Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Thursday, September 22, 2011 - 2:30pm
Location:
Dirksen 138
Witnesses
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 112-309]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-309
NOMINATION OF
IRVIN CHARLES McCULLOUGH III
TO BE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 22, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
RON WYDEN, Oregon JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland DANIEL COATS, Indiana
BILL NELSON, Florida ROY BLUNT, Missouri
KENT CONRAD, North Dakota MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK UDALL, Colorado
MARK WARNER, Virginia
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
----------
David Grannis, Staff Director
Martha Scott Poindexter, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
----------
SEPTEMBER 22, 2011
OPENING STATEMENTS
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1
Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia 2
WITNESS
McCullough III, Irwin Charles, Intelligence Community Inspector
General-Designate.............................................. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 20
Prehearing Questions and Responses............................... 34
Letter from Don W. Fox, Office of Government Ethics, Dated August
23, 2011, to Senator Dianne Feinstein Transmitting Public
Financial Disclosure Report.................................... 53
NOMINATION OF IRVIN CHARLES
McCULLOUGH III TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in
Room SD-138, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable
Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Wyden, Udall
of Colorado, Chambliss, Snowe, Blunt, and Rubio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Chairman Feinstein. The Committee will come to order.
We meet today in public. So, ladies and gentlemen, you are
our public today. This doesn't happen very often, so it's often
a special moment when it does. And of course this moment is to
consider the President's nomination of Charles McCullough to be
the first Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
I want to welcome him here. I want to congratulate you on
this nomination. I had the pleasure to meet with you, as I'm
sure other Members have as well, and know that you are superbly
qualified for this job.
The position of Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community, or IC/IG, as the techies would say, was created in
the 2010 intelligence authorization bill after several years of
trying to have the position enacted. I'd like to particularly
recognize Senator Snowe. She was the drafter of the provision
creating this position and the driving force behind it. And so
I'm delighted that you're here today, Olympia.
The reason to have a community-wide Inspector General is
similar to the reason to have a Director of National
Intelligence. The IG is intended to review and conduct
oversight on intelligence activities across the 16 agencies
that make up what we call the Intelligence Community, as well
as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the
DNI, instead of having every agency and their IG operate within
its own stovepipe.
So this further helps unify the community and break down
stovepipes.
We have seen over recent years how the agencies have worked
much more closely together. That's improved performance, it's
reduced duplication. But it also makes the oversight work of an
individual agency's Inspector General more difficult.
So this Committee felt the need to create an Inspector
General with authority and oversight of the entire community
and one who could look at issues that cut right across the
community. This view was reinforced by the relative weakness of
the Inspector General position in the Office of the DNI that
was authorized as part of the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.
Until now, the DNI has had the power to hire and fire his
Inspector General. In public testimony from 2009, the first IG
in the DNI's office, Edward McGuire, said his office was, ``not
independent vis-a-vis the DNI, because he can put us out of
business. This is a substantial weakness,'' he said, ``in our
ability to do work.''
So Congress created the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, to be confirmed by the Senate and given
the statutory authorities and independence of other Senate-
confirmed Inspectors General. The IG still operates under the
supervision and direction of the DNI, but he has substantially
more independence and authority under this new legislation.
So it's our hope and our expectation that, if you are
confirmed, Mr. McCullough--and I believe you will be--you will
make full use of these authorities--I think that's really
important--to ensure that the nation's intelligence activities
are legal, that they are keeping with relevant guidance and
direction, and that there is not waste, fraud, or abuse in the
community.
It's a big, big job, I think, of all of the IGs maybe the
biggest, because this is a difficult community to surveil, so
to speak.
So I would just like to welcome you. I'd like to welcome
your family here. And I'd like to recognize the distinguished
Ranking Member, with whom I have the great pleasure of working
with.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE CHAIRMAN, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Well, thanks very much, Madam
Chairman, and likewise.
Mr. McCullough, congratulations on your nomination to be
the first Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. You
have an impressive background in both intelligence and law
enforcement, which I believe will serve you well in your new
assignment.
I also welcome your family here today and thank them for
their support of you, which means their commitment to public
service.
Now, in many instances Inspectors General are the eyes and
ears of agency leadership throughout the government and can be
for Congress as well. Through critical oversight of executive
branch operations, they can provide useful assessments of
performance and identify areas for improvement.
These assessments are even more important now, given the
current state of the federal budget. It is clear the old ways
of doing business are not sustainable, especially when it comes
to expensive programs that seem to give us little in return.
As we conduct our own oversight and look for wise cuts
across national intelligence program budgets, this Committee
will seek your opinion on programs in need of oversight,
scaling back, or that can be cut altogether.
We will also look for your input when it comes to promoting
better accountability across the community. We are fortunate to
have many solid performers among our Intelligence Community
professionals, but there are occasions when those who exercise
bad judgment or perform poorly must be held accountable.
My sense is that the federal government does a mediocre job
in removing underperformers, but the IC can and must do better.
As the IC's Inspector General, much of your work will of
necessity be classified. This means there will most often not
be a public airing of your assessments. As a result, Congress
and the American people must have full confidence that your
findings are objective, independent, and entirely supported by
the facts. We expect, too, that you will stay within your
statutory mandate in promoting efficiency and preventing or
detecting fraud, waste, and abuse.
Mr. McCullough, you and I had a very good meeting earlier
this week and I'm very confident that you're a person of high
integrity and very well qualified for this job, and I look
forward to further dialoguing with you today.
Thanks, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.
I just received a note that, Mr. McCullough, you're
prepared to introduce your family before proceeding with your
remarks. Would you do so, please?
STATEMENT OF IRVIN CHARLES McCULLOUGH III, INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY INSPECTOR GENERAL-DESIGNATE
Mr. McCullough. That's fine. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Behind me I have my mother, Barbara Jackson, and my
stepfather, Terry Jackson, my son Chas and my daughter
Victoria. And right here beside me is my wife of 18 years,
Kathalyn. And I have my sister here, Anise, and I've got some
very good friends of mine from throughout my career, my
colleagues.
Chairman Feinstein. Well, thank you, and welcome all of
you. And I hope you're very proud of your father.
So please go ahead, Mr. McCullough.
Mr. McCullough. Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, and
distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for giving me
the opportunity to appear before you today as you consider my
nomination to be the Inspector General for the Intelligence
Community.
I especially want to thank Senator Snowe, who has been a
steadfast champion for the establishment of an IC/IG for quite
some time.
I am deeply honored to have been nominated by the President
for this position, and I am grateful for the support and
encouragement I have received from Director Clapper.
Over the past 20 years I have been privileged to serve in a
leadership capacity in law enforcement, legal and intelligence
positions. I'm currently serving on detail from the National
Security Agency as the Deputy Inspector General at the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence.
Prior to that, I spent eight years as the Assistant IG for
Investigations at the National Security Agency, where I
supervised investigations involving intelligence programs and
personnel around the world.
I served as the senior counsel for law enforcement and
intelligence at the U.S. Treasury Department, and I spent 10
years as a special agent of the FBI handling foreign
counterintelligence, counterterrorism, violent crime, white
collar crime, narcotics, and personnel misconduct matters.
As a result of these experiences, I am well grounded in
intelligence policy, management, and operations.
The FY 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act provides the IC/
IG with the statutory authority to conduct IC-wide audits,
investigations, and inspections. If confirmed, my primary goal
will be to identify and address systemic deficiencies that cut
across agency missions in order to positively impact IC-wide
economies and efficiencies.
Madam Chairman, I recognize that if I am confirmed you will
have high expectations for my performance in this regard,
especially given the difficult budget climate now facing the IC
and the larger federal government. I want to express my
commitment, if confirmed, to fully support the IC/IG's
notification and reporting obligations to the intelligence
committees.
I am under no illusion that fulfilling the IC-wide
responsibilities of this new position will be easy. I fully
comprehend this job will take and require a great amount of
independence, as well as diplomacy, discretion, and judgment.
If confirmed, I pledge to do my very best to earn your trust
and confidence.
Thank you again for giving me the opportunity to appear
before you today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared ststement of Mr. McCullough III follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 72745.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 72745.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 72745.003
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. McCullough.
When we visited the other day, we talked a little bit about
contractors, and I wanted to ask you a few questions. I think
this Committee believes that there are many too many
contractors really doing inherently governmental work within
the Intelligence Community. I mean, literally Dana Priest says
in her book, 250,000. So it's hard to tell, you know, really
what's fact and what's fiction.
But I want to ask you how you view the use of contractors
in the Intelligence Community.
Mr. McCullough. Well, I think that that topic, the use of
contractors and how much that's costing the IC in these tight
budget times, and what they're doing in terms of whether or not
they're performing inherently governmental functions is an
extremely appropriate topic for this new position and this new
office to undertake. I would envision and IC-wide review
looking specifically at those things, and I think that would be
a very appropriate topic to consider very strongly as we go
forward with our work planning.
Chairman Feinstein. How would you define ``inherently
governmental functions''?
Mr. McCullough. Well, it's normally defined as the
decisionmaking ability in the government--if a contractor is
performing certain functions that would normally be reserved
for a government employee, such as sitting on a source-
selection panel or doing something that we would normally
expect a government employee to be employed doing.
There are certain functions that OMB has listed, actually,
and there are certain guidelines and regulations which actually
set out lists of inherently governmental functions. And so we
would want to check that and crosscheck that across the IC to
see how endemic that was.
Chairman Feinstein. One last question for me. In the event
that you requested assistance from the DNI and the DNI
determined against your assessment, that a particular audit or
investigation should not proceed, what subsequent steps, if
any, would you take?
Mr. McCullough. Well, I would discuss that with the DNI.
The DNI has been extremely supportive and encouraging with
respect to this position. The statute itself, which created the
IC/IG position does contain a provision which allows the DNI to
impede or restrict an IG activity, but it's for a very narrow
reason. The reason has to be a national security equity.
So I would speak with the DNI about that first, but I would
not hesitate to interact with this Committee and inform this
Committee. If he sought to actually activate the procedures in
the statute, it would require the Committee's involvement and I
would follow through.
Chairman Feinstein. I think that's very important and I'm
very glad to hear that, that you would alert our Committee to
that fact.
Mr. McCullough. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman Feinstein. Before recognizing the Vice Chairman,
there are five standard questions. They just require a yes or
no answer. If I might read them, if you would just respond and
we'll get you on the record.
Do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in
other venues when invited?
Mr. McCullough. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. If confirmed, do you agree to send
officials from the Office of the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community to appear before the Committee and
designated staff when invited?
Mr. McCullough. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to provide documents or
any other materials requested by the Committee in order for it
to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
Mr. McCullough. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Will you ensure that the Office of the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community provides such
material to the Committee when requested?
Mr. McCullough. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to inform and fully brief,
to the fullest extent possible, all members of this Committee
of the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, rather than only the Chairman and Vice
Chairman?
Mr. McCullough. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks very much, Madam Chair.
Mr. McCullough, let me just add to what the Chairman said.
If you ever--without suggesting you might be so inclined to--
come to this Committee and voice an independent opinion
relative to an issue, I think you'll find we'll not only be
receptive, but we'll be extremely supportive of you in that
regard.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, there was a
concerted effort to remove the barriers that prevented
intelligence information from being shared fully within the
Intelligence Community. Part of this effort involved statutory
changes in the USA PATRIOT Act, which I understand you were
involved in drafting while you were at the Department of
Treasury.
I'm concerned, especially after the Christmas Day attempted
bombing, that some of the old stovepipes may be reappearing.
You and I talked a little bit about this, but for the record I
want to ask you: Has the Intelligence Community fully addressed
the issues that concerned you most when the PATRIOT Act was
drafted? And secondly, where do you think improvements need to
be made? And is there a role for you as the Intelligence
Community's Inspector General in this effort, as well as in the
information-sharing effort?
Mr. McCullough. Well, Mr. Vice Chair, thank you for that
question.
Yes, I concur that the old stovepipes that were there, from
my perspective, are still there to a certain extent. This is
something from an information-sharing standpoint that would be
just an excellent and appropriate review, well within the ambit
of the IC/IG's authorities and responsibilities pursuant to the
statute.
So I would certainly think that that would be something
that we would strongly consider to add to our work plan very
early. And, from my own experience, I've seen that even within
the IC/IG community, we tend to criticize other government
entities for being stovepipe, and we're fairly stovepiped
ourselves. And so that's one thing I want to do with the IC/IG
community also. I'm going to be dealing with that same issue in
the IG community in terms of the integration of these various
local IGs, the element IGs.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Is the PATRIOT Act working the way
you intended for it to work?
Mr. McCullough. Well, I think we have to look at that.
Again, that would be a good topic, I think, for an audit or an
inspection or review as to whether or not compliance with the
PATRIOT Act, whether there were impediments to the PATRIOT Act
and what those impediments were, and whether or not we can make
recommendations to diminish them.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Okay. Unauthorized disclosures of
classified information continue to be a big problem for the
Intelligence Community, especially within Washington. While
WikiLeaks garnered a lot of attention because of its scope,
there continue to be other equally significant leaks of
classified information, many of which go unpunished.
Yet efforts by Congress to give the Intelligence Community
more authority for addressing leaks of classified information
have not been supported by the administration. Is there an
appropriate role for inspectors general within the Intelligence
Community in addressing the ongoing problem of leaks of
classified information? And, based on your legal and law
enforcement experience, what do you believe is the best way to
deter leaks?
Mr. McCullough. Well, the answer to the first question, Mr.
Vice Chairman, is I do believe there's a very appropriate role
for the IC/IG with respect to compromises or potential
compromises and WikiLeaks-type situations. I think that there
tends to be a thinking that this is only a security, a
counterintelligence, or a law enforcement issue, but clearly
this is something which the fundamental tenets of IG work are
fraud, waste, and abuse, and this would be an abuse issue.
And so I think from an IG perspective the greatest efficacy
that we could offer would be focusing on access controls,
focusing on what controls are in place to allow people to get
to information, and again doing that on an IC-wide basis to
determine whether or not there were systemic vulnerabilities
and risks out there that we could devise recommendations to
apply across the IC. And I would want to work very closely with
you and with this Committee in pursuing that.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. As you look at that--and I would
hope that maybe that would be one of your first priorities--
this Committee has had dialogue with the DNI, with Director
Mueller, with the various Directors of the CIA about this
issue, and trying to find the one case that we can use as an
example from a prosecutorial standpoint has been very
difficult. We've talked with the Attorney General about it at
length also.
So I would urge you, coming in as somewhat of an
independent voice to take a look at this. If you have some
recommendations, I assure you again this Committee will be very
receptive to hearing that because we're very cognizant of the
fact that there is too much information getting out that
shouldn't be getting out.
And again, we appreciate your experience, your willingness
to serve in public enterprises, and we look forward to getting
you confirmed.
Thank you very much.
Mr. McCullough. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.
The list is Wyden, Snowe, Udall, Blunt, and Rubio.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. McCullough, earlier this year, Senator Udall and I
proposed directing an Inspector General to review the
implementation of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to examine
what kind of impact the law has had on the privacy of law-
abiding Americans.
Now, it seems to me that, if confirmed as the Inspector
General, you could use an array of analytical techniques to
provide a realistic assessment, a defensible assessment on the
impact the law had on the privacy of law-abiding Americans.
What's your reaction to that?
Mr. McCullough. Well, if I am confirmed, I envision the IC/
IG as having a very strong intelligence oversight function--
intelligence oversight in the sense that we're looking at
potential 12333 issues, FISA issues, regulatory issues from the
elements, the implementing directives in the elements.
And so I think that's a very proper role for the IC/IG and
I would anticipate that we would have the expertise, and I
anticipate obtaining the expertise to fulfill that function.
Senator Wyden. So you would say--and of course, these are
always resource issues and you have to consider those kinds of
factors--this is an area where you believe you could add some
real value and some substantive analysis. Would that be fair to
say?
Mr. McCullough. Yes, it would, Senator.
Senator Wyden. Okay. One other question, if I might, on the
declassification issue, another area where Senator Udall and I
have spent a lot of time. One of my concerns here is that it
often seems that just plain old bureaucratic inertia gets in
the way of declassifying documents that the public really has a
right to know. In other words, it is information that's
relevant to public debate in this country that doesn't
compromise our national security.
And the Public Interest Declassification Board pretty much
agrees with that take. They issued a report several years ago,
and I'll just quote from the report. They said, ``The latitude
given departments and agencies to declassify information when
the public interest in disclosure outweighs the risk of damage
is not being seriously exercised.'' They basically said, you
know, here's an opportunity to basically cut through the
bureaucratic inertia, ensure that the public right to know is
being satisfied without compromising national security.
I'd like to hear your thoughts about what you think could
be done to make the classification system work better.
Mr. McCullough. Well, I think, if I'm confirmed and we
stand up the IC/IG office, again, this is another topic,
classification and the application of the classification
guidelines IC-wide, that would be ripe for review. I think this
is something that would clearly fall under the purview of the
IC/IG pursuant to the statute and would be in the IC/IG's
bailiwick. And I think doing it IC-wide, we would have the
resources and the wherewithal to do that.
Senator Wyden. I'm encouraged you want to take it on
because I think it really comes at us two ways. I mean, the
point of classifying documents is to protect national security.
And often it seems that documents are classified to protect
somebody's political security.
And, by the way, this has gone on on both sides of the
aisle for a long time to come. But the point that the Public
Interest Declassification Board made with respect to this
particular report is sometimes just plain old bureaucratic
inertia that keeps documents that the public has a right to
know from getting out.
And the fact that you're willing to dig into this and try
to make the system work better, to try to strike the proper
balance between matters that do have to be kept secret in order
to protect the safety of our people, and at the same time
getting everything out possible, that the public has a right to
know about, that doesn't compromise national security,
encourages me.
I'm glad you're willing to take it on. We've heard good
things about you and I'm looking forward to supporting you when
Chair Feinstein moves ahead with the vote.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Snowe.
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I welcome you,
Mr. McCullough. It's been seven years, so thank you for being
here. And I want to thank the Chair and the Vice Chair and the
members of this Committee for creating the IC/IG, because it is
so crucial when we started this process back in 2004 to insert
it in the original legislation when we were overhauling the
Intelligence Community and the significant reform.
You come with a comprehensive, extensive background in the
area of Inspector General. And I think that that's going to
add, I think, tremendous confidence and credibility to the
process as well, especially as you're paving the way as the
first Inspector General across the Intelligence Community.
And your primary mission, obviously, is going to affect
across agency accountability and management cooperation and
collaboration. That's going to be infinitely important, as the
Vice Chair was referring to, in terms of breaking down those
barriers and the parochialism, the stovepipe, the failure to
inform, as we discovered in the aftermath of the Christmas Day
bombing, and what needed to happen and didn't happen. So you
can be more on the front lines of preventing and averting any
future crisis.
Secondly, it's a question as well in terms of The
Washington Post series that was done last year concerning the
fact that the Intelligence Community had become too unwieldy,
too large, too costly, too many employees, many of which we
couldn't even discern the numbers.
So I mentioned this article to Director Clapper during the
course of his nomination in 2010 in terms of this is precisely
how I envisioned the role of IC/IG in terms of evaluating and
being able to assess many of the issues across the agencies in
terms of cost, size, and also the failure to share information.
I know in your prehearing questions you were asked about
how you conduct an investigation inspection audit. And you
mentioned that there's no single modus operandi that would be
employed across the board. How will you maintain the
complementary relationship, ensure that an individual agency
will not assert itself in such a way to deter your ability to
investigate, inspect, or to review any aspects, because
Director Clapper said at the time, in response to my question,
there will be a complementary relationship because there won't
be significant resources.
In fact, it would be limited resources. So how would your
approach work in this instance so that it doesn't conflict, but
at the same time you have to override, perhaps, even the
interest of other Inspectors General?
Mr. McCullough. My reading of the statute is that the IC/IG
will have authority to conduct audits, inspections,
investigations for any matters IC-wide which are under the
responsibility and control of the DNI. I believe that the plain
meaning of that is a fairly broad meaning. So I would
certainly, as the IC/IG, if I'm confirmed, I will also be the
chair of the IC forum, which includes all of the element IGs.
And I'm going to work with those IGs.
And we've had these issues pop up in the past. There has
been some effort to integrate this group in the past. I would
work with those IGs in the forum to try to resolve that at that
level so that if there were any issues about us coming in to do
a review, we could iron those out at the forum, and actually
the statute requires that. It requires some coordination level,
as an advisory body at the forum.
But there will really not be a--I don't think that I see
this as a one-size-fits-all situation. So there may be
investigations where we have to go in as a singular entity into
an agency and conduct an investigation because of the
circumstances of it.
There may be other situations where we would create sort of
a task force type concept, where we'd be leading a review
within the IC and we would have members from each of the
component IGs on our task force for this particular topic.
And I do believe that there's receptivity to that. I know
and have worked with, for quite some time, the other IGs in the
IC and I do believe there's receptivity to that kind of
construct.
Senator Snowe. Do you visualize the IC/IG forum to be the
mechanism by which you resolve these disputes?
Mr. McCullough. I would. I think that it would be the
exception that we couldn't, frankly. This is a group of IGs
from the Intelligence Community. And so my hope would be and my
anticipation is that these types of disputes we'll be able to
work out, or these types of negotiations we'll be able to work
out within the forum.
Senator Snowe. You have notification requirements in here,
in the event that you do decide to override, if there's
overlapping jurisdiction and you decide to do an investigation
within a specific agency. So are those notifications
sufficient? Are there limitations to that as far as it is laid
out in the statute?
Mr. McCullough. Senator, from my read of them, they appear
to be sufficient now. It may be that when we stand the office
up and start operating that there may be something else we need
legislatively. And I certainly wouldn't hesitate to keep a
close dialogue with you and with the Committee and approach you
if that was the case.
Senator Snowe. All right. I thank you.
Thank you, Mr. McCullough. I look forward to working with
you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Snowe.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Good afternoon. It's a treat to see your family here. Thank
you, Mr. McCullough, for your service to the country in so many
different capacities and agencies over the years. You clearly
have been able to operate in both the civilian and the military
sectors which will, I think, prove to be a very valuable set of
experiences, if you're confirmed.
I want to just follow up with Senator Wyden's questions
related to the FISA Amendments Act and our interest in learning
as to its effects on Americans' privacy. As Senator Wyden
explained, we've been told that it isn't ``reasonably
possible'' to count the number of Americans whose
communications have been reviewed under this law.
So he and I propose that the Inspector General review the
FISA Amendments Act to examine its impact on Americans'
privacy. Senator Wyden asked you earlier whether a review of
this kind is something you would be able to do in your role. I
want to thank you for your positive response and I look forward
to working with Senator Wyden and you on this issue. So I did
want to have a follow-up conversation with you on this matter.
Which IG do you think would be best positioned to conduct
such an audit? Would it be you or the DOJ IG, the NSA IG,
another IG, or perhaps a combination of IGs?
Mr. McCullough. It would depend. It would depend upon how
we decide to scope the review, whether it was an audit, whether
it was an inspection, whether there were reasons to actually
conduct an investigation, perhaps, and would depend upon how
broad the review was going to be.
So it may be something, again, that the IC/IG, if I was
confirmed as the IC/IG, that I would need to send a team in
there as the objective outside force coming in to take a look
at this. Or it may be, if we scoped it in such a way that it's
going to be a very narrow set of objectives that we're seeking
in the review, that we wouldn't need to do it ourselves, but
that we would actually marshal forces within the IC and
appoint, again, a sort of a task force team to look at this.
But the topic is something that I think is very appropriate
for the IC/IG to look at and I really believe it falls within
the ambit of the statute.
Senator Udall. I appreciate hearing that, and the
distinction between an audit and inspection investigation, the
scoping process, very legitimate. I know Senator Wyden and I
look forward to working with you as that proceeds.
Let me go back to FISA. As you know, the FISA Amendments
Act of 2008 required the inspectors general of elements of the
IC that participated in the President's surveillance program to
conduct a review of that program, tracing its origins and
implementation, analyzing legal questions about its
development.
This is an example of the IC/IGs working together on a
crosscutting issue, but doing so at the behest of Congress. I
think Senator Chambliss asked about the PATRIOT Act. But with
regard to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, especially
because of the crosscutting nature of the issues, I assume that
you intend to review these issues carefully in your new role.
Is that a fair assumption?
Mr. McCullough. Certainly we're going to go through, as we
stand up the new office, a very robust work planning process.
And my intention for that work plan process is to coordinate
closely with you and with this Committee.
And so those are the types of issues, IC-wide reviews, that
we're going to be looking for, IC-wide deficiencies, if there
are things like that, misapplications going on.
That is something that we're going to want to take a very
strong look at.
Senator Udall. The joint IG review that I referenced, that
review was driven by statute. To what degree do you intend to
be forward-leaning in terms of taking on such reviews under
your own initiative as opposed to being prompted by Congress to
do so?
Mr. McCullough. Well, certainly we would ask for
congressional input, but I would go through the IG forum--
again, this is a dual hat; as the IC/IG you're also the chair
of the IC forum--and I would liase with my counterparts and my
colleagues at the IC/IG forum. There's value in obtaining their
input on this. And they all have their own individual work
plans also. So it's a matter of coordinating resources.
And, again, this would be a risk-based type of analysis
that we would go through, looking for areas of greatest risk,
looking for areas of greatest vulnerability, looking for areas
of greatest potential economic savings and returns,
redundancies, and things like that.
So that's the type of analysis we would do, and this would
be something that would certainly be considered in that
analysis.
Senator Udall. Thank you for that answer.
I'd like, Madam Chair, to submit a further question for the
record on the independence of the IG, but I would add one final
comment. I think Senator Chambliss talked about stovepiping,
and I think he was implying, if not directly suggesting, that
when you do your job and do it as effectively as I think we all
believe you will do it, that stovepiping can be broken down in
the process of what you do, as well as what the heads of the
various Intelligence Community agencies do.
So I think you could play a key role in that regard as
well. And in fact, function can follow form. Sometimes we've
got to come after the form to make sure that it fits what we
need to do to gather this intelligence and then disseminate it.
Mr. McCullough. Yes, Senator.
Senator Udall. But thanks again for your commitment to
serve. And it's great to see your wonderful family here.
Mr. McCullough. Thank you.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman.
Just a couple of questions, Mr. McCullough. On the IC
Inspector Generals forum, you'll chair that? Is that how that
will work?
Mr. McCullough. Yes, sir.
Senator Blunt. Will you vote on that as well?
Mr. McCullough. Yes. Yes.
Senator Blunt. And what happens to the current group you're
working with, the ODNI IG? Does that continue also as a
functioning group or does the new IC/IG supplant, replace that?
Mr. McCullough. The amendment to Title 50, which created
the IC/IG, contains a provision that the authority which is in
Section 8(k), I believe, of the Inspector General Act, is
repealed. And Section 8(k) is the authority which called for
the existence and allowed the existence of the ODNI IG
So when the IC/IG is confirmed, the law says that the ODNI
IG is going to--the authority for that office will have been
repealed.
Senator Blunt. Right. Okay. And having worked in the ODNI
IG for a while now, you mentioned redundancies among the
agencies. Do you see some potential to eliminate redundancies
among the IG community in the IC?
Mr. McCullough. Yes, Senator, I absolutely do. And I've
said to other people during this process that we are a group,
the IC/IG forum, we are a group that many of our reports
criticize others for being stovepipe and we're a fairly
stovepiped group ourselves.
So that's one of my primary goals, is to integrate this
group and to do that by bringing--this group has working
groups, sort of subcommittees--to bring those subcommittees
together to do this risk-based analysis, but not just doing it
agency by agency. We're looking at the forest, not just the
trees.
So to encourage all of these IGs' offices to look for IC-
wide deficiencies, the systemic deficiencies that we can
develop IC-wide recommendations to address.
Senator Blunt. And waste, duplication, that sort of thing,
would be one of your major targets in making the IG an IG for
the IG community that you're dealing with as well.
Mr. McCullough. Yes, Senator. Fraud, waste, and abuse are
the fundamental tenets of the IG's office, and certainly that's
where we would start. And just about everything we've talked
about here today falls within one of those categories, whether
it's fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement.
Senator Blunt. Those are exactly the answers I hoped you
had and the mission I hope you're on, and I wish you well with
it. And thank you and your family for the commitment you've all
made to public service for a long time now.
Mr. McCullough. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Blunt.
It would be my intention, unless someone has additional
questions, to end it with this round. We'll leave the record
open for 48 hours. Hopefully, you'll respond to any questions
very quickly.
We will aim a markup for our first meeting, assuming we
come back a week from Monday, and it's an assumption because we
don't know if we're going to be out yet. But the Tuesday
meeting, as a first order of business we will mark this up and
get it out of our Committee.
So I want to thank you, and I want to thank your family for
being here. And I think he's a shoe-in.
[Laughter.]
In any event, thank you. And the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:19 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]