nick, let me first say that I want to thank you for your
many years of government service at the State Department, the
White House, the ODNI, and at NCTC. And I thank you for the
time that you spent with me the other day and your insight into
the areas of interest that we had an opportunity to talk about.
I'd like to welcome your wife, your parents. I know all
three of you are proud of the progress of his career and I
thank you for sharing him with the country, because it is
invaluable.
Over the last 10 years, you've focused primarily on
analyzing the terrorist threat to our country and devising
policies to address those threats. NCTC is going to need your
experience in the years to come. 13 years after 9-11, we
continue to face Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda affiliates
in Somalia, Yemen, North Africa, Syria, and now the Indian
subcontinent. Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al-Shabab in Somalia, ISIL
and Al-Nusra Front in Syria and request, and the list goes on
and on and on and on.
These groups raise money via criminal acts, growing
business enterprises, and in some cases state sponsorship.
Extremists with technical degrees, special skills and
expertise, building IEDs or being lured to support complex
attack plotting. Western fighters, to include Americans, are
exploiting local and regional conditions to train extensively
before returning home.
Here at home, we face the threat by home-grown violent
extremists, extremists who often utilize the information and
connections from on-line and plan smaller-scale simple plots
that are harder to detect. These terrorists are capable, well
organized, well financed, and they aspire to attack U.S.
persons and facilities abroad and at home. The terrorist threat
is more distributed and complex than ever before. We no longer
have the luxury of focusing our attention on one group or on
one region.
You're being asked to lead our Nation's primary agency for
integrating and analyzing all intelligence related to the
terrorist threat and you do have your work cut out for you.
This Committee will endeavor to provide you with the resources
you need to address the threat and to keep our Nation safe. But
the truth is that we're going to have to make some difficult
choices in the years to come. NCTC is a capable organization
with excellent people. I fully expect you to lead an effective
agency, under our watchful eye. But I can also assure you that,
moving forward, we're going to challenge you to improve the
center to search for efficiencies. We're going to ask tough
questions and we're going to push you to be better, and I look
forward to you giving us direct and candid answers.
I thank the chair and pledge on behalf of Vice Chairman
Chambliss and this side of the aisle, Madam Chairman, that you
can't move too fast on this nomination for us.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Would you stand, please, Mr. Rasmussen. Would you repeat
after me:
I, Nick Rasmussen, do solemnly swear that I will give this
Committee the truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help me God.
TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN, NOMINATED TO SERVE AS
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
Mr. Rasmussen. I, Nick Rasmussen, do solemnly swear that I
will give this Committee the truth, the full truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help me God.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in
other venues when invited?
Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to send officials from the
NCTC and designated staff when invited?
Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to provide documents or
any other materials requested by the Committee in order for it
to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman Feinstein. Will you ensure that the NCTC and its
officials provide such material to the Committee when
requested?
Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to inform and fully brief
to the fullest extent possible all members of this Committee on
intelligence activities and covert actions, rather than only
the Chairman and Vice Chairman?
Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman Feinstein. Consistent with past commitments from
the Director of National Intelligence, will you promise to
brief the Committee within 24 or 48 hours of any terrorist
attack or attempted terrorist attack if requested by the
Committee?
Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. Please be seated,
and we'd be interested in your opening statement.
Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you, Madam Chair. Senator Feinstein,
Senator Burr, and members of the Committee: Let me start by
thanking you all very, very much for considering my nomination
to be the next NCTC director. I also want to express my
appreciation for the efforts of the Committee staff. I know
there's a tremendous amount of work that goes into the
preparation and review to support any confirmation hearing, and
I'm very grateful.
I'd also like to recognize and introduce my parents, Mary
Jo and Gary Rasmussen, and my wife Maria Rasmussen. Their love
and support means everything to me and I'm very glad they're
here with me today.
As you remarked, Madam Chair, I've briefed this Committee
several times, as recently as last week, in closed session in
my capacity as the Deputy Director of NCTC. But this is my
first opportunity to appear before the Committee in open
session and I truly welcome that opportunity.
I'm honored by the President's trust and confidence in my
ability to continue to serve in our national counterterrorism
enterprise. Public service came naturally to me growing up in
the Washington area, as I had to look no further than to my own
family for example and inspiration. My father Gary and my
mother Mary Jo moved to northern Virginia and Fairfax City from
Wisconsin in 1962 so that my father could pursue a career in
public policy. He was a career Federal employee, beginning at
Department of Agriculture, working here on Capitol Hill for a
short time as a junior staff member on the House side, and then
retiring almost 40 years later as the most senior career
official at the Department of Education.
My mother was for a time a public school teacher in Fairfax
County, while also playing an extremely active role in our
local church and serving for over ten years on the board of the
Northern Virginia Community College. Among my siblings, I have
one who is an active duty military officer with two tours of
duty in Afghanistan and another brother who proudly works in
local government in Fairfax and volunteers in his church
community. Again, everything I ever needed to learn about
public service and public commitment I learned first-hand from
my immediate family.
I obviously have a long way to go before serving in
government as long as my father, but I am currently on year 23
of my own public service career. I started my Federal
Government career while I was a student at Wesleyan University,
worked as an intern at the Department of Defense, working on
the Korea Desk. After finishing graduate school at Princeton, I
joined the Department of State as a Presidential Management
Intern, a PMI, just as the United States was liberating Kuwait
during Operation Desert Storm.
During my tenure at the State Department, I was given many,
many extraordinary opportunities, whether it was working on
efforts to dissuade North Korea from pursuing nuclear
ambitions, establishing a formal structure to implement the
Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia, or, latest in my State
Department career, working towards a lasting resolution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
But my career took a sudden turn in mid-2001 when I
accepted a position on the National Security Council staff
working on terrorism issues. My first day on the job was
Monday, September 17, 2001, six days after the 9-11 attacks.
Since that day 13 years ago, I have been singularly focused
for every day of my career on the Nation's counterterrorism
efforts. Those years include career positions at the White
House under both Presidents Bush and Obama and at NCTC under
Directors Brennan, Redd, Leiter, and of course Matt Olsen, who
asked me to serve as his Deputy in June of 2012. Over those
years, I've seen what I believe are vast improvements in our
counterterrorism capabilities, structures, and policies. But
that said, significant challenges remain and there is much,
much work to be done. This is what makes the work of the men
and women at NCTC so central to our national security. It's
exactly why I would very much like the opportunity to lead them
and to serve alongside them as their director.
The U.S., the United States, working with our allies and
partners, has made great strides in dismantling the Al-Qaeda
organization that attacked us in September 2001, but the
relationship threat we face continues to evolve, as both of you
indicated in your opening remarks. As the President said in May
at West Point, ``For the foreseeable future,'' quote, ``the
most direct threat to America at home and abroad remains
terrorism.''
As the Committee well understands, instability in the
Levant, the broader Middle East, and across North Africa has
accelerated the decentralization of the Al-Qaeda movement. The
movement's once global focus under Usama bin Laden is now
increasingly being driven by local and regional conflict and
factors. All across these unstable regions, we are confronting
a multitude of threats to the U.S. and our interests, from
longstanding, well-known terrorist groups, but also from newer
and much more loosely connected networks of like-minded violent
extremists who operate without regard to national borders or
established organizational norms.
This Committee, better than almost any audience I ever
engage with, understands in great detail the diverse and
multifaceted threat picture we face from Al-Qaeda and its
various affiliates. That threat picture also includes other
Sunni terrorist groups, to include ISIL. It also includes Shia-
aligned groups like Hezbollah and Iran's Quds Force. It even
includes home-grown violent extremists who live amongst us here
inside the United States.
So to sum up that threat picture, in my view we face a
broader array of threats from a greater variety of terrorist
groups and individual actors than at any point since 9-11.
Further complicating this threat picture are, of course,
our losses in collection as a result of unauthorized
disclosure, the spread of extremist messaging via social media
in new and different ways, and the need we face to balance
technology-based analytic tools with people-focused, human
resource-intensive, eyes-on analysis.
If I'm confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working
and helping the counterterrorism community overcome these
challenges in the years ahead.
Ten years ago, when Senator Susan Collins and Senator Joe
Lieberman first put pen to paper in what would become the
Intelligence Reform and Testimony Prevention Act of 2004, most
in the country truly believed that a second large-scale
catastrophic attack in the homeland was possible, perhaps even
probable in the near term. Today the threat we face is quite
different from then and I would argue that we are far better
equipped to respond to it than we were perhaps in 2004.
Earlier this year, as NCTC commemorated its tenth
anniversary, we were very honored to host both authors of that
landmark legislation in our auditorium. Senator Collins, you
told the assembled workforce, quote: ``There's no doubt that
information-sharing is far superior to what it was prior to the
passing of the law in 2004, and there's no doubt that the
talented workforce here at NCTC has made a huge difference.''
Unquote. Senator, I'm not sure that you could see the crowd
very well through the stage lights at the auditorium there, but
I can assure you that the members of our workforce at NCTC were
beaming with pride when they heard your words.
Ten years later, Senator Collins, I firmly believe that we
can declare that your vision, that the Congress's vision for
NCTC, has in fact taken hold. That vision called for an
integrated and motivated NCTC workforce, fully empowered with
access to the right information, and armed with the best
training and tools. I believe that vision for NCTC is growing
stronger every day.
Yet, we all know this is no time for complacency, for self-
satisfaction, either at NCTC or anywhere else in the CT
community. We understand well that significant challenges
remain. The terrorist adversaries we face are persistent and
adaptive, and so we too must learn and change and get better
and improve every day. We must match and exceed their
determination to attack us with our own will to make certain
that they don't succeed.
In the current position I have as Deputy Director and now
Acting Director, I'm reminded of 9-11 and the threat we face
every single day. If confirmed by the Senate, I would bring the
focus and urgency borne of that terrible day 13 years ago to
everything I do as Director. I would aim to ensure the best and
brightest continue to fill our ranks at NCTC and I would aim to
ensure that they are equipped with the tools and the training
they need to meet the terrorist threat.
In my 23 years in government service, I've worn a number of
hats, working in a number of difficult government
organizations. No label means as much to me personally over
that time as the label ``member of the counterterrorism
community.'' Every day I'm privileged to work with truly
outstanding friends and partners all across that CT community--
at FBI, at CIA, NSA, the Defense Department, Homeland Security,
Justice, State, and the Treasury, with our State and local
partners around the country, with our international partners,
at the White House, and here on Capitol Hill, with you and with
your staff.
The job for which I've been nominated demands very much,
but I'm thankful for the loving support of my family, my wife
Maria, my parents; and I'd like to take this rare opportunity
to thank her and to thank them publicly today. They've always
been there to support me as I've pursued my career.
Madam Chair, I've been part of the NCTC family since its
inception in 2004. Even when serving President Bush and
President Obama for several years on the NSC staff at the White
House, I still felt very personally connected to the remarkable
organization at NCTC, its vital mission, its uniquely qualified
workforce, and its terribly critical place within the
intelligence community. There's no place in government where I
would rather serve.
Chairman Feinstein, Senator Burr, Senators, thank you as
always for your steadfast support for the women and men who
work every day at NCTC and for considering my nomination to be
its next Director. I look forward to your questions. Thank you,
Madam Chair.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rasmussen follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. That was
excellent. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rasmussen, in your written statement for the record you
wrote, and I quote: ``Attacks, either linked or inspired by
ISIL, in Belgium and Canada, recent arrests in Europe and
Australia, demonstrate that the threat beyond the Middle East
is real, although thus far limited in sophistication. However,
if left unchecked, over time we can expect ISIL's capabilities
to mature and the threat to the United States homeland
ultimately to increase.''
Could you expand on NCTC's view of the threat from ISIL to
the extent you can here in an unclassified setting, please?
Mr. Rasmussen. I'd be happy to, Madam Chair. I tend to
think of the threat ISIL poses currently as being somewhat in
concentric circles. Because their capability is greatest in
Iraq and Syria right now, I think our personnel there are
potentially greatest at risk, particularly in Iraq, where our
embassy security is, of course, as you know, a serious concern.
In the front-line states around Iraq and Syria--Jordan,
Turkey, Syria--Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia--there
also we worry that ISIL has the capability and ability to
potentially carry out attacks, to identify and mobilize
personnel who could engage in attacks against U.S. personnel
and interests.
Beyond that, the next ring, the next outer ring I would
look at, is into Western Europe, where the very language that
you cited in your question indicates that ISIL looks at Europe
as a potential theater of operations where it may carry out
attacks against Western interests.
Then lastly, the homeland, where we certainly believe that
ISIL has aspirations over time to develop the kind of
capability it would need to carry out a homeland attack. At
this point, though, we assess that we're far more at risk
presently of attack from an individual home-grown violent
extremist who may be inspired by, but not necessarily directed
by, ISIL here in the homeland.
Then the point about if left unchecked; we worry that the
longer ISIL is left unchecked and is allowed to pursue and
develop a safe haven, the more that capability is allowed to
grow to carry out attacks in each of those theaters that I
mentioned.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
I saw in your responses to our pre-hearing questions that
you wrote that'll be hiring more than 40 officers this year.
It's my understanding that, in addition to these 40, NCTC still
has many vacant positions it needs to fill. So the question is,
with respect to contractors, which we have some concerns about,
how do you plan to fill the vacant spots at NCTC?
Mr. Rasmussen. First of all, thank you, Madam Chair. The
support NCTC receives from this Committee in our efforts to
maintain the best possible workforce could not be better. We're
very grateful for that.
Chairman Feinstein. We'll keep it going.
Mr. Rasmussen. The numbers you cite of 40 individuals who
we're looking to hire this year reflects what we call ODNI
cadre, people who are hired and work in the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence. As you know and as most of
the Committee knows well, NCTC has a blended workforce which
includes permanent cadre employees, but also detailed personnel
from other intelligence community, and not just intelligence
community, but other government organizations as well. To me
that is the real lifeblood of NCTC, the expertise, the talent
that we get from other departments and agencies.
Chairman Feinstein. Well, will the 40 be essentially
transfers? Will they be a mix, and if so----
Mr. Rasmussen. 40 will be new cadre direct hire. At the
same time, in parallel we're pursuing an accelerated effort to
try to get our detailee numbers up, for exactly the reason I
just said: We need the talent that comes from other
intelligence community partners. All of those partners are
willing and very strong, strong supporters of NCTC as an
enterprise. The challenge comes year in and year out as you try
to keep the numbers up. They have their own staffing needs. In
a period of budget uncertainty, they themselves sometimes
struggle to meet their own internal efforts to staff
themselves. So it's a constant dialogue with them, as I would
say, it's a very positive dialogue with them, to make sure we
can get talented officers from places like FBI, CIA, and other
partners in the intelligence community.
Chairman Feinstein [continuing]. Thank you.
Senator Burr.
Senator Burr. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Nick, the Committee, as you know, is charged with providing
vigilant oversight. A couple of questions that really go in
line with what the Chairman had you rise and raise your hand
and swear to. Would you agree that the Committee, to conduct
effective oversight, that we should have access to the
intelligence products produced by the intelligence community
and in some cases be provided with the raw reporting that
contributed to that analysis?
Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, I believe that in some specific cases
it would make sense to have access to that reporting.
Senator Burr. Will you commit to providing the Committee
complete and timely access to all NCTC products, reporting, and
staff, if necessary, to assist in our oversight responsibility?
Mr. Rasmussen. Yes.
Senator Burr. I won't get into staffing because I think you
covered that with Senator Feinstein. Earlier this week, the
Institute of Economics and Peace released its 2014 Global
Terrorism Index. The report indicates that the deaths from
testimony are at an all-time high. Significantly--specifically,
the number of deaths attributed to terrorism is five times
higher than it was in 2000, and we've witnessed a 61 percent
increase in the last year alone.
Would you agree that the threat from terrorism is at an
all-time high?
Mr. Rasmussen. I think as measured in the array, variety,
and dispersion of terrorist threats across many different
regions, the answer is certainly yes.
Senator Burr. What is NCTC as the executive agent for our
Nation's strategy against terrorism going to do about it?
Mr. Rasmussen. The role that NCTC plays in carrying out
strategic operational planning in support of the government is
one that has us tied very closely to the National Security
Council staff and the policy development percent for pursuing
strategies on counterterrorism. We work with the National
Security Council staff to develop whole of government plans to
address our counterterrorism concerns in each of the theaters
around the world, not just one single theater. As you would
well expect, Senator, the effort to develop strategies against
ISIL is at a particularly energetic pace right now. But our
strategic operational planning capability is also brought to
bear on the whole array of CT challenges we face in Africa, in
Asia, in South Asia, every region you can think of.
So I would consider our job at NCTC to make sure that we
aren't leaving any holes in that fabric of strategy as we look
out across all of the different CT challenges that we face,
while at the same time prioritizing where effort needs to be
most energetically directed. That of course right now would
argue for a lot of effort to be directed at the challenges
we're facing in Syria and Iraq.
Senator Burr. Are you confident that NCTC can discover and
are enabled to disrupt plots here in the homeland?
Mr. Rasmussen. I would say that our ability to detect and
potentially disrupt a plot involving a complex objective with a
number of terrorist actors and a fair amount of communication,
I would assess our odds as being very, very good at being able
to detect and disrupt that, that kind of plotting.
The more the plotting looks like what you and Chairman
Feinstein talked about in terms of being an individual lone
wolf actor, perhaps with no direct connection or even indirect
connection to an overseas terrorist group, perhaps only a self-
radicalized individual working alone on the Internet to develop
his own capabilities, that decreases pretty dramatically our
ability to use traditional CT tools to detect and potentially
disrupt. So it's hard to guarantee you or give you extreme high
confidence that we would be able to detect and deter, disrupt,
that kind of attack.
Senator Burr. Do you think the administration and-or
Congress should do more publicly to let the American people
know the threat from terrorism and the fact that it's growing,
not declining?
Mr. Rasmussen. I would certainly agree with you, Senator
Burr, and that's one of the reasons why this hearing being in
open session I think is such a good thing. The 9-11
Commissioners during the past year, as they reviewed where we
are this many years later, one of their calls was on the policy
community to speak more often, more publicly, more forthrightly
about the threat environment that we face. I would certainly
look to contribute to that in my own way from NCTC.
So much of what we do is necessarily in closed session and
with you, with your staff, but there are certainly
opportunities where we can speak more directly, particularly to
the homeland aspects of the threat, which I referred to a
minute ago, and the presence of home-grown violent extremists
and the threat they pose to our communities.
Senator Burr. Nick, last question. In your response to the
Committee's pre-hearing questions, you indicated that big data
was one of NCTC's biggest challenges. The IC and the United
States Government as a whole are really struggling with that
challenge. At NCTC, however, the correlation of big data is a
life and death matter. I'm concerned that this issue doesn't
receive the proper attention and resources at NCTC.
Can you assure us that you'll make this a top priority and
that this effort will get the attention it needs?
Mr. Rasmussen. Senator, you're right to point to this issue
as being one of our biggest challenges, and I can commit to you
wholeheartedly to embrace this as one of my top priorities. On
his way out the door, during his last couple of months of
service at NCTC, Matt Olsen directed the creation inside NCTC
of an office, of a new office, an Office of Data Strategy and
Innovation, to do a better job than we thought we were doing of
organizing our short, medium, and long-term vision in terms of
how to make best possible use analytically of the data we have
access to.
Some of that will also involve developing new technological
tools, taking advantage of broader efforts by the DNI, by
Director Clapper, to create a new architecture for terrorism
and for intelligence information for the entire intelligence
community. We hope to leverage NCTC's work as an early
benefactor of that work to create a more cloud-based
architecture for intelligence information across the IC.
Senator Burr. I thank you for that and I hope you'll keep
the community updated on the progress that we make on that.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thanks very much.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
First of all, congratulations on your appointment, which I
think is an excellent one. I appreciate very much that the
President chose to put a career expert in this vital position
and I thank you very much for your generous comments about the
role that former Senator Joe Lieberman and I played in creating
the NCTC.
I do hope that you'll let this Committee know if you
encounter difficulties in getting detailees who are well
qualified and experienced to come work at NCTC. I know it's
very hard for other components of the intelligence community
and the FBI to let go of some of their most talented analysts,
but for NCTC to be fully effective in these very dangerous
times it is essential that we achieve that goal of jointness by
having those detailees. So please do not hesitate to come to
the Chairman, Ranking Member, any of us, if you do anticipate
problems in that area.
Mr. Rasmussen. I will. Thank you.
Senator Collins. One of the findings of the 9-11 Commission
was that border security and immigration were not seen as
national security concerns prior to the attacks on our Nation
on 9-11-01. The 9-11 Commission specifically found that 15 of
the 19 hijackers could have been intercepted through more
diligent enforcement of our immigration laws.
As the Acting Director of the NCTC, were you or any of your
staff asked to scrub the President's proposals for immigration
changes that he will be announcing tonight?
Mr. Rasmussen. To my knowledge, NCTC or any of the
personnel at NCTC were not involved in any effort? I'm not
aware of whether there was elsewhere in the intelligence
community such an effort, but not at NCTC, ma'am.
Senator Collins. When President Obama created the 2009
Guantanamo Review Task Force to evaluate which detainees could
be transferred or released from Guantanamo, as I recall the
head of NCTC was the executive director of that task force; is
that correct?
Mr. Rasmussen. Yes. In prior service, Matt Olsen held that
position as chair of the task force.
Senator Collins. Matt Olsen has told me that when the
decision was made to exchange what have become known as the
Taliban 5 for the release of Sergeant Bergdahl, that NCTC was
not consulted in that decision. To your knowledge, was anyone
at NCTC consulted?
Mr. Rasmussen. My understanding is that in the context or
in the process of moving to the transfer of those detainees
there was a request for an intelligence assessment from the
ODNI, from the intelligence community, and such an assessment
was in fact prepared. It was prepared by another element of the
ODNI, not at NCTC.
Senator Collins. And that was despite the fact that the
NCTC was acting as the executive director for the commission?
Mr. Rasmussen. Well, I would----
Senator Collins. Or for the task force.
Mr. Rasmussen [continuing]. Matt had that role in a
previous, at a previous time. In the current processes that the
administration is following for considering transfer of
detainees, NCTC is being asked typically to produce threat
assessments of what impact on security the potential return of
a detainee may have. That did not happen in the case of the
issue you're referring to, madam.
Senator Collins. I just want to be clear on this. So the
normal process is for NCTC to be involved in putting together
the package that is used by decisionmakers on how to classify
the detainees; is that part correct?
Mr. Rasmussen. That's correct.
Senator Collins. But in the case of the Taliban 5 the NCTC
was not asked to put together a new analysis that went beyond
the previous analysis, which according to press reports found
that these detainees were too dangerous to be released; is that
correct
Mr. Rasmussen. Again, we did not have direct involvement in
the production of the intelligence assessment.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Again, I want to thank you for your willingness to serve in
what is a 24-7 very demanding job, and I think we're very
fortunate to have someone with your background and expertise.
Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. It looks like this is going to be a
tough vote.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
I too want to----
Chairman Feinstein. For TV, I was jesting.
Senator Rubio [continuing]. Thank you for your service to
our country and congratulations on your appointment, and we
look forward to moving forward quickly.
Let me ask you a number of questions that are of interest
to me and I think to everyone on the Committee. The first has
to do with the planned reduction in U.S. commitment to
Afghanistan and the growing concern that that would have
implications on our ability to conduct effective
counterterrorism operations in the region. There's been one
success in all of this has been the ability to erode core Al-
Qaeda's presence, for example in the FATA. If we lose territory
in Afghanistan back to the Taliban, we could very easily be
once again in a position where many of those elements
reconstitute strength in an ungoverned space somewhere in
Afghanistan. If the government is no longer capable of
exercising presence in that region and with less of a U.S.
commitment, that could be accelerated.
What are your thoughts on the current plans to draw down
forces in Afghanistan and the impact it would have on our
counterterrorism efforts?
Mr. Rasmussen. As an intelligence community, we also are
concerned about what potential effect the drawdown of U.S.
forces may have on the ability of Al-Qaeda to regenerate
capability, particularly in the northeastern parts of
Afghanistan. The effort to train and equip a competent Afghan
national security force is an important part of the effort to
make sure that there is a capability to disrupt potential
activity inside Afghanistan. We of course will maintain as
robust as possible an intelligence collection framework to
allow us to continue to monitor, track, and if necessary
disrupt Al-Qaeda resurgence in that part of Afghanistan or
certainly in Pakistan. But it will be a more challenging and
more difficult collection environment than we face today.
Senator Rubio. My second question has to do with Iran.
There's been a lot of talk about some sort of deal with regard
to their nuclear ambitions and the relaxation of sanctions
against them. What has not been discussed enough is that Iran
is the world's leading sponsor of terrorism as a state, and
certainly any economic growth and prosperity that would come
about as a result of the relaxation of sanctions I believe
would have an impact on their ability to fund and expand their
already robust sponsorship of terrorism around the world.
I was hoping you could share some thought with us, not just
about what Iran does now, but what they might be able to grow
and do if in fact these sanctions are relaxed and they have
more access to global capital, more money basically, to sponsor
these operations.
Mr. Rasmussen. The willingness and ability of Iran to
support various Shia terrorist groups has always been very,
very high on the list of concerns of the counterterrorism
community and the intelligence community. One of the pathways
to addressing that challenge has been to try to get Iran out of
the business of thinking that carrying out those kind of acts
advances their national interest, and ultimately they would see
that as self-defeating and not advancing their interests.
So I guess, speaking personally, in my own personal
analysis anything that puts us in a position where we are more
effectively dealing with Iran in a normal way would reduce the
incentive for them to use that proxy network of Shia terrorist
groups that they do in fact have at their disposal. There's no
doubt, Senator, you're absolutely right, the capability of the
terrorism apparatus sponsored by Iran is something that is
threatening to the United States, not just in the region, in
the Middle East, but all around the world and even potentially
here at home.
So I would place a priority in trying to, not necessarily
seek to defeat that terrorism apparatus on the battlefield, as
we have in our efforts against Al-Qaeda, but in effect trying
to take them out of the business in some other fashion. That's
how I would think about it. But there's no question, as we
watch and worry about how Sunni-Shia tensions in the Middle
East play out and how our interests in the region are put at
risk by Shia-sponsored terrorist groups. But the focus on
Iranian intentions will continue and be a very high priority.
Senator Rubio. Your statement about putting them out of the
business of sponsoring terrorism, it calls to mind the
potential that any sort of sanctions relaxation perhaps should
be linked not just to a nuclear program, but to their
sponsorship of terrorism, as a leverage point to get them to
abandon those sorts of things.
Mr. Rasmussen. I can't speak to the policy context in which
we would relax sanctions.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thanks, Senator Rubio.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Rasmussen, I have been to your office, I've been to the
CIA, I've been to the Pentagon, and have traveled recently, and
the one major conclusion I have taken from those visits is the
incredible quality of the people that we have working for us.
They're patriotic, idealistic, smart, and capable. And you're
Exhibit A today, and I just want to thank you, and I'm honored
to serve this country along with you and your colleagues, and I
hope you'll take that word back.
Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you, Senator. I really do appreciate
that.
Senator King. We've talked about this before. Here's my
concern, and I urge you--I know that in the day to day work
you're focusing on threats and attacks and dealing with fires
around the world, and that's your basic mission. But we have to
be thinking more strategically and long-term, it seems to me.
We cannot simply kill these people and call that the solution
to the worldwide terrorism problem.
I'm looking--I remember from the fifties we had the
containment strategy of George Kennan, that really worked with
the Soviet Union. It took a long time, but it worked. And it
was a strategy. It was a conscious, deliberate, well-developed
strategy. I urge you to work with your colleagues, with the
think tanks, with Rand Corporation or Brookings, whoever, to
really work on a strategy for dealing with this problem other--
in addition to the military response.
Do you have any thoughts on that?
Mr. Rasmussen. It's a terrific suggestion, Senator, and
obviously the expertise about how to carry out effective
counterterrorism policy does not reside only within the
government. As you alluded to, research organizations, think
tanks, not just in Washington, but all around the country and
all around the world, have a role to play in helping us get
this right.
The strategies that we try to help produce at NCTC in
support of the National Security Council staff in my answer to
Chairman Feinstein are typically whole of government
strategies, not just relying on our intelligence capabilities
or our military capabilities, but also trying to take advantage
of the abilities, the resources we have across the government,
to try to produce the conditions that would over time eat away
at support for terrorism in some of these conflict locations
overseas.
At the same time, we all go into it understanding well that
those efforts will ultimately take years, if not decades, to
play out and for us to reap the benefits of those kinds of
strategies, and in the mean time you're left to manage a very
difficult threat environment.
Senator King. I just want to be sure that we're not simply
putting out the fires. We've got to put out the fires, but we
also have to be thinking long-term, it seems to me. Otherwise
we're in for a 100-year war.
Mr. Rasmussen. Exactly right, sir.
Senator King. This morning at a hearing at the House
Intelligence Committee, an open hearing, I should mention, NSA
Director Rogers said: ``There shouldn't be any doubt in our
mind that there are nation states and groups out there that
have the capability to forestall our ability to operate our
basic infrastructure, whether it's generating power or whether
it's moving water and fuel.''
How concerned are you about terrorist groups using their
own capacity or what I call hackers for hire to attack our
infrastructure? How serious is the cyber attack threat?
Mr. Rasmussen. I would agree with the NSA Director in what
he said this morning. I think, as I understand it, the threat
he's referring to is more acute from state actors at present
than from individual terrorists or established terrorist
groups.
Senator King. Well, ISIL has shown a pretty good capability
with the Internet.
Mr. Rasmussen. Exactly, and it's certainly a capability
they aspire to develop and exercise. So, knowing that, we're
looking for ways to be ahead of them, both in our ability to
defend our infrastructure, but also in our ability to detect
key individuals who are engaged in that kind of activity and
disrupt their activities.
Senator King. Edward Snowden, you alluded to this. You
didn't use the word. Isn't it true that we've lost a lot of
capability in terms of tracking some of these groups because
they have gone dark, in part based upon their awareness that
was given to them by the Snowden revelations, and that's
compromised our ability to protect ourselves?
Mr. Rasmussen. I would agree with you. Not just the Snowden
disclosures, but other disclosures of classified information
and our collection capabilities, have caused our terrorist
adversaries to adapt, to look for new ways of doing business,
to find new platforms, to go dark in some cases, or just
simply, as I said, find new ways in an attempt to keep us in
chase mode as they move from potential platform to potential
platform.
This is an ongoing challenge for the intelligence
community. I know our colleagues at NSA are particularly
focused on this. But you're absolutely right, sir.
Senator King. And it's a particularly serious danger
because, in my view, with the terrorist threat intelligence is
the first line of defense. These aren't people that we can line
up the Army or the Navy and shoot. We need to know where
they're coming and when, and intelligence is really--that's why
it's so absolutely critical.
Mr. Rasmussen. I would agree with you, sir.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. And thank you, Senator.
Senator--I was going to say ``Warner''--Heinrich. Excuse
me, Martin.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Rasmussen, I want to thank you for being here today and
for all of your public service. As you can see, you have an
enormous amount of respect from this body. I wanted to ask you.
Given your experience with the National Counterterrorism Center
really going back to its inception, it's clear that there are
few in the Federal Government with your knowledge of the NCTC
and its mission. In your responses to unclassified questions
from the Committee, you talk a little bit about that unique
role, particularly of NCTC analysis as outlined in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as
well as the mission objectives assigned to NCTC through the
DNI's national intelligence strategy.
I want to dig a little deeper, if I can, into the unique
nature of the analysis that NCTC does relative to that done by
a number of other intelligence community agencies. As you know,
even though NCTC is effectively the primary U.S. Government
organization tasked to analyze terrorist organizations, there
are several other agencies within the IC track and they analyze
terrorists as well. Can you articulate for us, how is the
analysis conducted by NCTC truly unique compared to that done
by these other agencies
Mr. Rasmussen. One element that puts NCTC in a unique
position to carry out the best possible analysis of terrorism
information is our access to the full body of that terrorism
information. That was the unique insight of the IRTPA, the
effort to bridge the domestic-foreign intelligence divide. So
an analyst sitting at NCTC will have access to whatever is
available to the U.S. Government in terms of intelligence
reporting from overseas collection efforts, as well as from
domestic law enforcement investigations here at home, and that
is not true of every other element of the intelligence
community. So that puts NCTC, I would say, in a uniquely
advantaged position.
Now, that obviously plays out, that advantage, plays out
more profoundly when you're talking about homeland threats,
where the bridge between domestic and foreign intelligence
matters so much. I would not quibble at the talent, capability,
or insight that analysts from most of my intelligence community
partners could bring to the analytical effort on some of our
key challenges overseas. During the period of--I'll just give
one example. During the period of our extended military
involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Defense Department,
the Defense Intelligence Agency and their intelligence analysts
were doing terrific work, most of it informed by time on the
ground, and I would never do anything to suggest otherwise.
But to answer your question, I think it's access to
information that makes that critical difference.
Senator Heinrich. Would you characterize the most unique
thing as being able to see a bigger picture from multiple
sources, and particularly when we're talking about a
combination of foreign and domestic?
Mr. Rasmussen. Yes, I would.
Senator Heinrich. In your response to questions from the
Committee, you also discussed the growing importance of
monitoring social media and exploiting big data in tracking
terrorist threats and conducting analysis. In your comments you
mentioned that technology could help, quote, ``implement
privacy and civil liberty protections beyond the current basic
safeguards that are already in place.''
Could you elaborate a little bit on what you mean by that,
and also sort of describe for us the shortfalls as you see them
in the privacy and civil liberties safeguards that are
currently in place?
Mr. Rasmussen. I wouldn't so much describe it as shortfalls
as much as--I guess what I was referring to with that answer,
Senator, was the more we can do to automate and make happen
technologically segregation of information, deletion of
information, all of the things we commit to do as part of our
adherence to the Attorney General guidelines, the more we can
take the human element of that, where a human makes a mistake
and inadvertently sees something, retains something, holds onto
something that they did not have authorization to do, the more
we can automate that process through technology and give
ourselves the ability also to audit ourselves more effectively
and therefore train more effectively, that's what I was trying
to get at with that.
Senator Heinrich. So it's more about technology and
implementation effectiveness than any sort of change in
authorizations?
Mr. Rasmussen. Exactly, because on those rare occasions
when we have had something go awry in terms of handling of
information, we have found that it has almost universally been
a matter of human error rather than any intent to mishandle,
misuse, or not protect information.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you again.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
I believe this completes the questions. I would like
members to know that it's my intention to vote on this
nomination as soon as possible when the Senate returns. It may
be off the floor after Thanksgiving. Any member should submit
questions for the record by next Monday so we can have the
answers by the time the vote is taken, please. And we will do
our level best to move this just as quickly as we can, Mr.
Rasmussen.
Mr. Rasmussen. Well, I'm very grateful for that, Madam
Chair, and we'll commit to getting every answer back to you as
quickly and as expeditiously as possible.
Chairman Feinstein. That's fine. Can't do better than that.
So thank you very much for being here.
Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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