Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Tuesday, September 21, 2010 - 2:30pm
Location:
Dirksen SD-124
Witnesses
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 111-856]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-856
NOMINATION OF DAVID B. BUCKLEY
TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
----------
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
Virginia OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BILL NELSON, Florida
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
----------
David Grannis, Staff Director
Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
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SEPTEMBER 21, 2010
OPENING STATEMENTS
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1
Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from
Missouri....................................................... 4
WITNESS
Buckley, David B., Inspector General of the Central Intelligence
Agency-Designate............................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Letter from Sam Nunn, Dated September 15, 2010, to Senator Dianne
Feinstein...................................................... 3
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 18
Prehearing Questions and Responses............................... 32
Letter from Robert I. Cusick, Office of Government Ethics, Dated
August 12, 2010, to Senator Dianne Feinstein, Transmitting
Public Financial Disclosure Report............................. 41
Letter from David B. Buckley, Dated September 24, 2010, to
Senator Dianne Feinstein....................................... 49
Letter from David B. Buckley, Dated June 17, 2010, to Stephen W.
Preston........................................................ 51
NOMINATION OF DAVID B. BUCKLEY
TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:58 p.m., in
Room SD-124, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable
Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Wyden,
Whitehouse, and Bond.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Chairman Feinstein. The Committee will come to order.
We meet today in open session to consider the President's
nomination of Mr. David Buckley to become the Inspector General
of the Central Intelligence Agency. As the Committee knows,
this position has remained vacant since the retirement of John
Helgerson in March, 2009.
In April, 2010, Vice Chairman Bond and I wrote a letter to
President Obama pointing out the importance of the position and
the need to nominate and confirm a strong, independent auditor
and investigator at the CIA. The President has nominated Mr.
Buckley, who has had more than 30 years of experience in
government service that should provide him with an excellent
background for the challenges he'll face when confirmed.
Before getting to Mr. Buckley's bio, I'd like to make just
a few comments on the very unique role of his position.
Inspectors General are critical in every department and agency.
They conduct audits and inspections to ensure appropriate use
of taxpayer money, compliance with the law, and provide an
independent assessment of how well an agency is carrying out
its mission. As circumstances warrant, the Inspector General
carries out investigations into allegations of wrongdoing and
makes recommendations for accountability, as warranted.
These functions are all the more important in an agency
that, by design and necessity, shields its operations from the
public and the press, and even from the large majority of its
own personnel.
This Committee has seen firsthand the importance of the CIA
Inspector General function. While we can't talk about many of
the reports and audits that this office has produced, it is no
understatement to say that they've had a major impact on the
Committee's understanding of CIA programs and, at times, have
led directly to major changes in those programs.
The 2004 special review into CIA detention and
interrogation practices, conducted under the auspices of former
IG John Helgerson, was a watershed moment. The report raised
major questions about the program's legality and compliance,
and led to changes and additional reviews of this program.
Other recent CIA Inspector General reports have recommended
changes to operations, uncovered misallocation and poor use of
funds, and recommended CIA officers be held accountable for
problems it found in covert action programs.
To a degree, the Committee relies on the CIA to bring
forward to us notifications of its operations, analysis, and
its problems. While these notifications alert us of an issue,
we on the Committee are frequently reliant on the CIA IG to use
the resources of the office to explain matters fully and
accurately. We are also reliant on the office of the Inspector
General to uncover issues that might not be immediately
apparent and to do an independent review of those issues.
Ideally, the Committee and the Inspector General can play a
mutually beneficial role, with each side bringing forward
matters for the other to review.
As I noted, for the past 18 months the CIA has been without
a Senate-confirmed Inspector General. I want to note the
Committee's appreciation to Patricia Lewis, the Deputy CIA
Inspector General, who has acted as the IG and run the IG
office during this vacancy. I imagine that she, as much as
anyone, is happy to see that Mr. Buckley will, I trust, be
confirmed shortly.
David Buckley has been a career public servant. He enlisted
on active duty with the Air Force in 1976, specializing in
investigations. He continued service with the Air Force Office
of Special Investigations as a civilian in 1984, working for
three years before moving to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations under then-Chairman Sam Nunn. I'll insert in
the record, at this point, a letter to the Committee from
former Senator Nunn recommending Mr. Buckley.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Following eight years on the Subcommittee, including time
as chief investigator, Mr. Buckley worked as the special
assistant to the Inspector General of the Department of
Defense, at the General Accounting Office, and at the Treasury
Department for seven years, mostly as Assistant Inspector
General for Investigations.Mr. Buckley then served from
2005 to 2007 as the minority staff director of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. As such, he had a
purview of the entire intelligence community, including the
CIA, and developed an understanding from the Congressional
point of view of the important relationship that Committees
have with the CIA Inspector General.
Finally, Mr. Buckley has worked as a senior manager at
Deloitte Consulting since 2007, consulting in the national
security arena.
In short, David Buckley has spent 34 years in a career
focused on conducting oversight, much of it in the defense and
intelligence areas. He has agreed to fill this important
position and I believe his background makes him an excellent
candidate.
I'd now like to turn to Vice Chairman Bond, and then ask
Mr. Buckley to make any introductions he wishes before turning
to his opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE CHAIRMAN, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Buckley, congratulations on your nomination and for
appearing before the Committee. I extend a warm welcome to your
family here, and those others who are friends and supporters.
And it's clear from the discussions we had and your
statement for the record that you really understand the
importance of the position for which you've been nominated.
Now, as the Chair said, we in no way minimize the work and the
role of other inspectors general, but at the CIA, given the
extreme sensitivity, the necessary secrecy of the intelligence
mission, the IG position is extremely important.
If confirmed as the next Inspector General, you'll have the
weighty responsibility of ensuring the Director and
Congressional Intelligence Committees are fully informed of any
violations of the law or deficiencies in CIA programs. That
means you would often have the unenviable task of determining
whether or not there are such violations. Now that may not make
you the most popular person at the Agency, but it does mean
that you will be expected, and we will expect you, to be fully
impartial and above reproach in your own conduct.
You'll also be responsible for recommending policies to
promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the agency.
That's always a good buzz word. I've always heard people talk
about it; I've never seen them do it. But, we wish you luck.
At a time when the taxpayers are stretched thin and our
federal deficit has skyrocketed, every federal agency has to
tighten its belt and become more efficient. As the Inspector
General, you are expected to play a key role helping the CIA do
its part to cut spending without cutting back on our national
security interests.
Now, in your statement for the record you noted that you
believe the CIA Inspector General ``needs to establish and
maintain quality communications with the Intelligence
Committees,'' and it's extremely imperative that Congress be
kept fully informed. Well, we could not agree more. That's the
heart of the matter. I ask that whenever you find yourself in a
situation considering whether to inform Congress of some
difficult issue, please err on the side of disclosure. If you
do so, you will find this Committee a supportive partner. If
you choose not to, that's not a good way to start off.
Because the CIA's work is classified, it's not often that
the American people get to see the work that you do. Today's
hearing is your opportunity to give everyone from my
colleagues, the people here in the audience, an idea of who you
are and how you intend to perform the role.
Again, as the Chair has indicated, you have a wealth of
experience--the Department of Defense, Department of Treasury,
both houses of Congress--which qualify you well for the
position. Over three decades you've established a record of
distinguished public service.
In short, I and the rest of the Committee have the highest
expectations for your performance. I look forward to hearing
more about your views about this demanding, important position
and how you plan to tackle its challenges. Congratulations on
your nomination.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Now I'd like to proceed with several pro forma questions
and one other, and then ask you, Mr. Buckley, to make any
introductions you'd care to and a statement, if you wish.
Here are the questions: Do you agree to appear before the
Committee here or in other venues when invited?
Mr. Buckley. I do.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to send officials from
your office to appear before the Committee and designated staff
when invited?
Mr. Buckley. I do and I will.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to provide documents or
any other materials requested by the Committee in order for it
to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
Mr. Buckley. I do.
Chairman Feinstein. Will you ensure that your office
provides such material to the Committee when requested?
Mr. Buckley. I will.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to inform and fully brief,
to the fullest extent possible, all members of this Committee
rather than only the Chairman and Vice Chairman on intelligence
activities and covert actions?
Mr. Buckley. I will.
Chairman Feinstein. Now, one other question: Is it your
intention to seek a waiver or accept a waiver, if offered,
allowing you to receive a federal retirement annuity in
addition to the statutory salary for the position to which you
have been nominated?
Mr. Buckley. It is not.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
If you'd like to proceed and introduce your family and then
make us any statement you might wish to do.
STATEMENT OF DAVID B. BUCKLEY, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INSPECTOR GENERAL-DESIGNATE
Mr. Buckley. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I would like to introduce my wife of 26 years, Janice; my
daughter, my mother, my youngest brother and my stepfather.
They've all traveled here today to be with me. My two sons are
away at college--further away than my daughter is--and they're
hopefully watching on the Internet. But I'm really pleased,
Madam Chairman, that they're able to join me today, along with
several friends in the audience.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. And we very much welcome
them. It's a delight to have you here.
Please go ahead with your statement.
Mr. Buckley. Thank you.
Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman and members of the
Committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear
here today before you as you consider my nomination to be the
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.
I am deeply honored that President Obama has nominated me
for consideration for this position.
At the risk of being redundant, during more than three
decades of government service--including 31 years as a direct
government employee--I have married, have three children, have
been and remain active in my community and my church, and count
myself blessed in those endeavors. It would be my honor to
continue serving the country as the Inspector General, Central
Intelligence Agency, if confirmed for this position.
I would like to briefly speak to my background and
qualifications and then share some observations with you
regarding the role of the Inspector General, CIA.
As you indicated, Madam Chairman, I enlisted into active
service to the military in 1976 and went directly into law
enforcement and criminal investigative work for the Air Force.
I was honorably discharged and remained in the reserves for a
few more years, but became a civilian special agent and
counterespionage case officer with the Air Force Office of
Special Investigations.
I conducted criminal investigations and counterespionage
operations. I received specialized investigative training and
was also trained in the conduct of clandestine human
intelligence collections by the Defense Intelligence and
Central Intelligence Agencies.
In 1987, I became a professional staff member of the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee and as investigator for the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, where I had the honor
to serve Senator Sam Nunn and the other members for seven
years, conducting investigations and oversight of government
operations and other matters of import to the United States
Senate.
Then from 1995 to 1998, I was the special assistant to the
Department of Defense Inspector General, and, while there,
realizing the need for more oversight of the Department of
Defense intelligence enterprise, worked to establish a position
of Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence Review.
In 1998, I briefly served as the Assistant Director for
Defense and National Security Investigations at GAO's Office of
Special Investigations, until later that year when I was asked
by the Department of Treasury to help stand up the newly
authorized Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration. I
spent six years at the IG for Tax Administration as an
Assistant Inspector General for Investigations.
In 2005, I was asked by Ranking Member Jane Harman of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to join the
staff and became the minority staff director for the 109th
Congress.
Since retiring from federal service in 2007, I have been
working as a consultant for the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Defense and intelligence community
agencies.
I believe the role and mission of Inspector General is
important in any agency, but absolutely vital at the Central
Intelligence Agency. The Inspector General reports to the
Director and is an essential element of the proper functioning
of the agency.
The director needs an independent oversight element to
provide unbiased assessments, based on the professional tools
that auditors, investigators and inspectors bring. The CIA is
involved in international high-risk operations and activities,
the vast majority of which are done in secret in order to
protect them from detection by our adversaries. These factors,
as well as the consequences of any abuse in such programs,
demand that oversight be both vigorous and sensitive.
Furthermore, in the absence of transparency and public
scrutiny, the CIA relies on the Inspector General, as well as
Congress' Intelligence Committees, to provide independent
oversight. In this context, the Inspector General's Office is
often the only organization able to probe the agency's
intelligence programs to detect instances of fraud, waste or
abuse.
In addition to reporting to the Director, I believe the CIA
Inspector General needs to establish and maintain quality
communications with the Senate and House Intelligence
Committees. I believe it is critical that Congress be kept
informed of the issues of concern to the Inspector General and
that the Inspector General also be responsive to concerns
raised by the Congress.
An appropriate level of communication is also necessary
between the CIA Inspector General and other inspectors general
of the intelligence community and the other members of the
Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, so
that the CIA can also benefit from government-wide best
practices.
Madam Chairman, Vice Chairman Bond, Senators, the role of
the Inspector General is a difficult job to do well. The job
requires a great deal of skill, tact and professionalism. If
confirmed, I pledge to do my best in the execution of those
responsibilities in leading the office and in working with the
Agency's leadership, its employees and the Congress.
Before I close, I'd like to thank the Committee staff for
their assistance and hard work. And I know that, if confirmed,
I'll be working closely with them, as well as the Members. I
look forward to that.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you
today and I'll do my best to answer your questions.
Prepared Statement of David B. Buckley, Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General-Designate
Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman and Members of the Committee,
thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today as
you consider my nomination to be the Inspector General of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
I am deeply honored that President Obama has nominated me for
consideration to this position. Before I get too far into my testimony,
I would ask your indulgence and allow me to recognize my wife of 26
years, Janice, who is here today, and the several friends who have come
to the hearing to show their support for me. Our three children are in
college and were unable to travel here today. I am flattered by and
thankful for the support of my family and friends.
During more than three decades in government service--including 31
years as a direct government employee--I have married, had three
children (now all in college), have remained active in service to my
community and church, and count myself blessed in all those endeavors.
It would be my honor to continue serving my country as the CIA IG if
confirmed for this position.
Madam Chairman, I would like to speak to my background and
qualifications, and then share some observations about the role of the
Inspector General, CIA.
Madam Chairman, I entered active military service in 1976. I spent
eight years in law enforcement and investigations for the Air Force,
and then was honorably discharged and became a civilian special agent
and counterespionage case officer for the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations. I conducted criminal investigations and
counterespionage operations with the FBI. I received specialized
investigative training and I was trained in clandestine human
intelligence operations by the DIA and CIA. In 1987, I became a
professional staff member at the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
as an investigator for the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
where I had the honor of working for PSI Chairman Senator Sam Nunn for
seven years, conducting investigations and oversight of government
operations and other matters of import to the Senate. Then, from 1995-
1998, I was the special assistant to the Department of Defense
Inspector General and, realizing the need for more oversight of the DoD
intelligence enterprise, worked to establish the position of Assistant
Inspector General for Intelligence Review there. In 1998, I briefly
served as the Assistant Director for Defense and National Security
investigations at GAO's Office of Special Investigations until later
that year I was asked to help stand up the newly authorized Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration. I spent six years at TIGTA as
the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations. In 2005, I was
asked by then Ranking Member Jane Harman of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence to join the staff, where I became the
Minority Staff Director for the 109th Congress. Since 2007, I have been
working as a consultant for DHS, DoD and intelligence community
agencies.
Madam Chairman, I believe the role and mission of Inspector General
is important in any agency, but absolutely vital at the Central
Intelligence Agency. The Inspector General reports to the Director and
is an essential element of the proper functioning of the Agency. The
Director needs an independent oversight element to provide unbiased
assessments, based on the professional tools that auditors,
investigators and inspectors bring. The CIA is involved in
international high-risk operations and activities, the vast majority of
which are done in secret and often with an intentionally deceptive
cover in order to protect them from detection by our adversaries. These
factors, as well as the consequences of any abuse in such programs,
demand that oversight be both vigorous and sensitive. Furthermore, in
the absence of transparency and public scrutiny, the CIA relies on the
IG, as well as Congress' intelligence committees, to provide
independent oversight. In this context, the Inspector General's office
is often the only organization able to probe the Agency's intelligence
programs to detect instances of waste, fraud and abuse.
In addition to reporting to the Director, I believe that the CIA IG
needs to establish and maintain quality communication with the Senate
and House intelligence committees. I believe it is critical that
Congress be kept informed of the issues of concern to the IG, and that
the IG also be responsive to concerns raised by Congress. An
appropriate level of communication is also necessary between the CIA IG
and the other inspectors general in the intelligence community, as well
as members of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency, so that the CIA can benefit from government-wide best
practices.
Madam Chairman, as someone recently observed, the role of the
Inspector General is a difficult job to do well and an easy job to do
poorly. The job requires a great deal of skill, tact, and
professionalism. If confirmed, I pledge to do my best in the execution
of those responsibilities in leading the office and in working with the
Agency's leadership, its employees and the Congress. Thank you again
for the opportunity to testify today, and I will do my best to answer
your questions.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
There will be five-minute rounds. And so if you can keep
your answers relatively concise, that will be appreciated.
The size of the intelligence budget has doubled since
September 11. While the CIA's budget is classified, it's grown
enormously as well. A directive signed by President Bush in
November of 2004 instructed the CIA to increase its case
officers and all-source analysts by 50 percent and to double
its technical personnel. The number of contractors employed by
the Agency, often to conduct what at least I believe is an
inherently governmental function, skyrocketed until Director
Hayden and now Director Panetta have started to put some
controls in place.
Here's the question. How would you see the role of the
Inspector General in reviewing and making recommendations on
the overall size of the CIA, its budget, its personnel levels
and its use of contractors?
Mr. Buckley. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I would approach the task of assisting the Director in
reviewing the basic missions and functions of the Central
Intelligence Agency and looking at those issues. It's an agency
that's been tasked with huge demands in this era of high risk
to the nation and in defending our nation.
But a risk-based approach in the prioritization of mission
and in looking for economies and efficiencies that could be
taken during that review is the way I would probably use my
auditors and inspectors to focus on that problem set.
Chairman Feinstein. I think it's fair to say, and I think
the Vice Chairman would agree with me, that we believe there
are entirely too many contractors doing inherent governmental
functions, and that that should be closely examined.
Second question: Based on your numerous positions in IG
offices and as a congressional investigator, how do you
approach the challenge of needing to conduct very detailed
reviews that may result in referrals for prosecution or other
disciplinary measures for agency personnel, without getting
into an adversarial relationship?
Mr. Buckley. Thank you.
The role of investigators, or anyone that is engaged in
oversight, is a particularly tricky job. It requires
professionalism and independence of function and of mind.
The nice thing about being a government investigator,
particularly an internal affairs function, is that the vast
majority of government employees are there to do their job, do
it well, and do it honestly. And there are just a few, in my
experience, that can cause trouble or have things go sideways.
I think the vast majority of employees look forward to
working with the independent investigators to make sure that
their workplace is free of fraud, waste, abuse or other kinds
of misconduct. And I intend on making sure that the Agency
views the office of the Inspector General as a place that they
can trust and respect, first and foremost.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Last quick question: Under an arrangement between the IG
and the congressional Intelligence Committees in 2001, the CIA
IG conducts a detailed review on each authorized covert action
program every three years. This has been extremely helpful to
our congressional oversight. Here's the question. Do you plan
to continue this practice?
Mr. Buckley. Yes, I do. And, in addition, I think that a
top-to-bottom review, at least at a high level, is essential in
planning the audits and inspections for the Office of Inspector
General.
So while a routine, every-three-years audit will obviously
get some coverage of each of the covert actions, I'm also open
to reviewing a covert action 12 months later, if that's what's
required to make sure that things stay on track.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Buckley. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. I appreciate that answer.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I begin, obviously, with our own personal interest, and
that's standards for notifying Congress. You're supposed to
report any particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses or
deficiency immediately to the Director, and, within seven days
of being informed, the Director must report them to the
Committee.
What standards would you apply in deciding whether a
problem, abuse or deficiency is particularly serious or
flagrant--the language of the requirement?
Mr. Buckley. Yes, sir. I have given this some thought, and
will review it again, if confirmed and in office.
But a serious or flagrant event, in my mind, is at least
any felony or felonious allegation, or could be, depending on
the position of the person. If it's an allegation against an
individual employee, it could be a serious misdemeanor,
depending on the circumstances surrounding the incident.
Deficiencies in operations could be wide-ranging, Mr. Vice
Chairman. But you do have my commitment to probably be
overnotifying the Committee, at least at first, so we can fine-
tune our relationship and communications.
Vice Chairman Bond. Should the Committee ask you to
testify, do you believe that you'd have to get the approval of
the CIA Director to do so?
Mr. Buckley. I do not.
Vice Chairman Bond. Now, one of the things the Chair and I
and the rest of the Committee have been very interested in is
leaks. We've had too much damage; we've lost too much
information because of leaks.
What do you think, as an Inspector General, you can do to
prevent leaks or discourage or uncover them?
Mr. Buckley. Leaks are an incredibly large problem in our
intelligence community and in our defense establishment. I
think that the role of the Inspector General, first and
foremost, is to review the policies and procedures and
activities of the Agency, the CIA, in its efforts to stem
leaks. And that's where I would probably start, with looking at
their programs to determine whether those policies and efforts
are being carried out in an appropriate manner or if we've got
some better ideas that we could offer that could
institutionalize training, certification and the like.
Vice Chairman Bond. One of the motivating factors, I
believe, in leaks, number one, they think it's an unpunished
crime. They can get publicity for this, and be a real champion.
What could be done, could you suggest anything as the IG,
that would make the publicity or any such publicity less
attractive or impinge upon their game plan?
Mr. Buckley. I think regardless of the type of crime, but
particularly in leaks, that the motivation of the offender is
one of the hardest things to come to grips with as the
investigation is taking place. And, Senator, as I presume you
know, when leak investigations are opened, they're largely
conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office
of Security.
Vice Chairman Bond. Yes.
Mr. Buckley. Again, I think that the whole process of
attempting to limit, understand and deter leaks probably needs
to be taken. We need to take a look at the whole process--what
are we doing to stem that tide and what additional things can
we add to the programs and policies that would strengthen our
ability to deter leaks.
Vice Chairman Bond. As I understand it, most of these crime
reports, though, do originate with the Agency and they may be
expected to put together a preliminary case to turn it over to
the DOJ. And I thought that's perhaps where you might come in,
and if your work discovers that, you may be the one to
institute it.
Mr. Buckley. I will take a look at that. If confirmed, I
will be happy to take a look at the soup-to-nuts program and
also the role of the Office of Inspector General in the leaks
avoidance.
Vice Chairman Bond. A final question. Do you, from what you
know of the legal authority, do you have sufficient clear
authority for your statutory responsibilities and expectations
for congressional independence and effectiveness, or do you see
any clarified authorities that you might need?
Mr. Buckley. Senator, I am familiar with the intelligence
authorization bill that the Senate passed, and there are
several provisions in that legislation that the Senate has
passed that would give the office of the Inspector General
maybe some further independence, or at least an appearance of
independence, as it relates to the General Counsel and a
separate appropriation request. I support both of those. I
think those are both good ideas.
Relative to other matters regarding the jurisdiction or
authorities of the office, I would have to wait to get in place
to review those. But I promise you I will do that, if
confirmed, and get back to the Committee.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, Mr. Buckley. We appreciate
the plug for our authorization bill. It's about time.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Buckley. Yes. Yes, sir.
Chairman Feinstein. Senator Whitehouse.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Buckley, welcome.
Mr. Buckley. Thank you.
Senator Whitehouse. And thank you for giving me some time
the other day. I appreciate it; enjoyed the opportunity to meet
you.
The CIA's detention and interrogation program has been the
subject of considerable inquiry by Congress, by the Department
of Justice, presumably also internally. As a general
proposition, as a matter of corporate governance, if you will,
I believe that a chief executive official of an organization
against which allegations have been made should have a chain of
reporting to him- or herself about that incident that does not
involve employees implicated in that incident or conduct.
Do you agree with me that that's a fairly basic principle
of corporate governance with respect to internal investigations
of claims of misconduct?
Mr. Buckley. I do, and I think, Senator, I believe that
that's one of the essential roles of the Inspector General, to
offer that independent capability to audit, investigate, and
inspect.
Senator Whitehouse. I would like to ask your assurance that
when, as and if you are confirmed and take this position, that
you familiarize yourself with the existing chain of reporting
relating to the CIA's detention and interrogation program to
the Director so that you are in a position to respond to
questions from this Committee, from members of this Committee,
about whether or not, as it presently is constituted it meets
that standard of corporate governance. Are you willing to do
that?
Mr. Buckley. I am.
Senator Whitehouse. Okay.
Mr. Buckley. Yes. Thank you.
Senator Whitehouse. That's the only question I had. I
enjoyed talking with you and look forward to working with you
in your new position.
I want to thank you for your many years of government
service in a variety of different organizations and, despite
your presumably more lucrative tenure in the private sector,
your willingness to step away from that and return to the
service of your country in this role. And it may have been
with--I gather you have three children in college.
Mr. Buckley. I do, Senator.
Senator Whitehouse. So it's a fairly consequential choice
for you to have made, and I want you to know that I appreciate
it; I believe all of us appreciate it.
Mr. Buckley. Thank you. I'm honored.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator
Whitehouse. I'm glad you made that statement. I know that both
the Vice Chairman and I concur with it, and we, too, thank you,
Mr. Buckley.
Senator Wyden is on his way. I beg your pardon. He just
entered the room. While he is walking up to the podium, let me
ask you this. As you use your prior experience and as you
review the powers of the CIA IG, do you believe you have all
the authority that you would need to proceed in a vigorous and
effective way?
Mr. Buckley. Madam Chair, as I understand the authorities
of the office today and the mission that lies ahead and the
mission that the good employees of that office are performing
today, I believe so. However, as I indicated, I think it's
important to take a look at, today, 2010, what the position of
the office and the authorities of the office require. And I
will come back to you if I see any deficiencies in those
authorities.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks to
you and the Vice Cair for holding this open. As you know, I've
taken a great interest in this position over the years and very
much appreciate your holding this hearing.
In 2007, the former CIA Director began his own inquiry into
the operations of the CIA Inspector General's Office. As you
know, I was quite outspoken in terms of taking objection to
this approach, this type of inquiry because I was of the view
it posed a direct threat to the Inspector General's
independence. I made it clear that I would do everything I
could to oppose this kind of approach. Other members of the
Committee voiced their objections as well, and the inquiry was
terminated.
Now, in your response to the pre-hearing questionnaire, you
stated that you do not believe it's appropriate for agency
heads to investigate their own Inspector General, and you
suggest a number of ways that agency heads can properly address
their concerns about inspectors general without resorting to
what in my view is an extremely inappropriate step.
So my question is, if a future CIA Director decides that
they are unhappy with the Inspector General and wants to
undermine the office's independence, my sense is we're not
going to see anything quite as ham-handed as what we saw
before, somebody just going out and opening their own
investigation.
But it's certainly easy to think that there would be more
subtle ways that the Director could try to undermine an
Inspector General to limit the Inspector General's activities.
They could, for example, restrict access to certain personnel.
They could attempt to limit the resources that an office has or
use classification as an excuse for limiting the Inspector
General's access to information.
My question to you is, if you are confirmed as Inspector
General, and a future director begins to undermine your
office's independence and your effectiveness, how would you
respond to something like that?
Mr. Buckley. Thank you, Senator Wyden. I appreciate that
question. My first response would be to discuss the matter with
the Director and to let him know--him or her--my position on
the matter. Presuming, based on your question, that it was the
intent to subtly undermine the office, my first stop would be
right here. I think that the first place that I would turn are
the Committees. I presume that an intermediate step could be
the Director of National Intelligence, but within the statute,
I believe that the Committee is the right place to start if I
perceive the undermining of the office's authorities or its
independence, whether they be subtle through budget or space,
or access to information or personnel.
Senator Wyden. The question, also if I might, with respect
to the release of Inspector General reports. The Inspector
General's Office produces a lot of audits and reports that are
routine, where the office is basically providing management
consulting to the rest of the CIA, but it also generates a
modest number of reports that are of significant national
interest. And I have felt for some time that it's important to
make appropriately redacted versions of these reports available
to the public.
One in particular is the Inspector General's report that
was done a number of years ago on the CIA's activities in the
run-up to 9/11. Senator Bond and I had to work for years and
years to get this report declassified. We thought it was of
significant historical value. It made the case for a number of
reforms that Congress tried to implement. And as the two of us
worked on a bipartisan basis to declassify the report, it
wasn't exactly clear who was responsible for balancing the
CIA's natural almost penchant for secrecy with the need to
determine whether disclosure would be in the public interest.
In your view, how would you go about striking that balance?
How should that balance be struck?
Mr. Buckley. Senator, as you know, the authority to
classify information does not rest with the Inspector General.
And if the Agency is appropriately classifying information--
we'll just start there, if you don't mind--and the matter is
appropriately classified and plain on its face that it should
be so, in order to declassify the information--make it either
through a redaction or declassification--we have to rely upon
the Director or whoever the classification authority is to make
that determination.
And, as the Inspector General, I will work with you and
with the Agency to make sure that the reports that my office
produces will be relevant and informative to the folks that
need the information--the Director and the Committees. And then
if an effort is made to declassify those or required to
declassify or redact, I will certainly participate
wholeheartedly in that endeavor.
Senator Wyden. Madam Chair, I had one additional question.
Would it be appropriate to ask it at this time?
Chairman Feinstein. It certainly would be.
Senator Wyden. Okay. One last question with respect to
legal interpretations you all do, and I want to put it in the
context of some of the discussion about interrogations. In
2004, the CIA Inspector General conducted a special review of
the CIA detention and interrogation program. Much of that
analysis is still classified, but anyone who reads the
unclassified version can see that the Inspector General's
Office conducted its own independent analysis of CIA
interrogations, the meaning of various laws with respect to
torture.
And I think it would be fair to say that the Office of the
Inspector General didn't necessarily agree with all of the
legal conclusions that were reached by the CIA General
Counsel's office. And I think it's also clear today that the
CIA General Counsel's office made some mistakes, costly
mistakes, by relying on questionable legal opinions from the
Department of Justice, rather than on legal analysis that would
actually stand up to public scrutiny.
So my question is, do you believe that it is appropriate
for the Office of the CIA Inspector General to conduct its own
legal analysis, rather than to rely on the conclusions of the
CIA General Counsel?
Mr. Buckley. Thank you, Senator. As you know, the CIA
General Counsel is the chief legal officer for the Director,
for the Central Intelligence Agency. That said, yes, I believe
that it is appropriate to review underpinnings of activities,
whether they're legal or policy in nature. And if it's based on
a legal interpretation, the Office of the Inspector General has
their own attorneys. And yes, I think it's fair game to be able
to look at those.
Senator Wyden. And who would you notify if you thought that
the CIA General Counsel was wrong? We all know what the
politics of this are, and I'm not going to try to drag in the
Bybee memo and things of this nature. But I do want to know, if
you thought that the CIA General Counsel was wrong, who would
you notify?
Mr. Buckley. I would notify the Director first, and if I
learned or we felt, the office felt that the wrong
interpretation or the apparent interpretation was leading to
activities that we thought were improper, I believe that might
raise to a serious deficiency as outlined in the statute, which
would require a written notification to the Congress.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator.
Just an additional question, if you'd like to ask. I'm
finished.
Vice Chairman Bond. Two general areas. Ten years ago
President Clinton directed major intelligence agencies to
produce auditable financial statements. I used to be an
auditor. I thought that was great. So far, only NRO's financial
statements have received a clean opinion. CIA's statement got a
disclaimer of opinion, auditor-speak of an F.
How important do you think it is for the CIA to achieve
clean financial statements to prevent fraud, waste, abuse? What
can you do to help the CIA achieve that goal?
Mr. Buckley. Thank you, Vice Chairman. I agree that the
books and records of any agency, but particularly an
intelligence agency, need to balance. And having not seen the
audit reports--or the financial statements, for that matter--I
can only envision some of the things that might cause a problem
in balancing those books from an auditor perspective.
But to answer your question, I will work closely with the
chief financial officer, and obviously our audit staff does
today and will continue to work closely with the CIA's CFO to
get those books and records in an auditable format so they can
be audited without disclaimer, or without at least a material
disclaimer.
Vice Chairman Bond. All right. Let's see.
We're also interested in assuring that the CIA is
accountable. We need to have a culture of personal
accountability. Do you have any ideas on establishing
accountability, or what do you think are the necessary
ingredients, and what can you as CIA OIG leader do to establish
and oversee the procedures to make sure they work?
Mr. Buckley. Yes, sir. Well, I'm a big proponent of
accountability in service and in deed. I will just speak, I
guess, from an investigation standpoint. As the office conducts
investigations, it obviously is going to find shortcomings in
personal behavior. I think it's an important role of the
Inspector General not so much to recommend the course of action
that might be indicated based on the misbehavior, but to make
sure that appropriate action is taken by the authority that has
that responsibility.
So the first thing that I would recommend is to take a look
and see if you've got a pattern or practice of not holding
people accountable. You can do that through an audit, by
looking back, what's the pattern of practice based on the
activities, the investigations, audits or inspections that have
indicated impropriety, and where accountability has been
recommended. Then you can figure out if you've got a pattern or
if you've got just a one- or two-off type of situation.
And the second thing is to actually track the activity or
the action taken based on the investigation that's been
referred for action, and that's something that I think is the
responsibility of the Inspector General, to make sure that the
work product is being used effectively, first of all. Are we
giving them a quality product that they can base action upon,
and are they taking appropriate action, and keep a record of
that and report that information as appropriate.
Vice Chairman Bond. I might just add by way of a side note
that we have seen in other areas of the IC where somebody who
has botched a job has moved out and up to get that person out
of a job and give them an even better assignment, which has
raised hackles and I think has not served the community well.
Well, I thank you, Mr. Buckley, and wish you well.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Vice Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Buckley. You've been straightforward,
concise and direct and it's very much appreciated.
It is my hope, Members, to have Mr. Buckley's nomination
confirmed by the full Senate prior to the upcoming recess, so
I'd like to ask that any Members with remaining questions
submit those questions by Thursday noon. That's two or three
hours short of 48 hours. And then the Committee can vote on the
nomination not later than next Tuesday. So that's agreeable,
and we will proceed along those lines.
And I thank you very much, and your family. My sense is you
will be confirmed and we wish you a very, very good and strong
tenure. So thank you very much.
Mr. Buckley. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]