Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Location:
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 110-848]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-848
NOMINATION OF MICHAEL LEITER TO BE
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 6, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
48-491 PDF WASHINGTON : 2009
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JOHN WARNER, Virginia
RON WYDEN, Oregon CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
EVAN BAYH, Indiana SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
----------
Andrew W. Johnson, Staff Director
Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
----------
MAY 6, 2008
OPENING STATEMENTS
Robb, Hon. Charles S., a Former U.S. Senator from Virginia....... 2
Rockefeller, Hon. John D., IV, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from West
Virginia....................................................... 4
Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from
Missouri....................................................... 5
Feingold, Russell D., a U.S. Senator from Wisconsin.............. 21
WITNESS
Leiter, Michael, Director-Designate, National Counterterrorism
Center......................................................... 6
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Prepared Statement of Michael Leiter............................. 9
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Russell D. Feingold.......... 23
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 30
Harvard Law Review Article Dated June 2000 Concerning Federal
Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment 49
Harvard Law Review Article Dated March 1999 Concerning Recent
Cases.......................................................... 63
Statement of Michael Leiter Before the U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 69
Remarks Presented by Michael Leiter to the Washington Institute.. 82
Statement of Michael Leiter Before the U.S. House Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 92
Statement for the Record by Edward Gistaro, National Intelligence
Officer/Transnational Threats, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence; and Michael Leiter, Principal Deputy
Director, National Counterterrorism Center..................... 99
Executive Branch Personnel Public Financial Disclosure Report.... 105
NOMINATION OF MICHAEL LEITER TO BE
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM
CENTER
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 6, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:20 p.m., in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Jay
Rockefeller (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Rockefeller, Feinstein,
Wyden, Feingold, Whitehouse, Bond, Warner, and Snowe.
Chairman Rockefeller. This hearing will come to order.
The Committee meets today to consider the President's
nomination of Mr. Michael Leiter to serve as the next Director
of the National Counterterrorism Center.
Before the Vice Chairman and I make our opening statements,
I'm pleased to recognize our former colleague, Chuck Robb.
Senator Robb not only served as a valued member of this
Committee, a very good friend to me--southwestern Virginia and
West Virginia share characteristics--but he went on to make an
important contribution to intelligence reform as the Co-
Chairman of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of
the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.
It's a pleasure to have you here today to introduce Mr.
Leiter. And I recognize Senator Robb for so doing.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, might I interject and join
you in recognizing the presence of our distinguished colleague,
a very special colleague to me, having shared the
responsibility of the Commonwealth of Virginia with him for
many years.
And I also wish to point out, Mr. Chairman, that he's never
lost a beat in continuing to do public service. You mentioned
one commission; there are probably several others you could
mention.
But we thank you, Senator, and we welcome you before the
Committee. When I had the pleasure of meeting with the nominee,
we talked about you and I said he couldn't have picked a more
able, inspiring Senator to introduce than you.
Vice Chairman Bond. Mr. Chairman, this is getting thick.
[Laughter.]
Vice Chairman Bond. We could all say things about our
former colleague, Senator Robb, but I think maybe we ought to
get on to hearing his introduction.
Senator Warner. Well, it was a small matter of Virginia
with the two of us representing it. I think that required a
little----
Vice Chairman Bond. Oh, I thought it was--I thought you
laid it on thick. I have a lot more I was going to say too. I
don't want to wait till I get to my formal remarks.
Senator Robb. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to proceed
whenever you would like me to, but I do not want to interrupt
my distinguished former colleagues.
Chairman Rockefeller. Unless you choose to proceed, in
which case you may do so.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES S. ROBB, A FORMER U.S.
SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do indeed
appreciate the warm welcome from you and from others, from the
four Members who are currently at the Committee table, all
friends of long standing, and I am truly delighted. As a matter
of fact, this used to be my favorite Committee, so I'm
especially pleased to be here.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, members of the Committee,
as all of you know, Senators are often asked to introduce
someone from their home state who's been nominated by the
President. And in many cases, they may know this person only
casually, and they do so as a courtesy.
But for me, this introduction is personal. I'm delighted to
have this opportunity to present the man that the President has
formally nominated to become the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center. I'll let him present his son Zach in a
few minutes for advice and counsel that he might want to share.
Of course, Michael Leiter doesn't really need an
introduction to this Committee because you've been working with
Mike as Acting Director since Scott Redd retired last fall, and
prior to that, as Deputy Director of the NCTC, and before that
when he helped stand up the ODNI as chief of staff to the
Deputy Director of that organization.
You already know his reputation in the intelligence
community, and it is truly remarkable. As recently as early
2004, I had never heard of Mike Leiter. Yet in the last four
years there is no one in the entire IC with whom I have had the
pleasure of working more closely or for whom I have developed a
higher regard.
I give senior U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Larry Silberman
full credit for bringing Mike into the intelligence orbit. When
Judge Silberman and I agreed to co-chair the WMD commission--
and were incidentally given preferential hiring and detailing
authority throughout government--Larry recommended to me that
the very first people we ought to bring on board the
commission's professional staff, even before choosing an
executive director or general counsel, were a couple of recent
super-bright Supreme Court law clerks to help us deal with the
complexities of government organizations and requirements.
He just happened to know two such men who fit that bill
perfectly. And after we interviewed them, we agreed
wholeheartedly and we hired them on the spot. The other man,
Brett Gerry, is now chief of staff to the Attorney General of
the United States.
And I would submit to you that Mike Leiter, who is here for
confirmation at this particular hearing, is as prepared, as
qualified, as motivated to continue leading the NCTC as anyone
in the IC today.
I like and admire Mike Leiter for a number of reasons, not
the least of which is the diversity of his experience. As a
naval officer, he served in Bosnia and Iraq. His peers chose
him to be president of the Harvard Law Review. He clerked for
Justice Breyer.
He was a highly regarded fast-track federal prosecutor in
the Eastern District of Virginia, where most of the cases
involving terrorism are brought, known as the rocket docket.
And he was a real leader on the WMD Commission. He was the go-
to guy for all of us on the Commission when we needed something
done right and done quickly. And he was also a major drafter of
our final report.
When Vice Admiral Scott Redd, who came out of retirement to
serve as executive director of the WMD Commission and was then
persuaded to come out of retirement again to stand up the NCTC,
needed a Deputy Director at NCTC, he persuaded the DNI to let
Mike move over to take the job, because Scott had worked very
closely with Mike on the WMD commission and he knew just how
good he was.
Mike Leiter is a man wise beyond his years. He has a
powerful intellect, impeccable integrity, indefatigable energy,
and really solid judgment, even when he's faced with the most
difficult and complicated questions. If there's anyone in the
intelligence business who knows Mike Leiter and doesn't think
he's the perfect fit for this incredibly difficult job, I
simply haven't met them.
Mike has the trust and admiration of his peers and his
subordinates, because they know he'll speak truth to power and
he'll take full responsibility for his decisions. I've watched
him conduct his 0800 SVTC, his secure video teleconference,
with participants from all over the globe, representing all
elements of the counterterrorism network, dealing with raw
intel reports in real time from every source imaginable, and
he's as nimble and impressive as they come. As a leader, he's
the real thing.
There are, of course, no guarantees in countering the
terrorist threats that we face 24/7, and Mike knows that as
well as anyone. But with a consummate professional like Mike
Leiter at the helm of NCTC, I'm confident that we're currently
doing the best job that we've ever done to stay ahead of those
who would do us harm.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of this Committee, I
hope you can tell I have enormous confidence in and unqualified
respect for Mike Leiter. And I hope, in your wisdom, you will
confirm him as quickly as possible.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I leave you in his
care and abandon him to your plight, and I thank you.
Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Senator Robb.
I've been passing around a note up here that I was at your
wedding at the White House----
Senator Robb. Yeah.
Chairman Rockefeller [continuing]. Trying to impress my
colleagues. [Laughter.]
Vice Chairman Bond. I am impressed.
Senator Robb. And Mr. Chairman, before I leave, I might add
that I was at your very first swearing-in as well, so we go
back a long way--as governor, not as Senator.
Chairman Rockefeller. And you were the only governor to
show up.
Senator Robb. With that, Mr. Chairman, I seek your leave,
sir.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Chairman Rockefeller. I welcome Mr. Leiter to this
Committee even as I thank the departing Senator Robb. I also
extend our welcome to his son Zachary, which has me in thorough
confusion, because there are two extremely cute boys who look
very much alike. So I need to have Zachary identified. That's
Zachary. Hi, Zachary. Welcome.
As outlined by Senator Robb, Mr. Leiter brings with him a
demonstrated record of experience, which I believe will serve
him well, should he be confirmed in his role as the Deputy and
now Acting Director of NCTC. Mr. Leiter has demonstrated the
leadership skills that are necessary for having that job.
The NCTC was a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission,
was a central pillar of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004. In that Act, Congress made the Director
of NCTC a Presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed
position to ensure the Director had sufficient standing to
execute the broad range of responsibilities assigned to your
incredibly complex work.
The National Counterterrorism Center has two critical
functions--number one, to serve as the primary organization in
the United States government for integrating and analyzing
terrorism related to intelligence; and, two, to conduct
strategic operational planning to integrate all instruments of
national power--not just intelligence--in the battle against
terrorism.
In accordance with these functions, the Director of NCTC
has unique dual-reporting requirements. On matters of terrorism
intelligence and analysis, the NCTC Director reports to the
Director of National Intelligence, but on issues related to
counterterrorism strategic planning, the Director of NCTC
reports directly to the President.
I look forward to hearing Mr. Leiter's views on both of
these critical functions, the position's unique reporting
requirements and the adequacy of the authorities given to the
Director of the Center. I also hope to hear Mr. Leiter's plans
to advance and strengthen the important work now being
conducted at the NCTC.
The Committee, of course, is very familiar with the NCTC's
work. Not only are we a customer and a consumer of your
intelligence analysis, but the Committee has had an opportunity
to visit the NCTC just recently, where you presided over that,
as I hope I told you, brilliantly.
Our visit there inspired confidence in the Center's
capability to go after terrorists around the globe. It just
did. The NCTC leadership, staff, analysts are undeniably
dedicated to keeping this nation safe from terrorism. I take
this opportunity to extend our public thanks to Mr. Leiter, his
deputies, and the many analysts at NCTC who met with me and the
Vice Chairman and other members of this Committee. We say that
frequently, but what needs not to get lost is that we mean it.
As we all know, the threat of terrorism is real, on-going,
and evolving. The most recent National Intelligence Estimate on
terrorism--a portion of which was declassified in July, 2007--
stated that from its safe haven in Pakistan, al-Qa'ida had
regenerated key elements of its U.S. attack capabilities. Most
troubling is the judgment that they will continue to try to
acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
materials in attacks. Clearly the NCTC must succeed at the
tasks assigned to it; our security and safety depend on it.
Mr. Leiter is not a product of the intelligence community
himself, but after meeting with him and reviewing his
background I believe he has a resume that will serve him well.
And, quite frankly, there are parts of me that welcome the fact
that you don't have that as part of your official background.
It implies and infers to me a certain kind of objectivity, when
necessary, irreverence, and that you'll give us your thoughts,
straight and true.
Unlike many nominees, we have direct evidence of your
ability to do this job since you've been Acting for six months.
Undoubtedly there are many challenges ahead. And we will probe
into some of those, but I now ask if Vice Chairman Bond wishes
to make an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM MISSOURI
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Of
course I'm delighted to be able to welcome Mr. Leiter to the
Committee's hearing on the nomination to be the next Director
of the National Counterterrorism Center. And I expend a very
special welcome to your young son, Zachary, and the guy who's
riding shotgun for him, Will. The two of them, I am sure, can
provide any assistance that you need. If you need a little fire
support, we can call in those two guys.
But, Mike, if you're confirmed as Director, the time period
for which you would serve could be an abbreviated one due to a
change in administration. But I strongly hope it will not. And
whoever that person may be--and there's a little disagreement
on this panel--I will certainly urge that you continue to do so
if you continue to realize the high accomplishments that you
have already registered. But the potentially short term should
in no way diminish the responsibilities and challenges that lie
ahead. And our expectations, as you've heard from the Chairman,
are very high that you will address these challenges head-on.
The NCTC was created, as you well know, to address the
shortcomings identified in the 9/11 Commission report. As such,
we realize the NCTC is still in the building phase, is not a
finalized entity, but there have been some very encouraging
signs that its creation was indeed a very wise one.
The Chairman has already ably outlined the major
responsibilities of the NCTC. They include assigning
responsibilities, making sure other agencies have access, and
receive all source intelligence for the counterterrorism plans,
and have the intelligence they need to carry out their
missions. And if there is one area that I think was sorely
lacking, it was that sharing of information that put us in a
position where we could not determine the extent of the threat
to us prior to 9/11.
But, Mr. Leiter, you've been with the NCTC for 15 months,
and I'd be interested to hear your assessment of the progress,
particularly as it comes to the role of strategic operational
planner for the IC. I look forward to hearing your ideas on how
to advance progress and resolve any concerns that may exist
within the IC about NCTC's role as a strategic operational
planner.
I was around when the initial effort was made to set up the
NCTC, and let us say that that was not a painless birth. There
were quite a few difficulties in getting it established. But
the agencies who may have been somewhat under-enthusiastic at
the first are the ones who will benefit from the NCTC's
counterterrorism analysis, and they should now be willing fully
to assist in performing the mission, whether that means better
information sharing or providing more analytic resources or
support.
As you and I have discussed in conversation, I find it
particularly encouraging that, with your experience and
knowledge of it and bringing a fresh view in, you have
understood so clearly what is now being recognized much more
widely, and that is that while there must be kinetic force to
fight the immediate challenges of the radical terrorists who
threaten us, that the 80 to 90 percent of the battle is still
going to be in the rest of smart power. Smart power, in my
view, encompasses the educational, economic, diplomatic,
political, social, trade efforts that must go along if we are
to stop the spread and stop the cancer of radical terrorists
growing.
So, Mike, I hope you can give us an idea of what you can do
to move forward on all these areas. I'm particularly interested
in your thoughts on the FBI co-locating its international
terrorism headquarters within the NCTC; and the CIA's al-Qa'ida
analytic elements, thus far, refusing to co-locate at your
facility. We'd like to hear which one's the better decision,
from your perspective, and why.
Mr. Chairman, this is such an important job. I hope we can
get the Committee to act on this and get it to the floor, and
get him confirmed--so long as he doesn't blow it in the coming
few moments, which I am confident he will not. I look forward
to his statement.
Chairman Rockefeller. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL LEITER, DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
Mr. Leiter. I felt okay until that last comment there, Mr.
Chairman. [Laughter.]
Mr. Leiter. Chairman Rockefeller, Vice Chairman Bond and
Senators Feinstein and Warner, thank you very much for the
opportunity to appear today. I would also like to add a very
special thanks--I'm sorry he's not here to hear it--to Senator
Robb, for that incredibly kind introduction and his kind words.
It has been my distinct privilege to serve at NCTC since
February 2007, first as the principal Deputy Director and, for
the past six months, as the Acting Director. I'm extremely
honored to appear before the Committee today to discuss my
credentials. I have submitted for the record a longer
statement, and I ask that it would be made part of the record,
Senator.
Chairman Rockefeller. It will be.
Mr. Leiter. Before going forward, although he's been
welcomed by all of you, I want to note how privileged I am to
have my son Zachary with me today. And I honestly could ask for
no better inspiration in the work that I have to do at NCTC
than people like Zach and the Zachs all around the world.
On September 11th, 2001, our nation experienced what was
undoubtedly the most traumatic terrorist attack in our nation's
history. Now, this Committee and, I think, the public needs no
reminder of that fact, but I begin here because it was in fact
that event that was the impetus to the creation of NCTC. And
from my perspective, it remains the guiding principle and the
guiding vision for me at the Center.
The goal at the time of the attack and the creation of NCTC
was simple, and that was to provide greater security for the
nation and do so while protecting fundamental American values.
The means to doing that were equally straightforward: create in
NCTC a center to organize the U.S. government's intelligence
and strategic planning response to terrorism in a manner that
was simply not possible before 9/11.
Should I have the honor of being confirmed by the Senate,
it is these two foundational principles--greater security while
simultaneously protecting fundamental American values--that
will guide all of my actions. In many ways I believe, and I
hope you believe, that my credentials speak very much to these
principles and, moreover, to the type of work that NCTC must
do.
I am not, as the Chairman has noted, a product of a
lifetime of service in a single government agency. Rather, my
career includes service in the United States Navy--Senator
Warner, I did not plan ahead--the Department of Justice, the
office of the DNI, and in the judicial branch as a law clerk to
federal judges, to include Associate Justice Stephen Breyer of
the Supreme Court. And I believe I would also be remiss,
considering what NCTC and this nation has to do, if I did not
also note my seven-plus years of service as a first responder,
as an EMT and firefighter working for local governments.
I would proffer that such experience--the military, law
enforcement, intelligence, legal, and as a first responder--are
many of the same key elements that NCTC and we as a nation must
bring together to address terrorism effectively.
Now, in each of these roles, in addition to my service with
the Robb-Silberman Commission, I have strived to gain the trust
and confidence of my subordinates, my peers, and my superiors.
And my approach has always been straightforward: listen to
those around you and lead with vision, tenacity, judgment and,
above all else, integrity.
It is these traits that I have attempted to bring to NCTC
over the past year, and it is my performance over the past six
months as Acting Director that I would suggest best foreshadows
how I would lead NCTC in the future.
Throughout this time I have attempted to build strong
partnerships throughout the U.S. government, within the
intelligence community, but also beyond. And I have urged all
those within NCTC to similarly aggressively lead their
community counterparts.
With that overview, I would like to briefly provide you
with my outline for my vision of NCTC and, by extension, the
future of the U.S. government's fight against terrorism.
My first priority and the very first responsibility given
to NCTC under the Intelligence Reform Act is to ensure that
NCTC is the primary organization for analyzing and integrating
terrorism information, ensuring counterterrorism information
sharing among federal agencies, and supporting other agencies'
sharing of counterterrorism information with non-federal,
state, local, tribal, and private-sector partners.
This is an area in which, from my perspective, we have made
really tremendous progress, although much, much more remains to
be done, especially, I would note again, as it relates to
supporting the non-traditional partners outside of Washington
who are so critical to this fight.
Second, NCTC must further institutionalize U.S. government-
wide, beyond the intelligence community, strategic planning.
From my experience working in the interagency system, I am more
convinced today than ever before that our success in the fight
against terrorism will only come through such coordinated and
synchronized efforts, to include the full weight, as Vice
Chairman Bond noted, of our diplomatic, financial, military,
intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement
activities. And it is up to NCTC--and, if I am confirmed, it is
up to me as Director of NCTC--to drive those efforts.
Third, again as the Vice Chairman noted, NCTC and, I
believe, the entire U.S. government, must increase our efforts
to combat violent extremism through greater ideological
engagement. Despite our successful kinetic actions against the
enemy, it has to be emphasized over and over again that the
fight against terrorism will not be won solely through bullets
and bombs. Rather, we must have an equally robust effort in
what many term the war of ideas.
If confirmed, I will take it as my charge to provide the
intelligence analysis necessary to enable this engagement and
equally, if not more important, to help bring together all the
elements of national power beyond the intelligence community in
this long-term effort.
Fourth, NCTC must provide leadership and programmatic
oversight of the intelligence community's counterterrorism
efforts beyond the NCTC and on behalf of the DNI. Ultimately,
NCTC is simply one part of a much larger intelligence community
effort against terrorism. In this regard, NCTC must help to
lead that community to ensure that we function as more than the
sum of our parts and make best use of what are limited
resources.
Fifth and finally, and perhaps in many ways the most
important, NCTC must continue to attract the most highly
motivated and qualified personnel to allow us to meet all of
these challenges.
Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that you got to meet some
of those highly qualified, highly motivated analysts and
planners who do the work at NCTC, and I very much recognize
that as a leader, NCTC's ultimate fate will be based far more
on my ability to enable that extraordinary workforce than my
personal efforts alone.
In doing all this, from my perspective, little is more
important than ensuring that this Committee and the larger
Congress are appropriately informed of NCTC's activities. And
moreover, while I begin with the legal requirements as a
lawyer--and they are paramount--I also heartily welcome your
valuable insights into how NCTC, the intelligence community and
the U.S. government should go about this business.
Your years of experience are ones that I hope I can benefit
from in leading NCTC, if confirmed. Let me stress that no
single department, no agency and, most importantly, no branch
of government has a monopoly on wisdom on how to fight
terrorism. If confirmed, I look forward to the benefit of the
Committee's views and will seek its advice on how NCTC should
proceed in this mission.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a note from
my predecessor, Scott Redd, on the occasion of his confirmation
hearing about three years ago. Then he noted that he was
entering the realm of being a so-called political appointee and
he noted that there was nothing political about the job of the
Director of NCTC. I could not agree more strongly.
Every day that I have served at NCTC I have been guided by
the foundational principles that I noted when I opened--
providing Americans and our allies with greater security while
simultaneously protecting fundamental American values. In my
view, NCTC's mission has not been and must never be driven by
political calculations, for whatever differences we may have on
approach or emphasis, they pale in comparison with our very
common goals.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you again for
this opportunity, for which I am truly humbled and honored. I
look forward to answering your questions today and, if the
Senate chooses to confirm me, to working very closely with all
of you and your staffs in the future to ensure that I wisely
carry out my duties as Director of NCTC.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Leiter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Leiter, Director (Acting), the National
Counterterrorism Center
Chairman Rockefeller, Vice Chairman Bond, members of the Committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on the
occasion of my nomination to serve as the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). It has been my distinct privilege to
serve as the Center's Principal Deputy Director since February 2007, to
serve as its Acting Director for the past six months, and most recently
to be nominated by the President to serve as the Center's Director. I
am further honored to appear before this Committee today to discuss my
credentials to be confirmed as NCTC's Director, as well as my vision
for NCTC in the coming years.
Before turning to these issues, however, I think it critical to
reflect briefly on why NCTC was created by the Congress and President
less than four years ago. On September 11, 2001, our nation experienced
the single most traumatic terrorist attack in its history. NCTC was
created to organize the U.S. Government's intelligence and strategic
planning response to the threat of terrorism in a manner that was not,
for a variety of reasons, possible before the tragedy of 9/11. And we
were created to do so in a manner that not only provides our citizens
with greater security, but also simultaneously protects the civil
liberties that are the very essence of our nation.
I begin here because it is these foundational principles--providing
greater security while protecting fundamental American values--that
will, if I have the honor of being confirmed by the Senate, motivate
all of my actions. And I would seek to lead NCTC in a manner that fully
honors all of those who have been touched by the scourge of terrorism.
In many ways I believe that my credentials speak very much to these
guiding principles and, moreover, to the type of work that is required
of NCTC. I am not, as this Committee is well aware, a product of a
lifetime of service in a single department or agency. Rather my career
includes service in the United States Navy, the Department of Justice,
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and in the
Judicial Branch as a law clerk to two federal judges. And I believe I
would be remiss if I did not also note my seven-plus years of
experience working for local governments as a first responder. I would
proffer that such experience--the military, law enforcement,
intelligence, legal, and local first responder communities--are many of
the same key elements that NCTC, and we as a nation, must bring
together to address terrorism effectively.
From my perspective my legal training and experience as a law clerk
to Associate Justice Stephen Breyer and then as an Assistant United
States Attorney is especially relevant to the NCTC's work. As 9/11 so
vividly illustrated, a substantial portion of counterterrorism
intelligence and the U.S. Government's response to terrorism must occur
within our borders. Having led interagency investigative teams as a
prosecutor, I believe I have a healthy appreciation of the issues faced
by law enforcement agents in the United States. Moreover, having served
for two federal judges of the highest caliber, I have developed an
unshakeable and profound respect for the importance of the rule of law
and respect for civil liberties.
These experiences have, I believe, prepared me well to lead an
organization that must not only analyze information that is collected
within the United States, but also advise the Director of National
Intelligence on operations relating to counterterrorism in the United
States and assist the President's National and Homeland Security
advisors in devising forward-looking strategic plans to counter the
potential spread of violent extremism here at home.
I believe that my experience studying the Intelligence Community
from the outside further qualifies me to lead the interagency element
that is NCTC. As a lead investigator and report drafter for the
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Concerning Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission) I had the
distinct honor of working intimately with nine preeminent
Commissioners, to include Senator Chuck Robb who was kind enough to
introduce me to the Committee today. Equally important, I had the
luxury of devoting more than a year to an in-depth, Intelligence
Community-wide study of where we performed well and where reform was
necessary.
In this role I spent countless hours examining intelligence
collection, analysis, dissemination, and structural characteristics
and, much more significantly, formulating recommendations to improve
the Intelligence Community's performance. Much of my time at the
Commission was devoted to the issues I have faced since arriving at
NCTC--integrating counterterrorism information, confronting the spread
of weapons of mass destruction, and ensuring that policy makers receive
timely, accurate, and unbiased assessments of complex national security
challenges. My subsequent service to then-Director of National
Intelligence John Negroponte and then-Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence Michael Hayden provided the even more
illuminating experience of turning the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and the Commission's freshly authored
recommendations into real action and tangible results across the
Intelligence Community.
Ultimately, however, I believe that my strongest credential to
serve as Director of NCTC cannot be distilled from a list of
educational or professional accomplishments. Rather, I consider my
proven leadership of NCTC to be the truest testament to my
qualifications. During my time at NCTC--and in my leadership elsewhere,
to include the U.S. Navy and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence--I have strived to gain the trust and confidence of my
subordinates, peers, and superiors. My approach has been
straightforward: listen to those around you and lead with vision,
tenacity, judgment, and integrity.
I am proud of the relationships that I have developed since
arriving at NCTC, both within our walls and with key partners in the
U.S. Government, among state and local leaders, and our foreign allies.
I have undoubtedly made mistakes during this period, but I have done
all that I can to learn from those mistakes and improve my--and NCTC's
performance. And I believe that overall, and in spite of the fact that
I have served as both the Acting Director and Principal Deputy Director
for the past six months, I have helped NCTC become more effective
during this time.
These are, from my perspective, the principal reasons that I am
qualified to serve as the Director of NCTC. I would now like to provide
you with my vision for the future of NCTC and, by extension, what the
future holds for the U.S. Government's fight against terrorism. More
specifically, I will address five broad topics: (1) improving NCTC's
intelligence support to ``non traditional'' partners; (2)
institutionalizing cross-Government strategic operational planning; (3)
advancing the U.S. Government's global ideological engagement; (4)
leadership and programmatic oversight of the Intelligence Community's
counterterrorism efforts on behalf of the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI); and (5) ensuring that NCTC has the people to
fulfill all of its responsibilities.
My first priority, and the first responsibility given to the Center
by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA), is to ensure that NCTC is truly the primary organization for
analyzing and integrating terrorism information, ensuring
counterterrorism information sharing among federal agencies, and
supporting other agencies' sharing of counterterrorism information with
non-federal partners. In all of these roles I report to the DNI,
Michael McConnell, and serve as his Mission Manager for
counterterrorism. On several occasions prior and subsequent to the
President's decision to nominate me to serve as Director, Director
McConnell and I have spoken to discuss my potential leadership of NCTC
and I am confident that we share a common vision for the Center's
future.
I believe that NCTC has, since its inception, made enormous
progress toward fulfilling this primary responsibility. Today NCTC
authors the majority of terrorism analysis that goes to senior policy
makers and it ensures that all such products are appropriately
coordinated among Intelligence Community components. But whereas this
progress has been significant, we have moved more slowly in our support
to ``non traditional'' partners such as FBI Joint Terrorism Task
Forces; state, local, and tribal homeland security officials; and
military commanders in the field. NCTC has not--and will not if I am
confirmed--seek to displace the FBI, DHS, and DIA as they serve these
respective customers, but we can and must do a better job of crafting
our analytic product to support these diverse consumers.
In addition, we must continue to strengthen our focused information
sharing efforts to these customers, as best embodied by our Defense
Intelligence Unit (co-staffed by personnel from DIA's Joint
Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism and U.S. Northern
Command) and the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group
(ITACG, staffed by state and local law enforcement officers). These
targeted information sharing components not only push information to
these customers with unique counterterrorism needs, they also help to
educate the rest of NCTC's staff on how our products can be shaped to
speak more effectively to those combating terrorism outside of
Washington.
Second, NCTC must further institutionalize U.S. Government-wide
strategic operational planning (SOP). In its essence, SOP bridges the
gap between coordinated interagency policy and strategy, and operations
by Departments and Agencies to implement that strategy. From my
experience working within the interagency system I am more convinced
than ever that success against terrorism will only come through such
coordinated and synchronized efforts--to include the full weight of our
diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security and
law enforcement activities.
Since the President's approval of the first-ever National
Implementation Plan in 2006, SOP has matured and evolved very
significantly. Although we continue to pursue broad strategic plans
that meaningfully guide department and agency programs and budgets, we
have also initiated far more granular, targeted efforts to ensure
department and agency implementation of plans on key topics (e.g.,
terrorists' acquisition of weapons of mass destruction). I strongly
believe that this combination of ``deliberate'' and ``dynamic''
planning, with forceful support from the National and Homeland Security
Councils, will ultimately lead to cohesive government planning and
execution against terrorism.
Third, NCTC must--through both its intelligence and strategic
operational planning components--increase our efforts to combat violent
extremism through ideological engagement. Despite our successful
kinetic actions against the enemy, it must be emphasized that the fight
against terrorism will not be won solely with bullets and bombs in the
central battlefields of Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Rather, we
must have an equally robust effort in what many term the ``War of
Ideas.''
This global ideological engagement constitutes a key center of
gravity in the battle against al-Qa'ida, its associates, and those that
take inspiration from the group. Terrorist leaders aggressively employ
messages related to current events, leverage mass media technologies,
and use the Internet to engage in a communications war against all who
oppose their oppressive and murderous vision of the world. We must
engage them on this front with equal vehemence and we can do so in a
way that makes quite clear how bankrupt their extremist ideology is. If
confirmed as the Director of NCTC, I will expend significant time and
energy to make sure that the Center's analysts address this issue from
all perspectives, and I will spend equal time working to bring together
all elements of national power--from the Departments of State, Defense,
Homeland Security, Justice, and elsewhere--to tackle this long-term
effort.
Fourth, NCTC must provide leadership and programmatic oversight of
the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism efforts on behalf of the
DNI. As IRTPA clearly recognized and as the WMD Commission further
noted, there is a dire need for interagency coordination on key mission
areas such as terrorism. Ultimately NCTC is only one part of a much
larger counterterrorism effort within the larger Intelligence
Community. In this regard NCTC must help to lead that community to
ensure that we function as more than the sum of our parts. If
confirmed, I intend to continue working closely with Director McConnell
as well as the leadership of the Intelligence Community to coordinate
counterterrorism efforts and provide budgetary advice to the Director
as he formulates future National Intelligence Program budget requests.
Fifth, NCTC must continue to attract highly motivated and qualified
personnel to allow us to successfully meet all of the preceding
challenges. Doing so will require us to hire officers directly to NCTC
as well as working extremely closely with our partner agencies to
obtain qualified detailees. NCTC has experienced substantial growth
since its inception and I believe that this growth must continue
through Fiscal Year 2009 in order to provide the analytic and strategic
planning support mandated by IRTPA. As the Center grows we must provide
our workforce--both permanent and those detailed from elsewhere in the
interagency--the resources, opportunities, and incentives necessary for
success. As a leader I know that NCTC's ultimate fate will be based far
more on my ability to enable NCTC's extraordinary workforce than on any
personal efforts.
In doing all of this, little is more important than ensuring that
this Committee and others are appropriately informed of NCTC's
activities. One way the Center does so is through the daily provision
of intelligence directly to the Congress. Already this year NCTC has
provided more than 223 separate analytic terrorism products over
CAPNET, a secure Internet link between the Intelligence Community and
the Congress. These products include Intelligence Community Terrorist
Threat Assessments, NCTC's Terrorism Dispatch, and the NCTC's
Spotlight. I am completely committed to ensuring that this Committee
has the information it needs to perform its constitutional oversight
duties. The principle of checks and balances is one of the fundamental
tenets of our form of government and it is one that I fully appreciate
and look forward to supporting through open and honest communication
with the Congress.
Moreover, while the legal requirements for oversight are clearly
paramount, I also heartily welcome your invaluable insights on how NCTC
and the counterterrorism community should go about its business. Your
many years of experience in intelligence and elsewhere are a strength
that I intend to benefit from in leading NCTC if confirmed. No single
department, agency or branch of government has a monopoly on wisdom
when it comes to fighting terrorism. If confirmed, I look forward to
the benefit of the Committee's views and will seek its advice on how
NCTC should proceed in its vitally important missions.
In closing, I would like to take a note from my predecessor, Vice
Admiral Scott Redd's confirmation hearing. Almost three years ago
Admiral Redd noted that although he was entering the realm of being a
``political appointee,'' there was nothing political about the job of
Director of NCTC. I could not agree more strongly. Every day that I
have served at NCTC I have been guided by the foundational principles
that I noted when I opened--providing Americans and our allies with
greater security while simultaneously protecting fundamental American
values. In my view NCTC's mission has not been and should not be driven
by political calculations, for whatever differences we may have on
approach or emphasis, they pale in comparison with our common goals.
Thank you again for this opportunity for which I am truly honored.
I look forward to answering your questions and, if the Senate chooses
to confirm me, to working very closely with you in the future to ensure
that I carry out my responsibilities wisely.
Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Leiter. That's a
comforting statement, delivered with, I believe, the core
values that are within you.
We sent you some questions, and in one of your answers, you
wrote, ``Our former Director concluded that the NCTC permanent
cadre should comprise 20 percent of the NCTC's total personnel
strength. Over the past six months, I have concluded that a
slightly higher percentage would be optimal. In this light--
this is what you said--``in this light, if I should be
confirmed, I would pursue a strategy to ensure that the NCTC
permanent cadre be approximately 30 to 35 percent of the NCTC
total workforce.''
Now, this is one of those questions which is always hard to
answer but, generally speaking, in an era of leniency and
scarce resources and flexibility and cutting through the waters
rapidly, I'm somewhat concerned at this strategy of the growth
of the permanent staff of the NCTC. I believe that a certain
percentage of experienced permanent staff is required,
obviously, for the sake of the overall, and that's a very large
number, and I recognize that. I'm not convinced that the
permanent cadre needs to be as high as 35 percent. I'm not
necessarily criticizing that before I hear what your response
is, but I worry about hiring a permanent cadre of new analysts
without intelligence community experience.
I understand that some intelligence agencies continue to
resist detailing their personnel to what will hopefully be your
agency. And I wonder if your strategy is a way to deal with
this intransigence. So would you please describe your efforts
and authorities available to you as Director to ensure agencies
are living up to their expectations and providing the requisite
number of staff to you, and that they are of the requisite
quality that matches your standards. I'm especially interested
in learning more about the participation of the Department of
Homeland Security and of State.
Mr. Leiter. I'd be happy to, Mr. Chairman.
First, one point I would like to make, that in terms of
hiring of new analysts directly to NCTC, in all but the rarest
occasions, those individuals who are being hired do have prior
analytic experience. So simply because we are hiring them does
not mean that they have not previously worked at different
agencies before, and bring that experience with them.
Now, I'd like to set some foundational principals also. I
am firmly committed to ensuring that there's a flow of people
back and forth from NCTC to other agencies. I think it is that
expertise that gives NCTC strength. The reason behind moving
above that original 20 to 25 percent was purely born out of our
experience, and much less so in terms of difficulty getting
people from other agencies and much more so in ensuring that
our teams at NCTC have sufficient continuity, that there wasn't
excessive flow in and out based on detailees going back and
forth.
Now, in terms of the Director's authorities to ensure that
agencies are providing sufficient staff, my authorities are co-
extensive with the Director of National Intelligence's
authorities. So if an agency fails to provide detailed
analysts, I work with the DNI to ensure that those people are
transferred. Now, I can pledge to you that, if confirmed,
Senator, I will not hesitate in the least to go to the DNI and
suggest that the DNI use his budgetary authority and reduce
funding to individual elements if they are not supporting NCTC.
Now, you asked about DHS and State. I want to start with
the basic premise that most agencies have done an outstanding
job of supporting us. And although there were earlier
bureaucratic fights, I do want to highlight CIA has been
stellar in its support of NCTC, and they should be commended
for that.
Other agencies have not been quite as forthcoming in some
of their support. The recent inspector general report noted
some shortcomings on the part of both DHS and the Department of
State. I am pleased to say that, after I read that report last
week, I called up the office of the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the Secretary's office has already committed
additional support to immediately fill critical needs.
Chairman Rockefeller. May I interrupt, only to this point--
since my time is up--that when you get new people, you know the
intelligence world and you know the agency's world very well.
And, you're very forthright and I deem you to be dogged. Do you
say, ``This is who I want,'' or do you select from those that
they send you?
Mr. Leiter. There is some combination. We go out,
initially, and we recruit. We then ask those people to go
through their chains and provide names. Those names are then
submitted to us from the agency and we either accept or reject
people that the agency has submitted. In many, cases people are
submitted to us that we do not believe are of sufficient
experience or skill level that they will not help NCTC, and we
send them back, and we say, please try again.
Chairman Rockefeller. So in the mixture, you go to the CIA,
or some other agency, and you say, ``I really need these six
people.''
Mr. Leiter. We will select both based on skill set and, in
some instances, we do by-name requests working with that
agency.
Chairman Rockefeller. Senator Bond.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Leiter, as you probably well know, last summer,
Congress passed the Protect America Act, and after that, this
Committee worked long and hard and came up with what I think
was an excellent bipartisan measure to make sure that the FISA
operations could continue. However, we have yet to see a
positive action by the House on that bill, which is set to
expire in August.
To the extent that you can say so in this forum--obviously,
details would not be appropriate--to what extent does NCTC rely
on intelligence information collected under Protect America Act
certifications in conducting terrorism analysis, and what
impact would there be on your ability to conduct that analysis
of counterterrorism should this intelligence source stop?
Mr. Leiter. Mr. Vice Chairman, I would begin just by saying
that NCTC, obviously, does not collect any intelligence.
Vice Chairman Bond. That's correct.
Mr. Leiter. So we are a consumer of the intelligence that
is collected by organizations like the National Security
Agency. That being said, a significant percentage of the
information that we analyze comes from signals intercepts, most
notably from FISA and, since its passage, the Protect America
Act. So that is a significant portion of what we look at to
understand terrorists' plans, intent and the like.
We do not, as a general matter, know whether or not
something is collected through standard FISA or Protect America
Act. We don't delve into that level of detail. I will say that,
as I understand it, the flexibility that the Protect America
Act is quite helpful and allows us to be more agile in our
collection, which, of course, provides us with greater
information as analysts. And in that regard, it's quite
important.
Vice Chairman Bond. In the Committee's pre-hearing
questions, you were asked about the benefits of co-location,
particularly given that only the NCTC and FBI's al-Qa'ida
analytic elements are located at the NCTC. You noted that there
are some significant advantages to having some CIA analysts
remain closer to the operational counterparts at CIA
headquarters.
Given that no other al-Qa'ida analytic elements are located
at ALX1, does it still make sense for the FBI to have their
international terrorism headquarters there? And without getting
into classified matters, can you give us an analysis of what
significant advantages there are in having the CIA analysts
remain at CIA headquarters--and other reasons other agencies
have given for not locating with the NCTC?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I do think there are enormous benefits
to having the FBI Counterterrorism Division co-located. I think
it makes sense for FBI--and, obviously, I can only speak so
much for FBI and CIA--I think it makes sense for FBI because
they are able to co-locate their analysts and their operators
together while at the same time having them co-located with
NCTC. That is a luxury that CIA does not have. CIA cannot both
co-locate its analysts with NCTC and its operators.
So in that regard, I think the approach for FBI and for CIA
makes sense. And I would be fearful--and again, I don't want to
speak too much for CIA--but I would be fearful of removing the
CIA analysts from their operational counterparts. I think that
is a very important co-location. We, I believe, have been quite
successful in coordinating and collaborating regardless of
whether all of our analysts are co-located at NCTC.
Vice Chairman Bond. In our previous discussion, you and I
talked about advancing the United States' global ideological
engagement and fighting the ideological war against violent
extremists. What's the NCTC currently doing to counter the
spread of violent extremist ideology and how would you judge
the effectiveness of these efforts? And how can we measure them
in the future?
Mr. Leiter. On the analytic front, Senator, we're doing a
tremendous amount and looking at radicalization from a number
of angles.
To begin, I would say we look at it obviously from a
religious angle, we look at it from ethnographic angle, we look
at it from a psychological angle. And these are all critical
elements of understanding the process of radicalization and
then designing strategies. That's the most advanced effort and
it's an effort that I'm very proud of.
On the coordination and strategic planning efforts for the
U.S. government, those are far more nascent. And I think that,
if confirmed, I would view it as my number one strategic
planning priority to forcefully coordinate and synchronize U.S.
government efforts.
We've been at this from NCTC's perspective for only about
four months, five months. I think we've made excellent progress
in coordinating some of the U.S. government messaging. But this
is about much more than messaging. It is forcefully
coordinating things like foreign aid, private investment
overseas and the like, both overseas and domestically, to
counter the spread of the ideology which contributes to
terrorism.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much.
Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Senator Feinstein, if you'd forgive me, I have certain
standard preliminary questions which I failed to ask you.
Mr. Leiter, do you agree to appear before the Committee
here or in other venues when invited?
Mr. Leiter. I do.
Chairman Rockefeller. Do you agree to send officials from
the NCTC or the intelligence community to appear before the
Committee and designated staff when invited?
Mr. Leiter. I do.
Chairman Rockefeller. Do you agree to provide documents or
any material requested by the Committee in order for it to
carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities----
Mr. Leiter. I do.
Chairman Rockefeller [continuing]. And think it through
carefully before answering.
Mr. Leiter. I do, consistent with past precedent.
Chairman Rockefeller. Will you ensure that the NCTC and the
intelligence community provide such material to the Committee
when requested?
Mr. Leiter. I do, Senator.
Chairman Rockefeller. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Leiter, I very much appreciate the time we've had to
spend, and at that time you mentioned the absence of sufficient
support from the State Department of Intelligence and Research
and also from the Department of Homeland Security. You just
said that you had talked to both and you believe the situation
would be remediated.
I'd like to ask you a simple question. If it is not, would
you please let us know?
Mr. Leiter. I will happily let you know, Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
In your written responses to the pre-hearing questions, you
noted that DNI McConnell had specifically tasked you to
``increase the quality of NCTC's analytic products.''
In what way have you found those products deficient? And
how do you plan on or have you increased the productivity and
the quality?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I think some of our products--if I
look back a year or more--some of those products did not
include, for example, the regional context that was required; I
mean, terrorism occurs in regions. And we didn't always
integrate regional expertise sufficiently. So I think our
readers could not get the full picture.
I think in some areas we ran the risk--I'm not sure it ever
happened--but we ran the risk of groupthink as quickly-emerging
plots are being uncovered.
So what we've tried to do in the first instance is make
sure that our analysts get better training and coordinate
better with our regional counterparts. And on the second, we
have actually done integrated red team and alternative analysis
during threat streams as they emerge to ensure that we are not
getting caught or pushing the intelligence community down the
avenue of groupthink that has been so harmful in the past.
Senator Feinstein. Now, we are being told that al-Qa'ida is
in its strongest position since the attack on 9/11. The
unclassified judgments from the NIE on terrorism last summer
stated, ``Al-Qa'ida is and will remain the most serious
terrorist threat to the homeland, as its central leadership
continues to plan high-impact plots while pushing others in
extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to
supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected
or regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability,
including a safe haven in the FATA areas of Pakistan, its
operational lieutenants and its top leadership.''
The classified reports since then are even more blunt.
``Despite tens of billions of dollars spent since 9/11 and
countless lives lost, al-Qa'ida remains firmly ensconced in the
FATA region. It's able to plot and we are still revising our
counterterrorism strategy.''
What is your vision of how we should be fighting terrorism
into the next administration?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, thank you for that question--and I'll
obviously have to leave it at a level of generality considering
the unclassified nature.
First, I think we have to fight a full spectrum war. There
are pieces of al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups which will
only be incapacitated through either kinetic means or law
enforcement--actual incapacitation.
That being said, that is one end of the spectrum. And I
would say in the FATA and elsewhere, whether or not it's North
Africa or East Africa, we have to do a better job of
coordinating with that kinetic force the other elements of
national power.
We have to----
Senator Feinstein. Explain kinetic force--that's a bit
above my pay grade.
Mr. Leiter. I apologize. Kinetic force is high explosives.
It's going out and killing people. And there is a certain
population that that is probably the right answer.
But we have to combine with that and build around that the
other elements of diplomacy, political engagement, financial
sanctions and ideological engagement to ensure that the people
who are trying to incapacitate do not find support in their
society.
I think that is particularly important in Pakistan. We have
to continue to work with our allies, we have to have a
government that is a long-term partner with the United States,
that does not fluctuate when their administration changes or
our administration changes. And we have to ensure that they are
able to drain the swamp which supports the individuals who are
actively plotting against the United States and our allies.
Senator Feinstein. Well, those are generalities. Any
specifics?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I would be happy to go into extensive
discussion of specifics of my thoughts on the FATA. Again, I
think in an open session, it's difficult to give you many of
those specifics.
Senator Feinstein. Okay, fair enough. My time is up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Senator Feinstein.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Leiter, I want to follow up a different path in the
same area as Senator Feinstein discussed to get your assessment
of where we are today. Director McConnell gave us some stunning
testimony three months ago. He said that al-Qa'ida central
leadership in Pakistan--and I'll quote here--``has been able to
regenerate the core operational capabilities needed to conduct
attacks in our country.'' So extra points for the Director's,
you know, candor, but I still want to get your sense.
As of today, are our counterterrorism efforts succeeding?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I think our counterterrorism efforts
are succeeding along a number of fronts, and along a number of
fronts, we obviously haven't succeeded well enough. I think----
Senator Wyden. But Mr. Leiter, how can you say we're
succeeding when al-Qa'ida actually appears to be regenerating
its capabilities? I think we'd agree there's no bigger
terrorist threat than al-Qa'ida. So tell me specifically, how
can you say we're succeeding when al-Qa'ida appears to be
regenerating its capabilities?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, what I was trying to say about that
success is in terms of our intelligence capabilities of
watching plots as they develop, tracking those plots,
disrupting those plots and defending the homeland, there have
been successes. We are doing far better today, I think, at
NCTC--but beyond NCTC--than we were.
Where we have clearly not succeeded--I agree with the
premise of your question--we have clearly not succeeded in
stopping core al-Qa'ida plotting. We're better at disrupting
it, but we have not disrupted the senior leadership that exists
in the FATA, and we have also not stopped the organization from
promulgating a message which has successfully gained them more
recruits.
Senator Wyden. First of all, this isn't my analysis; this
comes from the Director and it reflects, in my view, great
credit on the Director for his assessment. And if he says
they're regenerating and you've said that, in many respects,
the problem is not being addressed, that to me suggests that
there needs to be changes in our strategy for dealing with the
principal threat.
What is your view about the changes that need to be made?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I think the change in the government
in Pakistan offers real possibilities. I think it offers
possibilities to work with that government and then have them
develop a plan. Ultimately, our success will rest on the
success of the Pakistani government to address the problem
which is, to a significant degree, within their borders. I
think that is one area where we have to further our engagement
with the Pakistanis and work with them to help them defeat it.
Senator Wyden. Do you believe that any time soon, the
Pakistani government will be capable of taking away al-Qa'ida's
safe haven in the Pakistani tribal areas?
Mr. Leiter. I think we have to work with the Pakistani
government both on capability and in----
Senator Wyden. The question was, do you think any time soon
the Pakistani government will be capable of taking away al-
Qa'ida's safe haven in that area?
Mr. Leiter. I think there is much more that the government
of Pakistan could do.
Senator Wyden. I will ask you that question for the record
so we get a closed----
Mr. Leiter. I'd be happy to.
Senator Wyden [continuing]. Transcript, because that to me
is the central question. Are we going to be able to get them to
take away that safe haven any time soon?
One last question, if I have the time, Mr. Chairman. You've
been very indulgent. I'm also concerned about terrorism
financing from Saudi Arabia. The high prices that Americans pay
at the pump right now are creating huge profits in Saudi
Arabia, where oil wealth has made a large number of people very
rich. And the problem, of course, is that many of these Saudi
citizens turn around and use their oil money to finance
terrorism around the world.
Now top Treasury officials have said publicly--I was in the
Finance Committee when they did--that more money flows from
Saudi Arabia to the Taliban and Sunni terrorist groups than
from anywhere else in the world. In your view, how serious is
this problem?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, the problem of terror funding from
Saudi Arabia and elsewhere is very serious. The Saudis have
been extremely effective in disrupting major portions of al-
Qa'ida within the peninsula, but they continue to face
challenges in stopping funding elsewhere. I think they have
been extremely effective in some ways, but there are many
potential sources of funding.
Senator Wyden. How cooperative are they being now when it
comes to cutting off funding for terrorists outside Saudi
Arabia? I mean, it seems to me that they're interested in
protecting their own country, but I don't see a lot of
cooperation as it relates to the area outside Saudi Arabia and
that this is a problem today. Is that true?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I'm not sure I would characterize it
exactly that way and I would ask--considering the sensitivities
here--I'd be happy to talk to you about that in a closed
session.
Senator Wyden. I'll be glad to talk to you some more about
it. But, I mean, this is a matter of public record. I mean,
we're not talking about something that's classified. Stuart
Levey came to the Finance Committee and, in response to my
questions, said in public the Saudis are dragging their feet
with respect to the Financial Intelligence Unit and the
Charities Commission, and that's how they get all their money
out around the world to finance terrorism. Is Mr. Levey right?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, first I would largely defer to Under
Secretary Levey, who I think is closer to this problem on a
day-to-day basis than I am. I think that there are many things
that we could discuss in closed sessions about particular
efforts by the Saudis, both within the peninsula and overseas,
that would give greater clarity to what the Saudi efforts have
been.
Senator Wyden. I would like greater clarity, but I'd like
some of it on the public record. I mean, Stuart Levey in
particular talked about Saudi failure in two kinds of key
areas. With oil at $100 a barrel, I mean, the Saudi government
certainly can't say they can't afford to take these steps. What
arguments would there be for the Saudis not to take action to
follow through on pledges they made to our country, both with
respect to the Financial Unit and the Charities Commission?
What possible argument would there be for their not following
through?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I'm not here to defend the government
of Saudi Arabia as to why they have or have not followed
through on these commitments. I think the problem of funding of
terrorism in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere is one that we have to
pursue, and I think that Under Secretary Levey, as I said, who
is extremely close to this, understands the challenges of Saudi
Arabia. I think the Saudis have made great progress in some
areas, and in other areas, like other countries, they have
likely fallen short. And I would happy to discuss it in great
depth in a closed session.
Senator Wyden. Chairman, can I ask one final question?
Chairman Rockefeller. One.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much.
Mr. Leiter, you told Senator Bond that NCTC has only been
engaged in counterterrorism messaging efforts for the last four
months. Why did the NCTC decide to do this after not doing it
for so long and what has been started in the last four months?
Mr. Leiter. And Senator, I apologize. I really misspoke in
saying that.
The NCTC, since we first helped author the National
Implementation Plan in 2005 and 2006, one of the key pillars of
that plan was ideological engagement. So in that sense and in
many respects, we've been involved since 2005, when we were
first established. What we have started over the past four
months--a bit longer now, since January--was a more forceful
integration of efforts across the U.S. government, principally
with CIA, Department of Defense and the State Department to
coordinate messages and other outreach in a way that we were
not given the opportunity to do before.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you.
Senator Whitehouse.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Leiter.
I'd like to follow up on questions that you've been asked
by Vice Chairman Bond and by Senator Wyden relating to the
whole question of ideological engagement--what you referred to
as ``draining the swamp of ideology.'' And I couldn't agree
with you more that we can attack with kinetic means and should
and must attack with kinetic means certain individuals and
certain structures. But if the purpose of the whole exercise is
simply to have others come up and replace them and you haven't
won the underlying battle, you really aren't making the kind of
progress that the country needs.
And I see your initiative as a correct one. I see it as a
bold one. And I look at you as an individual reporting to the
Director of National Intelligence, which is an agency still
sort of seeking to find its way administratively, and on
something like this, probably having to bump into not only CIA
and various components of Defense and the State Department and
USAID within State and Homeland Security perhaps--who knows who
all you all have to be involved with.
From a point of view of administering that purpose, do you
have the clout that you need to even convene people, let alone
get direction? What would be the primary motivating
administrative force behind this effort, if it's not yourselves
and your organization? And if it is yourself and your
organization, how do you compete among bigger, stronger,
closer-to-the-President entities that you would seek to bend to
your will?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, thank you for the question. I do want
to clarify. Although on the analytic front, for ideological
engagement, I report to Director McConnell, for this planning
and coordination of the war of ideas, in fact, I report to the
President directly.
And in that regard, what I require and what I so far have
gotten over the past five to six months is a strong hand from
the National and Homeland Security Councils, because in that
coordination of those, if I may, big dogs, I need a National
and Homeland Security Council and a White House that is
supportive of our efforts to force them together to get that
message out and coordinate. I have thus far had that, and in
the process I have been assured that I will continue to have
that. And the authority that we were given came directly from
the principals committee.
Senator Whitehouse. Well, that's very good to hear. I
appreciate it. That's more than I thought you'd been given, and
I was worried that you were getting off on a mission from which
some people never return to have the bureaucratic support
behind them to make it happen.
Mr. Leiter. And Senator, I don't want to underestimate the
challenge there. The challenge remains, and it's a significant
challenge. And I do think there was great wisdom, from my
perspective, in having a dual reporting chain. Although it is
complicated, I think a dual reporting chain--the DNI on
intelligence and the President on strategic planning--is
critical.
Senator Whitehouse. Mr. Chairman, I don't have further
questions. I am supportive of this nominee and hope that he can
be confirmed rapidly.
Chairman Rockefeller. Well, he might be pleased to hear
that.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a
full statement I'd like to enter into the record, if I could.
Chairman Rockefeller. Please.
Senator Feingold. And let me also say that I really enjoyed
our meeting the other day. Thank you for the time. And I think
you're highly qualified for this, and I look forward to
supporting your nomination.
Mr. Leiter. Thank you, Senator.
OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. Mr. Chairman, while this is a nomination
hearing, it comes at an opportune time to discuss the
challenges we face in our fight against al-Qa'ida and its
affiliates. The State Department's Country Report on Terrorism,
released last week, painted a bleak picture. Al-Qa'ida has
reconstituted some of its pre-9/11 operational capabilities in
the FATA, while its network in the Middle East, Southeast Asia,
Africa, Europe and Central Asia is working to attack U.S. and
other western interests.
To name just two regions that we talked about that I follow
closely, the terrorist threat in North Africa is growing and
al-Qa'ida continues to pose a serious threat to the United
States and allied interests in the Horn of Africa. Yet, almost
seven years after September 11th, I think the administration
still lacks comprehensive coordinated strategies to fight al-
Qa'ida and its affiliates globally or regionally.
Perhaps most dangerous of all is our lack of information
not only on current terrorist safe havens but, as we talked
about, on future ones. Despite the 9/11 commission's warning
that we must focus on ``remote regions and failing states,'' I
think we've basically failed to do that.
We've also failed to establish a global collection strategy
that encompasses not only the intelligence community but other
means by which our government gathers information, especially
our State Department. Simply put, we need to ask what it is we
need to know to protect ourselves, now and in the future, who
is best positioned to learn it, and how do we direct resources
accordingly?
Those questions have not been asked, much less answered,
which is why Senator Hagel and I have supported legislation to
establish an independent commission to examine these issues and
make recommendations to Congress and to the next President. And
this legislation was, of course, approved by this Committee
last week, and I'm certainly very pleased with the process that
we went through in that regard.
Mr. Leiter, do you agree with the DNI that we have devoted
disproportionate resources toward current crises rather than
long-term threats? And would you agree that we do not have
enough resources devoted to tracking potential terrorist safe
havens around the world?
Mr. Leiter. Largely yes, Senator. I wish I had more
resources to dedicate to longer-term threats, absolutely.
Senator Feingold. Obviously you're part of the intelligence
community. But in trying to understand conditions that can lead
to far-flung regions to become safe havens, how important is
State Department reporting?
Mr. Leiter. I consider State Department reporting
absolutely critical, Senator, because much of the information
about the instability that can lead to safe havens or
ideological radicalization comes not from covert collection but
from open collection, best done by Foreign Services Officers.
Senator Feingold. In that spirit, there are, of course,
times in which the intelligence community is better suited to
collect information on the terrorist threat. But do you agree
that there are times in which diplomatic reporting can get us
information more effectively than the intelligence community?
Mr. Leiter. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Feingold. Shouldn't we find ways to direct
resources toward whoever is best positioned to learn about
safe-haven conditions?
Mr. Leiter. Yes, I believe we should.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Chairman, last week CIA Director
Hayden gave a speech in which he discussed a number of threats
to the United States, including how changes in population
demographics result in violence, civil unrest and extremism, as
well as the rise in ethnic nationalism.
In that speech he mentioned the CIA, the FBI and DOD, as
well as academia and the business sector, but not the State
Department. While the Director understandably was talking about
what the CIA brings to the table, his failure to even mention
that diplomatic reporting could help us understand these
threats, I think, highlights the enormous challenges we face
and the reason why this commission is so important.
Mr. Leiter, do you agree, on another matter, with the State
Department's conclusion included in its Country Report on
Terrorism issued last week that incarcerating or killing
terrorists will not achieve an end to terrorism?
Mr. Leiter. Yes, I do.
Senator Feingold. For example, would you agree that the
strike acknowledged by DOD in Somalia last week is not a
substitute for a comprehensive strategy to stabilize the
country?
Mr. Leiter. I believe they are complementary.
Senator Feingold. And in that regard, what is that
strategy? What is the road map to start to reverse Somalia's
status as a terrorist safe haven? Specifically, who should we
be reaching out to as potential partners in Somalia?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I think the importance of a central
government and authority in areas like Somalia cannot be
underestimated. So we must identify those parties that can, in
fact, consistent with American values, govern that region and
provide security that we can support but we can never be a
replacement for.
Senator Feingold. And who would those parties be, if you
can say?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I have to admit--I'd be happy to take
that back for the record--I'm not familiar. As you know, the
parties in Somalia are rapidly changing and numerous, and I
simply couldn't give you a detailed explanation of who would be
best fit for a variety of purposes.
Senator Feingold. Well, as you know from our conversation,
I'll be very interested in the details when you have an
opportunity to do that. And I certainly wish you well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Feingold follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Russ Feingold, a U.S. Senator from Wisconsin
The State Department's Country Report on Terrorism released last
week painted a bleak picture of the fight against Al Qaeda and its
affiliates. According to the report, Al Qaeda has reconstituted some of
its pre-9/11 operational capabilities in Pakistan's FATA region while
its network includes associates throughout the Middle East, Southeast
Asia, Africa, Europe and Central Asia who are working to attack U.S.
and other Western interests. In the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Al
Qaeda has greater mobility and ability to conduct training and
operational planning, particularly for attacks targeting Western Europe
and the United States. Portions of Pakistan have become a safe haven
for Al Qaeda and a host of other dangerous organizations and the threat
is expanding, with extremists gaining footholds in settled areas of the
country. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda has expanded its presence in Afghanistan.
Among the litany of threats described in the report are two other
regions that I have followed closely. First, the terrorist threat in
North Africa is growing. Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
operates across the Sahel region, including in Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Algeria and Chad, to recruit for training and terrorist operations. And
Al Qaeda continues to pose a serious threat to U.S. and allied
interests in the Horn of Africa. Somalia's political instability, among
other factors, permits terrorist transit and safe haven.
Almost seven years after September 11, the Administration still
lacks comprehensive, coordinated strategies to fight Al Qaeda and its
affiliates. I have pushed for legislation to require a global strategy
to fight Al Qaeda, which the Administration has resisted. I have
succeeded in requiring the administration to produce a regional
strategy for the Horn of Africa. Unfortunately, the GAO found that this
strategy was ``incomplete'' and lacking numerous characteristics needed
for an effective strategy, including information on necessary
resources, investments and risk management. Meanwhile, the
Administration appears fixated on a purely military approach to the
region. Indeed, the very week that DOD announced another strike in
Somalia, we were reminded yet again--by no other than the State
Department--that ``incarcerating or killing terrorists will not achieve
an end to terrorism.''
Perhaps most dangerous of all is our lack of information, not only
on current terrorist safe havens, but on future ones. The leadership of
the Intelligence Community has acknowledged a lack of ``global reach.''
It has also admitted that ``disproportionate'' resources are directed
at current crises, rather than long-term threats. Despite the 9/11
Commission's warning that we must focus on ``remote regions and failing
states,'' we have simply failed to do so. We have also failed to
establish a global collection strategy that encompasses not only the
intelligence community, but other means by which our government gathers
information, especially our State Department. Simply put, we need to
ask what it is we need to know to protect ourselves, now and in the
future, who is best positioned to learn it, and how do we direct
resources accordingly. Those questions have not been asked, much less
answered. For that reason, Senator Hagel and I have supported
legislation to establish an independent commission to examine these
issues and make recommendations to Congress and to the next president.
The Senate Intelligence Committee approved this legislation last week,
and I will fight to get it passed into law.
Mr. Leiter. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Senator Feingold.
I just have one comment to make, and then Vice Chairman
Bond may have a question or so.
When Senator Wyden was talking about Saudi Arabia, I could
sort of feel my blood pressure rising. And it's almost
fascinating. I think that oil was discovered there as late as
the early 1930s. And I have this general view that virtually
everything we do in that part of the world is dominated by our
need for oil.
And I was stunned--I guess it was approximately a year ago,
maybe a little bit less--when the President gave them $20
billion to buy arms. It had not occurred to me that the Saudis
were either in need of arms or in need of money with which to
buy arms. And I was thinking, somewhat irreverently, that that
could go a long way towards finding the way to take carbon
dioxide out of everything that we burn and make it virtually
carbon-neutral.
But nobody seems to want to address this issue. And it's
either because the hold that they have over us--and some other
countries around there but particularly them--the hold they
have over us based upon the friendships that go back over the
years and the visits and the ambassadors here and there, that
it, in effect, ends up psychologically tying our hands in order
to do exactly what it is your job to do, and that is to make
sure that they are doing everything they can to cut off money
for terrorists, that they are not just doing that within their
own country--and granted, they're very good at that, because
they're a regency. None of them are elected, and they could be
overthrown, have been before.
That's a profound sense of unease on my part about America
facing the world. It's like we're facing the world and mouthing
all the right sounds, but in fact not doing what's needed to be
done.
And I don't necessarily ask for a response on your part,
although I would welcome one, but I think it's an overridingly
important matter, not only with the credibility to our own
people of our efforts in the war on terrorism, but I cannot
believe that people all over the world who wish us ill are not
watching that very closely and taking some either amusement or
at least interest from that fact.
Mr. Leiter. Senator, three quick points. One, as the Acting
Director of NCTC and, if confirmed, as Director, obviously I
have a piece of the Saudi Arabia portfolio, and that is the
counterterrorism piece. And I always remind my staff, and I
remind myself that counterterrorism is only one piece of the
national security puzzle. It may be a critically important
piece, but it is one piece.
Second, I would say that the one thing that I can assure
you is that I would never allow NCTC analysts--and I will
always support them in every way I can--to not have their work
colored by the discomfort or political consequences that you
fear we as a nation experience.
I will demand of them--I have in the past and I will in the
future demand of them--that they give the straight truth and
speak to power about what the Saudi actions are or are not, and
explain what the counterterrorism consequences are, completely
and utterly unclouded by other political consequences.
Chairman Rockefeller. I believe you.
Vice Chairman Bond.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
agree with the concern that you have raised and Senator Wyden
has raised about the financing coming from Saudi Arabia. This
is a very serious question. I know that, having worked with
Stuart Levey and the others, we know what has been done and
there is much more that needs to be done, and we will look
forward to following up with you to see what the NCTC can bring
forward.
Also, with respect to al-Qa'ida and its planning capability
in the FATA, I think that there have been some recent newspaper
op-ed pieces talking about a better strategy for dealing with
the FATA. And I hope we can go into those, because I think we
can take those as a stepping-off point to see where you would
go from there.
I would note that with all the planning capabilities, there
are a number of high-level al-Qa'ida operatives who have
kinetically disappeared on a regular basis in the FATA, and
that has limited their ability to carry out operations. And I
also think that the fact that we have been kept free from
attacks since 9/11 is in no small part due to the information
collection, the activities in the groups you serve as well as
our military efforts there.
But I would ask you first, some people say that the battle
with al-Qa'ida is no longer in Iraq. Now, that is directly
military. But I would ask your assessment of where al-Qa'ida is
posing the greatest threat to United States interests. Is it
not in Iraq?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, to the extent that we have military
forces in Iraq, al-Qa'ida in Iraq, which continues to exist,
poses the most direct threat to U.S. interests, those troops on
the ground in Iraq, in Iraq.----
Vice Chairman Bond. What would the impact on terrorism be
if we departed and Iraq was open as potentially a safe haven
for al-Qa'ida again? What would the impact on the terrorist
threat to the United States be?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, were al-Qa'ida to have a safe haven in
Iraq, I would assess that that safe haven would pose a very
similar threat to the United States and U.S. interests as does
the FATA in Pakistan. And, from my perspective, that's a dire
threat.
Vice Chairman Bond. Well, I would think there would be much
greater opportunity for establishing command and control and
operational activities than they have in the FATA.
But I'm very interested in the points that Senator Feingold
raised about the comprehensive view of where the threats to the
United States come from terrorism and how we're going to deal
with them.
Now, it seems to me that what he outlined pretty much fits
with what I thought the NCTC was supposed to do--figure out
where the terrorist threats are, where the emerging threats
are, and be able to take those recommendations through the
principals committee to all of the agencies, whether it's State
Department, military, CIA, or anyone else that has something to
do with them.
Am I wrong? Is this not pretty much what he outlined what
your responsibility is? And if it is, are you lacking in
statutory authority? Or what do you and the NCTC need to answer
those very important questions that Senator Feingold raised?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I do think that's NCTC's
responsibility. It is to identify where the threat is and then
help write the plan and implement the plan for attacking that
threat.
I think that we have done that and we continue to try to do
that. We are trying to grow the capacity every day to do more
of that in more places.
Vice Chairman Bond. And would you not say that developing
threats--and he indicated the challenges that he sees in the
various locations in Africa--is that part of your portfolio?
Mr. Leiter. Absolutely, Senator. We've been instrumental in
authoring regionalization counterterrorism plans in North
Africa, East Africa, Southeast Asia, and the like.
Vice Chairman Bond. My personal view is that we ought to
see that you have the resources, the horsepower to do it. I
think you are in the best position to do it. You have the
assets; you have the analysts and others. My view is that we
need to look to you to get this job done.
If you need a commission, tell us. If you need resources,
tell us. Or, as I am concerned, there isn't adequate
legislative structure for the DNI, through exercising his
powers, to develop an effective, integrated intelligence
collection operation and assignment of responsibilities
activity.
This all goes to, I guess, the strategic operational
planning, and I would like to know your views on that and if
you see any weaknesses in the strategic operational planning
that is going on at the NCTC, and what we can do to fix them.
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I think the strategic operational
planning construct, as I said in my opening statement, is
exactly what the U.S. government needs because it is the only
place in the government that can have concerted, continued
effort at interagency coordination beyond simply the NSC and
HSC.
That being said, it is a construct which runs up against
many entrenched institutional both executive branch and
congressional interests.
Vice Chairman Bond. Stop! Congress? I say that mockingly
because we do turf about as well as anybody else. But we do see
it in there.
So we need to discuss with you, are there additional
statutory authorities needed to get this job done?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I actually think, with what I've seen
thus far, that with a strong National Security Council this can
be done well. But I would absolutely take from you the charge
to look, if I'm confirmed, at how we can improve this. And I am
more than happy to come back to this Committee and make those
suggestions to give us a stronger hand to coordinate U.S.
government efforts if that is what needs to happen.
Vice Chairman Bond. I believe it's absolutely essential.
You referenced the State Department and others. And, frankly,
right now, our best diplomacy is being conducted by the U.S.
Army and National Guard. And I'd like to see the State
Department get in the game. That's just--I won't ask you to
comment on that.
Mr. Chairman, I'll leave that one lying out there.
Chairman Rockefeller. Well, it would also be good if we
gave them the money to be in the game.
Vice Chairman Bond. Exactly. That's our responsibility, our
failure.
Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Vice Chairman Bond.
Mr. Leiter, I just would like to say things which would be
excessive, so I won't. But if there were a single negative vote
on you in this Committee, I would be very surprised. And that's
not just because there is the absence of fault or the absence
of commission on your part as Acting, but also because of what
I feel is the truly extraordinary abilities that you bring and
the role model that you serve as, not only to us but to
Zachary, who has long since disappeared--decided not to defend
you in critical situations--but that you're kind of an ideal of
what a public servant ought to be.
So this hearing is a pleasure. I would like to see you get
confirmed next week. We have to get the record of this hearing
transcribed and made available to all Members, then there are
other small details that we have to do. But if it could be done
next week, I'd like to do it simply as a way of giving you a
faster start. If it can't be, it will not be because we don't
want to, but because of technical questions which will not
remain about you but remain in our process.
So I thank you, and this hearing is adjourned.
Mr. Leiter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]