Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Tuesday, March 12, 2013 - 10:00am
Location:
Hart 216
Witnesses
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 113-89]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-89
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY
THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, MARCH 12, 2013
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
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20402-0001
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
Virginia JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RON WYDEN, Oregon DANIEL COATS, Indiana
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
MARK WARNER, Virginia TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ANGUS KING, Maine
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio
----------
David Grannis, Staff Director
Martha Scott Poindexter, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
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MARCH 12, 2013
OPENING STATEMENTS
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1
Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia 3
WITNESS
Clapper, Hon. James R., Director of National Intelligence,
Accompanied by: Mueller, Hon. Robert, Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation; Brennan, John O., Director, Central
Intelligence Agency; Goldberg, Hon. Philip, Assistant Secretary
of State for Intelligence and Research; Olsen, Matthew,
Director, National Counterterrorism Center; and Flynn, Lt. Gen.
Michael T., Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.............. 6
Prepared Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community by James R.
Clapper.................................................... 13
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 12, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne
Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Chambliss,
Rockefeller, Wyden, Mikulski, Udall (of Colorado), Heinrich,
King, Coats, Rubio, and Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Chairman Feinstein. The Committee will come to order. We
meet today in open session, as we've done since 1994, actually,
to hear an unclassified briefing from our intelligence leaders
on the threats that face our nation; hence the title--the
``World Threat Hearing.''
As Members know, we will immediately follow this session
with a closed one, and I'll ask that Members refrain from
asking questions here that have classified answers. This
hearing is really a unique opportunity to inform the American
public, to the extent we can, about the threats we face as a
nation and worldwide.
Let me begin by welcoming our witnesses and thanking them
for being here. They are: The Director of National
Intelligence, Jim Clapper, who will provide the opening
statement on behalf of the Intelligence Community; the Director
of the CIA, new to the job, John Brennan--actually, it's his
fifth full day; the Director of the FBI, Bob Mueller, now
nearly twelve years on the job, and who, barring another
unforeseen intervention by the Congress, is appearing in his
last Worldwide Threat Hearing before this Committee--but Bob,
you never know; the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Flynn; the Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center, Matt Olsen; and the Assistant
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Ambassador
Phil Goldberg.
So welcome, all of you.
DNI Clapper, thank you for your Statement for the Record,
which I have read. It's submitted in both classified and
unclassified form, and we very much appreciate it.
It is clear that the threats to the United States are many.
They are diffused, and they are complex. We face a continuing
threat at home from terrorist attack, most notably from al-
Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, which we call AQAP, but also
from home grown extremists, such as Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood
shooter; Najibullah Zazi, who attempted to blow up the New York
subway; and Faisal Shahzad, the attempted Times Square bomber.
It's notable that the Statement for the Record includes the
assessment that, due to recent losses, the core of al-Qa'ida in
Pakistan--and I quote--``is probably unable to carry out large,
complex attacks in the West,'' end quote, although its desire
to do so hasn't changed. This appears to be a stronger
statement than in the past about the effect of counterterrorism
operations against al-Qa'ida.
Since last year's threat hearing, our staff has been
keeping a tally of terrorism-related arrests in the United
States. With the arrest on March 5th of Riaz Khan, for
conspiring to provide material support to terrorists in
connection with the suicide bombing of ISI headquarters in
Pakistan, there have now been 105 terrorism-related arrests in
the United States in the past four years. We have actually
listed these, and that's the number: 105 arrests in the last
four years. In our federal criminal court system, those arrests
will most likely lead to a conviction or a guilty plea. If
those arrests have not resulted in convictions or guilty pleas,
it is only because the case is still ongoing.
Another indicator of the success of our criminal justice
system in prosecuting terrorists is, in 2011, the Department of
Justice released a list of terrorism trials conducted since
2001 and reported a total of 438 convictions from September 11,
2001 to December 31, 2010; so in those nine years, 438
convictions in federal courts.
We have also been briefed recently on the detention and
arrest of Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, Osama bin Laden's son-in-law and
al-Qa'ida spokesman. And I'd like to commend the witnesses for
your agencies' work in bringing him to the United States to be
prosecuted in the federal criminal court, where he faces a life
sentence.
Of course, as the terrorist threat has receded, the threat
from cyber attack and cyber espionage has grown. We have seen
large-scale denial-of-service attacks against United States
banks, and recent public reports, including by the computer
security firm Mandiant, about massive cyber penetrations and
loss of intellectual property from United States businesses.
I am very concerned, also, about the instability that seems
to be festering across Northern Africa--from Mali to Egypt to
Libya and beyond, breeding and harboring a new generation of
extremists. Some of the governments in the region are unable or
unwilling to take action against these terrorist groups,
meaning that the rest of the world will need to focus energy
and attention to preventing a safe haven and launching pad for
future attacks.
In Syria, there is a massive and still-growing humanitarian
disaster under way, with no end in sight, as the regime and the
opposition appear nearly at a stalemate. This Committee has
been very concerned about the possibility that President Bashar
Assad would become sufficiently desperate to use its chemical
weapons stockpile. And I note that the DNI's statement includes
exactly that warning.
I know the President has expressed that the use of chemical
weapons would be a redline for the United States, and I would
predict that the United States Senate would demand a strong and
swift response should the use of such weapons occur.
Of course, Syria is not the only WMD state to be making
headlines. North Korea has claimed a third nuclear weapons
test, has displayed a road-mobile ballistic missile, and
demonstrated the capability of its Taepodong-2 missile. The
regime is now disavowing the 1953 armistice with the South.
There's perhaps nowhere else on Earth where the capacity to
wreak enormous damage is matched by the possibility of North
Korea using their nuclear weapons.
Both the Syrian and North Korean examples demonstrate the
need to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, yet its
work at Natanz and Fordow continue, and Revolutionary Guard and
Hezbollah proxies are growing bolder and more capable of their
terrorist attack plotting around the world.
So these, and many other threats and challenges, face the
Intelligence Community and play a very critical role in
providing warning to United States policymakers, and to
providing insight to shape their policy decisions.
Unfortunately, the IC is being asked to do this work under the
self-inflicted damage of sequestration.
I know, Director Clapper, that you have been planning for
sequestration and would like to speak to its effects. I have an
amendment to the appropriations legislation currently on the
Senate Floor that will provide the Community with as much
flexibility as possible to implement the cuts made by
sequestration, in the same way as the rest of the Department of
Defense, to make sure that intelligence efforts, and therefore
our national security, can proceed as much the same as
possible.
Let me now turn to the distinguished Vice Chairman, Saxby
Chambliss, for his opening remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Well thanks, Madam Chair, and I
join in welcoming Director Clapper, as well as all of our other
witnesses today, and particularly Mr. Brennan, as his first
testimony as the Director of CIA--Mr. Director,
congratulations; and to Bob Mueller--I had a conversation with
Bob when his last term was ending, and implored him to think
about staying.
I will expect to have that conversation again with you,
Director Mueller; we may not be successful this time. But you
have provided great leadership at a great agency, and all of
America is safer because of the kind of leadership that you
have provided. We'll have many more opportunities, I hope, to
say thanks, but we don't want to miss any of those
opportunities.
I particularly appreciate all of you being here today to
talk about the threats that face our nation. These threats come
in all forms--terrorism, espionage, cyber, and good old
fashioned counterintelligence--and from all corners of the
globe. Today, the American people have the chance to hear
first-hand from those on the front lines what these threats
mean to the security of our nation.
Let me just start out by noting that today's hearing
follows a lively discussion over the past month about the
potential for the domestic use of drones. While the
administration has put many fears to rest over the last few
days, this debate brought new attention to the difficulty
Congress often faces in getting information from the executive
branch.
The Intelligence Community is obligated, under the National
Security Act, to keep the congressional intelligence committees
fully and currently informed of its intelligence activities,
including covert action. We cannot do the oversight the
American people expect of us if every request for information
becomes a protracted battle.
As a group, our witnesses represent the entire Intelligence
Community, and each of you has made a commitment to this
Committee to provide information when we request it. We
understand there may be rare exceptions to this rule, but we
are now operating in an environment in which the exception has
become the rule, and this simply has to stop.
Let me now turn to the threats facing our nation. We've
heard it said over the past year that core al-Qa'ida has been
decimated and is on the run. Its Pakistan-based leadership is
crumbling under the pressure of U.S. and allied
counterterrorism efforts.
But new threats, posed by al-Qa'ida affiliates and other
similar organizations, are emerging--and possibly expanding--in
places like Yemen, North Africa, and Mali. The past six months
alone have brought the terrorist attacks in Benghazi and
Algeria that claimed innocent American lives. Clearly, these
attacks show that radical and extreme ideologies are not going
away anytime soon. Instead, these terrorist organizations are
regrouping and gathering strength.
When we entered Afghanistan in October 2001, our goal was
to put the al-Qa'ida terrorist training camps and military
installations of the Taliban regime out of business. Now, as we
prepare to leave Afghanistan nearly twelve years later, the
Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and similar groups in Afghanistan
and Pakistan seem to have mostly survived years of
counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations. This raises
the inevitable question of whether these groups will be able to
create a sanctuary, like we saw before 9/11, once the U.S.
coalition withdraws in 2014.
As we face new threats from al-Qa'ida affiliates, we are
badly overdue for a long-term detention policy that allows us
to fully and effectively interrogate terrorist detainees. Last
week, Osama bin Laden's son-in-law was indicted in federal
court in New York after being captured overseas. While Sulaiman
Abu Ghaith is finally facing justice for his long affiliation
with bin Laden and al-Qa'ida, I firmly believe this
administration's refusal to place new detainees at Guantanamo
Bay is hurting our ability to collect intelligence.
It seems as though we now either just kill terrorists or
give them Miranda warnings. Dead terrorists don't talk. And
when we Mirandize the ones we do capture, after just 50
minutes, or 90 minutes, we aren't likely to get the timely
intelligence we need. Three years ago, we had the same
conversation, following the failed Christmas Day Bombing, and
I'm disappointed that this scenario seems to be repeating
itself.
Whether Abu Ghaith is ultimately tried in federal court or
a military commission is not the primary question; it is
whether we maximize our opportunity to gather good intelligence
up front. Waiting for a potential plea deal before getting
access again, as we saw with the Christmas Day Bomber, is, I
believe, simply the wrong approach.
I'm very concerned that we have returned to the dangerous
pre-9/11 reactive mindset, where international terrorists were
treated as ordinary criminals. This is a mistake we should not
repeat. The administration's handling of Abu Ghaith also seems
to directly contradict the National Defense Authorization Act,
which specifically called for individuals like him to be held
in military custody.
Now, I understand that the administration adopted
procedures that effectively undermined the spirit of this
military custody requirement. And what I believe is an abuse of
the NDAA's waiver provision, the administration created broad,
accepted categories under which they can continue to avoid
placing terrorists in military custody. I would simply ask--if
someone like Abu Ghaith will not be held in military custody
for interrogation purposes, then who will be?
Of course, terrorism is not our only threat. The
possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, and North
Korea's nuclear test, and other provocations, merit our close
attention, as does the increasing conflict in Syria. It is
critical that we ensure the Intelligence Community can give us
a clear reading into these ``hot spots'' and to what may lie
over the horizon.
At the same time, cyber espionage and intrusions are
growing every day, and if we are going to prevent the siphoning
off of our intellectual property to hackers and nation-states
alike, then Congress must work with the private sector in a
truly cooperative way. We must pass voluntary information
sharing legislation that completely protects companies from the
threat of lawsuits. The government must put its own cyber house
in order, and we must make sure that our criminal penalties are
sufficient to punish and deter cyber intruders.
Gentlemen, today is your opportunity to give the country a
real glimpse of what it means to be on the front lines of the
Intelligence Community. There is no doubt that today's slimming
budgets, combined with increasing and diverse threats, clearly
present a challenge to the entire Intelligence Community.
Your task is not an easy one. But I am confident that the
men and women of the Intelligence Community, who work so hard
every day in defense of this nation, will rise to this
challenge and not only get the job done, but, under your
leadership, they will do it well.
Madam Chair, I thank you and look forward to a discussion
with our witnesses.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much for those comments.
We will now proceed. Director Clapper, you have the floor, and
it's my understanding you're going to make the comments on
behalf of everyone?
Director Clapper. Yes, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. And then we will be able to ask
questions. The rounds will be five minutes because we have a
classified hearing, and we will go according to seniority,
alternating sides.
Please proceed, Director Clapper.
STATEMENT OF JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
Director Clapper. Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman
Chambliss, and distinguished Members of the Committee, as you
indicated, we're here to present the 2013 Worldwide Threat
Assessment. You already introduced my colleagues, but I do want
to speak very briefly about, sort of, the alpha and omega of
tenure in the Intelligence Community.
Bob Mueller, approaching now twelve years in office, is a
very distinguished director of the FBI, and a tremendous
colleague for me--in this job and in previous ones I've held.
And of course, I could not be more delighted and more proud
to have John Brennan confirmed and installed as Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency. It's my view that John will go
down as one of the distinguished directors of CIA.
These remarks and our two Statements for the Record--one
unclassified, and then a much more detailed classified one--
reflect the collective judgments of the extraordinary men and
women of the United States Intelligence Community. And it's our
privilege--those of us who are here and those who aren't--a
privilege and honor to serve in these positions to lead them,
and now, as I will discuss shortly, our solemn duty to try to
protect them.
As you know, Madam Chairman, I have serious reservations
about conducting open hearings on the worldwide threat,
especially the question and answer sessions. While I believe
it's important to keep the American public informed about the
threats that our nation faces, I believe that can be done
through unclassified opening statements and statements for the
record. As you also know, we're ready to answer any and all of
your questions in closed session, but an open hearing on
intelligence matters is something of a contradiction in terms.
While our statements for the record and your opening
statements can be reviewed in advance for classification
issues, our answers to your questions cannot. And our attempts
to avoid revealing classified information sometimes leads to
misinterpretation, or accusations that we're being circumspect
for improper reasons. It's a hazard we have encountered when
publicly discussing sensitive details of national security
matters.
So, when we ask to discuss certain matters in the closed
session, it's not to evade, but rather to protect our
intelligence sources and methods and, if I might add, to be
sensitive to the often delicate relations we have with our
allies and partners. They, too, all carefully listen to and
watch these hearings, as I have learned the hard way.
The topic that you both alluded to--the topic that is
foremost on our minds this year--is, of course, sequestration.
You haven't seen much public discourse on the impact of these
indiscriminate cuts on intelligence. We haven't been on the
talk shows, and you don't read much about it in the printed
media. So, let me now be blunt--for you, and for the American
people: sequestration forces the Intelligence Community to
reduce all intelligence activities and functions without regard
to impact our mission.
In my considered judgment as the nation's senior
intelligence officer, sequestration jeopardizes our nation's
safety and security, and this jeopardy will increase over time.
The National Intelligence Program, or NIP, as it's called,
which I manage, is spread across six cabinet departments and
two independent agencies. Much of it is included in the DoD
budget.
For that portion of the NIP, the Congress directed that the
National Intelligence Program use an even more onerous set of
rules to carry out these cuts than that imposed on the Defense
Department. This restrictive Program, Project, and Activity--or
PPA structure, as it's known--compounds the damage because it
restricts our ability to manage where to take deductions in a
balanced and rational way.
Accordingly, the sheer size of the budget cut--well over $4
billion, or about 7 percent of the NIP--will directly compel us
to do less with less. I'll give you some examples--and I'll
have to be circumspect here in an open, unclassified setting,
but we're prepared to speak more specifically in a classified
setting--of the impacts of sequestration.
We'll reduce HUMINT, technical, and counterintelligence
operations, resulting in fewer collection opportunities while
increasing the risk of strategic surprise. This includes, for
example, possibly furloughing thousands of FBI employees funded
in the National Intelligence Program.
Our cyber efforts will be impacted. This is an area where,
as you all know, we need to keep ahead of rapid technology
advances to maintain and increase access to adversaries as well
as provide warning of a cyber attack against the U.S.
Critical analysis and tools will be cut back. So, we'll
reduce global coverage, and may risk missing the early signs of
a threat. Our response to customers will suffer, as well.
We'll let go over five thousand contractors--and that
number may grow--who are an integral part of the Intelligence
Community. And this is on top of the thousands of contractors
we've let go in previous years.
We'll delay major systems acquisitions, and we'll
decommission older, but still productive, overhead
reconnaissance capabilities, thus reducing coverage. Virtually
all of the 39 major systems acquisitions across the
Intelligence Community would be wounded.
We'll have to re-negotiate contracts, and slip schedules to
the right, which, in the long run, will cost us more. And we'll
scale back cutting-edge research that helps us maintain a
strategic advantage.
Since we're already halfway through the fiscal year, the
mandate of across-the-board cuts is equivalent to 13 percent,
because we'll be forced to take them in just seven months.
These condensed timelines magnify the impact these cuts will
have on the IC.
So, in response, our approach starts with the premise that
mission comes first. Therefore, our two highest priorities are,
one, to protect our most valuable resource--our civilian
workforce--so we can focus on the threats we face; and two, to
support overseas operations.
Our civilian workforce works 24/7 around the world, and is
crucial to performing that mission. It is our civilian
professionals who will provide the resilience and ingenuity to
help compensate for the other cuts we'll incur. I am resolutely
committed to minimizing the number and lengths of furloughs
that would be required, not only because of the direct impact
on our mission, but because of the severe impact on the morale
of the people who do it. I plan to follow Deputy Secretary of
Defense Ash Carter's sterling example and have my pay reduced,
as well, in solidarity with any IC employees that have to be
furloughed.
Now, let me emphasize here that we are not arguing against
taking our share of the budget reductions. What I am saying is
that we must manage this budget crisis and continue our vital
missions. And, in so doing, we'll minimize the impact on our
nation and on our employees. Therefore, I plan to submit a
reprogramming action that mitigates some of the most egregious
cuts to help us cut in a more rational, mission-focused manner.
And in this, I'm asking for your support, and the other
intelligence oversight committees, for expedited management and
consideration.
And Madam Chairman, I want to, on behalf of the entire
Intelligence Community, thank you for your leadership and your
care for the mission of the Intelligence Community and for
introducing a bill that would give us that flexibility.
Now, I must tell you that, unfortunately, I've seen this
movie before. Twenty years ago, I served as Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency--the job that Lieutenant General
Mike Flynn has now. We were then enjoying reaping the peace
dividend occasioned by the end of the Cold War.
We reduced the Intelligence Community by 23 percent. During
the mid to late 1990s, we closed many CIA stations, reduced
HUMINT collectors, cut analysts, allowed our overhead
architecture to atrophy, and we neglected basic infrastructure
needs, such as power, space, and cooling, and we let our
facilities decay. And most damaging, most devastatingly, we
badly distorted the workforce.
All of that, of course, was reversed in the wake of 9/11.
And thanks to the support of the Congress over the last decade,
we rebuilt the Intelligence Community into the premier of such
capability on the planet. And now, if we're not careful, we
risk another damaging downward spiral. So I'm going to do all I
can to prevent history from repeating that cycle.
But, to be clear, the scope and magnitude of the cuts
already under way will be long lasting. Unlike more directly-
observable sequestration impacts, like shorter hours of public
parks, or longer security lines at airports, the degradation to
intelligence will be insidious. It will be gradual and almost
invisible--unless and until, of course, we have an intelligence
failure.
With that preface as a backdrop, let me turn now to a brief
wave-top review of global threat trends and challenges;
although, Madam Chairman, you and the Vice Chair have, I think,
done an admirable job of that already.
I will say that in my almost fifty years of intelligence, I
do not recall a period in which we've confronted a more diverse
array of threats, crises, and challenges around the world,
which you both described. To me, this makes sequestration even
more incongruous. This year's threat assessment illustrates how
dramatically the world and our threat environment are changing.
Threats are growing more interconnected and viral. Events
that at first seem local and irrelevant can quickly set off
transnational disruptions that affect U.S. national interests.
It's a world in which our definition of war now includes a soft
version. We can add cyber and financial to the list of weapons
being used against us. And such attacks can be deniable and
non-attributable.
So, when it comes to the distinct threat areas, our
statement this year leads with cyber. And it's hard to
overemphasize its significance.
Increasingly, state and non-state actors are gaining and
using cyber expertise. They apply cyber techniques and
capabilities to achieve strategic objectives, by gathering
sensitive information from public and private sector entities,
controlling the content and flow of information, and
challenging perceived adversaries of cyber space.
These capabilities put all sectors of our country at risk--
from government and private networks to critical
infrastructures. We see indications that some terrorist
organizations are interested in developing offensive cyber
capabilities, and that cyber criminals are using a growing
black market to sell cyber tools that fall into the hands of
both state and non-state actors.
This year, we include natural resources as a factor
affecting national security because shifts in human geography,
climate, disease, and competition for natural resources have
national security implications. Many countries that are
extremely important to U.S. interests that sit in already-
volatile areas of the world are living with extreme water and
food stress that can destabilize governments. This includes
Afghanistan and Pakistan in South Asia, Egypt, Iraq, Syria,
Yemen, and Libya in the Arab world, and many other nation-
states across Africa and in our own hemisphere.
Water challenges include not only problems with quality and
quantity, but with flooding. Some countries will almost
certainly exert leverage over their neighbors to preserve their
own water interests, and water infrastructure can be considered
a viable target for terrorists.
In the United States, Germany, and Japan, less than 15
percent of household expenditures are for food. In India and
China, that figure climbs to more than 20 percent. In Egypt,
Vietnam, and Nigeria, it rises to greater than 35 percent. And
in Algeria, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan, more than 45 percent of
household expenses are just for food.
Terrorists, militants, and international crime groups are
certain to use declining local food security to gain legitimacy
and undermine government authority. Intentional introduction of
a livestock or plant disease could be a greater threat to the
United States and the global food system than a direct attack
on food supplies intended to kill humans.
So there will most assuredly be security concerns with
respect to health and pandemics, energy, and climate change.
Environmental stressors are not just humanitarian issues; they
legitimately threaten regional stability.
On the issue of terrorism, the threat from core al-Qa'ida
and the potential for a massive coordinated attack on the
United States is diminished, but the global jihadist movement
is a more diversified, decentralized, and persistent threat.
Lone wolves, domestic extremists, and jihadist-inspired groups
remain determined to attack Western interests, as they have
done most recently in Libya and Algeria.
The turmoil in the Arab world has brought a spike in
threats to U.S. interests. The rise of new governments in
Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya, along with ongoing unrest in
Syria and Mali, provide openings for opportunistic individuals
and groups. In these and other regions of the world, extremists
can take advantage of diminished counterterrorism capabilities,
porous borders, and internal stressors; most especially, a high
proportion of unemployed young males.
Development and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction is another major threat to U.S. interests. North
Korea has already demonstrated capabilities that threaten the
United States and the security environment in East Asia.
It announced last month that it concluded its third nuclear
test, and last April, it displayed what appears to be a road-
mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. We believe North
Korea has already taken initial steps towards fielding this
system, although it remains untested. It also used its
Taepdong-2 launch vehicle to put a satellite in orbit in
December, thus demonstrating its long-range missile technology.
These developments have been accompanied with extremely
aggressive public rhetoric towards the United States and the
Republic of Korea.
Iran continues to develop technical expertise in a number
of areas, including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and
ballistic missiles, from which it could draw it if decided to
build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons. These technical
advancements strengthen our assessment that Tehran has the
scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to produce
nuclear weapons. This makes the central issue its political
will to do so. Such a decision will reside with the supreme
leader, and at this point, we don't know if he'll eventually
decide to build nuclear weapons.
The United States and our allies are tracking Syria's
munitions stockpiles, particularly its chemical and biological
warfare agents, which are all part of a large, complex, and
geographically dispersed program. Its advanced chemical weapons
program has the potential to inflict mass casualties.
This adds to our concern that the increasingly beleaguered
regime, having found its escalation of violence through
conventional means inadequate, might be preparing to use
chemical weapons against the Syrian people. And besides the
regime's use, non-governmental groups or individuals in Syria
could gain access to such materials.
Let me now briefly address regional threats around the
world. Some nations in the Middle East and North Africa are
making progress toward Democratic rule, but most are
experiencing levels of violence and political backsliding.
Islamic actors have been the chief beneficiaries of the
political openings, and extremist parties in Egypt, Tunisia,
and Morocco will probably solidify their influence this year.
After almost two years of conflict in Syria, the erosion of
the regime's capabilities is accelerating. We see this in its
territorial losses, military manpower, and logistic shortages.
The regime's aggressive violence and the deteriorating security
conditions have led to increased civilian casualties.
This sort of violence too often accompanies major political
upheaval, being perpetuated by elites trying to assert or
retain control. This violence and economic dislocation has led
to more than two million Syrians being displaced, both
internally and externally.
In Iran, leaders are exploiting the unrest in the Arab
world to try to spread influence abroad and undermine the
United States and our allies. However, Tehran faces a worsening
financial outlook since sanctions were implemented in 2012 on
its oil exports and central bank.
Iran continues to be a destabilizing force in the region,
providing weapons and training to Syrian forces, and standing
up a militia force there to fight the Syrian opposition. Iran's
efforts to secure regional dominance, however, achieve limited
results, and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria would be a
major strategic loss for Tehran.
In Iraq, sectarian tensions are rising between the majority
Shi'a and minority Sunni. Last year, we saw a rise in vehicle
and suicide bombings by al-Qa'ida in Iraq. However, AQI almost
certainly lacks the strength to overwhelm Iraqi security
forces, and Iraq is producing and exporting oil at its highest
levels in two decades.
Moving to South Asia, the Taliban-led insurgency has
diminished in some areas of Afghanistan, but remains resilient
and capable of challenging U.S. and international goals. The
coalition drawdown will have an impact on Afghanistan's
economy, which is likely to decline after 2014.
In Pakistan, the government made no concerted effort to
institute much-needed policy and tax reforms, and the country
faces extremely challenging prospects for sustainable economic
growth. On a more positive note, this past year, the Pakistani
armed forces continued their operations in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA, which have been safe havens
for al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. Pakistan also saw fewer domestic
attacks from the militant group of TTP.
Across Africa, violence, corruption, and extremism will
threaten U.S. interests this year. We've seen strides in
development in some areas--Ghana here, is noteworthy. And
international efforts have combined with domestic support to
bring more stability to Somalia. But we still see unresolved
conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, extremist attacks in
Nigeria, the collapse of governance in Northern Mali, and
persistent conflict in Central Africa, especially in the great
lakes region.
China is supplementing its more advanced military
capabilities by bolstering maritime law enforcement to support
its claims in the South and East China Seas. It continues its
military buildup and its aggressive information-stealing
campaigns.
Russia will continue to resist putting more international
pressure on Syria or Iran, and will continue to display its
great sensitivity to missile defense.
Closer to home, despite positive trends toward democracy
and economic development, Latin America and the Caribbean
contend with weak institutions, slow recovery from devastating
natural disasters, and drug-related violence and trafficking,
which, of course, is a major threat to the United States.
On another aspect of transnational organized crime, roughly
20 million human beings are being trafficked around the world,
an issue on which we've increased our efforts to support law
enforcement. Virtually every country on the face of the Earth
is a source, a transit point, or a destination for human
trafficking, and some fall in more than one category.
In sum, given the magnitude and complexity of our global
responsibilities, our strong, persistent, and reliable
intelligence capabilities have never been more important or
urgent, and I have trouble reconciling this imperative with
sequestration.
With that, I thank you for your attention, and we are ready
to address your questions.
[The Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, prepared by
Director Clapper, follows:]
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Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Director Clapper,
and thank you for the written comments, as well--I think
they're excellent.
Director Mueller, in a quick question, I mentioned the 100
terrorist-related arrests in the United States since January of
2009, and the number of convictions since 2011 at over 400.
Let me ask you this question: Has the FBI been impeded in
its ability to conduct investigations or collect intelligence
from terrorist suspects because of the need to read Miranda
rights or present a suspect to a court?
Director Mueller. It's hard to respond specifically,
because there may be an occasion where it was an issue in an
investigation, but for the most part, the answer is no. If you
talk to agents who do this for a living, I think they would
tell you that it is their ability to elicit information by
developing rapport with individuals that is a prime mover, in
terms of providing the appropriate intelligence.
And let me, if I could, put in context what I think is the
underselling, or the underestimating, the ability of the
criminal justice system to produce intelligence. I, for one,
understand that if there is a terrorist attack, it is going to
be on us. I, for one, am very concerned about maximizing the
access to intelligence. One of the things I do think is
underestimated is the ability of the criminal justice system to
do just that.
There has not been--well, there are very, very few cases,
of the numbers that you mentioned, where we have not ultimately
obtained the cooperation of the individual, albeit going
through--as the Senator points out--going through the criminal
justice system.
But we have a number of cases where we have convicted
persons, and because of our plea bargaining in our system, we
have gotten the cooperation we need. And that cooperation has
led to our testifying in cases in the UK and elsewhere because
we had intelligence, from our system, that they did not have.
If you look at three of the cases that were prominent in
terms of providing intelligence--you start with David Headley,
out of Chicago, who opened the door to us in terms of the
Mumbai attacks; if you look at Najibullah Zazi in the plot to
bomb the New York City subway, that case couldn't have
proceeded without his full cooperation; and then another
individual by the name of Bryant Neal Vinas.
In every case, we try to look at the best option. And I'm
not saying that--in certain cases, the military tribunal option
is not the best option to go. But I do think that the ability
of the criminal justice system to produce intelligence is often
overlooked.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
For either Director Clapper or Mr. Brennan: In light of
recent warnings by North Korea, including the renunciation of
the ceasefire with South Korea after six decades, does the IC
assess that they could actually take provocative action that
could lead to a renewal of active hostilities with the South?
Director Clapper. Let me start, and then John can jump in.
Absolutely. I, personally, having followed Korea ever since
I served there in the mid 1980s as the Director of Intelligence
for U.S. Forces Korea, am very concerned about the actions of
the new young leader--very belligerent--and the rhetoric that
has been emanating from the North Korean regime.
The rhetoric, while it is propaganda-laced, is also an
indicator of their attitude, and perhaps their intent. So, for
my part, I am very concerned about what they might do, and they
certainly, if they so choose, could initiate a provocative
action against the South.
Chairman Feinstein. Director Brennan, would you like to add
to that?
Director Brennan. I would agree with Director Clapper. This
is a very dynamic time right now, with the new leader. I think
it also just underscores the importance of making sure that our
analytic capabilities, as well as our collection capabilities,
are as strong as possible, because what we're talking about are
developments that have strategic importance and potential
consequence for U.S. interests, not just in northeast Asia, but
also globally.
So I think this is one of the areas that we, as the
Intelligence Community, and certainly the CIA, need to pay
particularly close attention to.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks, Madam Chair.
Director Clapper, let me just address for one second your
comments relative to sequestration, and just initially say that
we are spending too much money in Washington. I don't think
there's any disagreement about that. And actually, the
reduction in $1.2 billion in spending is not a bad idea.
But your reference to the way in which we're doing it is
exactly right. It's a foolish way to reduce spending--to tell
every aspect of the federal government, ``You don't have a
choice. You're mandated to reduce spending across the board by
whatever the dollar amount is in your specific agency, or your
office.''
Let me just give you the assurance, and everybody here at
the table, the assurance that the Chairman, myself, and every
Member of this Committee is committed to ensuring that the
Intelligence Community does not suffer from the lack of
resources. One thing the Constitution is very clear about is
that it is the role of Congress to provide for the national
security of Americans. And we intend to honor our obligation.
You, and the men and women that work under you, are very
professional, and you're doing your job. You're doing exactly
what we ask you to do. So we want you to know that we're
committing to do everything within our power to ensure that the
resources are there to allow you to continue to do what you're
asked to do every single day.
Director Clapper. Senator Chambliss, first, I very much
appreciate that. I think, on behalf of the men and women in the
entire Intelligence Community, now, more than ever, we are
dependent on, particularly, our two oversight committees--this
one and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence--
to be our stewards and our advocates.
That said, let me stress that I am not, and none of us are,
suggesting that we won't take our fair share of the cuts.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Sure.
Director Clapper. All we're asking for is the latitude on
how to take them, to minimize the damage.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. And I know you mean it exactly
that way, and we're going to have your back on this as we go
through this. It's not going to be easy, but we're going to
work hard to do it right.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Vice Chairman, a point of personal
privilege--I have to go to the Floor on the continuing
resolution. May I respond to your comments, the Chair and
General Clapper, in terms of the state of play?
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Sure.
Senator Mikulski. We have a continuing resolution on the
Floor. This does not deal with the sequester--that's being
negotiated by the higher powers, whether it's a charm offensive
or whether it's an offensive. My job, along with Senator
Shelby's, is to move the continuing resolution. We are working
steadily, on a bipartisan basis, to do that.
But the money is spartan, and it is frugal. And in terms of
the flexibility that you've just asked for, that the Chair has
spoken pretty firmly with me about, along with other Members,
we will not have that in our bill. We were told that was a
poison pill. And I'm not just saying that to you, Mr. Clapper,
but to our colleagues. And I would like that as we go through
the rest of the day, we could talk to see if we could have an
amendment that would accomplish that.
But we were told, by both the House and by others, that
this was a poison pill. I'd like to do everything I can to not
only get you the money, but the administrative framework for
you to properly do the money.
So if we could work together, if I could have your help,
but I can't deal--first of all, I can say nothing but positive
things about Senator Shelby; we've worked very well, we've co-
sponsored our bill. But if we can do what you want us to do, we
need help. And if we could do that, we would. We do want to
work with you. We so admire you.
And I'm going to my other duty station.
Director Clapper. Senator Mikulski, if I may just--again,
in the complex arcana of PPAs, all we're asking for is to be
treated identically as the Department of Defense. And the same
PPA arrangement as the larger Department gets, so would we. But
we have been singled out for very small exacting PPAs, which
greatly restricts the latitude to move money around to mitigate
the damage.
Chairman Feinstein. And Director, as the Senator knows, the
only thing that this amendment would do that's being introduced
today--and I will give this to the Chairman--is essentially to
give you that authority. You would be treated as defense units
are treated.
Senator Mikulski. Madam Chair, I welcome you giving me this
amendment. I'd also like you to give it to Senators Reid and
McConnell, Boehner, and the House Democratic leadership, as
well.
Chairman Feinstein. Will do.
Senator Mikulski. You know, again, I always hoped that a
higher power would be on my side. The Pope, they meet for--we
will have a new Pope, and I'd like you to have new flexibility.
Okay?
Chairman Feinstein. Okay.
Senator Mikulski. But it's going to take higher power, and
this is what you need to show them.
Chairman Feinstein. We will--today.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you. Because it's not Shelby-
Mikulski here.
Chairman Feinstein. Okay. Thank you very much.
Shall we continue?
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Let me direct this to both
Director Clapper and Director Mueller: Obviously, we're still
in the stage of remorse, relative to the death of four brave
Americans in Benghazi. The American people have demanded
answers, and frankly, we have not been able to provide them the
types of answers that they have asked to this point because we
haven't been given all of the answers.
I realize we're in an open hearing, but what I would like
to ask Director Clapper and Director Mueller is to tell the
American people--number one, Director Clapper, what are our
lessons learned here, as we move forward? We know we have a lot
of other vulnerable spots around the world.
Director Mueller, what can you, in an open hearing, tell us
about the progress towards bringing these murderers to justice?
Director Clapper. Well, first of all, Senator Chambliss, I
think one lesson in this is a greater emphasis on the
Intelligence Community on force protection for our diplomat
facilities. And I can, in a closed context, go into
specifically what I mean by that. And that clearly was, I
think, a shortfall for us, having a better appreciation of the
tactical situation at a diplomatic facility.
I guess the other lesson learned is--don't do talking
points, unclassified talking points. That's the other lesson I
learned.
Director Mueller. With regard to the investigation,
Senator, a couple of points: Since this occurred, we've had
teams on the ground in Tripoli, and elsewhere around the world,
conducting the investigation.
With regard to the cooperation of the Libyan authorities,
there is a willingness exhibited by their actions to cooperate.
However, it is exceptionally difficult, particularly in eastern
Libya, in Benghazi. And that has been a hurdle that we have not
seen elsewhere where we've had similar incidents.
Nonetheless, we have received the cooperation from the
Libyan authorities. I traveled there in January to continue to
coordinate with them. And I will say that the investigation has
not been stymied. There are hurdles that we've had to overcome,
but it's ongoing, and I believe it will only prove to be
fruitful.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks very much, gentlemen.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
I'll give the next four and see what happens in terms of
arrival: Rockefeller, Burr, Wyden, and Udall.
Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I cannot help, Director Clapper and John Brennan, but bring
up the subject that Saxby did in his opening comments, because
to me talk was just given about a good relationship between the
Intelligence Community and Congress. What happened over the
last couple of weeks is a threat; is a threat to trust--between
us and you, us towards you, you towards us. And I'm going to
ask for comments just from the director, and from Director
Brennan.
What basically happened was we were given certain things
that we requested, primarily because you, sir, were up for
confirmation. And had we not been given some of those things
which we requested, the confirmation would not have had the
votes, and it wouldn't have mattered who had been put up.
It's a terrible situation. And I think you're absolutely
superb, absolutely superb. I've been through every--for the
last almost thirty years, I've been through every CIA director,
and I think you're the best. And I mean that.
But the irony was that we were given certain things to look
at, and then we were told, as we did that, when we finally got
our staff to be allowed to participate--this goes all the way
back to 2001. Then ``minders''--as I sat with my intelligence
expert in a room to read these opinions, there was a Department
of Justice ``minder'' who was sent in to watch us. I was not
aware that that person was going to have to be there. That was
an insult to me, and I kicked the person out. She said, ``My
orders are I have to be here.'' And then I said something
else--I told her to leave.
We have to find a way for us to trust each other. And I
don't think that we've--maybe, mutually--but in any event, we
haven't figured it out. Things, after the confirmation, went
directly back to the way they were from 2001/2002 to 2007. We
had a classified briefing, and all of our staff was kicked out.
All of our staff was kicked out, with one exception--two
exceptions. I was outraged.
And you can talk about worldwide threats, but unless we
have our common purpose together, like it was after 9/11, where
everybody was on the same team. Everybody was fighting for the
same thing. Everybody was working with everybody else. That was
the deal. We were eager to do it. The first bill that passed
after 9/11 was allowing the FBI and the CIA to talk to each
other. Maybe we need another bill allowing the Intelligence
Community to talk to us openly--more openly than they have.
It's a real problem.
John Brennan, you have--I don't think this is your
instinct--through your four-hour grilling, and I thought you
were superb. And on the questions that you had to deflect just
a bit, I thought you should have deflected, and I respected
that.
But we cannot be told that documents that could be in our
purview to look at, which, in fact, have nothing in them that
would make our review of them a threat to anybody at all, that
we can't have them, or that our staff cannot be in attendance.
What would happen if we had you here, and all the folks
behind you had to stay out of the room--all of you? That's the
comparable situation. I'm not a lawyer. I'm not an intelligence
analyst or specialist. I need advice. I need counsel. I need
staff. I have a superb one, as we all do.
Is there a way, in your mind, that we can somehow come to
an understanding that makes this program, or problem, work the
way it should, to work it out the way it should, so that we're
comfortable with each other; that you protect yourself when you
absolutely have to, but you don't protect yourself beyond where
you absolutely have to, so that we can trust each other, and
really concentrate on worldwide threats, sir?
Director Clapper. Senator Rockefeller, let me start. And
then I know John has views on this, having experienced the
process that I won't ever go through again--confirmation; I've
done it three times, and that's more than anybody should stand.
And what I'll say probably won't be entirely satisfactory to
you.
I think all of us--and I think I speak for all my
colleagues in the Intelligence Community who are here and those
who aren't--that trust is fundamental to the relationship
between the Intelligence Community and our oversight
committees. The oversight committees have a unique
responsibility, unlike others, because so much of what we do is
classified, it's secret.
So we recognize the doubly-important responsibility that
you have on behalf of the American public, since not everything
we do can be revealed. As a general rule, that which is under
our control, and activities that we manage and oversee, I think
our record has been pretty good, pretty consistent in sharing
that with you, because, again, we depend so heavily on you for
your support.
When there are documents that are elsewhere in the
executive branch--OLC opinions, just to name one example--or
when we are attempting to abide by a longstanding practice of
executive privilege, which has been practiced by both
Republican and Democratic administrations, I think that's where
we begin to have problems.
But I will tell you, for that which is fully under our
control and for which we manage, I think I can pledge to you
that we will endeavor to earn your trust.
John.
Director Brennan. Senator, like most hostages, I was
excluded from the ransom negotiations during my confirmation
process. But one of the things that I have committed to myself
is to familiarize myself intimately with the rules and
procedures that govern the interaction with this Committee and
other oversight committees for programs and activities that
fall under my purview.
And what I want to be able to do is to speak with the
Chairman and the Vice Chairman about this, because I don't know
what those procedures have been heretofore. I'll pick up on
Jim's point--Director Clapper's point--about some things that
are beyond the purview of the Intelligence Community or the CIA
to make some decisions on. But what I really want to do is to
have as much dialogue as possible with you so that that trust
can be built up, so that we are able to address these issues
earlier.
As I think the Vice Chairman was pointing out, on some of
the matters related to--like the Benghazi talking points and
other things, what we need to do is address it as early on as
possible, because, like an angle, the lines of an angle get
further apart the further out they go. And I really do believe
that what we can do is, up front, have a clear understanding of
what your interests are, what your requirements are, and then I
think what we need to do is to do what we can in order to give
you what you need to fulfill your statutory responsibilities of
oversight.
Senator Rockefeller. Either I or others, in the second
round, will continue this.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller.
I just want to add one quick thing right here. The OLC
opinions, in particular, particularly with our obligation,
which is robust oversight, you cannot know whether something is
carried out by the executive branch within the law unless you
see those opinions, which phrase the law. And I think that's
the problem--it's very difficult not to look at them, and to
make judgments without understanding. I'll just leave you with
that.
Senator Coats.
Senator Coats. Madam Chairman, thank you.
Director Clapper, I note that of all the topics that you
chose to talk about, you put cyber right at the very top. And I
think I understand why--you state that we are undergoing a
major transformation intertwined with digital technologies and
the internet that has profound implications for U.S. economic
and national security.
I was very disappointed that we were not able to put a
legislative package together in the last Congress--it failed in
the waning days of the Congress. The President followed up with
an Executive Order. I know, Director Brennan, you were part of
putting that Executive Order together. It's limited in terms of
what it can do, so I'm hoping we can work together to fashion a
proper legislative proposal that will enhance our ability to
better understand, and better deal with, this ever-growing
critical threat to our economy and to our national security.
In that regard, I noted that the Executive Order from the
President indicated a strong willingness to share information
from the government with private industry. But the hang-up here
is that the reverse--information from private industry shared
with the government--hit some road blocks. And we need some
incentives to provide private industry to feel secure, in terms
of their sharing of propriety information, and the impact on
its competitiveness with others, and so forth.
Providing such things as liability, coverage, and so forth,
and assuring that the standards that are set are compatible
with industry standards, I think, are critical issues there. So
I think I'm making a statement in that regard that hopefully we
can address that, and keep that at the level of priority where
you have put it. I know the majority leader has said we need to
take that up; unfortunately, we're all caught up in debate in
issues relative to the fiscal situation--sequester, as you've
talked about. But this is a serious subject, and we need to get
on it sooner rather than later.
I want to just briefly flip to a question on Iran and ask
maybe both you, and Director Brennan, just to--if you have
anything to say about the cyber, that's fine, but also, just to
put this into one question:
We have ever-ratcheting sanctions against Iran, in terms of
its pursuit of nuclear weapon capability, development: a) Have
you seen any glimpse of possible change in the decision-making
and will of the leadership, which will decide whether or not
they will comply in any sense at all with the requests being
made by the global community relative to their pursuit?
And, b) Are there concerns, and maybe you want to save this
for the closed session, but are there concerns relative to the
cooperation agreement signed between North Korea and Iran
relative to ballistic missile technology and other aspects that
might modify the timetable in which you assess Iran's ability
to get this capability?
Director Clapper. Let me just start on the first part of
your question. The second one--the potential relationship
between North Korea and Iran--might be better addressed in the
closed session.
Clearly, the sanctions have had profound impact on Iran's
economy--by any measure, whether it's inflation, unemployment,
the availability of commodities, et cetera--and that situation
is getting worse.
At the same time, at least publicly, overtly, that has not
prompted a change in the Iranian leadership, specifically the
supreme leader's approach.
We can go into perhaps a more detailed discussion in a
closed setting about some indications that I think would be of
interest to you. And I probably ought to let it go at that.
Senator Coats. Fair enough.
Director Brennan.
Director Brennan. Senator, the only thing I would add is
that on your first point related to cyber, the seriousness and
the diversity of the threats that this country faces in the
cyber domain are increasing on a daily basis. And from my
perspective, I think this is one of the real significant
national security challenges we face. And the threat is going
to continue, and it's going to grow.
What we need to do, as a country, is reduce the
vulnerabilities and take the mitigation steps. So, again, from
a national security perspective, I very much hope that the
Congress will move forward with legislation, and the issues
that you raise, on terms of information sharing and liability,
are the key ones. And hopefully, that legislation will get
through.
Director Clapper. If I could tag onto what John just said,
I think your brief discussion really highlighted the, sort of,
what I call ``organizing principles,'' those tenets that would
have to be covered. And I think the standards that need to be
applied would apply both to the government and the private
sector.
And the other thing I would want to mention is the due
consideration for civil liberties and privacy in whatever
legislation that eventually is enacted.
Senator Coats. I assume both of you would acknowledge that
time is of the essence here?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir.
Senator Coats. The sooner we get this done, the better.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Udall. Excuse me--Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Director Brennan, first of all--congratulations. I
appreciated the chance to talk about a number of issues with
you previously, and I'm going to be asking you some additional
questions about drones and targeted killings in the days ahead,
but for today, my congratulations.
Director Clapper, I want to ask you what I asked you about
a year ago, and that was the matter of surveillance--
particularly, what the rules are that an intelligence agency
would have to follow in order to electronically track the
movements and locations of an American inside the United
States. And I asked you about this a year ago, and you said
that your lawyers were studying this, and I hope that since a
year has passed, we can get some answers to these questions.
So first, let me ask the question: If an intelligence
agency wants to electronically track the movements and
whereabouts of an American inside the United States, how much
evidence do they need?
Director Clapper. Well, first of all, let me just say, sir,
that particularly in the case of NSA and CIA, there are
strictures against tracking American citizens in the United
States for foreign intelligence purposes. And that's what those
agencies are set up to do.
I think, though, when--I might ask Director Mueller to
speak to this because what you're referring to, I think,
devolves into the law enforcement/criminal area, so----
Senator Wyden. Let me--and I do want to hear from Director
Mueller, but I'm trying to get some general principles out with
respect to intelligence. And you've cited, certainly, some
areas that are relevant, but what I'm really trying to do is
get an unclassified answer to a question about what the law
authorizes.
Director Clapper. The law, of course, as you know, is
embedded in the Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Act, the
amendment to which was recently extended for five years, and it
places very strict strictures on the Intelligence Community's
tracking of U.S. persons where there is a terrorism nexus. And
that is overseen, very strictly, by both the FISA Court as well
as within the executive branch, both by my office and the
attorney general. So there are very strict rules about that, as
you know, as we've discussed.
Senator Wyden. But, as you know, there are some fundamental
questions about the balance between security and liberty that
transcend just the FISA question. So, what I would like to do
is see if we can get a direct answer to the question about when
the Intel Community needs to get a warrant, for example, when a
lesser amount of evidence would do; and second, the
circumstances when no specific evidence is needed at all.
And the FISA law does not specify whether a warrant is
required, so that's the reason that I'm asking the question. I
asked it a year ago----
Director Clapper. I'd like to ask Director Mueller to help
me with that question.
Senator Wyden. And Mr. Director, I'm anxious to hear from
Director Mueller, who I greatly respect, but I also need to
hear from you with respect to the Intelligence Community.
That's why I asked it a year ago, and----
Director Clapper. As I said, Senator Wyden, in the case of
CIA and NSA, who are engaged in foreign intelligence
collection, that's a practice that they do not engage in.
Senator Wyden. Director Mueller.
Director Mueller. Well, Senator, let me start by saying
that there's no real distinction in what we do between the
criminal and the national security--if we require it in the
criminal side, we require it in national security. We treat
them the same; there is no distinction between our intelligence
cases in terms of undertaking the activity you suggest, and our
criminal cases.
That being said, in the wake of the Jones decision, which
I'm sure you're familiar with--that has put some things in an
area where we're waiting to see where the courts go. But
obviously, as I said, if you were going to trespass to install
a device, then that requires a warrant, and the standard on
that warrant is still up in the air.
And consequently, to give you a more precise answer to a
particular question on a particular monitoring, I would have to
be more factually based and then apply the law to that
particular set of facts.
Senator Wyden. Director Mueller, you have identified the
exact reason why I'm trying to get an answer from Director
Clapper, because there's no question we are going to watch what
the courts do in the days ahead. The question is what will be
the rights of Americans while that is still being fleshed out?
And the fact is FISA does not specify whether a warrant is
required.
I know I'm out of time for this round, but I just want you
to know, Director Clapper, respectfully, I will be asking this
question of you--just like we did with respect to the legal
documents for targeted killings, which we finally got after
seven requests over a two-year period--until we get an answer,
because I think Americans are entitled to a direct answer to
that question.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Would you like Director Mueller to
respond? I think it would be helpful.
Senator Wyden. Madam Chair, I think the director did, and
he gave a very thoughtful answer, which is that the courts are
still wrestling with the various interpretations of it. I think
that is a correct answer by Director Mueller, but we still have
the question remaining--what are the rights of Americans, as of
today, while the courts are wrestling with this? And that is
the matter we have not gotten an answer to. And I will follow
it up again on my second round.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Well, would you like to respond to
that? I'll give you the opportunity.
Director Mueller. The only thing I would add, Senator, is
that with the law--disarray is probably too strong, but not
having been totally identified, we take the most conservative
approach----
Chairman Feinstein. Fair enough.
Director Mueller [continuing]. To ensure that the evidence
that is captured will pass scrutiny, regardless of how the
court may come down.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Next is Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I guess we can start with you, General Clapper, but then
everyone can weigh in if they have an opinion. I want to talk
about Egypt for a moment.
First of all, I want to have a clear understanding about
their security apparatus, and in particular, their military,
that, for a long time, has been seen as a professional
organization, which was committed to upholding its
international obligations and with which we had a good working
relationship.
What is the status of that relationship now? How heavily
influenced have they become with recent political changes--in
particular, with the election of President Morsi, and the
coming to power of the Muslim Brotherhood? Has that changed the
nature, or is it changing the nature, of those organizations?
Director Clapper. Well, I think the military, as an
institution in Egypt, has attempted to sustain its status and
its stature as a professional military organization, and not,
wherever it can be avoided, be drawn into the internal
political upheavals that are going on in Egypt.
Senator Rubio. In terms of the upheaval that they're
facing, what, in your judgment, or in the judgment of any of
the panelists, are the most significant security risks that
they face? And I'll tell you the context of how I'm asking this
question: We have recently seen sales of jet planes or--you
know, these other existing contracts, and tanks, and so forth--
but it strikes me that the real security concerns increasingly
should be towards security in the Sinai, upholding their peace
treaty with their neighbors, providing for improved law
enforcement in the streets there, where we've seen a rise in
criminality.
Can anyone comment on what the real security risks are?
Again, it strikes me that Egypt is not at risk of being invaded
by some foreign army anytime soon. So, shouldn't the weapons
systems they're acquiring and so forth kind of reflect their
real security needs?
Director Clapper. Well, that's kind of up to----
Senator Rubio. I know that's a policy decision.
Director Clapper. That's their policy decision. But I think
you've highlighted, though, what the challenges are in Egypt,
particularly with respect to security of the Sinai, which I
believe they recognize they have a challenge there, and I think
their intent is to--they may attempt to modify it--but I think,
by and large, they wish to support the peace treaty.
To me, the fundamental challenges that face Egypt have to
do with its economy. And it's kind of a spiral--one of the
impacts on their economy has been a decline in tourism, and
that's related to the security situation. I think they
recognize that. So, they clearly--I mean, they know they have
internal challenges that they have to deal with.
Senator Rubio. So their real security challenges are
internal; in essence, street crime, which--my understanding is
it's gotten pretty dangerous, particularly in Cairo, but in
some of the other tourist areas. And also, there are security
obligations vis-a-vis the peace treaty, and Sinai, and so
forth.
I think that the other question is broader, and again, any
input from anyone is welcome on this, and that's the general
direction that they are headed governmentally. And obviously,
you know, there was an election, and there are questions about
reforms to the constitution in Egypt.
But where is, in your judgment, Egypt headed? In essence,
where is the Muslim Brotherhood or President Morsi, to the
extent he's heavily influenced by them, headed in the long
term? Is it a real commitment to a democratic transition? Is it
a real commitment toward a more Islamist type state? Or is it
still in flux, and they're kind of trying to figure out how
they can grow their economy and at the same time bring about
these changes that the Muslim Brotherhood base of President
Morsi is asking for?
Director Clapper. I think the latter, the third condition--
it's still in flux. I think the leadership of Egypt, when
they're in charge, is influenced heavily by pragmatic aspects
and challenges, like the state of the economy, and security in
the streets.
However, at the same time, I think their ideology is
clearly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood. That's evident in
some of the constitutional provisions, particularly having to
do with the rights of women.
Senator Rubio. And in that vein, U.S. policy, particularly
U.S. aid policy towards Egypt, would probably weigh heavily on
the pragmatic side of the equation for these leaders--in
particular, their ability to receive the financing they need to
stabilize their economy, and also to provide the gear they need
to provide the security so people feel safe in Egypt again.
Director Clapper. Yes, sir, but not at any price. I think
they're very--understandably--very sensitive about their
sovereignty and the extent to which we or anyone else can
dictate to them what their behavior is. And, of course, that's
not just the United States; it's the International Monetary
Fund, and others, that ascribe conditions for financial aid.
And that's an issue for the Egyptian policy apparatus to
decide.
Senator Rubio. All right. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Rubio.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Director Clapper, I want to also associate myself with
Senator Feinstein's remarks on the threat assessment documents;
very readable, very helpful. I'm not sure you'd read it if you
wanted a good night's sleep, but thank you for the work your
team has done.
Let me turn to the 6,000-page report that this Committee
produced on the CIA's detention and interrogation program. I
stated at Director Brennan's confirmation hearing that I was
very concerned that inaccurate information on the management,
operation, and effectiveness of the CIA's detention and
interrogation program was provided by the CIA to the White
House, the DOJ, Congress, and the public.
As you know, Director Brennan expressed shock at the
report's contents. And I understand that you had a similar
personal reaction to the report; is that accurate? Were you
also taken aback by the report's contents?
Director Clapper. Yes, I was taken aback, by its length and
breadth and all that, but I also think that I would counsel
hearing from the Agency and its response to the RDI. I might
ask John to comment on that.
Senator Udall. Yeah, well, if I might, General, I'm going
to do that. I want to get the director to comment, as well. But
let me turn to Director Mueller.
In an interview in Vanity Fair, Director, in December 2008,
you were asked about terrorist attacks and whether they were
disrupted thanks to intelligence obtained through the use of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. And you responded,
without elaborating, ``I don't believe that's been the case.''
And then months later, in April 2009, your spokesperson, John
Miller, confirmed that your quote in the Vanity Fair article
was accurate.
Director, have you seen any information since April 2009 to
change your views on this topic?
Director Mueller. What I was trying to express is that I
was really not in a position to see, because I was not aware of
either the practices or the facts.
Senator Udall. Thank you for that. And I do want to follow
up with you later in that regard, as well.
I would like to turn now to Director Brennan. ``Director
Brennan''--it's nice to be able to say that. Congratulations on
your confirmation. I appreciate your comment on being the
hostage, and the hostage not being involved in the
negotiations. I really look forward to working with you in your
new role.
As you remember, in the confirmation hearing, we discussed
the Committee's study and the importance of putting reforms in
place to prevent past mistakes from happening again. And I also
pushed for declassification of the Committee's report. At that
hearing, I pointed out that misinformation about the CIA's
detention and interrogation program is, quote, ``regularly and
publicly repeated today by former CIA officials, either
knowingly or unknowingly.''
And then last week, before you were even on the job for
your first day, a newspaper story was published quoting a
senior intelligence official who claimed that, quote, ``The CIA
is objecting to a majority of the 6,000-page report,'' which, I
should note, has 35,000 footnotes directly sourced to CIA
documents.
And this newspaper article included numerous inaccurate
statements about the Committee's report, including that it has
20 recommendations, which it does not.
While it appears that the unnamed intelligence officials
quoted in the paper were unfamiliar with the Committee's
report, I'm concerned that, despite the Chairman going out of
her way to make sure that only the specifically-named
individuals at the CIA have access to the report, CIA personnel
are leaking what may or may not be the CIA's official response
to the report.
And it seems that unnamed CIA officials are putting you in
a particularly awkward position by making public their
disagreement with the report's conclusions, even before you
have a chance to weigh in as the new CIA director.
So, I have three questions concerning the leak, and I want
to run through them and then give you time to respond: One, do
you believe that this is a leak of the CIA's views, despite the
fact that these officials seem unfamiliar with the report? Two,
do you anticipate looking into the leak? And three, as far as
I'm aware, there's no new deadline for the CIA to provide
comments on the Committee's report to this Committee.
In my view, it's in no one's interest to delay the process.
Can you give the Committee a sense as to when we can expect the
CIA's comments?
Director Brennan. Thank you, Senator. First of all, I'm not
going to speculate on who might have been responsible for the
information that appeared in the newspaper. I know that people
are looking into that right now to see whether or not there was
any disclosure of classified information, but there is a real
interest on the part of CIA to be as responsive as possible to
this Committee and on that report.
And I've had a number of discussions with Deputy Director
Michael Morell and other Members of the leadership team, and
the response and comments on that report will be coming back to
this Committee. I'd like to be able to say that it will be done
within a month's time; hopefully before then. But I know that
there have been a number of conversations with Members of this
Committee on that, and it is my firm resolve to look at what
the CIA has pulled together in response to that report and get
back to this Committee on it.
Senator Udall. Thank you. I look forward to your firm
resolve resulting in an as-soon-as-possible response to this
seminal and important report from which we really need to learn
the lessons so that we don't repeat the mistakes that were
made. Thanks again, and congratulations, Director Brennan.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Udall.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Director Clapper, in your opening statement, you certainly
painted a bleak, dark picture of a very dangerous world. And I
share your concern about the impact of sequestration on the
Intelligence Community.
Senator Udall and I have introduced what I believe to be
the only bipartisan flexibility bill that would give,
essentially, agencies the ability to set priorities; submit
their plans to the Appropriations Committee the way you do with
reprogramming requests now. It's sort of an enhanced
reprogramming authority.
I talked to Senator Mikulski about it. She has a similar
vision in mind. I know the Chairman also has an amendment
dealing just with the IC. And I just want to encourage you to
make the disastrous consequences of sequestration known to the
Senate leaders and the House leaders, because that's really
where the decision is being made. And I think it's critical
that they hear from you, and indeed from all Members of this
panel, about what the consequences would be, particularly in
light of the dire threat situation that we face.
I want to turn now to Iran. During a Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing last week, the Commander of U.S. Central
Command testified that the current diplomatic and economic
efforts to stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons
capability are not working. Do you agree with that assessment?
Director Clapper. Not completely. I think, as I indicated
earlier, the sanctions are having a huge impact on Iran. And I
think clearly that that is going to have an influence on their
decision-making calculus, and we see indications of that.
But where I do agree, at least to this point, is that the
sanctions thus far have not induced a change in Iranian
government policy.
Senator Collins. Well, I think the fact that they haven't
produced a change suggests that General Mattis is correct in
saying that they're not working.
But let me follow up with Mr. Goldberg with a second
question. The President has exempted nine countries from fully
complying with the sanctions on Iran because they have
demonstrated a significant reduction in the purchase of Iranian
petroleum-based products. These nine countries, however,
include some of Iran's biggest trading partners, including
China, India, and Turkey. And Turkey was granted an exemption,
even after it conceded that it had helped Iran conduct energy
exports through the acquisition of billions of dollars of gold.
What is your assessment of what would happen to Iran's
fiscal and economic situation if these nine countries were not
exempt from the U.S. sanctions policy?
Mr. Goldberg. What I can tell you, Senator Collins, is that
the overall amount of Iranian oil that is being exported is
down considerably; that there were workarounds and exemptions
made for those who reduced over time. And that's a constant
evaluation and consideration.
But the actual amount of Iranian oil being exported is
down. And it's probably--well, I think maybe I'd reserve on the
exact quantity for a closed session.
Senator Collins. I would suggest--and maybe we'll get into
this in the closed session--there needs to be much more
transparency in order for us to make a judgment on whether or
not doing such sweeping exemptions is wise policy.
I just want to quickly touch on cyber security, Director
Brennan, since you and I worked extremely closely on that issue
last year when Senator Lieberman and I repeatedly tried to get
our comprehensive bill through. And we also worked very closely
with General Alexander.
As you know, I had real reservations about the President
issuing an Executive Order because I believe it sends the wrong
signal that this issue can be taken care of through an
Executive Order. So I just want to get you on the record this
morning that you do not believe that the Executive Order is a
substitute for legislation, and that only legislation can take
further actions, such as conferring a grant of immunity on
private sector companies that comply with standards. Is that an
accurate assessment?
Director Brennan. Senator, I'm no longer part of the Policy
Community; I'm part of the Intelligence Community now. And what
I will just say is that based upon the nature, scope, and
diversity of the cyber threat that is out there, I think that
we need to do more as a country to address the vulnerabilities
that we have and take the steps that we need to in order to
protect our infrastructure, our networks, from these types of
cyber attacks.
And I do believe that there are enhancements in legislation
that can be made, and that need to be made, in order to help us
as a country protect our systems, our networks, our
infrastructure from those types of attacks.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Director Clapper, this Committee spent an awful lot of time
examining the process that resulted in the unclassified
Benghazi talking points. And you've touched on that a little
bit this morning.
I just have one simple question around that that I want to
ask you: In your professional view of that process, was it in
any way unduly politicized?
Director Clapper. Absolutely not.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you for a very simple answer. We
don't get those very often, so I want to say I really
appreciate it.
I want to move on to Syria for a few minutes. And just to,
sort of, set the table, I wanted to ask how you would describe
the current state of the opposition in Syria?
Director Clapper. Well, the opposition is gaining in
strength. It is increasingly gaining territory. At the same
time, the regime is--as I indicated in my statement--is
experiencing shortages in manpower and logistics.
That said, the opposition is still fragmented. There are
literally hundreds of these opposition battalions of varying
strengths and cuts, and there are attempts being made by the
opposition to bring some overarching command and control to
that.
The bad news in all this, I believe, with respect to the
opposition of course, is the increasing prevalence of the al-
Nusra Front, which is the al-Qa'ida in Iraq offshoot that has
gained strength, both numerically and otherwise, in Syria. And
they've been pretty astute about this, and they are, where they
can, providing more and more municipal services in what is a
very terrible situation from a humanitarian standpoint.
As well, there has been a growing infusion of foreign
fighters that have been attracted to the conflict in Syria, who
have joined the opposition. And so the opposition, in my view,
and the al-Nusra Front specifically, has been very astute about
that.
The question, of course, comes up--how long will Assad
last? And our standard answer is his days are numbered; we just
don't know the number. I think our assessment is he is very
committed to hanging in there and sustaining his control of the
regime.
Senator Heinrich. How would you assess Iran's overall--the
role that they're playing in Syria today?
Director Clapper. Well, increasingly, they're being drawn
into Syria, both in terms of providing material aid and, as
well, advice, to the extent of organizing militias, and that
sort of thing. So Iran, together with their surrogate, the
Hezbollah, has a huge stake in keeping Syria under control of
the regime. It would be a tremendous loss--strategic loss--for
the Iranians, if the regime falls.
Senator Heinrich. You mentioned that Assad's days are
numbered; how do you think Iran is going to, or will react to,
a post-Assad Syria?
Director Clapper. Well, I think they will try to--that's
one of the reasons they're investing, both materially and with
advisors and some fighters, is to maintain their interest and
their physical presence there, so whatever form some successor
regime takes, or if there's fragmentation, that they would at
least have a foothold in Syria. I'm saying that, so we really
don't know what their strategy is.
Senator Heinrich. I'll leave you with one last question,
and then I'll give back my time.
On Egypt, how capable do you think that the current
Egyptian government is in handling the unrest that we're seeing
currently?
Director Clapper. The unrest, you say?
Senator Heinrich. Yes.
Director Clapper. Well, they were able to suppress the
violence in Port Said that was occasioned by the trials of the
so-called ``soccer hooligans.'' So I think they have the
capability, and when they put their minds to it, they can
maintain order.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Clapper, I want to call upon your long years of
experience. We put a lot of stock in sanctions and have over
the years, and we're putting a lot of stock in sanctions right
now in Iran. My concern is that we as Americans tend to think
that other countries will think and act and react the way we
do, when, in reality, their systems just are very different
than ours.
My question on Iran is--is there a sufficient middle class
who has the political power to have any influence on the
regime's decisions, based upon the squeeze applied by the
sanctions? In other words, does the supreme ayatollah care that
his economy is going down?
Director Clapper. Excellent question, sir. And yes, he
does. He does care. And it does concern him about the
deterioration in the economy because of the prospect for
promoting unrest among the citizenry of Iran. And we are seeing
more signs of that.
At the same time, though, I think the supreme leader's
standard is a level of privation that Iran suffered during the
Iran-Iraq War. And he doesn't believe they've reached that
point yet.
And of course, as the supreme leader looks westward, or
looks at us, he can argue that, you know, we're on the decline;
our influence is declining, particularly in that part of the
world. And so, you know, his view of the world may not be
necessarily fact-based, particularly when it comes to internal
conditions in his country.
Senator King. Thank you. Turning again to another
longstanding part of U.S. policy, which is nuclear deterrence,
which has been our policy since the late 1940s, does deterrence
work with a country like North Korea, or Iran?
And sort of the same question--do they care? Mutually
assured destruction--are they responsive to that kind of
rational thinking that guided U.S. policy for fifty years; are
these countries like the Soviet Union--that we can have some
confidence that they're going to make a rational decision,
knowing that if they do something crazy, they're going to be
wiped out?
Director Clapper. Well, I do think they both understand
that. I'm not sure about deterrence for North Korea, where they
would expect us to use a nuclear weapon. But they certainly
respect the capability of our military. They've gone to school
on what we've done, starting with Desert Storm. I know that for
a fact.
So I think deterrence, in this broadest context, does work,
and does have impact on the decision-making calculus of these
two countries.
Senator King. Mr. Brennan, you had a brief colloquy with
Senator Collins on last year's cyber bill. That bill did not
get through. There were objections, I understand, from business
interests.
I know you're not on the policy side anymore, but are there
things we can do to get that bill through? There's a certain
urgency here, and I believe it went twice before the Senate--it
didn't go through either time. What's happening to get that
done?
Director Brennan. I'm sure there are things that the
Congress can do to push this forward. There were differences of
view last year on the legislation. Again, I would just
underscore the importance of being able to come up with some
legislation that's going to be addressed, some of the
vulnerabilities that our adversaries are taking advantage of,
whether they be states, whether they be activists or organized
criminal groups; vulnerabilities exist that we need to be able
to address.
Senator King. Would you characterize the cyber threat as
accelerating?
Director Brennan. Absolutely.
Senator King. Madam Chairman, that's all I have. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Just on cyber, the Vice Chairman and I have resolved to try
to work together and see if we can't get a bill that we can
agree to move through the Committee on the information sharing
part of it. That might be of help to you. So we will begin that
effort shortly.
We will have one other quick round. I have a question on
Hezbollah, and this is it, Director: Does the IC assess that
Hezbollah and the Iranian Qods Force will continue to conduct
terrorist attacks against Israelis and Americans, as Hezbollah
has recently done in other places?
That's a yes or no question, I think.
Director Clapper. Yes. I think they clearly have the intent
to do that, when they can.
Chairman Feinstein. Okay. How does Hezbollah's capacity
compare with that of al-Qa'ida at this time?
Director Clapper. I don't think they reach that level of
al-Qa'ida--core al-Qa'ida at its height. I don't believe that's
the case. I might ask Matt Olsen if he'd like to comment on
that.
Chairman Feinstein. Good.
Mr. Olsen.
Director Olsen. Thank you very much, Chairman.
I would agree with Director Clapper. To be specific, I
wouldn't--compared to core al-Qa'ida ten years ago, Hezbollah
is not at that level. Hezbollah does have a presence that
extends to many countries around the world. We've seen plots
and activity from Hezbollah across the globe, but we haven't
seen anything like the capability or activity that we've seen
from al-Qa'ida over the last ten years.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Director Olsen, you are the guy
who is responsible for gathering all of the information from
the Intelligence Community, sifting through it, and making some
critical decisions, not only about who gets what, but where the
danger is.
This is a public hearing. Tell the American public what
keeps Matt Olsen awake at night.
Director Olsen. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.
I would say that there are a number of things that we're
particularly concerned about. From an overseas perspective, it
is the decentralized nature of the threat from al-Qa'ida. As
we've talked about this morning, the threat from core al-Qa'ida
is greatly diminished. It is nowhere near where it was ten
years ago. But we have seen that threat become geographically
dispersed, as affiliated groups, and groups sympathetic to al-
Qa'ida and al-Qa'ida's message, have grown in areas--for
example, in North Africa.
Probably the most significant of those affiliated groups,
from our perspective, is al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula.
We've seen AQAP seek to carry out attacks against aviation
targets three times over the last several years. So I would put
AQAP at the top of the list, from an overseas perspective.
Looking closer to home and the Homeland, the number one
concern for an attack, albeit a small-scale, unsophisticated
attack, likely comes from home grown extremists who may well be
inspired or radicalized by the message that al-Qa'ida sends.
But it would be more likely a person more likely to act alone
or in a very small group to carry out an unsophisticated
attack, and that's very difficult for us, from an intelligence
perspective, to see in advance and therefore, to be able to
disrupt.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Is there an aggressive effort on
the part of al-Qa'ida, as well as other affiliated groups, or
other terrorist groups, for that matter, to develop American
home grown terrorists?
Director Olsen. Sir, we definitely have seen--from both al-
Qa'ida core in Pakistan, as well as AQAP in Yemen--an effort to
reach out beyond those regions into the United States to
radicalize individuals who are here who may be susceptible to
that kind of a message. They may be simply wayward
knuckleheads, but they may well be inspired by that message,
and seek to carry out an attack.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Now, let me address that to you
also, Director Mueller, since the FBI has jurisdiction over
domestic criminal and terrorist activity, and I'd like your
comments on what you see taking place, from the standpoint of
home grown terrorists.
Director Mueller. Let me start by saying that the threat
from AQAP, particularly with airliners, has not dissipated over
the years. There's still that threat out there. The individuals
who were responsible for the previous attempts are still there.
So I join him with identifying that as a principal concern
overseas.
More directly at home, it is the radicalization of
individuals on the Internet, who develop the desire and the
will to undertake attacks. They're finding it very difficult to
find co-conspirators, others that would join in. But then
again, the Internet can facilitate that kind of a meeting/
coming together for an attack. And it is the lone wolves that
we are principally concerned about.
The other point I would put in terms of keeping me awake is
cyber, and the fact that what is happening in the cyber arena
cuts across any of our disciplines, whether it be
counterintelligence or counterterrorism, as well as criminal.
And the various objectives, goals, of discrete individuals
utilizing the cyber arena, whether it be for criminal purposes
or for terrorist purposes, has grown to be right up there with
AQAP, home grown terrorists, and cyber attackers.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks, Madam.
Chairman Feinstein. Thanks, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Senator Rockefeller, are you okay? No, you're not okay?
Senator Rockefeller. No, I am--I think I'm okay. I've got a
couple of questions I'd like to ask, but I'd rather get to the
closed hearing.
Chairman Feinstein. Okay.
I know, Senator Wyden, you have a question you'd like to
ask.
Senator Wyden. Just one, Madam Chair, and I thank you.
And this is for you, Director Clapper--again, on the
surveillance front. And I hope we can do this in just a yes or
no answer, because I know Senator Feinstein wants to move on.
Last summer, the NSA director was at a conference and he
was asked a question about the NSA surveillance of Americans.
He replied, and I quote here, ``The story that we have
millions, or hundreds of millions, of dossiers on people is
completely false.''
The reason I'm asking the question is, having served on the
Committee now for a dozen years, I don't really know what a
dossier is in this context. So, what I wanted to see is if you
could give me a yes or no answer to the question--does the NSA
collect any type of data at all on millions, or hundreds of
millions, of Americans?
Director Clapper. No, sir.
Senator Wyden. It does not?
Director Clapper. Not wittingly. There are cases where they
could inadvertently, perhaps, collect, but not wittingly.
Senator Wyden. All right. Thank you. I'll have additional
questions to give you in writing on that point, but I thank you
for the answer.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden.
Senator King.
Senator King. Just a follow-up on Senator Chambliss'
questions--my concern is we keep talking about al-Qa'ida, but
my impression, and Mr. Olsen, perhaps I'll direct this to you--
we have to realize that it only takes four or five people these
days to mount some kind of threat.
Is there a danger that we are so focused on al-Qa'ida that
we're going to miss the second cousin of al-Qa'ida that arises
in Brazil or someplace, that constitutes a serious threat?
Director Olsen. Well, I don't think so. I think that's
reflected on this panel. Director Brennan, Director Mueller,
Director Clapper--all of us work very closely together to look
forward to determine where that next threat is coming from.
We're very focused on, for example, the activities of groups in
North Africa that may simply be sympathetic to al-Qa'ida, but
certainly haven't reached the level of being affiliated
officially with al-Qa'ida.
And so, all of our organizations--and I certainly know I
can speak on behalf of the people working at the National
Counterterrorism Center--are laser-focused on trying to
identify that next threat. Are we going to be perfect every
time? The answer to that is no, but we are very, very focused
on trying to look forward to see that next threat, and that's
something that we're doing together as a Community.
Senator King. Mr. Mueller.
Director Mueller. If I might add, we have threats across
the board--domestic threats. We have not forgotten the bombing
of the Oklahoma City federal building in 1995. And while, yes,
we look at threats from outside that can be ultimately
undertaken within the United States and look at home grown
terrorists, we look across the board and try to anticipate, not
only with international terrorists affiliated in some way or
shape with al-Qa'ida, but with others that are affiliated with
more extremist, radicalized groups domestically.
Senator King. Are you seeing any increase in the number of
those groups not related to Islamic extremists, but more home
grown?
Director Mueller. I would say, to a certain extent, it's
cyclical. If there are groups who may lose their leaders--
either they were incarcerated or have passed--then the
capabilities of that group to undertake an attack would be
diminished. And we've seen that off and on.
We also see that many of the more radical groups or
extremist groups do not want to be associated with the lone
wolves and will push them out, which is a problem, because if
you have surveillance or you can understand what's happening in
a substantial extremist group, to have somebody with the intent
to undertake attack with nobody around them, that presents a
separate special challenge.
Director Clapper. We are seeing Northern Africa's, as Matt
alluded to, a proliferation of Ansar al-Sharia chapters--
Tunisia and Libya, to name two cases--which seem focused much
more on local, regional issues, Western interests only as they
are present in those particular countries, and less inclined--
at least at this point--to promote attacks elsewhere, although
that's always a possibility.
So we watch these groups as they evolve in their
objectives.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Let me thank you, everyone, first of all, on behalf of this
Committee, for your service to the country, for your presence
here today, for your testimony--and to those of you that didn't
have a chance to respond, we look forward to seeing you in the
Committee on some of these issues.
We will recess and reconvene directly to our SCIF right
down the hall, at the call of the Chair.
So thank you, and this hearing is recessed.
[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the Committee recessed briefly
to reconvene in a closed session.]