Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Wednesday, January 29, 2014 - 10:00am
Location:
Hart 216
Witnesses
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 113-600]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-600
ANNUAL OPEN HEARING ON CURRENT
AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 29, 2014
__________
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
Virginia JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RON WYDEN, Oregon DANIEL COATS, Indiana
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
MARK WARNER, Virginia TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ANGUS KING, Maine
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
----------
David Grannis, Staff Director
Martha Scott Poindexter, Minority Staff Director
Desiree Thompson-Sayle, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
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JANUARY 29, 2014
OPENING STATEMENTS
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1
Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia 3
WITNESS
James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Accompanied
by: John O. Brennan, Director, Central Intelligence AgencyJames
B. Comey, Jr., Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lt.
General Michael T. Flynn, Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and Matthew G. Olsen, Director, National
Counterterrorism Center........................................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 8
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Letter dated February 3, 2014, from Mr. Brennan to Senator Wyden
regarding applicability of 18 U.S.C. 1030 to the CIA........... 64
ANNUAL OPEN HEARING ON CURRENT
AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 29, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne
Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Chambliss,
Rockefeller, Wyden, Mikulski, Udall (of Colorado), Warner,
Heinrich, King, Burr, Risch, Collins, and Rubio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Chairman Feinstein. The meeting will come to order.
Let me say at the outset that we hold this hearing to
provide information to the public on the intelligence
community's assessments of threats facing our nation. I ask
that everyone in this room remove any signs you may have and
refrain from any disruptions during the hearing so that the
Committee can conduct the hearing and people sitting behind you
can see. I will ask the Capitol Police to remove anyone who
disrupts this proceeding.
This Committee meets today in open session to hear the
annual report from the United States Intelligence Community on
the range of threats to the nation's security. And let me start
by welcoming the witnesses. They are the Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency John Brennan, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation Jim Comey, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, and the
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Matt Olsen.
Every year at this hearing, Members and intelligence
officials alike talk about how the threats to the United States
are more varied and complex than ever before, and this year is
no exception. Rather than listing all the sources of
instability and proliferation of weapons capable of causing
physical and computer damage, I'd like to focus my opening
remarks on the threat posed by terrorism.
Thanks in large part to the efforts of the women and men of
the Intelligence Community, there have been no terrorist
attacks against--in the United States Homeland since our last
threat hearing and numerous plots against United States
interests overseas have been prevented. I'm concerned that this
success has led to a popular misconception that the threat has
diminished. It has not.
The presence of terrorist groups, including those formerly
affiliated with al-Qaeda and others, has spread over the past
year. While the threat emanating from Pakistan's tribal areas
has diminished due to persistent counterterrorism operations,
the threat from other areas has increased. In fact, terrorism
is at an all-time high worldwide.
If you include attacks by groups like the Taliban against
the United States military and our coalition forces, according
to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Response to Terrorism, at the University of Maryland, which is
the source for the State Department's official tallies, there
were more than 8,400 terrorist attacks, killing 15,400 people
in 2012.
The instability that spread through North Africa and the
Middle East during the Arab Spring has continued to lead to an
increase in the terrorist presence and terrorist safe havens
throughout the region.
Libya, Egypt and Mali continue to see regular violence.
Recent terrorist attacks, and controlled--control now parts of
western Iraq are of great concern.
While governments in Yemen and Somalia have improved, two
of the most dangerous terrorist groups continue to find safe
havens in these countries where they remain virulent.
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, known to us as AQAP,
remains intent on attacking the United States. And al-Shaabab,
which publicly merged with al-Qaeda in February of 2012,
continues to plot against western targets in East Africa.
But I think the most notable development since last year's
hearing is actually in Syria, which has become a magnet for
foreign fighters and for terrorist activity.
The situation has become so dire that even al-Qaeda's
central leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has announced the activities
of one group as being too extreme to countenance.
Because large swathes of the country of Syria are beyond
the regime's control, or that of the moderate opposition, this
leads to the major concern of the establishment of safe haven,
and the real prospect that Syria could become a launching point
or way station for terrorists seeking to attack the United
States or other nations.
Not only are fighters being drawn to Syria, but so are
technologies and techniques that pose particular problems to
our defenses.
I think I am also concerned about Afghanistan and the
drawdown of U.S. and ISAF forces. The Committee has heard the
intelligence community's assessment of the likely outcomes for
the future of Afghanistan, especially if the bilateral security
agreement is not signed, and the United States is unable to
commit significant personnel and resources beyond 2014.
I am particularly concerned that the Afghan government will
not be able to prevent the return of al-Qaeda elements to some
parts of the country, and that the Taliban's control over
Afghan territory will grow.
The vice chairman and I were in Afghanistan in 2012, and he
has just returned. I saw schoolgirls walking home with their
white headdress and brilliant smiles on their faces on the
streets of Kabul. And I also met women serving in the Afghan
parliament. I saw their courage and devotion to their country.
And I am deeply concerned that in the years following 2014,
if President Karzai or someone else doesn't sign the bilateral
security agreement, all the gains for democracy, for women's
rights will evaporate.
I'm going to skip some of this and put it in the record.
As your testimony, gentlemen, makes clear today, there are
numerous confounding and complicated threats out there that
need devoted attention. And the Intelligence Community, with
sequester and furloughs, has been through a very difficult
time.
And I'd very much like to thank the men and women of the
United States Intelligence Community for their service to this
country. It is very much appreciated by this Committee.
I'd also like to note to colleagues that Director Clapper
came before us in closed session two weeks ago and went through
a series of classified matters. And we discussed what the I.C.
is doing about them. He and other witnesses are available to
answer classified questions in closed sessions. But the point
of today's hearing is to focus on the unclassified details of
the threats we face, and to provide the American people with a
better sense of how our Intelligence Community views them.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE CHAIRMAN, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks very much, Madam Chair, and
I join you in welcoming all our witnesses back to this open
hearing this morning.
This has been an especially difficult year for the men and
women in the Intelligence Community. The constant stream of
press articles as a result of the largest intentional
disclosure of classified information has, without a doubt,
compromised our national security and complicated our foreign
partnerships.
As Director Olsen recently acknowledged, these disclosures
have caused terrorist groups to change their communication
methods and in other cases drop out of our collection
altogether.
But there's another piece to these leaks that each one of
you is seeing on a daily basis. The inaccuracies and
insinuations about intelligence activities that are in place to
protect this country are especially frustrating and
demoralizing to the men and women on the front lines.
This Committee knows from our oversight that the
Intelligence Community takes very seriously its obligation to
preserve the rights and privacy of Americans.
Director Clapper, I implore you to convey our thanks and
appreciation to the entire Intelligence Community and those men
and women that serve under each and every one of you.
Senator Burr and I recently returned from a trip to Jordan
and Afghanistan, where we met some of the men and women of our
military and our Intelligence Community. Many of them are
serving in isolated units in very dangerous parts of
Afghanistan, and are conducting very dangerous but very
important missions.
In our meetings it became very clear that we cannot let
Afghanistan suffer the same fate as Iraq. We must not withdraw
from the fight before we finish what we went there to do.
Recent press articles suggest that we may leave behind a
force of 8,000 to 12,000 American military personnel, which
would likely require continued support from the Intelligence
Community.
We've come a long way denying a safe haven to al-Qaeda and
building up the security forces of our Afghan partners. But we
must not commit the same mistake of losing what the President
termed a must-win war.
Assuming we have a signed bilateral security agreement, we
must ensure that Afghanistan has adequate support and military
assistance to ensure that it doesn't quickly go the way of
Iraq.
As we continue to pressure core al-Qaeda, the growth of
local and regional affiliates remains a big concern.
The reason we went into Afghanistan in the first place was
to remove the safe haven that, if the Taliban--and the Taliban
provided to al-Qaeda, yet the instability, in the Middle East
and North Africa seems to be fueling a new breeding ground for
terrorism, especially in places like Syria.
As we fight these changing terrorist threats, we must not
lose sight of the national security challenges caused by our
nation's state adversaries, and regional instability.
As we look to the Intelligence Community to give us a clear
reading on what is happening now, we also expect that you will
look over the horizon to tell us about the impending threats.
In this context, recent discussions to limit your abilities
to gather information are troubling. And I'd like an honest
assessment from each of you the potential impact of each of
these decisions.
We have to make sure that the Community can effectively
provide warning and protection for all of this country's
national security interests now and in the future.
It is the joint responsibility of Congress and the
administration to ensure that we prioritize our efforts
appropriately, state and nonstate cyber actors, international
and home-grown terrorists, and an ever-evolving list of
aggressors, proliferators and criminals will continue to try to
do us harm.
At any given time the Intelligence Community has to know
which of these threats presents the greatest potential harm. I
look forward to hearing the details of what those threats are,
what is being done to address them, and how we, as your
partners in this effort, can assist.
Thanks, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. And I thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.
I'd like to announce to the Committee that last night we
announced that the early bird rules would prevail today.
I want to welcome the panel. And Director Clapper, it's my
understanding you have a joint statement for the four gentlemen
and yourself. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE, ON BEHALF OF THE PANEL
Director Clapper. Madam Chairman, Vice Chairman, panelists
and distinguished Members of the Committee, my colleagues and I
here today present the intelligence community's worldwide
threat assessment as we do every year. I'll cover five topics
in about eight minutes on behalf of all of us.
As DNI, this is my fourth appearance before the Committee
to discuss the threats we face. I've made this next assertion
previously, but it is, if anything, even more evident and
relevant today.
Looking back over my more than half a century in
intelligence I have not experienced a time when we've been
beset by more crises and threats around the globe. My list is
long.
It includes the scourge and diversification of terrorism,
loosely connected and now globally dispersed to include here at
home as exemplified by the Boston Marathon bombing; the
sectarian war in Syria, its attraction as a growing center of
radical extremism and the potential threat this poses to the
Homeland; the spillover of conflict in the neighboring Lebanon
and Iraq; the destabilizing flood of refugees in Jordan, Turkey
and Lebanon; the implications of the drawdown in Afghanistan;
the deteriorating internal security posture in Iraq; the growth
of foreign cyber capabilities; the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, aggressive nation state intelligence efforts
against us; an assertive Russia, a competitive China, a
dangerous, unpredictable North Korea, a challenging Iran,
lingering ethnic divisions in the Balkans, perpetual conflict
and extremism in Africa, violent political struggles, and among
others the Ukraine, Burma, Thailand and Bangladesh; the specter
of mass atrocities, the increasing stress of burgeoning
populations, the urgent demands for energy, water and food, the
increasing sophistication of transnational crime, the tragedy
and magnitude of human trafficking, the insidious rot of
inventive synthetic drugs, the potential for pandemic disease
occasioned by the growth of drug-resistant bacteria.
I could go on with this litany but suffice to say we live
in a complex, dangerous world. And the statements for the
record that we've submitted, particularly the classified
version, provide a comprehensive review of these and other
daunting challenges.
My second topic is what has consumed extraordinary time and
energy for much of the past year in the Intelligence Community
and the Congress and the White House, and, of course, in the
public square.
I'm speaking, of course, about the most massive and most
damaging theft of intelligence information in our history by
Edward Snowden and the ensuing avalanche of revelations
published and broadcast around the world.
I won't dwell on the debate about Snowden's motives or
legal standing, or on the supreme ironies associated with his
choice of freedom-loving nations and beacons of free expression
from which to rail about what an Orwellian state he thinks this
country has become.
But what I do want to speak to as the nation's senior
intelligence officer is the profound damage that his
disclosures have caused and continue to cause. As a
consequence, the nation is less safe and its people less
secure.
What Snowden has stolen and exposed has gone way, way
beyond his professed concerns with so-called domestic
surveillance programs. As a result, we've lost critical foreign
intelligence collection sources, including some shared with us
by valued partners.
Terrorists and other adversaries of this country are going
to school on U.S. intelligence sources' methods and trade craft
and the insights that they are gaining are making our job much,
much harder.
And this includes putting the lives of members or assets of
the Intelligence Community at risk, as well as our armed
forces, diplomats, and our citizens. We're beginning to see
changes in the communications behavior of adversaries, which
you alluded to, particularly terrorists, a disturbing trend
which I anticipate will continue.
Snowden claims that he's won and that his mission is
accomplished. If that is so, I call on him and his accomplices
to facilitate the return of the remaining stolen documents that
have not yet been exposed to prevent even more damage to U.S.
security.
As a third related point I want to comment on the ensuing
fallout. It pains me greatly that the National Security Agency
and its magnificent workforce have been pilloried in public
commentary.
I started in the intelligence profession 50 years ago in
SIGINT, and members of my family and I have worked at NSA, so
this is deeply personal to me. The real facts are, as the
President noted in his speech on the 17th, that the men and
women who work at NSA, both military and civilian, have done
their utmost to protect this country and do so in a lawful
manner.
As I and other leaders in the Community have said many
times, NSA's job is not to target the e-mails and phone calls
of U.S. citizens. The agency does collect foreign intelligence,
the whole reason an NSA has existed since 1952, performing
critical missions that I'm sure the American people want it to
carry out.
Moreover, the effects of the unauthorized disclosures hurt
the entire Intelligence Community, not just NSA. Critical
intelligence capabilities in which the United States has
invested billions of dollars are at risk, or likely to be
curtailed or eliminated either because of compromise or
conscious decision.
Moreover, the impact of the losses caused by the
disclosures will be amplified by the substantial budget
reductions we're incurring. The stark consequences of this
perfect storm are plainly evident. The Intelligence Community
is going to have less capacity to protect our nation, and its
allies, than we've had.
And this connection I'm also compelled to note the negative
morale impact this perfect storm has had on the I.C. workforce
which are compounded by sequestration furloughs, the shutdown,
and salary freezes. And in that regard, I very much
appreciate--we all do--your tributes to the women and men of
the Intelligence Community. And we will certainly convey that
to all of them.
This leads me to my fourth point. We are thus faced with
collectively--and by collectively I mean this Committee, the
Congress at large, the executive branch, and most acutely, all
of us in the Intelligence Community--is the inescapable
imperative to accept more risk. It's a plain hard fact, and a
circumstance the Community must, and will manage, together with
you and those we support in the executive branch.
But, if dealing with reduced capacities is what we need to
ensure the faith and confidence of the American people and
their elected representatives, then we in the Intelligence
Community will work as hard as we can to meet the expectations
before us.
And that brings me to my fifth and final point. The major
take away for us, certainly for me, from the past several
months is that we must lean in the direction of transparency,
wherever and whenever we can. With greater transparency about
these intelligence programs, the American people may be more
likely to accept them. The President set the tone and direction
for us in his speech, as well as in his landmark presidential
policy directive, a major hallmark of which is transparency.
I have specific tasking, in conjunction with the Attorney
General, to conduct further declassification to develop
additional protections under Section 702 of the FISA Act, to
modify how we develop bulk collection of telephone metadata
under Section 215 of the Patriot Act and to ensure more
oversight of sensitive collection activities. And clearly we'll
need your support in making these changes.
Through all of this, we must and will sustain our
professional trade craft and integrity. And we must continue to
protect our crown jewel sources and methods so that we can
accomplish what we've always been chartered to do, protect the
lives of American citizens here and abroad from the myriad
threats I described at the beginning of this statement.
With that, I'll conclude and we're ready to address your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Clapper follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much Director Clapper,
and thank you for being so up front.
I wanted to ask you one question about Syria, and then Mr.
Olsen, a question about Sochi.
Your written statement for the record I believe states,
Director Clapper, that Syria has become a significant location
for independent or al-Qaeda aligned groups to recruit, train
and equip a growing number of extremists, some of whom might
conduct external attacks.
Could you respond to this, and how concerned should we be
also about Europeans or even Americans training in Syria and
traveling back to the West to carry out attacks?
Director Clapper. Well we should be very concerned about
this, Senator Feinstein. Syria has become a huge magnet for
extremists.
First those groups who are engaged in Syria itself, some
1,600 different groups. We estimate somewhere in the
neighborhood of between 75,000 and 110,000, of which about
26,000 we grade as extremists. We estimate, at this point, an
excess of 7,000 foreign fighters have been attracted from some
50 countries, many of them in Europe and the Mideast.
And this is of great concern not only to us, but to those
countries.
And our recent engagements with our foreign interlocutors,
and particularly in Europe, tremendous concern here for those
extremists who are attracted to Syria, engage in combat, get
training, and we're seeing now the appearance of training
complexes in Syria to train people to go back to their
countries, and, of course, conduct more terrorist acts.
So this is a huge concern to all of us.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. Mr. Olsen, on
Sochi, I'd like to know what your assessment is of the threat
to the Olympic Games and whether you believe our athletes will
be safe.
And I'd like Director Comey to respond to the level of
cooperation between the Russians, and the FBI, with respect to
security at the Olympic Games.
Mr. Olsen.
Director Olsen. Yes, thank you very much, Madam Chairman
and Vice Chairman.
Let me just say at the outset, I appreciate your
leadership, and in particular your focus on terrorism, and
leadership of the entire Committee.
And if I may say just as well, I fully agree with Director
Clapper's assessment of the situation in Syria. And as you laid
out in your opening statement, the combination of a permissive
environment, extremist groups like Al Nusra and the number of
foreign fighters combine to make Syria a place that we are very
concerned about, in particular the potential for terrorist
attacks emanating from Syria to the West.
Now, with respect to your question about Sochi, we are very
focused on the Sochi Olympics and we have seen an up-tick in
the threat reporting regarding Sochi. And this is what we
expected given where the Olympics are located.
There are a number of extremists in that area and in
particular, a group, Emirate Caucasus, which is probably the
most prominent terrorist group in Russia.
The leader of the group, last July, announced in a public
message that the group would intend to carry out attacks in
Sochi in connection with the Olympics. And we've seen a number
of attacks stemming from last fall's suicide bombings in
Volgograd that took a number of lives.
So we're very focused on the problem of terrorism in the
run-up to the Olympics. I would add that I traveled to Sochi
last December, and met with Russian security officials. They
understand the threat. They are very focused on this, and
devoting substantial resources.
The biggest issue from my perspective is not the games
themselves, the venues themselves. There's extensive security
at those locations, the sites of the events. The greater threat
is to softer targets in the greater Sochi area, and in the
outskirts beyond Sochi, where there is a substantial potential
for a terrorist attack.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Mr. Comey, would you tell us what you can about cooperation
between Russia and your organization?
Director Comey. Certainly. Senator, the cooperation between
the FSB and the FBI in particular has been steadily improving
over the last year. We've had exchanges at all levels,
particularly in connection with Sochi, including me directly to
my counterpart at FSB. And I think that we have a good level of
cooperation there.
It can always improve. We're looking for ways to improve
it, as are they. But this, as Director Olsen said, remains a
big focus of the FBI.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks, Madam Chair.
Director Clapper, you assess in your statement for the
record that core al-Qaeda has been on a downward trajectory
since 2008, and that their ability to conduct complex,
sophisticated, and large-scale attacks against the Homeland is
significantly degraded.
However, at the same time, you assess that AQAP poses a
significant threat and remains intent on targeting the United
States and U.S. interests overseas. What I'd like to do is to
have you first start off Director Clapper, but I want kind of a
general discussion about al-Qaeda, not just core al-Qaeda, but
their threat to the United States, both domestically as well as
overseas.
And each of you have kind of a different interest there.
Even down to you, Director Comey, obviously with respect to
homegrown terrorists, and the future there. So these are kind
of the questions I'd like for you to address.
One, how would you characterize the probability of an al-
Qaeda-sponsored or -inspired attack against U.S. Homeland
today, as compared to 2001?
If al-Qaeda is evolving from a centralized core group to a
decentralized global movement of multiple organizations,
capable of attacking the United States, would you say the
threat has decreased or increased?
Third has the terrorist threat against the U.S. interests
overseas increased or diminished over the past decade?
And then lastly, what--what is the impact on limitations
that are proposed on Sections 215 and 702 likely to have on the
future of the Intelligence Community with regard to collection.
Vice Chairman Chambliss. Director Clapper.
Director Clapper. Thank you, Vice Chairman Chambliss.
Let me start, and then I'll turn to others.
I think--in fact NCTC probably said it best recently that
the--one of--the ideological center of al-Qaeda movement I
think still remains in the FATA. The operational locus and the
locus for operational planning has dispersed. There are some
five different franchises at least, and in 12 countries that
this movement has morphed into. And we see sort of chapters of
it, of course, in Yemen, Somalia, in North Africa, in Syria, et
cetera.
And many of these movements, while essentially locally
focused, probably the most--still, I think, the most prominent
one that has an external focus and specifically on the Homeland
remains AQAP, which I think we--we still continue to view as,
of all the franchises, the one that has the most--poses the
most immediate threat to--for a potential attack on the
Homeland.
The probability of attack now compared to 2001 is, at least
for me, a very hard question to answer because--principally
because of this very dispersion and diffusion of the threat.
Whereas we were very, very focused initially, particularly in
that--in that time period on al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda core. Now, we
are facing a much more dispersed threat.
The--what we spoke about before in Syria, what's going on
there is in maybe some respects a new FATA for us. And the--and
what's going on there and the attraction of these foreign
fighters is very, very worrisome. Aspirationally, al-Nusra
Front, to name one, is--does have aspirations for attacks on
the Homeland.
So, I can't say that--that, you know, the threat is any
less. I--I think our ability to discern it is much improved
over what it was in the--in the early part of--the 2000 period.
So, I think that dispersion and decentralization actually
creates a different threat and a harder one to watch and detect
because of its dispersion.
It's clear as well that our collection capabilities are not
as robust, perhaps, as they were because the terrorists--and
this is not specifically because of the Snowden revelations--
but generally have gotten smarter about how we go about our
business and how we use trade-craft to detect them and to
thwart them.
As far as what impacts the changes that will accrue,
hopefully we can, particularly with respect to 215 and the
other tools that we have, we can minimize the threat by--as we
make these modifications and alterations. But in general, this
is big hand/little map, we are in total going to certainly have
less capacity than we had in the past. And that's occasioned by
the changes we're going to make, as well as, you know, the
significant budget cuts we're taking.
And those two things together, as I alluded to in my oral
statement, kind of the perfect storm that we're going to--we're
going to contend with. And the bottom line, at least for me, is
that we're going to have to identify and--and be eyes wide
open--I say ``we''--all of us--about identifying risk and
managing it.
Let me turn to my colleagues.
John.
Director Brennan. Just agree with General Clapper. The
diversity and dispersion have made it much more challenging for
us. We need to rely heavily on partners and building up
capacity in a number of countries throughout the world.
The terrorists are becoming more sophisticated and they're
going to school on the repeated disclosures and leaks so that
it has allowed them to burrow in--has made it much more
difficult for us to find them and to address the threats that
they pose.
So, when I look at the threat relative to 9/11, we as a
country have done I think a great job of addressing some of the
vulnerabilities that exist in our system and putting together
an information-sharing architecture that allows us to move
information very quickly, but you never know what you don't
know. And with the increasing diversity of the threat and with
the growth, as you pointed out, of terrorist elements in places
like Syria and Yemen, we have a number of fronts that we need
to confront simultaneously.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Vice Chairman.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you all for joining us today, and I want to thank you
for participating in this open hearing on worldwide threats. I
know it's not always easy to talk about some of these things in
an unclassified setting, but I certainly appreciate your
willingness to try.
I also want to publicly thank the men and women of the
Intelligence Community who day-in and day-out dedicate
themselves to keeping us all safe. It's a thankless job that a
simple expression of gratitude can't fully capture, but we
deeply appreciate their efforts.
Before I get to my questions today, Mr. Brennan, I just
want to publicly note my continued disappointment of how the
CIA under your leadership has chosen to engage and interact
with this Committee, especially as it relates to the
Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation
program.
Recent efforts undertaken by the CIA, including but not
limited to inaccurate public statements about the Committee
study, are meant to intimidate, deflect, and thwart legitimate
oversight. It only makes me firmer in my conviction that the
Committee should release and declassify the full 6,300-page
study with minimal redactions so that the public can judge the
facts for themselves.
I want to applaud my colleague, Senator Rockefeller, for
making significant efforts to bridge the chasm between the
Committee and Director Brennan on some of these issues. But it
doesn't appear to be in the director's nature to accept these
overtures, frankly. And I think that's incredibly unfortunate.
I am fully confident in the factual accuracy of the report and
nothing in your response so far has persuaded me otherwise.
Director Brennan, let me get to a few questions. On March
16th, 2009, one of your predecessors, CIA Director Leon
Panetta, announced the creation of a Director's Review Group
for Rendition, Detention and Interrogation, to be led by a
well-respected senior CIA officer and advised by Senator Warren
Rudman, who passed away, as you know, in 2012.
According to the press release at the time, the group was
tasked with assembling data and formulating positions on the
``complex, often controversial questions that define rendition,
detention and interrogation.''
Do you know when and why the Panetta review group was
disbanded?
Director Brennan. Senator, first of all, I respectfully but
vehemently disagree with your characterization of the CIA's
cooperation with this Committee. I am fully prepared to come
forward to this Committee at any time that requests my
appearance, to talk about that study.
And I think, related to the issue that you just raised in
terms of the question, all Committee Members are in receipt of
some information that I have provided recently to the chairman
and vice chairman on this issue. And I look forward to
addressing these matters with the Committee at the appropriate
time and not at a threat assessment--
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Brennan. I believe
that's appropriate.
Senator Heinrich. Actually, it doesn't fully answer the
question of whether--and I'm not sure that I do know actually
when and why the Panetta review group was disbanded.
Director Brennan [continuing]. I'll be happy to address
that question at the time when the Committee leadership
requests that information from me.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. I think that's appropriate,
Senator, for a classified session.
Senator Heinrich. OK. Let me move on to Director Clapper
and change gears a little bit to Edward Snowden. The
revelations by Edward Snowden regarding U.S. intelligence
collection have obviously caused some tensions with our
European allies. Have our European allies ever collected
intelligence against U.S. officials or business people, or
those of other allied nations?
Director Clapper. Yes, they have. I could go into more
detail on that in a classified session.
Senator Heinrich. That's fine, Director Clapper.
Russia recently announced that it would extend Edward
Snowden's asylum and not force him to leave their country. Do
you believe that the Russians have gained access to the
documents that Edward Snowden stole, which obviously--many of
which have not been released publicly, fortunately?
Director Clapper. I think this might be best left to a
classified session and I don't want to do any--say or do
anything that would jeopardize a current investigation.
Senator Heinrich. That's fine, Director.
Thank you, Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Let me start by saying that the men and women of America's
intelligence agencies are overwhelmingly dedicated
professionals and they deserve to have leadership that is
trusted by the American people.
Unfortunately, that trust has been seriously undermined by
senior officials' reckless reliance on secret interpretations
of the law and battered by years of misleading and deceptive
statements senior officials made to the American people.
These statements did not protect sources and methods that
were useful in fighting terror. Instead, they hid bad policy
choices and violations of the liberties of the American people.
For example, the director of the NSA said publicly that the
NSA doesn't hold data on U.S. citizens. That was obviously
untrue.
Justice Department officials testified that Section 215 of
the PATRIOT Act is analogous to grand jury subpoena authority.
And that deceptive statement was made on multiple occasions.
Officials also suggested that the NSA doesn't have the
authority to read Americans' e-mails without a warrant. But the
FISA court opinions declassified last August showed that wasn't
true either.
So, for purposes of trying to move this dialogue along,
because I don't think this culture of misinformation is going
to be easily fixed, I'd like to get into several other areas
where the government's interpretation of the law is still
unclear.
Director Clapper, law-abiding Americans want to protect the
privacy of their communications, and I see a clear need to
strengthen protections for informations--for information sent
over the web or stored in the cloud.
Declassified court documents show that in 2011, the NSA
sought and obtained the authority to go through communications
collected with respect to Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence and Surveillance Act, and conduct warrantless
searches for the communications of specific Americans.
Can you tell us today whether any searches have ever been
conducted?
Director Clapper. Senator Wyden, I think at a threat
hearing this would--I would prefer not to discuss this, and
have this as a separate subject that--because there are very
complex legal issues here that I just don't think this is the
appropriate time to discuss them.
Senator Wyden. When would that time be? I tried with
written questions, Director Clapper, a year ago, to get
answers. And we were stonewalled on that. And this Committee
can't do oversight if we can't get direct answers.
So when will you give the American people a unclassified
answer to that question that relates directly to their privacy?
Director Clapper. As soon as we can--soon, sir. I'll commit
to that.
Senator Wyden. What would be wrong with 30 days?
Director Clapper. That's fine.
Senator Wyden. All right. Thank you. That's making some
progress.
Director Brennan, a question with respect to policy. Does
the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act apply to the CIA?
Seems to me that's a yes-or-no question.
Director Brennan. I would have to look into what that act
actually calls for and its applicability to CIA's authorities.
I'll be happy to get back to you, Senator, on that.
Senator Wyden. How long would that take?
Director Brennan. I'll be happy to get back to you as soon
as possible. But certainly no longer than--
Senator Wyden. A week?
Director Brennan [continuing]. I think that I could get
that back to you, yes.
Senator Wyden. Very good.
Let me ask a question of you, then, if I might, Director
Comey. I'd like to ask you about the government's authority to
track individuals using things like cell site location
information and smartphone applications.
Last fall, the NSA director testified that we, the NSA,
identify a number we can give that to the FBI. When they get
their probable cause, then they can get the locational
information they need.
I've been asking the NSA to publicly clarify these remarks,
but it hasn't happened yet.
So, is the FBI required to have probable cause in order to
acquire Americans' cell site location information for
intelligence purposes?
Director Comey. I don't believe so, Senator. In almost all
circumstances we have to obtain a court order, but the showing
is a reasonable basis to believe it's relevant to the
investigation.
Senator Wyden. So you don't have to show probable cause,
you have cited another standard. Is that standard different if
the government is collecting the location information from a
smartphone app rather than a cell phone tower?
Director Comey. I don't think I know--I probably ought to
ask someone who is a little smarter on what the standard is
that governs those. I don't know the answer sitting here,
Senator Wyden. My time is up. Can I have an answer to that
within a week?
Director Comey. You sure can.
Senator Wyden. All right.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator Wyden.
Senator Udall let me apologize to you, I inadvertently
skipped over your name and called on Senator Wyden, but it's
your moment.
Senator Udall. No apologies, Madam Chair.
Good morning to all of you. Thank you for being here.
I, too, want to make it clear how much this Committee
respects and admires the hardworking members of the
Intelligence Community. And I know everyone on this Committee
keeps this worldwide threat assessment handy.
It's not reading that puts you to sleep; it's reading that
gets your attention. I want to thank you and your teams for
putting this together.
I did want to pick up on Senator Heinrich's line of
questioning.
Director Brennan, you know the long history of this
committee's study of our detention interrogation programs. I'd
like to put my statement in the record that walks us through
that--that record, but I did want to focus initially on the CIA
internal review, some people call it the Panetta review.
Were you aware of this CIA internal review when you
provided the CIA's official response to this Committee in June
of last year? I don't have much time, so I'd appreciate a yes-
or-no answer.
Director Brennan. It wasn't a review, Senator, it was a
summary. And at the time, no, I had not gone through it.
Senator Udall. It strikes me as a bit improbable, given
that you knew about the internal review, and you spoke to us
and stated that your obligation as the CIA director was to make
sure that the CIA's response was as thorough and accurate as
possible.
But, in that context, let me move to the next question,
does the information in the internal review contradict any of
the positions included in your June 2013 response to the
Committee?
Director Brennan. Senator, I'd respectfully like to say
that I don't think this is the proper format for that
discussion, because our responses to your report were in
classified form. And I look forward to addressing these
questions with the Committee at the appropriate time.
Senator Udall. Let me make sure I understand. Are you
saying that the CIA officers who were asked to produce this
internal review got it wrong, just like you've said, the
Committee got it wrong? We had 6,300 pages, 6 million
documents, 35,000 footnotes.
Director Brennan. Senator, as you well know, I didn't say
that the Committee got it wrong. I said there were things in
that report that I disagreed with, there were things in that
report that I agreed with. And I look forward to working with
the Committee on the next steps in that report.
And I stand by my statement. I'm prepared to deal with the
Committee to make sure that we're able to address the issue of
the detention, rendition interrogation program at the
appropriate time.
Look forward to it.
Senator Udall. Madam Chair, I still have two minutes
remaining.
Chairman Feinstein. You do; I beg your pardon.
Senator Udall. Let me move to the Snowden disclosures and
what I think has been clearly outlined as a trust deficit that
exists between the public and the Intelligence Community.
This Committee was created to address a severe breach of
trust that developed. When it was revealed that the CIA was
conducting unlawful domestic searches, the Church Committee
went to work, found that to be true.
I want to be able to reassure the American people,
especially given what's been happening, that the CIA and the
director understand the limits of their mission and of its
authorities.
We all are well aware of Executive Order 12333. That order
prohibits the CIA from engaging in domestic spying and searches
of U.S. citizens within our borders.
Can you assure the Committee that the CIA does not conduct
such domestic spying and searches?
Director Brennan. I can assure the Committee that the CIA
follows the letter and spirit of the law, in terms of what
CIA's authorities are, in terms of its responsibilities to
collect intelligence that keep this country safe. Yes, Senator,
I do.
Senator Udall. Let me--let me finish on this note; I think
we have an important opportunity when it comes to this vital
review that we undertook. We can set the record straight.
America is at its best when we acknowledge our mistakes and
learn from those mistakes.
It's clear that the detention, rendition and interrogation
programs of the CIA went over the line over last--during the
first decade of this century.
Director Brennan, I don't understand why we can't work
together to clarify the record, to move forward. And, in so
doing, acknowledge the tremendous work of those you lead, and
those that were tasked on this Committee to oversee.
I'm hopeful that we can find our way forward on this
important, important act. Thank you.
Director Brennan. I hope we can, too, Senator.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, very much.
I want to apologize to Senator Collins, because I didn't
indicate initially that we would go back and forth. So the list
is actually who got here first, but it's Senator Mikulski next,
and then Senator Collins.
Senator Mikulski. I would be happy to yield to Senator
Collins.
Senator Collins. The chairman of the Appropriations
Committee always goes first.
Chairman Feinstein. Senator, please proceed.
Senator Mikulski. First of all, to those here on the panel
and other members of agencies representing the Intelligence
Community, like Homeland Security, I too, want to echo my
thanks and support for all employees who work in the
Intelligence Community.
And General Clapper, I want to say to you, I recall in last
year's hearing you asked for flexibility for the Intel
Committee as we faced sequester. During this at times even
intense hearing today, I want you to know that even the
chairman and vice chairman supported by the entire Members of
this Committee worked with me to try to get flexibility for
you.
We were stopped by the House of Representatives during the
CR to get you that flexibility. But I want you to know today,
we were united to try to get you, and therefore the
Intelligence Community, that.
So we're on the side of the employees facing furloughs,
sequester, and so on. Thanks now to the budget agreement, and
what we were able to do in the consolidated appropriations, we
think that part is behind. So we look forward to working with
you as we listen to those needs.
I want to come, though, to the employees there. And no
group of employees has been battered more than the men and
women who work at the National Security Agency because of the
illegal leaks by Edward Snowden. NSA has been battered, and by
de facto, so have the employees of the National Security
Agency.
We're all well aware that the morale is extremely low there
because of budget impacts and the impacts of Snowden.
Let me go to my point, though. The men and women who work
at the National Security Agency truly believe that what they
do, particularly under 215 and 702, is constitutional, is
legal, was authorized, and was necessary.
So they felt they were doing a good job defending America.
I would like to come to the constitutionality and engage your
support and get your reviews.
There are now several legal opinions about the
constitutionality of these programs, and now, as we engage upon
the reform effort, which--I support review and reform--being
led by many members of this Committee, that we need to
determine the constitutionality.
Would you--because if it's not constitutional, that's it--
General Clapper, would you, consulting with the Department of
Justice, the White House, ask for an expedited review by the
Supreme Court of the United States to determine the
constitutionality of these programs so that we don't
continually shop for the legal opinion that we want, either one
side or the other?
Director Clapper. I'll discuss this with the Attorney
General. I am not up on what the protocol is for us seeking a
reading by the Supreme Court, but--
Senator Mikulski. Is there a sense of urgency within the
administration to seek such a constitutional determination?
Director Clapper [continuing]. I think there's--well, I
can't speak for the administration. I don't know. I would think
there would be, since we, to your point, think throughout all
of this and with all the controversy that we all felt, and
still feel, that what we were doing was legal, was oversighted,
both by all three branches of the government.
There is a current court ruling on the Fourth Amendment
ruling which, of course, if data is provided to a third party,
it doesn't--
Senator Mikulski. General Clapper, there are 36 different
legal opinions.
Director Clapper [continuing]. I realize that.
Senator Mikulski. Thirty-six say the program is
constitutional.
Director Clapper. And--
Senator Mikulski. Judge Leon said it's not. I'm not a--
Director Clapper [continuing]. Nor are we.
Senator Mikulski [continuing]. And I respect the appeals
process, but I think we've got to get a constitutional ruling
on this as quickly as possible.
I think the American people are entitled to knowing that,
and I think the men and women who work at NSA need to know
that. And I think those of you who want final review on reform
need to know that.
Director Clapper. I couldn't agree with you more about the
need for clarity on these issues for the women and men of the
Intelligence Community who are trying to do the right thing.
Senator Mikulski. Now, I would like to come to
cybersecurity. And Director Comey, as you know, Target's been
hit, Neiman Marcus has been hit, Michael's, who knows what
else.
What I find is in the public's mind there's confusion now
between cybersecurity and surveillance. They've kind of
comingled these words, but my question to you is two things.
Is the impact of the Snowden affair slowing us down in our
work to be more aggressive in the cybersecurity area,
particularly as it relates to American people, identity, the
safety of their credit cards, our grid, et cetera?
And has the failure of us to pass cybersecurity regulatory
efforts really aided and abetted these--has been a contributing
factor to the fact that international prime is now targeting
us?
Director Comey. Thank you, Senator.
With respect to the work being done by the men and women in
law enforcement to respond to cyber threats, especially those
around financial fraud and theft, we're working as hard as ever
to try to address those threats.
What the storm around surveillance and the leaks has done
is just complicated the discussion about what tools we use to
do that. So in that respect, it's made our life more
complicated. I think that people need to realize there is
threat of fraud and theft, because we've connected our entire
lives to the Internet. And that's a place where we, using our
law enforcement authorities, have to be able to respond
robustly.
Senator Mikulski. Do you think Congress needs to pass
legislation in this area?
Director Comey. Yes, I do.
Senator Mikulski. Do you feel that there's an urgency
around that and we should review those original legislation,
even as a starting point for negotiation?
Director Comey. There is. One of the critical parts of
responding to cyber criminals is information sharing. The
private sector sees the bad guys coming in. We need to make
sure that the private sector understands the rules of the road
and how they share that information with the government.
Senator Mikulski. My time is up.
I just want to say also, during the sequester and so on, I
read these wonderful documents that came from voluntary
organizations associated with the FBI. It was called, ``Voices
from the field.'' They were quite poignant, and it shows that
when they say with sequester they didn't want to exempt the
feds, when our first line of defense, in many ways, is what we
see at this table.
So would you thank the agents for us?
Director Comey. I will. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Feinstein. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
General Flynn, thus far in the discussion today and in
general, there has been very little focus on the damage that
Edwin (sic) Snowden has done to our military. I read the DIA
assessment, and it is evident to me that most of the documents
stolen by Mr. Snowden have nothing to do with the privacy
rights and civil liberties of American citizens, or even the
NSA collection programs.
Indeed, these documents--and we've heard the number, 1.7
million documents--are in many cases multipages. If you printed
them all and stacked them, they would be more than three miles
high.
I say that to give the public more information about how
extraordinarily extensive the documents that he stole were. And
they don't just pertain to the NSA; they pertain to the entire
Intelligence Community and include information about military
intelligence, our defense capabilities, the defense industry.
Now, you are the leader of military intelligence. You have
also been deployed for extensive periods in Iraq. You know what
the impact is on the military.
Could you share with the Committee your assessment of the
impact that the damage that Edward Snowden has done to our
military? And in particular, has he placed our men and women in
uniform at greater risk?
Lt. General Flynn. Senator Collins, thanks for that
question. And on the report that you're--you're indicating or
highlighting, we do have a--I believe a session in about a week
for this Committee to go through the entire report.
The--the strongest--the strongest word that I can use to
describe, you know, how bad this is, this has caused grave
damage to our national security. I think another way to
address, you know, your question is, you know, what is--what
are the costs that we are going to incur because of the scale
and the scope of what has been taken by Snowden.
And I won't put a dollar figure, but I know that the scale
or the cost to our nation, you know, obviously in treasure, in
capabilities that are going to have to be examined, reexamined
and potentially adjusted. But I think that the greatest cost
that is unknown today, but we will likely face is the cost in
human lives on tomorrow's battlefield or in some place where we
will put our military forces, you know, when we ask them to go
into harm's way. And I think that's the greatest cost that we
face with the disclosures that have been presented so far.
And like I said, the strongest word that I can use is this
has caused grave damage to our national security.
Senator Collins. So it has caused grave damage to our
national security. And you would agree that it puts at risk
potentially the lives of our troops. Is that accurate?
Lt. General Flynn. Yes--yes, ma'am.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Olsen, it's good to see you again. We've worked
extensively when I was on the Homeland Security Committee. I
want to turn to the impact of the Snowden leaks on our nation's
ability to connect the dots and to protect our citizens from
terrorism attacks.
You addressed this issue at a recent conference. Have you
seen terrorist groups change their methods as a direct result
of the disclosures of the stolen documents that Mr. Snowden
has?
Director Olsen. Senator Collins, the answer to that is yes.
As we've been discussing, the terrorist landscape has become
increasingly complex. We've seen the geographic diffusion of
groups and networks. And that places a premium on our ability
to monitor communications. And what we've seen in the last six
to eight months is an awareness by these groups, and they're
increasingly sophisticated, an awareness of our ability to
monitor communications and specific instances where they've
changed the ways in which they communicate, to avoid being
surveilled or being subject to our surveillance tactics.
Senator Collins. And obviously that puts us at greater risk
of an attack.
Director Olsen. It certainly puts us at risk of missing
something that we are trying to see, which could lead to
putting us at risk of an attack, yes.
Senator Collins. And just to quote you back to yourself,
you said, ``This is not an exaggeration; this is a fact.'' And
you stand by that.
Director Olsen. I absolutely do, yes.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
And I want to start actually picking up with what Senator
Mikulski said. And I think most of us have made these comments,
at least at the outset, even if some of our colleagues have
very distinct policy differences, which is we need to be, I
think, continue to express our support for the men and women of
the Intelligence Community who do these jobs in thankless
ways--and in dangerous ways.
And they have been under challenge, with concerns about the
NSA programs, the Snowden affair, the effects of sequestration.
And they're disproportionately, perhaps, in Virginia and
Maryland, but they're all across the country.
And I know, Director Clapper, we've talked about ways to
try to get them some of the recognition. They're not often
recognized in State of the Union addresses, but I hope that
we'll continue to find ways that we can, during these tight and
challenging times, affirm the very extraordinary work that
these men and women do protecting our country.
I want to take a moment, Director Clapper, again, following
up on what Senator Mikulski raised, I think the challenges
around cyber terrorism and cyber threats grow dramatically. We
now know the public report that (inaudible) put out a year ago
about challenges disproportionately coming out of China and
Russia.
I believe you stated last year that you thought that the
effect of cyber attacks on America were estimated to cost close
to $300 billion in economic damage, that damage in terms of
direct attack.
But I also think we see time and again cases where
intellectual property is taken and competitors are able to
enter into the marketplace basically leapfrogging over the
whole R&D step because they steal our intellectual capital.
We now have seen, I know, a series of committees, including
my banking subcommittee, have been looking at the--some of the
data breaches that at we're talking now at 70 million potential
loss of data--personal data information just with Target alone.
And (inaudible) disproportionately was ill-equipped.
I think this is an indication, though, that, industry by
industry, these attackers can find the weakest link. And even
companies that are doing the right things; if their colleagues
in the industry are not keeping up to standards, there is a
challenge.
Do you have any sense of--or would you or anybody else on
the panel care to kind of reposit a new number or a different
number or a higher number in terms of the economic threat, the
intellectual capital threat, and obviously the personal
information threat posed by these cyber activists?
Director Clapper. Senator, I think it's almost incalculable
to tote up what the potential costs may be. This starts from
the sheer difficulty of ascribing value to intellectual
property, particularly over time. So, the potential dollar
value is inestimable if you consider it in its totality.
So no, I really can't give you a good number, and we'd have
a hard time coming up with one. Whatever it is, it's big.
Senator Warner. Anybody else want to add a comment?
I guess the question I would also have, kind of continuing
down this lane, though, is that I, as someone that came from
the IT and telecom sector, I get the concern about additional
government regulatory burdens, but--and how you set it, an
appropriate standard, something that also is fluid as this
field is. But my gosh, not having some standards, not having,
again, for the good actors, some safe harbor, seems to me to be
a real economic challenge.
And I guess one of the questions I would have for you, in
light of the data breaches at Target, Neiman Marcus, now we
hear Michael's and others, you know, what does it say about the
ability of the private sector to keep its data secure?
Director Clapper. Well, this is a great concern to all of
us. And to Senator Mikulski's point earlier when this was
discussed a year ago or so, and there was a lot of discussion
and debate in the Congress about the need for some cyber
legislation.
There has to be, in my view--and I'll ask others to speak
to this--a partnership between the government and the private
sector, understanding the concerns about burdens being placed,
regulatory burdens and all that sort of thing that could be
placed on the private sector.
But the government cannot do all this by itself. The
private sector, particularly if you're, you know, have a
concern about the piece of this that I am, which are foreign
nation states, principally China and Russia, which represent
the most sophisticated cyber capabilities against us.
And then, you know, the litany of other potential threats--
be they nonstate actors, activists, criminal, whether foreign
or domestic.
And we need--the civilian sector is kind of our do line, if
you will, or our first line of defense. So there--in my
opinion, there needs to be some way where we can depend on that
sector to report to us, to enable the government to help them.
I'd ask Director Comey to speak to this as well.
Director Comey. And, Senator, that's what I meant, to
responding to Senator Mikulski about some of the work we have
to do to protect the American people in this area, getting all
tangled up in controversy around surveillance.
Without the cooperation of the private sector, I think of
us as--we're patrolling a street with 50-foot-high walls. We
can see that the street is safe. But we're of no use to the
folks who need help behind the walls in those neighborhoods.
So we have to find a way for them to tell us what's going
on and us to tell them what's going on in order to protect the
American people. But it gets caught up in this swirl around,
oh, my goodness, the government wants private people to
cooperate.
We really do. But we want to do it through clear, lawful
guidelines and rules of the road to make those communities
safer on the street and in the neighborhoods.
Senator Warner. I know my time is up, and I concur with you
in trying to get this collaboration, and information sharing is
so critical. And I think, again, the challenge that these
retailers saw in terms of them, when do they cross that line to
report to the public? Because I think if the public had a full
understanding of how often and how many firms are under daily
assault, it would, you know, maybe even make pale about some
other concerns they have about some of the other activities
going on. This is a thorny area that's evolving day to day.
And, again, I hope the Congress comes back and revisits it.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thanks, Senator Warner.
Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I'm going to make a statement. I'm not going to ask a
question. I'll wait for second round. There's something I feel
so strongly about I have to make this statement.
The president announced that Section 215 telephony metadata
should no longer be stored by the government and he asks the
director of national intelligence to work with the Attorney
General to come up with alternative options.
Ultimately the decision rests with Congress and this
Senator absolutely opposes contracting out this inherently core
governmental function.
What seems to be lost in this conversation is that every
day we face a growing and evolving threat from multiple enemies
that could cost American lives. The terrorist threat remains
real and ongoing. The government's ability to quickly assess
the data has protected Americans from terrorist attack.
The hard fact is that our national security interests do
not change just because public opinion on issues fluctuates.
The collection and querying of this metadata is not a private
sector responsibility. It is a fundamental core government
function and should remain that way.
I'm concerned that any change of our current framework
would harm both our national security and privacy.
While the President has made it clear that he understands
our intelligence need for this data and that we should keep
collecting, I do not believe that he came up with a better
alternative. In fact, he just threw it to you, and ultimately,
to us.
Here is why: Practically, we do not have the technical
capacity to do this. And certainly it's impossible to do so
without the possibility of massive mistakes or catastrophic
privacy violations.
There are hundreds and hundreds of telecommunication
companies in this country. They each have their own
initiatives. So you can't just talk about one or two big ones.
They're all--they got niches. They're all going to have to go
into this protocol.
Prospects are just daunting and, to me, ridiculous. They do
not want to become agents of the government. They do not want
to become the government's guardians of a vast amount of
intelligence data. They stress that.
The telecom providers themselves do not want to do this,
and for good reason. Telecom companies do not take an oath of
allegiance to protect domestically and internationally.
Small matter? No, it isn't. It's a big matter. They are
neither counterterrorist agencies nor privacy protection
organizations. They are businesses. They are interested in the
bottom line. And they are focused on rewarding their
shareholders, not protecting privacy or national security.
I have served on the Commerce Committee for 30 years and I
know the telephone companies sometimes make empty promises
about consumer protection and transparency.
I've been through many iterations of this and it's not
happy. Corporations' core profit motives can and sometimes have
trumped their holding to their own public commitments.
My concerns about private providers retaining this data for
national security purposes are only heightened by the advent of
the multi-billion-dollar data broker industry that mines troves
of data, including telephone numbers, which it uses to
determine our most personal inclinations.
One data broker holds as much as 75,000 different data
points about each one of us, including our health and financial
status. This is staggering.
Further involving the telecom providers in the extended
storage of this data for intelligence purposes would not only
make the data subject to discovery in civil lawsuits but it
would also make it more vulnerable to theft by hackers or
foreign intelligence organizations, another powerful reason to
be against private companies taking responsibility for an
inherently government function, core government function.
Additionally Target's recent loss of 110 million American
consumers' personal information hackers--to hackers does not
reassure me at all that moving this sensitive data to the
private sector for intelligence purposes would adequately
protect its consumers' privacy.
Moving this data weighs in a stringent audits and oversight
mechanism that this Committee has worked over the years to put
in place and now has added on 20 more amendments to do more.
It makes it less vulnerable to abuse. And I want to
reiterate, the team--the telecom providers want no part of it.
They say so; they never have. They didn't under FISA, but they
had to.
Blanket liability probably did the trick but that's a very
different situation. This is not a foundation for a good
partnership.
In fact, for context, under the existing system there are
only 22 supervisors in the intelligence directorate, highly
trained and skilled, and 33 intelligence analysts who work
specifically in the intelligence directorate.
These are professionals. They've spent their careers
preparing to do this job and to do it well. They work in an
extremely controlled environment with anonymized data. Their
queries are subject to multiple overlapping checks, audits and
inspections, and keeping in mind that these queries involve
only anonymous numbers, no name, no content, no location,
unlike many private companies, no-one is listening to your
private conversations or reading your e-mail.
The data is highly secure. It's secure. And the queries of
the data are conducted only by highly trained professionals,
which the telecom companies do not have and could not be
trained to have for a very long period of time, plus they don't
want any part of it.
Last year this Committee worked to significantly strengthen
215 oversight with the adoptions of 20 major reforms, making
the telecom providers keep the metadata for intelligence
purposes where it will be needed to be searched, or introduced
a whole new range of privacy and security concerns.
I think going down this path will threaten, not strengthen,
our ability to protect this country and the American people
from a terrorist attack and massive invasions of their privacy.
OK. I used my time. But I can't tell you how strongly I
feel about this.
The President left us in a very interesting position. He
said, I want to keep collecting. I want to keep collecting. But
I don't want the--I don't want the government to maintain--NSA
to maintain the metadata.
And then he started talking about another entity, private
entity. I think we all agree long hence that that's an
impossibility, not yet created, no experience, does not exist.
So what does that leave? That leaves the telecommunications
companies and they don't want it. And they shouldn't have it,
in the interest of national security.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much for that, Senator
Rockefeller.
I would like to point out, so the public knows, Senator
Rockefeller is chairman of the Commerce Committee and, in my
view, he knows what he's talking about.
Chairman Feinstein. Senator Burr.
Senator Burr. Thank you, Chairman.
Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you for what you do day-in and
day-out. And thank your colleagues for us. As the vice chairman
said, he and I had the opportunity to be in Afghanistan for
part of last week and we met with many people who work for you
and are doing a great job in a very challenging and difficult
area of the world, and we're grateful for that.
Director Clapper, over the last several years, the
committee's had some difficulty receiving timely briefings
after significant events or terrorist attacks, despite the
commitment we had from you that those briefings would happen
within 24 hours.
Moving forward, will you renew your commitment to the
Committee to brief us on those events in a timely fashion?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir. We always strive to do that.
Senator Burr. Director Olsen, without getting into
sensitive sources and methods, how would you characterize the
intelligence community's ability to provide tactical warnings
of terrorist attacks that are on U.S. interests?
Director Olsen. It's a complicated question. I mean,
obviously it's a focus of ours to be able to provide that level
of tactical warning. As we've discussed, the nature of the
threat has become significantly more geographically spread out.
And that challenges the Community in collecting the kinds of
information that would provide that type of tactical warning.
And we've seen the types of smaller-scale attacks,
particularly on soft targets. I think, for example, of the
attack at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi. That type of attack,
using small arms, a small number of individuals, puts a great
deal of pressure on us in order to provide the type of tactical
warning that would save lives under those circumstances.
So it's a focus of ours. We have increased our cooperation
and interaction in particular with the State Department and
diplomatic security as a community. We come together as a
community to do that. But as I've said, it's difficult to
provide the level of tactical warning that would provide, you
know, the advance warning necessary to preserve lives under
those circumstances.
Senator Burr. Thank you.
Director Brennan, without getting into sensitive sources
and methods, how would you assess the counterintelligence
capabilities of al-Qaeda and its affiliates?
Director Brennan. Increasingly good. And unfortunately, I
think they just have to pick up the papers sometimes or do some
Google searches for what has been disclosed and leaked. And
they really go to school on that. And they adapt their
practices accordingly. And they take steps to protect their
ability to communicate, to move and to operate.
And so, we are giving them, I think, the substance for
their counterintelligence programs.
Senator Burr. Thank you.
Director Comey, can you assure this Committee, the Congress
and the American people that the FBI has and will continue to
pursue the individuals who killed four Americans in Benghazi?
Director Comey. Absolutely, Senator, you have that
commitment. It remains one of our very top priorities. I have a
lot of people working very hard on it right now.
Senator Burr. We realize that the ability to share actions
that the bureau might have taken in this case are limited. But
I think I speak for the entire Committee that anytime we can be
briefed on progress, I hope you will do so.
Director Comey. Yes, sir.
Senator Burr. General Flynn, when I saw one of my
colleagues ask about cybersecurity, it seemed like you had
something you wanted to contribute to that. Let me give you
this opportunity, because I think you're in a unique position
to comment on it.
Lt. General Flynn. Well, I would just offer on
cybersecurity, one of the other aspects, you know, Director
Clapper mentioned state actors. I think that what is a serious
threat that we are paying very close attention to are these
non-nation-state groups and actors, al-Qaeda being among them,
as one organization among many others, are what I would just
describe as in the transnational organized criminal elements
that are also operating in the cyber domain. And they have no
rules that they have to adhere to. And they are increasingly
adapting to an environment that is actually benefiting them.
And so I think that we--while we definitely need to pay
attention to those nation-states that have, you know, that in
some cases have parity with us, we also have to pay very close
attention to the non-nation-state actors that are out there
that are doing things like we see--that have already been
described here today. And that, to me, is an increasingly
growing threat.
Senator Burr. Great. I thank, once again, all of you for
your willingness to be here.
I thank the chairman, and yield the time.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator Burr.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Director Clapper, do you have an intelligence assessment of
the impact of the interim agreement on Iran's nuclear program?
Does it slow it down, pause it? The requirements, as you know,
about dilution and limitations of centrifuges and those kinds
of things, is this going to have a real impact on the progress
of nuclear capability in Iran?
Director Clapper. Yes, it will, Senator King. Clearly, it
gets at the key thing we're interested in and most concerned
about is the more highly enriched uranium--the 20 percent
enriched uranium. So, yes, it does.
Senator King. Second question. You told us back on the
20th, quote, ``We judge that the new--that new sanctions would
undermine the prospects of a successful comprehensive nuclear
agreement with Iran.'' Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif in early
December said that the entire deal would be, quote, ``dead'' if
the international community imposed new sanctions.
Is that still your view?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir. It would be good to have them
in reserve if we need them, but I think right now the
imposition of more sanctions would be counterproductive.
Senator King. How do you mean ``in reserve''? If the
Congress passed them, would you consider--
Director Clapper. Well, obviously, the Iranians understand
our system. And the point there is that if the--if we had
additional sanctions right now, I think this would, you know,
the Iranians would live up to their word and it would
jeopardize the agreement. But they understand that this is a
subject of great interest in the U.S. Congress. And to me, just
that fact alone is a great incentive to ensure compliance with
the bargain.
Senator King [continuing]. So what you're suggesting is we
don't need new sanctions. Even those that have a delayed
trigger, it's the knowledge that Congress can impose them that
provides the impetus.
Director Clapper. That would be my view, yes, sir.
Senator King. Thank you.
Another question for you, Director Clapper. There have been
suggestions from outside groups, and we hear it all the time,
that section 215 really doesn't produce anything useful. And
we've had testimony about plots thwarted. In order for us to
assess this difficult issue, which as Senator Rockefeller
pointed out, the President sort of tossed back in our laps.
On the one hand, we want to weigh national security
concerns and the importance and significance of the program,
against privacy rights and the concerns of the public about
having large amounts of telephony--telephonic data in the
government's hands.
Is the program effective? Does it make a difference? Is it
an important tool? Or is it just something that's nice to have?
Director Clapper. I think it's an important tool. And I
also think, and I said this before, that simply using the
metric of plots foiled is not necessarily a way to get at the
value of the program. What it does is allows us to eliminate
the possibility of a terrorist nexus in a domestic context.
So, for example, last summer when I think 20 or so
diplomatic facilities in the Mideast were closed because of
various threat conditions, and in the course of that we came
across nine selectors that pointed--indicated--pointed to the
United States. So the use of this tool, of the 215 tool,
enabled us to quickly eliminate the possibility of a domestic
nexus. So, to me, that's another important way of considering
the value of the 215 program.
Senator King. Director Comey, do you have views on the
significance of 215? You understand that this is not easy for
this Committee. The public is very skeptical. And in order for
us to continue to maintain it, we have to be convinced that it
is in fact effective and not just something that the
Intelligence Community thinks is nice to have in their toolkit.
Director Comey. Yes, I totally understand people's concerns
and questions about them. They're reasonable questions. I
believe it's a useful tool. For the FBI, its primary value is
agility. That is, it allows us to do in minutes what would
otherwise take us hours. And I'll explain what I mean by that.
If a terrorist is identified in the United States or
something blows up in the United States, we want to understand,
OK, is there a network that we're facing here? And we take any
telephone numbers connected to that terrorist, that attack.
And what I would do in the absence of 215, is use the legal
process that we use every day, either grand jury subpoenas or
national security letters. And by subpoenaing each of the
telephone companies I would assemble a picture of whether
there's a network connected to that terrorist.
That would take hours. What this tool allows us to do is do
that in minutes. Now, in most circumstances the difference
between hours and minutes isn't gonna be material, except when
it matters most.
And so, it's a useful tool to me because of the agility it
offers. And so, I think it's a healthy discussion to discuss,
so what might replace it and how would we change it?
I would just want folks to understand what the trade-offs
would be in any diminution in that agility. But that's where it
matters most to the FBI.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. That's very helpful to the
dialogue. Thank you very much, Senator King.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Director Clapper, I want to compliment you for how you put
together your statement here in putting cybersecurity at the
top. This is the one open hearing we have every year. And those
of us sitting in this panel spend most of a couple afternoons a
week going through this stuff.
I think the American public really does not have an
understanding of how important this threat is. I notice you put
it ahead of terrorism. You put it ahead of weapons of mass
destruction. You put it ahead of proliferation. And I think you
wisely did that.
You said that the industrial control systems and
supervisory control and data acquisition systems used in water
management, oil and gas pipelines, electrical power
distribution and mass transit provides an enticing target to
malicious actors.
And I couldn't agree with you more, except I think that
that is a real understatement of what the situation is out
there. Certainly they are attractive targets.
But, more importantly than that, we've got chinks in our
armor, as you know. And although we do our best with firewalls
and what have you, this is something we've got to get more
diligent at.
I bring this up because in my state, in Idaho Falls, Idaho,
at the Idaho National Laboratory, there's nobody doing more on
supervisory control and data acquisition matters. And we also
have the isolatable transmission and distribution system we
call the loop, and a very important wireless test bed, national
user facility at the Idaho National Laboratory.
The problem I have is this. I've spent a lot of time there.
I've spent a lot of time with the people there. And they are
grossly underfunded in what they're doing.
Now, that's true in all areas of government spending, and
we're all under tremendous pressure. I know that. Everybody in
this room knows that. And there's no bigger advocate for
cutting than I am.
But, inasmuch as you have put this at the top of your
priorities, what I would urge you to do is review our
priorities of spending and look at these particular operations
at the Idaho National Laboratory. They're doing a lot of good
work in this. And this is an area that we truly do need to be
more vigilant on.
And it's unfortunate that Americans can't hear the kinds of
things that we hear that are really quite frightening as far as
what the possibilities are if we are subject to a cyber attack
in this and many other areas.
So I'd urge you to consider that, Director Clapper, and
appreciate your bringing this to the forefront and to the
focus.
Director Clapper. Senator, thanks very much for that. It
gives me a chance to say something about the entirety of the
DOE lab complex, which is a phenomenal contributor to U.S.
national intelligence.
It has unique expertise, unique technical competence that
is unmatched anywhere else in the Intelligence Community.
That's something I've been working with the DOE headquarters to
try to rationalize the way in which we convey funding from the
national intelligence program to all the labs. So, I'm very
sensitive to that, and I appreciate you bringing it up.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Director Clapper. We appreciate
that also. And I think the American people will appreciate
that, even though they don't, and really can't know the details
of it.
Director Brennan and Director Flynn, these next remarks are
directed to you. I have a constituent, Sergeant Beau Bergdahl,
who's being held captive. And I want to publicly thank you for
the exchanges, the information and the frequent interchange
between both myself and your office and my staff and your
office staff.
It's impossible to sit here and convey to you what this
family is going through. We all say we can't understand, and we
really can't.
And, obviously, without getting into the classified
material or saying something unintentionally that would impact
his safety, I think we'd go a long ways to helping his family
have some peace if you would reiterate publicly, as you have to
me privately, about what a high area of concern this is for the
United States government to return Sergeant Beau Bergdahl to us
personally.
Lt. General Flynn. Yes. And Senator, thanks. Thanks for
reminding the American public about Beau and his plight right
now.
I would tell you that every soldier that we have on the
battlefield that is in a situation like that is--becomes our
number one priority. There are, 24 hours a day, seven days a
week, there are dedicated resources to doing everything we can
to bring him home safe and sound.
And I would just say to the family, I can't imagine what
they go through, but they have our absolute commitment from
the--all the leadership, and I know I can speak for this table
here from the Intelligence Community, but definitely all the
leadership inside of the Department of Defense to bring him
home safe and sound.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Director.
Director Brennan.
Director Brennan. Senator, I'd just say that when I was at
the White House, I had the honor and privilege to meet with
Sergeant Bergdahl's mother and father. It was a very moving
experience.
And I told them then that we would do everything possible
to bring their son home safely. He is somebody who was on the
front lines, keeping this country safe. And I know that we are
doing that on a regular basis. And so we--our thoughts and
prayers are with the family as well as with Sergeant Bergdahl.
Senator Risch. Thank you from the bottom of our hearts for
your efforts in that regard.
Chairman Feinstein. Thanks, Senator Risch.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Thank you all for being here today.
I wanted to touch on something that was actually touched
upon last night in the State of the Union and may have been
addressed earlier before I came.
And it's this; on the one hand we keep hearing how the core
of al-Qaeda has been significantly degraded, particularly in
its presence in the FATA, et cetera, and in Afghanistan before
that.
But on the other hand, we see that their power is now
growing in a diffuse way. We see it in North Africa, Lebanon,
Syria, Iraq. And, of course, there's still a presence in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. There's the concern about fighters
from Syria returning to Europe and other countries.
Isn't this diffusion of their presence and power, isn't
this an even bigger and more complex challenge than when they
were, than when their core was centralized in one place?
Director Clapper. Senator, let me start. Senator Rubio,
actually, it is, because of the dispersal and the growth of the
so-called franchises into many other areas of the world; much
more globally dispersed.
That, plus the fact that, as we've also discussed here
today, they've gone to school us on how we try to track them.
So the combination of those factors, the geographic dispersal
and the increasing challenges in collecting against them, makes
al-Qaeda, in all of its forms, a very--in total, a very
formidable threat.
Matt.
Director Olsen. Senator, yes, I agree wholeheartedly with
Director Clapper.
I think it is important to think about the threat in a
number of different ways. So there is a group core al-Qaeda.
And, as the President said last night, that group is on the
path to defeat. That is the group that brought forward 9/11,
led by Zawahiri.
Operationally, that group is not what it was 10 years ago.
It is the ideological leader of a movement that has spread. And
that movement has spread both in terms of the geographic
presence in a number of different countries across the Middle
East and North Africa.
It's spread in terms of the diversity of actors. A number
of those actors have a largely local or regional agenda. In
other words, they don't necessarily pose a threat to us here at
home, at least not now.
And it's also changed in the way Director Clapper has said,
in that they've innovated and they've--sought out ways to carry
out attacks that are not as complicated, that--and they've
promoted the idea of lone attacks or smaller-scale attacks that
would be harder for us to detect.
So, in all of those ways, it's a more complicated and more
challenging threat.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
The second issue I wanted to focus on that really bothers
me sometimes is these romanticized notions about who Edward
Snowden is and what he's done to this country.
You know, all the reporting's been centered on things we've
read in the papers about the 215 programs, but his revelations
go far beyond that.
Is it safe to say that he has not just compromised
operations, but there are Americans and allies who are at risk
because of the actions of this individual?
Director Clapper. Absolutely, sir. That's--yes.
Senator Rubio. And, is it also safe to say that General
Flynn, I would ask you this. Are there men and women in uniform
who are potentially in harm's way because of what this
individual has done?
Lt. General Flynn. Senator, I believe there are.
Senator Rubio. All right.
Is it safe to say that the revelations that he has made,
what this individual has done is perhaps the gravest violation
and most significant, most harmful revelation of American
intelligence secrets in our history?
Lt. General Flynn. Yes, sir. As I stated at the outset,
that's how I would characterize it.
Senator Rubio. I wanted to ask you quickly about Asia.
I just returned from a trip to Japan. I know that they've
recently made changes to their intelligence--the laws governing
their intelligence programs.
Could you comment, whoever would be appropriate, briefly on
how that's increased our ability to partner with them, and how
you see the opportunities to more fully engage with the
Japanese in intelligence sharing, given their increased
capacity and the protections now afforded?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir. I was aware of your visit and
appreciate your engagement with some of our intel people.
Senator Rubio. Are you following me? No, I'm kidding.
Director Clapper. The Japanese are emerging as great
partners. They--and the passage of this Secrets Protection
Laws, as it's called, are going to do just as you inferred,
enable us (sic) to do more sharing with us.
We are in--have agreed on a recent--recently on an
intelligence sharing arrangement where they will be sharing
with us. I would be happy to go into more detail about this.
But really emerging as great intelligence partners and this
extends to the prime minister.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Rubio.
That completes the round. It's my understanding that
Members do not request a second round with one exception, and
that is Senator Wyden, who would like to ask a ten-second
question.
Questions will be sent to the panel and hopefully, you will
respond to them rather promptly.
Your ten seconds are upon you.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair. This is a request
for the record. General Clapper, and it's apropos good point
that Senator King meant. He asked you and General Comey whether
bulk collection of all these phone records on law-abiding
Americans were necessary to prevent terror, and you all said it
was because of timeliness.
As you know, the Independent Review Commission at page 104
of their report said that was not the case. They could get the
data in a timely way without collecting all of these millions
of phone records on law-abiding Americans.
So if you all would, for the record--and I've asked this as
well before, give us an example of a time you need a record
that was so old that the relevant phone company no longer had
it.
And I'm going to say, Mr. Director, I think that's
possible, within 30 days, to have an answer to that. Since I've
asked it repeatedly if there's some reason you can't do it, let
me know.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
And you had a long ten seconds. Be grateful.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you. And, gentlemen, thank you
very much and the people that you represent. This Committee
appreciates their service and your service.
So the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
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