Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Tuesday, October 13, 2009 - 2:30pm
Location:
Dirksen SD-106
Witnesses
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 111-545]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-545
NOMINATION OF DAVID C. GOMPERT
TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-432 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
Virginia OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BILL NELSON, Florida
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
----------
David Grannis, Staff Director
Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
----------
OCTOBER 13, 2009
OPENING STATEMENTS
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1
Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from
Missouri....................................................... 3
WITNESS
Gompert, David C., Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence-Designate......................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 24
Prehearing Questions and Responses............................... 47
Answers to Questions for the Record.............................. 101
Letter from Robert I. Cusick, Office of Government Ethics, Dated
August 19, 2009, Transmitting Public Financial Disclosure
Report......................................................... 122
NOMINATION OF DAVID C. GOMPERT
TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in
Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable
Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Feingold,
Whitehouse, and Bond.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Chairman Feinstein. The hearing will come to order.
Mr. Gompert, I'd like to welcome you here today to the
Committee's hearing on your nomination to be the next Principal
Deputy Director of National Intelligence. That would be the
second under the command of DNI Blair.
I want you to know I appreciated our meeting last week and
believe that you have a strong appreciation for the importance
of intelligence, a very firm grasp on the challenges we face
around the world and a willingness to work within the
intelligence community to make necessary improvements.
The Principal Deputy DNI has two main responsibilities--
one, to assist the Director of National Intelligence and, two,
to act on behalf of the DNI in his absence or due to a vacancy
in the position.
The role of the Principal Deputy is essential to the
success of the intelligence community and to its continued
transformation. If confirmed, Mr. Gompert will be the third
Principal Deputy DNI since Congress created the position in
2004.
Now, both Vice Chairman Bond and I know that there are a
number of challenges that the intelligence community faces, and
there are also rays of light. The recent intelligence operation
to identify and arrest Najibullah Zazi, we believe, shows great
improvement in collection abilities and the ability for
agencies to work together.
So before getting to a list of issues in need of
improvement, I'd like to take a moment to register my
appreciation for the fine work that is going on already.
We talked about some areas last week where I think you'll
need to focus. One of them is ensuring that the intelligence
community produces accurate and timely National Intelligence
Estimates to help policymakers tackle the toughest national
security issues we face and to help make sure that intelligence
does not lead us wrongly into war ever again.
And I think I mentioned to you that one of my main
interests in being Chairman of this Committee was to see that
never again is there an NIE like the Iraq NIE was. And I
believe we're on our way to changing that--to improving
analysis, to improving red-teaming, to really prevent it from
ever happening again--and requiring and building the systems to
allow the intelligence community to share information so that
the stovepipes which were once up and are now down remain down
at virtually all levels of the 15-member intelligence
community.
Improving our language capabilities across the IC so that
we can interpret and analyze all of the information coming in.
I strongly believe that the language deficit is one of the
greatest hindrances our intelligence community has;
Reducing our reliance on contractors in the IC. And I
believe that those things that have inherently governmental
functions should be done, in fact, by government employees;
Improving how the IC acquires technical collection systems
to prevent the huge cost and schedule overruns that had become
the norm, not the exception.
So let me say a few words about this nominee. Mr. Gompert
has almost 40 years of experience as a national security
professional and information technology company executive. Most
recently, he was a Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation and
previously served as the President of RAND Europe. In 2003 he
was a senior adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in
Iraq. He has been on the faculty of the National Defense
University, the United States Naval Academy, and he served on
the National Security Council and State Department staffs. So
he has experience as a national security analyst in senior
White House and State Department positions, where he worked at
the intersection of intelligence and policy.
Mr. Gompert also worked as an executive in the private
sector from 1983 to 1990, where he held Vice Presidential
positions at Unisys and at AT&T. These experiences give him a
good management expertise and a unique perspective on how to
address the challenges lying ahead for the intelligence
community.
One point I want to draw attention to is Mr. Gompert's
written answers to our Committee's pre-hearing questions, where
he expressed his views that the current size of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence is more or less right.
Mr. Gompert wrote in his answer that the ODNI has less than 2
percent of the overall intelligence community employees and
less than 1 percent of employees in the IC dedicated to tasks
other than those that are part of operational centers like the
National Counterterrorism Center and the National Intelligence
Council. In fact, two-thirds of ODNI employees are assigned to
those operational centers and mission support activities.
This Committee has fought hard for resources to give the
ODNI the tools it needs to be effective, and we will continue
to do so, especially as we prepare for conference negotiations
with our House colleagues on the 2010 Intelligence
Authorization Bill, which has passed the Senate now and, we
hope, can pass the House very soon.
With that, I would ask unanimous consent that any opening
statements that Members may have or that the witness may have
be included in the record in full. And, hearing no objection,
so ordered.
Mr. Vice President, I'd like to turn it over to you and
then ask Mr. Gompert to introduce his family, to welcome them,
and let him make a statement if he'd care to.
Vice Chairman Bond. Madam Chair, thank you very much. I was
actually Vice President of the Alfalfa Club last year, but I'm
now Vice Chairman of this Committee and the President of the
Alfalfa Club. But never mind----
Chairman Feinstein. But what does that get you, now, Mr.
Vice Chairman?
Vice Chairman Bond [continuing]. It gets me an opportunity
to pay a bunch of writers to write a very expensive and, we
hope, focused roast of everybody in sight. It's a machine-gun
opportunity. [Laughter.]
Chairman Feinstein. I won't be in sight.
Vice Chairman Bond. We might be able to find a spot for
you.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE CHAIRMAN, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Vice Chairman Bond. I agree with all that you said about
Mr. Gompert. His background is outstanding. We're delighted
that he has agreed to take this position.
I also join with you in issuing congratulations and I will
second that statement that the intelligence community worked
together on the recently-announced investigations and the
successful dealing with some of the challenges here in the
homeland. And that required great cooperation. There still are
some more areas we need to work on.
Madam Chair, I was disappointed to hear that this Committee
was not going to be able to get an opportunity to consider in a
classified session some of the provisions in the bill that
Judiciary just passed out on the PATRIOT Act, because we have
some questions about it and we've heard those from members of
the intelligence community.
And I would like at least to have our members have an
opportunity to discuss some of them before they reach the
floor. As one who thinks that the Intelligence Committee is too
often bypassed, certainly this Act has great ramifications for
the work that the intelligence community does. And I want to
make sure we get it right and we don't put unnecessary burdens
on the intelligence community in collecting the information
that they need.
But, with that, I join the Chair in welcoming Mr. Gompert,
and we look forward to seeing him often. We always have lots of
questions and we welcome your comments and we thank you for
taking on these weighty responsibilities.
The responsibilities of the DNI and his Principal Deputy,
unfortunately, are not matched by a set of clear and complete
legal authorities. You've got the responsibility, but not
always the authority.
I've repeatedly expressed my concern with this disparity,
which is the reason I did not vote for the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. For several years now
I've been asking your predecessors and past DNIs to tell this
Committee which authorities need to be enhanced or clarified.
While the Committee has heard general complaints, that's
not enough. We cannot change the law unless we understand from
your standpoint exactly what the problems are. I hope you will
break the tradition of suffering in silence and that you and
Director Blair will speak loudly if you believe legislation
that we could work on here can help you do your job better.
Now, Mr. Gompert, I was heartened by the emphasis that you
placed on personal accountability in your written statement and
responses to the Committee's questions, when you stated,
``Accountability must include meeting financial commitments
and, if confirmed, I would insist on that.''
In this vein, you further noted that, ``A budget is a
compact whereby a unit can count on an agreed amount of
resources and the corporation can count on agreed results, and
that overruns are not just accounting entries but have real
consequences which, in the national security domain, can be
profound.''
I couldn't agree more. I'd hope that if you're confirmed
you'll put these words into action and make it your business to
instill in the IC greater business discipline and personal
accountability, both of which have been sorely lacking in the
intelligence community. We have many wonderful people out there
who are doing great jobs. But they have to be accountable to
the people of America through this Committee and other
committees. And we want to assure that accountability.
As I'm sure you've learned in your preparation for this
hearing, over the last decade, the IC has spent nearly $10
billion on advanced imagery satellites that have never produced
a single picture. And that's unacceptable.
It's also unacceptable that at the same time millions of
taxpayers face increasing economic hardship the IC still cannot
produce auditable financial statements detailing how they are
spending these tax dollars. Even worse is the fact that the IC
does not expect to be able to produce these statements until at
least 2015. I doubt that the American family, average American
family could survive that long without taking a hard look at
their own budget.
Now, I don't mean to suggest that the IC is without
significant accomplishment. The Committee regularly hears about
the successes and the hard work and dedication of IC employees
that make those successes possible.
Part of our oversight responsibility and a significant part
of your responsibilities, if confirmed, will be to ensure that
the IC has what it needs to be successful all the time. You'll
have your work cut out for you. The Committee's oversight has
revealed some stark contrasts within the IC which would be
fascinating, but for the fact that our national security is on
the line.
For example, as I said earlier, the IC is full of talented,
brave and dedicated personnel. But it has no discernible
culture of personal accountability.
The IC recently demonstrated in the Zazi investigation and
other counterterrorism successes, as the Chair has indicated
and I have endorsed, that they have made real progress in
information sharing and interagency cooperation. Yet there are
still too many FBI intelligence personnel without easy access
to top-secret databases and desktop Internet connections.
The IC is capable of technological marvels which have
produced a wide array of actionable intelligence for our forces
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, most of the IC's major
acquisition programs are hugely over cost and behind schedule
and, as I noted, some have flat-out failed.
As you mentioned in your written responses to this
Committee, when it comes to strategic intelligence, the IC
failed to warn policymakers of virtually every seismic
geopolitical change in the last few decades, including the fall
of the Shah of Iran, the collapse of communism, the emergence
of the Internet, the rise of jihadism, and last fall's global
economic collapse.
If you're confirmed, the task of working with the DNI to
address these shortcomings will fall on your shoulders. I
believe you and I'm confident you're up to the task, and I hope
and look forward to you working closely with this Committee as
you wade into these issues.
I congratulate you on your nomination and look forward to
learning more about how you intend to help lead the IC to
produce consistently superior results that our nation deserves
and demands.
With that, I thank you, Madam Chair. And I apologize. I'm
going to listen standing up, because I have a bad back and I've
been traveling all weekend, and I am a lot more comfortable
standing up as I listen to Mr. Gompert.
Chairman Feinstein. Sorry to hear that.
Vice Chairman Bond. So please don't feel that I'm walking
out on you. I'm just standing up for a little pleasure. Thanks.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Mr. Gompert, if you'd like to introduce your family, and
any comments you would make we'd be happy to receive.
STATEMENT OF DAVID C. GOMPERT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE-DESIGNATE
Mr. Gompert. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman
Bond. I'm honored to come before you as the President's nominee
for position of Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence.
I am, as you suggested, very pleased that my family could
be here: my son-in-law, Kwan, my daughter Ellie, and my wife
Cynthia, who has been with me for decades of public service,
and has helped me immeasurably in the service to the American
people.
Chairman Feinstein. Welcome to your family.
We're delighted to have them here. Thank you.
Mr. Gompert. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
If confirmed, it will be a privilege to continue that
service to the American people, to assist Director Blair and to
work with this Committee.
The President has stressed the need for first-rate
intelligence to keep the nation safe, to inform U.S. policies
and to support U.S. troops operating in harm's way. In turn,
Admiral Blair has set very demanding standards for the
intelligence community and is working tirelessly to transform
that community. If confirmed, I'll do my best to meet those
very high expectations of the President, of the Director, and
of this Committee.
My career consists of three decades in national security, a
decade in private industry as a senior executive, a record,
both in and out of government, of institutional reform and a
commitment to objectivity, and, as the Vice Chairman noted, to
accountability.
I hope you will find that I have the qualifications to
fulfill the responsibilities of the Principal Deputy, the most
important of which are to ensure that intelligence affecting
the nation's safety and matters of war, peace and policy is of
the highest quality, reliable, timely, useful, and totally
objective, and also to integrate and improve the intelligence
community for the future.
If confirmed, I would have no higher duty than to do my
part to help keep the nation secure from attack. I would also
support our national decisionmakers and our military commanders
with intelligence of the highest quality. And finally, work to
make the intelligence community stronger, by which I mean more
agile, more integrated, more collaborative and more
resourceful.
In approaching these duties, I consider Congressional
oversight to be a clear obligation, and much more. That
oversight is crucial for earning public trust in U.S.
intelligence and for making the intelligence community more
effective. If confirmed, you can count on me not only to
provide timely and full information, but also actively to seek
your counsel and to do whatever I can do to help you fulfill
your responsibilities in oversight.
So again, Madam Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, thank you
for holding this hearing at such a busy time for the Senate,
and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gompert follows:]
Prepared Statement of David C. Gompert, Nominee for the Position of
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence
Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am
honored to come before you as President Obama's nominee for Principal
Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI). If I am confirmed, it
will be a privilege to serve the Nation in this capacity, to repay the
President's confidence in me, to assist Director Blair, and to work
with this Committee. I thank Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond
for holding today's hearing at a time when Senators have so much on
their plates.
The President has stressed the importance of high-quality and
unbiased intelligence in protecting America, informing U.S. policies
and leadership abroad, and supporting U.S. forces serving in harm's
way. In turn, Director Blair has set demanding standards for the
performance of the Intelligence Community (IC), and is working
systematically to transform it, as this Committee has encouraged him to
do. If confirmed, I will do my utmost to meet these high expectations
and standards.
My career can be summed up as three decades of work in national
security, senior executive positions in and out of government, a record
of institutional reform, experience in exploiting technology for
strategic advantage, and a fierce commitment to objectivity. I hope you
will find in me both the professional qualifications and personal
qualities to fulfill the responsibilities of the PDDNI.
Those responsibilities flow from the DNI's, which this Committee
has helped conceive and guide. The DNI exists for two fundamental
purposes: to ensure that intelligence bearing on the protection of the
Nation and on matters of war, peace, and policy is reliable, objective,
and timely; and to integrate and improve U.S. intelligence capabilities
for the future. These purposes require the DNI to organize
collaboration and to remove barriers to sharing information throughout
the IC and with those who depend on the IC: policy-makers, forces in
the field, and those we look to for Homeland defense. In addition, the
DNI is responsible for ensuring that intelligence resources, both
technical and human, are allocated according to national priorities. To
meet pressing and diverse needs in a turbulent world, optimizing IC-
wide collection and analytic capabilities is crucial and requires
strong DNI leadership. Also, by forming, proposing, and managing an
integrated National Intelligence Program, the DNI can assure that
investments in improved capabilities are well aligned, that they work
together, and that tax dollars are wisely spent to reflect national
priorities. This ambitious agenda frames the responsibilities of the
PDDNI, whether in assisting or acting for the DNI.
The PDDNI's responsibilities are also shaped by the security
challenges facing the United States. The foremost challenge is
unblinking vigilance against threats of attack on the Homeland. At
present, the most acute such threat comes from terrorist groups with
strategic aims, strategic reach, and abiding hatred of the United
States, the most dangerous of which is al Qa'ida. Beyond warning and
preventing attack, we must understand, find, outsmart, strike, cripple,
and defeat these terrorists. That they would eagerly use against us any
weapon they get their hands on makes this priority all the more
compelling. Recent U.S. success against al Qa'ida is a dividend on a
more integrated national intelligence effort. Whether on the Afghan-
Pakistan border or anywhere else on Earth, the goal of intelligence
must be to leave them no place to hide.
The second challenge is to prevent and counter the acquisition of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially by reckless regimes and
violent extremists. The recent disclosure of Iran's enrichment facility
at Qum underscores that integrated intelligence is a prerequisite of
effective counter-proliferation. Iran and North Korea are critical
priorities in their own right and because they could spawn further
proliferation. The wider challenge is to be able to discover the
diversion of fissile material, illicit weapons production, and
trafficking in WMD materials and know-how.
The third challenge is to comprehend the implications of a changing
world--shifting power, emerging threats, economic interdependencies,
and new opportunities. China could become a global partner, a rival or
both. India has growing capacity and clout, and is strategically
located. Cyberspace, health, climate, energy, fragile states, world
trade, and financial markets all pose security challenges, thus
intelligence challenges. At the same time, more and more countries are
willing and able to partner with the United States in tackling these
problems. As Director Blair has stressed, good intelligence should
illuminate opportunities as well as dangers for U.S. policy and
security.
Against this background, I would if confirmed have no greater duty
than to help keep the United States safe from attack. Even with
decisive actions and successful policies abroad, it could take many
years to defeat the likes of al Qa'ida. Meanwhile, weapons of mass
destruction and delivery means could spread. These conditions place a
premium on unimpeded sharing of information, prompt threat assessment,
active collaboration, and the setting of clear priorities at every
level across the IC. My goal would be to enhance cooperation among all
arms of the IC.
I would also commit myself, if confirmed, to give our national
security decision-makers intelligence on which they can rely. The PDDNI
is expected to play a supporting role in the NSC inter-agency process
while maintaining strictly the objectivity of intelligence analysis. If
confirmed, I would adopt the discipline of explaining what the IC knows
in its entirety; what it does not know; what it thinks; what is likely
to happen; and what may be unlikely to happen but is very consequential
and thus crucial to watch. For these purposes, I would rely on the best
intelligence professionals and technologies in the world, making use of
secret means while making sense of a growing abundance of open
information. I would be as ready to have my thinking challenged as to
challenge the thinking of others in the IC.
If confirmed, I would also work to make the IC stronger than it is
now--more integrated, more agile, and better understood and supported
by the public. Stronger also means being more resourceful: exploiting
information technology to expand sharing in both intelligence and
business functions; creating economies and efficiencies by
collaborating; and developing people who can excel in and strengthen
such a community. That we are beginning to see a positive return on the
effort to transform U.S. intelligence should make us even more
determined to press ahead with that transformation, for we have a long
way to go.
Managing the IC is a challenge. The DNI and PDDNI must accept heavy
responsibilities while at the same time empowering the agencies of the
IC to facilitate agile operations, encourage initiative, and respond to
changing threats and opportunities. The IC's decentralized structure
need not be a problem--in fact, it is a strength. Having fifteen of its
elements reside within six different departments makes U.S.
intelligence more responsive to those who depend on it. Increasingly,
these departments are benefiting from the DNI's integrative efforts,
and the arrangement of shared authority between the DNI and those
department heads is working better and better. Moreover, by organizing
cross-agency teaming, such as national intelligence centers and mission
management, it is possible to gain the benefits of both integration and
decentralization.
The imperative of integrated intelligence requires creating shared
networks, setting common standards for handling sensitive data, and
overcoming cultural barriers. In time, sharing across all intelligence
agencies should be institutionalized, resources optimized, operations
harmonized, and the Nation made safer with less need for DNI insistence
and intervention. Meanwhile, it is up to the DNI and PDDNI to create
conditions so that responsibility remains clear, the power of
decentralization is fostered, the hardest challenges are tackled by
cross-agency teaming, and collaboration becomes the norm.
To me, the Intelligence Community's oversight by and cooperation
with Congress are not only obligatory but also crucial for maintaining
public trust and for the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence. Trust
between the American people and their Intelligence Community is
critical because of the secrecy that must surround its work, the
potency of its tools, natural concerns about privacy and civil
liberties, and the consequences of intelligence failure. Key to
building public trust is the IC's accountability, both to the President
as the executive and to the Congress as the people's representatives.
Moreover, a close working relationship with Congress will make the
IC better at meeting the dangers the Nation faces. Strengthening this
relationship is a major responsibility of the PDDNI. It requires not
only furnishing timely, full, and reliable information on significant
matters to Congress but also inviting your counsel and your concerns.
This DNI has made clear to the entire IC, and to me, the importance he
places on communications and cooperation with Congress. He and I both
believe that the IC benefits from your oversight. If confirmed, I will
make myself fully available to you and will actively seek your views.
This is both a critical and a formative time for U.S. intelligence.
Success requires that the leaders of the IC work to build the
confidence of the American people. Director Blair has said that he
wants to increase public understanding of, trust in and admiration for
the Intelligence Community and its talented and dedicated people--the
way our military has earned such respect. If confirmed, I will join him
in that effort. The way we work with and answer to this Committee can
be instrumental to that purpose.
Again, Madam Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, thank you for holding
this hearing, and thanks to all Members for considering my nomination.
I welcome your questions.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Gompert.
I have just, first of all, some very precise but
rudimentary questions that we ask every witness. Yes or no will
suffice.
Do you agree to appear before the Committee, here or in
other venues, when invited?
Mr. Gompert. Yes, I do, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to send officials from the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence to appear
before the Committee and designated staff when requested?
Mr. Gompert. Yes, I do, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to provide documents and
any other material requested by the Committee in order for it
to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
Mr. Gompert. Yes, I do.
Chairman Feinstein. Will you ensure that your respective
offices provide such material to the Committee when requested?
Mr. Gompert. I will do so, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. You're batting 100 percent so far.
Thank you.
Mr. Gompert, could you describe how you and Director Blair
will be sharing and dividing responsibilities, if you are
confirmed? And let me give you just a couple of specifics.
I understand you may assist Director Blair by briefing
policymakers, so that he'll be able to focus on the so-called
``big picture'' issues. Is that correct?
Secondly, who will be briefing the President each morning?
And thirdly, who will be coming to Congress to testify on
oversight hearings?
Mr. Gompert. Madam Chairman, from the day he asked if I
could take this position, if nominated, Director Blair and I
have been discussing what an appropriate and helpful division
of labor would be.
What we've worked out, and what he's decided upon, is a
little bit different than you often see with regard to the
number one and number two person in a large government
organization. Often the number one person is engaged primarily
in external work--in the case of intelligence, in participating
in the interagency policy process--and the number two is much
more of an internal manager.
Director Blair has decided on a somewhat different division
of labor in our case, given my broad background in national
security, including policymaking and bringing intelligence to
bear on the policy process. He feels that I could be of
greatest use to him, to the community, and to the nation by
being heavily involved in the interagency process--bringing our
intelligence products to bear on policymaking. That would give
him that much more time to concentrate on the daunting task of
transforming and integrating the intelligence community.
Now, having said that, Madam Chairman, I do want to stress
that both of us have responsibilities that cut across the
entire intelligence community, both internal and external. I
have management duties; I will be will be chairing various
committees; I will certainly be mindful of the needs to
continue to develop our personnel. So I will have many internal
responsibilities.
But to answer your question directly, I think I'll be
mostly working the ``outside beat,'' if I can put it that way.
Chairman Feinstein. The ``outside beat,'' or the inside
beat? What you're saying is, how intelligence affects policies.
Mr. Gompert. That's correct.
Chairman Feinstein. So does this mean you'd do the
President's PDB?
Mr. Gompert. On the President's PDB, the Director is the
chief adviser to the President on----
Chairman Feinstein. So he will do that.
Mr. Gompert [continuing]. On matters of intelligence, and
he would certainly continue to do that. Of course, in his
absence, I would be present for that briefing.
Chairman Feinstein. And he would continue, then, to
regularly brief the Intelligence Committees?
Mr. Gompert. Yes, he would.
But there is one area in which he has stressed to me that
we would not have a division of labor, and that is with regard
to the Congress and to this Committee. We would both regard
that as important responsibilities. So you will see a great
deal of both of us--certainly no less of him, and a good deal
of me.
Chairman Feinstein. Give me an example of what you would do
where intelligence meets the road of policy.
Mr. Gompert. I would first see to it that all of the
intelligence capabilities that we can bring to bear--collection
capabilities, as well as analytic capabilities throughout the
intelligence community--are brought to bear on whatever policy
question is presented.
I would guarantee, of course, that the intelligence effort
not wander across the line between the provision of objective
intelligence and policy advocacy. That's an extremely important
line.
Chairman Feinstein. Well, let me be clear. For example,
what to do in Afghanistan. Would it be your responsibility,
then, to assemble all of the relevant intelligence for the
President to consider in making his decision with respect to
General McChrystal's recommendations?
Mr. Gompert. Yes. On a matter of such tremendous national
importance, certainly both the DNI and the Principal Deputy
would be deeply involved in collecting and synthesizing the
intelligence for the President for such a decision. And, in
fact, Director Blair has been extremely busy doing precisely
that over recent weeks as the President has faced this
decision.
But this is not something that the Director would delegate
to me. On a matter of that importance, we would both be heavily
involved.
Chairman Feinstein. On the subject of contractors, I think
our Committee has been very outspoken on the need to reduce the
IC's reliance on contractors. We have doubled the cut in the
authorization bill from five to 10 percent. I'm encouraged by
your written questions that contractors should be used less,
and my specific question is exactly how do you prepare to
proceed, because the number of contractors used by these
agencies is astronomic.
Mr. Gompert. Well, Madam Chairman, the Committee is quite
right to raise this question because there has been substantial
growth, really since the end of the 1990s. We dipped down in
terms of our head count in the first decade after the Cold War
and then, finding all of the intelligence demands we face, we
found that the quickest way to meet those demands was not by
growing our professional staff but by going out and contracting
work. And the pendulum is swinging back in the other direction,
as well it should.
One specific thing that I will do that I think will move
the pendulum in the right direction is every time someone
approaches me and says that we have to use a contractor because
we lack certain governmental capabilities to perform a task,
the question I will ask is should we have those capabilities.
Should we have provided those capabilities? And what steps do
we have to take, including coming to Congress, to ensure that
we build those capabilities for the future so we're never in a
situation where we must use contractors for lack of government
capabilities?
While that's true in general, it is all the more true when
we talk about inherently governmental functions and other
critical and sensitive functions that the government and only
the government should perform.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
The Chair mentioned Afghanistan, so I thought I'd ask you
if you believe you have enough intelligence, based on your
experience and what you may have learned about Afghanistan. Do
you have a view on whether the United States would see the
Taliban, if they were to regain a substantial foothold in
Afghanistan, providing safe haven for armed groups including
al-Qa'ida, as they did during their short reign from the late
1990s until 2001?
Mr. Gompert. Mr. Vice Chairman, I do have some experience
with Afghanistan. I've been there----
Vice Chairman Bond. I know you have.
Mr. Gompert [continuing]. A number of times, I think the
first time was in 1974. I have not, however, been involved in
the preparation of any intelligence materials, let alone in the
process that Director Blair has been involved in with the NSC
on Afghanistan. So I would have no basis for commenting on----
Vice Chairman Bond. That's why I asked. That's the kind of
question that probably the next time you come before the
Committee you will be asked about.
Mr. Gompert [continuing]. Absolutely.
Vice Chairman Bond. That's just a heads up. Those are the
kinds of things, if you're representing the DNI, we want to
know.
I mentioned the lack of explicit legislative authority and,
in the answers to questions about working with the IC, you
conclude that the arrangement currently under way ``appears to
be working well and steadily improving.'' Do you have any
concern that things seem to be working well now because of the
good personal relationships which could quickly change? We
think there's great personal compatibility in working
coordination. If those personalities were not there, would the
DNI be able to function as effectively as we hope he functions
now?
Mr. Gompert. Vice Chairman, I think that's an extremely
important question because we are blessed by having
personalities in the intelligence community and the departments
that have elements of the intelligence community who know how
to make things work. I've known both Director Blair and
Secretary Gates for decades and these two leaders have
certainly helped to produce a much improved relationship
between the military side and the civilian side.
The key is not to depend upon personalities and personal
harmony, because you're not always going to have it. When you
do have it, as we do now, it is important to institutionalize
this relationship. So what I've looked at carefully with regard
to the relationship between the Defense Department and its
intelligence elements and the rest of the intelligence
community is, are we institutionalizing this good relationship.
And I think the answer is yes, we are with regard to the
allocation of resources, the setting of priorities and so on.
Vice Chairman Bond. I would ask, if you see that additional
authorities are needed, I would ask you to share those views
with the Committee, even if there may be others in the
Administration who do not agree with them. Would you be so kind
as to share those views with us?
Mr. Gompert. Yes, I would, sir. As I've said, my in-going
position is that we have the authorities we need, and if that
proves to be inadequate, I would not hesitate with the Director
to come back to you and take you up on your offer.
Vice Chairman Bond. Well, let me get right to the heart of
the matter. The DNI has no budget authority over the Military
Intelligence Program or MIP, but significant portions of the
National Intelligence Program, NIP, budget directly support
military operations to Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, and the
DOD exercises considerable influence over NIP budget and
acquisition decisions. Do you think the DNI should have greater
authority to influence the MIP, at least as much influence as
the Secretary of Defense exercises in the NIP?
Mr. Gompert. One of the important officials in the
intelligence community in this regard is the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, currently retired General Clapper.
And that official occupies a very important position on the
question you raise because he in a way is the portal of the DNI
and the PDDNI into the Defense Department and into the Military
Intelligence Program. So we count on the Under Secretary to
ensure that the views of national intelligence, as articulated
by the Director and the Principal Deputy, are in fact
communicated as the Military Intelligence Program is formulated
within the defense budget.
You're right to say that there is no control exercised by
the DNI over the Military Intelligence Program. But I believe
that we do have the opportunity to have considerable influence
on it. So I will watch that very closely, and if I judge that,
because of a lack of authority in that regard, working through
the Under Secretary for Intelligence, that there's something
else we should do to bring about greater harmony than we
currently have, then again, with the Director, I would not
hesitate to come back and talk to you about it, Senator.
Vice Chairman Bond. I would just suggest that you follow
the admonition of a leader a few years ago who said trust but
verify.
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. I thank the Chair and thank you, Mr.
Gompert, for your willingness to serve in this position for
which you are clearly qualified, and I really did appreciate
the meeting we had last week and just want to quickly revisit a
few of the issues we discussed, starting with Congressional
notification, including statutory notification obligations.
After our meeting, did you have a chance to look at the
National Security Act, and, if so, do you agree that the
provision authorizing the so-called Gang of Eight notifications
appears only in the section of the law related to covert
action?
Mr. Gompert. Yes, Senator, I did go back and study the
language and also spend some time with the General Counsel
discussing this. And you're absolutely right that that
particular method of consultation is covered under Section 503
and not under 502. In discussing this with counsel, the view
there is that the fact that it is not covered explicitly under
502 neither mandates the use of that particular method nor
precludes the use of that particular method, and that,
therefore, from the point of view of our General Counsel, the
fact that there has been a practice of applying the method
specified by 503 also to activities other than covert
activities suggests that it is a reasonable interpretation.
But, Senator, I acknowledge that it does appear in one section
and not in the other section.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate that. And you know my view
that I don't think it's a reasonable approach to statutory
interpretation to say that somehow you can import that language
into another amendment that isn't there and that that isn't a
prohibition. But you've been fair in responding.
Let me take this tack. Would you agree with Director Blair
that this would only give the DNI a degree of latitude with
regard to how and when, not whether, the full Committee should
be notified? And would you agree that months and years of
keeping the Committee in the dark, as was the case with the
warrantless wiretapping program, certainly exceeds whatever
such authorities might exist?
Mr. Gompert. Yes, Senator, I certainly agree with Director
Blair that this is not a matter of whether there's an
obligation to provide full and current notification, but how
it's provided.
As to the question of oversight and notification and the
sharing of information in general, I feel quite strongly that
this is a matter of obligation, but not only a matter of
obligation, that the intelligence community has to constantly
work to earn public confidence and public trust. It's in the
nature of our work that we have to work very hard to that end.
And I think that being open with you and full and timely in
that openness is really an important aspect of winning and
keeping that public trust, and also in permitting you to
perform your oversight duties, which in turn, I believe, helps
us be more effective.
So to me, it's not only a question of are we absolutely
obligated, but should we--above and beyond our obligations, is
it in the interest of the country to do so?
Senator Feingold. I appreciate that, and we'll get back to
the issue about notification over time.
You said that in setting--on a different issue--in setting
intelligence community priorities, ``the immediate should not
overwhelm the future.'' And, as you know, I've long shared
these concerns. I also know that you have particular
responsibilities for meeting the intelligence needs of
policymakers, who, as we all know, are inevitably focused on
current crises often rather than long-term or long-range
strategic threats.
So how is the Deputy DNI an interlocutor with these
policymakers? Will you try to overcome this persistent problem?
Mr. Gompert. The problem, as I see it, is that there's a
very strong current demand from the policy community and from
our military commanders for intelligence collection and
analysis on immediate problems. This does not mean that our
commanders and our decisionmakers are shortsighted, but this is
really what they most need.
Therefore, it is really up to the leadership of the
intelligence community--and by this, I mean not only the
Director and the Principal Deputy Director, but all the leaders
throughout the intelligence community who command both
collection and analysis resources--to realize that we have a
duty to perform strategic analysis, to look at the issues that
could become major national security problems in the future,
even if they aren't today, to perform strategic warning, and
also to look at things that would be of great consequence even
if they may not seem very probable.
So the first point is that we have to accept that it is our
responsibility to do that even if it is not in response to
immediate demand. Second, we have to allocate resources
accordingly. And again, resources will tend to flow toward
where the demand is the greatest and the loudest. And we are
going to have to fence off the analytical capacity and use our
intelligence-gathering capabilities to address these long-term
questions, some of which are at least as complex if not more
complex than some of the immediate problems we face.
I think that, when you look back over decades, we've missed
some very important developments, watershed developments, that
may not have seemed likely before they happened, but if we had
only listened to that one dissenting voice, if we had paid
attention more to what might change all of our assumptions, we
might have been better prepared.
So it is a struggle. I have discovered, though, in my
preparations for this confirmation, in talking to the Chairman
of the National Intelligence Council and our NIOs, that there
is a keen awareness of this. There has recently been stood up a
unit specifically for long-term analysis. There is a growing
commitment to working a variety of issues where the
intelligence community may not be active in gathering
information because it's all out there in the public domain,
but in assessing that information and getting it to
policymakers in a form that they can use to take preventive
action.
So I sense that the intelligence community, for all of the
immediate pressures we face, is mindful of your admonition in
this regard, and they'll certainly hear it from me as well.
Senator Feingold. I really appreciate that answer.
And I thank the Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Whitehouse.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Gompert. Thank you for your willingness to
take on this task. And I must say I particularly appreciate
your administrative and management background. As you probably
know, there are very significant acquisitions programs which,
in the covert world, do not benefit from daylight, public
oversight, press scrutiny and other things. And I think your
attention to some of these classified programs and the manner
in which they are pursued will be very helpful.
Every agency risks becoming the captive of its contractors.
And in the dark areas of our national security program, that
concern is, I think, particularly acute. And your experience in
that area will be helpful.
One of the problems that you will encounter--with me,
anyway--is the question of declassification. As you are aware,
there is such a thing as a declassifier in the United States
government, somebody who can utter essentially any secret, and
instead of having divulged it or revealed it, they have
declassified it. And all of those people are presently in the
executive branch of government.
And, regrettably, in recent years that fact has been used
to rhetorical advantage, even at considerable cost in
misleading the American public about what the actual facts are.
As somebody who has spent a good deal of his life in a
courtroom, I will tell you I feel intense personal frustration
when I know facts that would rebut a case that an
Administration is making, and they've declassified their side
of the argument and kept mine classified, and I have to keep my
peace even though the public is being misled.
I think there's something that we now need to do about
that. I think that horse is out of the barn. There's no
Administration that will ever unlearn what the previous
Administration learned in terms of that capability. And I just
want to let you know that I think that's an issue that we need
to work on.
I'm not quite sure what the solution is. But to the extent
that, among the rival branches of government, the executive
branch has that power unilaterally, the desire and the reward
of using it, I think, will continue to prove irresistible. And
in my view, it has led to very, very substantial
misapprehensions of what circumstances are by the American
people, because they've frankly been fooled. And we haven't had
the chance to explain things more clearly because of that
declassification muzzle that we've been under. So I look
forward to working with you on that.
The third topic that I think is of key interest where you
have considerable background and interest is in maintaining our
cybersecurity. You mentioned in your testimony China in
particular as a threat that is constantly, I think you said,
exerting its power in cyberspace. And I would like to hear your
thoughts on where we stand, both in terms of policy,
preparedness, and resources to deal with the cyber challenge,
bearing in mind that this is a public forum.
Mr. Gompert. Thank you, Senator. And I appreciate the
strong views that you shared with me with regard to acquisition
policy and results and also with regard to the need for
objectivity--strict objectivity--with regard to
declassification. I will heed both of those comments and be
happy to come back and discuss with you whether you think
there's more that I can do on those points.
Senator Whitehouse. As long as you're aware of them as a
matter of concern, and I'm sure you are on the first one, I
wanted to highlight for you the second one because, as I said,
as somebody who's used to the give-and-take of argument in
courtrooms, in politics and a variety of other forums, the idea
of being muzzled when you know things that should be in the
debate is deeply frustrating, particularly when it leads to the
public being misled.
But back to cyber.
Mr. Gompert. Right. Well, Senator, I don't think I can
assure you that this country or, for that matter, this
government has achieved a satisfactory ability to defend all of
its networks. We've seen such a remarkably rapid growth of
information networking of all forms, especially the Internet,
to the point where we are heavily dependent and, by virtual of
that dependence, also vulnerable.
So I think we have to face that. You know, we're vulnerable
to the exploitation of, interference with, and disruption of
information on which we rely vitally as a country and on which
each individual relies vitally.
So we need to start with that understanding, and I think
there is a broad understanding now within the executive branch
and with the Congress and, increasingly, within the industry
itself to that effect.
I think it's important to establish responsibilities, which
is not easy because the starting point is that every
organization that manages, designs, or operates a network has
the responsibility for the integrity and security of that
network. Cyber security is not something that you can appoint
somebody to take care of and then the rest of us can forget
about because all of us who use networks and, certainly, all
who control networks have that responsibility.
For the government, the responsibility falls heavily to the
Department of Homeland Security for the non-national security
networks and non-national security information. And I'm told
that the Department of Homeland Security is ramping up
significantly its capabilities to improve network defense for
such government networks and to work with other network
providers where critical infrastructure is concerned. Whether
they have enough capability at this particular stage, I can't
say, but I can say that they are growing that capability
rapidly.
On the national security side, of course, we have
considerably more capability, both in the defense establishment
and in the intelligence community. Our responsibility, along
with our defense colleagues, is the security of our national
defense and intelligence networks, and I believe--in fact, I
know there's excellent cooperation between DoD and the
intelligence community on the security of the networks on which
we rely for national security functions. It doesn't mean that
we should not be concerned about those networks, but we've got
excellent capabilities in this regard.
The intelligence community does have important
responsibilities. One, of course, is to ensure the cyber
security of the intelligence community's own networks. But the
other responsibility is in threat assessment. We're responsible
for assessing the threat not only to the intelligence
community's networks but to our national security networks,
other government networks, and, indeed, those throughout the
country where we have important information about the growth of
one or another kind of threat.
The intelligence community has the responsibility to share
that information, again, as you suggested, consistent with
concerns about classification. So we take very seriously--and I
would, if confirmed, take very seriously--that larger
responsibility in cyber security.
I think that the Administration will be appointing a
coordinator. I've heard that this position will be filled. I
think that's a good step. I think that's important not only for
bringing about greater harmony and some standards across
government networks but also speaking to the country at large
about the importance of cyber security and the responsibilities
that all users bear.
I hope that's responsive to your question. I'd be happy to
go further.
Chairman Feinstein. It was substantial in length, if not in
responsiveness. In any event--no, I didn't mean that as a
knock. I just meant it as a friendly comment.
I want to go back to why the DNI was authorized in the
first place. And I think both Senator Bond and I were on the
Committee at that time. There was real concern about the
sharing, about the need to transform the intelligence agencies
from a CIA/KGB mentality into this new asymmetric world to be
able to engage in cultures where we had not previously engaged.
We found that the intelligence community was intensely
territorial and competitive. And, therefore, the creation of
one overarching authority that could, in fact, move the deck
chairs on the Titanic, so to speak, but could better
coordinate, better direct, better see that intelligence needs
were fulfilled was important. It was not meant to interfere
with the operations of any department, particularly the CIA.
The question I want to ask is, if you look at the DNI's
budget today, it's getting very big. And I'm concerned that the
original intent is subsumed into a much broader agenda. And I
really don't want to see that happen.
How would you work to prevent it from happening?
Mr. Gompert. Well, Madam Chairman, just a couple comments,
if I may, first of all.
Chairman Feinstein. Sure.
Mr. Gompert. I think significant progress has been made
toward exactly the vision of the DNI and of the intelligence
community that you had and that the Senate had in its role in
conceiving and launching the DNI.
I do not believe--in fact, I'm absolutely sure from all of
my discussions with Director Blair and his chief lieutenants--
that there is any interest in going beyond that vision, none
whatsoever.
He has those overarching authorities and oversight
responsibilities, as you suggested, and he also has the
responsibility to make the community more collaborative, as you
suggested.
But as to micromanaging the activities of various
agencies--16, for that matter--there is no interest in doing
that and, really, no significant capability to do that. When
you think about the size of the ODNI staff, I would point out,
as you yourself suggested, Madam Chairman, that two-thirds of
the folks on the ODNI staff are performing line intelligence
activities that are best organized at the IC level and,
therefore, report to the Director, like the National
Counterterrorism Center, the National Counterintelligence
Center, and the National Counterproliferation Center.
The actual staff of the Director is 500 to 600 people
which, given the size and the decentralized nature and the
diversity of the intelligence community and the need to
transform it, does not strike me as an excessive staff at all
and certainly not an indication that any of us would want to
overstep the important line that you suggested between
oversight and integration on the one hand and the management of
operations on the other.
Chairman Feinstein. One of my concerns is the inability to
get human intelligence that is of the culture, of the
languages. And we note that progress is extraordinarily slow in
that regard. Do you have any positive suggestions that might
encourage greater progress?
Mr. Gompert. I would certainly start by looking at the
language deficit that you mentioned. Part of learning a
language is learning the context of that language and learning
the culture. It doesn't do you any good just to learn the
grammar and vocabulary if you don't really understand that
culture.
So I consider language training and education to be of
critical importance. We have to recognize that we may not have
all we need, but as part of that effort we should also be
improving the cultural awareness and sensitivity and ability to
operate throughout the intelligence community.
Chairman Feinstein. I mean practical suggestions.
Mr. Gompert. I would like to discuss that, if I could, with
our chief of human capital and find out what I could do that
would be most helpful to the Director and to our human capital
people and then come back to you with something more concrete,
if I could, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Well, we will schedule that. I will not
forget that. So I'd very much appreciate it if you would do
that, because I think we have pushed on this for at least six
years now and it's excruciatingly slow. And to have major
platforms in Islamic countries where so few of the people speak
the language I think is really not effective. So we will be
very interested in your observations and your recommendations.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Just a couple of questions I wanted to follow up on in
answer to the Chair's first question. You talked about the
division of responsibility with the DNI--briefing Presidents
and attending meetings, which too many of us are plagued with
meetings. We find that that is one of the most infectious
diseases up here for which there's been no vaccine developed.
But we have heard complaints from the working-level DNI
staff and seen examples where the pressing daily requirements
on the DNI to brief the President and the Congress and
attending meetings with interagency senior leadership has not
allowed enough attention to be paid to day-to-day staff
management, resulting in inertia, stalemates on important
policy and oversight issues--things that need to be settled by
someone with authority.
Now, will the DNI be focusing on that or will you be
focusing on it? Apparently we hear there's a problem. Which one
of you is going to solve it?
Mr. Gompert. It sounds to me, Mr. Vice Chairman, that it's
a problem that both of us will have to work on, because we both
need to manage the external demands on the community and the
DNI staff. And certainly we both have those management
responsibilities.
But I know that the sort of concerns that you have
expressed would be of great concern to the DNI. I'll report
those to him and one or both of us would return to you with
some evaluation of that and comment on what we can do to lessen
the daily load and pay more attention to the long-term
stability of the staff and its work.
Vice Chairman Bond. Nothing personal, but based on a little
experience I've had in management, I want the belly-button
solution. I want to know who's taking primary responsibility
for it, because if we continue to hear it, I want to know one
person whose belly button I should point to to ask that
question.
Would you let us know how you and the DNI choose to handle
it and who's going to be focusing on that?
Mr. Gompert. Well, since I'm here, Vice Chairman, I can
volunteer this belly button. And if the Director says, ``No, I
will take it,'' then we will let you know that he is taking it.
Vice Chairman Bond. You've got the belly button until we
hear of a hand-off.
Mr. Gompert. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Bond. I want to ask you one other question
that's a particular interest of mine, and that is information
on energy. Energy security is, I think, a vital concern these
days, because, as we all know, tremendous amounts of the fuel
that we currently use is controlled by people who are not
friendly to the United States in varying degrees--some of them
being near zero on the friendliness scale.
And we need to have better information, because energy can
be used as a tool for major foreign policy initiatives; it can
be used as a direct weapon--cutoff of energy supplies can be
almost as effective as a cyber attack or a military attack. And
the previous DNI claimed that the NIO for economics was the
quarterback, yet when we informed this officer of the DNI's
view, she was surprised that that was her responsibility.
Do you think energy security is an area that could benefit
from formal mission management; and do you see any analogy
between the role of a combat commander and that of an IC
mission manager?
How important do you think that is? What degree of emphasis
do you think that particular area should consume?
Mr. Gompert. Vice Chairman, I think it warrants a great
deal of attention--more than it has had in the past.
Now, there are two aspects of this on which the
intelligence community should especially concentrate. One has
to do with the technical aspects of it. My understanding is
that the intelligence unit--the analytic unit--within the
Department of Energy is doing more on the question of energy
security from the point of view of the economic and technical
aspects.
The other aspect, as you alluded to it, is that energy
insecurity may result from political instability or
manipulation on the part of states--either weak states or
unfriendly states. So that aspect also must be addressed by the
intelligence community, starting with our analysts in the CIA
and our National Intelligence Council.
I did raise this in my discussions in preparation for this
hearing with the National Intelligence Council. And the strong
impression I had is that they are devoting more attention to
this and will continue to do so because of the great concerns
that you and others have registered about it.
Vice Chairman Bond. I think that's something we'll have
continuing discussions about with you. And I thank you very
much.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Senator Whitehouse.
Senator Whitehouse. My final question, Mr. Gompert.
We've had, on the Intelligence Committee, considerable--
we've experienced, I guess, considerable dismay at the news
reports of classified information, very often attributed to
present or former executive branch officials. And some of the
leaks have been of information that at least when presented to
us has been presented in a very high security context with
staff, you know, required to leave the room and things like
that. Then the next thing you know, a newspaper has it.
The intelligence community has profited, I believe, very
considerably from the teamwork and coordination of different
services and different elements of the intelligence community
and I'd like your thoughts on two things.
One, how significant at this point do you consider the
problem of leakage out of our covert agencies to be; and two,
if you consider it to be a problem that merits serious
attention, would the strategies of interagency coordination and
so forth that have proven so valuable in intelligence gathering
be applicable in this area, so that prosecutors who might have
to look at these cases, FBI agents who might have to
investigate these cases, counterintelligence folks in the
covert community who might have to screen them to protect the
integrity of the agency secrets, H.R. people who have to deal
with what folks' rights are who may be under a cloud of
suspicion could all be brought together and in a more
coordinated way try to take a better look at this?
There seems to be a lot of people standing around in the
outfield with the balls falling between them right now.
Mr. Gompert. Well, over 30 years of service in national
security I've developed a very low tolerance for leaks of
classified information.
Senator Whitehouse. Well, you're in for a treat then.
Mr. Gompert. I'm not sure, Senator, that I see it getting
worse. I'm not sure that I would say that it is worse in one
part of the executive branch than it is in another.
Leaks are harmful and they seem to be inherent, but should
not be tolerated. So I feel very strongly about that. Whether
the particular method that you have suggested would pay off in
practical terms I would like to give some thought to. What
you're suggesting is----
Senator Whitehouse. If you don't mind, take that as a
question for the record and get back to me, because it's much a
proposal as it is a question. But it does strike me that this
is one of those things where everybody talks about it and
everybody has strong opinion about it, but nobody ever does
anything about it.
And when you see places where there should be
coordination--for instance, between the intelligence community
and the Department of Justice when it comes to prosecution--
that handoff should be a pretty seamless one; and yet there's a
chasm between the two agencies about what each reports about
the other's performance across that linkage, which causes me to
think that some of those techniques and strategies of
coordination might be useful in this area.
Mr. Gompert [continuing]. I will certainly get back to you
after discussing the idea and give you my opinion about it,
including whether and how we might be able to move it forward.
Senator Whitehouse. I appreciate that.
Thank you, sir. And again, thank you for your willingness
to serve in this capacity. And my congratulations and respect
to your family for the long hours and late nights and stresses
and strains that they will share with you, without
compensation, as members of your family.
Mr. Gompert. Thank you very much, Senator.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator
Whitehouse.
Mr. Gompert, the Committee will be sending you additional
questions for the record. I'd like to ask all members through
their staffs here today to have any questions submitted by noon
on Friday so that we can send them to the nominee.
I agree with those who have pointed out that you are
clearly qualified--dramatically so. I do not foresee any
problems, but who knows. In any event, we'd like to thank you;
we'd like to thank your family. And thank you also for the
service you are about to render. We very much appreciate it and
this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]