Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Wednesday, January 12, 2022 - 2:00pm
Location:
Dirksen G50
Witnesses
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 117-248]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-248
NOMINATION OF KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN
TO BE UNDER SECRETARY
FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 12, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
46-624PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
RON WYDEN, Oregon JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
ANGUS KING, Maine ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado TOM COTTON, Arkansas
BOB CASEY, Pennsylvania JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York BEN SASSE, Nebraska
CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio
----------
Michael Casey, Staff Director
Brian Walsh, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
JANUARY 12, 2022
OPENING STATEMENTS
Page
Warner, Hon. Mark R., a U.S. Senator from Virginia............... 1
Rubio, Hon. Marco, a U.S. Senator from Florida................... 2
WITNESS
Wainstein, Kenneth L., Nominee to be Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 22
Prepared statement........................................... 25
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Nomination material for Kenneth L. Wainstein
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees........ 54
Additional Prehearing Questions.............................. 73
Post-hearing Questions....................................... 108
Letter of support from former U.S. Department of Justice
Officials dated January 11, 2022........................... 4
Letter of support from Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
Leaders dated January 11, 2022............................. 11
Letter of support from bipartisan group of former Government
Officials and National Security Experts dated January 12,
2022....................................................... 14
NOMINATION OF KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN
TO BE UNDER SECRETARY
FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 12, 2022
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in
Room SD-50 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark R.
Warner (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Warner, Rubio, Wyden, Heinrich, King (via
WebEx), Casey (via WebEx), Gillibrand (via WebEx), Blunt,
Cornyn, and Sasse.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
VIRGINIA
Chairman Warner. I call this hearing to order.
Welcome, Mr. Wainstein. It's great to see you. Welcome as
well to Elizabeth and three of your daughters, Mackie, Cecily,
and Natalie. Mackie had the good sense to be an intern for the
Committee last summer and we are grateful for her service.
I understand your daughter, Ellie, who's at Berkeley Law
School, is watching remotely. And I would ask, Ken, that you
would give us some evidentiary proof that she did actually tune
in for this couple of hours. And hopefully, if she's watching
now, she's appropriately embarrassed. So, we'll see in the
aftermath.
Before we begin formally, though, I do want to commend you
on your excellent judgment as evidenced by both your attending
UVA and living in the Commonwealth. I will question your choice
of law school, though.
But congratulations on your nomination to serve as the
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, or I&A, at the
Department of Homeland Security. This position sits at a
critical juncture between the analytic work of the Intelligence
Community and the information-sharing role of the Department of
Homeland Security. If confirmed, your job will be to receive
and analyze intelligence and law enforcement information
relating to the homeland security and to ensure its prompt
dissemination throughout the Department, as well as to your
partners at the Federal, state, local, and tribal departments
and agencies.
You come to this hearing with a strong background as an
intelligence and law enforcement professional who has
faithfully served our country throughout your career as a
Federal prosecutor, at the highest levels of the FBI, as
General Counsel both from Chief of Staff to Director Mueller,
as a U.S. Attorney for the District, and the first-ever
Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ's National Security
Division. And as Homeland Security Adviser to President Bush. I
mean, you've had virtually every job across the justice and
homeland security and intel world.
So, the fact that after a decade in private practice,
you've made the admirable decision to return to public service,
I think it is important. And as I said in our conversation
before this, your appointment comes at a pivotal moment and
it's going to clearly have some challenges.
While the I&A mission is defined, it continues to evolve
and mature since its creation in the aftermath of 9/11. And I
think for many of us on the Committee, there's a sense that the
I&A, at least recently, has been a bit unfocused and stuck
between its dual missions: national intelligence and
departmental priorities.
You have some Members, not just Senator Wyden, but me as
well, who were very unhappy with the I&A's operations in
Portland in 2020. And then we were disappointed that the I&A
provided next to no warning about what was to come on January
6th. We just had the one year anniversary of that date. And the
recognition of what domestic violent extremists can do from
either end of the political spectrum, I believe, needs to be a
focus of some of your work.
Obviously, at the same time, particularly if they're
domestic violent extremists, the First Amendment protects
Americans' right to free speech and nonviolent peaceful
protest. And obviously, part of your role would be to defend
the Constitution and those First Amendment rights. As head of
DHS intelligence operations, you'll be squarely at the center
of those two imperatives, both protecting our country and
protecting the Constitution. And I'd like to hear today a
little bit how you hope to navigate that important work while
not politicizing I&A's activities.
And obviously, when I submit for the record in a moment the
kind of Who's Who of law enforcement and intelligence officials
who are supporting your nomination from both political parties,
I think that is a good endorsement that you're the right guy at
the right time.
Thank you for appearing before the Committee this
afternoon. I look forward to your testimony.
I now recognize the Vice Chairman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
FLORIDA
Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Wainstein, for being here and for your
willingness to serve as the Under Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security. I think
the Chairman has gone through your extensive public service
record, the landscape.
We have all the same challenges that we had when you last
were in public service. And now we've got a few ones that have
emerged that are relatively new in scale and scope, not the
least of which, of course, is the threat to the United States
from the Chinese Communist Party and, in particular, their
plan--which is now, I think, abundantly clear--to work both
through licit and illicit means to dominate global emerging
technologies, to displace the United States and reshape the
rules-based international order in ways that benefit them.
So, I'll be very interested to hear your views on China and
more importantly on how they would inform your approach to
intelligence and analysis should you be confirmed.
I also would hope to hear a little bit about how you'll
ensure that DHS Intelligence and Analysis isn't being used or
even reasonably perceived--which is in many ways as important--
perceived to be used by either party or whoever is in power for
political purposes under the guise, for example, of pursuing
domestic violent extremists. It's a very fine line.
The worst times in the history of our intelligence agencies
have been when they were either used or perceived to be used
for purposes of political advantage. And this comes at a time
in which there's a broader crisis of confidence in institutions
in this country. But again, none, I think, has been more
damaged over the last few years, rightly or wrongly in many
cases, than the Intelligence Community.
And so I think it's more important than ever that we do
everything possible to ensure that there's both the perception
and the reality that the IC operates beyond the bounds of
partisan politics so that both policymakers--but ultimately the
American public--can have confidence that their assessments are
real. And so those are important points I hope you'll touch
upon.
With that, again, thank you for being here. We look forward
to hearing your testimony and your answers to our questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. I now ask
unanimous consent that letters of support for the nominee be
included in the record. I would simply point out, Ken has got
letters from a kind of Who's Who across law enforcement and
criminal justice leaders, and then his list of supporters from
national security and intel. I won't go down the whole list by
any means, but for my colleagues and for those who are tuning
in, that includes Mike Chertoff, Keith Alexander, Jim Clapper,
Saxby Chambliss, Mike Hayden, Bill Evanina, Mike McConnell,
Mike Morell, Leon Panetta, Tom Ridge and a host of others. So,
very impressive group and I ask these----
Vice Chairman Rubio. Mr. Chairman, the Chambliss one
concerns me deeply, but . . .
Chairman Warner. I will note this.
Vice Chairman Rubio. For the record, that's a joke.
Chairman Warner. The only thing that would be worse is if
Burr submitted a letter as well.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Well, that would be a devastating
death blow to the nomination.
Chairman Warner. So, without objection, I'll submit those
letters for the record.
[Letters of support for the Witness follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Warner. Will the witness please stand and raise
your right hand?
[Witness stands and raises right hand.]
Do you solemnly swear to give this Committee the truth, the
full truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Wainstein. I do.
Chairman Warner. Please be seated.
Before moving to your opening statement, I will ask you to
answer five standard questions the Committee poses to each
nominee who appears before us. They just require a simple yes
or no for the record.
First, do you agree to appear before the Committee here or
in other venues when invited?
Mr. Wainstein. Yes, I do.
Chairman Warner. If confirmed, do you agree to send
officials from your office to appear before the Committee and
designated staff when invited?
Mr. Wainstein. Yes.
Chairman Warner. Do you agree to provide documents or any
other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to
carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
Mr. Wainstein. Yes.
Chairman Warner. Will you ensure that your office and your
staff provide such material to the Committee when requested?
Mr. Wainstein. Yes.
Chairman Warner. Do you agree to fully inform and fully
brief to the fullest extent possible all Members of this
Committee, rather than simply the Chairman and Vice Chairman?
Mr. Wainstein. Yes.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
And now we'll proceed with your opening statement after
which I'll recognize Members for five minutes by seniority.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER
SECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, Chairman Warner, Vice Chairman
Rubio, Members of the Committee.
I'm profoundly honored to appear before you today as the
nominee for Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at
the Department of Homeland Security.
I'm joined here today by my wife, Elizabeth, and my
daughters Mackie, Cecily, and Natalie. And I'd also like to
recognize, as you mentioned, my daughter Ellie, who purportedly
is watching this from Berkeley back at school today. It means a
lot to me that they are with me today and it's meant a lot to
me that they've been with me throughout my career.
I'm also grateful to President Biden for giving me this
opportunity to serve and the opportunity to work with his
strong national security team. I'm also grateful to him for
looking beyond political optics and selecting someone who
previously served in a Republican Administration. In a small
but important way, that is a reaffirmation of the non-partisan
approach to national security that has traditionally been and
must always remain a bedrock principle of our government.
That is the same nonpartisan approach I always took during
my 21 years of government service. I first served as a Federal
prosecutor for about a dozen years, handling a range of
homicide, gang conspiracy, and white collar criminal cases, and
doing so without any consideration of politics and with a clear
focus on protecting civil liberties and due process rights.
I then pivoted after the 9/11 attacks to focus primarily on
national security matters: helping the FBI reorient itself
toward its intelligence mission after 9/11, establishing the
new National Security Division with my colleagues at the
Justice Department, running the Homeland Security Council as
President Bush's Homeland Security Advisor, and once again,
taking the same non-partisan approach I'd learned as a
prosecutor and making every decision with full regard for its
effect on civil liberties.
During this government service, I worked closely with DHS
and admired how the Department established itself under the
exceptional leadership of Governor Tom Ridge and how it
responded then to a constant stream of natural and homeland
security threats.
I'm clear-eyed, however, that those threats have multiplied
in the years since, and that the DHS of today faces an
increasingly complex threat environment from nation-state
adversaries like China and Russia, and others who target our
elections and steal our sense of technology, and from cyber
criminals and transnational criminal organizations that
victimize our communities.
I&A is absolutely critical to the Department's ability to
meet each and every one of those threats. To use Secretary
Mayorkas's words, DHS is fundamentally a department of
partnerships and it is I&A's mission to make those partnerships
effective by ensuring that relevant intelligence is fully
circulated throughout the whole homeland security enterprise.
I&A performs a number of functions to accomplish that
mission. It manages the information and intelligence sharing
with our state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector
partners. It serves the intelligence needs of the DHS
components and leadership. It leverages the information
holdings of the DHS components to identify and address threats
to our national security and it coordinates information-sharing
within the department.
If I'm confirmed, I will work hard to enhance I&A's ability
to accomplish each of those tasks.
First, I intend to focus on the workforce of I&A, which, as
I have seen, is a very strong and impressive group of dedicated
intelligence professionals. As a manager, I've always believed
that it's my first duty to support my personnel. And as a
leader of an intelligence agency, I'll be particularly vigorous
in defending their ability to deliver objective, unvarnished
analysis that is completely free from any political influence.
I'll also carefully review I&A's operational role in the
homeland intelligence enterprise in order to identify and
eliminate any unnecessary duplication or overlap, and to focus
I&A's role in those areas where it adds particular value.
I'll maintain a constant focus on the implications of I&A's
activities on civil liberties and privacy and the need for
strong safeguards, oversight, and transparency in our
intelligence operations. As we all know, we can only be
successful at safeguarding our people, our homeland, and our
values if we maintain the trust of our fellow citizens.
And importantly, I will work in close collaboration with
Congress and with this Committee in particular. I've long had a
strong relationship with the Members and staff of this
Committee and I've always had deep respect for it. And if
confirmed, you can count on my being a very willing and very
collaborative partner in our joint effort to make I&A as
effective as possible.
Thank you, again for the opportunity to appear before you
today and for the honor of considering me for this position.
And I'm happy to answer any questions that you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wainstein follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Wainstein.
For planning purposes, if any Members of the Committee wish
to submit questions for the record after today's hearing,
please do so by 5 p.m. this Friday, January 15th.
I'd like to start, and this is one of the questions we had
when we had a chance to visit over Zoom. You've had positions
in prior Administrations that, at least in terms of the outside
hierarchical approach, appeared to be higher in the food chain.
You've had an extraordinary, successful private-sector career.
Share with the Committee why you're willing, at this moment
in time, to come back to a part of DHS that I think really
needs strong leadership, but it would not be viewed as a
conventional choice.
Mr. Wainstein. I appreciate that question, Mr. Chairman,
and once again, thank you for the opportunity to talk to you
the other day.
Well look, it was the honor of my life and career to work
in government for the 21 years that I did. And yet the titles
and the positions and the responsibility at higher levels is
great and it's exciting, but it's really the substance of the
job and the people you do the job with that make it so
important. I've often been asked, what's my favorite job I've
ever had? And my answer, honestly, is being an AUSA--working
with trial teams, prosecuting cases. That's the low end of the
totem pole, but it was the substance of it, the meaningfulness
of it, and the camaraderie of it were the best. And that's the
way I look at this. It's a wonderful team from Secretary
Mayorkas on down and then the larger constellation of national
security leadership in this Administration. As you pointed out,
we're at a critical time in our history. I&A has an important
role to play in a lot of really important missions. So, I
couldn't be more proud and more excited about this opportunity.
Chairman Warner. Well, I accept that answer, and I
appreciate your willingness to serve. I promise I won't reveal
to either President Bush or Bob Mueller that you said the AUSA
job was better than working for both those individuals
directly.
Talk to me a little bit, and I think many Members may want
to get into this. And it's one of the reasons why I think
you're such the right choice right now. This is a piece of DHS
that a lot of us were concerned about in terms of what happened
in Portland. A lot of us were concerned it didn't do a very
good job in terms of alerting prior to January 6th. There are
enormous challenges in terms of how you set up your role vis-a-
vis the FBI and what kind of collections.
Can you talk about how you can work with the FBI, but also
de-conflict with the FBI?
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Look, there are issues with I&A as there are with any
organization. I just want to say, I spent a lot of time with
the folks in I&A over the last few weeks and I've been
tremendously impressed, as I said in my remarks, with their
quality and their dedication. They're good people and that's
the key. I mean, when you have good people on the team, the
team can succeed.
It's had some headwinds. For a number of reasons, they had
largely acting leadership, which is a problem. That's not
anybody's fault. That's just happened. And then a variety of
things have happened that have made things difficult. But the
makings of a strong team and a strong operation are there and
they're doing great things right now.
In terms of, specifically, the work with the FBI, I think
that's an important issue. When you look at the intelligence
enterprise in our government, the lines, very intentionally,
are not clearly delineated. There's overlap. There should
always be some overlap between the different agencies.
But you have to keep a focus on that because you don't want
overlap to mean duplication. Or for that, even worse,
confusion. Because if two intelligence agencies are working in
the same space and come up with different analyses, that just
confuses the customers.
So, the FBI and I&A need to work very closely together. I
understand they have a strong relationship. And I expect that,
if I'm fortunate to be confirmed, one of my first visits will
be to go down to FBI headquarters to talk about the state of
the relationship--where we can coordinate better and where we
can make the lines clearer.
Chairman Warner. Yes. I'll give you the benefit of the
doubt here, I do wonder at what point do you throw a case, an
investigation, over the transom to the FBI to pursue
potentially for criminal charges versus how far you might
pursue a matter?
I also think you're going to have challenges with de-
confliction with CISA, as well. I think one of the things that
Chris Krebs did a great job for President Trump--and I think
Jen Easterly is doing a good job right now, is really building
up those capabilities at CISA. But there's going to be some of
those--you're going to have some rub with CISA as well. Do you
want to speak to that for a moment?
Mr. Wainstein. Look, you just sort of look at the org chart
and look at the responsibilities and you see there's going to
be some overlap. And in fact, my sense is that the two entities
have done a good job trying to coordinate and making sure that
I&A is providing the intelligence advantages, both within DHS
and CISA, as well as the state and locals, and that CISA is
helping to operationalize that.
I've been in touch with Jen Easterly. She and I talked at
length just the other day and we're going to be focusing on
that overlap. And, frankly, on the need for that coordination
to be even stronger, because it's got to be the intelligence
and operational sides working together.
Chairman Warner. Senator Rubio.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you.
As we discussed on the phone, and this would come up today,
so I want to give you an opportunity to address it. There's
some reason to address, I believe, the very few but nonetheless
billable hours on behalf of the China National Offshore Oil
Corporation. And the reason why it's of concern is because it
fits the fact pattern for how the Chinese Communist Party
aggressively plays abroad, and in particular--.
Here are the basic facts as I understand them.
So, I think the first thing is, I want to make sure I
understand the facts and the Members of the Committee do. In
April 2018, a partner at the firm, I believe in the China
office, asked for help because he was working for their client,
the CNOOC, China National Offshore Oil Corporation. And it was
related to a March 2018 release by the U.S. Trade
Representative of something with the findings of the
investigation into China's acts, policies, practices related to
technology transfer.
The report included the government's evidence for how the
Chinese government provided competitive intelligence through
cyber-intrusions to Chinese state-owned enterprises and further
and sub its ``Made in China 2025'' goals and as part of its
military civil fusion. And the report explicitly stated that in
2012, this company twice requested and received intelligence
from Chinese intelligence services that helped them in
negotiations with five U.S. companies. In fact, the report
specifically found that these examples illustrate how China
uses the intelligence resources at its disposal to further the
commercial interests of Chinese state-owned enterprises to the
detriment of their foreign partners and competitors.
So, the core nugget in the report is there is no
distinction really between a Chinese company and the
government. American corporations competing with a foreign
corporation don't get to go to the CIA, or NSA, or whatever and
get intelligence information to negotiate and compete. And
these guys do.
But the fact pattern about you being asked by a partner at
the firm to look into it, I believe, is correct. So, if you
could just tell us what was the nature of the work and why were
you called in to do it? What did you do?
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, Senator Rubio. And thanks for
raising this and flagging it in our call the other day. That
was very good of you and I appreciate you asking about it. And
I think it's an appropriate thing, an important thing, to ask
about.
Just in terms of the facts, I think you have the facts
largely right. It was actually a partner here in the States who
does trade stuff. So, that partner was looking to see what
trade sanctions kind of consequences there could be because of
these allegations. And he thought, to be complete, he wanted to
find out if there was any criminal exposure. So, he asked me to
have an associate write a memo that just said, these are the
criminal laws that could be implicated.
That associate did that. I passed the memo back and, as you
said, it was 2.8 hours of work. I had no contact with the
client, did no advocacy, talked to nobody, didn't call anybody
in the government. It was literally sort of like almost a law
school exercise by the associate. But it was on behalf of the
Chinese oil company.
And look, you raise, I think, very legitimate concerns
about--and not just here, but you are leader in this area. I
know that you and Senator Warner have done a roadshow with
members of academia and industry to raise the alarm about what
China's doing. And I agree with you on the need to do that and
the fact that that's happening.
We're seeing now an assault across the board in every
space--political, economic, military--by China to try to become
dominant over the United States and change the world order. So,
I agree with that. And in fact, I think I mentioned this the
other day, harking back to my time in the National Security
Division at DOJ, 2006 to 2008, that's when there was just a
dawning realization that in terms of technology theft, that the
Chinese were rapacious.
And so my colleagues and I were really banging the drum,
sounding the alarm about that back then to try to get academia
and industry to pay attention.
So, this is consistent with what I've seen over the last 15
years. And I can assure you that if I get into the position at
I&A, I'll keep sounding that alarm.
Vice Chairman Rubio. Yes. And so my time is about to
expire. But I'm curious, what did you know about this company
before this work came to you? The way you described it is: a
partner came to you and said, ``Can I get answers to this?''
You handed it off to an associate who did a law-school-type
exercise; came back with a memo. You reviewed it and you
submitted it to the partner that requested it.
But what did you know about this company at the time? And
I'm just curious: obviously, would it make you sort of queasy
in any way or concern that the firm was advocating or trying to
help a company that undertakes these sorts of actions that
implicate national security concerns?
Mr. Wainstein. Well, a couple things. I think when I
thought about it, I thought this was--he was looking at a range
of sanctions. He didn't have the expertise to look at white
collar. I was just the one through whom the assignment would go
to somebody in the white collar space to look at that and say,
these are the possible laws that can be implicated.
Just to clear one thing; you said ``advocate.'' I don't
think there's any advocating that went on. This was a sort of
an explanatory exercise. And actually when you think about it--
--
Vice Chairman Rubio. But I meant the firm. The firm
representative was an advocate on behalf of this entity, not
necessarily you directly or even the associate.
Mr. Wainstein. I believe they were doing trade work with
them, but I honestly don't know for sure.
But to answer your question, I should have thought more
about it than I did that day.
Chairman Warner. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Chairman, first, let me express my thanks to you
for your responsiveness to my concerns about what's happened in
Portland.
And to Mr. Wainstein, I appreciated visiting with you, and
as you know, I believe in making sure witnesses know what we're
going to talk about. And so you're aware of these questions.
Mr. Wainstein. I appreciate that very much.
Senator Wyden. When the Trump administration sent
Department of Homeland Security troops into my hometown in the
summer of 2020, the Department's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis was there too. According to a report by the
Department's Office of General Counsel, the Intelligence Office
sent untrained, inexperienced personnel to Portland without a
plan or clear management. So, I spent months battling to get
the General Counsel's report released to the public so that
Oregonians would know about the abuses that took place. The
report was finally released last October, but because of
redactions, I am still pushing to get the full picture out for
Oregonians.
One issue in particular I have focused on, is the General
Counsel's finding that dossiers were developed on people,
presumably including my constituents, who apparently were no
threat to homeland security. According to the report, some
junior personnel were so upset about this, they refused to even
work on them. So, that's why Oregonians want to know what went
into these dossiers that were distributed around the Department
of Homeland Security. But so far, that information is just
being withheld.
So, do you believe the Department of Homeland Security
intelligence personnel ought to be collecting and distributing
dossiers on Americans?
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you again for that meeting the other
day, and thank you for your practice of giving a heads up for
all the questions that you're going to ask a nominee like
myself.
I was troubled by what I read in that report. The part
that's been made public. I've been heartened to hear about a
number of the changes that have been put in place to address
some of the lack of training, lack of guidance, and, as you
pointed out, lack of ability on the part of some who were
concerned about what was going on but who felt that they
couldn't raise the alarm. I can assure you that that will not
be the situation if I'm heading I&A. People will feel fully
comfortable to step forward and raise their concern. In terms
of----
Senator Wyden. But what about these dossiers, though?
Should there be dossiers? What information ought to be in them?
Who should get to see them? Because that's what my constituents
want to know.
Mr. Wainstein. Yes. And that goes with the guidelines and
it's very clear.
Now, let me step back for a second. As you and I discussed,
open-source collection, which is what I&A does--it can be
fraught, especially if it's done in a context of protests or
demonstrations. And so, there are clear guidelines about what
DHS/I&A can and cannot do. So, for example, they can only
collect information and distribute it if it's relevant to a
departmental mission, like protecting against terrorism. They
cannot collect just if somebody is exercising their First
Amendment rights; you can't do that. You have to use the least-
intrusive means of collecting information.
And then, once that information is collected, in terms of
disseminating it, this is U.S. person information that needs to
be carefully handled pursuant to Executive Order and pursuant
to law. And so it shouldn't be just distributed without regard
to privacy. And what I read in that report is that there was
insufficient training and guidance as to how information about
those U.S. persons could and couldn't be distributed.
Senator Wyden. I'm getting ready to run out of time. If
you're confirmed, would you release to the public this and
other information about this office in Portland that I have
been pushing to get unredacted? That's a simple yes or no
question. Would you be willing to release it to the public?
Mr. Wainstein. I won't have the authority to release, but I
will assure you that I will push hard to release it to the
maximum ability of the Department.
Senator Wyden. Is there any reason why it shouldn't be
released?
Mr. Wainstein. I know there's some redactions that might
have to do with personal information, private information,
there might be sources and methods, but I can assure you that
your concerns have been passed on. Folks at DHS are already
engaged as of last week with folks in the General Counsel's
office, and they're working hard to try to absolutely minimize
the amount that's withheld.
Senator Wyden. I will only tell you, you got to think--
because this is what happened in my hometown. We saw what the
Office of General Counsel said. You've got to think it's going
on elsewhere.
And I will tell you, there's a pretty ominous history in
this Committee, as Chairman Warner knows, about the use of
dossiers. So, I'm going to get to the bottom of it. We'll
continue to work with you between now and the time this
Committee votes on your nomination. I'll have additional
questions, and I hope we can have a second round, as well, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wainstein. Appreciate it, Sir.
Chairman Warner. On this issue, I do think there's so many
questions raised about Portland. I want to add my voice to
Senator Wyden's. Obviously, you got to see this, you got to go
through your appropriate channels once you get confirmed. But I
hope as much as possible can be released as well.
And I think we should frankly give Members extra credit for
actually being here in person, but that's not the rules.
So, we'll now go to Senator Cotton on WebEx.
[No response.]
Senator Cornyn. Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the extra
credit.
Chairman Warner. Well, if Tom doesn't poke his head up
soon, then I'm going to go to you.
Senator Cotton, are you out there in ether land?
Mr. Vice Chairman, I'm going to make an executive ruling
and go to Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wainstein, congratulations on your nomination and thank
you for your lengthy, distinguished public service. And I'm
glad your family could be here. I'm sure they're very proud of
you. And I'm sure your service is a family affair. And you're
not just hanging out there on your own.
Senator Rubio talked about the work you did for Chinese
clients and I don't imagine you had to register, I don't think
you had to register, under the Foreign Agents Registration Act,
did you?
Mr. Wainstein. No. And I've never lobbied.
Senator Cornyn. Have you had some experience with the
Foreign Agents Registration Act during your service?
Mr. Wainstein. When I was in government, yes. The
enforcement, that was under me or under our division.
Senator Cornyn. I think we've seen a number of instances
that certainly have been disturbing to me where foreign
governments have hired lobbyists here in Washington, DC, who
have not registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act,
but rather under the Lobbyist Disclosure Act in order to
obscure their representation of foreign governments.
But we're here because we were elected by our constituents
to serve the people of this county and not foreign countries,
and certainly not without our knowledge of who is advocating
for policy changes in Congress.
Could you expand upon your views of the role of the Foreign
Agents Registration Act and whether you believe that it is
adequately serving its purpose?
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, Senator.
Look, I think you're putting a finger on a very critical
issue. FARA has been around for a long time, but it hasn't been
enforced with sufficient energy for decades, for as long as
it's been around.
There has been a focus on FARA over the last few years. I
know that the Justice Department has added resources to that,
the National Security Division, and they're focusing on
bringing cases. And I think they need to, because I think
you're right: we need to know whom people are speaking for when
they're advocating for a legislative change and the like. So, I
agree with that. And to the extent that I'll have any role in
that at I&A, will be minimal, but to the extent I would, I
would do everything I can to encourage strong enforcement.
Senator Cornyn. Well there have been bipartisan bills
knocking around here for a while now and we haven't been able
to get those passed yet, but I would hope you would use the
benefit of your experience and your perspective to advocate
within the Administration for those changes so we can know it.
When we were considering the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act
to allow the 9/11 families an opportunity to file litigation
over foreign financing of the terrorist attack on 9/11, one
foreign government went so far as not just to hire U.S.
lobbyists here in Washington, DC, but also to enlist the aid of
veterans who came up here without disclosing who was paying for
their hotel room and who was financing their presence here and
purported to be advocating on behalf of United States military
veterans. So, this takes a lot of different shapes and forms,
but I think it's an insidious problem and one that I hope you
will help us in whatever way you can to address.
I want to ask you, there's been an increased focus on
domestic terrorism, obviously, since the events of a year ago
on January the 6th. But what part of the U.S. Government in
terms of law enforcement, particularly insofar as it affects
the Intelligence Community, would have jurisdiction to
investigate cases of so-called domestic terrorism?
Mr. Wainstein. Well that's a good question, Sir. And it
sort of goes to the point that we talked about, that I talked
with the Chairman about--sort of the areas of overlap. And this
is an area where there is shared jurisdiction--there are shared
responsibilities--to do intelligence and law enforcement work,
vis-a-vis the domestic terrorism threat. Obviously, the FBI
takes point on domestic terrorism when it comes to doing
investigations, building cases. And in fact, they will not do--
and I think Jill Sanborn has testified to this, in fact--that
they will not do intelligence work absent some predicate. There
has to be some predication under the FBI guidelines for them to
do that.
I&A approaches it from a different vantage point. It
doesn't have that predicate responsibility. It has limitations
I discussed earlier--that it has to be pursuant to the
departmental mission, it can't be focused on First Amendment
rights, et cetera. But, they can do the open source searching
or collection if it relates to a threat that DHS is actually
tasked with protecting against. And so it's a complementary
assignment of responsibility to the FBI and DHS and I&A.
And then the additional piece is that I&A plays a critical
role in tying the Federal Government's responsibilities and
efforts against domestic terrorism with the state, local,
tribal, territorial, and private sector. And that's really the
important piece and real huge value add that I&A brings to the
domestic terrorism fight and, frankly, to the whole
intelligence enterprise.
Senator Cornyn. Mr. Chairman, I have a few more questions
and I'll wait for a second round, if that's your preference.
Chairman Warner. I think that's probably Senator Heinrich's
preference as well.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. I'll try to be brief.
Mr. Wainstein, when the American public found out that
Section 215 had been interpreted by the FISA Court to allow the
collection of millions of Americans' phone records with a
single court order, there was an understandable amount of
disbelief and outrage in the public. And that precipitated
Congress stepping in, passing the USA Freedom Act, which banned
the bulk collection of American records, including those under
215, the FISA Pen Register Statute and National Security
Letters. And so USA Freedom Act codified a national consensus
that the government's collection of Americans' records in bulk
infringed on the privacy and civil liberties of ordinary
Americans.
Do you agree that this national consensus and the USA
Freedom Act have it right in prohibiting open-ended bulk
collection?
Mr. Wainstein. Well, thank you, Senator. And thank you for
having that question passed on to my colleagues at DHS, who
passed it on to me. This is also a topic that Senator Wyden and
I had a good discussion about.
Senator Heinrich. I can imagine.
Mr. Wainstein. Yes. And, look, let me say that bulk
collection is a very difficult fraud issue because bulk
collection by definition, as I understand it, means you might
be looking for one bad guy--there might be one bad guy in the
group--but you're going to then collect information that
involves innocent people.
So, you can imagine a situation where there's a crime in a
bus station at 2:00 in the morning and you want to get the
manifest for the buses that pulled in at 1:00, because they
might have contained the person who committed the murder or
whatever. Well, you know that everybody in that bus didn't
commit the murder, so you know you're getting the information
of innocent people. That's the dilemma of bulk collection.
And so the question then is, is a particular collection--I
think most people agree that that would be an appropriate
investigative step to try to solve that murder in the train
station. But is it appropriate then to take that to millions of
people's telephone records? And that's the issue that came up
with the use of the 215 order for the telephone metadata
program.
And just, I guess, two main points about that that occurred
to me and that we discussed in our call with Senator Wyden. One
is, even if that was arguably lawful--I mean different people,
scholars agree about whether it was lawful and the FISA Court
judges should have signed the order or not--there is an
additional step there which is, is it appropriate? Does it meet
the expectations of the American people and does it meet the
expectations of Congress to use that tool in that aggressive
way? That deliberation, that analysis, wasn't really done.
And the second piece to that--related to that--is this idea
of secret law. That the reason why those expectations weren't
measured against that program is because the program is
classified, the FISA Court opinion authorizing the use of 215
for all that metadata was classified, and it couldn't be
discussed openly in Congress--couldn't be discussed openly with
the American people. So, people couldn't see, couldn't make
their arguments one way or the other. And that really
handicapped the use of that tool and makes it understandable
why people reacted as they did when it got disclosed by
leaking.
And I think it's a lesson. It's a lesson that I've taken
from that. And that's not the only instance, I think. There are
other instances post 9/11 where there was too much of a
reliance on classification when there should have been more
transparency. Live and learn. I'll tell you that if I go back
into government, that's a lesson that I'll keep front and
center.
Senator Heinrich. Do you think Congress got it right in
passing the USA Freedom Act as a response to those revelations?
Mr. Wainstein. I think it's understandable why Congress did
that. In terms of the need for 215 for non-bulk collection, I
still see that that might be a need. I'm looking at it from the
outside and whether that's a need.
Senator Heinrich. Yes. But not for metadata that involves
enormous numbers of innocent Americans.
Mr. Wainstein. Exactly. It's just the fact that on the
criminal side you have a grand jury subpoena; on the national
security side, you don't have a comparable tool. And is that a
problem? And I honestly don't know where the Administration is
on that issue.
Senator Heinrich. One of the challenges, obviously, at I&A
is just that the challenges with workforce morale. That was
true even before some of the things that you heard about in
recent years with my colleagues in Portland, politicization of
intelligence, et cetera.
So, if you're confirmed, what are your plans to turn that
around? Because no organization can function well without high-
quality morale in its ranks.
Mr. Wainstein. No, that's a very important question. And,
really, at the end of the day my main responsibility is as a
manager, is helping to manage that organization. And as I said,
that means supporting the people.
When I mean support, I mean, it's my job to help them do
their jobs as well as they possibly can. They're really good
people in I&A, and I've been in organizations where morale ebbs
and flows for a variety of reasons. The nice thing about that
is that the right reasons come into play, that morale can go
back up. And I think I know morale might have taken some hits
at I&A, and I've heard about it. But I can tell you, the people
are pretty energized as I've been dealing with them.
I think in terms of how to deal with any morale issues, one
of the points is what you just put your finger on. They have to
know that I have their back, that I'm going to ask them to do
nothing more than give objective, straightforward analysis.
That's all I want. And that politics is going to play no role
in it. That approach--just as I felt as a prosecutor for years
doing national security law work at DOJ--that's what people
want to hear. They want to know that they're being valued for
their work, for their contribution to national security, and
not for whether their work butters the bread of one political
party or another.
Chairman Warner. And for Members who are going to be around
for second round, I'll be happy to give up my time so we can
get to them, but there are four, five Members who are on WebEx,
so it will be a while.
Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Wainstein, talking on personnel issues, what do you see
as the right balance between contractors and permanent
employees? Particularly on the contractor side, what do they
bring with them that it may be hard to replicate in the agency
on a permanent basis?
Mr. Wainstein. That's talking about management, Sir. That's
exactly one of the first management questions I'm going to need
to address, I think. And I've heard issues or concerns raised
about an overreliance on contractors at I&A.
But look, there should always be a balance. Contractors
provide really important value. They allow you to surge. If you
have a need to surge personnel, as you know takes forever to
hire people, go through the standard process of hiring folks
into the Federal service. You can get contractors and surge
quickly. They also are very helpful if you have particular
needs or areas of expertise that you need to satisfy.
Contractors can be brought in; you don't have to go train
somebody else. So, there's real value to the contractors.
By the same token, especially when you're talking about
analysts, the optimal is to have a traditional government
employee who takes over the position, learns the area of
analysis, and really develops expertise. It isn't somebody who
comes in and out on six month assignments. That's the optimum,
right? But there should be a balance.
And in positions that I've held or offices I've run I've
always looked at that and made sure there's a balance. Here, my
sense is there might have been an overreliance on contractors.
I think that's being rectified. But one of the first things I
do as a manager is to look at that on day one.
Senator Blunt As we think about the growing importance of
artificial intelligence and machine learning, and all of the
public data that's out there, do you think we'll be able to
keep up with the new techniques we need to sort this
information down to where a career individual can look at it?
Or are we going to need some help just dealing with all of the
information that's publicly available? It's not anything that
we're getting some other way, but how do you propose we go
through that in the most effective way and know what we can
know from the publicly available information that's out there?
Mr. Wainstein. Right. Well, I think you're raising sort of
the dilemma of intelligence and the intelligence enterprise in
general, which is there's always too much intelligence. And if
you can't zero in on what you need, you'll lose the
significance of the intelligence you need to focus on. And
especially when you're talking about an entity like I&A that's
looking at open source information, I mean, it's everywhere and
there's so much of it.
So, there are a couple of things. One, you've identified
one issue or one solution, which is artificial intelligence. I
have not gotten a deep dive on what I&A is doing with
artificial intelligence to try to get rid of the noise and
focus on the important information. But my sense is that's an
important part of their operations. And then also training and
guidelines--making sure especially when we're talking about
looking at people who might be somewhere around the line that
separates violent extremists from just political extremists who
have First Amendment rights to do what they're doing. You've
got to be very careful about hoovering up everything about
these people, because we're talking about U.S. person
information. So, those guidelines have to provide strict
guidelines or guardrails in terms of collection. So, that also
helps to winnow down what you pull in. But that's a real
challenge.
Senator Blunt That's helpful. I think you're right. It's
going to be one of the first things you have to deal with if
you're confirmed for this job, is how are we later going to
explain, looking back--and there's lots of information there--
and we just couldn't figure out how to find it, even though it
was publicly available information. And then the topic that you
got into earlier--that's a different topic in my view of the
things that aren't as available to the public as other things
are. And the mix of the contractors and the full-time
employees.
Is it your view that you can find the full-time
professionals that you now need for the skill set that are
willing to do this job as their career?
Mr. Wainstein. Well, yes. And the main reason is because
the people that I've been dealing with at I&A are top notch.
And the way you recruit the best is that you perform the best.
If you're known for performing, for being a strong entity,
people want to join you. They want to be part of your team.
And so we will be, obviously--based on resources and we'll
be talking to you about resources as well--resources
permitting, we'll be looking for the best and the brightest.
So, generally, we'll have access to them. But also there are
others in the Intelligence Community who might be interested in
coming over and doing some time on the domestic front.
Senator Blunt Right. Thank you.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator King on WebEx.
[No response.]
All right. If Senator King is not going to join us, how
about Senator Bennet on WebEx?
[No response.]
Going once, going twice.
Senator Casey?
Senator Casey (via WebEx). Mr. Chairman, thank you very
much. I'm happy to be jumping in the shoes of those Senators
who you just named.
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Senator Casey. But thanks very much for this opportunity.
I'm going to thank the nominee, the candidate for
nomination, Mr. Wainstein, for his public service. His service
to the country has already been distinguished and we're
grateful that he's willing to serve again. Certainly grateful
that his family is helping him do that, as I know every public
servant depends upon.
I wanted to ask about one topic and that's hospital
security and especially ransomware attacks on hospitals. We
know that increasingly, hospitals across the country have been
targets for these ransomware attacks because of the patient
data that these systems hold and the dependence we all have on
telemedicine and what happens in those hospital systems when
they have a ransomware attack. They have, of course, caused
severe disruptions to patient care and have caused and will
continue to cause problems for health care generally.
So, for Mr. Wainstein, I have two questions. One is to what
extent does I&A's Cyber Mission Center support and provide
analysis to the DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency to track cyber threats to hospitals and health care
networks throughout the country?
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, Senator. And I appreciate your
question. It's going to a very, very serious threat.
Before I get into hospitals and health care, specifically,
yes, the Cyber Mission Center. I've gotten briefed up on that.
I'm generally familiar with how it operates and how it works
closely with CISA. In fact, I had a long talk just recently
with Jen Easterly, who is heading up CISA, doing a great job
there. And we talked specifically about the integration of our
office--with the I&A with CISA and how I&A needs to focus or
channel targeted intelligence to CISA, as one of its customers,
but also to the state and local authorities to let them know
about threats they see in terms of specific attacks, specific
types of ransomware attacks and techniques. About parties and
groups that are engaging in ransomware and techniques for
dealing with ransomware. So, my understanding is I&A is working
on all those fronts. Working in a very good collaboration with
CISA. And Jen and I agree that if I get on board, that one of
the first things we'll do is sit down and see how that
relationship is working and how it can work better. In terms
of, well, I'll let--you say the second question and I assume
that's about hospitals specifically.
Senator Casey. Yes. I mean, obviously that's going to be
critical, that coordination, so that you can provide both
support and analysis.
The other question just pertains to a similar concern is if
you're confirmed, will you commit to enhancing I&A's both the
collection and analysis on cyber threats to health care
networks, to ensure that Federal agencies writ large are
providing networks with the most up-to-date and actionable
information?
Mr. Wainstein. Yes. Senator. I can commit. I will commit to
focusing like a laser on that issue. I mean, I can't think of--
look, ransomware is terrible directed at anybody. But
particularly, when it's directed at a health care organization,
where health care organization is going to be threatened to be
shut down, putting people's lives at risk. So, I would imagine
that folks at I&A and CISA are very focused on this issue and
that resources are being put to it. I know that ransomware is a
big priority of Secretary Mayorkas. But I will, when I get in,
I'll sit down and make sure I get a full briefing of what we're
doing on the health care front and make sure that we're surging
resources as needed.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, Sir.
Chairman Warner. The ever-patient and attentive Senator
Sasse.
Senator Sasse. Felt like it was dripping with sarcasm, Mr.
Chairman, but thank you.
Mr. Wainstein, congratulations on your nomination. Thanks
for your past service. And not just thanks to you but your wife
and daughters. I know one's away. But many times in the years,
the decades of your government service, particularly after 9/
11, I'm sure dad was away a lot. So, thanks to your family for
the sacrifices you all made, as well.
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you for that.
Senator Sasse. Do you believe that China sees themselves as
engaged in a zero-sum technological race with the U.S.?
Mr. Wainstein. Yes. I think they see themselves in a zero-
sum technological race with us. And not just technological.
Other aspects as well.
Senator Sasse. Can you explain to the American people what
you think the CCP's goals are vis-a-vis America and how they
seek to exploit America's open society, and to the degree that
your views have probably changed over the last couple of
decades? Everybody in 2000 had a much more benign view of what
the CCP or what China and the U.S. might be able to do in
cooperative competition. But we're in a different place now.
Can you explain to us how you see their goals and how your view
has changed, and when?
Mr. Wainstein. That's a great question. I was talking to a
friend about that just yesterday. Look, I did, sort of, have--
maybe it's Pollyannaish--but I had some optimism that China
would sort of come into the League of Nations, would operate as
a responsible member of the world order, would respect the
rules of the world order, and would compete fairly and become
maybe a capitalist democracy of some sort.
I had retained vestiges of those hopes for quite some time
after the turn of the century. I'll say that--and I mentioned
this earlier--I'll say that sort of a rude shock that, kind of,
made me realize that that was a pipe dream. When I was heading
up the National Security Division, we started seeing this just
sort of frontal assault by China on stealing our technology.
And they're very methodically going industry-to-industry,
hoovering up as much as technology and stealing it. Chinese
nationals and others are being deployed to do that. And it was
clear to me that they were not playing according to the rules.
In fact, they were starting a campaign to play in violation of
the rules. And that's why we sounded the alarm, very much so in
the time we were at National Security Division. Started up an
Export Control Initiative that was focused largely on China.
Doing speeches and press conferences and bringing cases,
because I think a lot of people were slow to pick up that
lesson. But I was probably slow to pick up, too.
And then since that time, in the last decade or 15 years, I
think we've seen that that focus on stealing technology and
intellectual property and willingness to bend the rules there
is now pervasive--throughout sort of their whole approach to
the west and the United States--military, political, and
otherwise.
And so I find it to be a very alarming situation. And I
agree with your characterization of their feeling that this is
a zero-sum game against the United States.
Senator Sasse. Thank you.
I appreciated your back and forth with the Vice Chairman
about three hours of work you did via a partner for the China
National Offshore Oil Corporation. I think it's important for
other Members of the Senate, maybe who are not on the
Intelligence Committee, to understand what the National
Offshore Oil Corporation does. They're essentially a bully for
the PLA in the South Sea that tries to intimidate China's
neighbors and help the CCP benefit from their civil-military
fusion and try to harm other nations that believe in open
navigation of the seaways, the rule of law, free trade, human
rights, et cetera.
And so, I've been satisfied in the back and forth that you
and I have had with how those three hours of billable work came
about. I don't mean to speak for the Vice Chairman, but I
appreciated the back and forth that you had with him. Would you
be willing to pledge that you would do no work for CCP-
affiliated organizations after your term of government service
ends?
Mr. Wainstein. Yes. I'm very willing to make that
commitment. I'll make that commitment right now.
Senator Sasse. Thank you. I'm satisfied and look forward to
supporting your nomination. And I think that our colleagues on
this Committee have had a lot of discussions in a classified
space in the past. And I think we should be evolving toward a
standard where certain types of work with Chinese government-
affiliated organizations in the past are not necessarily
inexcusable if we understand the context, as yours was. But I
think we should be moving toward a standard where all nominees
for all national security affiliated organization--or
affiliated responsibilities--agree that they would do no work
for CCP-affiliated organizations in the future.
So, I look forward to supporting your nomination. I
appreciated the distinction you drew about domestic political
extremism versus violent extremism. And I know Senator Cornyn
has more questions on that. So, I'm happy to move to that
second round.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator. And I think the
point you've made--worthy of consideration--that there are many
of our colleagues, as well as many businesses, that still don't
understand this. And one of the critical reasons--and I
appreciate so many Senators on both sides of the dais--who've
been part of our so-called roadshows as we make the case in a
classified setting to business and other entities about the
other challenges the CCP poses.
There are two more Senators on WebEx and then we'll go to
second round.
So, we're going back to Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry, I wasn't
there the first time. The network dropped out. None of us have
ever had that happen before.
I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you, Mr. Wainstein.
I want to talk about coordination and sharing. We have a huge
sprawling intelligence enterprise, as you know. It involves
something like 17 different agencies. On the domestic side,
your most important counterpart I think is the FBI as well as
local law enforcement. I would urge you to establish a regular
systematic relationship with the FBI to be sure that you are
sharing information, that you're not duplicating.
Is that something that you'd be interested in pursuing?
Mr. Wainstein. Absolutely, Senator.
And let me thank you for the meeting the other day. And
thank you, specifically, for that particular suggestion, where
you suggested that I reach out to the FBI and my FBI
counterparts and suggest that we have a, whatever it was--a
monthly lunch. Besides enjoying a lunch, I think it's a great
idea for purposes of making sure that we're knitting up and
coordinating and sharing information sufficiently. So,
absolutely, I agree with the sentiment. I agree with that
specific recommendation.
Senator King. Well, in serving on this Committee now for
going on 10 years, it's been my observation that one of the
tendencies in the Intelligence Community is to hold close the
information that's gathered. Intelligence isn't any good unless
it's shared, but particularly with the people that need to see
it.
So, I think we classify too much. And I think, of course,
sources and methods has to be top of mind. That has to be a
consideration. But I hope as you work with the other agencies,
and for example, we learn on September 11th, I mean, I'm
sorry--on January 6--that there was intelligence somewhere in
the system about potential violence, but it just never got to
the Capitol Police.
So, the other issue about coordination is to be sure that
there's serious sharing and that the I&A doesn't consider
intelligence that it gathers as something that it owns, but it
could certainly be helpful to either the FBI or local law
enforcement.
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, Sir. I think you've addressed a
couple of points there that I just would like to expand on. One
is just information sharing generally, and as we discussed the
other day, I lived and breathed the issues surrounding lack of
information-sharing post-9/11 where--and just as you said with
January 6, even more so. I think before 9/11, there was an
inability to connect the dots. That was sort of the terminology
that was used to characterize it. But a large part of it was
just failure to share information that could have been shared.
And it wasn't shared for a variety of procedural reasons,
cultural reasons, and the like. And we really had to go to work
after 9/11 to break those walls down.
And I think in the counterterrorism space, especially in
the international counterterrorism space between the Bureau and
the CIA and others, the government has come a long way on that
front. But, look, it's endemic in government work that siloing
happens. People guard information, and don't think ``sharing
first.'' They think raising it up their chain before sharing.
And so that's something that needs to be focused on.
Another issue you mentioned is classification and that's
also an issue that's near and dear to my heart. I've been a
member of the Public Interest Declassification Board for about
seven years. I believe that Senator Wyden was involved in
establishing that board. And our focus was on trying to
increase transparency. And part of the transparency--part of
the reason for that is to establish--give a basis for public
trust, but also so that information can be more easily usable
by our partners in the national security and law enforcement
enterprise, especially--like state and locals. And so that's an
issue that I&A is going to be very focused--is very focused
on--since it really is the intelligence bridge to the state and
locals.
Senator King. Well, thank you. And I have some other
questions about just how you deal with domestic violent
extremists or domestic terrorism--and separated from politics--
but I think other people are going to discuss that in a second
round. So, I appreciate your willingness to re-enter government
service and the straightforward answers you've given us today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thanks, Senator.
We have Senator Gillibrand on WebEx.
Senator Gillibrand (via WebEx). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wainstein, thank you for being here. A ``Cyber Scoop''
article published this Monday describes 20 current Federal law
enforcement contracts totaling $7 million, which includes
facial recognition services and software. A GAO report last
year documented the expanding use of facial recognition
technology in the U.S. Government for a variety of purposes,
some of which have the potential for abuse. Privacy advocates
and technologists have identified biases in facial recognition
technology which stand to disproportionally impact Black and
Asian people. Such mistakes could not only be discriminatory to
our citizens but potentially disastrous to law enforcement and
border patrol efforts.
If confirmed, will you commit to providing full and
accurate accounting of I&A's collection, retention, and
exploitation of intelligence information derived from the use
of facial recognition technology, including listing all
contracts and subcontractors used by DHS I&A, to this
Committee?
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, Senator.
Yes. I'll make that commitment pursuant to our obligation
to keep the Senate Intelligence and House Intelligence
Committees fully and currently informed about our intelligence
activities.
And I know that is--I don't know from being on the inside--
there was no facial recognition technology I don't think when I
was last in the government--but just reading about it, I've
heard about the concerns, about biases in the technology. And
then just general concerns whenever you have a powerful new
technology being used for intelligence purposes, it needs to be
very carefully vetted, needs to be subject to careful
constrains and safeguards and guidance. And so, I will make
sure to be looking into that and working with the various
parties, the privacy officer, civil liberties, and Civil Rights
Office, et cetera, to make sure that any use of that kind of
technology is going to be done in an appropriate way.
Senator Gillibrand. If I have time for one more question, I
don't have a time keeper here.
Chairman Warner. You've got it, go ahead.
Senator Gillibrand. Surveys among Federal workers, the
Intelligence Community members in particular, have consistently
rated DHS as one of the least satisfactory intelligence
agencies to work for. I'll quote the 2014 GAO report. ``I&A has
also faced challenges in providing professional development
opportunities for its workforce and experienced low morale
scores and high rates of attrition, particularly among its
lower level analysts. Regarding professional development, I&A
historically did not institutionalize a commitment to investing
in its workforce, according to I&A officials.''
If confirmed, what steps will you take immediately to
address workforce morale and training issues?
Mr. Wainstein. Thanks, Senator.
That is a fundamental question, a fundamental issue and a
challenge for me to--if I walk into I&A--is to assess what the
morale of the workforce is and take every measure I can to
improve that morale, which improves the effectiveness of the
organization. Look, I've just stepped into management positions
to a number of different entities throughout my government
career. And as I mentioned earlier, morale can change. It can
turn on a dime, but it also can improve on a dime. And it's a
matter of doing some of the blocking and tackling management.
Making sure that the line people have career path--career paths
laid out, opportunities for details, training--that kind of
thing. It's making sure the tone at the top is right, as I
alluded earlier. That everybody on the line realizes that the
supervisors and the head of I&A have their back, so that so
long as they do their job right and honestly and objectively,
they'll be supported.
They'll never get a message from the front office that they
need to do anything for political reasons, which is
antithetical to good morale in an intelligence agency. And,
look, I think there are good people at I&A, really good people.
And I think the word will get out, and is getting out to the
rest of the Intelligence Community that, yes, those surveys are
out there. But they are playing an important role in a critical
mission of our government. And I think we're seeing that now.
And so, when you have criticality, you have good work, and you
have strong management, those are the makings of good morale.
So, I actually expect the morale to end up being high. But
thank you for that question. It's an important part of my job.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Cornyn?
Senator Cornyn. Mr. Wainstein, you were a co-founder of
Former Republican National Security Officials for Biden and
obviously engaged in the political process during the last
election.
You organized and led a public letter calling the previous
President a threat to the rule of law. Certainly, you were
within your rights to express your point of view and support
the candidate of your choice. But can you assure Americans with
whom you disagree politically that you do not view them as a
threat to the rule of law, absent some criminal conduct?
Mr. Wainstein. Absolutely, Senator. And thank you for that
question. And I want to thank Senator Rubio for letting me know
that question might be coming. And if you permit me, I'll spend
a minute or so just giving you my position on that.
That is a completely fair and appropriate thing for you to
be asking about. You should ask about the political activities
of people who come before you to take these positions in the
national security and the law enforcement enterprises, because
the last thing, as I said earlier, the last thing we need is
anybody in these positions of authority in the national
security apparatus who is allowing, injecting politics, into
decisionmaking, it undercuts the effectiveness and the
credibility of the national security apparatus.
So, fair for you to look back at it, at political past. The
thing about me is there really is not much political past up
until 2020. I've been a government guy, was promoted by
Administrations on both sides and basically my job was to do
what was best for the American people and not for a particular
political party.
I felt strongly about the last election. And I think an
important point here is the thing that I felt most strongly
about--and you alluded to that letter I organized--was the
concern that there was politicization of the law enforcement
enterprise at the Justice Department and that's the centerpiece
of that letter. And it was that concern that really made me
feel like I should be vocal. And that's the concern that I
think you have, right? That's what I'm worried about,
politicization.
So, I've spent my life as a public servant resisting
politicization. I did that with my advocacy last year and you
can be sure if I end up at I&A, that's the position and the
principle I'm going to adhere to. So, thank you for that
question, Sir.
Senator Cornyn. We talked a little bit about domestic
terrorism and whose purview that falls within in terms of law
enforcement. And I think you said the FBI would certainly take
the lead and absent some foreign nexus, you would agree with me
that that would not be within the purview of organizations like
the Central Intelligence Agency and other parts of the IC,
correct?
Mr. Wainstein. Certainly. Domestic-focused intelligence
work would not fall within the purview of the CIA, yes.
Senator Cornyn. And that would include use of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, correct?
Mr. Wainstein. By the CIA, yes.
Senator Cornyn. Yes, well, the FBI----
Mr. Wainstein. Against the domestic terrorism threat, yes.
Senator Cornyn. As you know, having worked with the FBI--
it's the FBI that fills out the applications for FISA warrants.
And indeed one of the concerns that I think everybody should
have is about the abuse of some of those tools like the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act to surveil American citizens,
particularly based on perjured testimony. When you read
Inspector General Horowitz's report on Crossfire Hurricane as
it documented the perjury of one of the FBI lawyers and the
various other abuses of the process, did that cause you
concern?
Mr. Wainstein. Yes, it certainly did.
Senator Cornyn. And one of the problems we have here--you
talked about 215--I support the reinstatement of Section 215 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, but as I've told the
Director of National Intelligence, every time that the skeptics
talk about the power that is given to the Intelligence
Community under the supervision of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court and Members of Congress, every example of an
abuse of that power makes it harder and harder for us as a
political matter to get Congress to pass or reinstate those
authorities.
So, let me turn to the border. Obviously, when you see two
million people roughly plus coming across the border during
this last year, and instances of drug trafficking and seizures,
people with criminal records, potentially people from other
countries of special concern, for example, in the Del Rio
sector. When I was there last, they said they detained people
from 150 different countries coming across the Del Rio sector
alone. From a national security perspective, is that a concern
of yours?
Mr. Wainstein. Absolutely. Look, the border as long as I've
been engaged in national security has been an area of concern
because of the possibility that wrongdoers are going to get
into the country that way, and then contraband and the like,
also from a law enforcement perspective. So, yes, that is a
concern.
Senator Cornyn. And I realize this is not necessarily
within your authority or your bailiwick, but I want to use the
opportunity to highlight the fact that the Secretary of
Homeland Security has actually signed a non-enforcement
directive saying that the border patrol should not, and ICE
should not, detain anybody who was guilty of illegal entry into
the country--unless they've committed other crimes. And the
problem remains that that the non-enforcement posture of this
Administration and the Department of Homeland Security are
operating as a substantial pull factor for people to leave
their homes and come into the country illegally.
Are you aware of some of the most recent statistics with
regard to those who have come here and been released on notice
to report? Are you familiar with that process when somebody
claims asylum? They're given a either a notice to appear in
court or a notice to report to an ICE office. Are you familiar
with that?
Mr. Wainstein. Yes, Sir. I'm generally familiar with it.
Yes.
Senator Cornyn. And does it concern you that the----
Chairman Warner. Senator, Senator, I will get you a third
round.
Senator Cornyn. Pardon me?
Chairman Warner. You are at seven and a half minutes now.
Can I get you back on the third round? Senator Wyden is next.
Senator Cornyn. I just have one more question, but I am
happy to do a third round.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just two quick points, Mr. Wainstein. First, I'm going to
be asking you written questions with respect to the dossiers
and whether they're going to be released, and how they're going
to be used. And I'm going to need those answers before this
Committee moves forward. That's number one.
Number two, there's another part to this 215 debate. This
of course is the bulk collection of the phone records on
millions and millions of law-abiding people, where I am trying
to square your public testimony with the written answers that
you gave us to the pre-hearing questions. Let me make sure we
walk through this quickly.
In your public testimony about the bulk collection, all
these phone records, you said and I quote, ``that this part of
the law was significantly more protective of civil liberties
than grand jury subpoenas.'' You also testified that if the
government wanted to collect--and this is a quote--``an
obviously innocent day-to-day action, I think you're going to
have some questions from the FISA Court judge.'' Now, on the
basis of the written answers to the pre-hearing questions, you
knew that the government was secretly using Section 215 to
collect the phone records of millions of innocent Americans
without any subsequent review by the FISA Court. So, for the
Committee--and I'll be asking more about this in writing as
well--reconcile what you knew at the time, based on your
answers in your public testimony, because I'm having trouble
reconciling the two. And maybe there's something else I need to
have information from you on.
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you. I think I can help you a little
bit. And I appreciate you raising this the other day and giving
me a heads up about this.
So, let me just, so everybody's on the same page, you're
asking about testimony I gave in September, 2009, that was
after I left government.
Senator Wyden. In public.
Mr. Wainstein. In public testimony, that was in a hearing
that related to the reauthorization of certain parts of the
Patriot Act, including the 215 provision. I was asked to
testify as somebody who had worked in that area. I had left the
National Security Division where I had direct responsibility
for that area as of late 2007 or early 2008. But I opined about
the importance of reauthorizing those three--I think it was
three sections that were up for reauthorization at the time,
including 215. And the point that I was making was actually a
fairly simple point, and as you and I discussed, the premise
for 215--for enacting 215 as it was enacted in the Patriot Act
in 2001--was on the side of--on the criminal side, criminal
investigators and prosecutors could use a grand jury subpoena
when they needed to get records--any physical document, or any
physical thing, but really records. A prosecutor could just
issue a grand jury subpoena and say I want those intel records,
I want those bank records, what have you. And I did that
thousands of times in my career. You don't have to go to a
judge. The comparable provision for getting records on the
national security side under FISA was 215 that required the
Justice Department attorneys to go to a judge, explain to the
judge why there was information that was relevant to a
terrorism investigation, and get--persuade that judge to
authorize that order. So, in my mind it's always better to have
a judge in the process, and that that's more protective of
civil liberties because someone couldn't just go use 215 for an
innocent purpose, as I was explaining, to find out about his
girlfriend's whatever--records or something like that. So, that
was the point I was making. That it's more protective of the
civil liberties.
The issue that we're talking about in terms of the fact
that it had been used and authorized by, I think, a series of
FISA Court judges--that the 215 order could be used to get all
this metadata, telephone metadata--that was actually raised
earlier in the hearing that I testified in. David Kris, who was
then the sitting Assistant Attorney General for National
Security, made the exact same points I just made about the
value of having a judge in the process and the importance of
that to civil liberties. He also mentioned in his written
statement--he specifically singled out to the Members that
there was a classified collection under 215 that some Members
knew about, that he was happy to brief those Members about that
classified collection. And that's the metadata program. And so,
that was already out there; that was sort of the baseline for
the hearing. I was there for that. And so, when I was talking
about it, I was talking about how Section 215 was designed vis-
a-vis how the grand jury subpoenas were designed and that's
still, I think, a valid argument for 215.
Senator Wyden. I will just tell you my time is up. I
continue to find it hard to reconcile what you knew, and at the
time you gave this public testimony, when you talked, and I
quote here, about how 215 was ``significantly more protective
of civil liberties,'' you knew that the government was secretly
using Section 215 to collect all these phone records on
millions of innocent Americans without any subsequent review by
the FISA Court.
And so, this is not just a policy question. With respect to
215, Members have differing opinions. I'm going to have to get
some more information from you with respect to reconciling what
you now have indicated you knew at the time, which does not
seem to me to be consistent with what you said publicly. We'll
continue this discussion.
And thank you for the extra round, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Wainstein, we are going--on both dossiers and this
215 matter--we're going to need some additional information.
And as I told you when you came in, I'll continue the
discussion with you.
Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Wainstein. And if I may, Senator, just a couple of
points.
One, at that point--by the way--I'd been out of the
National Security Division for two years. I didn't know
actually what was still running or not. I knew that it had been
authorized. At some point I learned it had been authorized
previously, before my coming into the National Security
Division. But also you said that there's--these collections
were done without review of the FISA Court. My understanding is
the FISA Court authorized and reauthorized it a number of
times, so I think there was sort of continuing review of the--
--
Senator Wyden. Well, I'm not sure. I'm not sure that's
helpful to you because your written answers to the pre-hearing
questions indicated that you knew that the government was
secretly using 215 in a way that didn't have any subsequent
review by the FISA Courts. So, we're going to have to go over
this some more, and I'll continue that discussion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Before I go back to Senator Cornyn,
Senator Blunt, do you have anything else? Senator Cornyn? We're
in the seven minute round area.
Senator Cornyn. Mr. Wainstein, we were talking about the
border.
Mr. Wainstein. Yes.
Senator Cornyn. And as Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis, what will be your role in an official capacity with
regard to border enforcement and threats to the Homeland coming
across the border?
Mr. Wainstein. I believe, and I'll have still a lot to
learn about what I&A's role is at the border--my understanding
is it's sort of twofold. One is to provide intelligence and
information to the range of people or actors, enforcement
agencies, that are involved with law enforcement at and around
the border. So, making sure that state and local, territorial,
and tribal partners who are down around the border are getting
as much intelligence as we can find, about what they can expect
to be seeing crossing the border illegally. What kind of
migration patterns there are, this kind of thing. So, on one
hand I&A's job is to provide that intelligence to those
agencies as well as among the Federal agencies and within DHS.
But then also to collect intelligence that might be gleaned
from people who are coming across the border. So, with whether
there's people who are brought, taken to secondary and asked
questions, this kind of thing, intelligence, important
information that can be helpful to the Intelligence Community,
to DHS, to our state and local partners, is developed and we
then are responsible for helping to channel that intelligence
into I&A, and then make that into actionable analytical
product.
Senator Cornyn. As you know, given the volume of people
that have come across the border in the last year--some two
million--that by the way doesn't count the so-called
``getaways.'' It's always struck me as odd that we try to
estimate people we never see. The number--but we know it's more
than are actually detained along the border. And among those
law enforcement has, identified--people with criminal records,
multiple offenses, drug smuggling, sex offenders, and the like.
Currently there's no process in place to actually do biometric
identification of all the people who are coming across the
border. As a law enforcement professional, does it concern you
that people are coming across the border for whom we have no
record, positive or negative, and then they are released into
the heartland of the country and given a notice to report or a
notice to appear? And just in the last six months, 50,000 of
them did not show up at an ICE office, given their notice to
report and thus violating the terms of their release.
Do you view that as a national security and a law
enforcement vulnerability?
Mr. Wainstein. It is clearly. It's always a concern for
those in national security and in the Intelligence Community
when you have a blank space, when there is a lack of
information about people here in the United States and what
they might do. And so, the more that we can learn about and
from the people who are coming across the border the better.
So, yes, as an intelligence guy, I want to know more rather
than less. And so, whether that's from interviews, from making
sure they go through the process, or what have you, absolutely.
It's better to know more. And whether it's coming across the
southern border, whether it's coming through our airports and
ports, we want to know more rather than less about the people
who are here in the United States.
Senator Cornyn. And do you, finally, consider our lack of
knowledge about those individuals a national security
vulnerability?
Mr. Wainstein. I guess I'd say that a lack of knowledge
about people coming into our country is troubling because we
want to know more about these people than less. We want to have
an understanding whether somebody is coming in for malign
purposes, whether it's to launch a terrorist attack, or what
have you. So, absolutely whether it's people coming across the
border, whether it's people coming through airports, whether
it's people coming in as refugees, what have you. I know this
is the approach that DHS would want to have more of than less.
Senator Cornyn. So, that would be a yes, it is a
vulnerability?
Mr. Wainstein. Well, vulnerabilities arise from lack of
intelligence and information. And the intelligence enterprise
is all about, as you know, as this Committee and you know all
too well, is all about minimizing vulnerabilities. You minimize
that by having information before a threat becomes a reality.
So, my feeling is that we reduce our level of vulnerability,
the more knowledge we have.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, Sir.
Chairman Warner. I believe Senator King has one more
question from WebEx.
Senator King (via WebEx). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wainstein, I want to take you back to law school. You
get confirmed in this position. One of your analysts walks in
one day and says we have information on a group called Sons of
Liberty out in one of the Midwestern states. They seem to be
very strong supporters of conservative causes. We've heard a
tip that they may be planning some kind of action involving
violence at the U.S. Supreme Court. What do you do?
Mr. Wainstein. That's a great question. And I have a very
vague recollection of law school. But I remember getting a few
of those questions in classes and getting called on and
hopefully I'll do better than I did in law school.
That's a very realistic scenario, and that goes to the
issue that I think we discussed earlier, which is, given where
domestic terrorism is coming from--it's coming from a range of
motivations--but some of it is coming from attitudes about
politics and political views. That makes the intelligence
operations in that space incredibly fraught, incredibly
difficult, because you cannot--you're forbidden at DHS and
every part of the Intelligence Community and law enforcement
community in the Federal Government--you're forbidden from
doing investigative, taking investigative steps just because
somebody is exercising First Amendment rights. And you can
exercise your First Amendment rights by saying something that
other people would think is completely absurd and extreme, but
so long as it's not inciting violence, you're allowed to do it.
I&A cannot and should not be involved in collecting against
that person or that party.
It's the last piece of what you said, the analyst came in
with that got my attention: that there's an indication that
this group is planning some kind of violence, because that's
the dividing line. If there is sufficient basis to believe that
this group is planning a violent act of some kind, especially a
violent act like this which is sort of very clearly terrorism
seemingly, if it's intended to influence the government by
attacking the Supreme Court, then that makes it a fitting and
appropriate target for intelligence collection.
So, it really would come down to how much of a factual
basis is there to believe that that group is going over that
line into violence. And it can't be that there's some remote
possibility that it could happen or that similar groups in the
past have gone from being politically extreme to being violent.
It has to be that there's some evidence that this group is in
fact crossing over that line.
Senator King. I think you're right. I think violence is the
dividing line. I will share you my favorite interchange with
the law professor who once asked me a question. I didn't know
the answer but I bravely guessed and said ``yes,'' and the
professor said, Mr. King, a shorter and more accurate answer
would have been ``no.''
Thank you, Mr. Wainstein.
Mr. Wainstein. Thank you, Sir.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Wainstein, welcome back to the arena.
You have proven me completely wrong. I thought we would glide
through this hearing in 45 minutes. And you saw from both sides
of the dais enormous amount of interest.
I personally want to look forward to supporting you. I
think you have absolutely the right experience at this moment
in time for a part of the IC and law enforcement that I kind of
understand its role, but candidly still don't fully understand.
In the hypothetical that Senator King posed, if this group
which had been maybe throwing out violent threats, but somehow
move from violent threats to a plan of action, at what point
you continue at I&A versus turn it all over to FBI? And I don't
expect you to frankly have that whole answer, because I think
that this part of DHS is probably an area that's still
evolving, particularly in light of the fact that when it was
set up after 9/11, I think the general presumption was these
kind of threats were going to be generally foreign-originating.
And the unfortunate circumstances that we have right now is
that there are some of these instances where these threats may
be domestic-oriented. How we work that all through will be one
of your responsibilities, as well.
I appreciate the fact that you are constantly affirming the
workforce. I think that's the right thing to do, but clearly
the data indicates you've got a workforce that is at least at
this moment in time needs a strong leader, needs a permanent
leader, needs a Senate-approved leader.
I appreciate your candor. I do think some of the comments,
again, my colleagues have raised--and Senator Sasse and I work
really well together on a lot of issues around China--but I
think we're all evolving on China. I think it's really
important that when we talk about China as well, we put that
extra asterisk in there, that our beef is with the CCP and
leadership of Xi Jinping and it's not with the Chinese people
or the Chinese Diaspora, wherever they are.
But as I kind of dig into this a little bit, maybe I have a
little more understanding why this kind of job with this kind
of challenge--even though on the org chart is not as high as
some of the jobs you've had in the past--it might be the kind
of thing to bring you back into government service.
So, I thank you for your testimony. I thank you for your
thoughtful answers. I thank your wife and your three daughters,
and I will still be expecting validation that Ellie, I think,
is the fourth--that she is actually giving up time at Berkeley
to watch this hearing. You can quiz her on the fact that I
mentioned her twice or you can see if she actually did follow
through.
Mr. Wainstein. I will put her to the test.
Chairman Warner. As I mentioned to Members and staff, if
people have got additional questions please submit them by
Friday the 15th, at close of business, and clearly you'll get
some of those. And my hope is that we can move quickly on this
nomination. And my hope is we can get some help from some of my
Republican friends because there have been too many people held
up for too long. I think the sooner you get into this job, the
better for DHS, the better for our I&A, and the better for our
country.
And with that--any last comments?
Mr. Wainstein. No, I just want to thank you for holding
this hearing. I appreciated the engagement of you and all the
Members. And I join with you in the fervent hope that I'll get
confirmed, and then I'll get in there quickly. There's a lot of
work to do and I'm anxious to get in there and work with DHS,
and work with you and your colleagues.
Chairman Warner. Thank you so much. The hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon at 3:39 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Supplemental Material
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