Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Tuesday, January 31, 2012 - 10:00am
Location:
Hart 216
Witnesses
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 112-481]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-481
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2012
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
RON WYDEN, Oregon JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland DANIEL COATS, Indiana
BILL NELSON, Florida ROY BLUNT, Missouri
KENT CONRAD, North Dakota MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK UDALL, Colorado
MARK WARNER, Virginia
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
----------
David Grannis, Staff Director
Martha Scott Poindexter, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
----------
JANUARY 31, 2012
OPENING STATEMENTS
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1
Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia 10
WITNESSES
Clapper, James R., Director of National Intelligence............. 13
Petraeus, David, Director, Central Intelligence Agency........... 48
Olsen, Matthew, Director, National Counterterrorism Center....... 51
Burgess, Lt. General Ronald, Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 52
Mueller, Robert, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation....... 53
Goldberg, Philip, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, U.S. State Department................................ 55
Wagner, Caryn, Under Secretary for Office of Intelligence and
Analysis, Department of Homeland Security...................... 66
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
List of Counterterrorism Arrests in the U.S. in 2011 and 2012.... 2
Prepared Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community by James R.
Clapper........................................................ 17
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne
Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Chambliss,
Wyden, Udall of Colorado, Snowe, Rockefeller, Conrad, Mikulski,
Coats, Risch, Blunt, Warner, McCain, Nelson, and Rubio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Chairman Feinstein. The Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence meets today in open session for our annual
Worldwide Threat Hearing.
This hearing provides the Intelligence Community with an
opportunity to present to the nation its views of the threats
and challenges we face, and for the Committee to ask questions
of our intelligence leaders in public. Today is also an
opportunity to take stock of what has happened in the last year
and what we can expect for 2012.
Before looking ahead, I want to congratulate the leaders of
the Intelligence Community before us today, and the tens of
thousands of civilian and military intelligence professionals
they represent. Through their efforts, 2011 was a year of
numerous major intelligence successes, including, first and
foremost, the operation that located and killed Osama bin
Laden.
This past year also saw the removal of top terrorist
leaders, plotters and recruiters, including Anwar al-Awlaki, in
Yemen; al-Qa'ida's linchpin in Pakistan, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman;
and numerous others, resulting in the disruption of specific
terrorist plots, and casting into disarray al-Qa'ida's senior
leadership.
Closer to home, since our hearing last year, there were at
least twenty individuals arrested in the United States on
terrorism-related charges in seventeen different
investigations, which stopped them from carrying out or
assisting in attacks on the Homeland. In the interest of time,
I will put a list that describes each of these arrests in the
record.
[The List of Counterterrorism Arrests in the U.S. in 2011
and 2012 follows:]
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Chairman Feinstein. Arrests like these are the product of
coordination between the FBI, other intelligence agencies, the
Department of Homeland Security, and state and local law
enforcement units throughout the country.
Also in 2011, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the DEA;
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the FBI; the Central
Intelligence Agency, the CIA; and others combined to identify
and thwart an Iranian plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to the
United States, a plot so unusual and amateurish that many
initially doubted that Iran was responsible. Well, let me state
for the record, I have no such doubts.
Finally, the Intelligence Community supported countless
United States national security and foreign policy actions,
including the war in Afghanistan, the drawdown in Iraq, the
NATO-led mission in Libya that removed dictator Muammar
Gaddafi, the implementation of sanctions on Iran over its
nuclear program, the interdictions of weapons of mass
destruction shipments, and many, many others. Despite the
successes, the threats to our nation remain serious, and in
many ways, more difficult to understand and even address than
in years past.
The Intelligence Community's statement for the record,
which is posted on the Committee's website and will be
summarized by Director Clapper, describes these threats at
length. Let me address just a few points.
Terrorism: we are all familiar with the continuing threats
posed by al-Qa'ida affiliates in Yemen and Somalia, AQAP and
al-Shabaab, as well as that from al-Qa'ida in Iraq, AQI, all
three of which aspired to conduct attacks outside of their
borders.
I want to mention, with special emphasis, the threat posed
by the al-Qa'ida affiliate in North Africa, which calls itself
al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM. For the
past few years, AQIM has been almost an afterthought when
discussing the terrorist threat. This may be about to change.
Recent public records point out that AQIM, which has
traditionally operated in parts of Algeria and Mali, is well
positioned to exploit instability and pockets of extremism in
Libya and Nigeria, and to create new safe havens.
The reports also raised concerns about the tens of millions
of dollars AQIM has received from ransom payments for hostages
and other illicit activities.
I believe the Intelligence Community needs to move now to
be prepared to address this possible growing threat.
Then there is Iran and North Korea. While the overall
terrorist threat may be down, the threat from the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction from Iran and North Korea is
growing. On January 9th, Iran announced that it started
enriching uranium at its Fordo plant near the city of Qom.
According to IAEA reports, Iran is enriching uranium to 20
percent, both there and at Natanz. IAEA inspectors arrived in
Iran over the weekend, and I believe they must--and should--
have complete access to all Iranian nuclear facilities, and I
asked that they make their findings public on a regular basis
so the world will clearly understand what is happening there.
According to most timelines I've heard, 2012 will be a
critical year for preventing Iran's development of a nuclear
weapon. In North Korea, there is now a 28-year-old dictator
ruling over the country's cache of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles, which should concern us deeply.
Recently, this Committee received an update from the
Intelligence Community on the threat North Korea poses, and it
was quite sobering. I won't go into any details, because
they're classified, but I strongly believe this will need to be
an area where the Intelligence Community continues to focus its
resources and attention.
I think we all know the threat from Cyber. We all know the
need to pass some legislation in this regard, and we know that
the intrusions could be enormous--take down a dam, take down
our electric grid--and United States companies have cost untold
billions of dollars annually. China and Russia have both been
named as aggressive and persistent cyber thieves.
In Afghanistan, the surge of U.S. forces that began in '09
has produced meaningful gains. That said, I think we're all
very concerned about what will happen in 2014 when we reduce
our troop commitment, and President Karzai's term is up.
Frankly, I don't see a viable strategy for continuing the level
of security and stability that we are building after 2014. And
I'm also concerned by what appears to be a disparity between
the discussion of Afghanistan in Director Clapper's statement
for the record, and the bleaker description in the December
2011 NIE.
The Director's statement notes modest improvements in the
challenges that remain. While I'm unable to describe the NIE,
as it remains a classified document, news reports of the NIE
describe it as ``sobering'' and ``dire''--those words in
quotes--and includes phrases like ``mired in stalemate.''
So I would like to ask the witnesses how they assess how
stable Afghanistan will be in 2012, as well as 2014 and beyond.
I also want to note that last week I met with Zarar Ahmad
Osmani, the Afghan Minister of Counter Narcotics, and I was
very impressed. I believe he's making good progress in
Afghanistan, and we should be supportive of his efforts to
replicate the Helmand food zone in five other provinces to help
farmers grow alternative crops instead of the heroin poppy.
Of course, Pakistan remains a huge problem, and I would
very much appreciate your views on Pakistan's willingness to be
a partner in our efforts against terrorists and in Afghanistan,
as well as whether the civilian government can survive in light
of other political controversies.
There are a couple of things I want to add, and I'm not
sure this is a good place, but I'm going to do it anyway.
In this morning's edition of the Los Angeles Times, there
was an article asserting that CIA Director David Petraeus has
been inaccessible and guarded in his interactions with Congress
and with the intelligence committees, in particular, since
being sworn in last September. As far as I'm concerned, nothing
could be farther from the truth. And I believe the Ranking
Member--the Vice Chairman--would agree with that.
I spoke to the reporter last Friday and made very clear to
him that this has not been my experience or, to the best of my
knowledge, the Members' of this Committee. If it had been, I
would have heard. Director Petraeus has appeared before us
every month since becoming Director, and the Vice Chairman and
I have had several phone calls and other meetings with him. He
has upheld his obligation to keep the Committee fully and
currently informed, and I regret that some people felt the need
to engage in anonymous complaints.
I would also like to say that once again, this Committee
has been put in a difficult position of trying to avoid any
mention of classified matters when various parts of the
Executive Branch may be doing somewhat the opposite. I ask
Members to be careful in their questions and statements, and to
remember that public discussion of some intelligence programs
and assets can lead to them being compromised.
On the particular issue of drone strikes, I will only say
what I was cleared to say in our joint hearing with the House
Intelligence Committee last September. There's no issue that
receives more attention and oversight from this Committee than
the United States counterterrorism efforts going on along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border. These efforts are extremely
precise and carefully executed and are the most effective tools
we have. Noncombatant casualties are kept to an absolute
minimum.
So now, if I may, Mr. Vice Chairman, I want you to know
it's been a great pleasure for me to work with you. I also want
the public to know that together, your side and our side have
been able to pass three Intelligence Authorization Bills by
unanimous consent in both houses. And it's just been a great
pleasure for me to work with you. If you have some comments, if
you would make them now, and then I'll introduce the speakers.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE CHAIRMAN, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Very good. Thanks, Madam Chair.
And let me just echo the same sentiment to you with respect to
our working relationship. It has been pretty seamless, both at
a personal level at the top, as well as with our staff. I thank
you for the way that you have integrated me into the vice
chairmanship over this past year, and I look forward to
continuing to work in a very close way with you. And also, I
like your California wine, by the way.
I join the Chairwoman in welcoming our guests today. And
this is certainly the brain trust of the Intelligence
Community, and there's an awful lot of experience here. There's
also an awful lot of talent at the table. But I'll comment more
on the brave men and women that work for you, and the great job
that they're doing.
The Committee holds most all of our meetings in closed
session, so this annual threat hearing is one of the only
opportunities we have to discuss in public the threats that
face our nation.
It's also one of the few opportunities we do get to extend
our public thanks to the men and women of the Intelligence
Community. Because of the hard work of the folks who work for
each of you, 2011 was a great year for the Intelligence
Community, a year when we finally saw the realization of a
decade of work to ensure that Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-
Awlaki will never again threaten this nation. I'm glad to say
that we will no longer have an annual threat hearing where
someone asks the question, ``Where is Osama bin Laden?''
Last year's successes were no small achievement. They
resulted from transformation and improvement in every IC
agency. In particular, I am impressed by the work being done by
CIA's Counterterrorism operators and analysts working together
to take down terrorists and their network. We have heard from
these officers in countless briefings that core al-Qa'ida is
essentially on the ropes, as long as we continue sustained CT
pressure on the group.
Director Clapper, this exact same sentiment is expressed in
your written statement for the record for today's hearing. I
know I am not alone on this panel in believing that we must
continue whatever level of pressure it takes to degrade core
al-Qa'ida once and for all. As we are seeing in Iraq, gains
that took a decade to achieve can erode quickly if we do not do
what it takes to protect them.
I also hope we are learning from other lessons from Iraq. I
was dismayed by the Administration's decision to hand over
custody of Hezbollah operative Ali Mussa Daqduq to Iraq last
year. It is too late now to prevent what I believe will result
in the ultimate release of a terrorist who killed five American
soldiers in Iraq. But it is not too late to make sure that the
same thing does not happen with the hundreds of terrorists
still in detention in Afghanistan.
I hope our witnesses can discuss the range of likely
threats posed by these detainees and the role of the Community
in providing intelligence and support of planning for any
handover of detention facilities to Afghans. I understand that
this is going to be a challenge because the Administration
still lacks a long-term detention policy, but we just cannot
keep letting dangerous detainees go free.
This brings me to my last point. Press reports have
outlined the Administration's plans to trade prisoners detained
at Guantanamo Bay to the Taliban as a confidence-building
measure. It appears from these reports that in exchange for
transferring detainees who have been determined to be too
dangerous to transfer by the Administration's own Guantanamo
Review Task Force, we get little to nothing in return.
Apparently, the Taliban will not have to stop fighting our
troops, and won't even have to stop bombing them with IEDs.
I have also heard nothing from the IC that suggests that
the assessments on the threat posed by these detainees have
changed. I want to state publicly, as strongly as I can, that
we should not transfer these detainees from Guantanamo.
Moreover, I believe the Community should declassify the
intelligence assessments on these detainees so that we can have
a full and open debate without the wisdom of this transfer
before it takes place.
Let me conclude with two other comments. First of all, with
respect to the LA Times article, Madam Chair, I did not see
that this morning, but I want to again state in an unequivocal
fashion that Director Petraeus has done an outstanding job in
service to our country in many capacities, as his service in
the military would indicate. And during the time that he has
been the Director of the CIA, you're exactly right--he has
stayed in constant communication with the two of us, and I know
with our colleagues on the House side. He has been readily
available to come to the Committee on a formal and an informal
basis, as well as being available at any time for us to have a
conversation with. And I'm surprised that there would be any
question about that.
And as we all know, we have the utmost confidence in his
leadership, along with the leadership of the entire Community.
And there has been, again, a seamless transition from Director
Panetta to Director Petraeus, and we're very confident of his
leadership.
One other issue that I want to mention is that following
the event of September 11, as a Member of the House Select
Committee on Intelligence, Congressman Jane Harman and I
chaired a subcommittee on the Intel Committee that did a review
of the facts leading up the events of September 11. And we
issued the first detailed report on the deficiencies within the
Intelligence Community that led up to September 11. And we were
very critical of the Community in one respect, particularly,
and that was the lack of the sharing of information between our
various agencies within the Community.
Director Mueller, you and I have had extensive
conversations, since you've been here longer than any of the
rest of the Members here, about that issue. And I just want to
say that over the past decade, the stovepipes that we alluded
to in that report have continued to fall. And I would have to
say that today, without question, while we still have
improvements to be made, that the sharing of information
between all of our agencies is at a superior level.
And Mr. Olsen, I had the privilege, as you know, of
visiting with your folks at NCTC recently. It was very
impressive to not only see the improvement from a technology
standpoint, but just to see every member of the Intelligence
Community sitting around a table virtually and discussing in
real-time the issues that face the Community from a CT
standpoint. It's very impressive. And I commend all of you for
the great work you've done.
It's not been easy, and I know sometimes it's very
difficult to put aside some of the previous relationships that
might have existed. But boy, have you all ever done a good job
breaking down those firewalls and really engaging with every
member of the Intelligence Community to ensure that we disrupt
and interrupt terrorist activity around the world that's
directed at America, Americans, as well as other countries and
allies around the world. So I commend you from that respect.
I thank you for being here today, and I look forward to
your testimony. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Now I'd like to introduce the distinguished panel before us.
They are: the Director of National Intelligence, James
Clapper, who will deliver an opening statement on behalf of the
entire Intelligence Community; Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, David Petraeus; Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, General Ronald Burgess; Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bob Mueller; Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center, Matthew Olsen; Assistant
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Philip
Goldberg; and Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at
the Department of Homeland Security, Caryn Wagner. Thank you
all very much for being here.
We will now take your statement, Director Clapper, and we
will then go into 10-minute rounds based on the early-bird
rule.
Director Clapper, welcome.
STATEMENT OF JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Director Clapper. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Vice
Chairman Chambliss, and distinguished Members of the Committee,
for inviting us to present the 2012 Worldwide Threat
Assessment.
These remarks and our statement for the record reflect the
collective insights of the extraordinary men and women of the
United States Intelligence Community, whom it is our privilege
and honor to lead. And on their behalf, I would thank you both
for your acknowledgment and recognition of the great work that
these men and women do all over the world, day in and day out,
in many cases at some hazard.
I won't attempt to cover the full scope of the worldwide
threats in these brief oral remarks, so I'd like to highlight
just some of the issues we identified for the coming year.
Never has there been, in my almost-49-year career in
intelligence, a more complex and interdependent array of
challenges than we face today. Capabilities, technologies,
know-how, communications, and environmental forces aren't
confined by borders and can trigger transnational disruptions
with astonishing speed, as we have seen.
Never before has the Intelligence Community been called
upon to master such complexity on so many issues in such a
resource-constrained environment. We're rising to the challenge
by continuing to integrate the Intelligence Community, as you
both alluded to, taking advantage of new technologies,
implementing new efficiencies, and, as always, simply working
hard. But, candidly, maintaining the world's premier
intelligence enterprise in the face of shrinking budgets will
be difficult. We'll be accepting and managing risk more so than
we've had to do in the last decade.
We begin our threat assessment, as we did last year, with
the global issues of terrorism and proliferation. The
Intelligence Community sees the next two to three years as a
critical transition phase for the terrorist threat,
particularly for al-Qa'ida and like-minded groups.
With Osama bin Laden's death, the global jihadist movement
lost its most iconic and inspirational leader. The new al-
Qa'ida commander is less charismatic, and the death or capture
of prominent al-Qa'ida figures has shrunk the group's top
leadership layer. However, even with its degraded capabilities
and its focus on smaller, simpler plots, al-Qa'ida remains a
threat. As long as we sustain the pressure on it, we judge that
core al-Qa'ida will be of largely symbolic importance to the
global jihadist movement. But regional affiliates, as the ones
you mentioned, and, to a lesser extent, small cells and
individuals, will drive the global jihad agenda.
Proliferation--that is, efforts to develop, acquire, or
spread weapons of mass destruction--is also a major global
strategic threat. Among nation states, Iran's technical
advances, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthen our
assessment that Iran is well capable of producing enough
highly-enriched uranium for a weapon, if its political leaders,
specifically the Supreme Leader himself, choose to do so.
North Korea's export of ballistic missiles and associated
materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria,
illustrate the reach of the North's proliferation activities.
We don't expect Kim Jong-Un, North Korea's new young leader, to
change Pyongyang's policy of attempting to export most of its
weapons systems.
I would note that in this year's statement for the record,
we elevated our discussion of cyber threats to follow terrorism
and proliferation. The cyber threat is one of the most
challenging ones we face, as you alluded. We foresee a cyber
environment in which emerging technologies are developed and
implemented before security responses can be put in place.
Among state actors, we're particularly concerned about
entities within China and Russia conducting intrusions into
U.S. computer networks and stealing U.S. data. The growing role
that non-state actors are playing in cyberspace is a great
example of the easy access to potentially disruptive and even
lethal technology and know-how by such groups.
Two of our greatest strategic cyber challenges are, first,
definitive real-time attribution of cyber attacks--that is,
knowing who carried out such attacks and where these
perpetrators are located; and second, managing the enormous
vulnerabilities within the IT supply chain for U.S. networks.
Briefly, looking geographically around the world, during
the past year in Afghanistan, the Taliban lost some ground, but
that was mainly in places where the International Security
Assistance Forces, or ISAF, are concentrated. And the Taliban
senior leaders continue to enjoy safe haven in Pakistan.
ISAF's efforts to partner with Afghan National Security
Forces are encouraging, but corruption and governance
challenges continue to threaten the Afghan forces' operational
effectiveness. Most provinces have established basic governance
structures, but they struggle to provide essential services.
The ISAF and the support of Afghanistan's neighbors, notably
and particularly Pakistan, will remain essential to sustain the
gains that have been achieved.
And although there's broad international political support
for the Afghan government, there are doubts in many capitals,
particularly in Europe, about how to fund Afghan initiatives
after 2014.
In Iraq, violence and sporadic high-profile attacks
continue. Prime Minister Maliki's recent aggressive moves
against Sunni political leaders have heightened political
tensions. But for now, the Sunnis continue to view the
political process as the best venue to pursue change.
Elsewhere across the Mideast and North Africa, those
pushing for change are confronting ruling elites; sectarian,
ethnic, and tribal divisions; lack of experience with
democracy; stalled economic development; military and security
force resistance; and regional power rivalries. These are fluid
political environments that offer openings for extremists to
participate much more assertively in political life. States
where authoritarian leaders have been toppled, like Tunisia,
Egypt, and Libya, have to reconstruct their political systems
through complex negotiations among competing factions.
In Syria, regime intransigence and social divisions are
prolonging internal struggles and could potentially turn
domestic upheavals into regional crises. In Yemen, although a
political transition is underway, the security situation
continues to be marred by violence, and fragmentation of the
country is a real possibility. As the ancient Roman historian
Tacitus once observed, ``The best day after a bad emperor is
the first.'' After that, I would add, things get very
problematic.
The Intelligence Community is also paying close attention
to developments across the African continent, throughout the
Western Hemisphere, Europe, and across Asia. Here, too, few
issues are self-contained. Virtually every region has a bearing
on our key concerns of terrorism, proliferation, cyber
security, and instability. And throughout the globe wherever
there are environmental stresses on water, food and natural
resources, as well as health threats, economic crises and
organized crime, we see ripple effects around the world and
impacts on U.S. interests.
Amidst these extraordinary challenges, it's important to
remind this distinguished body and the American people that in
all of our work, the U.S. Intelligence Community strives to
exemplify American values. We carry out our missions with
respect for the Rule of Law and the protection of Civil
Liberties and Privacy. And that pledge leads me to a crucial
recommendation on our highest legislative priority this year,
and it requires the support of this Committee and both houses
of Congress.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act, or
FAA, is set to expire at the end of this year. Title VII of
FISA allows the Intelligence Community to collect vital
information about international terrorists and other important
targets overseas. The law authorizes the surveillance of non-
U.S. persons located overseas who are of foreign intelligence
importance, meaning they have a connection to, or information
about, threats such as terrorism or proliferation.
It also provides for comprehensive oversight by all three
branches of government to protect the privacy and civil
liberties of U.S. persons. The Department of Justice and my
office conduct extensive oversight reviews of these activities
and we report to Congress on implementation and compliance
twice a year. Intelligence collection under FISA produces
crucial intelligence that is vital to protect the nation
against international terrorism and other threats.
We're always considering whether there are changes that
could be made to improve the law, but our first priority is
reauthorization of these authorities in their current form. We
look forward to working with you to ensure the speedy enactment
of legislation to reauthorize the FISA Amendments Act so that
there's no interruption in our ability to use these authorities
to protect the American people.
So I'll end this brief statement where I began. The fiscal
environment we face as a nation and in our Intelligence
Community will require careful identification and management of
the challenges the IC focuses on, and the risks that we must
mutually assume.
With that, I thank you and the Members of this Committee
for your dedication to the security of our nation, your support
for the men and women of the Intelligence Community, and for
your attention today. My colleagues and I look forward to your
questions and our discussion. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of James R. Clapper, Director of
National Intelligence, follows:]
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Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Director Clapper.
We will begin with 10 minutes and the early-bird rule.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, I think 2012 is
going to be a critical year for convincing or preventing Iran
from developing a nuclear weapon. In Sunday's New York Times
magazine, Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman wrote, ``After
speaking with many senior Israeli leaders and chiefs of the
military, and the intelligence, I have come to believe that
Israel will indeed strike Iran in 2012.''
How do you assess that likelihood and the response from
Iran, if that happens, that might be forthcoming?
Director Clapper. Well, our hope is that the sanctions,
particularly those which have been recently implemented, would
have the effect of inducing a change in the Iranian policy
towards their apparent pursuit of a nuclear capability.
Obviously, this is a very sensitive issue right now. We're
doing a lot with the Israelis, working together with them. And
of course for them, this is, as they have characterized, an
existential threat. But this is an area that we are very, very
concerned about.
And I would be pleased, because of the sensitivities, to
discuss that in greater detail in a closed session.
Chairman Feinstein. Well, the Vice Chairman and I have just
met this past week with the Director of Mossad, so that is a
classified meeting, but we do know that. I think--and let me
ask this of you, Director Petraeus--that the world has to know
what's happening. It's one of the reasons I believe that the
IAEA, when they go in--well, they're in Pakistan now, but when
they go into Fordo--really must make transparent and public
what they find there, what they see there, so that we know for
sure what is happening.
I think the world is entitled to that, particularly when
you have a situation where one country views this as an
existential threat. They believe it's their survival. They are
determined not to let it happen. To really get the correct
picture on what is happening, I think it's important. Do you
have a view on this?
Director Petraeus. I do, Madam Chairman. If I could up
front, let me also echo Director Clapper's remarks about
thanking you and the Vice Chairman for your kind words on the
Members of the Intelligence Committee on the accomplishments of
this past year, some of which obviously were of enormous
significance, and thanks to both of you, as well, for your
comments on the Agency efforts to keep the Committee fully and
currently informed. We've worked very hard to be accessible to
you; I have, personally, my deputy and the staff, and we think
that the facts reflect that.
We have worked hard, also, to shorten the time frame from
event to notification when it comes to Congressional
notifications. And we've also increased those over the last
five months, as well.
Like you, I obviously met with the head of Mossad when he
was here. That is part of an ongoing dialogue that has also
included conversations that I've had with Prime Minister
Netanyahu and with Minister Barak; the latter almost on a
monthly basis in the nearly five months that I've been in the
job.
I think it's very important to note, as the article did in
the New York Times, the growing concerns that Israel has and
that the countries in the region have--and indeed, all of us
have--about the continued activities by Iran along a path that
could, if the decision is made--as Director Clapper noted in
his opening statement--to pursue the construction of a nuclear
device.
As both of you noted, Israel does see this possibility as
an existential threat to their country. And I think it's very
important to keep that perspective in mind as, indeed, analysis
is carried out.
As you noted, the IAEA inspectors are in Iran right now. I
believe their past report was a very accurate reflection of the
reality of the situation on the ground. I think that is the
authoritative document when it comes to informing the public,
of all the countries in the world, of the situation there.
Iran is supposedly, reportedly, trying to be more open this
particular time, perhaps trying to reassure countries as it
feels the increased bite of the new sanctions, of the Central
Bank of Iran sanction and the reduction in the purchase of oil
from some of its key customers. And so I look forward, as do
others, obviously, to seeing what that public report will
provide this time, believing, again, that it will be, again,
the authoritative open source document on the program that Iran
is pursuing in the nuclear field.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, General Petraeus.
To me, Pakistan is a very puzzling country. We know that
thousands of Pakistanis have been killed by terrorists, and we
suspect that what Pakistan is doing is trying to essentially--
to use a vernacular--walk both sides of the street. I think I
and most of us believe that having a positive relationship with
Pakistan, as a nuclear power--a significant nuclear power--is
very important. The question I have is how do you assess this
relationship, which certainly had its low in December and may
or may not be improving; how do you assess it at this time?
Director Clapper. Well, let me start and I'll ask Director
Petraeus to add in. Well, clearly, as you allude to, Chairman
Feinstein, this is a challenging relationship, but it's an
important one for exactly the reason that you mention, which is
Pakistan is a nuclear power. Pakistan and our interests are not
always congruent. Their existential threat continues to be
India. They have also paid a huge price because of the
militants that they've had in their country and have suffered
literally thousands of casualties in that context.
So sometimes our interests converge, and sometimes they
differ. But as I would characterize the relationship, it's
crucial that we have one and have a positive relationship, even
though we've gone through some trying times.
Director Petraeus. Well, again, the relationship is very
important, but the relationship right now is also quite
strained. The most recent cause of that, of course, is the 26
November border incident between ISAF and Pakistani forces.
In the Pakistani Parliament, there is a committee that is
determining recommendations for the government for the way
forward with the relationship between the United States and
Pakistan. I think there's awareness there, as well, that this
is a critically important relationship, that there are areas of
considerable mutual concern, mutual objectives, while there are
also those in which there are diverging interests, as Director
Clapper noted.
The activities right now are also complicated, though,
because of the difficulties in the domestic context there,
where there's a bit of tension between the Supreme Court,
between the Army Chief and the ISI Director, and the
government, the President and the Prime Minister. That may be
calming a bit. There have been signs of that in recent days.
It's worth noting, by the way, that the former Pakistani
ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Haqqani, was
allowed to leave, and he did arrive in the UAE this morning.
Nonetheless, the situation, I think as our British colleagues
might say, is fraught, and it is going to take some time, it's
going to take a lot of diplomacy, engagement, and so forth, to
move forward in a relationship that's important to both of our
countries.
I should note that, as a general comment, we believe the
relationship between the intelligence services is generally
still productive. There is certainly good communication going
back and forth. And there has been, again, pursuit of important
mutual objectives between the two services.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you both very much. Mr. Vice
Chairman?
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks, Madam Chair.
Director Clapper, press reports--and I emphasize that--
indicate that the United States is prepared to trade five
Taliban members currently detained at Guantanamo as a
confidence-building measure in negotiations with the Taliban.
Now, all five detainees that are named by the press were
determined by the current Administration to be--and I quote--
``too dangerous to transfer,'' and are being held as enemy
combatants. Now, as part of the task force, did the
Intelligence Community concur in the determinations that these
five detainees were too dangerous to transfer and should be
held as enemy combatants?
Director Clapper. Well, I believe that in the original
assessments, with which NCTC Director Matt Olsen was involved,
that was the case. I should say, though, that this proposed so-
called trade has actually not been decided yet. There's
continued consultation with the Congress. In fact, there will
be a session this afternoon with the Senate leadership on this
issue.
And, of course, we are certainly mindful of the provisions
in the National Defense Authorization Act and the requirement
for certifications, and I believe, inherent in that, is
continued consultation with the Congress on whether or not this
would go forward.
That said, I think the history has been, in almost every
case where we've had hostilities, that at some point in time
there are negotiations. I don't think anyone in the
Administration harbors any illusions about the potential here.
And, of course, part and parcel of such a decision, if it were
finally made, would be the actual determination of where these
detainees might go and the conditions in which they would be
controlled or surveilled.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Director Olsen, as stated there,
you did head the Guantanamo review task force that made the
determination that these five reported named individuals were
too dangerous to transfer. Have you changed your view with
respect to these detainees?
Director Olsen. Vice Chairman, I have not been involved in
any reviews more recently of those detainees. As you point out,
they were subject to the review we conducted in 2009 that
determined that. I believe those were among the 48 who were
deemed too dangerous to release and who could not be
prosecuted. But I've done no further review in my current
capacity at NCTC.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. So, what you're saying is that the
Administration has not asked you for any update of your opinion
relative to these individuals?
Director Olsen. That's correct.
Director Clapper. Well, sir, I need to inject here, though,
that in the interagency deliberations, certainly the IC has
been asked, and we have provided, assessments of the five that
are in question. So that has been a part of the discussion.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. And has there been a change by the
Community from the categorizing of these individuals as ``too
dangerous to transfer''?
Director Clapper. We haven't--no, sir, I don't believe that
under normal circumstance--in other words, repatriation to
their point of origin or their country of origin. This is a
little different. This is a different condition, though, in
terms of the potential for negotiating some form of confidence-
building measure with the Taliban. And this is very, very
preliminary. And, again, no final decision has been made.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Let me ask you and Director
Petraeus, who are very familiar with this--are you comfortable
with transferring these individuals out of Guantanamo?
Director Clapper. For me, the key would be where they would
go, the intermediate country where they might be detained, and
the degree to which they would be surveilled. And that would be
the key determinant for me.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. And Director Petraeus?
Director Petraeus. Very similar, Vice Chairman. In fact,
our analysts did provide assessments of the five and the risks
presented by various scenarios by which they could be sent
somewhere--not back to Afghanistan or Pakistan--and then, based
on the various mitigating measures that could be implemented,
to ensure that they cannot return to militant activity.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. The Intelligence Community
assesses--and, Director Clapper, your statement for the record
underscores--that the Taliban remains resilient and capable of
challenging U.S. and international goals in Afghanistan. The
Community also assesses that Taliban senior leaders continue to
enjoy safe havens in Pakistan, which enables them to provide
strategic direction to the insurgency in Afghanistan without
fear for their safety.
Does the Community assess that Taliban reconciliation is
likely to have a great deal of success, considering that the
group is resilient, maintains the ability to challenge the
United States, continues to enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan, and
knows the timelines under which we plan to withdraw U.S. forces
from Afghanistan?
Director Clapper. I think our assessment is pretty much as
you stated it, sir. The Taliban remains a resilient, determined
adversary. That said, again, I repeat--and I don't think
anybody harbors any illusions about it, but I think the
position is to at least explore the potential for negotiating
with them as a part of this overall resolution of the situation
in Afghanistan.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. I want to be careful how I ask
this, and hopefully you can respond in some way with respect to
our relationship with Pakistan. The safe havens that do exist
have been pretty obvious and well-documented publicly.
How is our relationship with Pakistan at this point in time
allowing us to address those safe havens and the cross-border
activity that's taking place there from a Taliban standpoint?
Director Clapper. Well, this is obviously part of the
dialogue and engagement that Director Petraeus and I have
spoken of. And clearly, this is a point of discussion with the
Pakistanis, and they are certainly aware of our concerns. But
this is a good example where our mutual interests don't always
converge.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Director Petraeus, anything you
want to add to that?
Director Petraeus. Well, I think, again, the record is
obviously mixed. There has been progress against some of the
extremist elements; in the border regions, in particular. That
would include, obviously, al-Qa'ida. When number one, two, and
three are removed from the picture in a single year, needless
to say, that's a pretty significant accomplishment.
But it's beyond that. It's important to note back in
October of this past year, for example, four of the Top 20 in a
single week were either captured or killed. And, again, some of
this has obviously been undertaken together.
There has also been progress by our Pakistani partners
against the elements that have threatened their very existence.
We should remember that a little over two and a half years ago,
it looked as if the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistani was going to
continue to march right out of Swat Valley and perhaps into the
suburbs of Islamabad. They reversed that. They fought very
hard. They've taken very, very significant casualties, and in
so doing, they've also gone after some of the other elements
allied with the TTP in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
On the other hand, obviously there's been insufficient
pressure on the Haqqani Network and some of the other
elements--again, the allies of al-Qa'ida, such as the Commander
Nazir group, the IMU, and some others. And then, needless to
say, the Afghan Taliban has not been pressured sufficiently in
the sanctuaries that it enjoys in Baluchistan and in other
areas, as well.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. General Burgess, you've also been
integrally involved in this issue relative to the cross-border
activity; anything you want to add to this?
General Burgess. No, sir. In fact, I think Director
Petraeus laid the line out very well in terms of where things
are progressing.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Okay.
Director Mueller, a month ago the President signed the
National Defense Authorization Act and issued a signing
statement in which he outlined his reservations about certain
provisions. Regarding Section 1022, which mandates military
detention for a limited type of non-U.S. citizen terrorist, the
President stated that he would use his waiver authority for
entire categories of cases, and would design implementation
procedures to provide maximum flexibility and clarity to our
counterterrorism professionals.
Are you aware of any categories of terrorists for whom the
President has used, or intends to use, his waiver authority,
and if so, which ones, and how are the intelligence and law
enforcement communities implementing Section 1022 of the NDAA?
Director Mueller. Let me start, Mr. Vice Chairman, by
saying that at the outset, I had reservations in two areas: one
was in terms of our continued authority to investigate
terrorism cases in the United States, and that was resolved by
the legislation. The other part was what happens at the time of
the arrest in the United States? And the statute provides for
the Administration to develop a set of procedures that would be
applicable to that particular situation.
Without getting into details, I can say that with the
Justice Department and White House, they're in the process of
drafting those procedures. I think it'd be premature to talk
about any of the specifics because it's on the drafting stages,
but my hope is that as we go through and develop these
procedures, the remaining concerns we have as to what happens
at the time of arrest will be resolved.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. I thank you for that comment and
would just say that, as you know, we had extensive
conversations between DOJ, the White House, and Congress on
this issue as it went through that drafting, and I would hope
you would continue to dialogue with us with regard to the
regulations that are ultimately implemented.
Director Mueller. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Senator Wyden?
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair. And let me commend
you, Madam Chair and Vice Chair, for the way in which you put
the focus in this Committee in a bipartisan way, and I commend
you for it. And to all our witnesses at the table, I thank you
for your outstanding service. This has been an extraordinary
year.
Let me start with you, if I might, Director Clapper, with
respect to Iran. I've come to believe that Iran's leaders are
not going to give up their push for a nuclear weapons
capability unless they believe it's going to cost them their
hold on power. Do you share that assessment?
Director Clapper. Senator Wyden, actually, that comports
with the Intelligence Community assessment that if the decision
is made to press on with a nuclear weapon--and there are
certain things they have not done yet to eventuate that--that
this would be based on a cost-benefit analysis, starting with
the Supreme Leader's world view and the extent to which he
thinks that would benefit the state of Iran or, conversely, not
benefit.
So that's, I think, precisely where he is, and it will be
done on a cost-benefit basis and we don't believe he's made
that decision yet.
Senator Wyden. What could convince them, in your view, that
their hold on power is being undermined by their nuclear
effort?
Director Clapper. I think a restive population--because of
the economic extremis that the country of Iran is incurring. If
you look at the two indicators that I think are important--the
plunging value of the rial and the extremely high unemployment
rate in Iran, I think this could give rise to resentment and
discontent among the populace. And that's not to say there
haven't been other examples of that elsewhere in the region.
Senator Wyden. Now, on another subject, Mr. Director, you
referenced a recent report that described how foreign spies,
particularly those in China and Russia, are stealing our
economic secrets. Can you give us some sense of what types of
secrets these entities in China and Russia are most interested
in stealing?
Director Clapper. Well, the report you refer to is a
National Counterintelligence Executive Report that was issued
this fall, which called out Russia and China--particularly
China--for their wholesale plundering, if you will, of
intellectual property. And of course, they seem most interested
in our technology. Obviously, if they can save themselves the
time and expense of doing R&D on their own and just steal it
from us, then that works to their benefit.
So, to the extent that they can penetrate unprotected
industry networks, which they've done, unfortunately -
Senator Wyden. Which industry networks, Mr. Director, do
you think are most vulnerable?
Director Clapper. I think it's across the board. I think a
lot of it is driven by what they can get access to. But I think
it's pretty much carte blanche; obviously, the more high-tech
for them, the better. And so this is a serious, serious
problem.
Senator Wyden. Let me move to a third topic, Mr. Director.
In your view, could the peaceful revolution in the Arab world
have happened if repressive governments in the region had been
successful in censoring Twitter, Facebook, Internet search
engines, and electronic communications?
Director Clapper. Well, in some cases they tried to do
that. I am not sure that the success of these upheavals, if you
will, was completely dependent on social media. I think the
basic problems in this region, particularly economic--
repression of political freedoms and all that--would have
bubbled up anyway. I think the social media simply helped
fulminate and amplify that resentment when people understood it
was a large collective.
So I think the social media certainly facilitated it, but I
don't think that without it, it would not have happened. Of
course, some of the governments reacted to that by their
attempts to suppress such communications.
Senator Wyden. I won't continue on this because I want to
ask something of Mr. Goldberg, but I don't know how the word
would have gotten out. I mean, if you look, for example, at the
way phones are tapped in the region and a variety of other
approaches, I don't think the word would have gotten out.
And that's why I'm going to ask you a question, if I might,
Mr. Goldberg. As you know, there is discussion now in the
Congress about whether or not Internet search engines should be
involved in a censorship approach in terms of dealing with
intellectual property, specifically.
Are you concerned that if that is done here, this could be
a precedent, which could make it harder for the State
Department to go forward, for example, with Secretary Clinton's
Internet Freedom Initiative? I've come to feel that at a
minimum, it would be cited as a precedent, that if it's done
here, you could have repressive governments around the world
say, ``Look at what goes on in the United States, and they're
supposed to be the leader in terms of freedom; now we'll pick
up on it.''
Are you concerned that this could possibly be a precedent?
Director Goldberg. I think that we're always concerned with
many conflicting strains when policy and legislation is being
discussed about the Internet and about how to solve various
problems with the distribution of information, as well as how
to protect private property, as is going on in the Congress at
the moment. The Secretary of State, Secretary Clinton, has made
it very clear that Internet freedom is a very important
principle and the overriding principle as we approach all of
these issues.
And I think when we consider whatever precedent is being
set, whatever legislation is being considered, that that's the
primary interest that we need to consider. The Administration
has spoken about online piracy and how to deal with that very
serious issue, and that this can be done in a way that protects
those freedoms, but is also not going to change the
architecture of the Internet.
Senator Wyden. Let me wrap up with you, Director Clapper,
on an issue that I'd asked about before at this open hearing.
General Petraeus knows about this. This is the question about
the use of force in a speech that was given by Mr. Harold Koh,
the State Department lawyer. And let me note at the beginning
that it's a matter of public record that the Intelligence
Community sometimes takes direct action against terrorists, and
this direct action sometimes involves the use of lethal force.
And as you know, Director Koh gave a speech outlining our
policy with respect to various terrorist groups. He talked
about detention, he talked about the use of unmanned drones,
and he noted that under U.S. law, the use of force against
terrorist groups is permitted by congressional authorization,
while under international law, it is permitted by America's
right to self-defense.
But in spite of having asked about this on a number of
occasions--and General Petraeus, you know that I, too, share
the Chair's view with respect to your working with us here on
this Committee and your being forthright--I have not been able
to get an answer to this specific question. And I would like to
know whether that speech that Mr. Koh gave contained unstated
exceptions for intelligence agencies?
Director Clapper. With respect to counterterrorism, it does
not. So it applies to all components of the government involved
in counterterrorism, be it military or non-military.
Senator Wyden. Are there other exceptions other than
counterterrorist activities?
Director Clapper. Well, I believe his speech dealt with
counterterrorism.
Senator Wyden. So you believe that his speech--the text of
the speech, because this would be important--applies to all
agencies? It applies to the Intelligence Community? His entire
speech, the overall thrust of the speech, applies to all of the
Intelligence Community?
Director Clapper. With respect to counterterrorism, yes.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden.
Senator Udall?
Senator Udall. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Good morning.
Thanks to all of you for the important work you do.
Let me start by commenting in a follow-on way on the topic
that Senator Chambliss mentioned, which was the detainee
provisions in the NDAA. I want to thank all of you for weighing
in and for sharing, with the Armed Services Committee and the
Senate at large, your concerns about the detainee provisions as
they were proposed.
We had a spirited debate on the Floor of the Senate for a
number of days. Senator McCain was very involved, as were a
number of other Senators. I think it was a valuable debate. It
was a worthwhile debate. I think it was the Senate at its best.
I'm hopeful that the compromises that were put into the final
product will work. I'm going to continue to monitor what's
happening. I think the debate as to whether we ought to be
prosecuting and delivering justice through the military system
versus the Article 3 system is an important one.
Senator Feinstein and I and others have joined to introduce
the Due Process Guarantee Act, and I think at the heart of our
concerns and the center of our mission is to ensure that
Americans will not be indefinitely detained. So again, I just
want to thank everybody for the engagement and the passion they
brought to that important debate.
General Clapper, if I could focus on a particular topic--
commercial imagery. I was glad to see your comments at CSIS
last week that you're a big believer in commercial imagery. You
noted that it has the benefit of being unclassified, which is
great for sharing among our war-fighters at all levels and with
our coalition partners overseas as well as with non-military
users.
In light of those comments, I've become concerned about
what I've been hearing about the steep reductions in Fiscal
Year '13 for the Enhanced View Commercial Imagery Program. I
understand that the White House has requested a requirements
review for commercial imagery consistent with the new Defense
Strategy, and that this review may well indicate the need for a
shift away from the national technical means, given that
commercial providers can collect imagery at resolutions that
meet virtually all of the military's needs.
So here's my question. Do--do you believe that the Fiscal
Year '13 Enhanced View budget will meet the war-fighters' needs
for unclassified imagery? How will it affect the safety of our
war-fighters and our capacity to work with our allies?
Director Clapper. Senator, as you alluded to, I am a huge
believer in commercial imagery, going back to when I served as
then-Director of NIMA and later NGA in the immediate aftermath
of 9/11, and we used a lot of commercial imagery then. It
continues to be of great value for exactly the reasons you
cited. It's unclassified; it can be shared in coalition
contexts as well as in domestic disaster relief and the like.
That said, though, we are looking at some pretty steep
budget cuts across the board in the Intelligence Community. And
as a consequence, commercial imagery will be considered in that
broader look at where we may have to take reductions, and I am
not going to single out commercial imagery as the only one.
It's my view that not only can we satisfy the military
requirements, but all the other non-military requirements, as
well for commercial imagery, at the contemplated level of
funding.
I think it is incumbent on the industry to perhaps come up
with some innovations and business practices and this sort of
thing that will help us as we look at a more constrained fiscal
environment.
Senator Udall. I appreciate your attention to this matter.
I know many of the other participants today on the panel depend
on this kind of imagery. My concern, I think--and you share it,
I hear you implying--is that if you cut too far, you reduce the
reach of the commercial sector, you may lose skill sets and
experts that have played an important role, and you create a
downward spiral that may be hard to reverse if it goes too far.
Director Clapper. Sir, this is a concern we have across the
board, not just in the commercial imagery industry. But as we
make reductions, particularly in intelligence, obviously that's
going to have some impact on the industrial base across the
board.
Senator Udall. Let me turn to the Middle East, and perhaps
direct this question at General Petraeus and Director Clapper--
and others on the panel, please feel free to weigh in.
Syria. Do you assess that the fall of the al-Assad regime
is inevitable at this point, or is it still in question? If the
regime should fall, how do you assess what a post-Assad Syria
looks like, both near-term and long-term?
And then what are your thoughts on how Hezbollah and Iran
would be affected, should the Assad regime fall?
Director Clapper. I personally believe it's a question of
time before Assad falls, but that's the issue. It could be a
long time. I think two there are factors here. The protraction
of these demonstrations and the opposition continues to be
fragmented. But I do not see how he can sustain his rule of
Syria. And of course, post-Assad would be exactly the issue.
There is a question about who would emerge in a post-Assad
situation.
As far as Iran and Hezbollah, what is transpiring in Syria
is, of course, of great concern to them. It's why they are both
expending great effort, in terms of resources and advice and
this sort of thing, to try to prop up the Assad regime.
Senator Udall. General Petraeus.
Director Petraeus. Yeah, I generally subscribe to that as
well. The opposition is obviously showing a considerable amount
of resilience and indeed is carrying out an increasing level of
violence. The fact is that Damascus and Aleppo now, two
previously relatively safe cities, the two biggest, are now
seeing violence in their suburbs.
The initiation of offensive operations by the Bashar al-
Assad's regime to try to push them out of the suburbs has met
very stiff resistance, and I think it has indeed shown how
substantial the opposition to the regime is and how it is, in
fact, growing, and how increasing areas are becoming beyond the
reach of the regime security forces.
Post-Assad, one would assume that there would be leadership
from the Sunni Arab Community of the country, which is
certainly the majority, as opposed to the Alawi minority that
is the core of the Bashar al-Assad regime. But that then begs
the question of what happens to these other elements, to the
minorities, to the Alawi, to the Druze, to the Kurdish
minority?
Senator Udall. The Christian Community as well.
Director Petraeus. The Druze Christians and other Christian
sects as well.
Clearly, the loss of Syria as a logistics platform, a line
of communication into Lebanon to support Hezbollah would be a
substantial setback for Iran in its efforts to use Hezbollah as
a proxy. That is, indeed, why the Revolutionary Guards Corps,
Qods Force, is so engaged in trying to prop up Bashar al-Assad
right now.
Senator Udall. Let me turn to another country in that
region. General Petraeus, you know better than anyone how much
we've invested in Iraq--treasure, our reputation, and of
course, the lives of Americans from all over our country. If
you were to advise the policymakers sitting here and in the
Senate and the Congress at large, what would you suggest we
should be doing as Iraq struggles to find a democratic path
forward?
Director Petraeus. I think essentially continuing what we
are in fact doing, which is engaging Iraqi counterparts at
various levels, all the way from the top through the diplomatic
communities, intelligence and security services, working hard
to help them to resolve the ongoing political crisis--and
there's no other word for that, although it has perhaps
diminished it somewhat.
And it now appears, as of the last 48 hours, that the Sunni
bloc of the political leadership is going to return to the
government, albeit with still some hedging of bets. Supporting
them as they grapple with the security challenges that have
emerged over the course of the past two months or so, where al-
Qa'ida in Iraq has been a bit more active than it was for quite
some period, and helping them to develop further their security
forces and their intelligence services to combat a mutual
enemy--we do not want to see the resurgence or the regeneration
of al-Qa'ida in Iraq--and very much in the interests of both
countries and indeed the region and the world, working together
to combat it.
Senator Udall. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator
Snowe?
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank all of you
for your contributions to our country.
I want to follow up on a couple of issues with respect to
Iran. And obviously it's deeply troubling in terms of the
direction that they're taking. And we predicate a lot,
obviously, on the report that was issued by the IAEA.
And I know, General Petraeus, you indicate it's an
authoritative document.
They list in page 8 of their report the number of
activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear
explosive device, including procuring nuclear-related and dual-
use equipment, materials, developed undeclared pathways, the
acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and
documentation, and work on the development of indigenous design
of nuclear weapon, including the testing of components.
I gather we agree with the fact that Iran has not made a
decision to weaponize at this point. Director Clapper, do you
agree on that?
Director Clapper. Yes, but they are certainly moving on
that path. But we don't believe they've actually made the
decision to go ahead with a nuclear weapon.
Senator Snowe. Well, how will we decide that they have
integrated all of these components in a decision to weaponize;
at which point?
Director Clapper. Well, certainly----
Senator Snowe. What will be our red line?
Director Clapper. Well, without going into sensitive areas
here, certainly a key indicator would be enrichment of uranium
to a 90 percent level. That would be a pretty good indicator of
their seriousness.
There are some other things they would need to do--which
I'd rather not go into in an open session--that we would also
look for part and apart from whatever we could glean from
across the Community on an actual decision to go forward.
Senator Snowe. General Petraeus, do you care to answer, as
well?
Director Petraeus. No. I fully subscribe to that. Again,
the various components--enrichment, weaponization, delivery,
and what we think would be evident if there is a decision to
enrich beyond the 20 percent that they are currently enriching
to--to the weapons grade--would be very significant, and, I
think, a tell-tale indicator. There's no commercial use for
that, arguably--in fact, not arguably--I think factually, the
amount of 20 percent enriched uranium that they have exceeds
any requirement, for example, for the Tehran Research Reactor
for the foreseeable future. So there are already concerns just
with that.
Senator Snowe. And the IAEA report said much of it is
dispersed among a number of locations. So, with the inspectors
being there for however many days, several days, would they be
able to discern or detect their ability to weaponize at what
state they're in? What do we hope to glean from the process?
Director Clapper. Well, as Director Petraeus has alluded,
the rule of IAEA is extremely important here. And of course, we
do have to bear in mind that Iran is a signatory to the
Nonproliferation Treaty. The facilities that they are now
operating are safeguarded, meaning they are required to be
inspected by the IAEA.
So, their presence there, and in fact their extended stay
there. And it is IAEA's intent, as they said before, to
hopefully resolve these ambiguities about Iran's program and
its intent. So, what they have to say is crucial, and of
course, their continued access is crucial.
Director Petraeus. And there's continuous monitoring, also,
by other means that the IAEA has as well.
Senator Snowe. General Burgess, Iran has issued various
threats with respect to the Strait of Hormuz. Can you give us
some analysis of the activities there and what we are doing, in
addition to--what capabilities does Iran have--or doesn't
have--with respect to having the potential to close the Straits
or affect it in any way, in terms of international transit?
General Burgess. Well, ma'am, what I have said in open
discussions on this--a lot would have to be taken to closed
session--but clearly the Iranians have the capability, we
assess, to temporarily close the Straits of Hormuz. The concern
becomes, then, defining ``temporarily''. But they clearly have
that capability. But if we go any further, I'd prefer to go to
closed session, ma'am.
Senator Snowe. Do we have a defined time in that respect--
on temporary?
General Burgess. Ma'am, I'd prefer to go to closed session.
Senator Snowe. Okay. Thank you. Director Clapper, getting
back to the issue of Pakistan, there was a senior
Administration official who was quoted recently in an article
talking about developing a new normal in terms of relationship
with Pakistan. So much of what we're doing in Afghanistan is
predicated on effectively addressing and rooting out the safe
havens, obviously. And that is the predicate and template for
the President's policy that he indicated in June, and that
obviously we need to have that strong relationship with
Pakistan.
How is our strategy going forward affected by what's
developing in Pakistan, especially now, where, as General
Petraeus indicated, there is a review of our relationship
that's underway within the Pakistan government, the Parliament?
And then secondly, they're issuing threats about imposing
taxes on the transit of our materials, both ours and NATO's,
from their ports and roads to Afghanistan. So this is deeply
troubling. And I don't know if this is a new normal, but how
does that affect our situation in Afghanistan, and how is it
that ever changes the dynamic in Afghanistan?
Director Clapper. Well, it obviously has a profound impact
on Afghanistan and the prospects for successful resolution
there. And that is a way of emphasizing the importance of a
positive relationship with the Pakistanis. And this is getting
into the policy realm now outside of intelligence, but it's
crucial that our dialogue proceed and that we find some way of
converging on that issue, as well, particularly with respect to
safe havens.
Pakistanis are very proud people, and they felt their
sovereignty was assaulted in the Abbottabad raid, and of
course, the regrettable incident in November with the killing
of the Pakistani troops along the border sort of heightens
that. That has caused them to collectively reassess the
relationship.
But in the end, I believe they realize they need a positive
partnership with us. And hopefully we'll work through these in
such a way that we minimize the impact of these safe havens.
Senator Snowe. General Petraeus, you're obviously in an
interesting position, being both Commander of the forces and
the architect of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan,
and now being Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Since you've assumed this position, do you view things any
different in Afghanistan with respect to our Strategy?
Director Petraeus. No. I can't say that I do.
Senator Snowe. Even with some of the reports that have been
issued publicly regarding the assessments of Afghanistan, and
that it is very difficult to make the gains that are essential,
precisely because of what is happening with the safe havens in
Pakistan? These issues are ever thus. I mean, nothing's changed
in the dynamic, unfortunately, including the corruption, the
government, and now, of course, the safe havens. These have
sort of been the dynamics that have been there since the
beginning.
Director Petraeus. There is nothing easy about Afghanistan.
As we used to say, it's all hard all the time, but it's also
all important all the time. There's a reason we went there in
the wake of 9/11. We have hugely important national security
interests there and it's very important to that country, to the
region, and to the world that we do everything possible to try
to get that right and to ensure that Afghanistan is never again
a launch pad for extremist attacks, as it was for the 9/11
attacks.
If I could, by the way--you touched on something that
alluded to the fact that I had a different viewpoint at various
times than that of the Intelligence Community. And I was pretty
clear, I think, in my confirmation hearing, that that typically
resulted from the fact that the Intelligence Community tends to
stop, if you will, a clock, and then for six to eight weeks do
the analysis, argue within the Community itself on the ultimate
position, and then actually provide the NIE or district
assessment or whatever document is provided to policymakers.
And typically, in the four times that I have differed with
the Intelligence Community on Iraq or Afghanistan, the reason
for it has been that lag in a dynamic situation that we
continued to make progress or, in a couple of cases, didn't.
Because in those four cases, twice I thought the assessment was
too negative by the Intelligence Community, and then once in
Iraq, once in Afghanistan, two other times, I felt that the
Community was actually too positive and that we should be more
guarded in our assessments.
Senator Snowe. Yeah. I appreciate that. I well recall that.
And I know there is that sort of, you know, difference, and in
terms of the culture even, but also the lag time.
Director Petraeus. Well, what I should note is that
Director Clapper and all of us have discussed this. And what we
want to do is dramatically reduce that amount of time when you
stop the clock for the analysts to start the writing, if you
will, or to finalize the writing, so that there is not such a
large gap between the end of the data and the delivery of the
product to the policymakers, to Congress, and to the rest of
the Community.
Senator Snowe. So that probably didn't happen this last
NIE?
Director Petraeus. Actually, I'm glad you asked that,
because I think that's worth clarifying.
First of all, the most recent NIE in an open session
addressed the post-2014 period. It was not on the past year or
how things were going in general in Afghanistan; it was
assessments by the Intelligence Community analysts about the
various scenarios. In other words, if you make a certain set of
assumptions about the level of support and a number of other
factors in Afghanistan, what will be the likely outcome?
And there were a series of assumptions, groups of
assumptions, about that. There was relatively little on the
state of the insurgency. In fact, in open session it basically
said, yes, there has been continued progress, but also that the
Taliban does remain resilient.
The military's concern in this case was a view that there
perhaps should have been an additional set or even sets of
assumptions that could be analyzed; in particular, some
assumptions that may have implied a greater level of assistance
than was in those other sets. And that was really the issue.
So I think that the accounts of this have not, in all
cases, been completely well informed, shall we say.
Senator Snowe. I appreciate that. Thank you.
Director Petraeus. Thanks.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Snowe.
Senator Rockefeller?
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to
make a couple of comments. One is I was very pleased to hear
that you want to proceed with the renewal of FISA. Actually, I
think FISA has served two roles. One, it created a very
valuable piece of legislation for us. It was not without
controversy, but it was a right thing to do.
And secondly, I think it helped what some of us who have
been here for some years should point out, that I think it
helped open up the dialogue between the Intelligence Community
and this Committee. This Committee went through a long period
of time when the IC Community treated us very cavalierly. It
was not interested in sharing. We could only--I guess it was
Pat Roberts at the time, and myself. We switched one Chair and
then the other Chair.
They would talk with the gang of four, the gang of eight,
but never both committees. They would never share what they
told us and there were certain circumstances where we could not
share what they had told us because it was a specific request,
and for good reason.
But it was not a good relationship. It was not a good
relationship. I mean, just as--right after 9/11, the first
thing that the Congress did was to pass a law saying it was
okay for the Central Intelligence Agency and the FBI to
communicate with each other, perhaps even shake hands and
perhaps even start to work up a little intelligence on the FBI
side. That was a long process. All of this is long and painful.
Now, I lead up to this by saying I cannot describe to you
my own frustration and sense of wonderment how all of our DNI
directors have come before these meetings and have, at least in
the past--you referenced today, Director Clapper, that, far and
away, the most important matter of national security is
something called cyber security. The President in his State of
the Union actually used the words ``cyber threat,'' which I
think is a better way of talking about it because it's more
sort of stunning, alarming, and less passive. We have made
virtually no progress on that subject.
So on the one hand, the Intelligence Community is telling
us that it's the number one national security threat, not, you
know, taking three of the top five out or, you know, what's
going on here or there. But on a sustained basis, national
security depends upon our ability to form a system wherein
private companies working with DHS and the government can on
their own and decide how they want to protect themselves and
get some help from DHS.
We do not over-regulate--some have said that--because we've
made changes. Olympia Snowe and I came up with a bill three
years ago, and it's wandered through Melissa Hathaway and Mr.
Schmidt, and nobody seems to get very excited about either it
or the subject. And I'm very troubled by this, and I want to
discuss this with you, specifically.
You're in the IC Community. Cyber security is not in your
general line of work, General Petraeus, but it's very much in
Director Clapper's line of work, and therefore, all of your
lines of work. I don't see, particularly, movement. There were
some criticisms made of Olympia Snowe's and my bill that it was
too regulatory. We have interfaced with hundreds of private
stakeholders and companies over the years, and they're quite
satisfied with an almost-completed bill, or a virtually
completed bill that we have.
And so, our Democratic leader and the President talked
about--we've got to do this. The President, as I say, did
mention it in the State of the Union. That is important, but
nothing has happened. And if it is a national security threat,
if it is the national security threat, I don't understand why
we can't get working together on this and get a bill done.
You know, FISA was hard, but this makes FISA look like a
piece of cake and it's far more in the long term. No, not in
the long term; it's probably equal in the long term in terms of
its importance. But it's been a very bad demonstration on the
part of the Congress, the Administration and the public, which
really has no particular interest in cyber security because
nobody's explaining it to them, because it's abstract. It's not
pushed by any one group with particular emphasis, and
therefore, nobody's very excited about it.
We've worked out a way that the private sector companies
basically take responsibility for their own cyber safety, cyber
security. DHS helps them and they're held accountable for it. I
grew so frustrated by the lack of action on the part of all of
us--the conclusive action that I went to Mary Schapiro at the
Securities and Exchange Commission and said, look, I can't do
legislation evidently right now. Would you please at least post
on the SEC website where investors go all the time, obviously,
to figure out if they're going to invest in private companies
or not, and that private company would have to simply say if
they had been hacked into, period. That's all they had to say;
not what subject, but just that they had been hacked into.
Sort of a desperate measure, but it was a start. It's had
some effect. People are talking about that effect in
Washington. That doesn't interest me unless it's headed towards
a bill.
So I would like to get your take, General Clapper, and
perhaps Director Mueller, also, and anybody else who chooses to
speak on the subject. How can you tell us that it's the
principal national security threat and we have absolutely no
bill? We do have a bill, but we have no sort of pervasive push
to get this accomplished, not just a legislative matter.
Director Clapper. Well, first of all, I don't think there's
any question as to the potential here. And there is sort of, I
think, two dimensions to this. There's what goes on day-in and
day-out in terms of our intellectual property being stolen from
us, which is a real threat. Then there is the potential,
although I think it's less likely, of a massive attack, as some
have described, that would basically paralyze the country or
key segments thereof.
The most likely proponents of that would be a nation-state;
specifically, China or Russia. That's why I pushed hard to have
that unclassified report published by the National
Counterintelligence Executive that highlighted that threat.
I think that is an important responsibility of the
Intelligence Community to advise all and sundry--whether it's
Administration officials, whether it's the Congress, or the
public--of the nature of that threat.
I do think the government has a responsibility to provide
support and advice, as exemplified, in my mind, by the Defense
Industrial Base Pilot program that was championed by former
Deputy Secretary Bill Lynn in the Department of Defense, which
evolved, I think, a very workable formula whereby threat data
is provided to key companies, particularly those involved in
the defense or, for that matter, the intelligence business.
But I think the bigger issue here is how do we protect the
nation's cyber? And that is an open question, and I'm not sure
that's completely the responsibility of the Intelligence
Community. I do not view it that way. I think there needs to be
a government-private partnership. They have to participate, and
they have to be open about that, as well.
As far as championing a bill, I personally have sort of
deferred to the White House on----
Senator Rockefeller. Director Clapper, my time is about to
run out. You cannot--it's not your job to champion a bill. But
I just--you know, at some point, you start asking, if you and
your predecessors--Mike McConnell and others--have come up
and--you know, said this is our number one national security
threat, and you're in the threat business, to say that I
don't--this is not necessarily what we do, frankly, I'm just
using this forum to scream out--who is going to start paying
attention to this?
Director Clapper. Well, I think a lot of people are paying
attention. And certainly, the President's mention of it--
there's a White House coordinator for it who's orchestrating
this across the board. It involves the Intelligence Community.
It involves the Department of Defense. It involves, clearly,
the Department of Homeland Security. And I think that the
leadership for that has to be in the interagency.
So I don't know that it's fair to say that, you know, the
Administration doesn't care. It certainly does.
Senator Rockefeller. I'm just saying that we have made no
progress. We have made no progress, and that is embarrassing in
view of what you and your predecessors have said about the
nature of the threat.
Director Mueller, do you have any comments?
Director Mueller. Yes, Senator. I think it's wrong to say
we're excited--or somebody should be excited about it. I can
tell you that we are exceptionally concerned about that threat.
I do not think that today it is necessarily the number one
threat, but it will be tomorrow. Counterterrorism and stopping
terrorist attacks is a present number one priority for the FBI.
But down the road, the cyber threat, which cuts across all
programs, will be the number one threat to the country.
We look at it in three different perspectives. The first
is, inside the FBI, we have to change our organizational
structure. In the same way we changed to address terrorism, we
have to change to address cyber crime. We have to recruit and
hire and bring on the persons who are capable of doing it. We
have to understand that our role is to investigate intrusions
and to thwart further intrusions.
And secondly, in the same way we had to share intelligence
in the wake of September 11, we have to share information and
intelligence between the various entities who address this
particular threat. At the time of intrusion, you do not know
whether it is a state actor, a Russia or a China. You don't
know whether it's an OC, organized crime entity, or the high
school student down the street.
And consequently, you can't allocate it to a particular
agency, which is why we developed the National Cyber
Investigative Task Force with the FBI, CIA, DIA, NSA, Secret
Service, all of those who have a role to address this kind of
threat. And so we have to build up the collective addressing of
that threat in the same way that we did so and broke down the
walls in the wake of September 11.
And lastly, in terms of legislation, we have pushed in the
legislation two areas that are of concern to us. One is a
national data breach requirement. There are 47 states that have
different requirements for reporting data breaches. There has
to be a national data breach requirement for reporting, and we
should be recipients of that reporting.
And secondly, there has to be in the statute, in my mind,
the ability to share the information indicative of a crime with
the Bureau and others who have that responsibility. But it is
something that we as an organization are focusing on as the
next substantial threat.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator
Rockefeller. And I have a data breach law that's been pending
for some time, so hopefully you'll include it.
Next is Senator Conrad.
Senator Conrad. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to thank
you and the Vice Chair of this Committee for conducting this
Committee in such a thoroughly professional way. I really have
enjoyed my service on this Committee and in no small measure
because of the leadership of this Committee. I think it's
just--it's a very good example for the rest of the Senate.
I also want to thank all those who are here testifying on
behalf of the Intelligence Community. Let me just add my voice
with respect to the press reports reflecting on Director
Petraeus by these unseen, unnamed sources.
You know, as far as I am concerned, these people that work
behind the cloak of anonymity attacking people are cowards. If
they have something to say about somebody, if they want it to
have some credibility, they ought to have the courage to stand
up and say it and put their name behind it. And I'd say to the
press they ought to quit printing anonymous attacks on people;
it does not reflect well on them, either.
So with respect to Director Petraeus, as far as I'm
concerned, he's a patriot. He's demonstrated that not only in
his military career, but on taking on this assignment. That
was, to me, an act of patriotism. It would have been very easy
for him--he didn't need to do this for his reputation or his
career. So he deserves our praise, not these nameless, faceless
attacks that, frankly, have no basis in fact, either.
And my--my experience is I have been quite pleasantly
surprised at how open the Intelligence Community has been with
this Committee, quite to the contrary of this report.
Director Mueller, thank you for agreeing to serve another
couple of years. I think that, too, is an act of patriotism.
It's very much appreciated. At this time of threat to our
country, for you to agree to take on additional years of
service deserves our public praise.
And we thank all of you. I can't neglect mentioning Mr.
Olsen because his parents are from my home state. I know them
well; couldn't have finer people. We're very, very fortunate to
have people of that quality and character serving.
I'd like to ask each of you in turn, since this is an
annual meeting--what is your assessment of whether or not we
have made progress in our ability to handle the terrorist
threat to this country? Have we made progress? If so, how? Are
we slipping? What is your assessment of how we have done
compared to where we were a year ago?
I'd start with Mr. Goldberg and go right down the line.
Mr. Goldberg. I think, as it was said earlier, Senator
Conrad, that progress has been made in various parts of the
counterterrorism fight, especially against al-Qa'ida senior
leadership. But there are many other challenges out there, and
it remains a very, very dangerous part of our work.
Senator Conrad. Ms. Wagner.
Ms. Wagner. Senator, I think we have made a lot of
progress, particularly in a couple of key areas. I think it was
already mentioned the extent to which many of the stovepipes
have been broken down in terms of information-sharing between
the elements of the Community. I think we have made huge
progress in that realm, and in fact, we operate as a team. And
I am daily interacting and operating particularly with my
colleagues at the FBI and at NCTC, looking at the terrorists
that are abroad as it projects to the Homeland, and then
dealing with the FBI on the issues that are inside the
Homeland.
In the second area, I would just say quickly that where
we've made a lot of progress, I think, in my own Department, is
in the ability to which we have been able to harness the
intelligence from the Intelligence Community to inform our
instruments, if you will, to keep people out at our borders, to
make sure that the wrong people are not getting on airplanes at
last points of departure, and to make sure that people who
shouldn't get them are not receiving immigration benefits from
the Department.
So we've really tightened our ability to take what the
Community is producing and operationalize that in Homeland
Security.
Senator Conrad. Mr. Mueller.
Director Mueller. The removal of bin Laden and al-Awlaki
was a huge benefit to the security of the United States, my
brothers and sisters in the other agencies. By the same token,
there are still leaders in both Yemen and Afghanistan-Pakistan
border area that have the capability of launching attacks
domestically.
Most of the arrests that we've made over the last year,
year and a half, had been lone wolves, those individuals who
have been radicalized, trained on the Internet, and have the
capability of developing IEDs and other mechanisms on the
Internet.
And as we have been relatively successful in addressing
these particular plots, nonetheless, the ability of persons to
utilize the Internet, to be both individually radicalized but
also get the information they need to undertake attacks, has
increased.
Senator Conrad. Director Clapper.
Director Clapper. Sir, just to take perhaps a little longer
perspective, this is my third job in the Intelligence Community
in the last 12 years. I started at NIMA two days after 9/11. I
think we've made tremendous progress.
The transformation of the FBI into an intelligence-driven
organization is just one case in point. The maturation of
Department of Homeland Security, the expansion of the
Intelligence Community to include both foreign and domestic
aspects, the sharing at the federal, state, local, tribal, and
private sector level, I think, demonstrate improvement.
That's not to say we should rest on our laurels. We always
have more issues to deal with. And this is not, particularly
with respect to counterterrorism, it's not a threat that's
going to go away.
Senator Conrad. Thank you.
Director Petraeus. Senator, first of all, thanks for your
words of support. We have made considerable overall progress
over the course of the last year. Any time the top three
leaders of the most significant terrorist organization that
faces us are taken out, that, needless to say, is really quite
a banner year. And al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, al-
Shabaab, and other organizations have sustained important
losses as well.
Having said that, the threat of terrorism remains
significant and we must sustain the campaign, we must maintain
the pressure on al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and other violent
extremist organizations, wherever they may be.
Beyond that, I also concur with Director Clapper that there
has been continued important progress in the organizational
aspects of the war on terror. The counterterrorist campaign has
benefited enormously from the continued efforts to better
integrate intelligence for the various elements of the
Community to work together more effectively and, frankly, even
within individual agencies to further the progress in the
integration of efforts between, say, the CIA operators, as well
as analysts, in bringing together all of the different
components of our organization and the rest of the Intelligence
Community, say, in the Counterterrorist Center and some of the
other centers that we have, as well.
Senator Conrad. General Burgess.
General Burgess. Sir, I guess the phrase up here is I would
like to associate myself with the remarks of those that have
gone before me. As a plank holder in the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, I agree with Director Mueller and
Director Clapper. We have made great strides in many different
areas.
Having said that, we still have work to do and we still
have challenges remaining.
Senator Conrad. All right. Mr. Olsen.
Director Olsen. Consistent with the other comments, the
bottom line, I think, is that al-Qa'ida is weaker now than it
has been in the past 10 years. That said, we face a more
diffuse and decentralized threat from al-Qa'ida's affiliates in
Yemen and Somalia, as well as the threat from lone actors in
the United States.
As Director Clapper said, I think from an organizational
perspective, in answering your question, our ability to handle
the threat--we are better positioned, and I think the operative
word is it's a team approach. We're better positioned to share
information, as the Vice Chairman commented at the beginning of
the hearing; we do a better job of integrating that information
and analyzing it.
At NCTC we've made improvements in watch listing and in
providing situational awareness. And overall, again, it's a
team effort among all of the agencies represented here.
Senator Conrad. Just in terms of summing this up, what I
hear is significant progress, serious threats still remain to
the United States, and that the teamwork in the Intelligence
Community itself has dramatically improved. I'm hearing that
quite consistently.
I think that's very important for the people that we
represent here, that they understand, yes, we've made progress,
in some ways very dramatic progress, especially against al-
Qa'ida, but that significant threats remain and that we've got
to continue to be vigilant, which means we've got to continue
to put resources to these issues.
I thank the Chair.
Senator Mikulski. Good morning, everybody, though it's
mostly heading into the afternoon. I would like to thank each
and every one of you for the wonderful work you do every day,
in every way, protecting our country.
So much progress has been made since 9/11 in reforming the
Intelligence Community, making it more effective, making it an
integrated unit. The fact that all of you are here at the table
at the same time points to our successes, and probably one of
our greatest has been what we have done to dismember and
decapitate al-Qa'ida.
But I'm going to pick up on the issue that Senator
Rockefeller raised about Cyber. I've been kind of almost a
``Johnny-One-Note'' on this issue in what I focus here. I share
Senator Rockefeller's frustration over a lack of urgency. I
think it's partly due to the Executive Branch, and also due to
the Congress itself. My questions are going to go to Clapper,
Mueller, and Wagner.
First, just a comment about urgency: it's now been--when we
get to April, it will be five years since the attack on
Estonia, in which we thought we were going to trigger Article V
of NATO for the first cyber war. So we've had five years of
supposed to being on the edge of our chair on this issue.
One was--how do we protect dot-mil, and so on? But what
we've now seen is the issues related to dot-gov and dot-com in
recent meetings with you, Director Mueller, because of your
involvement to the Appropriations Committee, and with Ron
Noble, Interpol, and the Interpol team, it is the protection of
the dot-com. And he spoke most eloquently about the counterfeit
and fake drugs coming into European countries, to Canada, and
to ourselves.
In a meeting with Dr. Hamburg yesterday at FDA, when we
were talking about a new regulatory framework to get drugs to
the market fast and yet safe, one of her biggest challenges is
protecting the secrets that she has of America's pharmaceutical
biomedical device community and the supply of the drug chain.
Right now, there is a bigger criminal penalty for a
knockoff of a Louis Vuitton handbag than there is for fake
heparin, which is a blood thinner that came into our country
that could kill thousands of people.
So you get what I'm saying here. The growing issues around
protecting dot-mil in our country, organized crime--Interpol
says Cyber is the growing crime, and it affects state secrets,
trade secrets, and then also this other stuff there--the
corruption, that where there is a weak government there is a
strong organized crime element.
So we've got to really move on this. Senator Rockefeller
has spoken about his frustration with the Executive Branch. I'm
frustrated with the Legislative Branch. We have turf battles,
we dither and diddle over policies, and so on. He has a great
policy, and so on.
So let me get, though--because to me, there are three
issues: urgency, foggy policy--particularly on governance, and
the need for bipartisan camaraderie among ourselves to pass the
bill.
So let me get to the governance issue, and it goes to
Director Clapper, and then Ms. Wagner, and then Director
Mueller.
So the question is who's in charge? We all diddle and
dither over the governance issue. Article 10 and Article 50;
Homeland Security; is it dot-mil, et cetera. So let's take our
President. He is at the Democratic Convention and the lights go
out in San Diego. He said, ``Oh, my God.'' He turns to
Napolitano and says, ``What is this?'' While he turns to
Napolitano--and the lights only go out for maybe three hours,
the lights go out in Boston, et cetera. So he turns to
Napolitano and says, ``What the hell are we doing here and what
can we do?''
My question is, is Napolitano in charge? We know the
President's in charge. Okay, we know the President's in charge.
But what is the President in charge of? And I need to know who
would respond, and so on, because I feel that it is the
governance issues that are the number one issues, and we
continue to diddle, dither, and punt.
Ms. Wagner. I'm just going to jump in here. You know, if
the lights go off--and we're talking an electrical power grid
issue--then I would say that, you know, my secretary would be
the logical person to turn to because we have a clear role.
Senator Mikulski. And what would she do?
Ms. Wagner. Well, if I could answer the question I didn't
get to answer last time, and then I'll get to that.
Your first question about who's in charge--there's never a
simple answer to that question, especially in this town,
because we all have pieces of the pie. But I can tell you that
where we are, where our responsibilities lie is in securing the
dot-gov, and then securing the parts of the dot-com that are
associated with critical infrastructure and key resources,
including, in your example, the power grid.
So we would hope that we would have been notified because
of procedures that we would have already put in place, the
relationships we would have built, the education we would have
given, that they had detected some kind of issue or intrusion.
Senator Mikulski. Have you done this?
Ms. Wagner. Yes, we have. And we would then turn to our
partners.
Senator Mikulski. Well, why don't they feel that?
Ms. Wagner. I think, ma'am, we still have a ways to go in
terms of educating and building up this network that we've been
working on. And we are trying to bring a sense of urgency to
that.
We then turn to our partners in the FBI and NSA, because,
as Director Mueller mentioned earlier, you never quite know
what the genesis of these attacks are. It could be crime. It
could be a state actor. It could be an accident. It could be a
disgruntled former employee.
So we work this as a triad. We make sure that we're
bringing to bear the appropriate technologies to bring things
back on line as quickly as possible, and we ensure that we have
an investigation going to try to determine the source and the
attribution.
Senator Mikulski. Ms. Wagner, first of all, my job--I don't
want to harangue you, so just know that. But I don't believe
this. I mean, I really have----
Director Clapper, what do you think here? So there you are.
Is the President going to call you? You're the DNI.
Director Mueller. Well, the President calls us. I mean, the
fact of the matter is this happens a fair amount now. DHS is
responsible for the infrastructure. But when it comes to
attribution, identifying the attribution of a particular
domestic intrusion, it generally falls to us. And what we
currently do is we get ourselves and DHS at the table and we
will put a team out. As soon as we got the word, there would be
a team. Generally, we would lead that team, but we'd have DHS
there because of the infrastructure. And wherever the outages
are, wherever the investigation leads us, we would have a team
of ourselves, DHS, and, if it goes overseas or if we need
expertise, we'd have NSA and others from the Community in
there. And we do this as a matter of course now when we get a
substantial intrusion that needs immediate investigation.
Senator Mikulski. Director Clapper.
Director Clapper. Well, I think what Director Mueller has
described kind of captures the essence of what I believe is the
Intelligence Community's responsibility, which is the detection
and attribution of an attack writ large, whether foreign or
domestic.
I just might mention that it just so happens that the
Administration is sending a senior-level team to brief the
entire Senate on cyber security tomorrow on the threat and what
needs to be done about it. Secretary Napolitano, I'm told, will
be there, my Deputy, John Brennan from the White House, the
Deputy Secretary----
Senator Mikulski. There are 11 coming. There are 11 coming.
So that means that there are 11. But I'll come back not only--I
mean, it's great that they're going to come and brief us. It's
great that the National Security Council has come to this
issue.
But my question is still, going back to the Rockefeller and
the sense of urgency, do you feel that the current authorities
related to Title 10 and Title 50, and then the issues around
Homeland Security--we're not talking about the current
situation, our proposed goal, or the way it ought to be when
the repository of knowledge inside rests in a military agency
at the National Security Agency.
Director Clapper. I would say that there probably could be
more done to take advantage of that technical expertise that
you recognize that resides in NSA. You know, the Department of
Defense's response to that was to establish Cyber Command as a
war-fighting headquarters, but smartly, though, having the
Director of NSA dual-hatted as the Commander of Cyber Command
for military application.
I think there is a debate, frankly, that maybe perhaps the
responsibility of DoD is bigger than just to defend itself.
This would be a good topic to bring up at this session
tomorrow.
Director Mueller. If I may just interject, we have built up
a substantial expertise in this arena over a period of time;
not only domestically, but internationally. We have agents that
are positioned overseas to work closely with, embedded with our
counterparts in a number of countries. And so we have, over a
period of time, built up an expertise. That is not to say that
NSA doesn't have a substantial expertise, also, understanding
where it's located----
Senator Mikulski. But it's a different kind.
Director Mueller. Well, no, much of it is the same kind.
Much is the same kind. In terms of power, I think NSA has more
power in the sense of capabilities. In terms of expertise, I
would not sell ourselves short.
Senator Mikulski. We wouldn't sell you short, either.
Ms. Wagner. And ma'am, I'd like to add that we're committed
to leveraging NSA's expertise in technology to bring to bear
for the sectors where we have responsibility. And we think
we've made a lot of progress in that regard.
Senator Mikulski. Well, my time is up, but I think, Senator
Feinstein, this shows that some of the issues are here. We
can--we can't stop the threat. We can only stop ourselves. This
is why I think we need to have a robust new legislative
framework and we have to de-conflict these issues. And instead,
we just remain foggy and keep punting.
Senator Feinstein. I thank you; you headed our Cyber Task
Force. I thank Senator Rockefeller for his interest. I think
you both are absolutely correct. I think we need to get
cracking on it. My own view is that there's, kind of, one
overwhelming issue where there's a difference of opinion, and
that's whether the standards mean something or whether they're
purely voluntary in the dot-com area. This needs to get
resolved and we need to move.
So I thank you both for the work you've done. As Chairman
of Commerce and as our Task Force Chairman, thank you very,
very much.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you.
Senator Feinstein. Let me move on and give you the list, as
it remains, because it's going to take us close to one o'clock.
We have Senator Coats, Senator Risch, Senator Nelson, and
Senator Rubio. So it would be my intention, unless there's
objection, not to do a second round, but to complete this
round.
Senator Coats.
Senator Coats. Madam Chairman, thank you. I'd like to
pursue an issue that you brought up in your opening, Chairman,
Madam Chairman, relative to the situation as it exists with
Iran and its pursuit of nuclearization and the potential
Israeli response.
And I think based on what was said earlier, if there's any
dispute to the fact that sanctions to date have not brought
about results that we would hope for--and I think, Director
Clapper, you indicated in your statement, ``We hope that
sanctions will prevent the necessity for an Israeli response.''
I don't think--I think the evidence is clear unless there's
hard evidence to the contrary that we are not aware of, that
sanctions to this point have not made any kind of difference
with the regime in Iran. Does anybody dispute that?
Director Clapper. No, sir, Senator Coats. That is precisely
the Intelligence Community view or assessment that to this
point, the sanctions, as imposed so far, have not caused them
to change their behavior or their policy.
Senator Coats. And secondly, Director Clapper, you said,
``We judge Iran would likely choose missile delivery''--no, I'm
sorry--``We judge Iran's nuclear decision-making is guided by a
cost-benefit approach. Iranian leaders undoubtedly consider
Iran's security, prestige and influence, as well as
international political and security environment when making
decisions about its nuclear program.''
Is there any indication that sanctions to date have changed
their view relative from a cost-benefit standpoint?
Director Clapper. Well, I think it's fair to say, and we
could go into this in more depth in a closed environment, that
there is dissension and debate in the political hierarchy of
Iran. So there is not unanimity about this. And I do think that
to the extent that the international community is united on
this, with U.S. leadership, I do think they pay attention to
international opinion and what others think of them.
And certainly if there are impacts on their oil exports and
to the extent that that would affect their financial situation,
that could have, I think, a profound impact on their decision-
making calculus in terms of, as we said, the cost-benefit.
Senator Coats. But that's more of a hope and a wish than it
is a hard reality, from what I understand.
Director Clapper. As I said, to this point, the sanctions
have not caused that calculus to change, apparently. But as the
pressure ratchets up, there is the prospect that they could
change.
Senator Coats. Would a dramatic decrease in oil prices have
a bearing there? But what is the likelihood of that, given the
world demand for oil energy sources?
Director Clapper. Well, it could, and that's what we'll
have to see how this plays out. And this, in turn, is dependent
on the willingness of the main customers of Iran to support
that position.
Senator Coats. But to date, those main customers are not
supporting these sanctions.
Director Clapper. I wouldn't say that. Again, we can
discuss this in closed session, as to who is and who isn't.
Senator Coats. Okay. We can discuss that in closed session.
I don't see any public acknowledgement that China, India, some
of the fast-growing Asian nations, have joined us in supporting
rejecting any kind of export.
Director Petraeus. If I could, Senator, actually publicly,
it is well known that China reduced its imports of Iranian oil
in the purchases. I mean, these are matters of public record.
It remains to be seen whether that continues. It appears that
Saudi Arabian production is ramping up and can fill some of the
demand that might have been met by Iranian exports now that
there are the sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran.
Senator Coats. Thank you, Director. But aren't we in a
situation where the clock is ticking?
Director Petraeus. Certainly.
Senator Coats. The clock is ticking on the side of the
Iranian pursuit of nuclearization and perhaps weaponization of
nuclear capability. And it has been for some time.
My own view is that it's going to take tougher sanctions
than currently exist in order to beat that clock that's ticking
toward a nuclear Iran. And so--but also, we're--you know, we
see how difficult it is to ratchet up that next level of
sanctions and get the world community's support. I mean, it
took us a long time to get European support for the current
level of sanctions. We don't have Chinese or Russian support
for it. It's unlikely that we would, unless something changes
that I'm not aware of.
And when you put that in the context of what the Israelis
must be thinking--and everybody acknowledges that it's an
existential question for them, we've got a time factor here.
And I just want to be realistic about the fact that the hope
that sanctions--it's been described as the hope that
sanctions--can bring about the desired results that we all
want, both from the Iranian standpoint and from the Israeli
standpoint. I don't know if any--you'd like to comment?
Director Clapper. Well, sir, I think you've very accurately
captured the gravity of the situation and what's at stake here
and particularly for what's at stake for the Israelis.
Senator Coats. Would a naval blockade--which I guess would
be an act of war--naval blockade achieve the kind of cost-
benefit ratio that would give them real pause about changing
their attitudes?
Director Clapper. Well, I don't know, sir. We'd have to
take that one under advisement, but perhaps to air out the
possibilities there in a closed session.
Certainly, that would have impact on their calculus.
Whether it would move in the direction of a positive outcome or
a negative outcome is hard to say.
Senator Coats. Well, of course, the outcome we want is
trending very strongly toward a negative--I mean, the outcome
that seems to be taking place is trending strongly toward a
negative outcome. And the outcome that we want seems to be
diminishing.
And I hope I'm wrong on this, but it just seems to me that
we've had years and years and years of sanctions. It's very
difficult to ratchet those up and tighten them to the point
where we see a decided change in the Iranian supreme leadership
decisions on this. The recent movement of uranium to Qom and
enrichment and the defiance in terms of public statements that
come out of Iran all indicate that, so far--I mean, maybe
they're disputing this internally, but so far we have not seen
positive results from that.
And when you're viewing it from the Israeli standpoint, it
clearly, I think, reaches the level of perhaps the number one
challenge of 2012, as the Chairman has indicated. General?
Director Petraeus. Well, I do think it's . . .
Senator Coats. Excuse me--Director. Director General.
Director Petraeus. The latest round of sanctions, of
course, is really just being felt, and it will take a number of
months. But as you note, there is a clock ticking during that
time, and there is the inexorable progress, if you will, and
the refinement of additional uranium to 3 percent, then 20
percent, and a variety of other activities that are ongoing.
And again, the IAEA has laid these out very accurately and
effectively. But the fact is that the Iranian currency has lost
considerable value recently. There are runs on the bank in
recent weeks that have been seen as the Iranian citizenry tries
to get its money out of their own domestic currency and into
anything that will hold its value better as inflation also
takes off. Director Clapper talked about problems of
unemployment as well. But the overall situation is one in which
the sanctions have been biting much, much more literally in
recent weeks than they have until this time.
So I think what we have to see now is how does that play
out and what is the level of popular discontent inside Iran?
Does that influence the strategic decision-making of the
Supreme Leader and the--and the regime, keeping in mind that
the regime's paramount goal in all that they do is their
regime's survival?
Senator Coats. I have additional questions to pursue,
particularly regarding the Israelis' perception of the impact
of this, but I think that's better left for closed session.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Appreciate it. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Senator Coats,
in response, I think it's instructive to remember what the
policy is on this, as stated by the President in the State of
the Union. And he said, quote, ``America is determined to
prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no
options off the table to achieve that goal.''
And then the Secretary of Defense was interviewed on 60
Minutes and said, ``The U.S. and the President's made this
clear. It does not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon.
That's a redline for us, and it's a redline, obviously, for the
Israelis, so we share a common goal here. If we have to do it,
we will do it.''
Questioner: ``What is 'it'?'' And this is the secretary--
``If they proceed, and we get intelligence that they're
proceeding with developing a nuclear weapon, then we will take
whatever steps are necessary to stop it.''
Question: ``Including military steps?''
Answer: ``There are no options that are off the table.''
Senator Coats. Would the senator yield just for a quick
response?
Senator Nelson. Of course. Of course.
Senator Coats. In a previous life, I served here and I
heard much the same rhetoric regarding North Korea. And now we
know that North Korea, despite all of our rhetoric, possesses
nuclear weapons capability. And I just hope we don't have to
talk ourselves into a situation where we're not able to back up
what we say. We didn't do it before, and so it raises some
skepticism on my part by statements made by both Republican and
Democrat leadership relative to what you indicated and quoted.
But we've been down this road before.
Senator Nelson. Well, let's ask General Clapper. Is that
the policy?
Director Clapper. I read it just as you do, sir. It's not
policies as much as it's execution. And in the case of the
North Koreans, our policy was just words, not action.
Senator Nelson. Well, I believe--this senator believes the
stakes are so high that the policy will be executed.
What I wanted to do was I wanted to give an example from an
earlier discussion of how we are meeting the terrorist threat.
And I want to particularly congratulate you, Mr. FBI Director,
because we just had a plot in Florida, in Tampa, to have
several truck bombs go off downtown to kill a lot of people.
And the FBI was all over this, in coordination with the U.S.
Attorney, in coordination, bringing in local law enforcement,
the sheriff's office, the Tampa police department.
But what is also instructive is help with intelligence out
of the Muslim Community to identify the potential perpetrator
and to stop him before he did the act. And I think it's another
example of how all of these different stovepipes that weren't
interacting before are beginning to. So I congratulate you.
Director Mueller. Thank you, Senator. It was, as I want to
use the word here, a team effort of particularly state and
local law enforcement and the other federal authorities working
together over a substantial period of time.
But I particularly want to single out the Muslim Community
for its recognizing a threat and bringing it to the
authorities. And I will tell you, over a period of time, many
of our cases--most of our cases have come with individuals from
the Muslim Community or the neighborhood who have brought to
our attention concerns about the potential threat in which we
have run and ultimately have resulted in a disruption of a
plot.
Senator Nelson. Madam Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. And I thank you, Senator Nelson, for
your patience.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you all. For the panelists,
I think this is kind of a general question. I don't know who
will handle it. It has to do with Iran's intentions in the
Western Hemisphere.
I think it's generally accepted, I think it's fact that
Iran is willing to sponsor and use terrorism as a tool of its
foreign policy and its statecraft around the world. And so it's
with alarm that I view, having been on this Committee only a
year, but that I view a recent trip through Latin America, a
four-nation trip, Ahmadinejad to Latin America--now, part of it
probably is just an effort, I think, to show that he's not
isolated, that there are countries that will actually meet with
him and talk to him, and part of it is that.
And I think mutually important, some of these leaders,
particularly the one in Venezuela, have these weird illusions
that he's some sort of global figure and that, and on that
stage he's actually a relevant individual.
But beyond that is something else that I may be concerned
about. And maybe, in this open source, you can comment a little
bit about what else is behind there.
I mean, a couple things that are concerning is, for
example, the Venezuelan banking system is a significant banking
system where billions of dollars flow through there. Could it
not be used as a place to evade sanctions, for example?
We also know that I guess they opened up what is called
Banco Internationale del Desarrollo. I guess it's the
International Bank of Development. And I think the largest
stakeholder in that is a bank by the name of--it's an Iranian
bank--Saderat, if I'm not mistaken, which we know is used to
funnel funds to Hezbollah and other groups like that.
So we're concerned about that. Obviously, the resources,
uranium mining, et cetera, is an issue, and then, you know, any
other kind of asymmetrical capabilities that that may be
establishing in the region.
So, kind of on a global--kind of looking at that, how
serious a threat is it? How focused are we on it? Obviously,
you know, relatively speaking, it's not what we confront in the
Middle East yet, but what's the state of that? Because there's
not a lot of conversations about Iran's intentions in this
hemisphere.
Director Clapper. Well, we are concerned about it. We do
follow it. And I think you're quite right and I appreciate your
highlighting that, Senator Rubio, because in this day and age,
the Iranians are looking anywhere for a friendly hand.
Ahmadinejad's trip was not all that successful.
Obviously, we are very concerned about the connection with
Venezuela. And of course, the most obvious manifestation of
this outreach is the plot uncovered to assassinate the Saudi
ambassador here in Washington, which was uncovered in Mexico--
with the cooperation, by the way, of the Mexican authorities.
So there is more to unfold here. I think they are,
consistent with their outreach elsewhere, trying as well to
penetrate and engage in this hemisphere.
We'll have to--I would like to research a little bit these
financial banking, potential financial banking connections. I'm
not current on that specifically. But I think that if there is,
that's indicative of their attempts to, again, evade sanctions,
which they have worked very assiduously at in the past.
Senator Rubio. Just as a follow-up to that, and I
appreciate it, is--and obviously we're limited in what we can
talk about in this setting, nor would I ask you to opine on
specific, you know, policy decisions that have to be made--but
I would just encourage, whether privately or otherwise, for the
Administration and those in the Intelligence/security Community
to think about--I hate to use the word red lines, it's been
discussed--but certainly things we're not going to tolerate in
the region. Because I think there's potentially always the risk
that some may think we're so distracted in other parts of the
world that there are certain things they may be able to get
away with in terms of capability building that we're somehow
not going to respond to.
So I don't think we should necessarily be out looking for
conflicts, but I certainly think there are things that we
should not allow and that we should consider that as a matter
of policy expressing that, privately or publicly, whatever, you
know, fits the--the needs of the Community.
My last question is about Mexico and just your--any
assessment that we have with regards to drug violence in that
country posing a threat to governance and to the government,
particularly in such an important year where these key
elections are going on in that country.
Director Clapper. Director Petraeus just returned from a
very successful trip to Mexico, so I'll ask him to address
that.
Director Petraeus. Well, thanks. I did indeed just visit
there. There's no question about the magnitude of the
challenges there to the rule of law. In certain areas it does
not exist.
But there's also no question about the determination of the
government of Mexico and indeed the progress that they have
made in a variety of different ways, both in terms of results
in taking key leaders of the criminal gangs, the narcotic--
illegal narcotics gangs out of action, very substantial results
in that in the last two or three years in particular, but also
in their organizing for this effort and in the building of
institutions.
Indeed, I think that the legacy of the current president
will be the institutions that he has built during his time in
terms of, for example, the national police, in coming to grips
with some of the judicial challenges, the opening up of--or
soon to open, for example, more than five additional
corrections institutes, and indeed the comprehensive approach
that they are taking to this effort in truly a civil, military,
law enforcement approach, because that is, obviously, what it
takes to retrieve certain areas that have gotten away from the
grip of the government and the writ of law, if you will.
That's the impression that I took away from this. And
clearly the fact that this is going to be--continue to be a
very tough fight. But my sense that the government knows what
needs to be done, has been building, again, these critical
institutions that are necessary to carry out this comprehensive
campaign that they recognize is necessary.
Needless to say, all of the different elements of the U.S.
government are partnering with their respective elements of the
Mexican structures. The integration of intelligence that we've
tried to achieve here in the United States is something that
they're also trying to achieve in Mexico and it's something
with which we're involved in trying to support.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Rubio.
Senator Wyden has one last question.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Madam Chair, thank you for your courtesy.
Director Clapper, as you know, the Supreme Court ruled last
week that it was unconstitutional for federal agents to attach
a GPS tracking device to an individual's car and monitor their
movements 24/7 without a warrant. Because the Chair is being
very gracious, I want to just do this briefly.
Can you tell me, as of now, what you believe this means for
the Intelligence Community, number one, and two, would you be
willing to commit this morning to giving me an unclassified
response with respect to what you believe the law authorizes?
This goes to the point that you and I have talked, sir,
about----
Director Clapper. Yes, sir.
Senator Wyden [continuing]. In the past, the question of
secret law, as you know. I strongly feel that laws and their
interpretations must be public and that of course the important
work that all of you are doing, we very often have to keep that
classified in order to protect secrets and the well-being of
your capable staff.
So just two parts: One, what you think the law means as of
now, and will you commit to giving me an unclassified answer on
the point of what you believe the law actually authorizes.
Director Clapper. Sir, the judgment rendered, as you
stated, was in a law enforcement context. We are now examining,
as are the lawyers, what the potential implications for
intelligence are, foreign or domestic. So that reading is of
great interest to us and I am sure we can share it with you.
One more point I need to make, though. In all of this, we
have and will continue to abide by the Fourth Amendment.
Senator Wyden. Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. And I'd like to
end this by thanking all of you. I think it's been a positive
year, as much as one can say anything is a positive year in
this area.
I just was looking at the list of the twenty plots that had
been prevented this past year, and it's really consequential,
the work that has been done to protect the Homeland, as well as
the work that's been done abroad.
So I think we really have a very important intelligence
team together, and I think it's really progressing. And I know
on behalf of the Vice Chairman and myself, we are very grateful
to you, and I know that includes the whole Committee as well.
So thank you very much for your dedication, for your
talent, and for your extraordinary service.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]