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[Senate Hearing 107-1086]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-1086
JOINT INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE
TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
U.S. SENATE
and the
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
__________
VOLUME I
SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, 24, and 26, 2002
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-166 WASHINGTON : 2004
_________________________________________________________________
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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
107th Congress
BOB GRAHAM, Florida, Chairman
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Vice Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan JON KYL, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, West Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ORRIN HATCH, Utah
RON WYDEN, Oregon PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
EVAN BAYH, Indiana FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina RICHARD LUGAR, Indiana
BARBARA MIKULSKI, Maryland
------
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
107th Congress
PORTER J. GOSS, Florida, Chairman
NANCY PELOSI, California, Ranking Democrat
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska SANFORD D. BISHOP, Georgia
MICHAEL N. CASTLE, Delaware JANE HARMAN, California
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York GARY A. CONDIT, California
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada TIM ROEMER, Indiana
RAY LaHOOD, Illinois SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM, LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
California COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan BUD CRAMER, Alabama
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Volume I
Hearing held in Washington, D.C., September 18, 2002............. 1
Statement of:
Breitweiser, Kristen, Co-Chairperson, September 11th
Advocates.................................................. 21
Hatch, Hon. Orrin G., U.S. Senator from the State of Utah.... 10
Hill, Eleanor, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Committee....... 58
Kyl, Hon. Jon, U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona........ 17
Push, Stephen, Co-founder and Treasurer of Families of
September 11th............................................. 48
Roberts, Hon. Pat, U.S. Senator from the State of Kansas..... 13
Hearing held in Washington, D.C., September 19, 2002............. 145
Testimony of:
Armitage, Hon. Richard L., Deputy Secretary of State......... 148
Berger, Hon. Samuel R., Former Assistant and Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs............. 220
Lake, Anthony, Former Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs........................................... 208
Scowcroft, Gen. Brent, Former National Security Advisor...... 216
Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul D., Deputy Secretary of Defense......... 153
Supplemental Materials:
Response to QFRs from the Department of Defense.............. 272
Response to QFRs from the Department of State................ 276
Response to QFRs from Hon. Samuel R. Berger.................. 280
Comments on Joint Inquiry Staff Statements by Samuel R.
Berger..................................................... 286
Report on Plans to Improve Department of State Access to FBI
Criminal Information for Visa Purposes..................... 292
Hearing held in Washington, D.C., September 20, 2002............. 305
Statement of:
A Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation....... 364
An Officer of the Central Intelligence Agency................ 344
Beer, Richard, Director, Coordination Division, Visa Office,
Office of Consular Affairs, Department of State............ 392
Hill, Eleanor, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Committee....... 309
Kojm, Christopher A., Deputy for Intelligence Policy and
Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State........................................ 371
Rolince, Michael E., Special Agent in Charge, Washington
Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation.............. 353
Supplemental Materials: Chronology prepared by Senator Carl Levin 380
Hearing held in Washington, D.C., September 24, 2002............. 431
Testimony of:
A FBI Headquarters Agent..................................... 482
A FBI Minneapolis Agent...................................... 487
A FBI Phoenix Agent.......................................... 478
Hill, Eleanor, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Committee....... 436
Supplemental Materials:
``The Phoenix Electronic Communication,'' Phoenix Special
Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation memo dated July 10,
2001....................................................... 552
Order of Judge Leonie Brinkema, U.S. District Court, dated
August 29, 2002, in Criminal No. 01-455-A.................. 562
Order of Judge Leonie Brinkema, U.S. District Court, dated
September 23, 2002, in Criminal No. 01-455-A............... 469
Order of Judge Leonie Brinkema, U.S. District Court, dated
September 24, 2002, in Criminal No. 01-455-A............... 556
Hearing held in Washington, D.C., September 26, 2002............. 571
Statement of:
Black, Cofer, Former Chief, DCI's Counterterrorist Center,
Central Intelligence Agency................................ 589
Watson, Dale, Former Executive Assistant Director, Counter-
intelligence and Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau
of Investigation........................................... 604
Supplemental Materials: Declassified June 18, 2002 statement of
FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III............................. 573
JOINT COMMITTEE HEARING ON THE EVENTS
SURROUNDING THE ATTACK ON THE
UNITED STATES ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2002
U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and
U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Bob
Graham, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, presiding.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence members present:
Senators Graham, Levin, Rockefeller, Feinstein, Wyden, Durbin,
Bayh, Edwards, Mikulski, Shelby, Kyl, Inhofe, and DeWine.
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence members
present: Representatives Goss, Bereuter, Castle, Boehlert,
Gibbons, LaHood, Hoekstra, Burr, Everett, Pelosi, Bishop,
Condit, Roemer, Harman, Boswell, Peterson, and Cramer.
Chairman Graham. I call the Joint Inquiry committee to
order.
We are here today because 3,025 innocent people, most of
them Americans, were killed 53 weeks ago when terrorists
stunned the world by hijacking domestic airliners and crashing
them into the World Trade Center towers, the Pentagon, and a
field in rural Pennsylvania. We are here today because so many
Americans have been personally touched by these horrific
events.
We who are privileged to serve in the Senate think of our
colleagues and staff as a family. And the Senate family,
especially those of the Select Committee on Intelligence,
suffered a special loss. Terry Lynch, who had turned 49 one
week before the attacks, was married and the father of two
beautiful daughters, Tiffany Marie and Ashley Nicole. For more
than two decades, he was a public servant. He spent several
years on the bipartisan staff of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, where he was our expert on Middle Eastern affairs.
In 1999, Terry left government service and became a consultant.
On September 11, 2001, Terry was attending a meeting at the
Pentagon on the subject of extending military survivor benefits
to military families. Every day, Terry's family and the Senate
family mourn his loss. And we have him on our minds and hearts
today as we begin the public hearing phase of the joint inquiry
committee's review of those events of September 11.
Like all Americans, we now realize that terrorism is no
longer something that happens ``over there,'' to people on the
other side of the globe. Terrorism can hurt people close to us,
here at home. In the days after September 11, many were quick
to blame the success of the terrorists' diabolical plot on
failures of intelligence or preparedness. These public hearings
are part of our search for truth, not to point fingers but to
pin blame, but with the goal of identifying and correcting
whatever systemic problems might have prevented our government
from detecting and disrupting Al-Qa'ida's plot.
The public hearings follow a series of ten closed hearings,
including one held on September 12. It is our task here to
fulfill our oversight responsibility and to recommend reforms.
We will follow the facts wherever they lead to provide answers
to the American people and to improve our nation's security.
While there have been many congressional investigations of
significant events in our nation's history, including the
several inquiries that followed Japan's surprise attack on
Pearl Harbor, this is the first time in the history of the
Congress that two permanent committees have joined to conduct a
bicameral investigation.
The Joint Inquiry Committee has hired an independent staff,
negotiated with the executive branch over access to documents
and witnesses and coordinated with the federal judiciary to
assure that our public hearings will not interfere with pending
prosecutions. I congratulate my colleagues from the Senate and
the House and our staff for their commitment and determination
to fulfill our obligation to the American people. I am very
pleased with our progress to date.
As we enter the public hearing phase of the inquiry, our
purpose is to inform the American people of our findings and to
continue exploring what reforms will be necessary to reduce the
chances of another terrorist attack on our homeland. As we said
in the preamble to the scope of inquiry statement that the
committee adopted in April, our review is designed to reduce
the risk of future terrorist attacks, to honor the memories of
the victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks by conducting
a thorough search for facts to answer the many questions that
their families, and many Americans, have raised, and to lay the
basis for assessing the accountability of institutions and
officials of the government.
To reach those ends, our inquiry is focusing on three key
areas. One, the evolution of the terrorist threat to the United
States, and our government's awareness of and response to that
threat. It is important that we gain an understanding of how
terrorist organizations, particularly Usama bin Ladin and Al-
Qa'ida, move from being a relatively insignificant threat to
American interests just a decade ago to their status today as
America's number one threat.
Second, what the Intelligence Community and the active
consumers of the government's intelligence knew, or should have
known, prior to September 11 about the scope and nature of
possible attacks on U.S. interests by international terrorists.
By examining how and when the government recognized this
evolving threat and how it responded to that threat, we will
gain insights into the ways that we need to respond to
terrorism. Clearly, this is not a static threat, but a rapidly
changing and accelerating danger to America.
Three, how the agencies that make up our Intelligence
Community interact with one another, as well as with other
federal, state and local agencies, with respect to identifying,
tracking, assessing and coping with international terrorist
threats, including biological, chemical, radiological, and
nuclear. The ultimate question we will seek to answer is this:
how can we use the information that we discover during the
inquiry to recommend, and then to successfully advocate to the
American people and our colleagues, changes in the Intelligence
Community that will reduce the prospects of another September
11?
In this first open hearing, we will hear from two
representatives of the groups that speak for the families of
the victims of September 11. Kristen Breitweiser is co-founder
of September 11th Advocates. Stephen Push is co-founder and
treasurer of Families of September 11th. They have been asked
to speak to us about the impact of September 11 on their
families and America, as well as what reforms of the
Intelligence Community will guard us against future threats.
We will then have the first of several presentations from
the Joint Inquiry committee's very capable staff, led by Ms.
Eleanor Hill. Ms. Hill is a former prosecutor, a veteran
congressional investigator, a former inspector general of the
Department of Defense. We are extremely fortunate to have a
person of her experience and capabilities as the committee
staff director. Ms. Hill will review the work of the Joint
Inquiry committee over the last six months, including the ten
closed hearings, interviews with nearly 500 individuals, and a
review of more than 400,000 documents. Following her
presentation, members of the Joint Inquiry committee will be
recognized for comments and questions.
In future open hearings, we will hear from customers of
intelligence, including representatives of the Defense and
State Departments, front-line personnel from intelligence
agencies, and then key leaders of the Intelligence Community,
including the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
I now recognize Congressman Porter Goss, Chairman of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Co-
Chairman of the Joint Inquiry committee for opening remarks. I
am extremely pleased to have Congressman Goss as a partner in
this effort. Congressman Goss will be followed by Senator
Richard Shelby, vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, and then by Representative Nancy Pelosi, ranking
member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Congressman Goss.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Chairman Graham. I'm pleased to
associate myself with your remarks, and I'm honored to serve
with you as Co-Chairman of this joint effort.
Looking back at the innocent lives lost and the damage
inflicted by a fanatical band of suicidal extremists has been
very painful for all of us. We all experienced that just a week
ago with the remembrances of 9/11, and I think it's fair to say
that every American is incensed. We need to understand the hows
and the whys of what happened to bring some comfort to those
who are still grieving, and there are many, and to ensure the
wellbeing of Americans at home and abroad as we go about our
lives today and tomorrow in the globe, as it exists.
And I want to thank Ms. Breitweiser and Mr. Push for being
with us today and sharing with others, and I know there are
others in the audience who are with them. You put a human face
on the tragedy that we all feel. The people whose lives were
unfairly ripped from them is way down deep what drives this
committee to follow the facts to find the truth and you should
know that. Your contribution today, representing so many who
have lost so much, reminds us how the impact of September 11 is
very profound and very personal across our land, and in fact,
around the world.
Providing your thoughtful, specific suggestions for what we
can do better and asking penetrating questions is a help to us,
and I know your testimony has questions and suggestions. I
suppose everybody has a tragic story about pain and suffering
related to September 11. Mine is about CeeCee Lyles. A flight
attendant on Flight 93, CeeCee was a resident of Ft. Myers,
Florida, in my district. She was a former police patrol officer
and detective, and she spent six years risking her life to
protect others in that job.
In December, 2000, mindful of her young children and
looking for a less dangerous and wearing career, although I'm
not sure that was a way to characterize flight attendant work,
she enrolled in a flight attendant school and began flying for
United out of Newark.
At 9:58 on September 11, 2001, CeeCee called her husband
Lorne, a police officer in Fort Myers, from the plane to tell
him that her flight had been hijacked. Her words, ``I called to
tell you I love you. Tell the kids I love them.'' Her last
words that we know of are, ``I think they're going to do it.
They're forcing their way into the cockpit.'' And then the call
broke off. We here owe a particular debt of gratitude to CeeCee
Lyles and her companions on Flight 93, which was heading
towards Washington when it crashed in Shanksville.
The President of the United States has told us intelligence
is the first line of defense. We know that he's right. We know
the first line of defense has to be strong. These hearings will
hopefully lead us to capabilities that better fit the threat as
it does exist today and make our first line of defense
stronger, which obviously it must be. We've already started
this process in the oversight committees of intelligence, and I
want to compliment all the members of the committees,
particularly Representatives Saxby Chambliss and Jane Harman
for the excellent report their Subcommittee on Terrorism has
already provided us on the House side.
It's been a useful building block to help our Joint
Committee staff, a group I would describe as small in number
but dynamic in impact. Under the leadership of Eleanor Hill,
they have interviewed a multitude of people, as the Chairman
has said, read thousands of documents and asked a great many
questions, always with the steady hand of the Members and the
staffs of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees to back
them up.
What this all means is that we have well over 100
professionals and some 37 Members dealing with mountains of
information. And these mountains are getting bigger every day.
Every time we track down another terrorist cell, conduct
another raid, through interrogation or documentation
exploitation and other leads, we find out more about the enemy,
and of course, how to stop them.
There will be further chapters as the war on terrorism
unfolds. We will incorporate as many as we can in our final
report of this joint effort, and I predict there will be plenty
of work for the other standing committees of jurisdiction in
Congress because our primary focus has been intelligence, and
there has been more than just intelligence involved in this
situation.
What forms further investigations take we'll leave to the
future and concentrate now on finishing our work as completely,
as accurately and expeditiously as possible. The terrorist
threat remains high. I want to emphasize that it is precisely
because we want to save lives in the future that we must be
careful how we present and discuss this information in public.
It's true, it may be axiomatic, the enemy is listening to
us today. We must protect our sources and methods, and we must
not reveal any of our plans and intentions to our enemies,
those who would harm us. So today, we begin the process of open
hearings with the understanding not everything can be discussed
in this forum, as much as we would like to share it with
America, but that much can and should be explained to our
nation, which is our goal. And we will go as far as we can.
Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and look
forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Graham. Senator Shelby.
Senator Inhofe. Could I ask a question, a procedural
question?
Chairman Graham. Yes. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Could you inform us as to how we're going
to proceed in terms of Members' participation?
Chairman Graham. Yes. After we complete the opening
statements, we will then hear from the representatives of the
families. Then Ms. Eleanor Hill will present a report on the
work of the Joint Inquiry Committee to date, after which
members will be recognized for questions of Ms. Hill and any
comments they wish to make.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Mr. Chairman, thank you. We now know
that our inability to detect and prevent the September 11
attacks was an intelligence failure of unprecedented magnitude.
Some people who couldn't seem to utter the words intelligence
failure are now convinced of it. Many of us also knew that an
accounting would have to be made on behalf of the innocent
victims, the families left behind, and the American people.
After all, there were nine separate investigations into the
attack on Pearl Harbor and the intelligence failures attendant
there.
We agreed, however, that some time would have to pass
before we began on the Committees such an effort, because we
were at war and it was our top priority to ensure its success.
Approximately six months after that fateful September day, our
two Committees joined together in what I hoped would be a
thorough and comprehensive examination of the United States
Intelligence Community's failures to detect and to prevent the
attacks of September the 11. Now, approximately six months
later, we're making progress, but we are far from done, and I
am concerned.
The staff has reviewed many thousands of documents, but
they have many thousands yet to review. They have interviewed
many people, but there are many people yet to interview. In
fact, it's still very difficult even to determine how far we've
come, and almost impossible to tell how far we've yet to go.
I've been part of many investigations in my career, but
none has been as important as this one. Almost 3000 Americans
have been murdered, and perhaps thousands more innocent lives
will hang in the balance every day. This investigation, I
believe, must be thorough, comprehensive, and complete. I want
it to be a success. But to be a success, an inquiry needs time
and resources. If you limit either one, your chances of success
diminish significantly. Unfortunately, I believe we have a
short supply of both in this inquiry, and I'm afraid that we're
beginning to reap the results.
From the outset, I argued strongly that we should avoid
setting arbitrary deadlines. Deadlines are an invitation to
stonewalling and foot-dragging, and we've had some of both in
this effort. I've also said many times that agencies under the
congressional microscope are generally not motivated to
cooperate. That's just common sense, that's human nature.
To be thorough, I believe we must be able to identify and
to locate relevant information, retrieve it, analyze it in the
context of all of the other information we've gathered. This is
inevitably difficult and time consuming. Because we have only
one to three staffers actually focusing on any particular
agency at any one time, and because so much of our Joint
Inquiry staff resources are tied up in producing hearings such
as this one, which I deem important, it is becoming exceedingly
difficult to be as thorough and probing, I believe, as we need
to be.
I'm afraid we've asked the joint staff to move a mountain
and perhaps only given them a couple of shovels and a little
over six months to get it done. I hope it's enough, but I'm
concerned. This is a massive undertaking, and I compliment our
Chairmen, Senator Bob Graham and Congressman Porter Goss, for
their leadership, because anyone who has willingly volunteered
to lead and to coordinate an effort such as this deserves our
admiration and our support, and perhaps our condolences. But
I'm concerned that the management challenges that you faced and
continue to face have created some fundamental flaws in our
process.
Many members of our joint committee have found it
exceedingly difficult to get information about the inquiry.
They're frustrated by what a lot of them perceive to be efforts
to limit their ability to participate in this inquiry fully.
They want to support and ultimately to endorse this effort that
we have undertaken, but they will be unable to do so, I
believe, unless they have a clear and unfettered view of the
activities of the joint staff.
At this point, I don't believe they do. Today, Eleanor
Hill, our staff director, will present a summary of a statement
intended to reflect the current state of our inquiry. Members,
however, have had essentially no involvement with the process
that led to its drafting, and therefore have little idea, as a
whole, whether what it says is accurate or a fair and thorough
representation of what has been discovered.
Mr. Chairmen, I'm not saying that it is not accurate or
thorough; hopefully, it is both. I'm saying that our Members,
as they've voiced to me, have no practical of way of knowing.
These are concerns that we've discussed before in the four of
us meeting, and they will need to be resolved if we're to have
any chance of reaching a consensus at the conclusion of this
inquiry.
I think it's important that the American people know where
we stand as we begin to discuss publicly why their multi-
billion dollar Intelligence Community was unable to detect and
prevent the worst single attack on American soil in our
history.
At this point, again, I'm very concerned that we may not
have the time or resources we set out to do. I will continue to
support this effort, and support our Chairmen, but there may
come a day very soon when it will become apparent that ours
must be only a prelude to further inquiries. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator.
Congresswoman Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi. Good morning, Mr. Chairmen.
I want to join you in welcoming today's very important
witnesses. I commend the two of you for your great leadership
in doing the best possible job under the circumstances to get
to the bottom of all of this, and I associate myself with the
remarks of our distinguished chairmen on the priority we place
in the participation of the members of the family.
When we began our Joint Inquiry eight months ago, we began
with a moment of silence. We did this in recognition of the
tremendous tragedy that had befallen us, the gravity of the
responsibility we faced, and the obligation we had to the
families of those who lost their lives. Today, it is
appropriate that we begin our first public hearing of this
joint committee and this inquiry with the presentation of the
families.
It is important that this inquiry be viewed through the
prism of the families of the victims of this terrible tragedy
that occurred at the World Trade Center, at the Pentagon, and
in Pennsylvania. The dignity shown by the thousands of family
members has been an inspiration to our country and a tribute to
their loved ones. They have risen to the occasion that they
never could have imagined, and their strength has lifted the
spirit of all Americans.
In welcoming our witnesses here today, I want to express
the appreciation I know that every American feels towards them.
The appreciation of the depth of their grief we can only
imagine, but we do appreciate their leadership which has sprung
from that sadness. To Kristen Breitweiser, the co-chairman of
September 11th Advocates, which is helping other families, and
to Stephen Push, co-founder of Families of September 11th, and
all the members of the families, thank you for your courage.
All of America has been touched by this tragedy, as we all
know, none more directly than all of you. However, we have,
some of us, a closer association because of our work at the
Pentagon. Members of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the
Office of Naval Intelligence lost their lives when they went to
work to work to protect our country. Little did they know that
they would lose their lives at the Pentagon doing that. And of
course, Mike Spann was the first American killed in conflict in
our struggle to root out terrorism wherever it is. And his
association with the Intelligence Community is one that I wish
to acknowledge.
As we address the challenge September 11 presents to our
country--and I also want to mention Betty Ang, a flight
attendant on the plane that went into the World Trade Center.
She was on Flight 11. She was one of my constituents in San
Francisco. Her courage enabled her to keep communicating with
the ground until the last possible moment. There are so many,
many stories, and we know that there are at least 324 of them
directly. We identify New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania,
but on those planes, one of which was destined for San
Francisco, there were people from all over the country whose
lives were touched.
As we address the challenge of September 11that it presents
to our country, we're walking on hallowed ground, respecting
the sacrifice of those who died and ensuring the families that
justice will be done. We must find answers, reduce risk to the
American people and comfort the families. Families of those
affected by September 11 talk of their continuing reactions to
events that used to be no cause for concern. For some family
members, every time a plane flies overhead, we have been told,
they experience deep fear. We must remove that fear.
We are all united in our determination to win the war
against terrorism. We all agree that this battle will be won
and that we will succeed by working together. The House and
Senate Intelligence Committees have a responsibility to ensure
that Congress conducts a thorough assessment of the performance
of the intelligence agencies leading up to, and including,
September 11.
Yes, Mr. Chairman, we must protect sources and methods, but
we must conduct our inquiry in the most open way possible, so
that information that can be made available to the public, and
especially to the families, is made available. Only in the case
of protecting sources and methods should it be withheld, not in
the case of protecting reputations or to avoid embarrassment to
some.
The committees have decided that the best way to do our
inquiry is to work cooperatively in a bipartisan manner on an
inquiry conducted by the House and the Senate, as you know. And
here we are today with our first public hearing. A joint
investigation is an unusual step, but the events of September
11 call for unusual measures. I join both of our Chairmen in
commending our colleagues, the Members of the House and the
Senate on the Committees for their diligence and their
reverence for the subject that we are dealing with.
Our purpose is not to assign blame but to identify areas
that could lessen the chance that another September 11 could
happen. We must do everything we can to prevent another
terrible tragedy. In doing so, we will balance the need to
enhance physical security for Americans with the duty to
preserve the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The
martyrs of September 11 gave their lives because of those
freedoms.
The goal of terrorists is to instill fear. That fear can
change the way of life for a society. We cannot let them have
that victory. We can and we must do things in a way that
respects our people, protects our founding principles, and
protects and defends our communities. The words of ``America
the Beautiful'' ring true in describing the great cities of
Washington, DC, New York, and indeed, the nation. ``Oh,
beautiful, for patriot dream that sees beyond the years. Thine
alabaster cities gleam, undimmed by human tears.''
Today, those tears are fresh, but this is America, land of
the free, and, as the martyrs and their families have shown us,
home of the brave.
We will take all the time that is needed. We will pursue
every angle. We will turn every stone to find answers for the
families. And I hope that in all that we do in this Joint
Inquiry and in rooting out the terrorism and finding the
perpetrators of this tragedy, that our work says to the
families, ``Peace be with you.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statements of Senators Hatch, Roberts and Kyl
follow:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
We are honored today to be joined by representatives of the
families of the victims. We understand the pain that you have
suffered over the last year. We can empathize, but you
represent an invaluable perspective and an insight into the
full meaning of this tragedy, and the responsibilities that we
all have to avoid the prospects of its repetition. We very much
appreciate your sharing with us today.
First, Ms. Kristen Breitweiser.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Breitweiser follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT OF KRISTEN BREITWEISER, CO-CHAIRPERSON, SEPTEMBER
11TH ADVOCATES
Ms. Breitweiser. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I have a
written statement to be made part of the record, and I would
like to submit some supporting documentation.
Chairman Graham. Ms. Breitweiser, could you put the
microphone--yes, right in front. Good, thank you.
Ms. Breitweiser. Is that better?
Chairman Graham. That's good.
Ms. Breitweiser. I will summarize my testimony as follows.
I would like to thank the families of the 3000 victims for
allowing me to represent them here today before the Joint
Intelligence Committee. It is a tremendous honor. Testifying
before this committee is a privilege and an enormous
responsibility that I do not take lightly. I will do my best
not to disappoint the families or the memories of their loved
ones.
Toward that end, I ask the Members present here today to
find in my voice the voices of all the family members of the
3000 victims of September 11. I would also ask for you to see
in my eyes the eyes of the more than 10,000 children who are
left to grow up without the love, affection and guidance of a
mother or a father who was tragically killed on September 11.
I would now like to thank the members of the Joint
Intelligence Committee, Eleanor Hill and her staff for giving
the families this opportunity to be heard. It has been an
excruciating and overwhelming 12 months, and it is now time for
our words and our concerns to be heard by you. My three-year-
old daughter's most enduring memory of her father will be
placing flowers on his empty grave. My most enduring memory of
my husband Ronald will be his final words to me. ``Sweets, I'm
fine, I don't want you to worry. I love you.''
Ron uttered those words while he was watching men and women
jump to their deaths from the top of Tower One. Four minutes
later, his tower was hit by United Flight 175. I never spoke to
my husband again. I don't really know what happened to him. I
don't know whether he jumped or he choked to death on smoke. I
don't know whether he sat curled up in a corner watching the
carpet melt in front of him, knowing that his own death was
soon to come, or if he was alive long enough to be crushed by
the buildings when they ultimately collapsed. These are the
images that haunt me at night when I put my head to rest on his
pillow.
I do know that the dream that I had envisioned, that I so
desperately needed to believe, that he was immediately turned
to ash and floated up to the heavens, was simply not his fate.
I know this because his wedding band was recovered from Ground
Zero, with a part of his arm. The wedding band is charred and
scratched, but still perfectly round and fully intact. I wear
it on my right hand it will remain there until the day I die.
September 11 was the devastating result of a catalogue of
failures on behalf of our government and its agencies. My
husband and the approximately 3000 others like him went to work
that morning and never came home.
But were any of our governmental agencies doing their job
on that fateful morning? Perhaps the carnage and devastation of
September 11 speaks for itself in answering this question. Our
intelligence agencies suffered an utter collapse in their
duties and responsibilities leading up to and on September 11.
But their negligence does not stand alone. Agencies like the
Port Authority, the City of New York, the FAA, the INS, the
Secret Service, NORAD, the Air Force and the airlines also
failed our nation that morning. Perhaps said more cogently, one
singular agency's failures do not eclipse another's.
And it goes without saying that the examination of the
intelligence agencies by this committee does not detract,
discount, or dismantle the need for a more thorough examination
of all of these other culpable parties. An independent, blue
ribbon panel would be the most appropriate means to achieve
such a thorough and expansive examination, in large part
because it would not be limited in scope or hindered by time
limits. An independent blue ribbon panel would provide a
comprehensive, unbiased, and definitive report that the
devastation of September 11 demands.
Soon after the attacks, President Bush stated that there
would come a time to look back and examine our nation's
failures, but that such an undertaking was inappropriate while
the nation was still in shock. I would respectfully suggest to
President Bush and to our Congress that now, a full year later,
it is time to look back and investigate our failures as a
nation.
A hallmark of democratic government is a willingness to
admit to, analyze and learn from mistakes, and it is now time
for our nation to triumph as the great democracy that it is.
The families of the victims of September 11 have waited long
enough. We need to have answers. We need to have
accountability. We need to feel safe living and working in this
great nation.
On May 17, 2002, National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice
stated, ``I don't think anybody could have predicted that these
people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade
Center, that they would try to use an airplane as a missile--a
hijacked airplane as a missile.'' The historical facts
illustrate differently.
In 1993, a $150,000 study was commissioned by the Pentagon
to investigate the possibility of an airplane being used to
bomb national landmarks. A draft document of this was
circulated throughout the Pentagon, the Justice Department, and
to FEMA.
In 1994, a disgruntled FedEx employee invaded the cockpit
of a DC10 with plans to crash it into a company building.
Again, in 1994, a lone pilot crashed a small plane into a tree
on the White House grounds. Again, in 1994, an Air France
flight was hijacked by members of the Armed Islamic Group with
the intent to crash the plane into the Eiffel Tower.
In January, 1995, Philippine authorities investigating
Abdul Murad, an Islamic terrorist, unearthed Project Bojinka.
Project Bojinka's primary objective was to blow up 11 airliners
over the Pacific. In the alternative, several planes were to be
hijacked and flown into civilian targets in the United States.
Among the targets mentioned were CIA headquarters, the World
Trade Center, the Sears Tower, and the White House.
Murad told U.S. intelligence officials that he would board
any American commercial aircraft pretending to be an ordinary
passenger and that he would then hijack the aircraft, control
its cockpit, and dive it at CIA headquarters. In 1997, this
plot resurfaced during the trial of Ramzi Yousef, the
mastermind behind the 1993 bombings of the World Trade Center.
During the trial, FBI agents testified that, ``The plan
targeted not only the CIA, but other U.S. government buildings
in Washington, including the Pentagon.''
In September 1999, a report, ``The Sociology and Psychology
of Terrorism,'' was prepared for U.S. intelligence by the
Federal Research Division, an arm of the Library of Congress.
It stated, ``Suicide bombers belonging to al-Qa'ida's martyrdom
battalion could crash-land an aircraft packed with high
explosives into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the CIA, or
the White House.'' Again, that was in September, 1999.
This laundry list of historical indicators, in no way
exhaustive, illustrates that long before September 11, the
American Intelligence Community had a significant amount of
information about specific terrorist threats to commercial
airline travel in America, including the possibility that a
plane would be used as a weapon.
On March 11, 2002, Director of the CIA George Tenet stated,
``In broad terms last summer that terrorists might be planning
major operations in the United States, but we never had the
texture, meaning enough information to stop what happened.''
On May 8 2002, Director of the FBI Robert Mueller stated,
``There was nothing the agency could have done to anticipate or
prevent the attacks.''
Once again, the historical facts indicate differently.
Throughout the spring and early summer of 2001, intelligence
agencies flooded the government with warnings of possible
terrorist attacks against American targets, including
commercial aircraft, by al-Qa'ida and other groups. The
warnings were vague, but sufficiently alarming to prompt the
FAA to issue four information circulars to the commercial
airline industry between June 22 and July 31 warning of
possible terrorism.
On June 22, the military's Central and European commands
enforced force protection condition delta, the highest anti-
terrorist alert.
On June 28, 2001, National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice
said, ``It is highly likely that a significant al-Qa'ida attack
is in the near future within several weeks.''
As of July 31, the FAA urged U.S. airlines to maintain a
``high degree of alertness.'' One FAA circular from late July,
2001, noted, according to Condoleeza Rice, that there was, ``No
specific target, no credible information of attack to U.S.
civil aviation interests, but that terror groups are known to
be planning and training for hijackings, and we ask you
therefore to use caution.''
Two counterterrorism officials described the alerts of the
early and mid-summer 2001 as ``the most urgent in decades.''
One thing remains clear from this history: Our intelligence
agencies were acutely aware of an impending domestic risk posed
by al-Qa'ida. A question that remains unclear is how many lives
could have been saved had this information been made more
public. Airport security officials could have gone over all the
basics again of the steps needed to prevent hijackings. The
policy allowing passengers to carry razors and knives with
blades of up to four inches in length certainly could have come
under scrutiny.
Indeed, officials could have issued an emergency directive
prohibiting such potential weapons in carry-on bags. Finally,
all selectees under the computer-assisted passenger
prescreening system, and their carry-on luggage and checked
bags, could have been subjected to additional screening.
Apparently, none were on September 11, although internal FAA
documents do indicate that CAPPS selected some of the
hijackers.
And how many victims may have thought twice before boarding
an aircraft? How many victims would have chosen to fly on
private planes? How many victims would have taken notice of
these Middle Eastern men while they were boarding their plane?
Could these men have been stopped? Going further, how many
vigilant employees would have chosen to immediately flee Tower
Two after they witnessed the blazing inferno in Tower One if
only they had known that an al-Qa'ida terrorist attack was
imminent? Could the devastation of September 11 been diminished
in any degree had the government's information been made public
in the summer of 2001?
On July 5, 2001, the government's top counterterrorism
official, Richard Clarke, stated to a group gathered at the
White House, ``Something really spectacular is going to happen
here, and it's going to happen soon.'' The group included the
FAA, the Coast Guard, the FBI, the Secret Service, and the INS.
Clarke directed every counterterrorist office to cancel
vacations, defer non-vital travel, put off scheduled exercises,
and place domestic rapid response teams on much shorter alert.
For six weeks, last summer, at home and abroad, the U.S.
government was at its highest possible state of readiness
against imminent terrorist attack.
A senior FBI official attending the White House meeting on
July 5, 2001, committed the Bureau to redouble contacts with
its foreign counterparts and to speed up transcription and
analysis of wiretaps obtained under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, among other steps. But when the field agent
in Phoenix, Arizona reported the suspicions of a hijacking plot
just five days later, the FBI did not share the report with any
other agency. One must ask why.
That report, written by Agent Kenneth Williams, now well-
known as the Phoenix memo, recommended that the FBI investigate
whether al-Qa'ida operatives were training at U.S. flight
schools. Williams posited that Usama bin Ladin followers might
be trying to infiltrate the civil aviation system as pilots,
security guards, or other personnel. He recommended a national
program to track suspicious flight school students. Agent
Williams was dead on point.
But in the summer of 2001, while our nation was at its
highest state of alert, his memo was flatly ignored. And what
result if it hadn't been ignored? What if his memo was promptly
placed on INTELINK, SIPRNET or NIPRNET? What if other agents
had the same suspicions in Florida, California, Georgia, Ohio,
and Nevada? Could the terrorists have been stopped?
On August 15, 2001 an alert civilian instructor at a
Minnesota flight school called the FBI and said, ``Do you
realize that a 747 loaded with fuel can be a bomb?'' The next
day, Zacharias Moussaoui was arrested. After investigating
Moussaoui's past, the FBI, with the help of French
intelligence, learned that he had Islamic extremist
connections. They also knew that he was interested in flight
patterns around New York City, and that he had a strong desire
to fly big jets, even though at the time he didn't have so much
as a license to fly a Cessna.
And then what happened? The FBI office in Minnesota
attempted to get a FISA warrant, but they were rebuffed, a
crucial mistake, because Zacharias Moussaoui's possessions
contained evidence that would have exposed key elements of the
September 11 plot. Why was this request denied? Again, the
historical facts must be analyzed. In March, 2001, an internal
debate ignited at the Justice Department and the FBI over wire-
tap surveillance of certain terrorist groups. Prompted by
questions raised by Royce C. Lamberth, the chief judge of the
FISA court, the Justice Department opened an inquiry into
Michael Resnik, an FBI official who coordinated the Act's
applications.
Attorney General John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller, then
Deputy Attorney General, ordered a full review of all foreign
surveillance authorizations. Again, this was in March, 2001.
Justice Department and FBI officials have since acknowledged
the existence of this internal investigation and said that the
inquiry forced officials to examine their monitoring of several
suspected terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida. And while
senior FBI and Justice Department officials contend that the
internal investigation did not affect their ability to monitor
al-Qa'ida, other officials have acknowledged that the inquiry
might have hampered electronic surveillance of terror groups.
The matter remains highly classified. What is not classified is
that in early September, a Minnesota FBI agent wrote an
analytic memo on Zacharias Moussaoui's case, theorizing that
the suspect could fly a plane into the World Trade Center.
Tragically, this too was ignored.
Also ignored by U.S. intelligence agencies was the enormous
amount of trading activity on the Chicago Exchange Board and in
overseas markets. Our intelligence agencies readily use PROMIS
software to analyze these kinds of market indicators that
presented themselves in the weeks prior to September 11. Why
were these aberrational trades and market swings ignored? We
were at the highest state of alert, an attack by al-Qa'ida was
expected to occur at any given moment, and yet massive amounts
of trade occurred on American Airlines, United Airlines,
reinsurance companies and lease holders in the World Trade
Center, and none of our watchdogs noticed.
Perhaps even more disturbing is the information regarding
Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, two of the hijackers. In
late August 2001, the CIA asked the INS to put these two men on
a watch list because of their ties to the bombing of the USS
Cole. On August 23, 2001, the INS informed the CIA that both
men had already slipped into this country.
Immediately thereafter, the CIA asked the FBI to find al-
Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, not a seemingly hard task in light of the
fact that one of them was listed in the San Diego phone book,
the other took out a bank account in his own name, and finally
we have recently come to find out that an FBI informant
happened to be their roommate. But again, our intelligence
agencies failed.
It was only after the devastation of September 11 that our
intelligence agencies seemed to get back on track. On September
12, 2001, the New York Times reported, ``On Tuesday, a few
hours after the attacks, FBI agents descended on flight
schools, neighborhoods and restaurants in pursuit of leads. The
FBI arrived at Huffman Aviation at about 2:30 a.m. Wednesday
morning. They walked out with all of the school's records,
including photocopies of the men's passports.''
The New York Times also reported that day that students at
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University said that, ``within hours
of the attacks, FBI investigators were seen,'' at their school.
How did the FBI know exactly where to go only a few hours after
the attacks? How did they know which neighborhoods, which
flight schools and which restaurants to investigate so soon in
the case?
The New York Times went on to report on September 12 that,
``Federal agents questioned employees at a store in Bangor,
Maine, where five Arab men believed to be the hijackers tried
to rent cell phones late last week. Store employees at first
refused to sell the phones because the men lacked proper
identification, but they gave in after the five offered $3,000
cash to store employees, an airport official said.''
The September 12 article goes on to state, ``The men then
phoned Bangor Airport trying to get a flight to Boston, but
were told that there was no flight that matched their desired
departure time. The men then phoned Portland International
Jetport, where two of them apparently made reservations for a
flight to Boston on Tuesday morning.''
How would this information be gleaned so quickly? How would
the FBI know to visit a store in Bangor, Maine, only hours
after the attacks? Moreover, how would they know the details of
a phone conversation that occurred a week prior to the attacks?
Were any of the hijackers already under surveillance?
It has been widely reported that the hijackers ran practice
runs on the airline routes that were chosen on September 11.
Did our intelligence agents ever shadow these men on any of
their prior practice runs?
Furthermore, on September 12, the New York Times reported
that, ``Authorities said they had also identified accomplices
in several cities who had helped plan and execute Tuesday's
attacks. Officials said they knew who these people were and
important biographical details about many of them. They
prepared biographies of each identified member of the hijack
teams, and began tracing the recent movements of the men.''
How are complete biographies of the terrorists, and their
accomplices, created in such short time? Did our intelligence
agencies already have open files on these men ? Were they
already investigating them? Could the attacks of September 11
been prevented?
The speed by which the FBI was able to locate, assimilate
and analyze a small amount of information so soon after the
attacks, barely one day later, perhaps answers this question
for itself.
But if the terrorists were under investigation, then why
were they ever permitted to board those planes? Perhaps even
more potently, why, if such an investigation was already under
way, was our nation so late in responding to the emergency that
quickly unfolded that morning?
Too many questions remain. Topping the list of unanswered
questions are those that involve our nation's coordination,
communication and response to the attacks that morning. The 24
hours that presented themselves on September 11 beg to be
examined. Questions like, why did the New York Port Authority
not evacuate the World Trade Center when they had an open phone
line with Newark Air Traffic Control Center and were told that
the second plane was bearing down on the South Tower? New York/
New Jersey Port Authority had at least 11 minutes of notice to
begin evacuations of the South Tower. An express elevator in
the World Trade Center was able to travel from top to bottom in
one minute's time. How many lives may have been saved had the
Port Authority acted more decisively or, rather, acted at all?
Washington Air Traffic Control Center knew about the first
plane before it hit the World Trade Center, yet the third plane
was able to fly loop-the-loops over Washington, DC, one hour
and 45 minutes after Washington Center first knew about the
hijackings. After circling in this restricted airspace,
controlled and protected by the Secret Service, who had an open
phone line to the FAA, how is it possible that that plane was
then able to crash into the Pentagon? Why was the Pentagon not
evacuated? Why was our Air Force so late in its response? What,
if anything, did our nation do in a defensive military posture
that morning?
Three thousand innocent Americans were killed on September
11, leaving behind families and loved ones like myself and my
daughter. There are too many heartbreaking stories to recount.
There are too many lost opportunities and futures to be told.
But what can be said to you today is that the families continue
to suffer each and every day. All we have are tears and a
resolve to find the answers, because we continue to look into
the eyes of our young children, who ask us, ``Why?''
We have an obligation, as parents and as a nation, to
provide these young children with answers as to why their
mother or father or aunt or uncle or grandmother or grandfather
never returned from work that day. We need people to be held
accountable for their failures. We need leaders with the
courage to take responsibility for what went wrong.
Mistakes were made, and too many lives were lost. We must
investigate these errors so that they will never happen again.
It is our responsibility as a nation to turn the dark events of
September 11 into something from which we can all learn and
grow so as a nation we can look forward to a safe future.
In closing, I would like to add one thought. Undoubtedly,
each of you here today, because you live and work in
Washington, DC, must have felt that you were in the bullseye on
the morning of September 11. For most of you, there was a
relief at the end of that day, a relief that you and your loved
ones were in safe hands. You were the lucky ones. In your
continuing investigation, please do not forget those of us who
did share in your good fate. Thank you.
[Applause.]
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Ms. Breitweiser for a moving,
inspirational and highly motivating statement. Thank you.
Ms. Breitweiser. Thank you.
Chairman Graham. Mr. Stephen Push.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Push follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN PUSH, CO-FOUNDER AND TREASURER OF FAMILIES
OF SEPTEMBER 11TH
Mr. Push. Chairmen Graham and Goss, Ranking Minority
Members Shelby and Pelosi, and members of the Senate and House
Intelligence Committees, I would like to thank you and also
thank the joint 9/11 inquiry staff for the vital work that you
have been doing to understand the problems of the intelligence
agencies and take steps to correct them. I appreciate the hard
work that you and your staff are doing to ensure that our loved
ones have not died in vain.
I would also like to thank you for inviting Kristen and me
to testify before you today. I realize that your decision was
not popular with the bureaucrats in the Intelligence Community,
but the victims' families greatly appreciate the opportunity to
have their voices heard on the important work of your inquiry.
Our loved ones paid the ultimate price for the worst
American intelligence failure since Pearl Harbor. I hope that
Kristen and I can do justice to their sacrifice and contribute
in some small way to preventing other families from
experiencing the immeasurable pain that accompanies such a
tragic loss.
While I eagerly await the final report of your inquiry, one
thing is already clear to me from the news reports about the
intelligence failures that led to the attacks: If the
Intelligence Community had been doing its job, my wife, Lisa
Raines, would be alive today. She was a passenger on flight 77,
the plane that was crashed into the Pentagon.
I realize that preventing terrorism is a very difficult
task, and that we will never achieve complete safety. But a
series of missteps that defy common sense made the attack on
the Pentagon possible.
In January of 2000, the Central Intelligence Agency learned
that two Saudi nationals, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and Khalid al-Mihdhar
attended an al-Qa'ida meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Thanks to the
infamous stovepiping of information in the Intelligence
Community, these two men, who were to become two of the
hijackers on flight 77, were not immediately placed on the
terrorism watch list, and they were allowed to enter the United
States.
Shortly after the bombing of the USS Cole in October of
2000, the CIA discovered that one of the men photographed with
al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in Kuala Lumpur was a suspect in the
Cole attack. But still the two suspected terrorists in the
United States did not appear on the watch list. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation seems to have been unaware of him, even
though they lived with an FBI informant during part of their
time in this country.
The two suspects were finally added to the watch list on
August 23, 2000, but on September 11, they were able to board
flight 77 using their real names. I don't know why they called
it a watch list; apparently no one was watching them.
After the Kuala Lumpur meeting, al-Hazmi had at least three
meetings with Hani Hanjour, the terrorist believed to have
piloted flight 77. I am convinced that had the CIA and the FBI
displayed any initiative, al-Hazmi, al-Mihdhar and Hanjour
would have been apprehended. With the loss of three hijackers,
including the pilot, flight 77 would not have been hijacked and
the lives of the 184 people murdered in the Pentagon attack
would have been saved.
What's more, Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of the 9/11
conspiracy and the pilot of the first plane to hit the World
Trade Center, attended one of the meetings between Al-Hazmi and
Hanjour. Thus it's possible, if not likely, that surveillance
of Al-Hazmi could have led to surveillance of Atta and
discovery of the other terrorists involved in the conspiracy.
In fact, the FBI, in an apparent attempt to pin the blame for
9/11 on the CIA, reportedly developed a chart that showed how
timely access of the information about Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar
would have enabled the FBI to foil the entire
9/11 plot.
I won't belabor the argument about the possibility of
preventing the 9/11 attacks. A number of intelligence experts
have said that preventive work is easier said than done. I
don't know if that's a fair excuse, but one conclusion is
incontestable: The 9/11 attacks exposed serious shortcomings in
the American Intelligence Community. Or, to state this fact
more precisely, the attack exposed these flaws to the wider
public. Many of the flaws have been known to intelligence
professionals, to your two Committees and to a succession of
commissions for years.
In voicing these complaints it is not my intention to
malign the field officers, agents, analysts, technicians and
others serving their country in the intelligence agencies. I'm
sure that most of them are very competent and dedicated people.
But in many cases they seem to be stymied by a bloated, risk-
averse and politicized intelligence bureaucracy that is more
interested in protecting its turf than in protecting America.
Initially, I thought 9/11 would be a wake-up call for the
Intelligence Community, but I was mistaken. The intelligence
agencies and the White House have asserted that no mistakes
were made. They couldn't possibly have conceived that anyone
would use commercial jets in suicide attacks on buildings. They
asserted that al-Qa'ida is impossible to penetrate.
Such a can't-do attitude is profoundly un-American. It also
raises the question of why taxpayers should continue to spend
tens of billions of dollars annually on the Intelligence
Community if it cannot protect us.
The following anecdote suggests that little has changed at
the FBI since 9/11. Three years ago, a female flight attendant
for an American airline was assaulted in flight in front of a
witness by a male flight attendant wielding a knife that the
female flight attendant described at the time as looking like a
box cutter. The assailant had bragged to this flight attendant
about how he regularly smuggled the knife past security. The
woman reported the incident immediately, but the airline
dropped the case without explanation.
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the female flight
attendant, noting the parallels between her assailant and the
hijackers, reported the incident to the FBI. An agent
interviewed her, but later told her that the FBI couldn't find
the male flight attendant because he no longer worked for the
airline.
I had a private investigator, yesterday, do a search for me
using public databases, and within a matter of a few hours he
was able to tell me the current address of this male flight
attendant and also report to me that he is indeed still an
employee of the airline in question.
Nearly a year later, the female flight attendant grew
frustrated and asked her Congressman to investigate. The
Congressman sent the request, including the original incident
report describing the weapon and the assault, to FBI
headquarters. Within a few weeks the woman received a letter
from the FBI explaining that the matter fell outside the
Bureau's jurisdiction.
I find this response unacceptable, not only because
assaulting an airline crew member in flight is a federal
offense, but also because a violent man who smuggles knives
onto planes should have received more attention from the FBI
than this man apparently did.
The time for incremental reform of the Intelligence
Community ended on September 11, 2001. The ossified
intelligence bureaucracy must now be thoroughly restructured.
If it isn't, the next attack may involve weapons of mass
destruction, and the death toll may be in the tens of
thousands, or even hundreds of thousands.
I urge you, please, seriously consider making the following
changes in the Intelligence Community.
One, put someone in charge of intelligence. Stovepiping is
an inevitable consequence of competition among agencies. Only a
strong leader with authority over all of the intelligence
agencies can force them to share information. In principle,
this is the President's job, but he has limited time to spend
on intelligence. There should be a Cabinet-level official with
authority over all of the intelligence agencies.
Two, establish a new domestic intelligence agency similar
to Britain's MI-5. This agency would have no law enforcement
powers, and would work with the FBI when criminal
investigations and arrests were necessary. The FBI would retain
a small intelligence unit to serve as a liaison with the
Intelligence Community. Domestic intelligence professionals can
not flourish in a culture that rewards people for the number of
cases solved or the number of arrests made.
Three, develop closer links with state and local law
enforcement agencies. There are 700,000 state and local law
enforcement officers who can provide help by providing the
Intelligence Community with raw intelligence and by acting on
threat assessments issued by the federal government.
Four, create a new clandestine service. Human intelligence
has become a lost art at the CIA. A new clandestine service
should be established and must be protected from second-
guessing by the risk-averse, politicized bureaucracy.
Five, share more intelligence with other countries.
American intelligence agencies have obtained much valuable
intelligence from foreign intelligence services. But the
American agencies have a reputation for not reciprocating. If
we want to maintain the flow of information from these other
services, we must be more generous with the information we
provide them.
Six, require all intelligence reports to be uploaded
immediately to INTELINK, the Intelligence Community secret
online database. This will help foster information exchange at
all levels of the Intelligence Community.
Seven, reorient the National Security Agency to be a hunter
of information rather than a gatherer. The volume of electronic
communications has grown exponentially, to the point where
intercepts cannot be translated in a timely manner. We've all
read about the two intercepts on September 10 that warned of
something to happen on September 11 that were translated on
September 12. The agency must learn to focus its resources on
those communications links most likely to yield information
about terrorist threats.
Eight, upgrade technical intelligence. The proliferation of
new communications technologies has hampered the NSA's ability
to intercept messages. Some of the nation's best scientists and
engineers should be assigned to a Manhattan Project-style
program aimed at making breakthroughs in new technologies for
monitoring electronic communications.
Nine, set up a separate oversight subcommittee specifically
for intelligence on terrorism.
While this is by no means an exhaustive list, I believe it
addresses some of the most urgent problems in the Intelligence
Community. Whether you decide to accept or reject these
specific recommendations, I hope you will agree that the
monumental tragedy of 9/11 requires changes far more sweeping
than the reform measures that have been implemented in recent
years.
Finally, I join Kristen in urging Congress to establish an
independent commission to study the events surrounding the 9/11
attacks. While the work of your inquiry is invaluable, it has
become clear that you cannot complete a thorough, comprehensive
investigation by the end of the 107th Congress. And also there
are other 9/11 issues other than intelligence that should be
investigated by an independent commission, such as law
enforcement, border control and immigration policy, diplomacy,
transportation security and the flow of assets to terrorists.
In conclusion, I would like to thank you again for offering
the
9/11 families this opportunity to have our voices and the
voices of our loved ones heard on these very important issues.
[Applause.]
Chairman Graham. Mr. Push, thank you very much for that
very informative statement, and your specific recommendations.
They will be taken fully into account throughout the completion
of our inquiry.
Mr. Push. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Graham. Thank you very much. The panel is
dismissed.
Again, we extend our thanks and appreciation to Ms.
Breitweiser and to Mr. Push and to all the families who are
with us today. You are a reminder of why we are undertaking
this inquiry. You are a challenge for us to fully fulfill our
obligation.
Ms. Eleanor Hill, staff director of the Joint Inquiry
Committee.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hill and supporting
documents follow:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT OF ELEANOR HILL, STAFF DIRECTOR, JOINT INQUIRY
COMMITTEE
Ms. Hill. Good morning, Chairman Graham, Chairman Goss,
Members of the Committees. Before I proceed with my statement,
I have a long written statement which I would like to submit
for the record, and I'm going to orally summarize it, given the
length of what we have here.
Chairman Graham. The full statement will appear in the
record.
Ms. Hill. Thank you.
Before I get into the main part of the statement, I do want
to make clear to you and members of the committees that the
information that's in this statement that we're going to
present this morning has been cleared for public release. As I
think most of you know, much of the information that our staff
has been working on over the last several months is obviously
highly classified or has been highly classified.
In the course of the last two months, we have been working
with the Intelligence Community in a long and what I would call
very arduous process to declassify much of the information that
we have reviewed and that we believe is important to the
public's understanding of why the Intelligence Community did
not know of the September 11 attacks in advance.
And I would point out that that process--we want to say for
the record that we appreciate the many long hours that have
been put into that process and what I believe for the most part
has been very constructive cooperation with the Executive
branch on that process. A good number of professionals from the
community have been brought together in working groups and have
gone over with our staff the details of this information to put
it in a form where it could be released publicly. So we have
made very good progress.
But I do need to report that by late last night we were
able to resolve all but two issues where we believe relevant
information to the inquiry has not yet, despite our discussions
with the Executive branch, been declassified. And I want to
make reference to those two issues because this statement has
been prepared recognizing that those two areas remain
classified.
The two areas are any references to the Intelligence
Community providing information to the President or the White
House, and the identity of, and information on, a key al-Qa'ida
leader involved in the September 11 attacks.
According to the White House and the DCI--Director of
Central Intelligence--the President's knowledge of intelligence
information relevant to this inquiry remains classified, even
when the substance of that intelligence information has been
declassified.
With respect to the key al-Qa'ida leader involved in the
September 11 attacks, I am advised this morning that the White
House and not the DCI has declined to declassify his identity
despite an enormous volume of media reporting on this
individual that has been out there for some time.
The Joint Inquiry staff disagrees on both of those issues.
We believe the public has an interest in this information and
that public disclosure would not harm national security.
However, as I believe you know, we do not have the
independent authority to declassify intelligence information
short of a lengthy procedure in the U.S. Congress, and we
therefore have prepared this statement without detailed
descriptions of our work in those two areas.
Mr. Roemer. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Graham. Mr. Roemer?
Mr. Roemer. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.
Chairman Graham. Mr. Roemer?
Mr. Roemer. Are the Committees bound by the classification
decisions made in these two instances?
Chairman Graham. It is our advice from staff director and
counsel that we do not independently have the authority to
declassify material, and therefore we are constrained by the
decisions made by those who have that legal responsibility.
Mr. Roemer. A further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
Is there a process then that either the Committee or the
Congress can undertake to challenge a classification decision
such as that?
Chairman Graham. The answer is yes, and I would like--Ms.
Hill alluded to the fact that there was such a process. I think
she described it as being cumbersome. If you or counsel might
briefly explain what the option is to Congress.
Ms. Hill. Mr. Chairman, I am not an expert on the Committee
process regarding declassification. As I understand it, from
speaking with the full Committee counsel on this, it would
require the Congress to vote. I'm not sure if it's the full
Congress or the Senate or House, but there's a vote involved.
The Congress itself would have to override that classification
decision.
We did not originate this information, and under the
classification system, the agency that originates it makes the
classification and declassifies it, and in this case, that
would not be the Congress. So the only alternative would be to
go through what I am told is a lengthy, rather prolonged
process.
I should point out that right before the hearing this
morning I was advised by the White House that they were going
to look at these two issues again and they thought they would
review it again within the next 48 hours. And I advised them
that if their position changes, please advise the committees
and we could always issue a supplemental statement on those two
issues for the record. So my assumption is they are still
reviewing it.
Mr. Roemer. Final parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman. Does
the Chairman intend to have this Committee consider or debate
that kind of process? I'm not advocating that we challenge it
at this point, but certainly understanding more from the Joint
Inquiry staff that strongly disagrees with the decision as to
why might be helpful in a deliberative sense for the committee.
Chairman Graham. I think there are two questions in your
inquiry. One is whether we might consider utilizing the
currently existing process in this or future instances in which
we have a disagreement as to whether the information which is
being withheld is, in fact, classified information--i.e., that
it relates to the national security.
Second question might be, as part of our final report, we
might want to recommend to our colleagues a change in the law
that relates to the congressional role in declassification so
that it would be more available as an alternative in the event
that there was a disagreement between Congress and an executive
classifying agency.
Mr. Roemer. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I hope we do
have a robust discussion of this, and I appreciate your
patience.
Ms. Pelosi. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Graham. Yes, Ms. Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join you in your earlier comments commending
Eleanor Hill and Rick Cinquegrana and the Joint Inquiry staff
for their fine work. And I want to inquire if it's possible,
just on this point, that the parliamentary inquiry that Mr.
Roemer brought up, if Ms. Hill could just clarify.
It says, ``Any reference to the Intelligence Community
providing information to the president or the White House.''
Could you give us an example of that?
Ms. Hill. What we're referring to is, and it's clear as you
go through this statement that I'm about to present, that we
are talking about a number of intelligence reports, which we
have had declassified through this process. And part of our
role was not just looking at what was the reporting, but where
the reporting went.
And you will note that this statement includes many
intelligence reports and in some instances says they were
provided to senior government officials--I believe that is the
wording that's used--but there's no reference on any of the
pages as to whether the President received that information or
not. And we have been told that that information--in other
words, not what is in the report, but rather whether or not it
went to the President--would be classified under this decision.
Ms. Pelosi. And when you say the President, you mean any
President.
Ms. Hill. That's correct. And clearly if you look at this
statement, the reporting is not just reporting that would have
been under the current administration, but also reporting that
was made under the prior administration. And the decision, in
fairness, obviously, to the White House is not simply as to
this sitting President, but as to any President.
Ms. Pelosi. Well, I would hope, Mr. Chairman, whoever's
presiding here, that Mr. Roemer's comments will be taken
seriously by the Chairmen and that the committee should
consider the options under existing Committee rules to make
this information public, depending on how it goes in the next
48 hours. I think that the White House should be aware that
there is strong interest among many of us to have this be the
most open process possible in fairness to those families who
are affected, we heard from this morning, and really in the
interest of a democratic society.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LaHood. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss [presiding]. Chairman Graham had to step out
for a moment. He'll be back. But I assure you, Ms. Pelosi, that
he will be attentive to that request, as will I.
Is it a point of inquiry or on this matter?
Mr. LaHood. On this matter.
Chairman Goss. Mr. LaHood.
Mr. LaHood. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the two Chairmen
could approach the White House within the next 48 hours since
they have this under consideration to encourage them to make
this information public and to relay the will of--I believe
it's the will of the joint committee that, based on what our
staff director has said, that this information is important to
be released. And it sounds like they're trying to make a
political decision. And the joint committee would encourage
them to release the information.
I say that because it's under consideration. And I think
it's important, particularly given the testimony that was
provided by the first two witnesses. Thank you.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Mr. LaHood. I assure that this is
not a matter of first impression for the two Chairmen or
actually the four of us. We have made this case before.
And just so all members of the committee and the public
will know, there are approximately three generalized areas that
we feel there is legitimacy to withhold information to the
public. Otherwise we feel the burden is on the administration
to prove to us why we should not give it to the public. We take
the position the public deserves it.
Those three exceptions are, of course, sources of methods,
particularly those are still active; plans and intentions that
would be involving any actions we might take, which might put
our personnel at harm by giving advance information about what
they're up to; and the third area is in the active prosecutions
ongoing by the Department of Justice. We don't want to in any
way mess up a prosecution that is going forward by saying
something inadvertent that would create a problem for the
prosecution.
I think other than those three areas the public has a right
to know and a need to know. Because part of the reason we're
going public here is the awareness curve of what this enemy
looks like, what they can do to us, and why we need to have a
better system and why we are going to be asking for the support
of our constituency, the American people, to give us a better
intelligence system and all that that means.
I hope that's a satisfactory answer. And your request is
duly noted and will be dealt with.
Would you please proceed, after I advise the Members that
we have about 12 minutes left on a vote in the House? Is it one
vote or two? Do we know? I believe it is one vote. Do the
members of the Senate wish to continue.
Senator Feinstein. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Yes, Senator.
Senator Feinstein. Might I ask a question? Will there be a
brief recess over the lunch hour for those of us that have
commitments?
Chairman Goss. It had been intended that there would not
be. And I would suggest that when Senator Graham comes back
that you confer with him on that.
The Members of the House are now going to vote. And we will
be away for about 20 minutes. And perhaps in that time you can
decide how you wish to carry forward.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Mr. Chairman, do you want us to wait
and suspend the hearing, because you won't have the benefit of
her testimony?
Chairman Goss. What is the view of the Members? Do you want
them to suspend or----
Vice Chairman Shelby. Until you get back. I think so.
Chairman Graham [presiding]. Okay. We'll take a suspension
until you return. The hearing will suspend until the members of
the House return.
[Whereupon, from 11:38 a.m. until 12:04 p.m., the hearing
recessed.]
Chairman Graham. I call the hearing back to order.
Ms. Eleanor Hill was in the early stages of providing us
with the report of the Joint Inquiry staff. For purposes of
people's schedules, it is our plan, after Ms. Hill completes
her statement, to then call upon Members in the order in which
they arrived for five minutes of either questions or comments.
I recognize that we'll be running through the lunch hour.
If Members have to leave for previous commitments or the pangs
of hunger become overwhelming, they are encouraged to do so,
but also encouraged to return so that they can have their
opportunity to ask questions or make their comments.
Ms. Hill.
Ms. Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feinstein. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, could you read
the list so we might know where we are?
Chairman Graham. Yes, ma'am. After the Chairs and Vice
Chairs, they are, in this order, Senator DeWine, Congressman
Boehlert, Senator Wyden, Congressman Bereuter, Congressman
Bishop, Senator Levin, Senator Inhofe, Congressman Peterson,
Congressman Kramer, Congressman Boswell, Congressman Castle,
Congressman Roemer, Congresswoman Harman, Congressman Burr,
Senator Bayh, Senator Rockefeller, Senator Feinstein, Senator
Mikulski, Congressman LaHood, Congressman Hoekstra, Senator
Edwards, Congressman Gibbons, Congressman Everett.
Mr. Hoekstra. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Yes.
Mr. Hoekstra. Would it be appropriate to ask unanimous
consent of the members that if individuals do have to leave, if
they have statements that they could be included as part of the
record?
Chairman Graham. They will be included in the record.
Mr. Hoekstra. I thank the Chair.
Chairman Graham. Are there any other comments before we
return to Ms. Hill?
Ms. Hill.
Ms. Hill. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Before I forget, I do want to ask that--we have two
versions of this statement. It's the same statement, but we
have two copies, one of which has been signed and certified as
releaseable, cleared for public release by the chair of the
declassification working group for the Intelligence Community,
and each page has been initialed by that individual.
And the second copy that I would also like to make
available and part of the record is a similar copy that was
signed and certified by the representative of the Department of
Justice and initialed, indicating that they agreed and
concurred that it was suitable for public release. Because, as
you know, the Justice Department has some litigation concerns
related to ongoing cases.
So I'd ask that those be made part of the record.
Chairman Graham. Without objection.
[The documents referred to contain classified information
and were made a part of the classified record and retained in
the files of the Joint Inquiry.]
Ms. Hill. I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today
to advise the Committees and the American public on the
progress to date of the Joint Inquiry staff's review of the
activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community in connection
with the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.
As the horror and sheer inhumanity of that day engulfed
this nation, all of us struggled with shock, with the utter
disbelief, and the inevitable search for answers. The
questions, if not the answers, were obvious. How could we have
been so surprised? What did our government, especially our
intelligence agencies, know before September 11, 2001? Why
didn't they know more? What can we do to strengthen and improve
the capabilities of our intelligence agencies and as a result
help save ourselves and our children from ever having to face
this again?
On February 14, 2002, the leadership of these two
Committees announced their resolve to come together to find
credible answers to those sobering but critically important
questions. The Committees joined in an unprecedented, bicameral
and bipartisan joint inquiry effort to meet that challenge. To
conduct the review, the Committees assembled a single staff,
that we call the Joint Inquiry staff, of 24 highly skilled
professionals with experience in such areas as intelligence
collection, analysis, management, law enforcement,
investigations and oversight.
My testimony this morning is intended to address the
inquiry's initial task, which was to conduct a factual review
of what the Intelligence Community knew or should have known
prior to September 11, 2001, regarding the international
terrorist threat to the United States.
I caution that the inquiry remains a work in progress, and
that we may be developing additional relevant information as
our work continues. That being said, we feel it is important to
share with the American people, through these hearings, what we
have found through our efforts to date.
Let me briefly describe the way in which we have approached
this review. We decided to target our search on categories of
information that would most likely yield any intelligence
material of relevance to the September 11 attacks.
Specifically, our teams requested and reviewed from the
Intelligence Community agencies these categories of
information: any information obtained before September 11
suggesting that an attack on the United States was imminent,
and what was done with it; any information obtained before
September 11 that should have alerted the Intelligence
Community to this kind of attack--that is, using airplanes to
attack buildings--and what was done with it; any information
obtained before September 11 about the 19 dead hijackers and
what was done with it; and any information obtained after
September 11 about the hijackers and their backgrounds,
including their involvement with al-Qa'ida, entry into this
country and activities while in this country, as well as why
they never came to the attention of the United States
Government.
And I would point out on the issue of the hijackers that we
do intend--we will not address that this morning, but we do
intend to have an additional statement at subsequent hearings
that are focused on that issue.
As part of this review of the evolution of the
international terrorist threat against the United States, the
Joint Inquiry staff produced a chronology that begins in 1982
and ends on September 11, 2001. And that chronology I believe
has been reproduced and handed out, and is also depicted on
these charts here in the room this morning.
And I would request that the chronology also be part of the
record.
Chairman Graham. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Hill. The chronology notes significant events in
international terrorism, significant counterterrorist actions
that were taken by the U.S. Government in response to the
threat, and information received by the Intelligence Community
that was potentially relevant to the September 11 attacks.
The chronology underscores several points regarding what
the U.S. Government, specifically the Intelligence Community,
knew about the international terrorist threat to the United
States and U.S. interests prior to September 11, 2001. And
these are those points.
September 11, while indelible in magnitude and in impact,
was by no means America's first confrontation with
international terrorism. While the nature of the threat has
evolved and changed over time, it has long been recognized that
United States interests were considered prime targets by
various international terrorist groups.
In response to a number of terrorist attacks on U.S.
interests abroad during the 1980s, the U.S. Government
initiated a focused effort against terrorism, including the
establishment by the director of Central Intelligence, William
Casey, of the Counterterrorism Center, or CTC, at CIA
headquarters in 1986. In 1996, 10 years later, the FBI created
its own counterterrorism center at FBI headquarters.
Both in terms of attempts and actual attacks, there was
considerable historical evidence prior to September 11 that
international terrorists had planned and were in fact capable
of conducting major terrorist strikes within the United States.
The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, the subsequent
discovery in 1993 of plots to bomb New York City landmarks, and
the arrest in 1999 during the millennium of an individual with
al-Qa'ida connections intending to bomb Los Angeles
International Airport should have erased any doubts, to the
extent they existed, about that point.
From 1994 through as late as August 2001, the Intelligence
Community had received information indicating that
international terrorists had seriously considered the use of
airplanes as a means of carrying out terrorist attacks. While
this method of attack had clearly been discussed in terrorist
circles, there was apparently little, if any, effort by
Intelligence Community analysts to produce any strategic
assessments of terrorists using aircraft as weapons.
Usama bin Ladin's role in international terrorism came to
the attention of the Intelligence Community in the early 1990s.
While bin Ladin as initially viewed as a financier of
terrorism, by 1996 the Intelligence Community was aware of his
involvement in directing terrorist acts, and had begun actively
collecting intelligence on him.
Bin Ladin's own words indicated a steadily escalating
threat. In August 1996, Usama bin Ladin issued a public fatwa,
or religious decree, authorizing attacks on Western military
targets in the Arabian peninsula. In February 1998, bin Ladin
issued another public fatwa authorizing and promoting attacks
on U.S. civilians and military personnel anywhere in the world.
Following the August 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in
East Africa, Intelligence Community leadership recognized how
dangerous bin Ladin's network was. In December 1998, Director
of Central Intelligence George Tenet provided written guidance
to his deputies at the CIA declaring in effect a ``war'' with
bin Ladin.
While counterterrorism was a resource priority from the
time of the DCI statement onward, it was competing with several
other intelligence priorities, such as nonproliferation.
Despite the DCI's declaration of war in 1998, there was no
massive shift in budget or reassignment of personnel to
counter-terrorism until after September 11, 2001.
By late 1998, the Intelligence Community had amassed a
growing body of information, though general in nature, and
lacking specific details on time and on place, indicating that
bin Ladin and the al-Qa'ida network intended to strike within
the United States. And concern about bin Ladin continued to
grow over time and reached peak levels in the spring and summer
of 2001, as the Intelligence Community faced increasing numbers
of reports of imminent al-Qa'ida attacks against U.S.
interests.
In July and August 2001, that rise in intelligence
reporting began to decrease, just as three additional
developments occurred in the United States--the Phoenix memo,
the detention of Zacarias Moussaoui, and the Intelligence
Community's realization that two individuals with ties to bin
Ladin's network, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, were
possibly in the United States.
The two individuals turned out to be two of the 19
hijackers on September 11. The Intelligence Community
apparently had not connected these individual warning flags to
each other, to the drum beat of threat reporting that had just
occurred, or to the urgency of the war effort against bin
Ladin.
Our review today provides further context for each of these
points. And my written statement addresses in great detail each
point. For purposes of this review, I'm going to focus not on
the historical sections, but rather on our review of more
recent intelligence reporting.
And the first point in that regard would be intelligence
reporting on bin Ladin's intentions to strike inside the United
States. Central to the September 11 plot was Usama bin Ladin's
idea of carrying out a terrorist operation within the United
States.
It has been suggested that prior to September 11, 2001,
information available to the Intelligence Community had, for
the most part, pointed to a terrorist threat against U.S.
interests abroad. Our review confirms that shortly after Usama
bin Ladin's May 1998 press conference, the Intelligence
Community began to acquire intelligence information indicating
that bin Ladin's network intended to strike within the United
States.
These intelligence reports, which I'll go through in a
minute, should be understood in their proper context. First,
they generally did not contain specific information as to
where, when and how a terrorist attack might occur, and
generally they are not corroborated by further information.
Second, these reports represented a small percentage of the
threat information that the Intelligence Community obtained
during this period, most of which pointed to the possibility of
attacks against U.S. interests overseas. Nonetheless, there was
a modest but relatively steady stream of intelligence
information indicating the possibility of terrorist attack
within the United States.
Third, the credibility of the sources providing this
information was sometimes questionable. While one could not, as
a result, give too much credence to some individual reports,
the totality of information in the body of reporting clearly
reiterated a consistent and critically important theme--bin
Ladin's intent to launch terrorist attacks inside the United
States.
And I will summarize several of these reports. And I should
stress again, these are in declassified versions. They have
been declassified.
In June 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained
information from several sources that bin Ladin was considering
attacks in the United States, including Washington, DC, and New
York. This information was provided to senior U.S. government
officials in July 1998.
In August 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained
information that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly
an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World
Trade Center. The information was passed to the FBI and the
FAA. The FAA found the plot highly unlikely, given the state of
that foreign country's aviation program. Moreover, they
believed that a flight originating outside the United States
would be detected before it reached its intended target inside
the United States. The FBI's New York office took no action on
the information, filing the communication in the office's
bombing repository file.
The Intelligence Community has acquired additional
information since then indicating there may be links between
this group and other terrorists groups, including al-Qa'ida.
In September 1998, the Intelligence Community prepared a
memorandum detailing al-Qa'ida infrastructure in the United
States, including the use of fronts for terrorist activity.
This information was provided to senior U.S. Government
officials in September 1998.
In September 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained
information that bin Ladin's next operation would possibly
involve flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S.
airport and detonating it. This information was provided to
senior U.S. Government officials in late 1998.
In October 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained
information that al-Qa'ida was trying to establish an operative
cell within the United States. This information indicated there
might be an effort under way to recruit U.S.-citizen Islamists
and U.S.-based expatriates from the Middle East and North
Africa.
In the fall of 1998, the Intelligence Community received
information concerning a bin Ladin plot involving aircraft in
the New York and Washington, DC, areas.
In November of 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained
information that a bin Ladin terrorist cell was attempting to
recruit a group of five to seven young men from the United
States to travel to the Middle East for training. This was in
conjunction with planning to strike U.S. domestic targets.
In November of 1998, the Intelligence Community received
information that bin Ladin and senior associates had agreed to
allocate reward money for the assassinations of four top
intelligence agency officers. The bounty for each assassination
was $9 million. The bounty was in response to the U.S.
announcement of an increase in the reward money for information
leading to the arrest of bin Ladin.
In the spring of 1999, the Intelligence Community obtained
information about a planned bin Ladin attack on a U.S.
government facility in Washington, DC.
In August 1999, the Intelligence Community obtained
information that bin Ladin's organization had decided to target
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence. ``Target'' was interpreted by
Intelligence Community analysts to mean assassinate.
In September 1999, the Intelligence Community obtained
information that bin Ladin and others were planning a terrorist
act in the United States, possibly against specific landmarks
in California and New York City. The reliability of the source
of this information was unknown.
In late 1999, the Intelligence Community obtained
information regarding the bin Ladin network's possible plans to
attack targets in Washington, D.C., and New York City during
the New Year's millennium celebrations.
On December 14, 1999, an individual named Ahmed Ressam was
arrested as he attempted to enter the United States from
Canada. An alert U.S. Customs Service officer in Port
Washington stopped Ressam and asked to search his vehicle.
Chemicals and detonator materials were found in his car.
Ressam's intended target was Los Angeles International Airport.
In February 2000, the Intelligence Community obtained
information that bin Ladin was making plans to assassinate U.S.
intelligence officials, including the Director of the FBI.
In March 2000, the Intelligence Community obtained
information regarding the types of targets that operatives in
bin Ladin's network might strike. The Statue of Liberty was
specifically mentioned, as were skyscrapers, ports, airports
and nuclear power plants.
In March 2000, the Intelligence Community obtained
information indicating bin Ladin was planning attacks in
specific West Coast areas, possibly involving the assassination
of several public officials. The Intelligence Community had
concerns that this information might have come from a source
known to fabricate information.
And in April 2001, the Intelligence Community obtained
information from a source with terrorist connections who
speculated that bin Ladin would be interested in commercial
pilots as potential terrorists. The source warned that the
United States should not focus only on embassy bombings, that
terrorists sought ``spectacular and traumatic'' attacks and
that the first World Trade Center bombing would be the type of
attack that would be appealing. The source did not mention a
time frame for any attack. Because the source was offering
personal speculation and not hard information, the information
was not disseminated within the Intelligence Community.
Bin Ladin's declaration of war in 1998 and intelligence
reports indicating possible terrorist plots inside the United
States did not go unnoticed by the Intelligence Community
which, in turn, advised senior officials in the U.S. Government
of the serious nature of the threat.
The staff has also reviewed documents other than individual
intelligence reports that demonstrate that, at least at senior
levels, the Intelligence Community understood that bin Ladin
posed a serious threat to the domestic United States.
Here are five examples. A December 1, 1998, Intelligence
Community assessment of Usama bin Ladin read, in part, ``UBL is
actively planning against U.S. targets. Multiple reports
indicate UBL is keenly interested in striking the U.S. on its
own soil. Al-Qa'ida is recruiting operatives for attacks in the
U.S. but has not yet identified potential targets.''
On December 4, 1998, in a memorandum to his deputies at the
CIA, the Director of Central Intelligence summed up the
situation in this way: ``We must now enter a new phase in our
effort against bin Ladin. Our work to date has been remarkable
and in some instances heroic. Yet each day we all acknowledge
that retaliation is inevitable and that its scope may be far
larger than we have previously experienced. We are at war. I
want no resources or people spared in this effort, either
inside CIA or the community.''
A classified document signed by a senior U.S. Government
official in December 1998, read, in part, ``The Intelligence
Community has strong indications that bin Ladin intends to
conduct or sponsor attacks inside the United States.''
In June 1999 testimony before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence and in a July 1999 briefing to House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence staffers, the Chief of the CTC
described reports that bin Ladin and his associates were
planning attacks in the United States.
And a classified document signed by a senior U.S.
Government official in July 1999, characterized bin Ladin's
February 1998 statement as, ``a de facto declaration of war''
on the United States.
What is less clear is the extent to which other parts of
the government, as well as the American people, understood and
fully appreciated the gravity and the immediacy of the threat.
For example, officials at the National Security Agency whom
we have interviewed were aware of DCI Tenet's December 1998
declaration that the Intelligence Community was at war with bin
Ladin. On the other hand, relatively few of the FBI agents
interviewed by the joint inquiry staff seem to have been aware
of DCI Tenet's declaration.
There was also considerable variation in the degree to
which FBI-led joint terrorism task forces, or JTTFs,
prioritized and coordinated field efforts targeting bin Ladin
and al-Qa'ida. While the FBI's New York office was the lead
office in the vast majority of counter terrorism investigations
concerning bin Ladin, many other FBI offices around the country
were unaware of the magnitude of the threat.
There are also indications that the allocation of
Intelligence Community resources after the DCI's December 1998
declaration did not adequately reflect a true war effort
against bin Ladin. In 1999, the CTC had only three analysts
assigned full time to bin Ladin's terrorist network worldwide.
After 2000, but before September 11, 2001, that number had
risen to five.
On a broader scale, our review has found little evidence
prior to September 11 of a sustained national effort to
mobilize public awareness and to harden the homeland against
the potential assault by bin Ladin within the United States,
with the possible exception of a heightened focus on weapons of
mass destruction.
The second point that I want to cover is strategic
warning--indications of a possible terrorist attack in the
spring and summer of 2001.
Let me briefly describe what we have found regarding the
level and the nature of threat information that was obtained by
the Intelligence Community during the spring and summer of
2001. During that time period, the community experienced a
significant rise in information indicating that bin Ladin and
al-Qa'ida intended to strike against United States interests in
the very near future.
Some individuals within the community have suggested that
the increase in threat reporting was unprecedented, at least in
terms of their own experience. While the reporting repeatedly
predicted dire consequences for Americans, it did not provide
actionable detail on when, where and how specific attacks would
occur.
Between late March and September 2001, the Intelligence
Community detected numerous indicators of an impending
terrorist attack, some of which pointed specifically to the
United States as a possible target.
In March 2001, an intelligence source claimed a group of
bin Ladin operatives were planning to conduct an unspecified
attack in the United States in April 2001. One of the
operatives allegedly resided within the United States.
In April 2001, the Intelligence Community obtained
information that unspecified terrorist operatives in California
and New York State were planning a terrorist attack in those
states for April.
Between May and July, the National Security Agency reported
at least 33 communications indicating a possible imminent
terrorist attack. None of these reports provided any specific
information on where, when or how an attack might occur, nor
was it clear that any of the individuals involved in these
intercepted communications had any firsthand knowledge of
where, when or how an attack might occur. If they did know, it
was not evident in the intercepts. These reports were widely
disseminated within the Intelligence Community.
In May 2001, the Intelligence Community obtained
information that supporters of bin Ladin were reportedly
planning to infiltrate the United States via Canada in order to
carry out a terrorist operation using high explosives. The
report mentioned an attack within the United States, though it
did not say where in the U.S., or when or how an attack might
occur.
In July 2001, this information was shared with the FBI, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Customs
Service and the State Department, and was included in a closely
held intelligence report for senior government officials in
August 2001.
In May 2001, the Department of Defense acquired and shared
with other elements of the Intelligence Community information
indicating that seven individuals associated with bin Ladin had
departed various locations for Canada, the United Kingdom and
the United States.
In June 2001, the DCI's CTC had information that key
operatives in Usama bin Ladin's organization were disappearing,
while others were preparing for martyrdom.
In July 2001, the DCI's CTC was aware of an individual who
had recently been in Afghanistan who had reported, ``everyone
is talking about an impending attack.'' The Intelligence
Community was also aware that bin Ladin had stepped up his
propaganda efforts in the preceding months.
On August 16, 2001, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, the INS
detained Zacharias Moussaoui. Prior to that date, in August
2001, Mr. Moussaoui's conduct had aroused suspicions about why
he was learning to fly large commercial aircraft, and had
prompted the flight school he was attending in Minneapolis to
contact the local FBI office. FBI agents believed that
Moussaoui may have been intending to carry out a terrorist act.
On August 23, 2001, the Intelligence Community requested
that two individuals, Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi, who
had first come to the attention of the community in 1999 as
possible associates of bin Ladin's terrorist network, be added
to the U.S. Department of State's watch list for denying visas
to individuals attempting to enter the United States.
Working levels of INS and U.S. Customs had determined that
at least one of them was likely in the United States, prompting
FBI headquarters to request searches for them in both New York
and Los Angeles. The FBI's New York field office unsuccessfully
searched for Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi. The FBI's Los Angeles
office received the search request on September 11, 2001.
In late summer 2001, the Intelligence Community obtained
information that an individual associated with al-Qa'ida was
considering mounting terrorist operations within the United
States. There was no information available as to the timing of
possible attacks or the alleged targets.
And on September 10, 2001, NSA intercepted two
communications between individuals abroad suggesting imminent
terrorist activity. These communications were not translated
into English and disseminated until September 12, 2001. These
intercepts did not provide any indication of where or what
activities might occur.
Despite these indicators of a possible terrorist attack
inside the United States, during the course of interviews the
Joint Inquiry staff was told that it was the general view of
the U.S. Intelligence Community in the spring and summer of
2001 that an attack on U.S. interests was more likely to occur
overseas. Individuals in the Intelligence Community pointed to
intelligence information, the arrests of suspected terrorists
in the Middle East and Europe and a credible report of a plan
to attack a U.S. embassy in the Middle East as factors that
shaped their thinking about where an attack was likely to
occur. One senior FBI official said that based on the
intelligence he was seeing, he thought there was a high
probability, ``98 percent,'' that the attack would occur
overseas.
During the summer of 2001 the Intelligence Community was
also disseminating information through appropriate channels to
senior U.S. government officials about possible terrorist
attacks.
For example, in June 2001, the community issued a terrorist
threat advisory warning U.S. Government agencies that there was
a high probability of an imminent terrorist attack against U.S.
interests by Sunni extremists associated with bin Ladin's al-
Qa'ida organization. The advisory mentioned the Arabian
peninsula, Israel and Italy as possible locations. According to
the advisory, the community continued to believe that Sunni
extremists associated with al-Qa'ida are most likely to attempt
spectacular attacks resulting in numerous casualties.
Subsequently, intelligence information provided to senior
U.S. government leaders indicated that bin Ladin's organization
expected near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences on
governments or cause major casualties. A briefing prepared for
senior government officials at the beginning of July 2001
contained the following language, ``Based on a review of all-
source reporting over the last five months, we believe that UBL
will launch a significant terrorist attack against U.S. and/or
Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be
spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against
U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been
made. Attack will occur with little or no warning.''
Later intelligence information provided to senior
government leaders indicated that bin Ladin's organization
continued to expect imminent attacks on U.S. interests.
The Joint Inquiry staff has been advised by a
representative of the Intelligence Community that about a month
later, in August 2001, a closely held intelligence report for
senior government officials included information that bin Ladin
had wanted to conduct attacks in the United States since 1997.
The information included discussion of the arrests of Ahmed
Ressam in December 1999 and the 1998 bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. It mentioned that members of
al-Qa'ida, including some U.S. citizens, had resided or
traveled in or traveled to the United States for years and that
the group apparently maintained a support structure here. The
report cited uncorroborated information obtained in 1998 that
bin Ladin wanted to hijack airplanes to gain the release of
U.S.-held extremists; FBI judgments about patterns of activity
consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of
attack and the number of bin Ladin-related investigations under
way; as well as information acquired in May 2001 that indicated
a group of bin Laden supporters was planning attacks in the
United States with explosives.
In August 2001, based on information it had in its
possession at the time, the CIA sent a message to the FAA
asking the FAA to advise corporate security directors of U.S.
air carriers of the following information. ``A group of six
Pakistanis currently based in Bolivia may be planning to
conduct a hijacking or possibly a bombing or an act of sabotage
against a commercial airliner. While we have no details of the
carrier, the date or the location of this or these possibly
planned actions, we have learned that the group has had
discussions in which Canada, England, Malaysia, Cuba, South
Africa, Mexico, Atlanta, New York, Madrid, Moscow and Dubai,
have come up, and India and Islamabad have been described as
possible travel destinations.''
While this information was not related to an attack planned
by al-Qa'ida, it did alert the aviation community to the
possibility that a hijacking plot might occur in the U.S.
shortly before the September 11 attacks occurred.
Now, I want to turn to intelligence information on possible
terrorist use of airplanes as weapons.
Central to the September 11 attack was the terrorist use of
airplanes as weapons. In the aftermath of the attacks, there
was much discussion about the extent to which our government
was or could have been aware of the threat of terrorist attacks
of this type and the extent to which adequate precautions were
taken to address the threat. Based on our review to date, we
believe that the Intelligence Community was aware of the
potential for this type of terrorist attack but did not produce
any specific assessment of the likelihood that terrorists would
use airplanes as weapons. Our review has uncovered several
examples of intelligence reporting on the possible use of
airplanes as weapons in terrorist operations.
In December 1994, Algerian armed Islamic Group terrorists
hijacked an Air France flight in Algiers and threatened to
crash it into the Eiffel Tower. French authorities deceived the
terrorists into thinking the plane did not have enough fuel to
reach Paris and diverted it. A French antiterrorist force
stormed the plane and killed all four terrorists.
In January 1995, a Philippine national police raid turned
up materials in a Manila apartment indicating that three
individuals planned, among other things, to crash a plane into
CIA headquarters. The Philippine national police said that the
same group was responsible for the bombing of a Philippine
airliner on December 12, 1994. Information on the threat was
passed to the FAA, which briefed U.S. and major foreign
carriers.
In January 1996, the Intelligence Community obtained
information concerning a planned suicide attack by individuals
associated with Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman and a key al-Qa'ida
operative. Theplan was to fly to the United States from
Afghanistan and attack the White House.
In October 1996, the Intelligence Community obtained
information regarding an Iranian plot to hijack a Japanese
plane over Israel and crash it into Tel Aviv. An individual
would board the plane in the Far East. During the flight, he
would commandeer the aircraft, order it to fly over Tel Aviv
and then crash the plane into the city.
In 1997, one of the units at FBI headquarters became
concerned about the possibility of a terrorist group using an
unmanned aerial vehicle, UAV, for terrorist attacks. The FBI
and CIA became aware of reporting that this group had purchased
a UAV. At the time, the agencies' view was that the only reason
that this group would need a UAV would be for either
reconnaissance or attack. There was more concern about the
possibility of an attack outside the United States, for
example, by flying the UAV into a U.S. embassy or a visiting
U.S. delegation.
As noted previously, in August '98, the Intelligence
Community obtained information that a group of unidentified
Arabs planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign
country into the World Trade Center.
Also noted previously, in September '98, the Intelligence
Community obtained information that bin Ladin's next operation
could possibly involve flying an aircraft loaded with
explosives into a U.S. airport and detonating it.
In November 1998, the community obtained information that a
Turkish Islamic extremist group had planned a suicide attack to
coincide with celebrations marking the death of Ataturk. The
conspirators, who were arrested, planned to crash an airplane
packed with explosives into Ataturk's tomb during a government
ceremony. The Turkish press said the group had cooperated with
Usama bin Ladin. The FBI's New York office included this
incident in one of its Usama bin Ladin databases.
In February 1999, the Intelligence Community obtained
information that Iraq had formed a suicide pilot unit that it
planned to use against British and U.S. forces in the Persian
Gulf. The CIA commented that this was highly unlikely and
probably disinformation.
In March 1999, the Intelligence Community obtained
information regarding a plan by an al-Qa'ida member, who was a
U.S. citizen, to fly a hang glider into the Egyptian
presidential palace and then detonate the explosives he was
carrying. The individual, who received hang glider training in
the United States, brought the hang glider back to Afghanistan.
In April 2000, the Intelligence Community obtained
information regarding an alleged bin Ladin plot to hijack a
747. The source, who was a walk-in to the FBI's Newark office,
claimed that he had been to a training camp in Pakistan where
he learned hijacking techniques and received arms training. He
also stated that he was supposed to meet five to six other
individuals in the United States who would also participate in
the plot. They were instructed to use all necessary force to
take over the plane because there would be pilots among the
hijacking team. The plan was to fly the plane to Afghanistan,
and if they could not make it there, that they were to blow up
the plane.
Although the individual passed an FBI polygraph, the FBI
was never able to verify any aspect of his story or identify
his contacts in the United States.
And, in August 2001, the Intelligence Community obtained
information regarding a plot to either bomb the U.S. embassy in
Nairobi from an airplane or crash an airplane into it. The
Intelligence Community learned that two people who were
reportedly acting on instructions from bin Ladin met in October
2000 to discuss this plot.
Despite these reports, the community did not produce any
specific assessments of the likelihood that terrorists would
use airplanes as weapons. This may have been driven in part by
resource issues in the area of intelligence analysis. Prior to
September 11, 2001, the CTC had 40 analysts to analyze
terrorism issues worldwide, with only one of the five branches
focused on terrorist tactics. Prior to September 11, 2001, the
only terrorist tactic on which the CTC performed strategic
analysis was the possible use of chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear weapons, because there was more
obvious potential for mass casualties.
At the FBI, prior to September 11, 2001, support for
ongoing investigations and operations was favored in terms of
resources over long-term strategic analysis. We were told
during the course of our FBI interviews that prevention
occurred in the operational units, not through strategic
analysis, and that prior to September 11 the FBI had
insufficient resources to do both.
We were also told that the FBI's al-Qa'ida-related analytic
expertise had been ``gutted'' by transfers to operational units
and that as a result the FBI analytic unit had only one
individual working on al-Qa'ida at the time of the September 11
attacks.
While focused strategic analysis was lacking, the subject
of aviation-related terrorism was included in some broader
terrorist threat assessments, such as the National Intelligence
Estimate on Terrorism. For example, the 1995 NIE on Terrorism
cited the consideration the Bojinka conspirators gave to
attacking CIA headquarters with an aircraft. The document
contained the following language: ``Our review of the evidence
suggests that the conspirators were guided in their selection
of the method and venue of attack by carefully studying
security procedures in place in the region. If terrorists
operating in this country, the United States, are similarly
methodical, they will identify serious vulnerabilities in the
security system for domestic flights.''
The 1997 update to that report on terrorism included the
following language: ``Civil aviation remains a particularly
attractive target in light of the fear and publicity the
downing of an airliner would evoke and the revelations last
summer of the U.S. air transport sector's vulnerabilities.''
In a December 2000 report, the FBI and the FAA published a
classified assessment that suggested less concern about the
threat to domestic aviation. ``FBI investigations confirm
domestic and international terrorist groups operating within
the United States but do not suggest evidence of plans to
target domestic civil aviation. Terrorist activity within the
U.S. has focused primarily on fundraising, recruiting new
members and disseminating propaganda. While international
terrorists have conducted attacks on U.S. soil, these acts
represent anomalies in their traditional targeting, which
focused on U.S. interests overseas.''
After September 11, 2001, the CIA belatedly acknowledged
some of the information that was available and had been
available regarding the use of airplanes as weapons. A draft
analysis dated November 19, 2001, entitled ``The September 11
Attacks: A Preliminary Assessment,'' states: ``We do not know
the process by which bin Ladin and his lieutenants decided to
hijack planes with the idea of flying them into buildings in
the United States. But the idea of hijacking planes for suicide
attacks had long been current in jihadist circles. For example,
GIA terrorists from Algeria had planned to crash an Air France
jet into the Eiffel Tower in December 1994. And Ramzi Yousef, a
participant in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, planned to
explode 12 U.S. jetliners in mid-air over the Pacific in the
mid-1990s. Likewise, the World Trade Center had long been a
target of terrorist bombers.''
Despite the intelligence available in recent years, our
review to date has found no indications that prior to September
11 analysts in the Intelligence Community were cataloging
information regarding the use of airplanes as weapons as a
terrorist tactic, sending requirements to collectors to look
for additional information on this threat, or considering the
likelihood that Usama bin Ladin, al-Qa'ida or any other
terrorist group would attack the United States or U.S.
interests in this way.
Mr. Chairman, our purpose this morning was to report on
theinformation that the Intelligence Community possessed prior to
September 11, 2001, about terrorist attacks of the kind America
witnessed on that fateful day. In closing, let me just say that for all
of us who have been conducting this review, the task has been and
continues to be not only a daunting one, but in all respects a sobering
one. We are ever mindful that lost lives and shattered families were
the catalyst for this inquiry. We know, as I have heard Ms. Pelosi say
many times, that we are on sacred ground.
We also have come to know from our review of the
intelligence reporting the depth and the intensity of the
enemy's hatred for this country and the relentless zeal with
which it targeted American lives. We understand not only the
importance, but also the enormity, of the task facing the
Intelligence Community. As my statement this morning suggests,
the community made mistakes prior to September 11. And the
problems that led to those mistakes need to be addressed, and
they need to be fixed.
On the other hand, the vengeance and the inhumanity that we
saw on that day were not mistakes for Usama bin Ladin and for
others like him. The responsibility for September 11th remains
squarely on the shoulders of the terrorists who planned and
participated in the attacks. Their fervor and their cruelty may
be incomprehensible, but it is real, it persists and it is
directed at Americans. We are convinced that it is no longer a
question of whether the Intelligence Community can do better.
It must do better. America can afford no less.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement this morning.
Thank you.
Chairman Graham. Ms. Hill, I would like to extend my
congratulations to you and the staff for an excellent, sobering
assessment of the events prior to September the 11th. I
recognize this is the first of what will be a series of
publicly released statements of the results of our inquiry to
date, and we look forward to your future reports.
Ms. Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. We will now proceed to questions and
comment from members, starting with Senator DeWine.
Let me just state who the next questioners will be: Mr.
Boehlert, Senator Wyden, Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Bishop, Senator
Levin, Senator Inhofe, Mr. Peterson, Mr. Cramer.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Ms. Hill, thank you for your very good statement and your
good work. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to make
some brief remarks at this very important public hearing.
Let me also thank our witnesses who testified this morning.
While none of us can understand what you have been through, I
have seen how tragic the events of September 11 had been for my
own state director, a very good friend of mine, Barbara
Schenck. Barbara lost her brother, Doug Cherry, to the
terrorist attacks.
Before talking about what I hope comes out of these
hearings, let me express a concern. I've been concerned from
the outset of this investigation that the time deadlines under
which this Committee is operating would not be conducive to
producing the product that we want. The artificial deadline I
believe is making it extremely difficult to get the job done.
It's simply a lack of time, it's a lack of resources.
However, Mr. Chairman, there still are things that we can
accomplish, even with the current constraints of this
investigation. First, it is important to report, and we have
begun this today, it's important to report to the American
people what intelligence failures did occur, not so we can
assess blame but so we can learn from the specific mistakes
that were made.
But there is more to it than that. Yes, we need to gather
the facts and take time to examine what they mean with regard
to what happened on September 11, but we certainly cannot stop
there. We also need to figure out what these facts tell us
about the current structure of our overall Intelligence
Community. What are the shortcomings? Where do we need reform?
And I thought Mr. Push's testimony earlier was very
excellent. I thought he talked about some of the big picture
issues that we're not going to resolve on this Committee, but
at least that we can begin to look at and begin a national
dialogue about these issues. So I thought his testimony was
particularly telling.
I think, for example, Mr. Chairman, in investigating these
issues, we must take a serious look at the role of the Director
of Central Intelligence. I believe it's time to give the DCI
the necessary authority and the ability to truly direct our
overall intelligence operations. Quite simply, we need to
empower the DCI to do the job.
I believe we also must seriously examine the long-term
resource issues that confront us, not just now but over the
long haul, over the next decade or two decades. Do we have the
human resources available within the agencies themselves? Do we
have the right technology, and enough of it, to get the job
done in the new world that we live in? Do we have a long-term
commitment to intelligence?
I think we need to discuss that commitment and what we are
looking at and make it very plain to the American people the
sacrifices that are going to have to be made if the
Intelligence Community is to do its job, and what kind of
resources they need.
And finally, I believe that we need to re-examine the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or the FISA statute, and
determine what changes are needed to make sure we are getting
the intelligence from this source to help prevent future
attacks. FISA deserves and requires a great deal of attention
and oversight from the joint committee, from the Senate and
House Intelligence Committees and, frankly, from the entire
Congress. We must focus on our congressional duty for oversight
because we simply have not had, in my opinion, effective
oversight since FISA was instituted approximately a quarter of
a century ago. Somehow, we've got to figure out, Mr. Chairman,
how to do that.
Finally, this Committee's job, I believe, is really to kick
off, to launch, a serious national debate about what changes
must be made in our Intelligence Community. Because, if we've
learned anything from September 11, it is that our security,
our safety, the safety of our loved ones, is intrinsically
linked to the quality of that intelligence.
I thank the Chair.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator.
Congressman Boehlert.
Mr. Boehlert. Mr. Chairman, let me ask about procedure. Are
we just to have an opening statement or to go right to
questions?
Chairman Graham. It is your choice; you have five minutes.
Mr. Boehlert. All right, thank you very much Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Hill, let me thank you for an excellent presentation,
and let me begin where you ended. You said we are convinced
that it is no longer a question of whether the Intelligence
Community can do better, it must do better. America can afford
no less. I could not agree more with that statement.
Your summation of our 10 closed hearings and the revelation
of the information in the public domain is somewhat difficult
to deal with because so much of what we've had, obviously,
during those closed hearings has been highly classified,
dealing with sensitive national security information.
But it appears to me that the alarm was sounded not once,
but several times, but too many gave it a deaf ear. I'm not
ascribing any sinister motives; I'm just saying too many were
not paying attention. A lot of reasons for that, resource
deficiencies, lack of adequate staff. Some of the revelations
in your testimony are just absolutely mind-boggling.
But let me ask something. Back in '98, when the Director of
Central Intelligence declared war on al-Qa'ida, sent a
memorandum to his agency people, was that a unilateral
declaration of war? Was that memorandum shared with anyone but
the in-house people at the CIA? Did it go to the FBI? Did it go
to all the other agencies in the Intelligence Community?
Ms. Hill. We have been following that question in the
course of our interviews and we've been basically asking those
questions. We're dealing with a lot of the agencies in the
Intelligence Community and we're trying to find out how much
the entire community was aware of that declaration of war.
And what we're finding is that some people were. I think
certainly senior levels in the CIA were, and probably elsewhere
in the CIA, but as I mentioned, if you go out to the field
offices of the FBI they were not aware of it.
Other people in the federal government were not aware of
it. The Defense Department--we've interviewed some people there
who were not aware of it that might have been interfacing with
the community.
So I would say it appears to be, it was the DCI's decision.
It was circulated to some people but certainly not broadly
within the community. And what I find disturbing about it is
that it was distributed at senior levels, but sometimes the
operative level, the level in the field, is where it actually
is critical that they know what the priorities should be and
have to be, particularly in combating something like al-Qa'ida.
The field offices of the FBI, in terms of domestic activity,
are crucial because they are the ones who are going to be in
the front lines in the United States dealing with those kinds
of groups.
And, at least in that respect, what we're finding is that
many of them were not aware of that declaration of war and some
of them really were not focused very much at all on al-Qa'ida
and bin Ladin.
Mr. Boehlert. Well, I find that incomprehensible, quite
frankly. Because a key operative in our Intelligence Community,
a leader, issues something as important as a declaration of war
against an organization that has openly declared its determined
effort, a fatwa, the religious decree to destroy America and
Americans, and that information is not shared at the highest
level down to the lowest level.
Which brings me forward to the Phoenix memo and the
Minneapolis case involving Mr. Moussaoui. And I've checked with
counsel to see if it's all right to reveal some of this stuff,
because the problem is, I have difficulty, and I've had for all
the years I've served on the Committee, in recalling where I
learned the information that I have. Was it from a highly
secure, highly sensitive briefing, or did I read it in the
front page of the newspaper? And so my practice has been just
not talk to the media at all about this very important
assignment.
But we go forward to the Phoenix memo, which was sent up to
headquarters, at a time we had a declaration of war in the
Intelligence Community, and the memo was marked ``Routine.''
Ms. Hill. And it was not only at the time of the
declaration of war, it was in the summer of 2001; it was at a
time when the threat level was very high also.
Mr. Boehlert. And so the memo was marked ``Routine'' and it
was given the most routine handling and it never got above mid-
level. And then we go out to Minneapolis in the Moussaoui case,
and that was treated in a somewhat cavalier, very routine
manner.
I fail to see how, with all the alarms that were sounded,
why--what do we know? There was not the proper coordination,
there was not the proper information sharing.
You have indicated some corrective action has been taken--
but boy, God, we would only hope so--since September 11, but I
would suggest a lot of corrective action should have been taken
well before September 11th.
Let me ask you this. With our first two witnesses, Ms.
Breitweiser and Mr. Push--and their testimony was very
poignant----
Chairman Graham. Your time is expired.
Mr. Boehlert. That's a fast five minutes. All right, just
let me finish the one question; I'm in the middle of it.
Chairman Graham. We'll be compassionate.
Mr. Boehlert. Did you spend an extended amount of time with
both of these witnesses? Because they both have statements that
are forever seared in our souls. Some deal with opinion, others
deal with alleged fact. And so did you spend a good amount of
time with them? And have you checked up on the alleged facts
that they presented?
And I'm not questioning those facts; I just want to make
sure we're dealing with the same information.
Ms. Hill. I have met with Ms. Breitweiser several times
since I joined this effort with the Committee, with her and her
group. And Mr. Push, I believe, I've met with him once. I have
not checked up on all the specifics in their statements because
I didn't see the statements until yesterday--I mean, we got
those statements yesterday. But I've had a lot of discussions
with them and some of the things, you know, that they mentioned
I am aware of, some of them I'd want to look into in more
detail, obviously.
Mr. Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.
Chairman Graham. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Hill, as you know, there were years of history
indicating that airplanes would be used as a tool of terrorism.
And yet you state on page 30, and I'll quote here, ``Our review
to date has found no indications that prior to September 11th
analysts in the Intelligence Community were cataloguing
information regarding the use of airplanes as weapons, as a
terrorist tactic, sending requirements to collections to look
for additional information this threat or considering the
likelihood that bin Ladin, al-Qa'ida or other terrorist groups
would attack the United States or U.S. interests in this way.''
That is a remarkable statement, given the history going
back, I believe, to 1994 at least. And my question, to begin
with, is when you asked the Intelligence Community why this was
the case, why they didn't catalogue this information regarding
the use of planes as weapons or consider the likelihood that
they would be used as terrorist tools, what was the response of
the Intelligence Community when you asked them why?
Ms. Hill. Well, I think a couple of things. We've spoken to
many people over there and gotten, you know, opinions and
reactions on this.
You have to understand, the reason we have been able to
catalogue all these instances is because one of the things we
did was ask the community to go back and find anything that
related to aircraft as weapons. So we went back and
consolidated and went through their databases to pull it all
out so you could see it all together. And I don't believe that
had been done, obviously, before we focused on it, given
September 11.
So, one, it had not been all pulled together for them to
see it, you know, other than in piecemeal fashion over time.
Secondly, I think what they will tell you on many of these
things in the terrorism field is that they were overwhelmed.
The people who were looking at al-Qa'ida and bin Ladin will
complain to you about resources, about the amount of
information that was coming in. They were overwhelmed by almost
a flood of information. Because, as you can see from our
statements, there's a lot of reporting in there just on these
topics. And of course, that reporting is but a small amount of
the overall amount of reporting that the community deals with.
So I think the reasons that they would give you were that
it was spread out over time, they were overwhelmed by limited
resourcesand other priorities, and they were overwhelmed by the
amount of information they were getting and dealing with responses to
other areas.
Senator Wyden. What is so hard to swallow, however, is how
anything could be a higher priority than this. And for you to
state that the Intelligence Community was not considering the
likelihood that bin Ladin, al-Qa'ida would attack the United
States in this way is, of course, exactly the kind of thing
we've got to address in these inquiries.
In your testimony and also from the victim's families we
have heard about the failure to place Khalid Al-Mihdhar and
Nawaf Al-Hazmi--and by the way, Mr. Al-Hazmi is listed in the
phone book in San Diego, I gather--on a watch list that would
have prevented their entry into the United States.
I offered an amendment on the intelligence bill this year
to create a terrorist tracking system that would help ensure
that this information would finally actually get shared to
everybody in the intelligence, everybody in the law enforcement
area, and would actually get to local law enforcement
officials.
In your view, to make this kind of a system effective, what
sort of policies need to be included so that finally we can
respond to what Mr. Push has asked for, and that is to have a
system that on an ongoing basis makes as a top priority
tracking the most dangerous individuals who threaten this
country?
Ms. Hill. Well, I think part of it is, you have to get
people's attention. I mean, you have to get people focused on
the need to do that--people in the system, in the agencies, in
the group that is working on those issues. We're going to go
into that particular case in much more detail when we present
our testimony or statement on the hijackers; that would relate
to the case you're talking about. So we will go into it in a
lot more detail and tell you what we've heard from people who
were handling that information at the time and why it slipped
by them.
But I think you may hear anything from they had too many
things to do, it wasn't considered that significant, they were
overwhelmed and it was simply a mistake--they made a mistake.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I would
only want to add one last point with respect to where I think
we are in terms of our inquiry.
As we all know there are many, both on this Committee and
off, who think that essentially this Committee ought to punt to
an independent effort. I'm of the view that the bar is very,
very high now in terms of establishing the credibility of this
effort and to show that we're capable of attacking these
fundamental problems. This is not something that's going to be
solved by just moving the boxes around on the organizational
chart and people going up with pointers and saying the problem
is solved.
So I think Ms. Hill has helped us, with the families, get
off to a good start. And I look forward to working with my
colleagues.
Chairman Graham. Thank you very much, Senator.
Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you.
This is, indeed, a historic occasion when the two
Intelligence Committees working together on a matter of great
importance like this comes to pass. And I'm sure, however, that
given the nature and the circumstances which require our
attention, the destructive attacks on our country September 11,
it's a task which all of us wish that we didn't have to face.
But we are most appreciative today for the well-prepared,
thoughtful and helpful testimony presented by Ms. Breitweiser
and Mr. Push.
We have a responsibility to thoroughly and professionally
gather, assess and present the facts about September 11 as they
relate to performance of the intelligence agencies. And as we
enter these public hearings there remains a general sense of
disappointment and disbelief within the American people that
those agencies, particularly the CIA and the FBI, were not
better positioned to detect the conspiracy and to prevent the
attacks.
We must try to address the many questions which have arisen
about why better intelligence was not collected, or why better
use was not made of the information which was available. And
now, publicly examining the performance of the communities and
the decisions that were made in the Executive branch and
perhaps in Congress about the establishment of priorities
within the Intelligence Community, we will be conducting the
type of oversight which these committees are at present
uniquely situated to provide.
It is my continued hope that these hearings and our final
report will result in a marked improvement in our understanding
of the events that led up to 9/11 and most importantly, in our
ability to protect the American people from terrorist attacks
such as these.
I look forward to working with the joint leadership and all
of our scheduled witnesses. And I want to thank Ms. Hill and
her staff for the tremendous work that they have done under
very difficult circumstances, with some muzzling and bridling
and limitations and with great time constraints. It has, I
think, been a valiant effort. And we will certainly, as a
Committee, work with you to try to secure the cooperation that
you need from the Executive branch and the agencies in getting
access and being able to explain to the American people, and
have this Committee explain to the American people, in the kind
of detail which does not compromise sources and methods, plans
and intentions, or active ongoing prosecutions, so that they
can understand, as well as we hope to understand, what
happened, why it happened, and what we can do to make sure it
does not happen again.
With that, I have no questions, but I did want to share
those comments and thank again the witnesses for taking the
time and the effort, which must have been extremely difficult,
given the exigencies of your lives over the past year, to have
come forward and done the magnificent job that you did today.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.
Our next questioner, or discussant will be Senator Levin.
After Senator Levin, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Castle, Mr. Roemer, Ms.
Harman, Mr. Burr, Senator Bayh, and Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me thank you, Ms. Hill, and your staff for
getting us to the point where we are finally analyzing and
presenting to the American people the significant intelligence
failures which occurred prior to September 11. At this stage of
the inquiry, much is already evident.
First, the Intelligence Community said that it was at war
with Usama bin Ladin, and had said so for three years prior to
the attack of September 11.
Second, despite National Security Adviser Condoleezza
Rice's assertions to the contrary, the use of a plane as a
terrorist weapon capable of causing mass casualties was neither
ingenious nor novel but, rather, a method of attack that the
Intelligence Community knew that the terrorists were
considering as early as the early and mid-90s.
Third, there is much troubling evidence that information
crucial to preventing attacks by al-Qa'ida terrorists was not
shared or acted upon by intelligence officials prior to
September 11. Those intelligence failures will haunt loved ones
and their families and should also haunt us and motivate us to
very strong and necessary reforms.
Here is just a few examples that I'm summarizing from your
report. In January of 2000, the U.S. Intelligence Community was
alerted to a meeting of al-Qa'ida members in Malaysia,
including two of the eventual hijackers of American Airlines
Flight 77. The hand-off of that information from the CIA to the
FBI was bungled. The individuals were not tracked and,
inexplicably, were not promptly placed on a watch list. Ten
days later, the two accomplices entered the United States on a
flight to Los Angeles. The location of the individuals after
they were finally placed on the watch list was also mishandled.
Second, a July 10, 2001 memorandum from an FBI field agent
in Phoenix to the Usama bin Ladin unit and the radical
fundamentalist unit at FBI headquarters requesting that an
investigation be opened into foreign terrorists training at
flight schools in the U.S. was never acted upon. Nor was the
Phoenix field investigation shared with the CIA as specifically
suggested by the FBI agent.
And this is not in your memo, but this is what we learned,
that nearly a year after the Phoenix memo, the FBI Director was
unable to explain to our Committee who saw that request from
the Phoenix FBI agent, what was done with the request, and who,
if anyone, had been held accountable for letting that important
information fall between some crack.
Third, the August 16, 2001 arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui and
the suspicions of the FBI agents in Minneapolis that he might
be planning to undertake a terrorist attack using a plane and
the urgent request that a warrant to search his computer and
other belongings were not acted upon by FBI Headquarters.
And I want to emphasize a point here. These were not some
reports by unreliable sources. These were not unconfirmed
statements. These were FBI agents that were asking for action.
Their requests were ignored.
Now I believe it is critically important for the
Administration to release the Phoenix memorandum, documents
relating to the Minneapolis FBI office request, and other
documents that will allow the American people to judge for
themselves the significance of these missed signals and the
failures to share information between and within the
intelligence and law enforcement communities.
The Committee, I understand, has asked for declassification
of those documents. That request is under consideration, I
understand, by the Administration in preparation for next
week's hearings.
We've had discussion about this already this morning, but I
do hope that the leadership of these Committees, our
committees, will let the administration know that our
Committees will seek congressional authorization, by
legislation if necessary, to declassify appropriate information
if the Executive branch refuses.
We have Chairmen and Vice Chairmen of our committees who've
agreed on some matters. It seems to me that is enough for us as
committees to automatically authorize them to seek legislation
should the Executive branch refuse. And that would go to future
refusals, not just to previous ones.
The American people understand that perfection is
unattainable. But they also believe, as I do, that when errors
are made, accountability, accountability is essential if
lessons are to be learned for the sake of the future security
of our nation.
Is my time up?
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator, for those very
thoughtful----
[Applause.]
Chairman Graham [continuing]. And obviously well-received
suggestions of actions by the Committee. We will take those
under advisement.
Mr. Boswell.
Mr. Boswell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think the word that hit me hardest today has been the
word sobering. And as I heard the testimony of Kristen and
Stephen it caused me to do a little flashback in my earlier
life when I had to spend a lonely night, as some of the rest of
you have done, to write to the loved ones why their loved one
was lost in the battlefield that day. I've sensed your pain. I
love you, respect you, and want you to have relief. And I see
the relief for you is to see that these lessons learned are
learned and filed and not have to be learned again.
I used to work for Admiral Fluckey, probably the most
decorated living American. He said, ``Put that in your lessons
learned file and you don't have to learn it again.'' And that's
what I hope we accomplish here.
I feel like maybe my colleague from the Senate that said
that maybe we don't need this extra blue-ribbon panel. After
listening to Kristen and Stephen, I think you made a pretty
good case maybe we do need it. And I wonder about the time and
the resource and availability to us to finish this job, though
I trust that the days lying ahead of you, Mr. Chairman, you're
going to be dealing with that, with this side of the operation,
and I know you'll give it serious consideration.
A couple of questions, Ms. Hill, if I might ask. And I'll
just ask them all and then I can refresh if you need them. Do
you intend to have further statements of fact as we go forward
from here today?
Ms. Hill. Not today, but we do in future hearings.
Mr. Boswell. I mean in the future. All right.
Would you want to elaborate a little bit on what, or could
you, what agencies had the responsibility to respond to the
warnings? We've heard so much about the warnings for two, three
years. Would you have any comment from your research and your
study that who should have been responding--military, who?
Ms. Hill. Well, it would depend on what you mean--a warning
from the Intelligence Community or the reports?
Mr. Boswell. Well, a combination. Did we fail as part of
our lesson learned, if we can, in the area of maybe there
should have been some responses going out to somebody else?
Ms. Hill. Well, some of this--it depends. I mean, some of
this information was disseminated further, some was not
disseminated. Some, for instance, that we talked about, some
went to the FAA in certain cases, and then they in turn would
put out a warning.
For instance, I talked about the one instance of the
terrorist attack to the private commercial airline industry. So
it depends on the nature of what the threat was and who they
would warn.
Mr. Boswell. I think in your further analysis and maybe
what I'm asking is that you share with us as you look at it and
have more time, if there's some things that we can put in
this----
Ms. Hill. I can say that we are pursuing the whole issue
about questions of warnings and dissemination of information.
It is notjust sharing information, as Senator Levin was talking
about, within the Intelligence Community, between the FBI and CIA, for
example, but also sharing threat information beyond the Intelligence
Community to the agencies within government, outside the community and
also to the private sector, which gets into the warning and how far
this information went.
And that is an area we are looking at, and we haven't yet,
you know, come back with a report on it. But we are looking at
that. And you know, that's a valid point because the job of the
Intelligence Community is not only to get the good intelligence
and to analyze it, but then to disseminate it to people who can
use it in a timely manner.
Mr. Boswell. Thank you. I've got a little bit of time left.
Do you have any comment about the--and all the emphasis on bin
Ladin and his activities and his lack of being able--prior to
September 11 that is--lack of ability to bring damage to us.
Did that lure our people into complacency, even at the senior
levels?
Ms. Hill. I think part of it is, as I alluded to earlier,
is that the community, you know, does get so much information.
And as I said in this statement, there were a lot of these
threats coming in, but a lot of them they couldn't really
corroborate. They didn't know if some of them were true or not
true. So I think, you know, it may be human nature if you keep
hearing this stuff all the time and nothing happens and you
never really know if it's accurate, you tend to start
disregarding it.
And the problem is that buried in the middle of all that
where some may be accurate, some maybe not, there may be
something that really is important that needs to be looked at.
So it may be that when the threat level was very high and
all the chatter was coming through it was hard to distinguish
what was really legitimate and something they needed to be
concerned about.
Mr. Boswell. Thank you very much. My time is up. I
appreciate the hard work that you've presented to us, the
straightforwardness, and I'm looking forward to what you
further have to say as we go on from here.
Ms. Hill. Thank you.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Mr. Boswell.
Mr. Castle.
Mr. Castle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would also like to thank Ms. Breitweiser and Mr. Push for
their testimony on their own behalf and on behalf of the others
who have endured this. You're brave to be here. But you also
had a lot to say and from a perspective that's different than
we've heard so far.
And I also thank Ms. Hill for making sure that we started
off with this testimony. I think it is vitally important that
we hear this.
And some of my--these are sort of statements/questions. Let
me go through a few of them, and if we have time perhaps you
could respond to some of them, Ms. Hill, based in large part on
matters that both Kristen and Stephen referenced.
But one that has concerned me for some time, and Mr.
Boehlert referenced it too, and that is the whole business of
public versus private or classified information versus non-
classified information. I, for one, have felt for some time,
having served on this Committee for a while, that we over-
classify terribly in the world of intelligence. You read about
it the next day in the New York Times. It's about 90 percent of
what you'd heard about the day before. And I just have serious
questions about that. But the point was made in some of their
testimony about the failure to warn the public. And I would
imagine the public really didn't know much about bin Ladin.
Based on what you said, I'm not even sure the Intelligence
Community knew what it should have known about bin Ladin when
September 11 came in 2001.
We saw what the President has been able to do with Saddam
Hussein, who is probably in the forefront of the minds of
almost every American today. We know what can be done if there
is a greater public awareness as to what is going on.
And a lot that's happened since September 11 of last year
has caused us all to be much more aware of possible terrorist
activities or whatever. I would hope that as our Committee
looks at all of this, we look at the public aspect of it. The
American public is very intelligent and very cognizant of
what's going on in the world. And, if they're given a chance to
know what the potential problems are, my sense is that perhaps
we can prevent some of the problems that we've had so far. And
we shouldn't be so closed as far as intelligence is concerned.
Now I understand there are circumstances in which that can
not happen. I well understand that, and I'm not trying to go
too far in saying that. But I really think we need to visit
that question in terms of speeches being given by people in the
Intelligence Community perhaps could be more open in terms of
information that could be released, that kind of thing. And I'm
very interested in pursuing that at some point.
Something that Mr. Push said I had heard earlier when I
visited the Homeland Security. And that is that the officials
here in Washington were struck by how much the local law
enforcement officers know about what's happening in their
communities, about the individuals in their communities,
perhaps troubled individuals in their communities, various
things that we probably would never know in Washington, DC.
There are a whole lot of them, you know, well over half a
million state and local law enforcement officers who have a
tremendous world of knowledge.
And I think that Homeland Security is looking at trying to
develop and to cultivate that knowledge, and make it part of a
central--not a central bank system necessarily but the ability
to be able to have that information go up and be digested and
used in dealing with terrorists and other activities in this
country. I think that's vitally important. We don't hear much
about that.
We hear about the CIA and the FBI and NSA and various major
federal agencies. When you're dealing overseas, that's probably
what it's all about. But when you're dealing in America, and
also even when you're dealing overseas, you're dealing with
some sort of a cell or a pod or somebody who's here locally,
it's very helpful to have that information. And I hope as we go
about our business of this particular Committee and what we're
doing, that we incorporate that into it as well. So that also
concerns me.
And another area is much broader too than anything we've
talked about and that's the area of prevention overall. I am
vitally concerned about the hatred that exists in the Middle
East, apparently at least in certain pockets of the Middle
East, for America and perhaps for Israel and other portions of
the world.
And I don't know how to go about this. I'm not suggesting
that we should be starting to formulate policy with respect to
diplomacy and education. But it seems to me its something we
should be paying attention to. If we could get to the root
causes of this, of why that is there, if we could start to
build the relationships that might change some of this, this
might take 10, 15 or 25 years, but I don't think we should
ignore it. And perhaps it's a little bit beyond what we are
doing on this Committee, but the bottom line is I think it's a
very important function of what we're doing as American
citizens to try to prevent terrorism activities as far as the
future is concerned.
And I do have a specific question. I'd like your comment on
any of those things. And then a specific question--I've got
about 10 seconds here I think--and that is, just how far along
are we in terms of all of your work? Are we going to be able to
get our work done by the completion of this Congress?
Ms. Hill. I am optimistic that we will be able to get
through what we have in our minds as our schedule in terms of
treating various topics that we think need to be treated. Where
no one can ever be sure is that things are still coming up as
we investigate. You know, once youstart looking at an agency
and you're going through files, what tends to happen is the more you
get into it, the more you start finding more things. And as we find
things, we want to follow those where the facts lead and make sure we
understand what did or did not happen. And that takes time.
So there are some things like that, that we are now working
on that are going to take us more time, because we haven't
planned for that. But I'm cautiously optimistic we can make
what I think would be a significant contribution on this whole
front in terms of really understanding what did and didn't
happen here before the eleventh and why, why we didn't know
more in terms of what were the systemic problems that were
preventing people from knowing more.
So I would be foolish to sit here and tell you we're going
to look at every single document on terrorism that the United
States Government had for the last 20 years, because we haven't
tried to do that. We've tried to narrow it to where we get to
the relevant material that pertains to September 11. And I
think we have a good shot at doing that.
Mr. Castle. Thank you, Ms. Hill. We'll take my other
statements and perhaps we can discuss them further at some
point in terms of what we can do with them.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Mr. Castle.
Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockfeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Ms. Hill, very much for your distinguished work.
In the interests of time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make
just three points.
First, the fundamental question is what did the
Intelligence Community know, and then what did they do with
what they knew. The work of the Committee has not to this point
unearthed any single piece of information or smoking gun, if
you will, that would have in and of itself prevented the
attack. But we have found far too many breakdowns in the
intelligence-gathering and processing method.
My own conclusion is that, given the events and signals of
the preceding decade, the Intelligence Community could have,
and in my judgment should have, anticipated an attack on U.S.
soil on the scale of 9/11.
We had witnessed attacks on Americans overseas, as you laid
out--the USS Cole, Kenya, Tanzania, Khobar, the 1993 attack on
the World Trade Center. We knew beyond any doubt that al-Qa'ida
wanted to strike the United States. We were just sort of stuck
in our classic American innocence that anything that happens is
going to happen overseas. But there was information and plenty
of it, disseminated or not disseminated, that something was
going to happen here. Yet the Intelligence Community, for a
whole host of reasons, did not launch the all-out effort that
is its responsibility, that might have detected and potentially
prevented 9/11.
Second, the FBI is an outstanding law enforcement agency.
But I have serious questions about whether it is the right
place to do intelligence work necessary in our country. Law
enforcement is not necessarily compatible with intelligence
gathering; in fact, it is not. It's not the same skills, not
the same mission. Going forward, we must not undermine the
FBI's ability to carry out its fundamental responsibilities,
because they're very important, and they do it very well.
And we must not give short-shrift to new intelligence
demands. So we have to ask ourselves, can the problem be
addressed by reforming the FBI? I don't think so. Or is this a
case where we need to find a wholly different solution? This is
a tough question, obviously, which I hope this Committee will
be tackling in the coming months, and it leads me to my final
point.
Are we ready, as a committee, as a Congress, as a
government, as a people, not only to pose the tough questions--
it's easy to do--but also to find and to implement the tough
solutions? It is clear to all of us that we must make serious
changes in how we gather, process and react to intelligence in
this country. Our existing agencies came into being in the Cold
War. That's fine, but that structure no longer matches the
threat that we face. Lines of authority are, in my judgment,
blurred intentionally for the sake of turf, for the sake of all
kinds of things which in some cases have justification, in many
cases do not. The whole process leading up to today has been an
interesting example of how difficult it is, in a very common
purpose, to get people to agree on some relatively simple
things.
So lines of authority are blurred, information gets lost,
and the mission is unfocused, the intelligence mission is
unfocused. It might best be described as trying to do
everything and in the process doing little well.
Far-reaching change isn't just a goal, it's a necessity.
Unfortunately, it's a very controversial and very uncomfortable
necessity. It's something that they don't want to do here in
Congress, they don't want to do at the White House, they don't
want to do at the Defense Department, they don't want to do in
the non-defense intelligence aspect of what we carry on in this
country.
But are we going to find the political will to create an
intelligence system that works? Or are we going to say that
this is going to be politically impractical, or probably not
doable, and therefore cut our goal by 50 percent and then get
leveraged down from there?
So are we as a committee, in which we have our own
differences and our own conflicts, as a Congress where the same
exists, and as a government where the same exists, in the
Intelligence Community where the same exists, do we have the
political will and the strength and the determination to do the
job right?
Nothing else counts.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Roemer.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Ms. Hill for an excellent presentation and
outline this afternoon to help us understand this issue a bit
more after several months of this investigation.
I want to compliment your top-notch staff for their
sacrifices and their hours of service to the country. And Mr.
Chairman, you and Mr. Goss, on my side, I want to compliment
both of you for bringing together in a bipartisan way this
committee to launch an unprecedented bicameral investigation
into the worst terrorist attack in our nation's history. And it
is with pride and confidence that I know that we will produce a
good product on this committee.
In listening to the very moving testimony from Kristen and
Steve this morning, I'm even more convinced, I'm even more
compelled to work hard. I'm even more persuaded that an
independent blue-ribbon commission is the right way to go.
It's the right way to go because if this committee, with
its jurisdiction and its might and insight and experience and
dedication to intelligence, does its job, and by the very
nature of an investigative inquiry staff doing their job over
an eight-month period, unearthing facts, uncovering data,
asking tough questions, they will produce even more questions
for us to try to answer over the next year.
So I think there is a compelling case, by the very
effectiveness of this committee to do its job near perfectly
and assume its jurisdiction as a body of Congress to take on
this tough task, we make the case in a very convincing way for
follow-up and a thread attached to this for an independent
blue-ribbon commission to continue to look at these very, very
tough questions as to how to reorganize an Intelligence
Community that made mistakes, that committed failures, that saw
warnings, and reorganize it in a time when we are threatened by
a brand new source that wants to kill Americans in massive
numbers very quickly. And they can do it in this kind of world
environment.
I think the case is made compellingly for an independent
blue- ribbon commission. And I think that compliments us, and I
think it adds into the history of this committee, the
Intelligence Committee, which has had independent commissions
such as Aspin-Brown, Hart-Rudman, the NRO, Rumsfeld on ICBMs,
and even in the Senate bill, a brand new commission to study
something else.
Ms. Hill, I do have a question or two that I wanted to ask
about the classification of data. On page 16 there is a
reference to information provided to senior U.S. Government
officials in September of 1998, and on page 28 mentioning
senior government officials in July of 2001.
Now without getting into breaking our classification--and
we don't want to do that--one would be a Democratic
administration, one would be a Republican administration. Is
there the possibility that those references might be, could be,
to a White House?
Ms. Hill. Well, obviously given the classification----
Mr. Roemer. I'm just asking in the realm of possibilities.
Ms. Hill. Well, I guess are you asking about the term
``senior government officials''? I mean, I guess the term
``senior government officials'' would be anyone at a senior
level in the entire U.S. Government, but I cannot, as I
understand the rules on this, we are not allowed----
Mr. Roemer. But your case, Ms. Hill, is that it's important
for the American people to know when we get intelligence that
it's not only the intelligence agencies that act upon it, it's
the administration, as to what they do with it, with the
military, with other branches of government----
Ms. Hill. Right.
Mr. Roemer [continuing]. The FAA, the border control, and
so forth and so on.
Ms. Hill. That's absolutely right. Because, I mean, to make
intelligence really the way it should be, to make it important
and valuable, it has to be not only collected and analyzed, but
it has to be disseminated to the people who can use it in a
timely manner.
That's the whole point of having intelligence.
Mr. Roemer. Part of our bipartisan efforts would be to get
in a bipartisan way this access to declassifying that kind of
references. Is that your argument?
Ms. Hill. Well, I mean, our argument on this issue about
the White House is that if you've declassified the information
itself, it seems to us we don't see the national security
interest in declassifying where it goes from there. If you
declassify that it goes to some people, you should be able to
declassify that it goes to everybody, whoever it went to.
Mr. Roemer. I would hope our committee would have a long,
very serious discussion about what to do on this
declassification issue.
Finally, Ms. Hill, if I could ask one final question, you
mention the CTC and the number of analysts that they had, and I
think mentioned a number of three to five.
Ms. Hill. Right.
Mr. Roemer. Yet as we've looked at the CTC budget over the
1990s and a question of resources, without mentioning a
specific number, which is classified, the trend which we can
talk about, right----
Ms. Hill. Right.
Mr. Roemer [continuing]. Is a quadrupling in the CTC
budget. So why isn't more money put into analysts in that
budget when it's quadrupling?
Ms. Hill. I think it's a priority question. What we found
and we're saying is that the resources--they were getting more
resources for counterterrorism prior to September 11 and after
the DCI declared war on bin Ladin, it was going up. But there
was no massive shift. It was a gradual thing.
Mr. Roemer. Quadrupled.
Ms. Hill. And in terms of analysis, there was not a
significant amount of resources dedicated to it. So I assume it
is like every other research allocation. It's depending on
where your priorities are, and obviously there was not a big
priority on the analysis.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Mr. Roemer.
Mr. LaHood.
Mr. LaHood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Hill, thank you for your service to our Committee and
to your staff too. I know they've worked long hours.
Ms. Hill. That's very true, and they've done an excellent
job.
Mr. LaHood. They really have; I agree with that.
And to Kristen and Steve, thank you for--if you're still
here--for being here and the people that you represent.
Obviously, our hearts go out to all of you.
Ms. Hill, if you take all of the information that's in your
report today, and you analyze all of that information and then
you look at the notion that there was a lot of information
prior to 9/11, there were a lot of people in separate ways who
saw it, and if you took that information, and it was analyzed
correctly, and the people responsible, whether it be the
President, the Vice President, the National Security Adviser,
the CIA Director, FBI Director, if they had had all of the
information that you've collected and documented in your
report, could 9/11 have been prevented--if they had seen the
Phoenix memo, if they had seen the memo from Minnesota, if they
had really had all of these documents that had come over the
transom for any number days?
I mean, there has to be some idea about--because the
criticism is that a lot of information came, but it wasn't
shared. A lot of information was available, but wasn't shared,
and the right people didn't know it. Well, if you take all of
that information, and if it had been shared with the highest
elected people in our government and the highest appointed
people in our government who have responsibility for
counteracting these activities, could 9/11 have been prevented?
Ms. Hill. My own view is that I don't think anyone will
ever be able to say--no one will ever really know whether 9/11
would have been prevented. Because what we're talking about
here is we not only would have to know what everyone would have
done with the information they had in the Intelligence
Community in terms of law enforcement and intelligence, you
would also have to know how bin Ladin and the hijackers would
have reacted. We don't know that.
I mean, it's all--we're hypothesizing. And there's been so
much emphasis on, was there a smoking gun? Was there a where,
when, how, that sort of thing.
We haven't found that. What we have found is a lot of
information, a lot of things that weren't put together. And to
me maybe the biggest issue is, and we say it somewhat in the
statement, not only that they weren't put together, but that
they weren't recognizing their importance given everything else
they should have known, for instance, in the summer of 2001.
That's the summer that you had Mihdhar and Hazmi. You had
Phoenix. You had Moussaoui. You had a high threat level. Well,
you would think that with all of that, when you got Phoenix or
you got Moussaoui--it would have even been more important--you
would have been more aggressive with it. And that didn't
happen.
So there's a lot of unknowns. There's questions about if
you had caught one hijacker, would they have replaced him with
someone else? There's questions about if you had gotten on to
one of these cases, could you have surveilled and perhaps found
what was going on?
All of those are hypothetical. So we're never going to
know, but I think what we do clearly know is that the community
could have done a lot better--the intelligence side and the law
enforcement side.
Mr. LaHood. But your answer is that the community could
have done a lot better. But knowing what we know about
information that wasthere and the dots were never connected in
a lot of these different areas, you're not saying though that the
community could have prevented this. They could have done a lot better,
but they couldn't have prevented it.
Ms. Hill. No, I didn't say they--I never said they couldn't
have----
Mr. LaHood. Well, I want to know. I want you to be able to
tell us pretty definitively here for these people that are here
that if all of the dots were connected and if all of the
information was shared and all of the right people would have
known it, could we have prevented 9/11?
Ms. Hill. I would say----
Mr. LaHood. I mean, that's the criticism all of this town
and all over the country and all over the world that we, that
you know we collected a lot of information, but it wasn't
connected, that people didn't connect the dots, they didn't
share information.
And my question is, and I think it's a question on the
minds of the American people, if it had been done correctly,
could it have been prevented? And people that are promoting a
blue ribbon committee, which I am not, are saying that that's
the way we get to the bottom line.
But I want to know from you, who have been working at this
now for several months, could it have been prevented?
Ms. Hill. I can't say, guaranteed, that it could have been
prevented. There could have been some things done that it would
have been possible that they might have been able to uncover
some of this plot--if they had had the information on
individuals, and they had followed them, and they had
surveilled them, and the individuals had talked about something
and they might have picked it up.
I mean, all of those are ifs. It's one if after another.
You're never going to know that. But you need to get beyond
that point to the point that they could have done better. You
know, that's what they have to do the next time. Because if
they don't, you're not going to have a shot at preventing this
the next time. That's where the issue is, not so much
preventing what's already happened. It's preventing what may
happen in the future that we have to focus on. That's my own
view.
And I think to prevent what may happen in the future,
there's a lot of things that have to be done to get us there.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Mr. LaHood.
Let me say tomorrow we're going to have two panels with
five persons in total, all of whom have had extensive
experience at the highest level of actually making decisions
based on intelligence. And I would suggest the question you
just asked of Ms. Hill would be a very appropriate question to
ask of those panelists to get their assessment of whether there
was enough information from the experience and perspective that
they have had and can provide as to whether there was enough to
have avoided September the 11th.
Mr. Hoekstra.
Mr. Hoekstra. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I'd like to thank the Chairmen for how they started off
these public hearings with Steve and Kristen today, a very
appropriate way to begin the process by remembering those whose
families paid the ultimate sacrifice on September 11 and
recognizing the sense of urgency and the importance with which
this Committee has to go through and conduct its work.
And Ms. Hill, thank you for your work.
Ms. Hill. Thank you.
Mr. Hoekstra. Having gone through some other investigations
on other committees, recognizing the importance of how you
approach this work and the intensity and the professionalism
and having to put up with Members of Congress. So thank you for
being willing to go through that process.
As you've gone through and done the analysis, have you also
taken a look at other attempted terrorist activities during
this timeframe which may have been prevented because of
knowledge that we had beforehand and things that might not be
part of the public record? Have you uncovered anything like
that?
Ms. Hill. You mean other actions by other groups or----
Mr. Hoekstra. By al-Qa'ida or other groups that--you know,
where they had been planning on attacking the United States and
for one reason or another, those attacks were thwarted.
Ms. Hill. We have heard some of that. I mean, we have not
focused on that because we have been focusing on the
information on aircraft as weapons and the September 11 plot.
But certainly, in talking to people, there were successes
by the Intelligence Community against al-Qa'ida and other
terrorist groups. There were also, you know, failures.
Mr. Hoekstra. There were other failures.
Ms. Hill. So I didn't read that part of it, but in our
statement we talk about the fact that it was a very difficult
target for the Intelligence Community. Al-Qa'ida had a lot of
operational security. They were hard to penetrate. It was hard
to get them to talk about things that would help you. It was
difficult. There were resource problems.
But despite all of that, the community did amass a lot of
information on them, and they were engaged in operations
against Al-Qa'ida. And there were some successes, but there
were also some failures.
Mr. Hoekstra. As you go though this process, will you also
overlay policy decisions that were made either in Congress or
at the Executive level? Specifically, I think this morning,
Steve talked about--and I'm not sure exactly what the words
were--the inability to penetrate organizations like al-Qa'ida
with human intelligence and recognizing that during parts of
the '90s, you know, there were decisions that were made that
changed the way that the CIA and other organizations could
actually recruit human intelligence.
Ms. Hill. I think that area, I mean those are all valid
policy questions, and it's relevant to how you combat terrorism
in groups like this obviously, because penetrating a group like
this is tremendously important. It's a valuable source of
intelligence.
But I think those are issues that we will probably address.
As I understand the Chairmen, one of the things we want to do
as we get further away from the facts--we're trying to get the
factual review out first--is to go to the systemic problems and
then look at possible ways to reform the community and changes
and policy issues and those sorts of things.
So I would guess that those issues would be addressed once
we get into where do we go from here in terms of reform.
Mr. Hoekstra. Because it's very, very clear that the
Intelligence Community and the various agencies don't operate
in a vacuum. There are policy decisions that are over a period
of time that will have an impact on the culture within the
various agencies as to their ability to recruit or how they
will use or who they will access for human intelligence. There
are also decisions that are made by Congress in terms of the
funding levels and direction and those types of things.
And as the report moves forward, we will get a fuller
context of where the breakdowns will be, some of which may have
occurred within the intelligence agencies, some of which may
have occurred in the Executive, other parts of the Executive
branch or some of which may have occurred in Congress because
of decisions that have been made over here, so that we get that
full picture of what went on.
Ms. Hill. Right.
Mr. Hoekstra. Those are all areas that you plan on looking
at?
Ms. Hill. The game plan, so to speak, is to look at the
factual review, get through that, then look at the systemic
issues and then decide how those systemic issues can be
addressed through reform. And what you're talking about I think
would be in the review of systemic problems, restrictions on
our ability to penetrate human sources, and then where we go
from here in terms of reform.
Mr. Hoekstra. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Chairman Graham. Thank you very much.
Senator Shelby.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Thank you. I've missed some of this
because, like everybody else, we have to do other things during
the meetings.
Would it be fair to say at this point in the inquiry, the
investigation, that we're a long way from finishing our
inquiry; are we not?
Ms. Hill. I like to be optimistic rather than pessimistic,
and I would say I think we've made a significant good start
down the road. We're not finished, but I think we've done a
fair amount of work here, and we have a good record on the
facts so far.
Vice Chairman Shelby. But you are a veteran investigator,
veteran prosecutor, Inspector General of DOD, we all know this
and we have a lot of respect for you. In any investigation, you
don't know what's going to turn up next, do you?
Ms. Hill. Right.
Vice Chairman Shelby. And you're not telling us here today
and the American people that you see the end of this
investigation?
Ms. Hill. No, I think I said previously in response to
another question that any investigation, the more you dig, you
find things and then you have to have time to go through those
things.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Analyze it.
Ms. Hill. That is happening. It's happening to us like it
happens in any investigation, and we're trying to follow those
facts to where they lead. Now, whether all of that will be
finished by whenever this is determined to end, I don't know.
But I think we'll make a significant contribution, and we'll
have made available a good body of knowledge.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Well, I think you're already making a
significant contribution, and I think the staff is. My concern
is that we don't know what we don't know.
Ms. Hill. That is correct.
Vice Chairman Shelby. And I have the feeling that there's
more out there because I raised this morning--I raised the
issue in my opening statement that I don't believe, as a member
of the Committee, that we've had the utmost support by the
agencies that we're investigating. And I don't believe that
we've had the support that was promised at the outset, you
know, by the Administration.
Having said that, I want to focus just what little time I
have on the FBI. You may have talked about this earlier--I know
you addressed it--and that is the analytical component of the
FBI. We know that the FBI has got good people. We know that
they're great on investigations. They have no peer, I believe.
But on analysis of intelligence information, some of us have
been on the Committee--and this is my eighth year here--we've
been concerned with that for a long time. It's hard to put an
intelligence division or component together and make it work.
Tell us in your judgment, what was the state of the
analytical component of the FBI before September 11 as far as
terrorism is concerned?
Ms. Hill. The FBI, I mean, our figures--we have the figures
in the statement--they, I think, had one individual working al-
Qa'ida analytically.
Vice Chairman Shelby. One individual working al-Qa'ida
before September 11 in the analysis.
Ms. Hill. Analysis, right.
And, you know, my own personal view, and you alluded to it,
is based on the fact that I have worked with the FBI for many,
many years starting when I was a prosecutor----
Vice Chairman Shelby. I know you have.
Ms. Hill. And I agree with you. I think they are tremendous
investigators. And in terms of law enforcement, they can be the
best on some cases and prosecutions. But that's their mission.
Their mission is to do an investigation, to do a prosecution,
do a case. If it's their case and their mission, their
prosecution, they will go to the nth degree and they're very
aggressive and we need that.
But they are not, at least in my experience, their training
and their mission does not focus on going beyond that into the
broader analytical world and looking at the big picture. They
are focused on their case, and it's too bad because their
aggressiveness would be very valuable if they could also
channel it, at least in issues like terrorism, in a little
broader way, onto the analytic view.
Vice Chairman Shelby. But before September the 11, they
only had one person in the whole Bureau working on that, you
just testified to--is that correct--on al-Qa'ida?
Ms. Hill. Yes, and I just have a note from our staff, who
has done a lot of these interviews, that at the FBI they had
one individual doing strategic analysis. That is what we're
talking about.
Vice Chairman Shelby. That's right.
Ms. Hill. They did have some others that were doing, as she
calls it, operational analysis, which I would interpret to mean
that was connected with prosecutions and cases. And so, there
were individuals doing that.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Do you think that there is a way to
get the FBI changed, or at least part of it, toward strategic
analysis of information dealing with terrorism in the future? I
know we talked to the Director about this, but that's harder to
do than it is to say, isn't it?
Ms. Hill. Well, I think it's not only getting them to
expand their focus. I mean, it's like any job or profession in
an agency; they have to be able to give people incentives in
terms of career and progression and those sorts of things to
make the analysis positions in the FBI important positions that
people want to do.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Well, my light's on. I guess I'll
wait another round, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Ms. Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join others in commending Ms. Hill on the
excellent work that she and the members of her very able staff
have performed.
Ms. Hill. Thank you.
Ms. Pelosi. I hope that it is a comfort to the families to
know how persistent and thorough the staff is in this
investigation, in this inquiry. However limited it is, it's
strictly to intelligence. And as was mentioned earlier, there
are other agencies of government beyond the Intelligence
Community that need some review as well.
The question of could it have been prevented, of course, is
one that will haunt us as long as we exist as a country, and
there's no good answer. The good news is the bad news. If the
answer is no, it could not have been prevented, that means
we're very exposed in the future. If it means yes, it could
have been prevented, that's good news because that bodes well
for the future, but is a tragedy, obviously, for the families.
It's a tragedy in any event. But if it could have been
prevented, we'll all be haunted by the guilt associated with
that, and that's not even good enough punishment for us. There
will be hell to pay. That's going up to September 11.
Post-September 11, if any of these agencies of government
in the Intelligence Community are not dealing honestly with
us--and by that I mean, being forthcoming with information--if,
as Mr. Shelby says, there's other information to come that we
don't know about now, I believe there will be hell to pay for
them because we all assume that everyone is doing their best to
protect our country, and they must help us get to the bottom of
this. I trust that they are helping us all they can, but we
must continue the inquiry.
I think, as one who originally supported an independent
commission--I was the original author of it and we passed in
Committee, we failed on the floor--the idea, I think, is an
important one. However, it does not in any way undermine the
important work of this inquiry. As Mr. Roemer has said, and
others have said, this piece of it that goes into the
Intelligence Committee is very important.
We could have had the best intelligence in the world,
though, and what we've found out since September 11 is that the
hijackers and the al-Qa'ida knew something about us that we did
not know about ourselves, and that is we had tremendous
exposure at the airports. That all four of these hijackings
could have been successful is remarkable. I find it remarkable
that maybe one would get by, but four of them to succeed, in
their words ``succeed,'' is remarkable to me.
So my question to you, Ms. Hill, is on this subject your
report is clear, but I'd just like to see if you could shed
some further light. As you were looking into this issue of the
hijackers, and we'll go more into it in a couple of days, but
did you see a distinction made between hijacking--of course,
that's a predictable threat to us--and using airplanes as
weapons as two distinct threats, because from the perspective
of many of us, a hijacking is still the loss of many, many
lives and should have been taken as seriously as hijacking with
intent to do further damage?
Ms. Hill. We certainly, when we went out looking for
information and requesting information from the agencies,
distinguished it because we were asking for information on the
use of aircraft as weapons. So that would imply more than the
usual attempt to just hijack a plane to get somewhere or take
hostages or whatever.
But in terms of being prepared to address it--and your
comments about why they were able to hijack all four of these
planes and why our defenses were down--there's probably less of
a distinction, and I point to the FAA and FBI assessments that
we quote in this staff statement. I think for that year, which
was I believe 2000, they were looking at the whole terrorist
threat to civil aviation, so they were not distinguishing
between aircraft as weapons or hijacking. And what was
interesting about it is they were concluding that there was a
very small domestic threat. So they were not too concerned
about any sort of terrorist threat to domestic U.S. aviation
here in the United States as late as 2000.
Ms. Pelosi. Well, I find that to be a serious shortcoming
separate and apart from not knowing the time and place and
date.
Ms. Hill. Right.
Ms. Pelosi. The fact that the entire threat was minimized
to that extent. So I do see the need, as I had said before, to
assess the performance of any agency, beyond the intelligence
agencies, which have a responsibility to protect against acts
of terrorism and to shed--to look with fresh eyes and some
innovative thinking on our intelligence and all other aspects
of protecting the American people in this regard. And of
course, as Senator Rockefeller said, we must do it right, but I
think doing it right also means protecting our civil liberties.
So we have quite a challenge, and your presentation this
morning and the work of your staff has been a valuable
contribution. Thank you.
Ms. Hill. Thank you.
Ms. Pelosi. I look forward to following hearings.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Ms. Pelosi.
Mr. Goss.
Chairman Goss. Thank you. Let me advise members of the
House that there's ten minutes left on a vote in the House, so
my wrap-up will be very quick.
First of all, I want to thank Ms. Hill for a very excellent
presentation.
Ms. Hill. Thank you.
Chairman Goss. I like the version that we had before it had
been redacted better, and I expect that we are going to
continue to press on because I do believe that there is more
that can be revealed.
And along that area, is it fair for me to make a statement
that, because of the joint staff, we now know some things that
we otherwise certainly would not have known. Is that a fair
statement?
Ms. Hill. I would hope so, yes. I would say so.
Chairman Goss. It is certainly my feeling as well, and I
would hope that much of that can be shared with the American
people.
The second question I wanted to ask provides some guidance
from my perspective. It was in your excellent report this
morning on intelligence reporting on bin Ladin's intentions to
strike inside the United States on pages 14 and 15 of your
report--15 and 16. There are a series of specifics that cries
out to say, why was all this ignored? Where was the audience?
Why was nobody listening?
And one of the issues that I would like to have further
amplification on this is, if this was 2 percent of the
reporting, what was the other 98 percent of the reporting that
was consuming the analysts' time in the Intelligence Community?
I'm not asking for an answer now. I think that's going to be
helpful for our report.
The next question, I think, is self-evident and others have
said it. There's no doubt that some of the questions Members
here have addressed today to you are more appropriate for
witnesses that will be forthcoming, and I want to make sure
that we understand that there will be other witnesses
forthcoming. We will try and have as much of that as public as
we can, as it should be.
But the very penetrating questions that were asked by Ms.
Breitweiser and Mr. Push, and the recommendations I think are
excellent points. Each one of them deserves consideration and
we'll get them at some point. In fact, some of them have
already been given consideration, as I'm sure you know.
And finally, with regard to the remarks by Senator Levin
and Senator Rockefeller on declassification, my view is that
the burden is on the Administration to tell us why we must
preserve classification, unless it's in those areas, those
exempt areas that I spoke to--sources, methods, plans and
intentions, and ongoing prosecutions by the Justice Department.
The final point I would make is that the work of this
Committee will be done. There is no question about that, and
there will continue to be oversight by the United States
Congress in a number of areas, including in the Intelligence
Committees, no matter who the members are of that committee. So
this is an issue that is not going to be dropped merely because
another date flips up on a calendar or there is a change of
personnel somewhere in the establishment. This will go forward
because the American people deserve the answer, and they will
get the answer.
I thank you very much for your participation today. An
excellent job, Ms. Hill.
Ms. Hill. Thank you.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Mr. Goss.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I certainly concur with the remarks that have been made
about the excellence of the report.
Ms. Hill. Thank you.
Senator Feinstein. I'm just sorry I couldn't get it until
the meeting so I had to spend my time reading it during the
meeting, which Mr. Chairman, I would suggest is not the best
way of enabling us to carry out our duties.
Chairman Graham. Senator, as you know, we made the original
non-redacted version available in both the House and the Senate
Intelligence Committee rooms, and I understand that you took
advantage of that. Unfortunately, it was only within the last
less than 36 hours that we got back from the declassification
agencies the version that we could make public. I hope that in
the future we and they will do a better job and a more
expeditious job so that will give us an opportunity to know
what's going to be public with more lead time.
Senator Feinstein. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Hill, on December 4, 1998, the DCI told his deputies in
a memo about bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida that, ``We are at war. I
want no resources or people spared in this effort, either
inside CIA or the community.'' Yet, in your testimony, you
indicate that when it came time to translate that declaration
of war into real resources, the government's efforts fell
woefully short.
Specifically, you concluded that the allocation of
Intelligence Community resources did not adequately reflect a
true war against bin Ladin. For example, you point out in 1999
the CTC of CIA had only three analysts assigned to the bin
Ladin network worldwide. And after 2000 that number had risen
to just five, and that things were even worse outside the CIA.
The international terrorism analytic unit at the FBI had in
place only one analyst to address al-Qa'ida, this out of an
intelligence budget of literally billions of dollars every
year.
Now, it really concerns me because I was one that felt very
strongly that the warnings that something was going to happen
were there. And certainly, by July--I mean, this was just based
on what I heard in this Committee--100 percent certain that
something was going to happen. I even said that on national
television, that I thought it wasgoing to happen within the
next three months. And my question really goes to the fact that whether
today even we have enough to do what we need to do.
Why do you think so little attention, even after these
declarations of ``We're at war,'' were really paid when it came
to devoting real resources and what was taking a higher
priority?
Ms. Hill. I think that we have asked that to many people in
the community--and again I have to be careful with the details
of it because we're in a public session--but I think what we
are hearing is that there were other priorities for
intelligence. One reaction would be that people would tell you
is that the Intelligence Community responds to its customers,
customers being other parts of government that are tasking them
to come up with intelligence on certain items. And that, in
some respects, there were customers that they had to satisfy,
they felt they had to satisfy, and were told to satisfy on
other topics other than al-Qa'ida. So that was one issue that
we've heard.
We have heard in the FBI on the resources, as we just
discussed with Senator Shelby, that there were not many. There
was like one strategic analyst for al-Qa'ida in the FBI. There
were some more analysts on operations, and there was a much
bigger emphasis in the FBI on operations, on cases,
investigations, as opposed to strategic analysis even though it
was on al-Qa'ida, which was a high threat. But their mission
was more focused on actual prosecutions and cases.
So I think, as with any resource issue, it was a question
of other priorities, customers demanding other things and the
agencies responding to that.
Senator Feinstein. Do you believe that today there are
sufficient resources?
Ms. Hill. Senator, we know some of the details as to how
things have jumped since September 11 in terms of resources,
but we have not focused intently on what is going on post-
September 11 because our job has been to try and find out what
was happening before September 11. So I really would not feel,
you know, probably qualified to start guessing as to whether
it's adequate now.
Senator Feinstein. On page 15.
Chairman Graham. Senator, we will have another round after
this round.
Senator Feinstein. I don't even get the time that our
question took up. Never mind, that's all right. Thank you.
Chairman Graham. Senator Mikulski.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, a few words to the families, and then a question for
Ms. Hill.
To the families, first of all, my name is Barbara Mikulski.
I'm a United States Senator and I'm from the State of Maryland.
I had people die at the World Trade Center, and I also had 60
Marylanders die at the Pentagon when a plane created the
inferno there. I also believe I owe my life to the gallantry of
the men and women who fought back on flight 93 because I do
believe the plane was heading towards us. And I have two
constituents who died in the anthrax attack on us.
So know that I'm absolutely on your side. And I want you to
know I thank you today for coming because you show such
inspirational strength and courage, and I believe you have a
right to know about what happened. You have a right to be heard
in any public forum, and I believe that Americans have a right
to be protected. I know that you're still looking for answers
on why this happened, how it happened and how it doesn't happen
again.
Know I would support a vote to establish an independent
commission. I believe my Committee has done an outstanding job.
But I believe when such an impact happens to America and its
families, we need more than one opinion on how to make sure it
never happens again.
I find many things about what happened troubling, but what
I find most troubling is that four of the terrorists were
stopped by local law enforcement--four for speeding and one for
not having a driver's license. They were actually in the hands
of law enforcement. But when they were stopped and the police
went to check the databases, nothing alerted them to detain
these men. Something is wrong here.
State troopers, like the one in my own state that stopped
one of these thugs and other police officers, know more when
they check their database, know more about men being behind in
their child support the database will tell them, than they will
do about men who are possibly around a terrorist attack. There
are more than 50 different watch lists to keep track of people
dangerous to the United States.
But guess what? If you're a watch list, you don't talk to
other watch lists. If you're a watch list, you like live in one
of those caves. You might not know if there are other watch
lists out there. You don't tell anyone that you are a watch
list, and you certainly don't talk to each other, make friends
with the other watch lists or make friends with law
enforcement. That's really, I think, unacceptable.
And these will be the questions I'm going to direct to Ms.
Hill, because, like you, I want to be sure that this Committee
gets answers for you and the rest of America on how we can
detect, deter, disrupt and defeat any attack on the United
States of America.
And having said that, Ms. Hill, you know about these watch
lists. You know that they're all over the place and they're
nowhere. In our work with you and my colleagues, I wanted to
see if there was a smoking gun. I wanted to know what were the
systemic problems and what were the solutions. I'm not sure
there's a smoking gun, but these watch lists are definitely a
systemic problem.
Could you elaborate on them what you can or where you would
see solutions going on this watch list issue?
Ms. Hill. The watch list issue, Senator, I am aware of it.
We are going to go into that in more detail when we get to the
hearing on the hijackers because as you alluded to that is an
issue regarding Mihdhar and Hazmi. I mean, that's a very big
issue. It's an issue of getting in on the right watch list,
getting it to the right people. But even before that, it's also
an issue of getting it between the Intelligence Community and
the law enforcement community and breaking down the reluctance
sometimes to share information across--from the Intelligence
Community to the criminal investigators and law enforcement on
the other side.
And that, I think, may also play in some of this. But those
are issues that we will talk about when we look at the hijacker
case. And you're right, they are problems.
Senator Mikulski. Well, let me just say this before the
yellow goes to red. I raised the issue of a smoking gun. I've
been at many hearings. Do you believe that there is a smoking
gun on what went wrong or were there just a series of total
disconnects?
Ms. Hill. Well, of course, I'm handicapped in answering
that because we are in a public session and we are still
looking at a number of other issues that have come up. But I
don't think in any of what we have seen here there is a smoking
gun--if you mean by smoking gun that somebody in the United
States Government had information on when, where, and how this
was going to happen in the United States Government. We have
not found that.
But I had a discussion actually with one of our staff on
this the other day and he pointed out wisely that there's been
so much discussion about looking for a smoking gun. The truth
is, you hardly ever get a ``smoking gun,'' in not just
terrorism, but in a criminal case, et cetera, et cetera. And if
by focusing all of the time on whether we have the smoking gun,
you know, we focus on how we have to be ready to go if we have
a smoking gun, the truth is that most of the time you'll never
have a smoking gun. It's a lot harder to find it when you don't
have one.
So what we ought to be focusing on is how to get our
systemready to find these guys when you don't have a smoking gun, which
is what you're going to be faced with most of the time. You know, the
odds are, you're not going to have a smoking gun. And we need to have
our intelligence and law enforcement people good enough and bright
enough and aggressive enough that they can track these guys down and
find this even when there is no smoking gun, because, you know, in my
own experience, at least in law enforcement, that's what you have most
of the time.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kyl has submitted an opening statement which will
be placed in the record.
Senator Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
By the way, I think that last point is a very important
point and needs to be underscored. And it's one of the most
important things that comes from your statement today, Ms.
Hill.
Ms. Hill. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kyl. I was this morning detained in my office
waiting for a couple of phone calls, but I had my television on
the entire time and was privileged to hear not only the
statements of the Chairmen of our committee, but also the
statements made by Ms. Breitweiser and Mr. Push. And, as has
been expressed by others here, my heart goes out to them and
the families and friends that they represent. And I think that
I should state that I am certain that every American shares
their grief and their anger and even their frustration. And I
also share their view that there's more we could have done to
try to prevent the terrorism we experienced on September 11.
I also agree with Eleanor Hill that at the end of the day
it's doubtful we'll ever find a smoking gun, but as she said,
the important point is to be in a better position to deal with
the other pieces of information in order to try to prevent this
in the future.
I do think, Mr. Chairman, that it is very unclear whether
the joint investigation, the Joint Committee investigation that
we're engaged in here and whatever report we eventually submit
will satisfy these witnesses and those that they represent or
whether they will satisfy members of this Committee, let alone
the other members of the House and Senate.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, I've expressed serious
reservations about the direction of our investigation,
including the allocation of time and resources to holding open
hearings at this time before we've finished our work. Ours is a
large undertaking, and we've got a lot more work to do before
our fast-approaching deadline. And yet we're proceeding with
public hearings in spite of not having completed that
investigation.
What was presented today was only a staff document. I'm
talking now about the testimony of Ms. Hill. It was not a
consensus product of the Committee. Members had no practical
input into interim report, I think the public should know.
Ordinarily, we investigate, we write our report and then we
present our recommendations.
The staff's presentation of its interim report before
Member vetting is, therefore, in my view, premature as well as
a diversion of the joint staff from the investigation that we
have given them the job to do. The interim statement from our
Joint Inquiry staff provides some very valuable information
about what has been done to date--a chronology of events
leading to the September 11 attacks and some background
information about the growing threat of al-Qa'ida over the last
decade. It is very useful to have this history, and it's
important to make it public, but the Committee should have
approved it first. And in any event, the release of the report
could have been done without taking the time to have it read by
the staff director.
But more importantly, I believe the questions fundamental
to our investigation have yet to be pursued adequately. These
include, but are not limited to, whether part of the pre-
September 11 problem was the result of a culture of risk
aversion in the Intelligence Community and/or an inadequate
allocation and improper prioritization of resources to those on
the front lines of our counter-terror efforts.
Mr. Chairman, you know I've expressed before my concern
that Committee members have been able to play only a limited
role on this inquiry. It's largely being conducted by the Joint
Committee staff with little input by or to our own Committee
staffs, let alone the Members themselves. And that will make it
difficult to concur in the final product without reservations.
We will not know what we haven't been told, and, therefore, we
will not be able to vouch unequivocally for the final product.
Questions about this investigative process have led to
calls for the creation of a national commission to investigate
all of these matters. This would further stress the
Intelligence Community at the very time we're trying to fight
the war on terrorism. While it may be deemed necessary, it can
hardly be deemed desirable.
So I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can continue to work to
resolve these issues. Only by doing our very best will we have
done our duty to the victims who are represented here today and
to the American people.
Senator, thank you.
Senator Bayh is supposedly en route. Senator Shelby, do you
have a comment?
Vice Chairman Shelby. Yes, sir, if you'll recognize me till
he comes.
Chairman Graham. And then I have a couple of questions I'm
going to ask at the conclusion of Senator Bayh's questions.
Senator Shelby.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Ms. Hill, I'd like to go back to the
FBI and the analytical component we were talking about earlier,
or lack thereof. In your investigation regarding the analytical
ability of the FBI, do you know if the FBI prior to September
11 ever did an analysis of terrorist tactics--that is terrorist
tactics with a possible use of airplanes as weapons?
Ms. Hill. I don't believe so. We, as I think the statement
says----
Vice Chairman Shelby. You're saying no? You go ahead and
answer.
Ms. Hill. As the statement says, we haven't found any
analysis of the use of aircraft as weapons in the community, as
far as I know, including the FBI.
Vice Chairman Shelby. In the community--you're talking
about the Intelligence Community----
Ms. Hill. Yes, but we would include----
Vice Chairman Shelby [continuing]. Not just the FBI?
Ms. Hill. Right. I think it's safe to say the FBI also on
that.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Now, in our statement, I believe it's
on page 28--without reading it all--and I'll quote some of it.
It says, ``In April 2000 the Intelligence Community obtained
information regarding an alleged bin Ladin plot to hijack a
747. The source was a walk-in to the FBI's New York office
claiming that he had been to a training camp in Pakistan where
he learned hijacking techniques and received arms training. He
also stated that he was supposed to meet five or six other
individuals in the U.S. who would participate in the plot.''
I'll read further. ``They were instructed to use all
necessary force to take over the plane because there would be
pilots among the hijacking team. The plan was to fly the plane
to Afghanistan and if they could not make it there, they were
to blow up the plane.''
This is part of your report, is that right?
Ms. Hill. Right.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Now, I believe there was another
report of August 2001, according to page 28 of your report.
``In August 2001 the Intelligence Community obtained
information regarding a plot to either bomb the U.S. embassy in
Nairobi from an airplane or crash an airplane into it. The
Intelligence Community learned that two people who were
reportedly acting on instructions from Usama bin Ladin met in
October 2000 to discuss this plot.''
And then we go back--and you've touched on this I believe;
I know we've had hearings on it--about the Philippines '95
situation where there was information that they could use
airplanes as weapons and so forth.
In the light of the part of your statement that I just
referred to, you're saying that, according to your
investigation, there was not any analysis of these terrorists
tactics in the Intelligence Community regarding the use of
airplanes?
Ms. Hill. There was no analysis of the likelihood of the
use of airplanes as weapons as a terrorist tactic.
Vice Chairman Shelby. I wonder why not.
Ms. Hill. I would hypothesize that, when we've asked
questions of people, it's a resource issue. People say they
were overwhelmed. The other thing, and I mentioned this
earlier, I don't think anyone had pulled together as much
information on this as we did. The way we got this information
is by going to the agencies and saying we want everything you
have on the use of aircrafts as weapons. And we had them pull
reports out of this huge amount of data they have and come up
with enough to show that there was this trend and this theme
going through some of the reporting.
Vice Chairman Shelby. This was not on September the 11th
something new or shouldn't have been something new.
Ms. Hill. No.
Vice Chairman Shelby. This was stuff that had been out
there at least since '95 before then. And I believe you talked
about the Paris incident----
Ms. Hill. Right.
Vice Chairman Shelby [continuing]. Where the French----
Ms. Hill. The Eiffel Tower.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Oh, yes, the Eiffel Tower deal, the
Philippine deal, these reportings that you listed. So, when
people come up and they say, gosh, we were shocked that they
would use airplanes as weapons and we didn't do any analysis of
that in the community, are you kind of shocked or surprised?
Ms. Hill. Well, it was there. The information was there.
Vice Chairman Shelby. The information was there, if they
had analyzed it.
Ms. Hill. Right.
Vice Chairman Shelby. As far as the potential tactics of
the highjackers, is that right?
Ms. Hill. Yes. Based on what we've seen, this was not a new
idea as of September 11.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I apologize for
not being here earlier, but I had a Judiciary Committee hearing
which ran in conflict with this hearing. And I thank you, Mr.
Chairman, Senator Shelby and our counterparts in the House for
the time put into this effort and your leadership in bringing
us to this moment.
I personally feel that we have identified some things of
value in terms of shortcomings from the government's point of
view prior to September 11. We have identified a lack of
communication among the intelligence agencies and I'm afraid
that today, although there's been an improvement, there's still
much room for improvement.
I have focused primarily on the issue of information
technology and I have been chagrined and disappointed by the
reports about the lack of coordination of the computer
architecture of the federal government so that intelligence
agencies can share information effectively. Governor Ridge
referred to this as a force multiplier and it would be, but it
is not because of those shortcomings.
We've also considered the results of those shortcomings,
not the least of which was the example of the Phoenix Memo,
which should have been, but was not, brought to the attention
of or analyzed by counterterrorism forces. That memo might have
at least helped us to be better prepared for what occurred on
September 11, though I don't want to suggest that anyone saw
this coming in its specifics. But it certainly raised
questions, which should have been pursued and were not. I
think, recalling some of the testimony we received, there was
clearly a lack of follow-up at the FBI and a lack of
involvement by the CIA. The same thing holds true for the
Moussaoui arrest and disclosures that came out of the FBI
afterwards--again, evidencing a lack of coordination, a lack of
sharing of vital information that could have had us better
prepared to defend America.
Those two instances, though, I would like to bring to the
attention of this joint inquiry, have come to the public eye
because of leaks by the Administration and leaks from Capitol
Hill of vital information. It strikes me as unwise and unfair
for us to expect there to be a thorough investigation of what
led up to September 11 based on the possibility of leaks coming
from anywhere.
History has told us that it is far better to have a public
hearing, a public investigation and the involvement of third
parties when it comes to assigning blame and perhaps suggesting
meaningful and painful reforms. But, that has not been the case
here. I think we are doing what we set out to do, to try to
find ways to improve the workings of the Intelligence Community
to avoid a future September 11. But we will never be able to
satisfy the needs and curiosity of the American people about
whether their government did everything it could to protect
them in closed hearings with occasional leaks. That is not
going to serve the needs of America.
[Applause.]
Senator Durbin. I know that earlier today there was
testimony of one of the widows of a victim of September 11 and
I have met in my office with some of those same victims and
their families in painful meetings. There is an anger and a
sadness in the message that they bring to Congress, but there
is certainly, I think, wisdom in what they've suggested. Let us
do our business here. Let us try to find evenwithin closed
hearings ways to improve intelligence, but let's not forget our primary
obligation to the people of this country.
We do not serve the needs of an open society with closed
hearings in relation to an attack on America, virtually
unprecedented in our history. It is time for us to acknowledge
the obvious. We need a third party investigation, people that
we can trust who have no political animus, who are going to
come to this as loyal Americans and try to help us be a safer
nation.
I commend the staff. They have done heroic work and I know
have worked long and hard to bring the report that we have
today and we should continue to meet our mandate as best we
can. But let us not believe that this chapter has been closed
in American history. We have merely addressed the foreword with
this investigation. Now we must get into the substance and do
it in a public way. That's not to diminish any of the efforts
of my colleagues or anyone on this Committee, but I think we
owe it to the American people to give them more.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. I would like to ask a question and then
make a comment. The question has to do with the relationship
between intelligence and affecting the operations of a
governmental agency. You have five or more pages in which you
outline the examples of the use of commercial aviation as a
weapon of mass destruction. As I understand the history,
generally the taking of an airplane by highjackers has been
done for either a political or an economic purpose. In light of
that, the standard protocol of what a crew is supposed to do if
they are subjected to highjacking is to cooperate, to
acquiesce, try to get the airplane on the ground and then start
the process of negotiating with the highjackers. From your
review is that an accurate statement?
Ms Hill. Yes, I think that's correct and that was
traditionally the way you would deal with a hijacking.
Chairman Graham. And I believe it was reflected in the way
in which the first three planes that were highjacked on
September the 11 reacted. It was not until the information of
the first three planes became known to the persons on the
fourth plane that there was a resistance to the hijackers and
the result that the plane crashed in Pennsylvania.
With the kind of intelligence information then, there might
be a shift in the way in which hijackers and aircraft
interrelate. That is, instead of they can be airplane for a
political or economic purpose, that the plane itself might be
converted into a weapon and used in the horrific manner that it
was. Was that information from the Intelligence Community
transmitted to either the FAA or the commercial aviation
industry so that it might affect the way in which they advised
crews as to how to respond to a hijack?
Ms. Hill. I cannot say that all that information was
transmitted to the FAA, but the FAA did get some of it and we
talk about their analysis of the threat to civil aviation. My
own read on it is that I don't think that, to the extent the
FAA got the information, there was a real recognition that this
was a serious threat.
You're correct. If they had changed their focus from
highjacking for a ransom or to take the plane and fly it
somewhere else or hostages or whatever, if that had changed to
the use of an aircraft as weapon, you would have had to change
the entire mindset and training that was given to the flight
crews, for instance, and the security in the plane and
everything. And that, obviously, did not happen, as of
September 11; you're absolutely correct. It didn't happen on
September 11 until, evidently, the passengers in the fourth
plane became aware of what was going on. But the flight crews
up to that point, I assume, were following the standard
protocol for dealing with a hijacking.
But that issue underscores the importance of someone
recognizing in the community, the Intelligence Community, that
this was a serious threat and that there was a stream of
information there and that perhaps it was serious enough and
the likelihood was serious enough that they needed to address
not only disseminating it but telling policymakers in those
other agencies that this was a threat they now had to be
prepared to meet.
Chairman Graham. One of my criticisms of the threats that
are being issued to the general public, including the one
within the last two weeks, is that what's lacking is the
follow-on of what is the citizen who receives this information
that they're living in a heightened threat environment supposed
to do to protect themselves, their families, their communities.
And here we have a case where intelligence information was sent
to a sophisticated industry, commercial aviation, apparently
without any direction as to how the industry should use the
information and the consequence was they didn't use the
information and that contributed to what happened on September
the 11.
I'd like to ask if we might pursue that issue, because I
think it is a metaphor for the larger issue of how do you get
intelligence from the theoretical to actually affecting the way
people function and how they use that information to reduce
their vulnerability to a particular threat.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. I think Senator DeWine was before me,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Oh, I'm sorry. Senator DeWine, I'm sorry.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Chairman, I don't have any further
questions, thank you.
Chairman Graham. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. May I, Mr. Chairman?
Ms. Hill, I wanted to kind of follow up on where I was
trying to go with this. The year 2001 was a very big year in
the early spring with a lot of pieces of intelligence coming
in. In reading your report, the year 1998 also appears to have
been a very big year for all kinds of pieces. And I wanted to
see if we couldn't go into some of those pieces a little bit
more. They're contained on page 15 on your written statement.
You talk about the use of fronts for terrorist activities.
You talk about flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into
an airport and detonating it. Al-Qa'ida was trying to establish
an operative cell within the United States, a bin Ladin plot
involving aircraft in New York and Washington, recruiting a
group of five to seven young men from the United States to
travel to the Middle East for training, reward money for
assignations of four top intelligence agency officers and on
like that. And then of course the war that was declared in the
CIA.
Can you go into any more detail on any of these individual
pieces of intelligence and how they were used from an
intelligence perspective to try to weave an intelligence web?
Because it seems to me with this and then, unfortunately, in
July of 2001 with the Phoenix Memo and then in August with
Moussaoui, I don't know what was in his computer or in his
possession, but I would suggest if you took those pieces and
the other pieces, one might be able to weave together a rather
significant scheme. Can you give us any more information?
Ms. Hill. I can't. I don't think I can give you more
information on the actual report because, as I mentioned at the
outset, the language that we have in this statement is what has
been declassified. So, to venture beyond that language, that is
the language that the declassification group basically signed
off on as suitable for public release. I can't go into much
more detail about the language of the report.
We did go on some of these to the FBI and asked them what
they did with some of this information or what happened to it
when the report came in, if they got it, and I can tell you,
some of them. We've given them a whole list and some we still
have not gotten responses. They are still trying to find out
what they did or trying to locate the record. Others they have
found. For instance, I think you mentioned the 1998 information
concerning a bin Ladin plot involving aircraft in New York and
Washington. The FBI, I can tell you, did receive that
information and theyworked actually with local law enforcement
to try to verify the report, but they were not able to corroborate the
report and took no further action. That is what we have been told.
In September '98, we had one where we did get a response
from the FBI. This was the one indicating that they obtained
information that bin Ladin's next operation could involve
flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S. airport
and detonating it. We asked the FBI if they got that
information and what did they do with it. They did receive the
information and they also worked with another government agency
to try to verify the information.
The source of the information said that another individual
had advance knowledge of some of bin Ladin's operations and had
given him the information about bin Ladin's attack that was in
this report. The FBI tells us that they tried to work with
other agencies and did verify portions of this account, but
they were not able to locate the individual who purportedly had
the advance knowledge. And after September 11 they actually
went back to this report and tried to locate that individual
again and were unable to do so.
So, what we tried to do when we got these reports that we
felt were significant, there were many in 1998 involving
domestic U.S. attacks and on those we went back to the FBI, as
I said, and asked them did you get the report? What did you do
to verify it or did you take any action? And they have come
back to us on some of them. Some of them, there are a number of
them, they are still trying to go through the records and come
up with an answer as to whether they got it and if so what they
did with it. But, those two are examples of the type of thing
we're getting from them.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, just one quick comment, if I might. I think
this report becomes kind of a basic primer on 9/11. I'm sure
more will be filled in as time goes on, but I find it a very
valuable document in establishing a chronology of what was
known, when it was known, the fragmentary messages that come
through here, and my hope is as these hearings go on, and
particularly when we get to the Phoenix Memo and the Moussaoui
case, that we might be able to ask some questions and I don't
know in public session if we will about if there had been a
FISA warrant on Moussaoui and the information made available,
whether that would have been substantial enough to really ring
a very strong bell.
But, I wanted to thank the staff and Ms. Hill and also
thank the victims who are here today. It's very special and I
hope you know that we really do care and you really do have our
sympathy and our determination to get at the heart of it.
Chairman Graham. And, Senator, I share those comments and I
would say that within the next week or ten days we will have a
further specific hearing on the issues that surround the
Moussaoui case and that would a very excellent opportunity to
bore in at the level of detail that you've indicated your
interest.
I didn't get a chance in my first round to make my
comments, so I will do so, unless does anyone have any
remaining questions or this will be the last word.
To me, one of the lessons that we have been learning and
today we've learned it at a new depth is how difficult it is to
get an organization which has been doing its business,
important business, in a particular pattern for an extended
period of time to be flexible enough to recognize that the
environment has shifted and it is going to have to change its
pattern of business.
In case of the intelligence agencies, they were a child
born in 1947 and grew up in the Cold War. Every experience that
the U.S. intelligence service had was a post-1947 experience,
because we didn't have any civilian intelligence service in the
United States prior to 1947. I contrast that with, for
instance, the British, who've had an intelligence service since
the Napoleonic Wars. So it's not surprising that when the Cold
War ended the agencies continued to act pretty much the way
they did while the Cold War was still under way because that
was the only environment in which they had ever functioned or
known.
We've had some examples in, I think, in the report that Ms.
Hill has given us today--the difficulty in reestablishing
priorities, even though we've declared that terrorism and Usama
bin Ladin specifically was such an adversary that we were at
war with him. We didn't change resources commensurate with that
decision. We did not recognize that terrorism was now becoming
a domestic threat, because historically we thought of terrorism
as something that happened abroad and the new creative uses
that the highjackers were about to make of commercial
airliners. No longer were they passive instruments to try to
use to secure money or some political advantage; they have
themselves become a weapon of mass destruction.
So, I see as one of our challenges as we move from what
we're learning to what we're going to prescribe for the future
is how can we build in to our Intelligence Community a greater
capability of internal adaptation? We certainly don't want to
leave this issue for the future that will require a repetition
of September the 11 to get to grab us by the sleeves and say
you've got to change, because your old ways are threatening the
security of the American people. And how we go about doing
that, I suggest, will be one of our major tasks and, if we're
successful, one of our major accomplishments.
If there's no further statement, as I indicated earlier,
the record will be open for 48 hours if anyone has any
additional material they would like to submit.
I want to especially thank the families who are represented
here today and especially to Kristen, who I see is still with
us, and also Stephen for their excellent presentation which
started our public hearings with the appropriate recognition of
why we are here. We are here because of you. Thank you.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Mr. Chairman, what's the schedule for
the rest of the week?
Chairman Graham. Ms. Hill, do you want to review tomorrow?
Ms. Hill. I believe tomorrow we are going to have a public
hearing in this room beginning at 10:00 and there will be two
panels of users of intelligence products from the Intelligence
Community and those users will be senior government officials
over several Administrations.
I believe tomorrow we will have Mr. Wolfowitz, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Mr. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State,
Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser, Tony Lake,
former National Security Adviser and Sandy Berger, former
National Security Adviser.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Will we start at ten?
Chairman Graham. You'll start at 10:00 and, assuming that
the stars line up properly and we can accomplish this, our goal
would be to complete the first panel, which will be Mr.
Wolfowitz and Mr. Armitage in approximately three hours, have a
break and then return at 2:30 and have the second panel run
another--I'm corrected. The second panel's going to start at
two o'clock so that we can try to finish at approximately 5:00
with both panels.
Ms. Hill. That's correct.
Chairman Graham. Are we at a point, Ms. Hill, we can
comment on Friday yet?
Ms. Hill. I think we're still engaged in ongoing
discussions regarding Friday.
Chairman Graham. Okay. Thank you, Senator.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
JOINT COMMITTEE HEARING ON THE VIEWS OF CURRENT AND FORMER SENIOR
POLICYMAKERS ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S COUNTERTERRORIST EFFORTS
IN REVIEW OF THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2002
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
House of Representatives Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:25 a.m., in
room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Bob
Graham, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, presiding.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence members present:
Senators Graham, Shelby, Levin, Rockefeller, Feinstein, Durbin,
Bayh, Edwards, Mikulski, Kyl, Inhofe, Hatch, DeWine and Lugar.
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence members
present: Representatives Goss, Bereuter, Castle, Boehlert,
Gibbons, LaHood, Hoekstra, Chambliss, Everett, Pelosi, Bishop,
Harman, Roemer, Reyes, Boswell, Peterson and Cramer.
Chairman Graham. I call the hearing to order. Welcome to
this, the second public hearing by the joint inquiry committee
into the Intelligence Community's performance before, during
and since the attacks of September the 11th.
At the outset I would like to make an announcement about
tomorrow. We will have a hearing, and it will probably include
a 10:00 morning and 2:00 or 2:30 afternoon session. The subject
will be the Malaysia hijackers. We will have a staff report,
which is available to be read in both the Hart offices of the
Senate subcommittee and at the Capitol offices of the House
committee. It is in the process of being declassified. As of 10
o'clock, that process had not been completed, but the
classified version is available now. It has been for the past 2
weeks. The declassified version hopefully will be available
shortly.
We will have three witnesses representing the CIA, the FBI.
Each of them had a particular role in the events that surround
the Malaysia hijacking aspect of the September 11 tragedy.
We will have designated questioners for that hearing. The
designated Senate Democratic questioner will be Senator Levin.
At this time I do not know who the other three questioners will
be.
Is there any question relative to tomorrow's schedule?
I again would like to express our joint appreciation for
the excellent presentations that were made in yesterday's
hearings by representatives of the families of the victims of
September 11. Their powerful testimony, probing questions
underscored the reason for this inquiry, to ensure that our
government is better prepared to fight the threat of terrorism
and to avoid repetition of last year's tragedies at the World
Trade Center, the Pentagon, and that field in Pennsylvania.
We remain at risk for the very same terrorist
organizations. It is our responsibility, as well other
important parts of the Federal, State and local governments, to
reduce their threat to our homeland.
I would also like to express my appreciation for the
outstanding presentation made yesterday by our professional
staff under the leadership of Eleanor Hill. Ms. Hill's
compelling presentation of the early findings of our inquiry
raised many questions, some of which will be posed to witnesses
today, and those questions are: how much of a priority has been
given within our government to fighting terrorism, particularly
since the end of the Cold War; why was there not more attention
to the possibility of a terrorist attack on the homeland of
America; did the United States Government understand the
gravity of the threat of terrorism; and did the Intelligence
Community provide adequate warnings to policymakers; based on
these assessments, what reforms to the Intelligence Community
would you recommend? These are a few of the important questions
of our inquiry. We will be addressing these at this and future
hearings.
Today we will hear from two panels of distinguished
witnesses who will describe for us how well the Intelligence
Community has discharged its duty to support senior
policymakers. As active consumers of intelligence, these
individuals are uniquely qualified to help us determine whether
senior policymakers have been well served by the Intelligence
Community. In other words, are the senior leaders of our
government receiving timely and relevant information,
particularly regarding terrorism?
We will also seek to learn from these individuals about the
overall direction of the United States Government's effort
against terrorism and the efforts that have been undertaken by
the current and former administration to assure that the
Intelligence Community has had the leadership and resources
necessary to focus on this escalating threat.
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz will testify before the
committee this morning, and we welcome them.
This afternoon the committee will hear from three former
national security advisors to the President: General Brent
Scowcroft, national security advisor in the Ford and first Bush
administration; Dr. Anthony Lake, national security advisor
during the first term of the Clinton administration; Mr. Sandy
Berger, national security advisor in the second term of the
Clinton administration.
Three lead questioners, one from the Senate and two from
the House, will ask questions of the witnesses. Senator
Rockefeller will take the lead from the Senate side.
Representatives Boswell and Bereuter will take the lead from
the House side. Other Members will be recognized to ask
questions in the order in which they have arrived at the
hearing.
We must conclude the first panel by 1 p.m., so some
questions may need to wait until this afternoon's session.
Before calling upon our witnesses, I would ask if there are
any opening statements from our co-Chair Congressman Goss or
from Congresswoman Pelosi.
Chairman Goss. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Pelosi. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you.
We are honored to have with us this morning Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Mr. Armitage was sworn in as Deputy
Secretary of State on March 26, 2001. He previously served our
country in senior positions in the Department of State and the
Department of Defense, and on the staff of our former colleague
Senator Bob Dole of Kansas. From 1993 until his return to
government service last year, he had his own business and
public policy consulting firm.
Dr. Wolfowitz was sworn in on March 2, 2001 as the 28th
Deputy Secretary of Defense. This is his third tour of duty in
the Pentagon. He also served in the State Department and was
our Nation's Ambassador to Indonesia. For the 7 years prior to
his return to government service in 2001, Dr. Wolfowitz was
dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies at the Johns Hopkins University.
Each of our committees has adopted a supplemental rule for
this joint inquiry that all witnesses will be sworn. I would
ask the witnesses to rise at this time.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Graham. Thank you.
Mr. Armitage, welcome, and we look forward to your
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Armitage follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If you will allow me
just to submit my testimony for the record, the purpose of this
hearing is for you all to ask questions. The public wants
questions asked, we are going to do our best to give you some
answers. So I would just like to make three points, if I might.
The first is one that is a question that was not asked in
the letter that you kindly sent to Secretary Powell and
Secretary Rumsfeld; that is, are we satisfied that we did
everything we could do to prevent 9/11 from happening? It is
implicit in these hearings, the question I want to pose
explicitly, and the answer to that is when you see 3,000 of
your brothers and sisters die, when you witness the compelling
testimony yesterday, people sitting in the audience holding
pictures of their loved ones, no one can say that they were
satisfied no matter how splendidly any individual thinks that
they were doing their job, and no matter thus far, that I have
not been able to ascertain, a single point of failure in the
system.
This is not to say that we just sat back for the 9 months
or so from the time the administration came in until this
tragedy occurred. I will speak, obviously, from the Department
of State's point of view. As was noted yesterday by Ms. Hill,
the strategic intelligence was not bad. In fact, it was good
enough for us to take several steps. We issued, between January
and September, nine warnings, five of them global, because of
the threat information we were receiving from the intelligence
agencies in the summer when George Tenet was around town
literally pounding on desks saying, something is happening,
this is an unprecedented level of threat information. He didn't
know where it was going to happen, but he knew that it was
coming.
The strategic information was sufficient to allow us to go
out to four specific posts with warnings, and let me be clear,
this does not mean we tell our people in the embassy to button
up. We are required because of our no dual standard or policy
to inform every American who is going to travel to X country
and every American that we have registered in that country by
e-mail, by consular bulletin, telephonic notification, by
bulletins in hotels, et cetera. I make this point because it
behooves all travelers to make sure what we long requested that
they do; that is, check in with the U.S. Embassy whether you
are a visitor or permanent resident.
Second, the administration, I think, as you will see
through your questions in their--I believe the first Deputies
meeting after Paul and I were both confirmed, set off against
al-Qa'ida. As you will see in the questions today, we just
didn't want to roll back, we realized that we were in a war.
And you will see that through the testimony.
Finally, something that I don't quite know how to
verbalize. It is this: I mentioned that we were able to warn
some of our embassies. We did it again last week, as you saw,
particularly in Southeast Asia, because of specific and, we
believe, credible information, and in some cases we buttoned
them up, we closed them, we kept people at home. Did we save
any lives? I don't know. I hope so. Last summer when we did the
same thing. Did we save any lives? I don't know. I hope so.
That is the point I want to make, is, for the Department of
State, the metrics to define success in many aspects of this
war is in things that didn't happen, things that were avoided.
So I guess another way of saying that is that your
administration and successive administrations have to be right
every time, every single time. The terrorists only have to be
right once.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Wolfowitz.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfowitz follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
TESTIMONY OF PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Wolfowitz. Chairman Graham, Chairman Goss, members of
this committee, you have long provided our country strong
leadership and bipartisan support, especially now as we wage
this war against terrorism. You demonstrate by example that
America's security transcends party or politics. I appreciate
the opportunity to discuss with you today some Defense
Department perspectives on the very important role of
intelligence. I will keep my comments brief, as I believe my
primary purpose today is to respond to your particular
questions.
Let me first say that our thoughts and prayers are with the
families of the victims of last September's attacks. Last week,
on the anniversary of the Pentagon attack, I was privileged to
take part in a ceremony honoring those men and women who
labored so diligently and tirelessly over the last year to
rebuild the Pentagon, and I was able on that occasion to meet
with some of the family members of the victims. And while they,
too, rejoiced in the outward healing that has taken place in
the Pentagon since that day, it was all too evident that there
is a hole in their hearts and many others', a hole that will
never heal, and we grieve with them at their loss. But seeing
those family members whose lives were so fundamentally changed
1 year ago served also to renew the commitment of each person
who works in the Pentagon, military and civilian, to carry out
our Department's mission in this war that we wage to prevent
future acts of terrorism.
Yesterday, before a different committee in the Congress,
Secretary Rumsfeld addressed a dimension of this war against
terrorism, referring to valuable intelligence information we
already possess. He referred to President Bush, who said last
week at the United Nations, and I quote, ``We know that Saddam
Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors
were in his country. Are we to assume that they stopped when
they left?''
The Secretary concluded to the contrary. Knowing what we
know about Iraq's history, no conclusion is possible except
that they have and are accelerating their WMD programs.
Secretary Rumsfeld went on to observe that there are many
now who are asking hundreds of questions about what happened on
September 11, poring over thousands of pages of documents, and
asking who knew what, when, and why they didn't prevent that
tragedy. And he concluded, and I quote, ``I suspect that in
retrospect most of those investigating September 11 would have
supported preventive action to preempt that threat if it had
been possible to see it coming.''
He went on to make the point that if one were to compare
the scraps of information that the government had before
September 11 to the volumes that we have today about Iraq's
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, its history of
aggression and hostility towards the United States, and factor
in our country's demonstrated vulnerability after September 11,
the case that the President made should be clear.
And the Secretary then added, we cannot go back in time to
stop the September 11 attack, but we can take actions now to
prevent some future threats. And, of course, that is precisely
why we are heretoday, to examine how we can all work together
to prepare for future threats to our Nation.
From the beginning, President Bush emphasized that the
United States would fight this war using every element of
national power, from diplomatic and law enforcement to
intelligence and military elements, and certainly one of the
most important elements of national power, one that we rely on
every day now to help us in this war on terrorism, is the U.S.
Intelligence Community. As evidenced by this hearing, these
committees are well aware of the fundamental importance of
intelligence to our national security and have long been
dedicated to providing bipartisan support for critical
intelligence programs.
Four areas ago I was privileged to serve on the Rumsfeld
Commission, which was charged with reporting to Congress on its
assessment of the ballistic missile threat to the United
States. One of underlying focuses of our study was, of course,
intelligence. When the commission released its report in 1998,
its nine Commissioners, which were an almost even mix of
Democrats and Republicans holding a very wide range of views on
policy, unanimously concluded that U.S. analyses, and I quote,
``practices and policies that depend on expectations of
extended warning of deployment be reviewed and, as appropriate,
revised to reflect the realty of environment in which there may
be little or no warning.''
Well, that conclusion came out of an assessment geared
toward the ballistic missile threat. It was understood by each
Commissioner that the conclusion was applicable to all
intelligence-related issues. This was an understanding, I
think, shared by those to whom we presented our findings, since
Members of Congress subsequently requested an intelligence side
letter that elaborated on the Commission's concerns and
recommended some--had some recommendations for change.
First, according to the side letter, it was evident to all
of the Commissioners that resources for intelligence had been
cut too deeply, and that the United States was entering a
period in which the Intelligence Community was going to be
seriously challenged to meet its foremost task, preventing
surprise.
Second, one of the primary weapons in the endless struggle
against surprise is knowing what our enemies don't want us to
know. U.S. intelligence capabilities needed to succeed in this
task, the letter concluded, were not as robust as they needed
to be.
Third, when there is more ambiguity in the intelligence
material, the system becomes more dependent on analytic
resources to discern the potential for surprise. The letter
highlighted that in methodical approach, analytic depth and
presentation to users, the Intelligence Community was in a
degraded situation.
Following those conclusions, Congress responded with a
significant increase in funding for intelligence in the fiscal
year 1999 budget. Despite the best efforts of this committee,
however, these increases were not sustained in fiscal years
2000 or 2001. At the time of the attacks last September, the
Defense Department was preparing a significant increase for
intelligence in the fiscal year 2003 budget, and after the
attacks this figure was doubled to the present proposal.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, in my prepared
statement, which I would encourage you to read, there is a very
impassioned passage from Thomas Schelling's foreword to Roberta
Wohlstetter's superb book about Pearl Harbor, Warning and
Surprise, and it underscores that some of the difficulties that
we are analyzing today about our ability to discern
intelligence, to find signals in noise, to deal with our--
projecting our own assumptions about rationality on enemies
that have different assumptions about rationality are problems
that go back in practically every comparable incident in
history and will probably be endemic to the intelligence
process. We can work at reducing them, but we can't eliminate
them.
One of the most telling lines from Schelling is that the
danger, he said, is in a poverty of expectations; a routine
obsession with a few dangers, that that may be familiar rather
than likely. The expectation of the familiar must not guide us
as we move forward. Rather, the unfamiliar and the unlikely
must be our new guides.
With this in mind, let me discuss briefly some lessons from
September 11. First, for the past 50 years, U.S. intelligence
has concentrated on defeating external nation-state threats. It
is now clear that we must apply the same level of effort to
nonstate actors and threats that emanate from within our
borders.
Second, when people threaten openly to kill Americans, we
should take them very seriously. That is true of Usama bin
Ladin, and it is true of the regime in Baghdad. We must not
assume that our enemies share our views about what is rational
or irrational.
Third, we should not underestimate the skill of our enemies
or their determination to conceal their activities and deceive
us. They understand how we collect intelligence, how we are
organized and how we analyze information. Just like them, our
intelligence services must constantly adapt and innovate. Thus,
we have aggressive efforts under way to find new ways to
discern those terrorist signals from the background noise of
our society, but we must also recognize that enemies will
deliberately create noise in our system in order to conceal
their real signals.
Fourth, we need to adapt our intelligence system to the
information age. Old stovepipes are being broken down and must
be broken down. The culture of compartmentation is being
reconsidered and must be reconsidered. In all that we do, we
must emphasize speed of exchange and networking to push
information out to people who need it, when they need it,
wherever they are.
Fifth, while we must always work to improve our
intelligence, we should never allow ourselves to believe that
we can rely exclusively upon intelligence for our security. We
should expect surprise and have capabilities that do not depend
on perfect intelligence to defend the Nation.
As Secretary Rumsfeld observed yesterday, we have had
numerous gaps of 2, 4, 6 or 8 years between the time a country
of concern first developed a weapons of mass destruction
capability and the time we finally learned about it.
Efforts are under way that will ultimately result in the
transformation of our intelligence posture. Our current sources
and methods depreciated badly over the last decade, and sorely
needed investments were postponed. Our budgets have been
substantially increased, but we are playing catch-up.
There is no question that we need to recapitalize and
introduce new sources of intelligence and novel methods of
collecting and analyzing information, but our intelligence
sources and methods have also been devaluated by a pattern of
leaks from the executive and legislative branches of government
and through a number of well-known espionage cases. Leaks and
espionage have provided our adversaries over time with an
unfortunately good picture of what we know and how we know it.
One well-known incident involves the unauthorized disclosure of
information that led Usama bin Ladin to stop using a satellite
phone that we had been monitoring. Once that information was
out in public, we never heard again from that satellite phone.
Culture and doctrine. A culture of excessive
compartmentation will hinder our ability to defeat new threats.
We need to facilitate greater sharing of information and
collaboration with and between intelligence agencies, including
law enforcement agencies and analysts and collectors. At the
same time, it is true that compartmentation is necessary to
prevent compromise of sources and methods.
Global terrorism now forces domestic and foreign
intelligence systems to link together to prevent the enemy from
finding a hiding place in the seam between our disciplines. It
means that we have to work together between the executive and
legislative branches, within the executive branch, with foreign
intelligence services to redefine the relationships and the
rules. And we must also accelerate the speed with which
information is passed to policymakers and operators.
Finally, we need to avoid the mistake of thinking that
intelligence estimates reached by consensus should routinely
trump those of a lone dissenting voice. They do not. During
World War II, the U.S. and Britain assembled our best minds to
crack the German code. Those code breakers assembled in England
at a place called Bletchley Park defied the odds of
accomplishing their vital mission faster than anyone expected.
In so doing, they hastened the demise of Nazi Germany and the
end of the war. As we seek to defeat terrorists and their
supporters, our intelligence culture must renew that sense of
urgency in collecting and mining and analyzing intelligence.
With respect to organization, we need to continue to update
the Cold War intelligence structure to better address 21st
century threats. We are already taking steps to get our Defense
Department house in order, and have proposed to the Congress
the creation of an Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
to streamline and integrate disparate DOD intelligence
activities. That Under Secretary is intended to provide the
Department with a single staff office to oversee the various
intelligence programs and will support the existing
relationship between the Director of Central Intelligence and
senior DOD officials and provide a focal point for securing
timely and effective support for the DCI from the defense
intelligence establishment.
This change will permit us to accelerate a large number of
actions that are already under way. As members of this
committee know, many of them are very highly classified, but
there are a number that are mentioned in my statement. That is
there for the record.
We also need to address the relatively new problem, what I
would call information discovery. Many agencies collect
intelligence, and lots of agencies analyze intelligence, but no
one is responsible for the bridge between collection and
analysis. For tagging, cataloging, indexing, storing,
retrieving and correlating data or facilitating collaboration
involving many different agencies, given the volume of
information that we must sift through to separate signals from
noise, this function is now critical.
There is much that we can do to exploit the full benefits
of new information technologies, such as data mining, and
change detection, as well a steadily decreasing cost of data
storage, but partly because of the inescapable need for
security of information, the intelligence world lags behind the
private sector in its ability to tag and store massive amounts
of data and to mine that information to determine patterns.
And one more issue we must consider is how we consider need
to know. We have to break down the access to information so
that those who need it get access to it. It is interesting to
recall that before Pearl Harbor, the ultra secret code-breaking
operation called Magic, one of the most remarkable achievements
in American intelligence history, had unlocked the most secret
Japanese communications, but that operation was considered so
secret and so vulnerable to compromise that the distribution of
its product was restricted to the point that our field
commanders in Pearl Harbor didn't make the need to know list.
But it is easy to say in hindsight that this information should
have been shared more widely. If it had been, and if it had
been compromised as a result, we would have been asking
ourselves why it was shared so widely.
In closing, I would like to emphasize three points. First,
as I mentioned, the President has said that the United States
would fight this war using every element of national power,
from diplomatic and law enforcement to intelligence and
military elements, with America's military power by no means
necessarily the first option, but one of the vast array of
national resources with which to fight.
Certainly one of the most important elements in fighting
this war of the shadows involves the U.S. Intelligence
Community and its extraordinary capabilities. Whatever is done
to reform and improve our Intelligence Community should not do
harm to its contribution to the current war effort.
Second, no matter how good intelligence can be, we will not
win this war simply by going after individual terrorists. We
must not only capture and kill terrorists and break up
individual plots, but we must drain the swamp in which
terrorists breed.
In February of 1998, Usama bin Ladin published a fatwah
declaring his intent to kill Americans, a fact which leads to
my third conclusion. When our professed enemies declare that
they intend to kill us, we should take them at their word and
prepare accordingly. We must avoid the temptation of believing
that the truth can only be found through classified sources. To
do otherwise, despite warnings and signs, would indeed
constitute a grave intelligence failure.
Secretary Rumsfeld testified yesterday to some of the signs
of the signals that now abound, saying that we are on notice.
Let there be no doubt, he said, an attack will be attempted.
The only question is when and by what technique. It could be
months, a year, or several years, but it will happen.
If the worst were to happen, not one of us here today will
be able to honestly say it was a surprise, because it will not
be a surprise. We have connected the dots, he said, as much as
it is humanly possible before the fact. Only by waiting until
after the event could we have proof positive. The dots are
there for all to see. The dots are there for all to connect. If
they aren't good enough, rest assured they will only be good
enough after another disaster, a disaster of still greater
proportions, and by then it will be too late. We cannot afford
to wait, the Secretary put it, until we have a smoking gun, for
a gun smokes only after it has been fired.
We appreciate this committee's dedication to accomplish
meaningful positive and constructive measures with regard to
America's Intelligence Community. We appreciate your continued
bipartisan leadership and guidance, and we look forward to
working with you in your important task of looking to the
future to improve America's intelligence capability. Thank you.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Mr. Wolfowitz and Mr. Armitage.
Excellent statements. We appreciate the significant
contribution that you have been and are making to our Nation's
security.
I would like to call upon Senator Rockefeller for the first
round of questions.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Armitage, Secretary Wolfowitz, for
being here. Let me just say at the beginning what Eleanor Hill
said yesterday; that is, it was not our Intelligence Community,
it was not the FBI, it was not anybody else that did the
killing at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and in
Pennsylvania. It was the terrorists. That is paramount.
Having said that, I would like to talk a little bit about
perceived threats and ask some questions. According to the
Department of State publication Patterns of Global Terrorism,
there were 274 international terrorist attacks worldwide in
1998, reflecting that the number of attacks, in fact, had been
decreasing and were at their lowest point since 1971.
If we measure the threat of terrorism by the number of
Americans killed, and, of course, even one death is too many,
including the attacks on our African embassies, 12 U.S.
citizens died in 1998, 54 were killed in the proceeding 5
years. In 1999, five more Americans died. In 2000, another 19
died, 17 on the USS Cole.
These numbers are tragic, but they show a fairly persistent
pattern over the past decade. Even with this consistent pattern
of activity, George Tenet, who by most Americans, I think, is
considered to be the person who runs intelligence in this
country--we know that not to be true, I am going to discuss
that--but the Director of Central Intelligence kind of evokes
an image of real control. He was concerned enough, as both of
you mentioned, particularly Secretary Wolfowitz, to mention in
1998 and tell his deputies, and then it was broadly
disseminated within the Intelligence Community, doesn't say
beyond that in our report, that we are at war with al-Qa'ida.
So my first question is what did you think that meant,
either or both of you? What did you think that meant? And what
should have happened at that point, in your judgment?
The reason I ask that question, Secretary Wolfowitz, you
talk a lot about things that must happen, things that cannot
happen again, ``we should be, we must do, we must make sure
that such and such doesn't happen again.'' But specifically
what did that mean, we are at war, to you, as you came into
office? And what should have happened at that point, in your
judgment?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think it means that you plan for war. And,
in fact, over the course of--from the time Secretary Armitage
was sworn in, which I think was late March of 2001, which was
when we finally had two deputies and could have a deputies
committee, in fact, prior to that I believe even, national
security advisor Dr. Rice had tasked her staff to begin
preparing options for what this would mean.
And as you start to look at it, you realize that war
against al-Qa'ida is something different than going after
individual acts of terrorism or retaliating against individual
acts of terrorism; that it really does involve all of the
elements of national power; that it is not just something for
the Intelligence Community alone; that, in fact, you can't go
to war against al-Qa'ida without recognizing the role that the
government of Afghanistan is playing. You can't go after the
government of Afghanistan without recognizing the problems in
your relationship particularly with Pakistan, but with other
neighboring countries, and you can't get serious about this
without looking at military options.
And when you start to look at military options, you have to
think about something more than a one-off retaliation for an
attack. That is the process that we were engaged in over the
course of basically the summer of 2001. And, ironically enough,
it led to a principals committee meeting in early September
before the attacks that produced a recommendation that was not
far off from what we ultimately implemented after September 11.
I would like to make one other point.
Senator Rockefeller. I have 12 questions in 20 minutes.
MR. Armitage. I will only add that where we--I think our
story is pretty good on going after al-Qa'ida from April 30th
on, after the first deputies meeting. However, where we went
wrong, where we made a mistake, was that we didn't have the,
first of all, a necessary baseline from intelligence on the
global aspect and global possibilities of al-Qa'ida, number
one. And, number two, although many of us, including Members of
Congress, were saying the right words, I don't think that we
really had made the leap in our mind that we are no longer safe
behind these two great oceans, and even though we had the World
Trade Center attack of 1993.
Senator Rockefeller. When you came into office, did you
both think, know that we were at war with al-Qa'ida?
Mr. Armitage. I was briefed in January and February,
leading to my hearings in March before the U.S. Senate. The
term ``at war'' was, to my knowledge, not used. There was no
question, though, that we were in a struggle with al-Qa'ida,
and al-Qa'ida was the very first thing that the administration
took on at the deputies level.
Senator Rockefeller. But you were aware that the DCI
thought that we were at war?
Mr. Armitage. I was aware of his comments.
Senator Rockefeller. Yes. And did the Intelligence
Community clearly warn you what al-Qa'ida was capable of doing,
and that it sought to carry out a mass casualty attack on U.S.
soil? Did you know that? Had you been informed of that by the
Intelligence Community?
Mr. Armitage. The Intelligence Community, as I recall,
informed me, one, that we may have an explosion in Kenya from
an explosive-laden aircraft. I do not specifically remember a
mass casualty event.
However, there were discussions in INR in the State
Department from information gleaned from the Intelligence
Community that there was the possibility of a chem-bio attack,
no location, no time, but that was being discussed.
Senator Rockefeller. What did you two gentlemen perceive
the threat to be?
Mr. Armitage. I, in general, perceived the threat to be at
our interests overseas, primarily in the Gulf, some in
Southeast Asia, and most definitely in Israel. That is from my
point of view and the Department of State.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I would say near term we perceived the
threat to be overseas, as Secretary Armitage says. In the mid
to longer term, we perceived the threat to be mass casualties
in the United States as a result of chemical or biological or
conceivably nuclear attack, and that is why, in the course of
developing the Quadrennial Defense Review over the summer of
2001, we identified homeland security as the top priority for
transformation.
Senator Rockefeller. Did you take any steps with respect to
reacting to these threats that the Clinton administration had
not taken at that point in time? Because the Tenet warnings
came out in 1998.
Mr. Armitage. We increased, in INR, the number of analysts.
We have 4 in general that look at terrorism and crime. We
increased the number to eight. It has, since 9/11, been
increased to 10. So that is a specific answer.
Mr. Wolfowitz. We undertook a number of steps in our
development of the defense program to increase our capability
to detect or respond to weapons of mass destruction attacks,
and I believe there were a number of classified actions taken
by other agencies.
Senator Rockefeller. Anything specific you can tell us
unclassified?
Mr. Wolfowitz. No, not with respect to classified actions.
Specifics on what we did with respect to developing our own
capabilities to respond, I can give you lots of detail for the
record.
Senator Rockefeller. Please do that.
Who, in fact, is responsible for assessing the risk of
terrorist attack in the United States of America, and was any
strategic assessment or other kind of assessment done when you
came into office, both of you?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think what you are putting your finger on,
I think, to some extent is that we have certain divisions of
responsibility between what the FBI and domestic law
enforcement is responsible for and what the CIA is responsible
for, and indeed limitations on what the CIA is allowed to do
and collect domestically, which I think members of this
committee are very familiar with. So there is a problem of
where responsibility is assigned.
I am not aware of any specific assessment of what the
threat was domestically.
Mr. Armitage. I agree, sir.
Senator Rockefeller. All right. Obviously we had had the
1993 World Trade Center incident and the whole series of other
things, which Eleanor Hill delineated yesterday. So there were
things going on in this country over a long period of time. The
question was were they individually aggregated and taken to a
higher level where they reached policymakers who said, oh, this
is not just a matter of the international, but this is a matter
of domestic?
So America's perception of threat here, as opposed to
overseas, was not, you are saying, fully formed when you
gentlemen took office?
Mr. Armitage. I think that is a fair statement, but I would
like to accompany it with the notation and the notice that when
Mr. Bush was a candidate, he specifically spoke about homeland
security, and he was drawing on a report that was actually
commissioned by the U.S. Congress, the National Defense Panel
Report, which spoke about homeland security being a new mission
area, and the Pentagon is on top of that as far as I can see;
and, second, that we recognized that we couldn't have a policy,
certainly in South Asia, as early and--more broadly as early as
the end of April when we had a deputies meeting and made
decisions and gave instructions to not just roll back al-
Qa'ida, but to go after and eliminate them.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you.
The Intelligence Community--this is sort of about what you
were talking about, Secretary Wolfowitz--collects, analyzes and
disseminates one kind of intelligence for civilian policymakers
and another and different kind for the defense needs to shape
our military forces and plan and execute military operations.
Many of our intelligence collection systems used to collect
both kinds of intelligence. I mean, there is an overlap. And it
is well known--no, in fact, it isn't well known generally out
there in the country, but it is a fact that 85 percent of the
money for intelligence is within or controlled by the
Department of Defense. So it is important to understand the
different needs, how they overlap, and how they do not, and
what happens when there is a conflict between the civilian
policy needs and military needs.
And to that I would just give you something to lop on. If
Director Tenet foresaw a requirement to make a change because
he needed to have something happen, but that change was not
under his budget authority, would he have the ability to go
into the Department of Defense and move the money he needed? Or
is it the unwritten law that the Director of Central
Intelligence, thought to be the controller of intelligence by
most of our country, in fact usually loses when he goes up
against the Secretary of Defense?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I don't think that describes the
relationship. In fact, I think Secretary Rumsfeld and Director
Tenet have a closer relationship than any previous Secretary of
Defense and the DCI. And when these issues come up, this was
true before September 11----
Senator Rockefeller. I understand personal relationships.
That is not the question I asked.
Mr. Wolfowitz. It is not a personal matter; it is a working
relationship, it is a professional relationship. They meet
regularly. These problems get resolved. We have frequently
moved resources to address their needs.
But I think a fundamental point, too, here, Senator,
related to a lot of these questions is this is not a game that
we will ever win on defense; we will only win it on offense.
And I believe that recognition came very early in this
administration, and the recognition that going on offense was
something that would be a very substantial exercise.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Armitage. Absolutely.
Senator Rockefeller. Under the current structure I think it
is fair to say that the Director of Central Intelligence,
thought by the American people to control intelligence,
doesn't. And I am not arguing that point, but I am raising it.
I don't think there have been any recent Central Intelligence
Directors who have really wanted to venture beyond their budget
authority, and their budget authority is fundamentally 15
percent of the intelligence budget. This raises all kinds of
questions about the relationship between the DCI, the DOD,
which you say is very good. And I have been at the meetings
when people have had their arms around each other and were
working very well together, but it doesn't seem to work out
necessarily to the best coordination of intelligence
activities.
It seems to me, in fact, that the DCI lacks that authority
and is not necessarily willing to take on a Secretary of
Defense, who controls budgets and personnel. If there is any
truth in either of your minds in this, does that, in your
judgment, hinder the fight against terrorism?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, I don't think it is a matter of
taking on the Secretary of Defense. I think there are times
when it would be helpful--and this is why we have proposed an
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence--when the Director
has a problem or when his subordinates have a problem, to be
able to come to somebody below the level of the Secretary and
get these problems sorted out.
When problems are elevated, my experience has been they
have been resolved, and I don't think there are basic problems
here that flow from some inability of the Director of Central
Intelligence to get from the Department of Defense what they
need.
But a basic point which the American people also expect is
that these vast intelligence resources of ours will be made
available to permit our military to win wars when they fight
them. And the intelligence resources of the Defense Department
have been absolutely critical in this campaign against
terrorism.
Senator Rockefeller. And I agree with what you have said,
and I also note that in your testimony you talked about
stovepiping, and you talked about the proposed new Under
Secretary for Intelligence. And I would like to ask that
question: how do you think that this is going to help bring
clarity, succinctness, precision, sequential accuracy to the
variety of 14 different intelligence agencies which exist but
which have no sort of central command, even though the American
people think that it is that way? How will this proposed new
Under Secretary be able to bring clarity to the process of the
gathering, dissemination, and strategic assessment of that
intelligence?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think the key to breaking down stovepipes
is to bring them together at levels below the very top level
ofthe government. When the only place they come together is at the
Cabinet level, then inevitably there are going to be the walls and
compartments that busy Cabinet officers don't have the time to break
down.
Having an Under Secretary for Intelligence whose sole
responsibility is overseeing those agencies and precisely
looking at those compartments and stovepipes I think is a key
to doing it. And the Rumsfeld Commission, looking at the
ballistic missile threat, nine of us working part time were
able to do an enormous amount in breaking down stovepipes, but
it requires people who are focused on that issue and not
distracted by many other things. That is what an Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will be able to do.
Senator Rockefeller. Talking about stovepipes is something
that the Intelligence Community and this committee have done
for a very, very long time, and we have seen not much progress.
So when you say getting people together at a lower level, I am
pleased to hear that.
Could you elaborate a little bit on how you really break
down a culture of non-communication of individual campuses
spread around within a 3- to 6-mile radius of Washington, which
all have their own cultures, their own memorial gardens, their
own cafeterias, their own set of histories? I mean, it is an
easy thing to talk about, a hard thing to do. How do you think
this should be made to happen, Secretary Wolfowitz?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Let me try to split it in two different
problems. I think, first of all, there is--before you get into
the culture problem, there is just simple problems of
compartmentation. One reason that the Rumsfeld Commission was
able to break down a lot of stovepipes is that we had the
authority to go into every compartment, and we could see that
information in one compartment was something that people in
another compartment needed to have and weren't getting.
That is not a culture issue, that is a--somebody with the
oversight, the ability and the time to look into those
compartments that can break them down.
You raise a bigger question, which is culture, and you
don't change those things overnight, nor do you want to change
them entirely. You need organizations with specialized
capabilities. I think, though, we have seen a lot over just the
last 12 months of agencies, including agencies that have not
traditionally worked together--the FBI, for example, has
brought CIA analysts into the FBI. That is a rather radical
change. How much it is changing the FBI? You have to ask the
Director or the CIA Director.
Senator Rockefeller. Let me use that statement to go into
my final question. Regarding the FBI, from my point of view, I
really question--I would like both of your responses on this--
whether the FBI ought to be heavily involved in the
intelligence business.
They are trained differently, their skill sets are totally
different, their habits are different. Everything is different
about them. They do a superb job at prosecuting and putting
people in jail. But the intelligence function on a domestic
basis--which raises serious questions of what would an
alternative be, which is what we need to discuss--is something
that I worry about a lot.
You indicated the FBI reported to you, but was the FBI
really monitoring some of these domestic groups in a way which
was satisfactory to you? Did they have the mindset, skill set
to do that?
Mr. Armitage. I am going to give you two answers. One is a
perspective, Senator. I was involved in the setting up of the
CTC in the mid-1980s. There has been a light year's difference
between the FBI now and the FBI then.
But the direct answer to your question is, absolutely. The
FBI must be more than an investigation and prosecutorial arm
who comes in after an event. They have to be involved in the
investigation and the monitoring. There is no way around it,
nor should there be.
Senator Rockefeller. My time is up. I thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller.
Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, good
morning. Thank you for your initial statements and your
responses thus far. Because of a change in the committee's
schedule yesterday, I was not able to be here for a part of it
that I expected to be. And I want to take a minute or two in my
available questioning time to say something, and it is that I
am concerned about the total preoccupation on intelligence
failures. And that's the headlines, of course, and that was the
theme of all day yesterday and in general.
Of course there are inadequacies, gaps, and deficiencies in
intelligence collection and analysis. We all understand that
very well. But what is not being focused upon are the failures
in the law enforcement agencies and the other entities that
could have averted terrorist acts and need to avert future
terrorist attacks.
I have been amazed to find thus far there has been no place
in the Federal Government where there was a responsibility for
examining all the potential terrorist scenarios and then making
plans to avoid them with the domestic agencies. I think most
citizens would have assumed that capacity existed. I certainly,
with some knowledge of the Federal structure, would have
expected it existed. It apparently didn't.
It doesn't take too much imagination, it seems to me, to
imagine that a commercial airliner would be used as a flying
bomb. And we know from the committee's report yesterday, there
were many indications this was being considered by al-Qa'ida--
Tom Clancy had it as a part of one of his books, with an
airliner being crashed into the Capitol dome--and if it wasn't
specifically assigned to an entity or an interagency group, it
looks like it would have been done in the National Security
Council. Now we have a homeland security director, and we know
where the responsibility is placed and will be developed.
Gentlemen, I want to focus first on I guess, you, Secretary
Armitage. I am generally aware of the recommendations for
changes in the intelligence agencies within the Department of
Defense. But looking at the State Department's own
intelligence--internal intelligence capacity, INR, how do you
think it interfaces? How has it interfaced in fact with the
other collectors and analytical capabilities of the Federal
Government, and what changes have been made or would you
contemplate, would you recommend, Secretary Armitage?
Mr. Armitage. Thank you. In INR we are primarily almost
exclusively involved in analysis and not in gleaning
intelligence. And I believe the excellent staff of this
committee has determined that much of the analysis at INR was
pretty damn good, number one. Number two, that means that
primarily it's limited by the information end. So one might
contemplate whether State itself wants to have a larger, sort
of more active role in the gleaning of intelligence.
Now, primarily, the intelligence we get is open source, or
comments of one embassy officer with some host country official
or another, and the other is gleaned from open sources. And
Paul was careful and I think right to draw our attention to
that. We have put both INR and DS, Diplomatic Security agents
with the Counterterrorism Center. This is good at breaking down
the culture. It also helps us a bit. We have had before 9/11,
and continue to have, FBI officers who serve in our
Counterterrorism Center. In the main, I have to do a little
more with the budget for INR. As I said, we've now got 10
analysts strictly devoted to terrorism, which is up from
before, but it is clearly not sufficient. But the analysis
they've given was judged, by your own Commission, to be pretty
much on the mark.
Mr. Bereuter. Secretary Wolfowitz, you generally quote the
President, in the conclusions of your testimony this morning,
as saying that every element of national power must be used
against the terrorists--military, law enforcement, diplomatic
intelligence. And I don't think anyone would dispute that.
Looking back at this small boat attack on the USS Cole in
the previous administration, looking back and determining what
was done at that point or not done, why--first of all, was
there a military response planned to respond to the attack on
the USS Cole? And if not, why not? Was there an expectation
that the problems of al-Qa'ida and the Taliban would be handled
by the intelligence agencies or covert operations? Why was
there no attack? And was there any military planning to attack
and respond to the USS Cole attack?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Congressman, I can't tell you what happened
in the immediate aftermath of the attack. I can tell you 6
months later when we came into office, or when Secretary
Armitage and I came into office, it was clear that terrorism
had to be dealt with in a different way. It is not a law
enforcement problem, and it can't be dealt with simply by
retaliating against individual acts of terrorism. As we said
earlier, we understood this was an entity that was at war with
us, and taking them on involved more than just an individual
retaliatory response. That wasn't going to stop the problem.
You, I think, expressed your puzzlement, and undoubtedly
the puzzlement of many Americans, of why the FBI didn't provide
some of this information. In fairness to the FBI, it ought to
be pointed out, that for very good, substantial reasons, they
are not supposed to report information on Americans to
intelligence agencies. This is an issue we have to confront
now. It's not that they were stupid. They are there under a
different set of rules, rules that require people to be very
careful about information that can be prosecuted.
But if I could, just two points: We are not going to win
this war on defense. No matter how good our intelligence is, we
have got to go on offense. And offense does not just mean one-
off military retaliation; it means the kind of campaign we are
conducting now against terrorism. It means a war.
Mr. Bereuter. Secretary Wolfowitz, we are well aware of the
limitations properly imposed upon the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and that there is no excuse for the failure to
communicate what the agents in the Phoenix office had
uncovered, which therefore caused a failure to respond properly
to the agents in the Minneapolis field office. There is an
absolute failure in that bureaucracy and the information
technology failure, to say the least. And so it's important we
don't divert by telling us that this is not in their area of
responsibility from their real failures in this instance.
And, of course, yesterday the family witnesses pointed out
to us about the 11 minutes, or perhaps 12 minutes, that seemed
to have taken place in FAA control, New York, after they knew
that the second airliner was headed for the second tower but no
alert was given to the port authority.
I would like, Secretary Armitage, if you would respond to
this question: Do you feel U.S. foreign policy in the Middle
East has contributed to the rise of al-Qa'ida?
Mr. Armitage. No, Senator.
Mr. Bereuter. I would say to you that many people believe
that it does; and many people in the Middle East, more
importantly, believe that it does.
Mr. Armitage. That's a different question.
Mr. Bereuter. In light of this attitude of so many people
living in the Middle East, and indeed some of our citizens,
what is the State Department's role to correct errors in
perception--I guess I will put it that way--or to change their
attitude about the United States and their attitude about the
terrorists?
Mr. Armitage. I know you understand this explicitly, but I
want to make the point that Usama bin Ladin was planning these
attacks at a time when the Israeli/Palestinian question was in
a much more benign state, when our President was meeting here
at Camp David and they were very close to a resolution. So I do
not buy the argument that our policy in the Middle East is
responsible for al-Qa'ida, Usama bin Ladin. And it was only
laterally, it was only after the World Trade Center attacks
that Usama bin Ladin could even say the word ``Palestinian''
out loud publicly.
Now, the question of what should we do to fix it? I think
we are trying to work a very difficult equation, to address the
humanitarian situation, particularly in the occupied
territories, to work with our closest ally, the Government of
Israel, who even today suffered yet again from terrorism and,
finally, to have a political change in the Palestinian
Authority that will allow the Palestinians to be governed by
the type of government the people deserve. And that is all
ongoing, and that was the subject of Secretary Powell's meeting
2 days ago in New York.
Mr. Bereuter. Secretary Armitage, would you speak to the
role of public diplomacy that would have an impact upon
attitudes of the population of the Middle East, particularly
the Arab countries?
Mr. Armitage. This is an area that we have done
historically, we know now, a bad job. And the Secretary brought
in Charlotte Beers to really try to address this; and I am
delighted, particularly Frank Wolf's Appropriations Committee
in the first instance, have been so supportive to give us the
resources for this. But we had to learn what the questions to
ask were before we could start addressing them, and Charlotte
Beers has done that, and we are off and running in the Middle
East. And I think over time, you will be able to judge whether
we have been effective or not. I don't think I can judge that
today.
Mr. Bereuter. It's an important priority. We wish you well
in this respect and much success.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you.
Mr. Bereuter. I would like to ask both of you if you would
give us your own observations about the weaknesses that you
have observed with regard to intelligence collection and
analysis. And let me just stipulate, we all seem to agree that
there is an inadequacy of human intelligence and a risk
aversion perhaps in some of the people involved in HUMINT which
we are trying to address. But setting that aside, what other
kinds of weaknesses have you seen in your experience in
government, going back over some years now and contributing to
this day in the intelligence collection and analysis function
of the Federal Government? And, of course, I am talking about
foreign intelligence collection.
Mr. Armitage. I think the questions of human intelligence,
agents and all of this, this committee, both the House and the
Senate, have delved into it at great length. And the point that
has always bothered me was related to by Paul, and that is that
the Intelligence Community is in the analysis business, which
is where I am. I am the consumer. It's very rare that we get
the one-off voice or the dissident voice that Paul was talking
about. For a policymaker, the dissident voice is very helpful
to either confirm what you think or really open up a new area,
and this is not generally done. If I had to say the one biggest
weakness in the analysis area, I would say that's it.
Second, it's the way analysis in the Intelligence Community
is generally put forth, and it's related, and that is
consensus.
Mr. Bereuter. We found a dissident voice in the DIA that
seemed to be discouraged from being able to present his
viewpoints, and I would guess that's a common problem. So you
bring up an interesting point. And how do we protect that, how
do we make sure that those dissident voices that sometimes have
part of the answer, or the answer, are heard?
Mr. Armitage. I must say I remember when Director Gates was
the deputy director. I remember vividly. I was in the Pentagon.
He set down something on Africa and it had to do with the
community view on HIV/AIDS in Africa. And he said, I want to
give you the view of one analysis, it is not a community
product--which was dramatically different and, by the way,
dramatically correct, as was seenby the virulence of the spread
of AIDS. And that's the kind of thing that has to be encouraged.
Mr. Bereuter. Secretary Wolfowitz, would you like to focus
in your observations on any weaknesses other than HUMINT, which
we can probably agree on?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I really would just enforce this observation
about the need to get alternative views up, because almost
everything that's important here is shrouded in ambiguity and
uncertainty. There's nothing that is flat black and white.
There is a tendency to want to get things scrubbed out to get
the differences eliminated.
I remember the first national intelligence estimate I ever
read, which I'm embarrassed to say was nearly 30 years ago, in
which--it was on the critical issue of Soviet strategic
capabilities. And I believe it was the Director of Central
Intelligence in forwarding the report said, very proudly, how--
what a great job these people had done in producing a report on
such an important subject without a single footnote; in other
words, without a single voice of disagreement. And I was just
appalled. I thought, how could you address a subject of that
importance without differences?
So I think get those differences up on the table, get the
raw information up a little faster. Understandably, some of it
is going to be wrong and you don't want people rushing off and
taking precipitous actions based on raw intelligence, but I
think there is a tendency to hoard stuff too long and to keep
it in compartments.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you. I want to ask both of you, are
there any groups capable of--any groups other than al-Qa'ida
capable of or seriously considering attacking the United States
today? And I am talking about the homeland.
Mr. Armitage. In terms of capability and virulence,
Hizbollah certainly is capable. They have thus far confined
themselves in the main to Central and South America and, of
course, the Middle East. But capability, they could do it.
Mr. Wolfowitz. It's absolutely right--and intentions are
one of those things that if you want any precision on you
almost never get it--if you reject the evidence that comes from
overt expressions of hostility, then you'll be taken by
surprise every time.
Mr. Bereuter. Is there any other entity you would suggest,
other than Hizbollah, at this point or make general reference
to?
Mr. Armitage. No; other than to make the obvious point that
there are a number of groups in the so-called network that is
al-Qa'ida, whose intentions are clearly to harm Americans.
They've said it, they do it, they write it. So I don't have
direct information that they are targeting the United States,
but they are certainly intent on targeting U.S. interests.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Congressman, we don't have that kind of
precise information about what groups are there. This group
that calls itself the Islamic Movement for Change that sent a
threatening letter to our embassy in Saudi Arabia in the spring
of 1995 and then claimed credit for the attack in Riyadh in the
fall of 1995 has never been identified. We don't know what
countries or what groups have sleeper cells buried around the
world now. We know what people have capabilities and we know
what people have declared hostile intentions toward us. And I
go back to Secretary Rumsfeld's point. Those are the dots, and
if you want to wait until they're connected, you're going to
wait until something terrible happens.
Mr. Bereuter. Both of you have experience beyond your
current capacity, in your previous roles in the
administrations. Both of you have held important roles in the
Department of Defense and one continues today, of course. What
do you think the state of affairs is with respect to our allies
and their ability to provide intelligence to us? Have we--is
there progress yet to be made in that respect?
Mr. Armitage. Well, first of all, the difference between
September 10 and September 12 in this regard is night and day,
and that includes more than just intelligence. It is also in
the terrorist financing. We stood up to terrorist financing
back in May, the tracking center, but after the tragedy, people
came aboard.
Is there more work to be done? Absolutely. And I say that
with complete assurance, because we don't know what we don't
know from these countries. And we sometimes find it very
surprising that we have some information which turns out to be
true, and we turn to those countries and they say oh, yeah, we
knew about that, we neglected to tell you, we forgot to tell
you. So there's a lot of work still to be done.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I just add very briefly, our cooperation
with our allies improved dramatically after September 11. Our
cooperation with unfriendly countries improved dramatically
after the fall of the Taliban.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we are
called for a vote and so I will just terminate at this point.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Congressman Bereuter.
Congressman Boswell, would you like to do your questioning
now or----
Mr. Boswell. I have just shared with your co-chair--and
he's got a solution--that I definitely want to share in this
questioning. So I think we are going to go vote and he's got us
suggesting about letting the Senators continue their 5 minutes.
Chairman Graham. And when you return, you will be called
upon for your 20 minutes.
Mr. Boswell. And I'm ready.
Chairman Graham. The House members will be attending to
their voting for approximately the next 20 to 30 minutes, but
we are going to continue with questions from Senators, and I
would just like to ask two questions.
Mr. Wolfowitz, you said in your prepared statement that our
goal should be to drain the swamp of terrorists, and that the
primary method of doing so was going to be win on the offense;
that is, to go after the terrorists, not play defense.
In a previous hearing, we had high officials in the
Intelligence Community who were asked a question: What was the
biggest mistake that we made in the 1990s relative to al-
Qa'ida? Answer: The failure to aggressively assault the
training camps of al-Qa'ida, which at one time were producing,
on average, 100 terrorists per week, who then were subsequently
placed around the world, including, as we know, in the United
States.
In light of that, I have been surprised that our current
war on terrorism has not, at least apparently, targeted the
training camps where the current generation or the next
generation of terrorists--and I am speaking specifically the
training camps outside of Afghanistan--are producing the next
group that will likely be equipped to attack us. Is that based
on intelligence that the community is getting to the effect
that the training camps are not as significant today as they
were 4, 5 years ago; or what is the reason why in a campaign on
the offensive to drain the swamps, the place that the
alligators are being prepared are not being targeted?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, I am not sure if we can get into
this in open session. I am not sure which training camps you
are referring to.
Chairman Graham. Primarily the ones, as I say, outside of
Afghanistan; and I will not mention the specific countries,
although they are fairly well known.
Mr. Wolfowitz. There are countries like Yemen and Georgia
where we know there are active terrorists, not just training
camps--training camps, yes, but also people plotting and doing
plots. And we are working actively in different ways with both
those governments to get actionable intelligence, number one,
and, number two, to improve their capabilities to go after
these problems. But if we have actionableintelligence and they
are not prepared to act, then we'll have to figure it out ourselves. I
mean, in the cases that I'm aware of, we're aware that there are
problems, but we don't have the kind of precision that told us about
Tornak Farms or specific things in Afghanistan.
Just one last point. I don't want to get in an argument
with the people who talked to you earlier about training camps,
but it seems to me even worse than the training camps was the
training that took place here in the United States and the
planning that took place in Germany. The donkeys, if we can
call them that, that took over the airplanes may have been
trained in Afghanistan. The pilots were clearly trained
elsewhere.
Chairman Graham. In your opening statement, Mr. Wolfowitz,
you commented about the importance of us not being seduced by
the status quo, the way things have been, and to be prepared to
think creatively as to the nature of the threat and the nature
of our vulnerability. Based on what has happened September 11,
and before and since, what recommendations would you have in
terms of personnel policy, organizational policies as to how we
can inject a greater degree of creativity within our
intelligence agencies?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, some of the things we've done already
are in fact enumerated in my statement. I do think
organizationally from within the Department of Defense, we
believe very strongly that having this single focal point for
intelligence, the Under Secretary for Intelligence, would
contribute enormously in dealing with two problems. One is
breaking down compartmentation within the Department and,
number two, giving the Director of Central Intelligence a focal
point that he can go to to solve problems when they occur.
With respect to the issue about culture, I think there are
a lot of things that come to mind, but I can't think of
anything that would be more important than finding ways to
reward those long voices that do descend to perhaps send back
intelligence estimates that have no footnotes in them, and
praise the ones that come forward that indicate with some
clarity what we know and what we don't know and what we may not
even be aware that we don't know.
Chairman Graham. Thank you. The questioners will be Senator
DeWine, Senator Lugar, Senator Inhofe, Senator Feinstein,
Senator Kyl. Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Secretary, thank you for
both being here. We all have a great deal of respect for both
of you. It's clear that George Tenet was, as Secretary Armitage
said, pounding on the table. It's clear that you both were very
concerned and working hard on the issue of terrorism. And it's
also clear that there are a lot of good people not just in the
administration but down in the trenches who were doing a lot of
good hard work. And I don't think--we should make it clear to
the American people that our investigation has shown that: that
while there was an intelligence failure, we have seen there
were a lot of people doing a lot of very, very good work every
single day.
I really have two questions. One was, was there a strategy
for fighting terrorism? Were all the instruments of national
power coordinated and applied together? Off the top of my head,
these would include covert action, the use of foreign
countries, disruption by foreign governments, use of the
Justice Department, prosecution, jailing terrorists when we
catch them, military, obviously, trying to freeze economic
assets. Were all of those being coordinated together?
And second, and probably more important, if the answer to
the first question is yes, who is driving this?
George Tenet talked about a war against Usama bin Ladin.
He's the man who talks to the President every day. He's the man
who the public looks to, frankly, in regard to the effort
against terrorism. I believe, you know, in spite of that fact,
in spite of the fact that you wouldn't find anyone who was more
driven than George Tenet about this issue during that period of
time, it didn't seem that all the things got pulled together.
I wonder if you could reflect a little bit on that and talk
to me a little bit about structural changes that need to be
made, so that this is a focus that can be applied, so there is
the coordination that is needed.
Because I agree with you, Mr. Secretary, the cooperation
does exist at the top level. The question is how you drive it
down and how you make sure that someone who is in the field,
who works directly under the Defense Department, candidly, gets
the priority, that information, things need to flow somewhere
else when they are tasked to do that. And that is the real
difficulty that we face. I don't want to go in any more detail
than that. But I think that is the difficulty that we face.
If the two of you could reflect on those. One was the
coming together, if you had a plan to coordinate everybody; and
two, who is driving it?
Mr. Armitage. The National Security Council was driving it.
It started in March when they called for new proposals on a
strategy that would be more aggressive against al-Qa'ida. The
first deputies' meeting, which is the first decisionmaking body
in the administration, met on the 30th of April and set off on
a trail of initiatives to include financing, getting at
financing, to get at increased authorities for the Central
Intelligence Agency, sharpen things that the military was asked
to do. The Attorney General was wrapped into it. The point of
this is it is not something that takes place at one meeting,
and it happens because there are many considerations, from
privacy considerations to budgetary ones.
So from March through about August we were preparing a
National Security Presidential Directive, and it was
distributed on August 13 to the principals for their final
comments. And then, of course, we had the events of September
11. So the answer was yes, we are on that track; it's not
something that takes place overnight.
Senator DeWine. I would just say to the public--Mr.
Secretary, I understand what you said--but to the public that
sounds like a hell of a long time, Mr. Secretary. In hindsight
that sounds like a long time.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, and the truth is that these people
were embedded in our country, the pilots 2 years ago, and
people carrying out the hijackings last spring. I mean, they
were way ahead of us. And that's something one has to bear in
mind in saying, where is the evidence of an imminent threat? By
the time threats are imminent, first of all, you probably won't
have the perfect intelligence, and if you do, it may be too
late to do anything about it.
I think organizationally there are many things that can be
done and are being done; some of them not yet being done. But I
think nothing is as important as what the President has
proposed for the new Department of Homeland Security. The clear
deficiency before was that we didn't have anyone with the
responsibility for dealing precisely with that problem.
And I don't think it's an exaggeration to say, as has been
said, that this proposal which the Congress is wrestling with
right now is as important to restructuring our government for
this new security era as the 1947 National Security Act was in
structuring the government for the Cold War. It's not a magic
solution and there's still going to be work to be done, but I
do think it's very clear that we need--having a single official
who has that responsibility doesn't mean that they will work by
themselves, but will focus a great deal of effort in sorting
intelligence.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator DeWine. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. During all the
committee's analyses of what occurred prior to 9/11, we have
come back time and again to two thoughts: we possess vast
powers of collection out there and hopefully we will do better
with analysis.
I am hopeful that in the course of all of our discussion we
can parse this large input-output mismatch. I'm impressed with
how much somebody has listened to or heard somewhere and how
difficult it is to translate this for the policymaker. How does
the analyst determine ``relevance''?
The second thought is even if we do excel at collection,
this information has to be translated. The language skills that
are required to deal with this hand-off from the collector
simply are not there. A crash program has to occur. In other
words, even if we collect the nuggets, can we get it in a
language the analysts can understand?
What fascinates me about our witnesses' testimony today is
their concern that the desire for analytical consensus may lead
to the policymaker receiving the lowest common denominator, one
devoid of dissent. We don't want to confuse the President or
the Secretary of State or Defense with conflicting advice, but
having several different policy choices weighed by the
policymaker is imperative.
Lastly, let me query Secretary Wolfowitz and Mr. Armitage
on the issue of ``intelligence accountability.'' Somebody has
to be in charge of intelligence, someone has to be
``accountable.''
Mr. Armitage. There is something seriously out of sync when
you have policymakers, and even good friends like Paul and I,
who can disagree almost violently without being disagreeable I
think on policy issues as we discuss them; and yet it doesn't
seem to be the case in the Intelligence Committee that that
kind of disagreement is allowed to flourish. The meetings in
front of the President--it's not a secret that he welcomes
different views; he requires them to make the right decision.
I can't give you any satisfaction on the other question of
the interconnectivity of our information and all of that. We're
dealing with a Department of State that, thanks to the goodness
of Congress for the last 2 years, is finally coming into the
1980s. We almost have all of our posts wired for e-mail, not to
mention secure.
Senator Lugar. The technical revolution in the field----
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, I think one of the real lessons--
and it's not with respect to terrorism--is we now have
technological capacities that allow us to have a pull system
for intelligence rather than a push.
Let me give you an example. When it comes to satellite
photography, our traditional way of doing it is the photo
interpreters at a central location pore over it and figure out
what's really good and they distribute to a user. We now have
the capacity to distribute stuff that a user out in the field
who may not be the world's best photo interpreter, but he knows
that it's the guy shooting at him from over the hill that he
needs a photograph of, can pull it out, and the data, can
distribute it. And we need more of that. And that, by the way,
is the opposite of this tendency which is every problem is
going to be solved by centralizing. I think on the whole, we
get huge advantages from more decentralization.
The other point is, I hope the people understand no matter
how good our intelligence gets, and obviously it can be
improved and obviously we can identify things that could have
been done better, it will never be good enough that we can
simply wait and head off every attack when it's imminent. We
have to act preventively. And that isn't only by military means
or even only by intelligence means. But we can no longer say
that it is somehow acceptable--maybe acceptable was never quite
the right word, but countries sponsor terrorism and we put them
on the terrorism list and we don't sell them Boeing aircraft,
and that's good enough. I think we have seen on September 11 a
glimpse of how terrible the world will be when those
capabilities are magnified by weapons of mass destruction. And
I think what we came to live with over the last 20 years, we
can't live with anymore. And no matter how good our
intelligence is, we will not be able to live with it.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to
cover three things that I don't believe have been covered.
First of all, and I think it's appropriate even though it is
not within the scope specifically of what we're supposed to be
talking about here, but what Senator Lugar said about the
abilities, the ability that we have. I don't think we can
isolate and leave out of this discussion what is happening to
our military capability. We have seen several articles
recently, and one as recent as Monday in the Wall Street
Journal, in terms of the attention that we are paying to the
defense of this country; that throughout the 20th century, we
have spent on average about 5.7 percent of our gross domestic
product on defense during peacetime; during wartime, 13.3
percent on defense. It has been, prior to this last budget,
under 3 percent of our gross domestic product. I think this is
a very critical thing, and I believe that it was in one of the
early hearings that we had in this administration, Secretary
Rumsfeld said we are going to have to face it and get it up to
or exceed 4 percent of our gross domestic product. I would like
each one of you to respond to that.
Mr. Wolfowitz. You are not going to get a strong argument
from me. We are getting substantial increases in resources,
thanks to the budget increases that the President approved
actually prior to September 11.
Senator Inhofe. Except the current budget is only at 3.1
percent.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think the other point I would make,
Senator, is we need to make truly efficient use of what we
have, and it's similarly not a matter--though it's not a
trivial matter to make good use of the taxpayers' dollars--but
I think sometimes we find that we need structures that are
quicker and more agile and communicate with one another better,
and sometimes that is a smaller, leaner structure rather than a
bigger one.
Senator Inhofe. Let me get to the point. There seems to be
an attitude here, or several public statements have been made
that talk about this administration and the mess that we got.
I was thinking about the two skeletons in the closet. One
rattled to the other one, how did you get in here? The other
one said, if we had any guts we'd get out.
Well, I think we have an administration now that has the
guts to get out. I'm a little disturbed, though. The first
thing that happened in the past administration--take the energy
labs, for example, they did away with color-coded ID badges.
They did away with background checks and reinstated some people
that had already been shown to have leaks. And I remember going
through what I call the hand-wringing phase of Usama bin Ladin,
starting with the World Trade Centers, and actually taking
credit for the first Yemen threat that was out there; Somalia,
and then Tanzania and then Yemen.
All this happened, and then you guys came in office. I
think you said, Secretary Armitage, that by the time you got
your national security team in place and were able to do
something--your first meeting was in March?
Mr. Armitage. April.
Senator Inhofe. In April. And then this comes along just a
few months later. And I would just ask you for a real brief
answer as to what do you think you had to do in terms of
getting a real handle on all the access to the information that
was there and getting it properly interpreted to your
satisfaction?
Mr. Armitage. I'm not sure how to satisfactorily answer
that, Senator Inhofe. I know that within a month, we felt we
had enough information that we had to aggressively go after al-
Qa'ida. And that was within a month. We learned a lot more as
we moved on down the path. But that was a decision April 30. I
had been in office 5 weeks, and Paul about 7.
Senator Inhofe. I think in your testimony, Secretary
Wolfowitz, the key paragraph: The President has made it clear
we will not wait until it's too late and that the one option we
don't have is doing nothing. We cannot afford to wait until we
have a smoking gun, for a gun smokes after it's been fired.
I see the hand-wringing now coming from this side of the
table as opposed to the administration, quite frankly, because
when we talk about all the things that have to be done and all
the things that have to be in place, I am hoping that you do
realize and the whole country needs to realize that you have
the authority in the event that the President sees imminent
danger to an American city to go ahead and take the necessary
action. That doesn't require a response.
Lastly, my predecessor, David Boren, was the Chairman of
the Senate Select Intelligence Committee. He and I talked in
1994, when I took his place and he became President of Oklahoma
University, about the problems that we have in our Intelligence
Community talking to each other, NSA, and it's kind of a turf
battle going on.
In terms of the Under Secretary of Intelligence--which I
strongly support--recognizing this doesn't take all of the
Intelligence Community into effect, only the DOD portion of it,
do you think this is going to go a long ways into ending the
turf battle in the intelligence system?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I hopes it goes a long way toward dealing
with turf battles in that large chunk of the intelligence
system that is in the Department of Defense. Yes, there are
turf battles and there are legitimate reasons why one agency is
concerned about overly wide dissemination of information. And
these problems don't arise just because people are defending
turf. But I think within that large area that is under the
Secretary of Defense's purview, I think this will go a long
way. It's not a magic cure. There is no single magic cure, but
it will be a major step forward. I thank you for supporting it.
Mr. Armitage. May I take advantage of your initial
question? Any support for the defense budget is welcome, and I
think it should be welcomed by every citizen. And I will make
the point that the Department of State's budget is one-tenth of
1 percent.
Senator Inhofe. I only mention that because I chaired the
Senate Armed Services Committee on Readiness. And we are at the
point now when you look at readiness, modernization, all these
things we have to do, there's no longer one area that you can
rob money of, and we're still going to have to do something
about the bottom line.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Senator
Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen,
welcome and thank you.
What has come through to me so far is that although George
Tenet declared war, either no one heard that declaration or not
many people heeded it. And although the Intelligence Community
warned that al-Qa'ida sought to attack the United States and
was capable of inflicting mass casualties, insufficient
attention was devoted to the risk of an attack at home. Gaps in
intelligence coverage were not filled. Defending the homeland
should have been the number one priority. But instead,
attention was really focused on attacks overseas and no real
effort was made to harden the homeland to reduce the chances of
attack.
Did the Intelligence Community--and I recognize that
there's a shift of administrations, and I recognize the time it
takes to get up and running, and I'm not intending to ask these
questions purporting any blame whatsoever--but did the
Intelligence Community clearly warn you that al-Qa'ida was
capable of and sought to carry out a mass casualty attack on
the United States?
Mr. Armitage. Senator, thank you. I recall being told by
the Intelligence Community about the efforts of al-Qa'ida to
develop chemical, bio, and radiological weapons. I do not
recall and I'm sure I didn't get any information that said they
had this capability. They were intent on developing; I remember
that.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I don't recall any warning of the
possibility of a mass casualty attack using civilian airliners
or any information that would have led us to contemplate the
possibility of our shooting down a civilian airliner. I do
recall a lot of information suggesting the danger of a mass
casualty attack from chemical, biological, nuclear weapons.
And I disagree with the statement that nothing was done to
protect the homeland. We put a major focus on what needed to be
done to deal with particularly those mass casualty
contingencies. We included a number of measures in our '02
budget proposal. And as I said earlier, when we did the
Quadrennial Defense Review some considerable time before
September 11, we identified homeland defense as the number one
priority for the Defense Department for its transformation
efforts.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, and that's certainly correct.
Since you mentioned Iraq and you mentioned it in your written
statement as well, what do you see as the connection between
al-Qa'ida and Iraq? And have you received any information which
is specific enough to let you be convinced that there was a
meeting between Mohamed Atta and Iraqi intelligence in Prague
or anywhere else?
Mr. Wolfowitz. This gets into a lot of classified areas.
Senator Feinstein. I am not asking you for the information.
Mr. Wolfowitz. One can't get into it without getting into
the information. One of the things we've said earlier, these
are not issues where there is a categorical that is the case or
this is the case. Almost everything we know, or certainly
everything we think didn't happen, has some uncertainty
attached to it.
But the point I was trying to make, the point that the
Secretary of Defense is trying to make, is about more than just
one country. It's about the fact that there are people out
there, a number of them, with horrible capabilities and with
hostile intentions. And if we insist on waiting until we have
the kind of precise intelligence that allows us to say there is
an imminent threat, we will wait too long.
When one thinks about September 11 and the kinds of actions
that might or might not have been taken in a war against al-
Qa'ida, it is worth remembering that the September 11 plot was
clearly put into motion as early as the beginning of the year
2000; that the entire group of hijackers was in this country by
the spring of last year. And if we had succeeded in closing one
door to them, they might have well examined others.
We know that Mohamed Atta, for example, was investigating
the possibility of crop dusters, presumably to distribute
biological weapons. So we can't defeat terrorism by defense, by
closing every door we can find. We are only going to defeat
terrorism when we put these organizations out of business.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator. Senator Kyl.
Senator Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to begin.
I have been reading this August Time magazine piece that tells
all with absolute accuracy, I am sure. And by way of
introducing our two panelists today, they come out very well as
enthusiastic supporters of doing something about terrorism:
``Richard Armitage, the barrel-chested deputy Secretary of
State. Paul Wolfowitz, the scholarly hawk from the Pentagon.''
Mr. Wolfowitz. I resent that comment.
Senator Kyl. You should be very pleased with it in the
context of the article, which says there were those who weren't
quite as anxious to move forward on terrorism and that you all
were very enthusiastic.
Chairman Graham. And I will also note that Mr. Armitage did
not reject his description of barrel-chested.
Mr. Wolfowitz. They didn't describe which part of mine.
Senator Kyl. In your testimony, Secretary Wolfowitz, you
talk about your service on the Rumsfeld Commission and the
issuance of the report back in 1998. And I just wanted to
quote, because this was not quoted during your oral
presentation. You talk about your service on that Commission
and the fact that because of the significant need for good
intelligence, Congress subsequently requested an intelligence
side letter to the report, which was provided. And then I quote
partially from your testimony here: First, according to the
side letter, it was evident to all commissioners that resources
for intelligence had been cut too deeply and that the United
States was entering a period in which the Intelligence
Community was going to be seriously challenged to meet its
foremost task--preventing surprise.
You go on to say that U.S. intelligence capabilities needed
to succeed in this task, the letter concluded, were not as
robust as they needed to be.
And to go on to conclude the letter: Methodological
approach, analytical depth, and presentation to users of the
Intelligence Community was in a degraded situation. And then
your testimony notes that, partly as a result of this, Congress
responded with a significant increase in funding for
intelligence in the fiscal '99 budget but--and I quote your
testimony--despite the best efforts of this committee, however,
the increases were not sustained in fiscal years 2000 or 2001.
And then you conclude by noting, literally at the time of
the attacks last September, the Department was preparing a
significant increase for intelligence in the FY 2003 budget.
And you noted immediately after the attacks it was doubled.
So I take your point and have been urging for some time
that we focus on the resources part of the problem, that many
of the deficiencies that people have been able to point to here
can be traced back to a requirement that we compromise some
intelligence because of inadequate resources.
And my first question to you is, without citing any
specifics--unless you would like to and can in an open
session--are you aware generally of situations when
intelligence compromises had to be made because of inadequate
resources?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Yes, generally, but I am not aware of ones
that I would directly connect to the September 11 events.
Senator Kyl. Does it make sense to fix the intelligence
budget as a specific arbitrary percentage of the defense
budget, given especially the kinds of things you have been
trying to do in terms of transition and the increasing
requirements for good intelligence as a component of the new
kind of war that we fight?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I don't think so. I'm reluctant to have
arbitrary targets, although it's maybe good to keep them in
mind as a benchmark to ask yourself the question. To give you
an example of how I think it needs to be done, we went through
a major exercise last fall in putting the budget together and
looking at transformational technologies that hadn't made it
into the service budgets. And a lot of those were in the
intelligence area. And then we sat down, program by program,
with Director Tenet and with his people and decided where there
were overlaps and redundancies or where there were gaps that
needed to be filled. I don't think there's any substitute for
doing the detailed work. We did it, and we need to continue to
do.
Senator Kyl. I want to give Secretary Armitage an
opportunity to talk about the need for enhancements in budget
with respect to the State Department's significant
responsibilities specifically with regard to terrorists coming
into the country, the visa programs, the new requirements that
I think we have properly placed with the State Department in
the border security bill.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I support him.
Mr. Armitage. The first 2 years, I must say the Congress in
relative terms has been generous to us; the requirements of the
PATRIOT Act, further in the homeland security bill, which we
gladly accept, will definitely require more consular affairs
officers, more training in consular affairs, which is exactly
what you all want. This does not mean, however, that even in
the State budget, that other than for planning purposes I would
welcome a fixed percentage of the GNP devoted to the State
budget, because it's what you what do with the money that is so
much more important than some arbitrary number. But for
planning purposes, having a general range would be very
helpful, I think, for guys who have to make budget decisions.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you,
Senator Kyl. Senator Hatch.
Senator Hatch. I want to welcome both of you here, and we
appreciate the service both of you have given through all these
years to our country. It has been an extraordinary service, and
of course I'm aware of a lot of it and personally have high
regard for both of you.
Dr. Wolfowitz, to your knowledge, did the Defense
Department ever do any kind of after-action study of the
lessons learned following the USS Cole incident? And let me
just add one other question. Did it ever attempt to inform
intelligence collection or analysis in ways designed to prevent
future such attacks?
Mr. Wolfowitz. There was a very careful after-action study
on the Cole incident. I believe it was done at the request of
the House Armed Services Committee. And understandably--maybe
not understandably, but I think understandably--it focused very
heavily on force protection deficiencies and what we needed to
do to close that particular door in the future. And we are
pretty good at closing the barn door after that particular
horse is out. And at the risk of repeating myself, I think the
message there is we are not going to win this game on defense.
We've got to go to offense and we are on offense now.
Senator Hatch. For both of you, in February 2001 the
Director of Central Intelligence testified before the Senate
Intelligence Committee that he believed al-Qa'ida was the most
immediate threat faced by the United States. And before
September 11, did anybody in your respective departments
receive periodic reports from the Intelligence Committee on al-
Qa'ida and the threat that it posed?
Mr. Armitage. Yes, absolutely. In the State Department, we
had mostly a weekly update on al-Qa'ida.
Senator Hatch. Were you aware that despite what the DCI
said about al-Qa'ida being our number-one threat, the CIA's
Counterterrorist Center had only five persons working full time
on intelligence analysis related to Usama bin Ladin and the FBI
only had one?
Mr. Armitage. No, I was not.
Senator Hatch. Would you have less confidence in the
strength of the products you were getting if you had known how
little effort the Intelligence Community had devoted to
analytical work on this type of a product?
Mr. Armitage. We had our own analysts looking at it and
sometimes they came to slightly different opinions on this or
that. And I had a fair amount of confidence that between the
two, I was getting it right. I had no idea of the numbers
involved in the Agency.
Senator Hatch. Just one more question. Mr. Wolfowitz, would
you care to comment?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I would give you the same answers.
Senator Hatch. When you arrived at the Defense Department
in this new administration, were you briefed on any serious
contingency planning for using military personnel in the fight
against terrorism?
Mr. Wolfowitz. We certainly talked about contingency
planning for the use of the military in dealing with a mass
casualty event in the United States. But one of our
observations was that contingency planning was in the very most
primitive stages, and it's one of the considerations that led
us to saying in the Quadrennial Defense Review that this had to
be the number-one priority for DOD transformation.
Senator Hatch. At the time you arrived at the Defense
Department, what degree of effort and resources did the
Department of Defense devote to fighting terrorism as distinct
from force protection measures?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I'm not sure I can make that distinction
very well. We were spending billions of dollars on force
protection. I guess to say what we were spending on the
offensive piece, that would mostly be in--there really is an
accounting problem here. There would be a lot in the
intelligence world, and then the question would be how do you
count the various capabilities that we were developing that we
later used in Afghanistan. We were not actively using our
military against terrorism at that particular stage, but we
obviously were developing capabilities that proved to be
crucial.
Senator Hatch. One last question to either or both of you:
Does the FBI currently have the freedom necessary to penetrate
radical cells within our country? And we know there are radical
cells in our country.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Armitage. Don't know the answer to that.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator Hatch. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me add my
welcome to our witnesses.
Let me ask both of you: In August of 1998 in the aftermath
of the east African embassy bombings, the United States
launched cruise missiles at al-Qa'ida targets in Afghanistan.
Is it your understanding that bin Ladin was an intended target
of that attack? Let me start with you, Mr. Wolfowitz.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I don't know what the intentions were at
that time, Senator. I have read that he was, but that it was
considered avaluable target, whether or not he was there.
Mr. Armitage. I agree.
Senator Levin. Were we not, in any event, after that attack
in effect at war with bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida at that point 3
years ago?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I would say, Senator Levin, that we probably
were at war with al-Qa'ida in February of that year when bin
Ladin issued his famous fatwa declaring war on us in effect, or
possibly earlier. I mean, one of the basic problems we have
here is we're not dealing with a traditional enemy where there
is a clear transition from being at peace to being at war, but
surely that fatwa was something that was pretty chilling.
Senator Levin. Let me ask you about intelligence reporting
by the FBI that you received and as to whether or not the
reporting from the FBI on the threat of foreign terrorism has
changed since September 11. Mr. Armitage, why don't I start
with you?
Mr. Armitage. From our point of view at State, it has. And
the FBI is a very active participant in the secure video
teleconference we have twice at least twice a week simply in
the counterterrorism arena. I asked the very question to our
fellows this morning, and that's the answer I got.
Senator Levin. That was not the case before September 11?
Mr. Armitage. No, I believe it was not the case, and
general sharing of information from law enforcement agencies
was a real shortfall.
Senator Levin. Mr. Wolfowitz.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think there has definitely been a change
since September 11. I think there are still big issues that
people wrestle with about civil liberties considerations
involved in sharing information that may directly be related to
a prosecution. And I think there are concerns that the FBI has,
like every other agency, that if they share information with
someone else it might get compromised. So there are still
issues there and there's no magic solution, but there's
definitely a change since September 11.
Senator Levin. Be specific. What changes have occurred
since September 11?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I measure it in terms of the quantity of
information that I get.
Senator Levin. How would you measure, twice as much, four
times?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Enormously more. Threat reporting every
morning. And by the way, it isn't always clear when something
has come from the FBI or from another intelligence source, but
I'm making guesses that a lot of this is coming from FBI
investigations.
Senator Levin. And you are looking at the quantity of
reporting every morning on threats?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Basically, yes.
Senator Levin. Was that reporting available every morning
prior to 9/11 but there wasn't as much each morning, or it was
sporadic as to whether it was every morning or not?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think it's two things. I don't think there
was nearly as much. I mean, remember all of these people that
the FBI has detained and interrogated around the world,
including this country, has produced a huge volume of
information we didn't have before, but I also think there is a
much greater willingness to share what they have.
Senator Levin. Yesterday the joint inquiry staff reported
that a closely held intelligence report was prepared in August
of 2001 for senior government officials and that it included
information that bin Ladin had wanted to conduct attacks in the
United States since 1997, as well as information acquired in
May of 2001 that indicated that a group of bin Ladin supporters
was planning attacks in the United States with explosives.
Can you tell me who within the administration received that
report and what action was taken in response, if any, to the
warnings in that specific intelligence report of August 2001
for senior government officials?
Mr. Armitage, let me start with you.
Mr. Armitage. I recall that general topic in the SEIB, the
Senior Executive Intelligence Brief--I can't tell you who got
it. I know I got that one. I think a day or two after, some
other people saw it, but I saw that, and it talked about a
hijacking possibility.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I have to confess, I wasn't aware of it
until I read about it much later. Maybe that is because it came
in August, and I think during a time when I was on leave. I
think that we were generally aware of the fact that al-Qa'ida
attacks could take place in the United States as well as
abroad, and put a lot of emphasis on heightened force
protection levels in July of last year when we got an
exceptionally large volume of threat reporting. We went on a
worldwide alert, including in our facilities here in the United
States.
Senator Levin. For the record, would you let these
committees know who in the Defense Department then, if anyone,
received that August 2001 intelligence report that I have
referred to?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I will try to check for the record.
[See Department of Defense responses to questions for the
record.]
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Congressman Boswell, a designated questioner, has now
returned.
Mr. Boswell. I have returned. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And
thank you and Chairman Goss for your hard work in trying to
bring this to resolve.
I would like to address our two Secretaries just a moment
before I ask questions.
Mr. Armitage, you and I have a little history together. I
suppose you probably know where that was, in Southeast Asia in
the Vietnam situation. I might make a reference to that in a
moment. But I appreciate the fact that you said some things
didn't happen, as we refer to what is going on, this talk
today. And I refer to them as prevents that we can't talk about
that have happened, and I appreciated that, but I think that we
owe it to these families from yesterday. It was a soul-
searching day yesterday as we talked to them, and I would guess
if you would have been sitting up here, you would have felt no
different than we did.
But they need assurances from us that we learned whatever
lessons we are learning, and that we don't have to learn them
again, and I hope that we will remember that and try to keep
that information flowing to them, because it is terribly
important in their grief, and we wouldn't feel any different--
we don't feel any different.
I am going to go over to, I think, Mr. Wolfowitz just for a
minute. We need to know what is new. You may not be able to
tell us today, but you made a comment that we have known for
some time aboutthe chemical and biological possibilities of
mass destruction, and somewhere, someplace, we need to know what the
situation is with the nukes, how close they are. And I hope that is in
mind, which leads me to some of your opening comments that caused me to
think about that.
And, Secretary Armitage, yourself, again I thank you for
your years in uniform, now your service now, both of you, in
fact. But you and I, and, of course, others right here at this
table, we went to Vietnam, and we didn't have the people behind
us, and we know that. And we left there under less than
favorable conditions, kind of had our tail between our legs.
The worst part of it was that 56,000 body bags that came back.
I don't know about you, but I helped put some of my comrades in
those bags, and I will never forget that; you wouldn't expect
me to, and I am sure you don't either.
So I want to know when we get to the point where you can
share with us, maybe not today, to give information that will
cause the American people to be with us if and when we should
go to Iraq. And I think it is terribly important because of
that history that I have just referred to, so I hope that that
will be shared.
And I would also like to know from your opinion of that
time, and we have allowed our Chairs to get you with us, what
do we do next? The day after we take Mr. Saddam Hussein out,
then what happens next?
So I guess I wanted to lead off with that and now I would
like to go to some questions. I appreciate you being here. I
know since I am the last one to ask the lengthy set of
questions, a lot has been already asked, so I hope that I don't
do things redundantly at anybody's expense because of absence
and so on.
But, Secretary Armitage, in your written testimony, you
note that in the summer of 2001 the U.S. Government demanded
formally of the Taliban that they cease support of terrorism,
and that we will hold them responsible for attacks committed by
terrorists that they harbored. Can you elaborate on that? Can
you describe how this message was received? Was there a
reiteration of previous warnings to the Taliban of a
significant ratcheting up of the stakes? Can you address that?
Have we learned anything from this about the tools at the State
Department's disposal to prevent states from harboring
terrorists?
Mr. Armitage. Yes, sir. We, in June, late June of 2001, had
our ambassador in Islamabad talk to the representatives of the
Taliban in Pakistan. We also demarched the government of
Pakistan, who was supporting the Taliban at that time. We made
it clear that should any harm come to any Americans, they, too,
bore responsibility.
In the intelligence reporting after that, for a short while
we saw that some in the Taliban leadership were trying to put a
little distance between themselves and the people that they
referred to as the Arabs, which we know are, of course, the al-
Qa'ida, foreigners who were in Afghanistan. However, as that
discussion internal to the Taliban continued, Mullah Omar
finally overruled it, I believe because of greed, the money
that he was getting from bin Ladin, and it had ultimately
little effect.
Mr. Boswell. In your written statement you discuss State's
information-sharing mechanisms with the FBI and local law
enforcement still not where they need to be.
And our embassies bear a responsibility as hosts for a
number of agency representatives, such as the FBI and legal
attaches and so on. How well is this system interaction with
the FBI and law enforcement working now, a year later after the
attacks?
Mr. Armitage. Well, the short answer is it is working much
better, but I don't think it is sufficient to the problem. I
don't think our own capabilities from our embassy, in terms of
communication and interconnectivity, are sufficient to the
problem at all.
Mr. Boswell. Well, sharing of information will always be
under scrutiny, and I appreciate what both of you have said, I
think, in terms of the sensitivity and putting people in
danger. If it is in the wrong hands, so on, we will always have
to deal with that in a democracy. Of course we will. It is very
sensitive. We have to go back and deal with approximately
600,000 people that we are here to represent, something close
to that number.
And it is my opinion, from spending a lot of time with
local law enforcement and the State equal of FEMA and so on,
and those that will be on the front line in this kind of a war,
that they really need and deserve the best communication we can
get to them, and so anything that we can do to work with you on
that, we have got to do the best we can. I trust you understand
that, and I would like for you to allude a little more how we
can get there, that is not in a classified sense, so if they
are watching, or if we go home, the rest of us, we can tell
them about it, that we are engaged in this, and it is our
intent to be sure that they are in the information scheme of
things so they can do what we are going to expect of them as we
continue this battle with terrorism.
Mr. Armitage. First of all, you are talking to the son of a
cop, so you are not going to get anything but cheerleading from
me on that statement. But I think my father, as I recall, would
have been astonished to find that he was on the front line of a
national battle. He thought it was all he could do to get
through the day on the street. But that is sort of the mindset
that has to be changed immediately.
Further to that, there are new--we have got new folks in
our Intelligence Community, the TSA. Customs has become so much
more important. We have got to be able to more integrate them
with this, and so over time it becomes a seamless flow of
information.
Now, no witness is going to sit in front of you, sir, and
tell you that that is the case now. It is not credible. But
that is the direction we are going in, and it takes a mind
change not just from the national level, but at the level of
mayors, and Governors, et cetera.
Mr. Boswell. They are very keen on this. I know you know
that from what you have just said. They are very keen on this.
I appreciate your reassurance that you are tuned in to it, but
I can tell you from firsthand contact, which happens almost on
a daily basis, that they are very, very concerned that we don't
expect them to have responsibilities that they are not at least
informed about, and they need that information. So we have got
to keep that in front of us and continue to expand on it.
Let me shift a little bit. Secretary Wolfowitz, what can
you share with us? What should the American people know about
the toll, the cost this global war on terrorism will take on
the Department of Defense. And how big a threat is this--your
thoughts on how long it would last? How much effort do we need
to deal with it? And what do you see as the gaps between the
counterterrorism capabilities that we have and the
counterterrorism capabilities that we need? And can we do a war
on terrorism and a war on Iraq at the same time? What
comments--can you give us some reassurance?
Mr. Wolfowitz. You covered a lot of ground there.
Mr. Boswell. I will go back.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think the answer is we have had
substantial increases in resources, for which we appreciate the
support of the Congress. I think it has made a huge difference.
There are strains in certain areas, particularly in the call-up
of Reserves. I think most people who signed up for the Reserves
some years ago probably didn't anticipate the length or the
level of demands that this new homeland security mission would
place on people. But I think the force has responded
magnificently so far. I believe it has a great capability to
sustain what is probably going to be a long war.
You asked how long. I don't think we know how long, and, as
we get a better idea of how long it will be, we will have to
assess at each stage what kinds of resource that we need. But I
think that we have adequate resources now.
I believe, as Secretary Rumsfeld has testified, it is a
mistake to separate this issue of Iraq as something separate
from the war onterrorism. It is very much part of the war on
terrorism. And I think we--depending on what the President asks us to
do, we have a very wide range of options that we can sustain, I think,
with the military capabilities that we have today.
But we certainly are anticipating getting the full level of
increases that are planned over the course of the 5-year
defense program that we gave to the Congress last year. We have
got to be on a steady, but not overwhelming, upward curve.
Mr. Boswell. Well, I guess a point I am trying to make is
if we are going to have a war on terrorism and the potential of
this war with Iraq, which is certainly getting lots of
attention, can we afford it, and can we take care of the
homeland in the process? This is something that people are
sharing with us as we travel back to our districts.
And I think that is a fair question, you know, picking up
the tab, taking care of homeland, ensuring that Europeans, the
region and whatever, as we go back to probably classified
things at some point, are picking up their share of the tab.
And so I think there are folks--the American people are
getting behind all of this. We are going to have to communicate
better than we are so far, and some of that responsibility lies
on us, but for a lot we have to rely on you, because I have
often said, because of being on this committee, I kind of know
what some of the threats are, but I don't know what is going on
with the Secretary of State, as you folks travel and do all
things. You can't keep us totally informed on that. I
understand that. Maybe you are accomplishing some great things
that we don't know about, and at some place and point you can
tell us about it. When you can, we need to know, because--again
going back to my opening statement--the American people have
got to be with us, and there is a lot of doubt out there.
And they are reminded of the 56,000 body bags. They bring
it up to me once in a while because I am a Vietnam veteran, as
are you.
Mr. Armitage. May I make a comment? Paul probably wants to
comment, too. I am not contradicting what you said. You are
right. One of the questions that we and you particularly with
your responsibilities have to ask is whether we can continue
the global war on terrorism and if the--depending on what the
President decides, how to handle Iraq and to take care of
homeland security. That is one of the questions.
One of the other questions that I hope constituents are
also asking or at least being asked to think about is can we
afford not to act?
As Paul and I have been discussing last night and this
morning, in this very hearing, and we were thinking to
ourselves, if a terrible event happened from Iraq, what kind of
hearing would we be having if we hadn't done something? That is
a fair question. That is one that we have to--you are
suggesting we should do a better job communicating. Fair
enough. But I think it is also fair to have this discussion
with the American public along the lines of what is the cost of
no action? And we happen to feel it is considerable.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Congressman Boswell, one thing that hasn't
gotten communicated sufficiently in public, and that is the way
in which this war is a global war, and that is the reason why
separating out the issue of Iraq as not part of the war on
terrorism is a mistake.
Let me give you a couple of examples. We have uncovered a
whole network of al-Qa'ida terrorists in Southeast Asia. We
would never have gotten at those people if it hadn't been for
the action in Afghanistan, which unveiled some capabilities
that were going on in Singapore.
The success in Afghanistan drove several people, including
the man we arrested, detained a couple of months ago, Abu
Zubaydah, and probably now this guy we got just very recently,
Ramzi Binalshibh, into Pakistan where we were capable, with
Pakistani authorities, to wrap these guys up. And finally, I
mean, among the many interactions here, the fact that the
Taliban supported terrorists and are now no more is a lesson to
every other government around the world that used to support
terrorists and now begins to think whether it has to change its
policies.
So it is really a mistake to think that there is one
struggle with just terrorists and this issue of Iraq is
something completely separate. They really are part of a piece.
Finally----
Mr. Boswell. Let me just interface with you a little bit.
That is a point I have been trying to make, as in my opening
statement. We understand that. And this guy is a terrorist, and
he can provide a lot of resources, but we have got to be able
to protect the homeland. I appreciate what you are saying. So
continue, please.
Mr. Wolfowitz. We are protecting the homeland in every way
that we can, but, as I said, we can only get so far playing
defense. So we are going to do everything we can defensively
here, and undoubtedly they will come up with some surprises we
haven't thought of, but our real effort is to get them out of
business.
Mr. Boswell. Then we have got to make the case. That is, we
are not there. We have got to make the case. We are relying on
you to come to us and make the case. And I know you are doing
some of that now, and I appreciate the presentation to the
U.N., but the American people, we need to hear the case. And I
think the support will be there, but we have got to make the
case.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Thank you.
Mr. Boswell. Moving on. Our time is okay?
Secretary Armitage, much of the success in the campaign
against al-Qa'ida has been the result of significant
assistance, and we have been touching on that, from foreign
governments around the world.
The administration has much to be proud of in working with
the other countries. I compliment you on your efforts, you and
the Secretary. We have asked them to take dangerous police
actions. We have asked them to accept our troops on their
territory and to provide us law enforcement, intelligence
information to an unprecedented degree. But recently, however--
and I am concerned about it--we have become aware that some of
our allies are unsettled about our policies and the way in
which we are pursuing our interests. Some leaders are becoming
more popular with the electorate as they distance themselves
from U.S. policies. So how strong are our bonds?
Elaborate. Talk to us about that, because I think that we
have to have allies with us to make this acceptable to our
people.
Mr. Armitage. You are referring, I think, in the main to
the German election to be held the 22nd of this month, and I
think it is quite regrettable that there have been a number of
both--to some extent a campaigning on an anti-American theme. I
don't know how, as a general matter, to separate our
preeminence in the world from jealousies, from being a target.
I think we are going to be that as long as we enjoy this
promise and preeminence in the world, and indeed American
Presidents generally do stand up and stand for principle, and I
think we are doing that.
And most of our allies in this global war on terrorism have
been quite good. Even in the case that you cite, I think you
were citing, that--activities in Afghanistan alongside us do
continue with German police and military.
So to some extent it is a mixed picture. In other areas
like in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, people are not only standing up,
they are standing up at risk to their governance and to their
lives. Witness the fact that President Musharraf's intelligence
service thwarted a bombing attempt on him yesterday.
So it is a mixed picture. I think it is a better picture
than it is worse, but it is a daily struggle. We are going to
keep at it.
Mr. Boswell. Thank you.
To both of you, the response to global terrorism threats,
it is an interagency situation. Before 9/11 the National
Security Council orchestrated and coordinated interagency
responses to terrorism. After9/11 the national security
interagency system has shifted in adding in particular a deputy
national security advisor for combatting terrorism. So who reports to
both Ms. Rice and Governor Ridge?
Mr. Armitage. Right.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Who is it?
Mr. Boswell. Who reports to them?
Mr. Armitage. It's now General John Gordon, sir. It was
General Wayne Downing up until a month or two ago.
Mr. Boswell. Give us some reassurance and elaboration on
how the coordination, the sharing of information at the high
level, at the administration level, is actually taking place.
Mr. Armitage. Regarding General Gordon, he chairs the--the
secure teleconference at least twice a week. During last week
it was several times a day because of the fact that we had
increased our threat alert. And I talk to John probably every
other day, myself, on one issue or another. So I think, from my
point of view, he is interacting pretty well, just as General
Downing did.
I would have to let Dr. Rice speak to how she feels about
it, but I have every reason to believe that she is very
satisfied with the way that he works.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I would agree with that.
Mr. Boswell. Okay.
Chairman Graham. Well, good.
Mr. Boswell. Is my time up? I am still in the yellow light.
Chairman Graham. We have had a rule that you don't start a
question in the yellow light.
Mr. Boswell. They made a new rule on me.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity and the time,
and I appreciate the efforts. And I just want to leave this, my
opening thought, if I could. It is that we have got to take
this to the American people, and we don't want another Vietnam
situation where we have got 56,000 body bags and we don't have
the people with us. We have got to give reassurance where
lessons learned to those families.
And I thank you for your attention. I thank you for your
time.
Mr. Armitage. If I may, you are right, absolutely, but I
didn't and I doubt that you left Vietnam with our tail between
our legs.
Mr. Boswell. No. I had my head high, but I didn't like the
fact that----
Mr. Armitage. I didn't like what happened either. I had my
head high.
Mr. Boswell. We did.
Mr. Armitage. It is not your problem.
Mr. Boswell. Our people were not with us. You know that.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.
Senator Shelby.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Mr. Chairman, first I want to
apologize to both the Secretaries. I have been tied up in the
Banking Committee all day. I told Secretary Wolfowitz earlier
that I would have been here. I have been here most of the time.
I want to just make a few observations--I am going to keep
you here--because, one, Secretary Wolfowitz, I think this
statement, I have reviewed it, is excellent. And lessons
learned, that is very important. If we don't learn from the
past, we will repeat them. We all know this.
My observation is that both of you have brought a lot of
leadership to the State Department and to the Secretary of
Defense's office. You have outstanding Secretaries, Secretary
Powell, Secretary Rumsfeld, people that are going to put the
security of this Nation first, whatever comes.
I had the opportunity when I chaired this committee to work
with Secretary Rumsfeld when he headed up the Rumsfeld
Commission that you served on, and I thought that Commission
laid the groundwork for many things, including missile defense.
But it also touched on intelligence, and if you look back in
that report, we got something out of it.
But I just want to thank you for your service, thank you
for what you are doing, and I am sorry I was not here earlier
for all of your testimony.
But as far as the President is concerned, I know a lot of
questions may have centered around the right. I think the
President is on the right track. I know he is on the right
track. I am going to support him. I believe that Congress is
going to support the President overwhelmingly, and I think we
should lead, not the U.N.; we should lead. And if the U.N.
follows, well, that is good. If they don't fellow, they will
become a debating society. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator Shelby.
Congresswoman Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I was
settling in getting ready for your distinguished Vice
Chairman's 20 minutes of questioning, but pleased to be
recognized.
Vice Chairman Shelby. I will yield my time. Only this
morning, though.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for your presentation
this morning.
My questions spring largely from some of your comments here
today. Some of them I don't need answers to; I just want to
make some observations, and then I do have a couple of
questions.
First of all, I was interested in your ``drain the swamp''
comment--that we, in order to fight terrorism, had to drain the
swamp. And it was interesting to me, because the--this was said
earlier--the Hamas and the Hizbollah are an important part of
terrorism in the world, and as we know, there is significant
support from Iran for terrorism.
I wondered if that was the next swamp that we were planning
to drain, if there were any other swamps that you might like to
mention as well?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I wasn't talking about anything specific. I
am trying to make the point that we are not going to be able to
have intelligence that is so perfect that we can find every
snake in the place.
Ms. Pelosi. I understand. But you related it to the Iraq
situation.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think the point--and maybe you weren't
here when I said it, I think it bears repeating. For roughly
the last 20 years or maybe even longer, we viewed terrorism as
an evil.
Ms. Pelosi. Mr. Secretary, I understand. I only have 5
minutes. I was here. I just missed the first couple of minutes
of Mr. Boswell's. But my point is you were mentioning that in
the context of Iraq. We have a responsibility to the American
people to protect them. We all want to work together to do
that. We all stand with the President on the war on terrorism.
But that is the war that we are in, and I would not like to see
us undertake any initiatives that would jeopardize the
cooperation we have with the countries in the world in the war
on terrorism that put our forces--in which force protection is
one of our primary responsibilities in intelligence.
So if we are talking about going after the al-Qa'ida and
the support that we need to do that, my concern is that, and I
didn't have any intention of talking about Iraq today. It is
not the subject of this hearing. The subject of this hearing is
rooting out terrorism.
Now, you want to talk about it in a larger sense and relate
it to a different initiative, but we are trying to figure out
how we can improve our intelligence gathering so we can
understand plans and intentions to protect the American people
better and to assure the families of those who are affected
that this won't happen again, the suffering they have
experienced won't be experienced by others.
So in terms of that, if we were to go into Iraq, do you
feel confident that we have the intelligence capability, going
into a different place to--as we are engaged in the war on
terrorism to protect our troops when we go in there, if we were
to go in there in a matter of weeks?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I mean, we didn't come here to discuss that.
Ms. Pelosi. I understand that. No. But you brought it up,
and I specifically advised my colleague, this isn't about Iraq.
But you spent your testimony quoting Secretary Rumsfeld's
testimony from yesterday to another committee about Iraq when
we are here to talk about how we best fight the war on
terrorism in relationship to 9/11.
I want to be respectful of you. I hope that you will extend
my best wishes to the Secretary, as you will to Secretary
Powell, and tell them that our invitation stands for them to
come here and answer these questions as well.
But let me be more specific, Mr. Secretary Wolfowitz.
Again, going back to your comments, on page 3 of your
testimony, you say, lessons learned from September 11, and the
important point that you make is that you quoted Thomas
Schelling's novel--I mean, the foreword to Roberta
Wohlstetter's superb book, Pearl Harbor, and in it you quoted,
this is in your statement, surprise, when it happens to a
government, is likely to be complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic.
It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility
so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that actions get
lost.
My question to you is when you used that quote, are you
saying that this--September 11 happened because it included
neglect of responsibility? If so, what? Responsibility so
poorly defined? If so, what? And so ambiguously delegated that
action gets lost? Could you address your own statement relating
to this inquiry?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I am not trying to say everything in that
quote pertains to September 11. I think everything in that
quote pertains to the problem of the future----
Ms. Pelosi. I am just talking about what you quoted. I
didn't say----
Mr. Wolfowitz [continuing]. And how one avoids surprise.
One of the points that he makes there, I think it is crucial,
and I think it is actually by now widely accepted, that in
addition to failures that may have existed to get information,
for example, out of the Phoenix FBI, there is a problem which I
think we are trying to address now with a new Department of
Homeland Security, assigning responsibility so that not only
that we get beyond this issue of simply who neglected
responsibility, but to make sure that the responsibility is
pinned somewhere so that it gets done, because unless you
identify people as responsible, there is a tendency to say,
that is not my job, someone else is taking care of it.
Ms. Pelosi. That is a very good point. I wonder if you
would like to be specific in that regard, because you are using
the quote that this was--are you saying that September 11 was a
neglect of responsibility?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I didn't say that.
Ms. Pelosi. But you used that quote, though. It says,
includes neglect of responsibility.
Mr. Wolfowitz. The import of that quote is to say that
problems often arise, even though people are taking their
responsibilities perfectly seriously, because the
responsibilities aren't clearly assigned. He is actually
talking about Pearl Harbor where people identified all kinds of
people who didn't do what they should have done, but where
there were problems also that the responsibility for making
sure, for example, the information got out to Pearl Harbor
wasn't assigned anywhere.
Ms. Pelosi. But we are talking about September 11. I am
asking in relationship to the context in which you made the
comment. My time has expired, but I have to close by saying
that I had hoped that we could focus on September 11 and that
the purpose of this hearing was September 11, and it was not to
expand it to justify--to saying, but if we could have in war in
Iraq, that it would make some difference as to what happened on
September 11.
Certainly we have to be proactive and go out there and co-
opt any attempt to attack our country, but it isn't about that.
And we were trying to be respectful of you in confining our
questions to September 11 and how we can do better in the
future, and I am just disappointed that you--the Secretary
didn't come, but you came and read his statement to another
committee, about a different subject that was not the specific
focus of our hearing. I am glad you came.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I thought the focus of this hearing was to
talk about what can be learned about September 11 to prevent
attacks in the future. The statement I gave you is full of what
I think is lessons learned from September 11 that can help us
to prevent attacks in the future.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Pelosi.
The Chair recognizes Congressman Goss.
Chairman Goss. Thank you. Secretary Armitage, you have
noted that we have had great cooperation from other services in
other countries in the war on terrorism. That is a very welcome
comment. I don't interpret from that you suggesting in our
intelligence capabilities that we should in any way reduce or
give up our unilateral efforts in the Intelligence Community.
Am I interpreting you correctly?
Mr. Armitage. Absolutely. On the contrary, we should
redouble our capabilities and encourage others to come along
with us.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, sir.
Also in your testimony you say we simply cannot afford to
lose the openness for which we are famous, and, of course, that
is the hallmark of our country. You are talking about
protecting in some ways our embassies overseas, which is a
concern of all of us.
Many of us are concerned that we don't want to build just
fortress America in many places around the world. On the other
hand, we want to provide reasonable protection from terrorists
at our overseas installations, whether they are embassies or
bases. Mr. Wolfowitz, do you have any further comment on that?
Mr. Armitage. Senator Hatch asked Paul earlier a question
about any lessons learned after the U.S.S. Cole. Well, we
learned some lessons after Kenya and Tanzania. That is, as much
as we desire to be open and keep in close contact with every
country, it is not on these days. So, because of the
congressionally-mandated Crowe Report, I think we have taken
those lessons to heart.
Our budget submissions reflect both the upgrading of the
diplomatic security efforts as well as the hardening of our
embassies, which were called for in that report.
Chairman Goss. I hope you would agree with my view that
hardening of the embassies and taking necessary gates, guards
and guns protection obviously makes great sense, but really the
first line of defense would be good information so we never
have to rely too much on those gates, guns and guards.
Mr. Armitage. Of course, I would, but I would also add that
our first line of homeland defense, as far as we are concerned,
starts with our consular people, who are interviewing now these
folks overseas. They really, as far as we are concerned, are
the first line.
Chairman Goss. That is welcome. Thank you.
Secretary Wolfowitz, you made the statement that our
current sources and methods have depreciated badly over the
last decade. I characterize that as basically that we have been
underinvested in intelligence. Is that pretty much what you are
saying?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think underinvested, and I thinkprobably a
bit risk-averse, too much risk-averse. You don't penetrate
organizations of the kind we are talking about easily. I think we now
recognize that the cost of not penetrating them is enormous, however.
Chairman Goss. Thank you. I yield to the Chairman on that.
Chairman Graham. I apologize for myself and for my
colleagues. A Senate vote is under way and is reaching the end,
so we are going to have to leave to make that vote. I wanted to
extend my personal thanks and the appreciation of The Joint
Inquiry Committee for the excellent testimony and response to
questions which you have allowed us to receive today.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Goss [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think
that we all know that we have got ourselves smothered in stacks
of hay with fewer and fewer needles out there basically in the
Intelligence Community. We have heard that expressed so many
different ways by military and civilian customers, that is a
problem. And, Secretary Wolfowitz, you talked about what I will
call information discovery and that bridging, which we
understand, and that is a theme.
My worry is that we do not have enough people focused on
what I will call the hard work of building the database that
Secretary Armitage referred to also, that we don't have people
loading up the system with the kinds of information which--open
source, routine stuff which seems like a waste of time, but can
be critical as we go along.
And I notice even in the vetting of background for security
clearances in the Department of Defense, and I am sure other
agencies as well, there is quite a reasonable waiting list,
perhaps unreasonable waiting list. Are we making any progress
in those areas?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think we have cleared up a lot of the
backlog on the security clearance side. One problem that we
have, I think, is something that Senator Lugar alluded to
earlier, on the need for more language capability. We have
potentially enormous resources in this country with our
immigrant communities to deal with these difficult languages,
and I think the security and understandable security concerns
about bringing in people that we haven't got long familiarity
with deprives us of a great deal of that benefit. That is
something that I think we need to deal with.
And just to say it very quickly, we have a challenge. We
have said it over and over again in the Defense Department. At
the same time that we are fighting a war today, we are trying
to build the military of 10 years from now. It is difficult. It
is a lot more than just walking and chewing gum at the same
time.
The same thing is true in the intelligence world. A lot of
capabilities that we would like to be developing are
capabilities that are going to pay off a year, 2 years, 5 years
from now. And the same people that have to do that work are
busily working on the most immediate threat information that
comes in. So keeping that balance between the immediate and the
very important long term is a challenge, and it is something
that I think committees of the Congress can help us in getting
that balance.
Chairman Goss. Committees of the Congress have recognized
that challenge. We need to be reminded, realistically, when we
are doing our authorization and appropriation, of what the true
needs are, and we need to work with you on what consequences we
are willing to accept by not meeting those true needs in case
we can't. That process has not worked as well as it should have
in the past, in my view. Pointing no fingers, it is just simply
that we know some things don't get the attention that they
need. We need to understand what those are and what the
consequences are.
Thank you. My time has run out.
Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to both witnesses.
I just want to jump in where this conversation has just
left off, because we had a conversation, private conversation,
before your testimony, and I was waiting to say exactly what
you just said, and that is that the point of looking backwards
is to make certain we understand what failed--and I think what
failed were systems, not people--so that we can look forward
and make certain it doesn't fail again, and that if we dwell
too long on finding the needle in the haystack, we may miss the
needle in the next haystack. And I think it is very important
to remember that, and I frankly think that even the families
who offered enormously compelling testimony yesterday would, if
they had the choice, rather know that no one else will meet the
fate of their spouses or parents than know precisely,
absolutely that some piece of paper maybe should have moved
from desk A to desk B.
So I just want to commend you for looking forward. I hope
systems do change. I think it is imperative that good people
trying to do their jobs get a signal from us that we want them
to do their jobs, and that while we investigate this, we want
them to be at their desks thinking out of the box,
communicating with people in the next agency about everything
they can imagine that could happen, and reaching for better
technologies to converge the different databases and the
different information so that next time we can hunt and not
just gather the clues that will get us to know in advance what
can be coming our way.
I also want to say something that you have said often, Mr.
Chairman. I quote you anyway. I hope you said it, but if you
didn't, I impute it to you. That is, that what changed on 9/11
was the audience, and I think that is a big difference.
I appreciate the fact that these witnesses have not said,
gee, some prior administration did something wrong. That isn't
the point. Every administration over, you know, the last 20
years has been trying to get this right. The point is that now
the attention is focused on solving the problem, and there is
popular support for the investments we need to make in
counterterrorism, and we are making those investments.
And we do need a Department of Homeland Security so that
someone is in charge, and we do need the right authorities to
that person, and we do need the technologies that go with that.
At any rate, I know these witnesses agree.
Let me just ask two questions thinking forward about things
under your control, and I will put them both out there before
the light changes.
The first is for you, Secretary Armitage. I am interested
in what changes we are making to our visa system that was
obviously extremely porous pre-9/11, and some of us who looked
at this in past lives, I as a member of the Bremmer Commission
pointed this out, and nothing changed. What are you doing to
change that?
And to you, Secretary Wolfowitz, I am interested in
NORTHCOM, which I don't think has come up this morning, I don't
believe, and how the Northern Command, in your view, will
integrate with our homeland security effort to make certain
that we have capabilities that work seamlessly with the new
Department of Homeland Security, rather than work as a separate
stovepipe.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Ms. Harman. If I might start out
by saying your comments and that of Chairman Goss's will do
more to inspire a confidence in people to be not risk-averse,
to really think out of box, than anything that we would ever
say, I will tell you that. Thank you.
The changes in visas runs the gamut. First of all, because
of the homeland security bill, particularly the House bill
where we gladly accept the direction of the Director of
Homeland Security, we will have functional responsibility as he
has policy responsibilities for us, number one.
Number two, we have, I think, rather dramatically
increased, with cooperation now from law enforcement and from
intelligence, the number of files that are in our TIPOFF system
and our CLASS system; that we have gone to machine-readable
visas in almost all cases; that in certain countries, all males
between 16 and 45 have to be not only interviewed, but there is
a required waiting time; and there are a whole host of these
issues which--or measures that I would be more than happy to
supply for the record, if that is acceptable to you.
Ms. Harman. Fine.
[See Department of State responses to questions for the
record.]
Mr. Wolfowitz. If I can make one very quick comment. I
think it is important to understand failures and try to correct
failures. I do think--and this isn't in our departments--I
think it would be fair also to recognize success, because a lot
of things have been prevented by some very hard-working and
talented and creative people in the Intelligence Community. We
want to inspire that kind of creative risk-taking. I think it
is important as one focuses on failure not to make everybody
failure-averse.
On the issue about Northern Command, it--of course we are
just about to stand it up on October 1, and General Eberhart is
developing the plans by which it would be structured. But what
it will provide is a single point of contact for the Secretary
to go to for those military capabilities needed in support of
civilian authorities.
We are going to have to work very hard on making sure that
these requirements are communicated in a timely way, and we
have had quite a few opportunities for real-world exercises, if
I can call them that, over the last 6 months of making sure
that when something was needed on the civilian side, that we
had the right rules of engagement in the military chain.
I don't think there is any substitute for two things:
Number one, trying to think as carefully as you can and
anticipate real-world requirements, whether it be to deal with
a hijacked airliner or any number of other things that could
occur. And, secondly, I think we are going to have to do a fair
amount of war game simulation to actually see what works and
what doesn't work. We have just been through a very, very
revealing exercise called Millennium Challenge that had nothing
to do with the homeland side, just on a pure military side. We
have had huge lessons learned from that. I think we need a kind
of Millennium Challenge for Northern Command as soon as they
are ready to do one.
Chairman Goss. I will announce to Members that our
agreement with these gentlemen--they have other obligations--
was to leave at 1:00. We have three Members here who have been
here and attentive all day. If you could spare time for a few
minutes for each of them, I promise you I will not go more than
the allotted time. And I would ask Members to be as concise in
their questions. Is that agreeable?
Mr. Armitage. Of course, sir.
Chairman Goss. Thank you very much.
Mr. Roemer.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, gentlemen. Delighted to have the distinguished
panel here this morning.
I would just like to for 30 seconds talk about Iraq,
although we are not supposed to talk about Iraq. It was my very
first vote in 1991 on whether or not to go to war, and I am
open to the administration's arguments, to the rationale, to a
forward engagement, as we called it in the Democratic Party's
platform, but I really would hope that people of your caliber
and stature as well as your bosses would be up here talking to
the full committee and to the House of Representatives making
the argument that I know you are capable of making and
explaining why we need to do it so that we can communicate that
to our constituents as well, too.
Just as an aside, I remember on that first vote, we had the
administration, the first Bush administration, coming up scores
of times to help inform and educate and work with Members of
Congress on what was an exceedingly important vote at that
time, and I hope that we can reengage in that with this
administration. That is not a criticism. That is a hopeful
suggestion on a vote that may be pending next week.
Mr. Secretary, I want to say to you, I didn't know that you
were going to quote Wohlstetter's book. I happen to be looking
at it. Let me read you one more part of what Schelling's
foreword was, and either you did great work on this or your
staff, maybe Rich Haver is reading this.
It would be reassuring to believe that Pearl Harbor was
just a colossal and extraordinary blunder. In fact, blunder is
too specific. It was just a dramatic failure of a remarkably
well-informed government to call the next enemy move in a Cold
War crisis, to call the next enemy move.
Finally, he says, Wohlstetter's book is study of a great
national failure to anticipate.
Usama bin Ladin in a fatwa says that he is at war with us.
George Tenet says we are at war with him. Yet we can't
anticipate even with all of these clues the next move.
I think mistakes were made. I, like Secretary Rumsfeld
yesterday, think it is too late when the smoking gun is there.
You have got to find the person pointing the gun, loading the
bullets, getting ready to pull the trigger. And intelligence,
that is what it is supposed to do.
So I hope that we can, as the families who were here
testifying so emotionally and so passionately yesterday, we can
prevent the next one, but we can also move forward in a
paradigm shift to see what we need to do in the Defense
Department to forward engage or to support Special Ops that can
go after terrorist groups that aren't sponsored by nation-
states, but may be in different countries in the world, and
work with Congress in a bipartisan way to see if that is a good
policy to implement.
We have a panel coming after you, Mr. Secretary. I think
this is a tough question, and I hope it is fair. They may say
we briefed this administration on these priorities. They said
that they would spend more time on the war on terrorism than
any other war or any other battle. Did you have those kinds of
transition briefings that you were part of, and were there
specific requests by George Tenet at CIA to move resources and
money in the Defense Department to this tougher, more
unconventional war, to go after al-Qa'ida?
Mr. Wolfowitz. We--I don't remember briefings from--by the
time we were nominated and confirmed, the transition was over,
so they weren't transition briefings. We got lots of briefings
from the beginning about the al-Qa'ida danger, including from
important people who had served in both administrations, not
only Director Tenet, but Richard Clarke at the National
Security Council. As we said earlier, there were quite a number
of actions that were proposed, quite a few of which were, in
fact, implemented, but some of which we recognized really
called for looking at the whole problem in a bigger way, and
recognizing that if you are going to go to war with an entity,
it was war, it wasn't just an intelligence activity or just a
single military retaliation.
And I would say considering the challenges of putting all
of that together, it came together pretty quickly.
Mr. Roemer. Did you consider doing it before September 11?
Did you have a plan to go to war in an unconventional way
against al-Qa'ida before September 11?
Mr. Wolfowitz. We weren't quite there, but we had a
conclusion from the principals, meaning that we needed to look
at major military options. That conclusion came on September 5.
As we have said, the Presidential decision memo that came after
September 11 was not substantially different.
But, I mean, one could also----
Chairman Goss. Could I interject? Your time has run. I
don't mean to interrupt, but out of fairness to your schedules
and the two Members remaining.
Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And to our Secretaries, welcome, and I will not try to keep
you long.
And sometimes we all, in looking back, have 20/20
hindsight. The question has been asked. And oftentimes in order
to soothe some of the, you know, the feelings and the emotions
of America following September the 11, we come up with this
question: Why were the Americans not warned?
Well, why were they not warned when you look at the attack
of 1993, when people died in the World Trade Center, when you
look at the 1998 attack on our embassies in Africa, or the 2000
attack on the U.S.S. Cole? And we can all ask that question,
why were the Americans not warned?
I think that is part of what we are trying to do here today
is to find the avenues through which we can improve our
intelligence capability to provided that warning. That is why
we are here, and that is what it is about today. It is not a
perception of who was negligent, and it is not a perception
about failure to anticipate. It is about what we do tomorrow to
prevent yesterday's attack.
What I want to ask you, both of you, very quickly, is do
you believe that America is better defended without the passage
of the homeland defense bill that we have in the House of
Representatives?
Mr. Wolfowitz. If I understood the question correctly,
absolutely not. I think we would be much better defended with
the homeland defense bill and with a Department of Homeland
Security so that there is a clear responsibility.
Mr. Gibbons. Secretary Armitage.
Mr. Armitage. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. Final question for you. That would be vertical
integration of information and intelligence-sharing. Part of
the problem has been throughout the history of terrorism the
failure to communicate not just between Federal agencies, but
vertically as well, down to State and local law enforcement
agencies as well.
Have you found in the recent years that the activities of
Governor Ridge and the homeland security advisor have improved
our ability to communicate intelligence both vertically as well
as horizontally down to and up from our local and State law
enforcement agencies?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I guess all I can say is I have an
impression, and it is related to what I said earlier about the
quality of reporting that appears to come now from domestic
sources, that we are just getting a lot more of it. I can't
tell you exactly why. I imagine because an awful lot of people,
including Governor Ridge and the Attorney General and everybody
in the FBI, and the pressure from this kind of a committee, I
think, encourages people to ask, are we passing the right
information?
Mr. Gibbons. I know there was a concern and a perception
that classified information and the ability to share that with
those that do not have or possess a clearance was a problem.
Have we managed to overcome that in terms of expediting
classifications and clearances for those individuals so that we
can get the necessary information down to them? That was one of
the hurdles. Are we moving in that direction?
Mr. Wolfowitz. We are moving in that direction. There have
been some important changes, but I don't think we have debugged
that system, if I can use a computer term, because there is
always going to be this dilemma of do you share stuff that
compromises your sources, or do you share stuff that prevents
something from happening?
A general point, if I may make it, I think it goes back
also to the Pearl Harbor book. I think it helps to understand
that certain kinds of failures are endemic, that this is not
the first time we have been taken by surprise, nor will it be
the last time probably, unfortunately. If you understand some
of the reasons why that happens, you have a better chance of
fixing them, and I think one of the things to remember and
understand is that warning comes in lots of shapes and flavors,
and we have had lots of warnings. Some of them have been issued
to the public, and the reaction is, what do they expect us to
do about it? It is, in effect, not an actionable warning.
You have to relate the intelligence warning to the action
that it is warning you of, and if the action it is warning you
of is to shut down all civil aviation in the United States, it
is going to have to be pretty darn precise information. So I
think helping people understand and improving our own
understanding of the relationship between the warning and the
action that is expected to be taken on the warning, I think, is
a fundamental point that I think this committee can help with.
I think the whole country needs to understand a little better.
Mr. Armitage. If I may, Mr. Gibbons, I don't want to
prolong this, but I think it is worth mentioning. Congressman
Boswell hit one of the same points. Are we in a seamless
information flow down to the local law enforcement? No, we are
not. We are not in a seamless information flow down to the
Governors and the mayors yet either. I think Governor Ridge has
worked magnificently to try to bridge that.
Witness the Golden Gate Bridge warning. We issued a warning
based on what we felt was the credible information of a desire
to attack that, and there were some who criticized us for
inducing and inciting fears, et cetera.
We had an experience, Paul and I, in the middle of last
year when we sortied--or he and Defense Department sortied
ships from Bahrain around the July timeframe. We closed up an
embassy. We were accused by some of the ``sky is falling''
phenomenon. So there is a lot of sort of paradigm shifts that
have to go on not just in law enforcement. It is in the
governance as well.
Chairman Goss. Thank you very much.
The last Representative of the morning will be Mr.
Chambliss. You have the floor, sir.
Mr. Chambliss. Thank you.
Very quickly. Gentlemen, you are certainly two of the--
outside of the Secretary, you are the highest-ranking and the
highest-profile folks at State and Defense. Prior to April 30,
2001, had you gentlemen been involved in any meetings with the
previous administration, particularly with Mr. Clarke and Mr.
Berger, where you were advised of an urgency of the matter
regarding al-Qa'ida and that positive action needed to be
taken, and were you given a plan of action by Mr. Clarke and
Mr. Berger?
Mr. Armitage. I never met with Mr. Berger. I did meet with
Mr. Clarke, along with other colleagues. He certainly was
infused with an urgency of the al-Qa'ida threat. We were right
with him on that. We were never given a plan. There were some
briefings, I understand, that the transition got, but it was
not a plan.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Same answer for me. I met with Mr. Clarke,
not with Mr. Berger.
Mr. Chambliss. At the meeting that took place on April 30
that both of you acknowledge that you were at, and I believe
your quote, Secretary Armitage, was, a deputies' meeting on 4/
30/01, you made a decision to go after al-Qa'ida and eliminate
them. Again, was that meeting--at that meeting, which I know
Mr. Clarke was at, I am not sure whether Mr. Berger was there
or not, would you tell us whether both or either one were
there? Was their sense of urgency at any degree higher than
what had been expressed to you before, and, again, was any plan
to offensively go after al-Qa'ida or bin Ladin given to you?
Mr. Armitage. I can assure you that Mr. Berger was not
there. We did have some discussions there about the use of
UAVs. I won't go any further than that. Out of that meeting,
among other things, came directions to the various
bureaucracies, including the Defense Department, to develop
contingency military plans. Mr. Clarke was there.
Mr. Wolfowitz. It also might be worth pointing out, April
30 is an interesting date, if I am correct, on the intelligence
information. All of the hijackers were in the United States by
that time. It is important to recognize the lead time you need
to have to deal with these threats, and if we had undertaken
this campaign in Afghanistan in July of last year, those people
were all ready. They had their plans engaged really from early
2000.
Mr. Chambliss. Thanks, gentlemen.
Chairman Goss. I want to thank you very much, Mr.
Chambliss.
I want to thank our witnesses, the two Secretaries, for
coming up. This has been extremely instructive. We are
definitely, as you know, aware of how the consumers see this.
We are working very steadfastly to try and come up with the
best possible awareness and understanding of the American
people on the events of 9/11, and you have helped us to do
that.
We are reassured by the work that you are doing, and we
wish you well in it. We are all counting on you. Thank you.
The committee stands adjourned, subject to the call of the
Chair, I guess, which should come at about 2 p.m.
[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee was recessed,
subject to the call of the Chair.]
Chairman Graham [presiding]. I call the meeting to order.
We are pleased to have with us this afternoon two former
national security advisors, General Brent Scowcroft and Mr.
Sandy Berger. We were to have a third, Dr. Tony Lake, who
unfortunately has had a medical problem which has precluded him
from joining us this afternoon. He had previously submitted his
written statement which will be available and included in the
record.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lake follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Graham. The fight against Usama bin Ladin and
against terrorism broadly goes back many years. This afternoon,
we will seek to understand what happened in some of those
earlier years in the emerging fight against terrorism in the
views of those who had key policymaking and policy advising
positions as to the support which they received from the
intelligence community.
General Brent Scowcroft served as national security advisor
to both Presidents Ford and President George H.W. Bush. He had
a 29-year military career that included the rank of Lieutenant
General in the United States Air Force. His career also
included a period of service as special assistant to the
director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and military assistant to
President Nixon.
Mr. Samuel R. Berger has served as assistant and deputy
assistant to the President for national security affairs under
President Clinton. Mr. Berger, a lawyer, has a long career in
public service, including serving on the staff of former
Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa as well as at the State
Department.
Gentlemen, I very much appreciate your participation this
afternoon and I know that it will be very meaningful to the
members of the committee. Each of our two committees has
adopted a supplemental rule for this joint inquiry that all
witnesses shall be sworn. So I would ask if you would please
rise and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Graham. Mr. Scowcroft, we look forward to hearing
your statement.
TESTIMONY OF BRENT SCOWCROFT, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
TO PRESIDENT GERALD FORD AND PRESIDENT GEORGE H.W. BUSH
General Scowcroft. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm very
pleased to appear before you to discuss such a complex and an
important subject. I am not so efficient as Dr. Lake, so I was
unable to provide a written statement, but I am prepared to
make a few introductory remarks. I was asked to focus on the
role of terrorism in the first Bush administration and that
will be the focus of my remarks. And at the outset, I would
like to point out the difficulties of comparing the
counterterrorist situation and activities of the first Bush
administration with those of the present time.
The dominant security challenge of the Bush I
administration was still the Soviet Union, and that tended to
be the organizing focus in which security priorities were
viewed. So there was a different kind of an outlook there. And
still, things that were not related somehow to the Soviet
Union, sort of ipso facto, were not given quite as much
attention. In addition, at that time, terrorism was primarily a
phenomenon which was State-sponsored or State-assisted or
tolerated. And therefore, it was natural for us to think of
deterring or dealing with terrorism primarily through the
sponsor than through the--with the terrorist organizations
directly where things like deterrence and so on would have some
impact.
A further point: none of the terrorist organizations at the
time so far as we knew had global reach. This meant that while
U.S. persons, U.S. interests and U.S. assets were not immune
from terrorist attack, the United States homeland, in effect,
was. And that certainly colored how terrorism was viewed.
Terrorist organizations appeared to be either regionally- or
issue-related. And even though Hizbollah was thought to be
behind many of the terrorist acts that occurred during the
Reagan administration, they, the acts themselves, seemed to be
relatively independent and uncoordinated events rather than
part of an overall strategy.
Indeed, at that time there were some terrorist experts who
argued that terrorist acts were less an attempt to create
damage or to kill people than they were to call attention to
the issue which the particular terrorists supported. And I have
no idea whether that is really true, but that would be another
distinction with the present. As compared to the Reagan
administration, which we succeeded, the incidents and the
severity of terrorist acts diminished significantly during the
Bush I administration.
There was nothing, for example, comparable to the Beirut
embassy bombing, Kuwait embassy bombing nor the Marine
barracks. There was only one aircraft hijacking during our
administration, and no Americans were involved at all.
Nevertheless, there were terrorist activities which
compelled a focus on the terrorist problems. And there are two
issues which stand out in my mind. The first is Pan Am 103,
which occurred technically during the Reagan administration on
21 December 1988, so that the fallout was almost entirely in
the Bush administration. And the second was the issue of
hostages in Lebanon. I followed the Pan Am 103 problem closely.
I received periodic briefings on the investigation. And the
effort which led to Libya and away from Syria and Iran, who
were the first suspects, was, in my mind, a product of
brilliant analysis and investigation and had appeared to be the
result of very close coordination between/among CIA, FBI and
the British.
The hostage problem was one which we basically inherited.
In the decade beginning in 1982, there were some 30 westerners
kidnapped in the Middle East. When we came to office, I believe
there were about eight hostages being held most apparently in
Lebanon.
In February of 1988, Marine Lieutenant Colonel William
Higgins, a member of the UNTSO, the UN Treaty Supervision
Organization, was captured early in the Bush administration;
pictures of what seemed to be his execution were released. The
emotional impact of that in the country was severe. The hostage
problem was a particularly difficult one. We had various bits
of information about some of the hostages, nothing about
others. We considered various ideas for trying to rescue the
hostages, but the intelligence was never adequate to make the
risks appear reasonable. And I'll comment in a moment further
about that.
In the early nineties, we saw the emergence of a
fundamentalist or Islamic fundamentalist movement, which became
suffused with the terrorist threat. It entered the political
structure of a number of countries in the Middle East so that
the character of terrorism was now changing. It was assuming,
for example, possibility of terrorism fundamentalism capturing
the political structure of different countries inaddition to
the typical Hizbollah-like terrorists. And this was an entirely new
thrust.
And one of the best examples of that is Algeria. In 1992,
the fundamentalists threatened--the Algerians were having two-
stage elections. After the first stage, it appeared likely that
the fundamentalists would capture the Algerian government. The
then-government, realizing that, canceled the elections and a
civil war ensued, replete with much terrorism--and that war has
just recently been winding down.
Now my recollection there is that the President was kept
well informed through the PDB of this evolution of terrorism
into the broader issue involving politics. My summing up is
that terrorism was a difficult issue for us to deal with, but
that, especially compared with the Reagan administration, it
was not an issue that was on the rise and getting worse.
But now, just as terrorism, as I pointed out, has changed,
so have the challenges before us. I would say that for Bush I
intelligence support in general seemed adequate to the task as
it then appeared. But as I indicated, I was frustrated then at
the lack of HUMINT capability to help with the hostage problem.
We simply could not find out enough about the hostages--who
precisely was holding, where they were held and so on--to make
any attempt at rescue feasible because we stood the chance of
having more of them killed in an attempt to rescue one or two.
And I think that remains an area where improvements are
required. The war on terrorism is, in my mind, primarily an
intelligence war. And we badly need an improved capability to
get inside terrorist networks if we're to deal with that
problem. I would observe also that the early nineties began a
period of severe budget cuts in the intelligence community.
That's a policymaker's issue. That's not an intelligence
problem. And that also hampered the ability of the intelligence
community to make the transition from the focus on the
terrorist threat to that of a world nurturing terrorist
activities. And I think that was particularly the case in
HUMINT, which had been, to my mind, exclusively focused on the
Soviet issue. And HUMINT capability in other areas was sparse
and making that transition was made harder.
One last thought about the changed nature of terrorism, and
that is its global reach. I believe that the change exacerbates
the bifurcation of the intelligence community, the bifurcation
being the U.S. border and intelligence collection and
activities outside the border versus inside the border. It was
not so much of a problem during the Cold War and in the
immediate post Cold War world when most of the intelligence
problems we faced were overseas, were out of the country. So,
with the exception of a couple of counterintelligence cases
when we did run into this bifurcation, it was a manageable
problem.
The borders, as far as the terrorists are concerned, are
gone. There is no distinction for a terrorist between inside
and outside the United States. And I think that makes much more
serious the division that we have between the CIA and the FBI.
And I think it goes two ways. First of all, when you have to
have a hand off between any two bureaucracies, there is a
considerable loss of efficiency, even if they get along very
well. I am not suggesting those two do not. But that is in
itself, it makes the problem more difficult, and some of the
things that you all are looking at about
9/11 are clearly a result of that bureaucratic difference.
But, in addition to that, there is to me a cultural issue
between these two organizations. And that is they approach the
problems on which they are expert from opposite ends of the
spectrum for the law enforcement organization--and that's
fundamentally what the FBI is. You start with an incident. You
start with something that focuses your attention and you seek
to know more about it to find out about it and so on, but you
start with this central fact and you build a case--and as
you're building the case, you protect the evidence in that case
so that it can be used in prosecution.
The intelligence analyst comes to that problem in an
opposite way. There are a lot of little sort of disconnected
things going on in the world and the analyst looks at it and
says is there a pattern here somewhere that I can discover that
will lead me to be able to prevent something from happening.
Now these are both legitimate points of view for the jobs that
these two have, but they are not interchangeable, and you do
not make one an expert simply by putting another label around
his neck. And I think that is one of the fundamental problems
that we face in the community today. And while we are working
on it, I'm not sure that we have adequately solved that
difficult issue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Berger, thank you for joining us.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berger follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
TESTIMONY OF SAMUEL BERGER, FORMER ASSISTANT AND DEPUTY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS UNDER
PRESIDENT CLINTON
Mr. Berger. Chairman Graham, Chairman Goss, members of the
Joint Committee, thank you for inviting me here today. We meet
at a time of sober reflection just a year since the attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. We can never forget
what we lost that day, more than 3,000 lives cut short.
September 11 changed our perspective and priorities as a
Nation, perhaps even as individuals. I welcome the committee's
efforts to explore community intelligence performance prior to
that terrible day and to determine what can be done better.
In order to look forward, we have to look back, to ask hard
questions and seek honest answers. All of us want to learn the
right lessons to prevent another catastrophe. At the same time,
as I am sure your investigation has revealed, it's easier to
see how puzzle pieces fit together when you have the final
picture at hand. History is written through a rear-view mirror,
but unfolds through a foggy windshield. Few things are as clear
at the time as they are looking back. Our challenge now,
regardless of party or administration, is to sharpen to the
greatest extent we can our ability to look forward, because the
dangers and opportunities our country must confront lie before
us, not behind.
In that spirit, I would like to, today, first put into
perspective the intelligence the Clinton administration
received and the actions it prompted, and then focus on the
challenges that I believe our intelligence system still faces
in dealing with jihadist threat, jihadist terrorist threat, and
what we must do to enhance our capabilities and protect our
people.
When President Clinton began his first term in 1993, as
General Scowcroft has noted, the Intelligence Community was
primarily focused on the agenda created by the Soviet Union's
collapse, with Cold War's end, and our Gulf War victory.
Despite the fact that during the eighties nearly 500 Americans
had been murdered in terrorist attacks abroad by Hizbollah,
Islamic Jihad, and others, counterterrorism was not a top
intelligence priority. The CIA maintained no significant assets
in Afghanistan after our withdrawal from that region in 1989.
Little was known about Usama bin Ladin, except that he was one
of many financiers of terrorist groups.
Terrorism became a priority for us early with the fatal
attack on employees at Langley five days after inauguration,
the World Trade Center bombing in February, the Iraqi plot to
assassinate President Bush in April, and the Day of Terror plot
against historic landmarks in New York that was thwarted in
June. The terrorist threats came from disparate sources,
although perhaps not as disparate as we knew at the time. But
they reinforced a larger view that President Clinton expressed
early and with increasing frequency, that the very same forces
of global integration that were making our lives better also
were empowering the forces of disintegration, the terrorists,
the drug traffickers, the international criminals, sometimes
all three together.
In 1995, he was the first world leader to bring the
terrorist challenge before the United Nations, calling for a
global effort to fight it. And, as early as 1996, he spoke of
terrorism in a major speech as the enemy of our generation.
Director Tenet, in my judgment, shared the President's sense of
priority for the terrorist threat. To reflect that increased
priority, working with the Congress, we more than doubled the
counterterrorism budget from 1995 to 2000 during a time of
budget stringency, with a 350 percent increase in the FBI's
counterterrorism funds and, although it is classified,
substantial increases in CIA's counterterrorism resources. We
sought to achieve greater coordination by energizing an
interagency counterterrorism security group consisting of
senior level officials from all key agencies, and we appointed
a tough-minded activist, Richard Clarke, to a new position of
White House-based national counterterrorism coordinator.
The CSG convened several times a week, sometimes every day,
to review threats presented by the intelligence and law
enforcement community and to follow up. In 1995, the President
signed a presidential directive formalizing a system for
periodically reviewing intelligence priorities and elevated
terrorism to a level exceeded only by support for military
operations and a few key countries such as Iraq.
How effective was the intelligence community within the
context of that heightened priority? The intelligence and law
enforcement community did succeed in preventing a number of
very bad things from happening before September 11. They
thwarted the day of terror plot in New York 1993. Sheikh Omar
Abdel Rahman was convicted of that conspiracy in 1995. They
worked with foreign intelligence services to track down and
capture more than 50 top terrorists, including Ramzi Yousef,
responsible for the '93 World Trade Center bombing, and Mir
Amal Kansi, who murdered the CIA employees at Langley.
With Filipino authorities, they helped to prevent a Manila-
based plot to assassinate the Pope and blow up 12 American
airlines over the Pacific. Beginning as early as 1997, they
undertook a campaign working with cooperative intelligence
agencies around the world that broke up al-Qa'ida cells in more
than 20 countries.
In late '99, the CIA warned of 5 to 15 attacks on American
interests during the millennium celebrations that were
upcoming. That prompted the largest counterintelligence
operation in the history prior to 9/11. Our intelligence
community worked with Jordanian officials to uncover plots
against the Radisson Hotel in Amman and religious holy sites.
Following the arrest of Ahmed Ressam crossing into the
United States from Canada, they traced materials seized from
him to terrorist cells that were broken up in Toronto, Boston,
New York and elsewhere. During this very tense period, the most
serious threat spike of our time in office, I convened national
security principals, including the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Attorney General, the top level people from
the FBI, State and Defense at the White House, virtually every
single day for a month for coordinating meetings.
I am convinced that serious attacks were prevented by this
warning and the actions that resulted. Yet there were things we
did not know or understand well enough. The sophistication of
the Counterterrorism Center increased significantly after it
was substantially increased in size in 1996 and the dedication
and commitment of the people who worked there was
extraordinary. But the picture of the al-Qa'ida network
developed slowly. It was and is a hard and illusive target, as
we have seen even since the horrifying events of September 11,
which galvanized the world to go to war with Afghanistan and
turn Taliban allies like Pakistan into its adversaries.
Islamic jihadists have been attacking American targets
since the early '80s. But the linkages among this new breed,
hardened by the battle against the Soviets in Afghanistan in
the '80s and energized against the United States by the
military presence we left in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War,
emerged gradually in the nineties. Our understanding of bin
Ladin evolved from terrorist financier in the early nineties to
an increasingly rabid, magnetic and dangerous galvanizer of
anti-American hatred in the mid to late nineties.
In June of 1998, I described bin Ladin in a Nightline
television interview as the most dangerous non-State terrorist
in the world. The first time the Intelligence Community
presented clear evidence of bin Ladin's responsibility for
attacks against Americans was following the bombings of our
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August of 1998, killing 12
Americans and many more Africans. Our focus on bin Ladin and
our efforts to get him intensified in urgency. I do believe the
CIA was focused on the counterterrorism mission.
What we have learned since 9/11 makes clear to me that the
FBI was not as focused as an organization. Director Mueller has
acknowledged these problems. Until the very end of our term in
office, the view we received from the Bureau was that al-Qa'ida
had limited capacity to operate in the United States and any
presence here was under surveillance.
That was not implausible at the time. With the exception of
the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, not attributed before
9/11 to bin Ladin, plots by foreign terrorists within the
United States have been detected and stopped. But revelations
since September 11 have made clear that the Bureau
underestimated the domestic threat. The stream of threat
information we received continuously from the FBI and CIA
pointed overwhelmingly to attacks on U.S. interests abroad.
Certainly the potential for attacks in the United States was
there. That is why, for example, we established first program
on protecting U.S. critical infrastructure. But the ongoing
picture of specific threats we received generally was pointed
abroad. Serious efforts appear to be under way to reorient the
FBI, making prevention of terrorism its primary mission.
As far as intelligence reporting on threats to civil
aviation was concerned, the risk was principally placed
overseas and generally involved information about bombing or
hijacking, along with scores of potential threat scenarios from
truck bombs to assassinations to public utilities.
We have heard of the idea of airplanes as weapons, but I
don't recall being presented with any specific threat
information about an attack of this nature or any alert
highlighting this threat or indicating it was any more likely
than any other.
Mr. Chairman, in a speech before Congress nine days after
September 11, President Bush memorably declared, in our grief
and our anger, we have found our mission and our moment. As our
government builds on, expands and intensifies its efforts to
combat terrorism, I would like to highlight seven important
challenges that I believe our Intelligence Community must
address if that mission is to succeed. First, we have to
improve dramatically the timely coordination and integration of
intelligence.
September 11 brought into stark relief the extent of the
information breakdown, not only between agencies but within
them, in some cases. We have to resolve these problems while
recognizing the different elements of the national security
community have distinctly different intelligence needs. The
creation of a Department of Homeland Security is a step in the
right direction. The key to making the new DHS work, in my
judgment, will be the creation of an intelligence analytical
unit that is accepted as a full partner in the Intelligence
Community--an integrated all-source fusion center to analyze
and prioritize both domestic and foreign threats.
They should have the ability to set collection priorities
and task partner agencies. And there will still be a need for a
White House-led coordinating mechanism to deal with policy
judgments that flow from threat analysis. In my view, that
mechanism is better placed within the National Security Council
system rather than separate from it.
Second, we must reach a new consensus on the proper balance
of responsibilities within the Intelligence Community,
especially now, as General Scowcroft has pointed out, that the
lines between wartime and peacetime, foreign and domestic, law
enforcement and intelligence have been blurred.
I believe strengthening the DCI's program to plan, program
and budget for intelligence collection analysis and
dissemination will permit much more effective integration of
our intelligence priorities and efforts, including better
concentration on counterterrorism.
In that connection, I encourage the committee to consider
proposals to separate the DCI and the CIA director positions so
the DCI can focus primarily on community issues and not just
CIA concerns. In addition, I would end the practice of having
every Intelligence Community agency develop its own bilateral
relationships with foreign counterparts and give the DCI
authority to coordinate all intelligence cooperation with other
countries. In some countries there are now a dozen or more of
these relationships.
Third, the terrorism challenge increasingly increases the
importance of predictive intelligence from terrorist targets,
the information that tells you where they are going to be and
what they are going to do. This is an incredibly difficult
challenge, especially when dealing with a shadowy cell-based
network. After new authorities were issued by President Clinton
in 1998, we were actively focused on getting Usama bin Ladin
and his top lieutenants through overt and covert means.
The success of those efforts depended upon actionable
intelligence on his future whereabouts. The Intelligence
Community stepped up its efforts to anticipate bin Ladin's
movements. But reliable intelligence of this nature emerged
only once shortly after the African embassy bombings. We acted
on this predictive intelligence to attack a gathering of bin
Ladin and his operatives in Afghanistan. Twenty to 30 al-Qa'ida
lieutenants were killed, we were told, and bin Ladin was missed
by a matter of hours.
Over the next two years we continually sought to obtain
predictive intelligence on bin Ladin. This included developing
and successfully testing promising new technologies in late
2000, but never again in our time would actionable intelligence
necessary for effective action emerge. Obtaining better
predictive intelligence requires strengthening human
intelligence collection. Recruiting these exceptional sources
requires effort, patience, ingenuity and professional zeal. It
also depends upon a profound understanding of the intelligence
targets that comes from the closest possible partnership
between the CIA director of operations and intelligence.
Fourth, intensified use of new technologies also is
essential, particularly downstream information capabilities
involving processing exploitation and efficient distribution.
We need to enhance the Intelligence Community's cadre of
computer science and technology experts, as well as expand
public/private IT partnerships, building upon Director Tenet's
innovative In-Q-Tel venture capital program.
Fifth, we need to strengthen covert action capability,
including paramilitary, while maintaining all of the necessary
congressional consultations and oversights. Our military
special forces are magnificent, but they are organized and
trained to work best within the context of a larger declared
military operation. There is a need for a strong CIA
paramilitary capability for highly sensitive undeclared
operations less compatible with the special forces traditional
mission.
Six, I believe we should seek the same ethic of jointness
among our various intelligence units as Goldwater-Nichols
initiated in the military. Requiring rotational assignments for
intelligence professions in different agencies in the community
can expose them to different techniques and points of view,
create relationships that facilitate cross-agency cooperation
and improve the performance of the overall community.
Finally, we must address resources not only to collection,
but also to analysis, including looking at new ways to fuse
open source analysis with information from clandestine sources.
We need to build better mechanisms to bring academic and
private sector experts in close and constructive contact with
the Intelligence Community. The National Intelligence Counsel
has been used to recruit outside experts for periods in
government. We should consider ways of expanding this
cooperation, including a quasi-official institute to bring
experts together in a classified context with intelligence
professionals. And there are less formal ways to build virtual
networks of cleared outside experts and government intelligence
specialists.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, let me simply say that the
hardest challenge for policymakers is to recognize the larger
context, to discern the bigger picture, to understand the
historical forces and hear the sounds of distant footsteps.
That requires the best possible Intelligence Community. For
better or for worse, after September 11, nothing is
unimaginable anymore. Our challenge is to summon and sustain
the will to make our intelligence as good as it must be. Thank
you very much.
Chairman Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Berger and
General Scowcroft, for two excellent, thought-provoking
statements. Our practice is to have the designated questioners
who will ask questions for a period of approximately 20
minutes. The House is leaving because of a vote that is under
way. They will be returning in approximately 20 to 30 minutes.
First, Senator Rockefeller and then Senator Shelby.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen. I
will repeat something I said this morning. This is, as Eleanor
Hill said yesterday, the terrorists at the World Trade Center
and Pennsylvania, the Pentagon, and that needs to be said
because you want to free witnesses of any sense of the word
going after people, trying to place blame until we know a lot
more. So that the terrorists are at fault and that has to be
made very, very clear.
Now you represent very key intelligence policymakers in the
years before 9/11, as opposed to this morning's panel which was
some of each. And each of you has been involved for years in
promoting reform. And I have here just at random--I mean, an
endless series of reports, none of them thin, all of them huge
and all of them recommending how do you bring the Intelligence
Community together to work efficiently before 9/11, when the
world changed forever. There is an enormous reluctance to do
this.
From my observation, I don't think very much has been done
in a larger systemic sense and that troubles me. Each of you
have already in your own way answered some of the questions
that I have, but I want to follow up on them. You have the
concept of how do you service customers. You suggested seven
approaches. General Scowcroft, you are at work on something
which you are probably not free to discuss but you have
discussed with us in a classified setting, and so that the
question of protecting the Nation at home and prosecuting the
war on terrorism here and abroad occurs very deeply to each of
you.
The first thing that strikes me is why is this so
impossible? Why is there such an ethic against change? I can
give you some answers, but I am not interested in my answers, I
am interested in yours. When everyone really goes at the
subject of doing systemic change, I mean, if there was ever an
opportunity that was handed this Nation and this Nation's
intelligence effort and beyond that to reorganize ourselves in
a way which protects the American people, which is our first
responsibility under the Constitution, it is now, it is post 9/
11. And you would think people would be coming out of the
woodwork in ways to do that, but that is not happening. Changes
are being made at the edges. People are taking those changes
and making them appear to be enormous events when they're not.
Because as you said--I forget your phrase, Mr. Berger, but it
was something like jointness, the ethic of jointness.
They're all in this together and the intelligence
communities are in this together. And yes, they do have
separate missions and they do have certain things, but they
have their own campuses and they have grown up NSA, no such
agency. I mean they have grown up in a climate of quiet
uniqueness, nobody to intrude, their own memorial gardens,
which are sacred, their own cafeterias, their own way of doing
things, directors come and go, the bureaucracy stays, nobody
really challenges, and, since 9/11, people have gotten very
interested.
The question is what are we going to do about it? And you
just start with the question of no single person over all of
this. And we were told this morning that the new Under
Secretary for Intelligence will be able to do that, bring all
the different threads together. Can an Under Secretary, in
fact, do that? Just drawing some thoughts and I want you to
come back with some. I can't remember any director of the CIA
who felt really at liberty, with controlling only 15 percent of
the budget, with the Department of Defense controlling 85
percent of the intelligence budget, you know, to equal 100
percent, that they felt really able to wander beyond what they
had the power to participate and authorize and their authorized
limit, which in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency
which the American people think is the source of all
intelligence is 15 percent.
Now if there's a crisis, if a satellite goes dead, if
something happens, can George Tenet and any of his
predecessors, whether there were similar situations or there
weren't, go to the Department of Defense and say I need X
hundreds of millions of dollars to do this kind of thing and
will it happen? Probably not? Why? Because it is this Senator's
opinion that they know they're going to lose that effort to
improve their efficiency.
So what do you make of a system where you have the 15
percent/85 percent divide, where Mr. Berger is calling for a
sharp increase in preemptive intelligence--and I agree, you
can't make war without preemptive intelligence. You have to
have good intelligence before you make good war. But what do
you make of this? They have their own. The Central Intelligence
Agency has their own. They both share in the control of a
variety of other agencies, but the budget belongs to the
Pentagon. What is the fear? What is the political fear?
Is it the fact there are so many campuses out there that
are complete and settled? Is it the fact that nobody wants to
take on a big risk and nobody wants to take on the Secretary of
Defense and if they do that, they are taking on the President
maybe? I don't know. Why is it so hard to get us to focus
particularly now on coordinating our intelligence efforts? That
is my short question.
General Scowcroft. I will try to give you a shorter answer
than the questions. You make a number of very good points. My
guess is if you look at those volumes that you showed us, they,
in general, go in one direction, which is to--toward
centralization of the Intelligence Community. The Department of
Defense and the CIA or the DCI, let me say, the Secretary of
Defense and DCI were both established by the legislation,
National Security Act of 1947, and they were both sort of
titular heads of agencies that were gathered together from out
of the executive branches or executive departments of the
government. Neither of them had significant powers.
Now over a period since then, the Secretary of Defense has
accreted a great deal of power. He still is not probably quite
so much a czar as most other Cabinet heads are, but he has
pretty much authority over his constituent elements. The DCI,
despite his title of Director of Central Intelligence, has
shared in no such accretion. There have been changes and they
have generally gone on in that direction, but he still presides
over a group of semiautonomous agencies.
Now is that good or bad? There are some people who say
organizational blocks don't matter, it's the people. And if you
get the right people in, you'll get the job done. But I think
in part that's true. But a good organizational structure can't
make up for bad personnel. But a good organizational structure
can make good people more efficient at what they do. But every
time you take steps to increase the authority of the DCI,
you're taking away authority from someone else. And no
bureaucrat likes authority taken away from him, and so the
resistance is significant. And by and large, there has been the
crisis within the Intelligence Community as there has been in
the Department of Defense having to fight several wars since
1947 to get people to take that step.
Now that's a pretty broad answer, but is 9/11 that
precipitating incident? I don't know. I would just point out
one thing. In May of 2001, the President established an NSPD 5,
a review of the Intelligence Community. And I was honored to
chair the external panel of that review. And that was the sense
that even before
9/11, that we had some problems here that needed to be worked
on. Now that also conjoins me from getting into too much detail
because that report has been submitted and is still classified
and that is my initial response to you. It is the inertia;
whether it's constructive or destructive depends on your
philosophy about organization and its connection to management.
Senator Rockefeller. Mr. Berger.
Mr. Berger. Why is it so hard to change? Perhaps you should
bring in a distinguished panel of psychiatrists, but let me
give you my perspective from the intelligence side. I think
that people tend to look at things from the inside out rather
than outside in. So change means what about my carpool and what
about the project I'm working on and how I fit into the new
office. So there is a personal inertia. And then there is
vested interest in the status quo. But I do believe 9/11 is an
indispensable moment and so I believe the work of this Joint
Committee is so important because the battlefield of the war is
now here at home and therefore we have to be organized for that
war.
My own view, Senator, as I said in my remarks, I think
organization does matter. I would have a Director of Central
Intelligence who had overall authority for budget, planning and
priorities working with his colleagues, not execution. He would
not own the agencies, but he would have the ability to set
overall priorities in concert with his colleagues under the
direction of the President.
Number two, as I indicated, I think there still should be
two counterterrorism centers, but I think in the new Department
of Homeland Security there must be a fusion center. It's an
analytical center, not a collection center, with the ability to
take all of this information you've been getting, all 400,000
documents and try to see the patterns, that has the ability to
task the agencies for collection and seen as a full partner in
the intelligence process.
And third, I think there does need to be a White House
focused coordinating mechanism, because policy and intelligence
are linked together, my own view is, best situated within the
National Security Council than in an Office of Homeland
Security. We can get into that later. It's a side issue. I
think it's more central to the way we make decisions in this
country involving national security. But I think this is the
moment, Senator, that all of us have to try to change the way
we do things and we can either do it----
Senator Rockefeller. Reclaiming my time. I have an FBI
question for both of you. We can either say this is what it
ought to be, but then if we try to do that, everybody would
say, oh, they are just fooling themselves. They're just naive.
They're do-gooders. It will never happen. You accept that, you
accept that and then by definition, you have immediately cut in
half what it is that you seek which will then be leveraged down
to 25 percent or below.
So, I mean I just want that out there--the horror of 9/11
and people talking about carpools and what kind of a Nation are
we with respect to change. We are capable of doing some rather
extraordinary things, and this ought to be one of them.
My second and last question has to do with the FBI. I am
interested, and I think that Mr. Berger, you were fairly clear
on this and I think that you were, too, General Scowcroft. I
would be interested in the quality of the intelligence that you
received, each of you, in your own time from the Intelligence
Community as compared to the FBI, and I would put that within
the following context. I do not understand why it is that you
have the obvious situation of you collect intelligence
internationally, and that's central intelligence, and then you
collect it internally and that can't be central intelligence
because that's invasive.
We have something that is called the PATRIOT Act, that says
yes, you can cooperate on some things and all of a sudden
there's an analytical group set up over in FBI of not very many
people to do intelligence work. And they are trained in one
kind of life as you said, General Scowcroft. They are trained
to do one set of things. They are not trained to do the other
set of things. We don't have the time. It takes five years to
train good analysts anyway. So why is it that we're trying to
make the FBI do something which I don't basically think it can
do from this Senator's point of view. And I am interested, one,
in what your views are about that and, secondly, what was the
quality of the feedback that you got from each of those
separate agencies on common threats?
General Scowcroft. Well, that is an interesting question,
Senator Rockefeller, because, as you first mentioned, I was
thinking back to intelligence from the FBI, I mean,
intelligence information from the FBI, and I was trying to
think of cases where we actually got it. Not very much, because
we are or I was focused on foreign intelligence primarily.
There was some counterintelligence issues where the FBI
intelligence was particularly involved, and the one case I
mentioned, Pan Am 103, but that was investigative intelligence
and the FBI and the CIA did an absolutely brilliant job on
that. But I can't think of many--can't recall of any instances
of pure intelligence product from the FBI. And I don't say that
pejoratively at all.
Senator Rockefeller. And I don't ask it in that fashion,
because what they do, they do superbly.
General Scowcroft. They do superbly. And it would be a
shame to say now FBI, you are going to focus only on
intelligence collection and we're not going to worry about law
enforcement anymore. That would be a serious mistake. But I
don't know how to answer your question because I can't separate
FBI intelligence out very well.
Senator Rockefeller. Mr. Berger.
Mr. Berger. Senator, let me say first, there are
extraordinarily dedicated people in the FBI and we have seen
that since 9/11 as we have looked back. And the FBI had some
successes here, for example, in breaking up the 93 days of
terror. But by and large, if there was a flood of intelligence
information from the CIA, there was hardly a trickle from the
FBI.
I think that relates somewhat to how they saw their
mission. I think it relates to their sense of the al-Qa'ida
fundamentalist threat in the United States--which I think
either was much less by the end of 2000 than it seems to be
today, or was underestimated--and the priority given to this
area of counterintelligence.
So it is a little bit like the person who looks for his
keys under the light pole because that is where the light is.
We were getting a lot of information on foreign threats. We
were getting very little information on domestic capabilities
and threats, and that obviously influenced the focus.
Senator Rockefeller. I thank you both. Mr. Chairman, that
concludes my questions.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller. Senator
Shelby. Senator, before you commence--after Senator Shelby, we
will then turn to questions from members of the committee,
assuming that we are still in a situation where our House
brethren have not returned. The order of questioning will be
Senator Bayh, Senator Durbin, Senator DeWine, Lugar, Inhofe,
Feinstein, and Kyl.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, General Scowcroft and Mr. Berger, we
appreciate you coming here today and we appreciate your insight
and your experience. I respect both of you. I especially
appreciate Mr. Berger's insight into the creation of the
intelligence component at Homeland Security. It is something
Senator Graham and I have been working with both Senator
Lieberman, Senator Thompson, the White House, and others to
create what Mr. Berger described. We think it is very
important. Without it, we doubt that Homeland Security could be
what it needs to be to deal with this. So I appreciate your
insightful remarks.
I would like to pick up on, first, what Senator Rockefeller
was talking about. We all respect the FBI. We know the FBI has
no peer when it comes to forensic science, you know,
investigations and stuff. I believe they are great and they
have got great people there. And I believe Director Mueller is
bringing leadership down there. But we will have to measure
that with time.
Having said that, Mr. Berger, on page 6 of your testimony,
and I will quote again, it is similar to what you said earlier:
I do believe the CIA was focused on the counterterrorism
mission. What we have learned since 9/11 makes clear that FBI,
as an organization, was not as focused. Director Mueller has
acknowledged these problems. Until the very end of our time in
office, this is the Clinton Administration, what we received
from the Bureau was that al-Qa'ida had limited capacity to
operate in the U.S. and any presence here was under
surveillance.
Gosh. I am not going to comment on that, but that is
disturbing. And I think your remarks were true--ring true.
I would like to get into something else now. Mr. Berger,
first I will direct some questions at you. I have some
observations to make first. In August of 1998, after al-Qa'ida
bombed our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Clinton
had strong words about how we must deal with the terrorist
threats. He declared, and I will quote, ``that countries that
persistently host terrorists have no right to be safe havens.
Our battle against terrorism,'' he said, ``will require
strength, courage and endurance.''
He pledged--that is, President Clinton--that we, and I
quote, ``will not yield to this threat. We will meet it no
matter how long it may take. This will be a long, ongoing
struggle. We must be prepared to do all that we can for as long
as we must.''
President Clinton also went on and he warned that the risk
from inaction from America and the world would be far greater
than action, for that would embolden our enemies, leaving their
ability and their willingness to strike us intact.
President Clinton went on to say, and he promised, ``There
will be no sanctuary for terrorists. We will persist and we
will prevail.'' Those are very strong words. I agreed with him.
I welcomed it. And they sound a lot to me like what President
Bush has said recently and said just before we destroyed the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan with overwhelming force.
By the time he spoke those words, President Clinton, if I
recall right, had already or about that time, contemporaneous
with, launched a missile strike against a camp in Afghanistan
and a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan. After that speech, Mr.
Berger, what steps did the administration take to fight a
decisive, clear battle against terrorism?
Mr. Berger. Well, Senator, as you point out, first of all,
when--after the attacks on our embassy in Afghanistan and--
excuse me, in Kenya and Tanzania--there were 12 Americans
killed; a number, many more Africans. Quite soon, within 2
weeks, we had developed very good intelligence indicating that
200 to 300 bin Ladin operatives would be at a fixed location
with bin Ladin. We attacked that facility. We killed many al-
Qa'ida people.
What I was told afterwards is that bin Ladin had probably
left a few hours before, indicating the difficulty of getting
predictive intelligence, getting inside the tent cycle.
We can talk about Sudan. I believe hitting that plant was
the correct thing to do. I know that the Sudanese have paid a
lot of money to lobby us with public relations firms to try to
portray it as a toothpaste factory. I would be happy to make
that case if you like, as to why that was an appropriate
target. From that point on----
Vice Chairman Shelby. That is a dispute----
Mr. Berger. It may be disputed, but I believe we were
correct then, and I believe we are correct now.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Was there a dispute in the
Intelligence Community?
Mr. Berger. There was no dispute----
Vice Chairman Shelby. As to whether or not this was a
military target or an intelligence target?
Mr. Berger. There was no dispute presented to the
principals or the President.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Okay.
Mr. Berger. That facility was one in which there was VX
chemical precursor found, which was owned by the Military
Industrial Corporation of Sudan, which we knew was their
vehicle for developing chemical weapons, which was--had
received millions of dollars from bin Ladin. And we have
actually learned since, from an al-Qa'ida operative, that they
were working with Sudan on chemical weapons in Khartoum. And I
would much rather be defending the decision to hit that place
than not having hit that place, if two weeks later chemical
weapons had shown up in the New York City subway system or in
Alabama. So as for that, I believe that was the right decision
to make. We proceeded on the information that we received.
Whether down in the bowels----
Vice Chairman Shelby. Do you believe that was good
information?
Mr. Berger. I have gone back to the Agency on a number of
occasions, because I have been defending this from time to time
since. And at the highest level, that information has been
validated to me.
Now, with respect to what else was going on, from 1998 on,
we were embarked on a very intense effort to get bin Ladin, to
get his lieutenants, through both overt and covert means. I
cannot discuss in this committee the covert efforts, which
involved working with----
Vice Chairman Shelby. Let me go back. You said 1998. What
about 1996? Was he ever offered up by the Sudanese people? I
was recently--Senator Spector and I were in Khartoum. They told
us that they offered him up to the Clinton administration and
that you all declined. Was that a real offer or was that just
talk or what?
Mr. Berger. Senator, can I answer the last one and then get
to the next one?
Vice Chairman Shelby. Sure.
Mr. Berger. You ask them faster than I can answer them. You
asked what we did after 1998. We were involved--at that point,
our intense focus was to get bin Ladin, to get his key
lieutenants. The President conferred a number of authorities on
the Intelligence Community for that purpose.
Vice Chairman Shelby. By ``get him,'' that meant kill him
if you had to, capture him or kill him?
Mr. Berger. I don't know what I can say in this hearing,
but capture and kill--until the Chairman rules me out of order.
There was no question that the cruise missiles were not trying
to capture him. They were not law enforcement techniques. We
unfortunately, despite intense effort, had actionable
intelligence only that time.
Whether more could have been done to get more actionable
intelligence, I don't know. We developed some new techniques at
the end of 2000, some technical means to get corroborating
information on bin Ladin's whereabouts. Those were tested
successfully in 2000. I don't know if they were used again
after 2000.
So our focus was, in addition to breaking up al-Qa'ida
cells around the world, in addition to a number of other things
we were doing, our focus was getting bin Ladin, A, and B,
putting pressure on the Taliban. We froze Taliban assets, about
$250 million. We went to the United Nations. We got sanctions
on the Taliban. We sent senior diplomats to meet with the
Taliban and issue to them privately the same threat that
President Bush issued publicly after September 11; that is, if
there were any further incidents involving bin Ladin, they
would be held personally accountable as the Taliban.
So I think that was intense effort. I think that it was
directed at personnel, it was not directed at jungle gyms or
facilities. We--I think the judgment was to hit a camp and not
get top bin Ladin people would have made the United States look
weak and bin Ladin look strong. And I think the potential of
going to war with Afghanistan before 9/11 was not something
that I think was feasible. No one on this committee was seeking
that, or, I think, elsewhere.
Now, you ask about Sudan. There never was an offer,
Senator, from Sudan to turn bin Ladin over to the United
States.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Were there discussions?
Mr. Berger. There was an effort in 1996----
Vice Chairman Shelby. Were there discussions?
Mr. Berger. There was an effort in 1996 taking place. There
were contacts with the Sudanese. Understand, Senator, the
Sudanese Government in the mid-1990s was one of the worst
terrorist states in the world. Close to Iraq. They tried to
assassinate Mubarak. They have been engaged in a civil war in
which two million of their people have been killed. They have
bombed their own people at feeding facilities. They practice
slavery and discriminated in gross ways against the Christian
community in that--these were not nice people. That is point
number one.
Number two, we tried to--they wanted to get off the
terrorism list. We put them on the terrorism list in 1993
because of all of this and many other things. They wanted to
get off the terrorism list. And from time to time they would
say just, you know, take us off the terrorism list and we will
be nice guys.
We said, do something. Prove it. Get rid of bin Ladin.
Expel all of these other groups. There never was--and I spent a
great deal of time on this since 9/11 because the question has
come up more than once--there never was, and certainly no
official I have talked to at any agency is aware of any offer
by the Sudanese to turn him over to the United States.
We pressed the Sudanese to expel him. We actually had
discussions, I believe, with the Saudis and others about
whether they would take him. They said no. But the Sudanese
never offered that. They have said so since, most recently.
And if I can say this in conclusion, if you think that
Tarabi and Beshar, who were as vile a bunch of thugs as exists,
was going to turn Usama bin Ladin over to a hostile country,
whether Saudi Arabia or the United States, I think that
overestimates the kind of people we were dealing with.
We gave them every opportunity, from 1996 on, even after--
let me just finish, Senator--even after bin Ladin was expelled,
to give us information, to turn over information. We met with
them continually all over the world. They never gave us
anything. Since 9/11, there is a bit of revisionism going on,
because they don't want President Bush to single them out as
the next target. And there is obviously an attempt to rewrite
history.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Do you think they have changed very
much since September 11 last year?
Mr. Berger. Well, I am just reading now that they are
probably taking al-Qa'ida resources back to Sudan. That is--
they now, according to what I have read, even though--the
Sudanese now is where the al-Qa'ida are transferring gold and
other materials, al-Qa'ida resources. So it doesn't sound to me
as if they have made much of a fundamental break, although they
have had some negotiations with Senator Danforth about ending
the civil war.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Back in 1996, had there been a
decision made at that point in your discussions at the National
Security Council to take, if you could, Usama bin Ladin dead or
alive, if you could? Had that decision been made then or was
that----
Mr. Berger. I think in 1996 that decision was never
presented. I think there had been a discussion, as I understand
it, at the CSG, at the assistant secretary level, about could--
could we find some place to take him. Could we take him here,
could we take him to Saudi Arabia? But those were hypothetical,
because we never had such an offer from the Sudanese.
And in 1996, Senator, I don't believe that the law
enforcement community had evidence linking him to attacks on
the United States. We have subsequently found out since 9/11
that there may be linkages between bin Ladin and World Trade
Center 1993 and other activities.
Vice Chairman Shelby. In 1996, you were very interested in
him?
Mr. Berger. In 1996 he was certainly on the radar screen.
He was not as--I would say this: In 1996 he was on the radar
screen. In 1998 he was the radar screen.
Vice Chairman Shelby. He was. Okay.
I want to shift over to, Mr. Berger, something else I think
you know something about. The White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security, headed by Vice President Gore as
I understand, recommended that the U.S. develop and implement a
system of airline passenger profiling.
According to the Commission, and I quote: ``Based on
information that is already in computer databases, passengers
could be separated into a very large majority who present
little or no risk, and a small minority who merit additional
attention.'' These are techniques that the Customs Service has
long used and which could have played an important part in
preventing terrorists from being able to commit the attacks of
September 11.
As I recall, and you might correct me, did anything ever
come of the Commission's recommendation for doing this? In
other words, were those recommendations implemented?
Mr. Berger. As I recall, Senator, the Commission was
established after TWA 800, which at the time we thought was a
terrorist act. We subsequently concluded that it was a
mechanical failure. But I remember very well the night that the
plane went down and we were very concerned that it was a
terrorist attack.
One of the things that President Clinton did was to appoint
this Commission to look at aviation security. That Commission
came up with a number of recommendations. My understanding is
some were implemented, some were not implemented by the FAA,
some were not implemented by the Congress. So I think--I can't
tell you piece by piece, since I was not directly involved in
that, which recommendations were implemented, which were--which
died at the FAA and which died in the Congress.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Mr. Berger, the National Security
Council sets priorities, as I understand it, and allocates to
some extent resources to the most important issues. How high on
the screen did fighting al-Qa'ida rank on your list of
priorities up until the time, January 2000, that you left?
Mr. Berger. Well, I will take this in a couple of stages,
Senator. In 1995 the President issued PDD-35, which for the
first time was an organized system of establishing intelligence
priorities. And I think General Scowcroft has very well
described the situation prior--in the 1980s--where the focus
was more on the Cold War and more on the post-Cold-War issues.
So in 1995, we set up a system for setting and periodically
reviewing intelligence priorities. At that point, intelligence
was placed at a level exceeded only by support for military
operations and a few key countries such as Iraq. And at the
same time, the President issued PDD-39, which essentially
directed the agencies to give terrorism the very highest
priority. So I think from 1995 on, budgets started going back
up. The focus was more intense. The bin Ladin cell was set up
at the Agency. I guess he is probably the only terrorist that
had his own acronym, a dubious distinction. We were obviously
increasingly focused.
And I think with 1998, with the bombing of the African
Embassy, where for the first time the intelligence and law
enforcement community was able to say to us, this is al-Qa'ida,
this is bin Ladin, that is the first time we had been able to
have that kind of predicate. I think at that point bin Ladin
and al-Qa'ida were among the highest priorities of our
administration.
Vice Chairman Shelby. My yellow light is on. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today and for your
excellent written submission to the committee. I want to thank
you both for your service to our country.
I was particularly interested in your remarks about the
importance of coordinating and improving the communication
among the different service branches. Senator Rockefeller asked
about that at some length, so I won't get into that.
Sandy, I would like to ask you--Brent, I think you covered
it pretty well in your comments--you suggested that within the
Department of Homeland Security there be a unit focused upon
coordinating intelligence. What does that say--what is your
opinion about how that would interface with the FBI? Does that
mean that you agree with Senator Rockefeller's skepticism about
whether the FBI can be reformed to carry out that function or--
--
Mr. Berger. No, I don't think it devalues or undermines the
FBI in any way. I think that we could either reform the FBI to
make it more focused on counterterrorism or invent a new
institution and have to build it from scratch. It seems to me
to make more sense, at least in the first instance, to try to
make the FBI, as Mr. Mueller is trying to do, into primary
focus counterterrorism prevention. They do have a lot of
talented people and skills in investigation.
Now they are collecting essentially and analyzing. CIA is
collecting and analyzing. They both have CTCs, counterterrorism
centers. One of the things that we did, by the way, is we took
an FBI person, and made him deputy at the CIA Counterterrorism
Center. And we took a CIA person and made him or her deputy at
the FBI CTC center. Obviously that was helpful, but not enough.
We also had a counterterrorism group that was taking the
information that it had and looking at it collectively. But I
believe to have a fusion cell in the new department would not
be a collection agency, it would be an analytical function. It
would take all of the information that it got from the CIA,
that it got from DIA, that it got from NRO, that it got from
FBI, and it would be dedicated to looking at this. And if it
was a second pair of eyes or set of eyes to what was happening
in the constituent agencies, all the better.
Senator Bayh. This is something, from my perspective, the
two big issues that we need to grapple with, going forward, are
how to better coordinate and improve communication among the
different agencies. You have spoken to that. Senator
Rockefeller spoke to that.
And then what to do about our domestic security and
intelligence-gathering intelligence capacities and how to
optimize those. I must say that--I told this to Senator
Rockefeller--I share some of his concerns in this area. It is
one of the big-picture items I think that we need to think
through. So we deeply appreciate the insights that both of you
can share with regard to that.
Just a couple of other things, because I know that I don't
have much time. This is little bit sensitive, but I think we
need to address it. We are now focused upon Iraq and what to do
about the weapons of mass destruction there, largely being
driven by their leader, Saddam Hussein.
The question, gentlemen: Specifically, I would be
interested in your perspective on both--as you know, it is
prohibited by Federal statute, it is a felony for us to
authorize the killing of a head of state.
And there are other--well, there are Executive orders that
restrict our ability to eliminate individuals who are non-heads
of state. Is that a policy we should rethink? And we are in the
process here of putting an untold number of American servicemen
and women in harm's way, and yet we are constrained from
accomplishing a similar objective through more precise and
direct means?
Do either of you have an opinion about whether we should
revisit those restrictions?
Mr. Berger. I think they were put into effect when General
Scowcroft was National Security Adviser the first time, so I
will defer to him.
General Scowcroft. I believe that we should probably
rescind them. One of the objections to rescinding them is that
it encourages terrorists to think that it is okay to eliminate
heads of state. But it gets us into all sorts of complications
and drawing legalistic lines. One of the things that we found
out in 19--let's see, 1989--there was an attempted coup in
Panama, and we tried to help a little, but not very much. After
we were looking into it, what we found is that some of the CIA
personnel who were--I wouldn't say involved, but who knew about
it and were meeting with the coup plotters and so on, were
concerned about being accessories; because if you mount a coup,
you know, it is very likely there are going to be some people
killed.
So we tried afterwards to amend the Executive order to take
account of that. But it seems to me highly legalistic. It was
designed specifically after the investigations of the
Intelligence Community in 1975, with some pretty farfetched
attempts at Fidel Castro.
I think it is anachronistic, and we ought to be duly
respectful of all reasons why you might not want to do that,
but to be proscribed I think is a mistake.
Mr. Berger. Senator, let me have an--I don't know whether
this is a slightly different perspective or not. The Executive
order was--we received rulings from the Department of Justice
that the Executive order did not prohibit our ability--our
ability to prohibit our efforts to try to kill bin Ladin,
because it did not apply to situations in which you are acting
in self-defense or you are acting against command and control
targets against an enemy, which he certainly was.
Query whether or not actions against--if self-defense can
justify a war, then presumably it can justify somewhat more
surgical action. So while I do have some of the concerns that
General Scowcroft has, if I believed that it was not an
impediment to surgical actions with respect to an enemy, as it
was not in the case of bin Ladin and might not be in the case
of Saddam Hussein, I would then have to measure the fact that
as a practical matter it didn't stop us from doing anything.
From the public international blowback that we would get
from the symbolic statement that we are now going to go around
killing foreign leaders, I think it depends a lot on whether it
is a practical constraint about doing--with respect to dealing
with Saddam Hussein, what the President may believe is
necessary. I believe legally, based on rulings that we got,
that it would not be a bar to targeting in self-defense a
command and control target. And if the head of the army is not
a command and control target, I don't know what is.
Senator Bayh. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is expired. I
would just add one comment. We have heard, and we can't discuss
it in this forum obviously, but we have heard from some of the
folks who deal in these kind of areas. They are pretty
reluctant, absent an express authorization, to wander too far
down that path for fear of having the wrong legal
interpretation and someday being faced with a lawyer who has a
different analysis of some kind.
So I do think that it is an issue we ought to----
Mr. Berger. They certainly would have to have clarity from
the President of the United States or something like that.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator Bayh. Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you both for joining us. I have listened to the line of
questioning from Senator Rockefeller, Senator Bayh, and others.
It seems to be very apparent to us as we review the
capabilities of the agencies that are tasked with gathering
intelligence that there is a wide disparity in their
information technology and capability. I would say that the FBI
is barely out of the Stone Age in terms of computer capability.
Other agencies apparently, National Security Agency and others,
are very sophisticated.
I would like to ask General Scowcroft and Mr. Berger, under
your watch, who had the responsibility of oversight on
something as basic as the information technology of each of
those agencies and their physical ability to gather, review,
coordinate, and share information?
General Scowcroft. That is a very good question, Senator.
And I think the answer is it depends on the particular
intelligence agency and who it belongs to. And in many cases
it--there is divided responsibility. And what has really
happened is each one of the individual components has built
their own system. And in many cases the systems can't talk to
each other.
Senator Durbin. Were you aware of that?
General Scowcroft. Yes.
Senator Durbin. Were any efforts made during your watch to
address that?
General Scowcroft. Yes. And there has been some progress
made in combining systems or inputting what I would call an
interpreter, an electronic interpreter to allow the search to
go on. But there is no enthusiasm in many cases to share this
data. Each one likes to keep the family jewels.
Senator Durbin. I was afraid you were going to say that. I
was afraid that it wasn't just a matter of a breakdown of
computer architecture, but it really was a mindset that said,
``why would we want to talk to those people?''
General Scowcroft. That is some part of the problem that--
this is a subset of a larger problem that I think that Senator
Rockefeller talked about.
Senator Durbin. Thank you. Mr. Berger, would you address
that as well?
Mr. Berger. Senator, in some cases this is a matter of
collective priority or a matter of priority for the President
or for the National Security Adviser. Early on in our
administration, for example, it was the judgment of the then-
DCI that our satellite infrastructure was woefully inadequate
and that we had to make major investments to deal with the
information technology, communications technology revolution.
And so in the early 1990s we spent more money on satellites.
That was something we shared, an overall assessment that was
done with Congress.
Senator Durbin. Who had the corporate responsibility of
directing that discussion?
Mr. Berger. There was enough money involved that that was a
matter that both--this committee, both committees, as well as
the Office of Management and Budget was involved in and the
overall budgeting process. This was a big chunk of money to
rebuild, update our satellite system. So in some sense it is
overall responsibility. I would say the day-to-day management
systems within a particular agencyare generally the
responsibility of the head of the agency. It is not possible from the
NSC----
Senator Durbin. Mr. Berger, the point I am making is this:
what they serve in the cafeteria at the FBI, as opposed to the
CIA, is irrelevant. But their computer technologies, and
whether or not they are complementary and consistent with the
architecture of computers at other intelligence agencies would
seem to be a matter of national security. And when we find in
our first Judiciary Committee oversight hearing of the FBI last
year, the first one I think in 12 or 14 years, maybe longer,
the primitive state-of-the-art of computers at the FBI, it
suggests no one was watching. Not just under your watch, but
going back for the first----
Mr. Berger. Well, those budgets were increased
substantially. I think it would be worth looking at what
happened to that money. The CT budget in FBI, according to
Director Freeh, increased 350 percent. So I think it is worth
looking inside that and finding out what the allocation was.
Senator Durbin. But----
Mr. Berger. Like I say, they were efforts to increase
coordination. And in particular, we energized a high-level
senior group that--the Counterterrorism Security Group--these
were assistant secretaries for security--for counterterrorism
in all of the key agencies. They met three, four, sometimes
every day, to look at intelligence.
Now, I think looking post 9/11, not everything was always
provided to that central mechanism. So there has to be a
willingness, and this gets I suppose to culture, on the part of
the agency to----
Senator Durbin. I am out of time.
Mr. Berger [continuing]. To share that information.
Senator Durbin. I think this is emblematic of what the
challenge is. If we do not have one person at the top of the
heap somewhere near the White House, if not there, who is
taking a look at something as basic as information technology
at these agencies and saying that they ought to be able to
communicate with one another if they wanted to, how will we
ever reach the point of having a conversation where they can
meaningfully be told to communicate? We seem to have lacked
that in previous administrations. If we are talking about
reforming intelligence, I hope this is part of it.
Mr. Berger. I think some efforts were made, but more
efforts need to be made, Senator. Absolutely.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator Durbin.
Congressman Reyes, I had indicated that you were going to
be the next questioner, and then two persons who were here this
morning have arrived. And so staying with our first arrival
policy, it will be Congressman Castle, and then Congressman
LaHood and then Congressman Reyes.
Mr. Castle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I unfortunately missed
a lot of your testimony because of other responsibilities,
including voting on the floor. So I am not exactly sure what
has been stated, so I apologize if I am replowing land you have
just plowed moments ago. But I am just interested in the broad
conclusion of whether based on what we heard yesterday--you
probably read about it in summaries, if you didn't see it at
all--about what we actually knew or did not know with respect
to al-Qa'ida in the Intelligence Community.
And my first question is, is it your judgment that we knew
and we had broadcast the fact that they were capable of
carrying out a mass casualty attack on U.S. soil? One of my
concerns, frankly, is that sometimes we don't talk publicly
enough about the potential threats, which could embrace all
Americans in helping prevent it.
And my question to you is: Was that something which you
felt was publicly an issue before it happened on September 11,
2001, beyond just the Intelligence Community knowing?
Mr. Berger. Well, I think there was--again, you have to see
this like a photograph developing in developer, which becomes
clearer over time, and certainly becomes clearer after 9/11.
But I think that as we got into 1997, 1998, it was clear
that there was an al-Qa'ida network that bin Laden was at the
center of. This was something that we talked about a great
deal. I said earlier, Congressman, that, you know, in June of
1998, I said on television, bin Laden is the number one
terrorist threat to the United States.
And where there were--the President spoke about terrorism
and al-Qa'ida and bin Laden very frequently. I mean, I provided
the committee staff a book, 270 single-spaced pages of
statements that President Clinton made about terrorism, al-
Qa'ida, bin Laden, over the 8 years, this thick.
Where there was specific threat information, obviously that
was provided. But we did not really have, as I said earlier,
specific threat information with respect to the United States.
And I think that the threat in the United States was
underestimated.
The threat information we generally had, for example, we
had threat information that the Tehrani Embassy in Albania was
going to be attacked. We sent 300 marines and stopped the
attack.
During the Millennium, we warned the American people that
there was a general threat of terrorist activity during the
Millennium. I have talked about what we did in that connection.
But I don't think there was specific threat information with
respect to the United States that we did not provide. And in
general I think, as I said earlier, the threat picture in the
United States I think was not sufficiently seen.
Mr. Castle. I am not trying to play the blame game at all
with this. I am one of those who wishes very much to resolve
these problems as far as the future is concerned.
But I mean, you were there in 1998 when the attacks took
place as the National Security Adviser, and bin Laden at that
point was clearly identified by everybody. And yet we had
testimony yesterday that the FBI really didn't have a lot of
resources focused on this. And my sense is that even though
most of us who have worked on this committee or at the White
House knew about this, that perhaps the actual Intelligence
Community did not have quite the focus we would like to have on
bin Laden. And I realize that the President did and I realize
that you did.
But the question is, in a broad sense: Did we in the
Intelligence Community as a whole--this is not faulting anybody
when I say this--have the focus that we should have had on bin
Laden in retrospect? I realize in retrospect everything is a
little bit simpler.
Mr. Berger. Congressman, I was puzzled by the statement by
the FBI that they didn't understand----
Mr. Castle. The statement yesterday?
Mr. Berger. That I read in the paper today, that they
didn't understand the al-Qa'ida/bin Laden threat. They met
three times a week in a highly secret Counterterrorism Security
Group in which all of this information was on the table.
We went through the Millennium together, where we knew that
there would be--we were told that there would be five to 15
attacks in the United States. We met at the White House at the
highest level, Attorney General, Director Freeh, Secretary of
State, every single day for a month, for at least an hour. We
were a high-level fusion cell, if you want to call it that,
during the Millennium period. And nothing happened in the
Millennium. I believe we stopped some things from happening.
How you can walk away from those experiences and not
understand--we are trying to kill bin Laden, we dropped cruise
missiles on him. How you could not understand--I think this is
an internal FBI issue of communication from the top to the
field, and field to the top.
But there was no question, I think, that al-Qa'ida was a
threat, bin Laden was a threat, certainly within all of the
elements of the Intelligence Community.
Mr. Castle. My time is up and I can't ask you another
question I wanted to ask you, but maybe we can discuss it
someday. And it would have been whether you were satisfied with
the extent of our human intelligence during the period of time
that you were in the White House.
Mr. Berger. I would be happy to at any time, Congressman.
Mr. Castle. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Graham. And will you give us the answer to the
question?
[See Mr. Berger's responses to questions for the record.]
Chairman Graham. We have had another member added to our
list. So the questioning now will be Mr. LaHood, Mr. Chambliss,
and then Mr. Reyes.
Chairman Goss. I am sorry; Mr. Chambliss did speak this
morning.
Chairman Graham. I am sorry; clerical error. You did speak
this morning. So it is Mr. LaHood and then Mr. Reyes. Mr.
LaHood.
Mr. LaHood. Well, thank you for your fairness in conducting
this hearing, Mr. Chairman; we appreciate it.
Can I ask both of you gentlemen, were you shocked and
surprised on 9/11 or 9/12, and after you began to learn about--
I don't mean shocked from a personal point of view, but shocked
at the news--who the people were; who was involved; how they
did it--and particularly you, Mr. Berger, after just coming off
of having worked in the administration in such a high-level
position, and I know you worked very hard and spent a lot of
hours on a lot of these activities.
But I am wondering, though, when you read the details of
what happened, were you surprised by any of it, in terms of the
people involved and how they did it, and how they carried it
off, and the fact that they were able to do it?
Mr. Berger. I was not surprised, Congressman, by who was
responsible, for a second. I was stunned by the magnitude of
this. Surprised by how they had used primitive, in a sense,
instruments. This was not--we had spent a lot of time on trying
to anticipate weapons-of-mass-destruction threats, trying to
build up our stockpile of Cipro, trying to build up our
smallpox vaccines, trying to get first responders training,
beginning to anticipate a potential WMD attack.
So I was not surprised by responsibility, because I thought
it was the only terrorist organization that had the capability
of doing simultaneous activities like that. I was surprised by
their ability to strike here as sharply as they did, and I
suppose by their ability to take box cutters and airplanes and
turn them into weapons of mass destruction. But not by
responsibility.
Mr. LaHood. Mr. Scowcroft, do you have any comments?
General Scowcroft. Yes. I was not surprised. I was
horrified. I was surprised at the coordinated nature of the
attack. That did surprise me.
But I would say, you know, the safest place in the world
for a terrorist is inside the United States, because then he
becomes a U.S. person with a lot of protections that we don't
give him or anybody else outside. And so as long as they don't
do something that trips them up against our laws, they can do
pretty much all they want.
So all you have to do is pick some people that are clean to
start with, that don't have records, and they can do all of
those things. And so I think what, in a sense, what we are all
surprised at--we have had this notion ever since really
terrorism became a threat--that somehow the United States was
immune. It was just too complicated for them to extend their
organizations and to mount a sophisticated attack inside the
United States. This was not actually very sophisticated, but it
didn't really have to be, given the freedom with which they can
operate, go in and out and back and forth.
Mr. LaHood. Mr. Berger, were you surprised or shocked at
the level of noncommunication between and within agencies that
were in the business of collecting intelligence and sharing it
with the highest levels of our government?
Mr. Berger. I have been continually disappointed since 9/
11, Congressman, just reading the newspapers about the
difficulties of communication within agencies from people in
the field up, and the fact that there was inadequate sharing of
information between them.
Mr. LaHood. Do you think that was true during your
stewardship?
Mr. Berger. Well, we tried to address the horizontal
communication issue in a number of ways. I think probably it
was better, but it was not sufficient. We energized, we got all
of the key players in a room three times a week, or sometimes
every day, to go through all the threat information and to
share it and talk about what to do about it, what more they
needed to do. The FBI was there, the CIA was there, the Justice
Department was there, number one.
Number two, we took a--we decided that an FBI person should
be deputy at the CTC, at CIA, and vice versa. So we took steps
to increase horizontal coordination, and I think it probably
was better. But it is clear that not everything was being put
on the table.
Mr. LaHood. Can I stop you, because I had one other
question. Both of you have served in high public office and
both--I know Mr. Scowcroft has been on commissions. There is an
idea floating around Washington and around Congress to
establish a blue ribbon commission to look into what happened.
I would appreciate your thoughts on that idea.
General Scowcroft. I am not sure we need a blue ribbon
commission on what happened. I think that we have a pretty good
idea in general what happened. And the kinds of questions that
you are asking, whether they were precisely responsible, I
think we ought to start looking forward and fix the things we
know need fixing, whether or not they were precisely
responsible.
Mr. Berger. I don't know what my answer is to that
question, Congressman. There obviously is a trade-off here
between past and future. There is a trade-off between open and
secret. I want to get the answers, I want to fix things,
whatever is the best way to do that.
Mr. LaHood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Mr. LaHood. Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for not
having been here before, but we were finishing up on the House
side and I just now got an opportunity to leave there. I wanted
to welcome both Mr. Berger and General Scowcroft, who I have
had the opportunity to talk with extensively. General, we
served on the oversight--civilian oversight for the Air Force
Academy. And ironically enough, some of the conversations
dealing with today's subject we discussed about the commissions
that were talking essentially about not if there was going to
be an attack on the homeland, but when it was going to occur.
And, of course, Mr. Berger on many occasions on Air Force One,
traveling with the President, discussing many different issues.
But I am curious first, General, what you recommend--given
your statement that the safest place for a terrorist is in the
United States. What are your recommendations to resolve that
dilemma that we are facing?
General Scowcroft. Well, I think in general we ought to
look at terrorism this way: that aside from one thing--which is
to try to penetrate terrorist networks and activities--is that
every time the terrorists speak, every time they move, every
time they spend money, every time they get money, there are
some traces of those activities.
Now, theoretically it is hard to find them. But
theoretically you can. There are several problems, though,
because in those activities there are similar activities of
millions of other people doing innocent things the same way.
How do you distinguish between them? And also, how--since many
of those may be in a foreign language--how do you get them
translated quickly enough to be able to act on them? And in
addition, you are dealing with volumes that are horrendous. I
think we need to look at technology here for a solution to each
one of those.
And the one I didn't mention, of course, is how you look
through all of these without violating the privacy of all of
those innocent individuals doing it. I think you can do some
things with machines and technology, before they get to human
beings, that help preserve the privacy things and still let us
get more of a handle than we are able to do now.
Mr. Reyes. Because one of the big concerns that a lot of us
have in Congress are concerns dealing with minorities and
racial profiling and those kinds of issues. You know, I was
asked early on whether I thought it was a good idea to do
racial profiling and fingerprinting individuals coming out of
specified countries that the Attorney General had commented on.
And I said, well if we are going to do that, then perhaps we
need to go back and fingerprint everybody in Oklahoma because
of Terry McVeigh.
The point there is that we want to make sure that we don't
do exactly what you are talking about, General, and that is
trample on the civil rights, because the first ones trampled
would be the minority community. And we are seeing a lot of
those kinds of issues surfacing already, and I am very much
concerned in that regard. And I appreciate your comments along
those lines, which leads me to the second point.
Wouldn't it make sense to be able to, in addition to the
official role that we play here as Members of Congress with
these hearings and this mandate, to have a commission that
would be composed of people that could bring different talents
and different expertise to looking at the events of 9/11, to
get a different perspective, including the issue of protecting
minorities and racial profilings and all of those? Don't you
think that would help give a different perspective than the one
we generally give here?
General Scowcroft. Well, it might. And of course, we don't
know what we don't know. One of the things for a commission to
look at is to find out all of the things we know.
But I would--I would say it would be very valuable at least
to have an information technology group skilled enough to try
to deal with the problems that you raise, and I suggested a way
to deal with them, because there may be--technology may be able
to give us the access that we need to the people we want,
without trampling on anybody else.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you. I am out of time. The time runs
faster over here, Mr. Chairman. I am not used to this galloping
pace.
Chairman Graham. There is a reason for that. I will explain
it to you later.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. I understand that Congressman Chambliss
was shorted on his full five minutes. So as we begin the second
round, I will call on him and you will have a full five minutes
now.
Mr. Reyes. Mr. Chairman, I think I was shorted, too.
Chairman Graham. Same clock.
Mr. Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Berger, during the Clinton administration, was bin
Laden ever offered up to the United States by any country?
Mr. Berger. No. I have a longer version of that answer
which I provided to Senator Shelby earlier. But the short
answer is no.
Mr. Chambliss. That is fine.
During the time you acted as National Security Adviser, did
you and your colleagues ever reach the conclusion that
offensive action needed to be taken against al-Qa'ida as well
as bin Laden himself?
Mr. Berger. Yes.
Mr. Chambliss. When was that conclusion reached?
Mr. Berger. From August 1998, the first time that the
intelligence and law enforcement community, particularly the
Intelligence Community, was able to say to us this is the
responsibility of al-Qa'ida and bin Laden. From that point on,
the President authorized a series of overt and covert actions
to try to get bin Laden and his top lieutenants.
Mr. Chambliss. Did you develop any plan to dismantle or
disrupt or go after the al-Qa'ida organization?
Mr. Berger. Yes. And, in fact, the Intelligence Community
worked with intelligence agencies around the world from 1997
on. Al-Qa'ida cells were dismantled, disrupted in about 20
countries.
There was not as much receptivity, Congressman, today--then
as there is today. There were some countries which did not take
the threats as seriously then as today. We were more protective
of civil liberties and ethnic communities than today, but there
was an active and aggressive effort by the Intelligence
Community, working with liaison agencies, to disrupt and
dismantle al-Qa'ida cells. And that succeeded in more than 20
countries.
Mr. Chambliss. During the latter weeks and months of the
Clinton administration, was there a plan developed and proposed
by you and your colleagues to the Clinton administration with
respect to----
Mr. Berger. You mean to the Bush administration?
Mr. Chambliss. Well, initially I would like to know if it
was proposed to President Clinton.
Mr. Berger. We were continually looking at what we were
doing, looking at new techniques, looking at new steps we could
take. In the fall--in February of 2000, for example, I sent a
memo to President Clinton outlining what we were doing. And he
wrote back, this is not satisfactory. It was particularly
related to how you find this guy. We have got to do more. And
that prompted us to work with the Intelligence Community and
the military on a new technique for detecting bin Laden. I am
not able to talk about it in this forum.
We tested that in the fall of 2000. Actually it was very
promising as a way of determining where he would be if we had
one strand of human intelligence. So we were continually
looking at how we can up the ante.
Mr. Chambliss. But did you have a plan, a plan that could
be executed, to disrupt or take out bin Laden and the
organization?
Mr. Berger. Yes, sir. And we were executing that plan. Now
the second question you asked, was there--which comes out of a
Time magazine story, I think--was there a plan that we turned
over to the Bush administration during the transition?
If I can address that, we--the transition, as you will
recall, was condensed by virtue of the election in November. I
was very focused on using the time that we had. I had been on
the other side of transition with General Scowcroft in 1992.
But we used that time very efficiently to convey to my
successor the most important information that was going on and
what situations they faced.
Number one among those was terrorism and al-Qa'ida. And I
told that to my successor. She has acknowledged that publicly,
so I am not violating any private conversation. We briefed them
fully on what we were doing, on what else was under
consideration, and what the threat was. I personally attended
part of that briefing to emphasize how important that was.
But there was no war plan that we turned over to the Bush
administration during the transition, and the reports of that
are just incorrect.
Mr. Chambliss. Thank you.
Chairman Graham. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman
Chambliss. And Congressman Goss and I appreciate your
maintaining the classified nature of the geography of where
that election took place that shortened the transition period.
We have now completed the first round of questions.
Now I would like to ask two questioners from the House who
did not get to ask their questions if they wish to ask a series
of questions beyond five minutes. Did you indicate a full 20
minutes?
Mr. Bereuter. I will not take a full 20 minutes.
Mr. Boswell. I will attempt not to take the full 20
minutes.
Chairman Graham. Congressman Bereuter, then Congressman
Boswell.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, gentlemen,
thank you for your statements here, responses and your previous
service to the country. Very much appreciate it. I will try not
to cover things thathave been asked previously if I understand
what has happened appropriately. I wonder--this one goes to you, Mr.
Berger, in particular. It appears that the FBI was not active in
monitoring or penetrating radical Muslim groups. Is that your
understanding? And if you have something of that understanding, why was
that the case?
Mr. Berger. I think that is my general understanding,
Congressman, and I think that was pursuant to guidelines and
directives that had been drawn up within the FBI in prior years
and perhaps the threat to some degree, their view that the
capability here was not substantial.
Mr. Bereuter. The capability within al-Qa'ida and related
organizations was perhaps not substantial? That might have been
their understanding?
Mr. Berger. That is at least what was conveyed. Perhaps
there are different understandings among different people in
the FBI.
Mr. Bereuter. Is it your view that the FBI did not
seriously warn or understand and then not warn that there was a
serious terrorism problem that could take place in the United
States?
Mr. Berger. You know, I think there were certainly people
at the FBI, Dale Watson, the late John O'Neill who understood
this.
Mr. Bereuter. Are you talking about your twice a week
meetings?
Mr. Berger. They were certainly there and I think they were
trying to deal with what I now understand better was a
disconnect between headquarters and the field. So I think as an
institution--and I think Mr. Mueller has acknowledged this--as
an institution, at least as of the time I left, which was the
year 2000, there was another 9 months, there was not a sense
that there was--the sense, the capability that was here was
logistical support, was not a serious threat and was covered,
was the word they would use. We have it covered.
Mr. Bereuter. A question for both of you. Does the United
States need an MI5 or some modified MI5 and can you answer
briefly why you think that would be the case or not the case?
General Scowcroft. I think that is one solution to the
problem. The fundamental problem is that you need either to
change the basic laws and responsibilities of the two
intelligence agencies, FBI and CIA, or you need to build
capabilities to match the legal responsibilities. Now one way
to do it in the FBI would be to create an MI5, which is a
domestic intelligence without the law enforcement. Another way
would be to create a separate career path, for example, for the
National Security Division of the FBI, training them not as law
enforcement officers the way they are now, but as intelligence
analysts to do the job. And there are other ways. But simply to
say your primary duty right now has gone from law enforcement
to counterterrorism is not going to produce a revolution inside
the system.
Mr. Bereuter. Do you think there has been relatedly a
disadvantage to an FBI person that moves into counterespionage
or counterterrorism for a significant part of their career?
General Scowcroft, Oh, yes, quite definitely. Most of my
information is anecdotal, but it has been from talking to a
wide number of people, including high FBI or Justice Department
officials. And the people who don't make it in law enforcement
are sent off to the National Security Division.
Mr. Bereuter. So it's possible for someone to be a
homesteader in counterespionage activities like Mr. Hansen and
then breach the compartmentation----
General Scowcroft. I am not sure about the specific cause
and effect, but, yes.
Mr. Berger. Congressman, my inclination would be to fix the
FBI. I think there are dedicated fine people there who care
passionately about their country, who take risks every day, and
it seems to me intuitively better and easier to fix and change
the mission and deal with the organizational problems of an
agency that exists than to do a greenfield operation someplace
out in the Beltway. So I guess I see no inherent reason why it
would be harder to fix the organizational problems in the FBI,
reorient the mission, provide the leadership than it would be
to start from scratch. I think the people there are talented,
dedicated, patriotic people who if you tell them what their job
is, they'll do it.
Mr. Bereuter. I appreciate your opinion and I appreciate
the fact that they're talented, patriotic and energetic.
Looking back at the situation, it seems to me that the
Intelligence Community would desirably be able to tell us the
kind of approaches that terrorists might take against our
citizens, against our infrastructure in the United States,
spelling out the delivery methods, the techniques and so on.
And if you look at the testimony presented yesterday by Eleanor
Hill, which constitutes in effect a part of our committee's
report, the Joint Committee, just focusing in on one type of
approach that was used, the use of commercial airliners as
flying bombs, we have these items in our chronology. We have of
course the Manila plot where part of it was an attempt to bring
aircraft to crash into the CIA headquarters.
In August '98, Intelligence Community obtained information
that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-
laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center.
September, '98, Intelligence Community obtained information
that Usama bin Ladin's next operation would possibly involve
flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S. airport
and detonating it. In the fall of '98, the Intelligence
Community received information concerning Usama bin Ladin's
plot involving aircraft in New York and Washington, D.C. areas.
April of 2001, the Intelligence Community obtained information
from a source with terrorist connections who speculates that
bin Ladin would be interested in commercial pilots as potential
terrorists.
So these are the things that were specifically identified
as some of the things coming in that were geographically not
specific and time uncertain of course, and that is one method
of delivering terrorism in this country. But what surprises the
American public and what shocks me is that there seems to have
been no place in the Federal Government as far as I can find it
that examined the information then about the potential delivery
methods of terrorism and said this is how we counteract it.
And these are the kinds of procedures that have to work
between the FAA and the FBI or between the FBI and the INS. And
given the fact there didn't seem to be any agency responsible
for that, and indeed it's a multi-agency problem and no one
specifically looking at details of how to approach that, I
guess I would have turned to expect it in the National Security
Council.
But now hopefully we'll have the Director of Homeland
Security and the new department with that very specific
responsibility. But that is all categorized as an intelligence
failure, and it seems to me it goes beyond that. I would
welcome any response from you two gentlemen who have been
National Security Advisors as to how it is that our government
didn't meet its citizens' expectations by having a focused look
at how these means of terrorism could be delivered upon our
country.
Mr. Berger. Congressman, first of all, recognize that there
were mountains of intelligence information. Someone said we
were drowning in the information. They related to a wide
variety of possible means from truck bombs and car bombs to
assassinations and an infinite--not infinite, but a wide range
in variety of modalities. As I said in my testimony, we did not
and I did not recall receiving anything that focused
specifically on the threat of airlines as weapons. Certainly,
it was known as one of many possibilities.
There was, chaired by the National Security Council, a
counterterrorism security group whose job it was to look at
cross-agency information. It was only as good as what was
given. And obviously, I have checked. It did not receive the
February '98 report, for example, that you referred to. So
there was nothing that made this stand out anymore than any
other range of threats.
But that's history. I do believe, as I said in my
testimony, that a Department of Homeland Security ought to have
a fusion center where all of the agencies are there, all of the
raw data is available. The fusion cell is able to task, follow
up. I think that because the volume of threat information, some
of it unextracted from its digital form, is so great that we
have to have a new mechanism for extracting patterns.
Mr. Bereuter. General Scowcroft, do you have a comment?
General Scowcroft. I agree with most of what Mr. Berger
said. I think that we need to look more closely than we have,
because this is still fairly new as the best way to go about
the intelligence job. Is it to look at all the things that can
be done to us? Is it to look at all the people who could do it?
Is it a connection of both and how do you do either one? And
we're a long way from that. We have analyzed different parts
better than we had the use of aircraft, for example. It's going
to be very hard to stay ahead of people anyway.
But I think the specific answer to your question is
homeland security is designed to be an answer to it. I cannot
agree with Senator Shelby and Mr. Berger about the solution. I
don't think replicating the Intelligence Community inside
Homeland Security is--I think it's dodging the problem rather
than solving it. But a fusion center needs to be done.
Mr. Bereuter. I have one more area of questions that
relates to the military and their past and future use in the
war on terrorism. Mr. Berger and General Scowcroft, both of
you, do you feel that there has been any reluctance on the part
of the military to have become engaged in the war on terrorism
or do you think there has been a reluctance on the part of the
civilian leadership of the country to employ them?
And I raise a couple of other questions relatedly. Why is
it, for example, that we had no military response to the boat
attacks--small boat attack on the USS Cole? Did our policy
structure suggest that the primary focus of dealing with al-
Qa'ida terrorism was or even is the law enforcement and
Intelligence Community unless we are formally engaged in going
into a country like we did in Afghanistan?
Mr. Berger. Congressman, let me start off by answering all
three of your questions. We, both the President and myself,
spoke to Secretary of Defense, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of
Staff on numerous occasions about boots on the ground options
in Afghanistan. And they looked at them, I believe seriously.
And their assessment--this is pre-9/11, we don't have Pakistan,
we don't have Uzbekistan, we don't have Tajikistan, we don't
have any of those neighbors. Their assessment was that, given
the distance for staging, given the likelihood for detection,
given the inability to have forces proximate for backup and,
most importantly, in the absence of actionable intelligence,
that it was likely to fail. I don't believe that actually was
risk aversion. I think that that was not an unreasonable
assessment under the circumstances.
Mr. Bereuter. How would you assess the military's attitude
about their involvement?
Mr. Berger. We are in an entirely new situation. 9/11 has
galvanized the world to go to war in a full scale war that I
thought was not possible, not thinkable before. And I think the
military in the war on Afghanistan has performed very well. But
you're really talking about special operations kinds of--if one
is talking about special operations. There are--there's
something we pressed on. It's something I think we got a
response to. And I don't think the response was necessarily an
unreasonable one under the circumstances.
Number two, you asked about the USS Cole, which happened in
October of 2000. When we left office, neither the Intelligence
Community nor the law enforcement community had reached a
judgment about responsibility for the USS Cole. That judgment
was reached sometime between the time we left office and 9/11.
So even with 9/11 people said show us the proof. We did not
have a judgment from the Intelligence Community of
responsibility on the USS Cole when we left.
Mr. Bereuter. Are you surprised there was no military
response when it became clear that al-Qa'ida was responsible?
Mr. Berger. I leave that to the people from the Bush
administration to address whether this was part of a larger
plan on their part. I really would prefer to address my own
tenure.
On the question of law enforcement versus military, after
August of '98, after we knew we had responsibility for an
attack that killed 12 Americans, we were not pursuing a law
enforcement model. Cruise missiles are not generally conceived
of as a law enforcement technique. We were trying to kill bin
Ladin and his lieutenants. And so I know there has been a lot
of discussion of that. The FBI is an investigative arm. They
are an instrument for trying to find out what happened. But we
are in a war and it takes the instruments of war to fight that.
Mr. Bereuter. General Scowcroft, would you have any
comments on the comments that I brought up?
General Scowcroft. Yes, I would. Part of the problem is the
nature of terrorism and terrorist organizations. It seems to me
your question is basically that of retaliation in an attempt to
deter further action, so on. I suggest that that's irrelevant
to terrorist organizations. If you knock someone out, they
don't care very much. As long as they are there, they'll go on.
This is poor man's war. It seems to me we're not going to have
maybe any more situations like Afghanistan where you had a
terrorist organization protected by the government and the
military operation was really after the government forces
primarily--maybe too much.
But most of it now is going to be terrorists hiding in
states where control over territories is insecure or where you
don't have a fully operating government--Yemen, Somalia, those
kinds of things. And it's a war where our military machine is
pretty largely ineffective except for the intelligence aspects
of it. It's not military destruction we're after, it's finding
these people. Getting rid of them is easy if you can find them
and pin them down.
Mr. Berger. Congressman, can I make one thought? It has
occurred to me since 9/11 that we have had since the beginning
of the Cold War essentially a threat-based approach to national
security. We built NORAD so we could have detection so that we
could respond. And part of what this committee is doing is
trying to figure out how we get better intelligence, so we have
threat, so we can have warning.
But with this new enemy I think we have to think about not
only threat-based protection but vulnerability-based
protection. We have to look at each of these systems and see
where the vulnerabilities are, because we will not always have
warning with this kind of enemy. We started to do that by
focusing in on critical infrastructure in the nineties. But I
think the real task of the Department of Homeland Security and
all of us is to look--beef up our ability obviously, to get
them, fight offense and get warning, but recognize that we also
have to look at all of our systems, our critical systems, from
a vulnerability point of view, whether that's companies or
government, and have a much higher threshold of security in a
vulnerability sense.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. I would like to comment on one aside that
you made, which was the characterization of the staff report
that we started yesterday's hearings with. It is not our
characterization of these staff reports as being part of or the
final report. They are rather means of putting the committee
into a position that it can have an overview as to major blocks
of events and activities that led up to September 11 and then
to have that fleshed out by the kind of commentary that we've
had today from our excellent witnesses. It will then be our
responsibility to prepare the final report with that as one
source of that beginning preparation, but not a part of the
final report.
Mr. Boswell.
Mr. Boswell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, remembering your
urging me to be short----
Chairman Graham. Just asking.
Mr. Boswell. I took that as urging. This panel has been
good. General, Mr. Berger, you bring a lot of expertise and a
lot of experience to what we need to talk about and we
appreciate it very much. I've got a couple of things I would
like for you to comment on. I'll start off with you, Mr.
Berger.
During your tenure, was the NSC worried about the nightmare
described in Mr. Lake's book of terrorists' access to weapons
of mass destruction? In particular, were you concerned about
loose nukes falling into the their hands and would you comment
on that?
Mr. Berger. This was a very serious concern. In fact, in
1999, the President gave a speech to the National Academy of
Sciences talking about this as the great looming danger. And he
asked the Congress for $1.4 billion, most of which you
appropriated, for money that provided for research, vaccines.
We had the Cipro stockpiles because we got started then. We
started to train first responders. Obviously, much more needs
to be done. Much more needed to be done. But this was a
particular preoccupation of the President.
And if you read Judy Miller's very good book called
``Germs,'' a New York Times reporter, hardly a natural fan of
the Clinton administration, I think she indicates that
President Clinton was really focused on this. We have a long
way to go and we probably will focus more on the weapons of
mass destruction scenario than the airport scenario. We built
an airport security system in the seventies to stop hijackings.
The only hijacking that took place in the nineties before 9/11,
as far as I know, was a disgruntled FedEx pilot who took a
FedEx plane from Memphis and flew it to San Jose. In fact, it
appears as though that that airport security system had
atrophied more than the people running it had known. But we
were very much focused on the WMD threat, sir.
Mr. Boswell. I appreciate that. Some have criticized the
administration's missile strikes against bin Ladin in '98 as
ineffective and inadequate. And could you comment? Why didn't
the Clinton administration in 2000 or 2001 launch a combined
military effort something like what we've done after September
11?
Mr. Berger. Congressman, I don't think that that was
feasible before 9/11. Let's remember that in the Clinton
administration, 67 Americans have been killed by terrorism.
That is 67 far too many, 12 in Africa. But it is an order of
magnitude different than what happened to us on 9/11. I don't
think there was anybody up here calling for an invasion of
Afghanistan. I don't think anybody in the press was calling for
an invasion of Afghanistan. I just don't think that was
something we would have had diplomatic support, we would not
have had basing support. And so I don't think the kind of full-
scale war that we have seen since 9/11 was feasible,
unfortunately, before then.
Mr. Boswell. I would like for both of you to comment, if
you would, just based on your experience, both of your years
around the White House, how difficult, how difficult would it
be for the Bush administration to maintain the focus and
urgency of the war on terrorism with our allies, the American
people and with government personnel, many of whom are pretty
well stretched at this point? General, do you want to go first?
General Scowcroft. It will be very difficult. It will be
especially difficult if there are no more terrorist acts for a
while because you can already see us slipping back into
business as normal. I think part of the job of any President is
to keep the people motivated. Keep them stirred up. Keep the
issues before them. And I think so far the President has done a
good job, but the difficulty of keeping us focused will
increase the more time that passes without any additional
attacks.
Mr. Boswell. Understandably so. The efforts on the war on
terrorism are very, very important, no question about it. None
of us disagree on that. But there are some pressures from
across the country to get back on some of the domestic issues,
and justly so. So will that accomplish----
General Scowcroft. I think we ought to be able to walk and
chew gum and ride a bicycle. But keeping an attention on
terrorism is--first of all, the President has declared it the
number one mission of the country. Secondly, it's not
glamorous. You can't read the reports like you could in World
War II of how the battle line changed over the last 24 hours
and so on. Lots of times, it would be absolutely quiet and then
in the last few days we've caught a few people and there will
be an upsurge. But this is not a war that the press will be
glued to to keep the American people up for it. And so the
administration will have to serve that.
Mr. Berger. Congressman, if I could add one thing. I think
the President is right in saying rather periodically we are
going to be attacked again. I think Secretary Rumsfeld is
right. I support Secretary Ridge in doing the same thing. It's
always a very difficult balance, how do you warn without
creating anxiety? How do you tell people to be alert and go
shopping? But the fact of the matter is, Congressman, we are
going to be hit again and it is something the American people
do have to be reminded of continually so that they will demand
that these problems get addressed, that we learn from what
happened, that they are not inert in their daily lives but
alert in their daily lives.
I think the President is doing the right thing by saying
from time to time we're going to be attacked again. That is
true, and that's part of maintaining the concentration and
focus of the American people and we ought not, in my judgment,
to be dismissing that as alarmism.
Mr. Boswell. Moving to another point, General Scowcroft,
through your long career you have witnessed a number of
strategic surprises that result in dramatic shifts in the
international relations environment--the rapid fall of the
Soviet bloc, the end of the Cold War in '89, Saddam Hussein's
invasion of Kuwait, discoveries in '91 about his development of
mass destruction weapons and others. Is there in your mind or
could you give us your thoughts, is there some common
characteristic to the way our government does intelligence and
strategic analysis that leads us to missing dramatic paradigm
shifts such as these?
General Scowcroft. That's a really tough question to
answer. I don't know. I'm not aware of it. One of the real
problems is that if you start to look far out and anticipate
contingencies and bring those to the decisionmakers, they say
don't bother me with something 10 years away. I've got
something 10 minutes away. Or he'll say, well, that's a
possibility, but I have 10 others that are just as likely. It's
very hard to do long range planning.
And I have been involved in it both in the military and the
NSC, which supposedly is supposed to do it. It is incredibly
hard to integrate it into government whose primary job is
putting out fires as a practical matter.
Mr. Berger. Congressman, let me just add one perspective on
this. I think there's information and context. I think often
the problem is failure to understand the context, which is why
I said in my remarks how important it is to build up the
analytical side as well as the collection side and to bring
outside experts in. Why did we not see the Holocaust coming
when you can look back now and see plenty of signs? Why did we
not see the Khmer Rouge coming into Cambodia even though there
were telltale signs? Why did we not see in the eighties Saddam
likely to invade his neighbor after what he had done to the
Kurds? Why do the greatest experts on Yugoslavia not understand
that the breakup of Yugoslavia would lead to rabid nationalism
and wars against humanity?
Those were only partly failures in information. These are
generally failures of understanding and context. And I think we
always have to wrap the question of information, finding that
needle in the haystack, with understanding the haystack.
Mr. Boswell. Do you have suggestions how we might?
Mr. Berger. I think we live in a world, Congressman, in
which expertise increasingly does not exist in the government.
It's a very complicated world. And the five people who know
Afghanistan the best or Sierra Leone the best are probably
located either in academia, in think tanks or in companies, not
to devalue the people of the government. So we have to find a
way in my judgment to integrate the expertise that exists on
the outside with the information that exists on the inside. I
suggested some kind of--we tried this with the National
Intelligence Council counsel once under Joe Nye. I think it was
a good experiment.
We ought to look at some sort of a quasi-official institute
where top level academics and top level businessmen can give
two years, not necessarily working for the CIA, which continues
to be a bit of a tank going back to academia, but can be some
place where they have access to classified information, they
have access to our best people, our best people have access to
them and we're able to put the consequences of the footprint we
left in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War in a better context.
Mr. Boswell. Thank you. General, I am informed that in the
early nineties when the generals began to make clear the threat
of nuclear proliferation, while you were at the White House,
you once considered creating a nonproliferation agency to focus
on addressing the threat. Can you share with us your thinking
behind considering this and other proposals that you might have
had to deal with this high priority situation?
General Scowcroft. Yes. At one time, as the Cold War turned
off, if you will, the issue of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons--first their extent, proliferation within the old
Soviet Union and therefore into some of the successor states--
the general issue became an important one. And that at one
time, as we were looking at the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, which seemed no longer to serve a purpose for so large
an agency over an issue which was declining in importance, we
looked at the possibility of turning that into a
nonproliferation agency.
I happen to think it was a pretty good idea. But some of my
more frugal colleagues thought it was better to eliminate an
agency and that nonproliferation was everybody's business and
that putting it in one agency would be most likely to leave the
other agencies not to pay any attention to it because it wasn't
their job anymore, and nonproliferation was everybody's job.
Mr. Boswell. I think the last question, Mr. Chairman, to
Mr. Berger, that a lot of senior policymakers complain that
there's relentless focus on the ``in box'' need to respond to
short-term crisis, which I think you touched on just a moment
ago, at the expense of having time for long-term strategic
thinking. Is it true, and what can we do about it and what
would be a role we could play?
Mr. Berger. I think it's unquestionably true that the
urgent tends to drive out the important. I think that's
probably true for your day as it is for the day of a
policymaker in the executive branch or a CEO of a company. I
don't have a magical solution except to understand that if you
don't go to work every day with the idea of what are the three
things you want to get done and then go home, if you got one of
them done you're feeling pretty good and two of them are still
left undone and then you'll get to the in box, I don't think
you ever overcome the problem. I think you've identified a
problem, I think, that clearly exists.
Mr. Boswell. Was there time to conclude that the al-Qa'ida
was this high priority? Did you have time, or were you
constantly badgered with all the other things going on?
Mr. Berger. Congressman, there was no question in my mind.
This is a problem I woke up at night about. We were focused on
this. I wish we could have gotten bin Ladin, but it was not
because it was not a priority, sir.
Mr. Boswell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
for bringing these witnesses to us today. I appreciate it very
much, and I want to personally thank each of you for your
contribution to our country. Thank you.
Chairman Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Boswell. We have
committed to our witnesses, who have been extremely generous
obviously in the amount of time that they took in thoughtfully
preparing the remarks they've given and now responding to our
questions, we committed that at 5 o'clock we would call this to
an end. What I'd like to suggest is maybe in the remaining 13
minutes if we could restrict ourselves to one final question
and then at 5 o'clock, we will adjourn.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Is that one final question per
person?
Chairman Graham. One final question per person.
Mr. Berger. This is a commitment that I have from some of
your colleagues.
Chairman Graham. I am going to ask the first question and I
will try to ask a precise question and it will be to General
Scowcroft and maybe he can give a precise answer. I know that
you have been heading up the external review of the
Intelligence Community and until the President makes some
decisions you are constrained in terms of what you can say, but
in our morning panel we did have considerable discussion about
the proposal to establish within the Department of Defense an
Under Secretary for Intelligence. Could you comment on that in
terms of what from your review of the structure and
architecture of the Intelligence Community that might mean?
General Scowcroft. Well, let me just say that while the
things I have heard about it make it look like a housekeeping
measure within the Defense Department, I really think that it
ought to be viewed in the light of the structural discussions
that are going on, whether it's the report of my group, and
there are many others going on, because it will have profound
implications for the Intelligence Community as a whole.
And it seems to me to make one single step unassociated
with all the other things that your committees are now
deliberating would be a mistake, because then you would
predetermine the direction of thestructure or you have to
change it to go back again. So I would urge as a first step that no
decision be made on anything which ipso facto will affect the entire
community.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, General. Congressman Goss.
Chairman Goss. Thank you very much for your testimony and
for taking the time to be here, and it's a pleasure to see you
both and we appreciate the assistance. It's hard to restrict
ourselves one question to you because you have so much to offer
us on your views on the fixes that we need, and I appreciate,
Mr. Berger, the seven points that you've outlined in your
testimony, and I know that General Scowcroft has other points
for the structure of the Community as well which we anxiously
looking forward to reading.
My question is for both of you. I believe that the Aspin-
Brown Commission identified a problem that still exists in the
Community which is extremely important, and that is the
relationship between the President of the United States and the
Community. Is there anything that we in Congress can do to
ensure that that is always functioning in a way that gets the
best out of the Community to serve the President and the
country?
Mr. Berger. If we had a DCI who was head of the Community
and not only head of 15 percent of the Community and was able
to integrate all of these priorities working with his
colleagues, I think automatically that would change the nature
of the relationship.
General Scowcroft. I don't disagree with that.
Chairman Goss. I am glad to hear that we are in agreement
on that. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Senator Shelby.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going
to try to have one question in several parts, I hope. We were
talking with Mr. Berger earlier about a group. Was this the so-
called White House Working Group on Terrorism? You said the FBI
met two or three times a week.
Mr. Berger. Counterterrorism Security Group, sir.
Vice Chairman Shelby. And did they meet about three times a
week more or less?
Mr. Berger. Sometimes every day. As much as necessary.
There were also meetings at the deputy level probably every two
weeks.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Did you go to some of these meetings?
Mr. Berger. The principals met on terrorism during our
years frequently, the last two years probably once a week or
once every two weeks.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Did you ever hear or know of the
group talking about the possibility of terrorists using
airplanes in some ways as weapons?
Mr. Berger. You would have to ask Mr. Clarke. My
understanding is----
Vice Chairman Shelby. He headed this group, did he not?
Mr. Berger. Yes, he did. I don't know that that issue was
brought to that group with clarity.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Do you know whether or not the
Counterterrorism Center over at Langley ever discussed or
considered or gained the possibility that terrorists would or
could use airplanes as weapons considering the fact that they
were aware of the Philippine situation in '95, the French
dealing with the Eifel Tower and a lot of other threats?
Mr. Berger. I can't answer that question.
Vice Chairman Shelby. I would have to go to that group. Do
you know, General? I know you were not there then.
Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator. The next speakers will
be Congresswoman Pelosi, Senator DeWine, Ms. Harman, Mr.
Roemer, Mr. Reys and then Senator Edwards.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. So many
questions, so little time. I want to join our distinguished
chairman and my colleagues in thanking you for your testimony
today and for your very distinguished service, both of you, to
our country. It really was a very valuable presentation that
you both made and we appreciate it very much. I have so many
questions, and this is the one I am going to ask because I
think it is of major concern to the American people.
Following September 11, one of the biggest fears that we
had was use of some radioactive material or some weapon of mass
destruction or act of bioterrorism, et cetera, that as horrible
as September 11 was, and it has scarred our souls forever,
would have many more deaths than that. In addition to that,
stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is
the pillar of our foreign policy. It is an overarching issue in
terms of a presidential priority to stop it. When we go to
address the issue, we are looking at the end user rather than
the source.
From your experience can you tell me why--certainly the
capacity that some countries have in the Persian Gulf area,
more than one, is not indigenous to them nor is their delivery
system indigenous. Why is it, as a matter of policy if this is
a pillar of our foreign policy and it is a major priority for
the President of the United States, that we're not more serious
as a country in stopping proliferation at the source rather
than always dealing with it at the end user?
General Scowcroft. Congresswoman Pelosi, I'm not sure I
accept the premise. I think we have taken serious steps against
possible proliferation, the Nunn-Lugar legislation. I think it
is inadequately funded, but it is designed precisely for that
question and that is by all odds the largest source of
potential proliferation in the world. All others are dwarfed by
it. One of the other major proliferators is North Korea, and
it's a proliferation partly of know-how and partly of
components and so on. We have tried to stop that in a variety
of ways. The same with some Chinese exports.
So I don't think--I know you're focused on a particular
potential user now, but I think we have tried to control
proliferation at the source. I think it has been inadequately
funded.
Ms. Pelosi. If I may just say, of course, Nunn-Lugar--God
bless Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar. We are all deeply in
their debt and this is a most significant and discrete area of
the technology as well as know-how.
Mr. Berger.
Mr. Berger. I share your concern about this priority. I do
think some progress has been made, not nearly enough. When the
Nonproliferation Treaty was signed in 1975, the expectation was
at the time there will be 30 nuclear nations in 20 years. There
are eight, three putative nuclear nations. But I agree
absolutely more has to be done. Number one, for purposes of
this committee, I think there is an active role that covert
action can play in this agenda. I will say no more. But we can
try to stop things from moving from place A to place B.
I agree on Nunn-Lugar, and I suppose some of us will
disagree. I happen to believe that international regimes like
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Biological Weapons
Convention strengthen the international norm. We're not
perfect, but that means when states are outside that norm it is
easier, as in the case of Iraq, to rally the world to see they
are out of compliance with the international norm. So I do
believe that international regimes are useful.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you very much to both of you. Thank you
very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. We have now less than two minutes left.
Senator DeWine. Let me just thank both of you very much. I
wholeheartedly agree with your comment that this is the
opportunity for this country to make fundamental reforms in
intelligence. It's interesting on page 7 of Anthony Lake's
testimony he also talks about reform. I'd ask my colleagues to
take a look at that. Let me play the devil's advocate because I
want to touch on a couple of questions that I think are
questions that should be asked.
One, Mr. Berger, how do you make sure that the DCI in your
plan is not a czar--up a little higher but really with no
authority or even less authority than he has under the system
today--once you take the CIA out? And second, Mr. Scowcroft,
how do you deal with the military's ability to control their
fear that they're going lose ability to control their assets if
you follow that plan?
Mr. Berger. My proposal, Senator, and I think I said the
commission should consider--I mean this is a complicated
subject. The DCI would have primary responsibility on budget
resources and priorities. He would not own these individual
agencies. They'd still be run by the Defense Department and by
other agencies. There might be some consolidation that's
possible, but I think that would help in prioritizing and
particularly putting a higher priority on the number one war we
face, which is the war against terrorism.
General Scowcroft. Senator, I can't answer your question
explicitly, but there are--it is a valid concern the military
getting what they need, and there are ways to provide for that
in a way that doesn't require them to own the assets.
Senator DeWine. Thank you very much.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator. We are now at the 5
o'clock hour. The record will remain open through the end of
business on Monday. So any of those who did not get to ask the
questions that they wished to ask, if they would submit them in
writing, we will forward them to the person to whom you would
like them directed.
I wish to take this opportunity on behalf of the Joint
Committee to thank again General Scowcroft and Mr. Berger for
their excellent presentations. I recognize the special effort
that both of you extended to do this for which I am personally
and the members of the----
Mr. Berger. I am told by my friend here we have probably a
few minutes if Congressman Roemer or----
Chairman Graham. There is a man of truly generous heart.
Can you stay a few more minutes?
Mr. Berger. There's another meeting of Senators that I'm
supposed to be at in five minutes.
Chairman Graham. Then the next would be--everything I just
said still counts--Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The witnesses are all
friends of mine and I just decided I like them a lot better
than I like you. Just a joke, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. I am deeply wounded and offended.
Ms. Harman. I want to thank them for their prior service to
our country and for their future service, and it would be very
valuable if they served our country in the future, too, because
they are so highly skilled. I want to ask another question
about risk aversion.
Chairman Graham. Ms. Harman, one question.
Ms. Harman. Risk aversion, Mr. Bereuter was asking about
it. My question is, given the fact that on 9/11 the audience
changed, given the fact that these committees have criticized
1995 guidelines and recruitment of human spies and they have
been changed, given the fact that I think the whole country is
focused on this now, do you feel that our Intelligence
Community, the 14 agencies in our Intelligence Community, have
finally overcome what one could call risk aversion and are
aggressively in every way possible going after the terrorist
targets?
General Scowcroft. No.
Mr. Berger. We can always do better. I think I mean the
whole country is focused much more intensely than they were
before 9/11.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Mr. Roemer.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Nice to see you,
General, thank you, Sandy, and thank you for your service to
the Clinton administration. My one question that I get to ask
here is not going to be knowing you are a big Oriole fan; it's
going to be about General Scowcroft has spearheaded an effort
to try to make some institutional changes in the way the CIA
has responsibility and jurisdiction for budgets and issues and
so forth. This Joint Committee will probably make some sweeping
institutional recommendations at some point when they finish
their job.
I guess my question is--well, let me just underscore one
more point. The Department of Defense has now recommended an
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence which may run
counter or may run in sync with what you recommend. I don't
know. What do you think about the creation of that Under
Secretary position, both of you, and when might your
recommendations be available to the committee for review?
General Scowcroft. I think that a recommendation such as
the one that Secretary Rumsfeld made ought to be considered in
the light of overall structural considerations and should not
be acted on in the absence of the comprehensive review that is
now going on. I can't answer the question.
Mr. Berger. I agree.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Mr. Roemer.
Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. I just have one question and I also wanted to
thank both you gentleman for your service to the country. My
question is, do you think that there is sufficient diversity in
the Intelligence Community to address the current challenge as
we see it against this country?
Mr. Berger. I don't know if I can answer that question. I
think we need a lot more people, Congressman, who are from the
countries of concern here whose heritage is Arab and Islamic
and in particular who speak the language and are able to
function with sophistication in our societies.
General Scowcroft. And primarily whatever we need to get
inside the ethos of different countries and how they will react
to different stimuli, and so on and so forth, we're not very
good at that and I think diversity, as you suggest, would help
that problem a lot.
Chairman Graham. Thank you.
Senator Edwards.
Senator Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
thank you to the witnesses very much for being here. I have
been following this hearing very closely during the course of
the day and thank you both for what you have done for our
country. Almost every question I had has been asked at least
twice so far, so I do have a quick anecdote I want to tell
before I yield the mike.
When I went on this committee originally, which was about a
year-and-a-half ago, the first thing I did was to call Sandy
Berger and asked him to come meet with me. He came and met with
me and this was long before 9/11. And he was sitting on my sofa
and I said I am going on this committee, what are the things I
need to be concerned about?
And Mr. Berger's response was, two things are going to
dominate us for at least the next decade. The first is the
threat of terrorism, and the second is weapons of mass
destruction.
Given what has happened on 9/11 and the ongoing national
debate now about Iraq, it is a clear indication of you being on
the front edge of what we need to be focused on and what needed
to be done. I am confident if you were saying that to me, I am
not the only person you were saying it to, and I think it was
an extraordinary prediction of where we would be.
Thank you for what you have done and for all of the help
you have given me and others in my position.
Mr. Berger. Thank you.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator.
Any concluding comments? If not, again, thank you for your
very generous and helpful participation.
[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
JOINT COMMITTEE HEARING ON WHAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY KNEW PRE-9/
11 REGARDING THE HIJACKERS IN REVIEW OF THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11,
2001
----------
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2002
U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and
U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Bob
Graham, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, presiding.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence members present:
Senators Graham, Levin, Rockefeller, Feinstein, Wyden,
Mikulski, Shelby, Kyl, Inhofe, Hatch, and DeWine.
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence members
present: Representatives Goss, Bereuter, Burr, Pelosi, Bishop,
Roemer, Reyes, and Peterson.
Chairman Graham. I call the Joint Inquiry Committee to
order. Welcome.
This is the third public hearing of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence in our joint inquiry into the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Today the Joint
Inquiry will receive testimony regarding three of the 19
hijackers. These three are notable because they had come to the
attention of the Intelligence Community at least 20 months
before the September 11 attacks. We will review what actions
the Intelligence Community and the law enforcement agencies
took or failed to take with respect to these individuals.
Today's proceedings will be in two parts. First, the
Committee will hear from Eleanor Hill, the staff director of
our Joint Inquiry, who will present a staff statement on this
portion of our inquiry. We will then ask the public and
representatives of media organizations to leave the room
briefly while we prepare it for the second panel of witnesses.
I will explain the purpose of doing so after the room is
reopened for the testimony of that panel.
Are there any opening statements, by Chairman Goss?
Chairman Goss. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Senator Shelby.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Mr. Chairman, I'll try to be brief,
if I can, with my opening statement.
We're holding a hearing today, in large part, based on what
our intelligence agencies knew about two specific people before
they participated in the September 11 attacks. In our first
open hearing on Wednesday, several members complained about how
much information the Administration has been willing to
declassify. That issue, of course, is a concern to all of us.
I would like to point out, however, that there is vital
information about these two hijackers that the Administration
has shared with the Joint Inquiry staff but which the Chairmen
have ordered to be concealed not only from the public but also
from members of these two committees and from committee staff.
Mr. Chairman, in the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence we have certain rules that govern how we do
business. Among those rules is the requirement that information
in the possession of the Committee be shared between the two
sides of the aisle. This rule prevents the majority from taking
advantage of its status to hide information. As you made clear
in our first closed hearing, Mr. Chairman, we do not sit here
as a joint committee. The Joint Inquiry is being run
concurrently by the Senate and House oversight committees as
two separate committees, acting jointly. All records of the
Joint Inquiry are simultaneously the investigative records of
each committee. I believe it's a violation of Senate committee
rules to conceal information in the Committee's possession from
members of this Committee and from properly-cleared minority
staff.
Unfortunately, this is not the only problem. In discussions
with my staff, the FBI has indicated that it has been
instructed by the two Chairmen not to share this same vital
information with Members or staff of these two committees, the
House Committee and the Senate Intelligence Committee. I do not
know what legal authority the Chairmen have to tell the FBI to
withhold information from Senators and Congressmen, but these
are apparently the instructions given to the Bureau.
I do not necessarily propose that we make the information
in question about these two people, the hijackers, public at
this time. I think it would be dangerous. That's a matter for
the proper declassification authorities to determine. I must
insist, Mr. Chairman, that we end this policy of withholding
crucial information from Committee Members and our staff.
Conducting an investigation and pursuing leads without fully
informing Members of the very committees who are supposedly in
charge of the inquiry is not a precedent any of us should ever
condone. I do not know how many members of these committees are
aware that information about these two hijackers has been
concealed from them by the Committee leadership.
Members of these Committees are privy every day to
enormously sensitive compartmented information from across the
Intelligence Community. I doubt that they will understand why
they may not be permitted to know this information. Before
Members of these Committees can consider themselves properly
informed about the subject at hand, I think, Mr. Chairman, we
must end this practice of withholding information from
Committee Members and staff. If we need to discuss this matter
in closed session, we should do that, but we must not conduct
investigations, I believe, out of the full view of our Members.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I believe that this still promises
to be a very productive hearing and I'm looking forward to the
testimony. I am concerned, however, that the topics we're about
to explore involve a great deal of classified and sensitive law
enforcement information. When we begin questioning the
witnesses the possibility of an inadvertent disclosure of
classified information is very real, and we would not serve the
public interest if such disclosure took place.
I strongly support your efforts, Mr. Chairman, to share as
much information with the public as possible, but I'm afraid
that we may be walking a fine line in this instance. I think we
have to be very, very careful. I believe we should conduct this
hearing in a secure facility where we can have a full and
unrestricted discussion without the risk of an inadvertent
disclosure.
After the hearing, we can review the transcript, redact
classified and sensitive law enforcement information, and then
release it to the public. I wish you would close this hearing,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Let me comment on those suggestions and
observations. First, as to the very sensitive information,
without elaborating, this information is not only extremely
sensitive relative to the events leading up to September 11 but
has very potentially adverse effects on U.S. current policies.
Two, at the request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
this information was made available to the Chairs and the two
Ranking Members of the Committees, with the understanding that
it would not be made further available until we could do so at
a closed session of thisCommittee. We have been endeavoring for
the past several weeks to make arrangements for that closed hearing of
this committee, where that matter will be fully discussed with
appropriate safeguards. It had been my hope that we would be able to do
that as early as next week. Based on information that I have received
this morning, I doubt that we will be in a position to do it next week.
But I can assure you, Senator, that it is my desire to have this made
available to the Committee at the earliest possible moment, and I
believe when the Committee hears the information they will be seized
with why the FBI felt that this had to be treated with such special
precaution.
Second, as to the hearing we're going to have today, as
with the hearings that we had Wednesday and as to those that we
will have in the future, the staff report is submitted to the
classifying agencies, which in this case included the FBI and
the CIA. Those agencies have the responsibility of reviewing it
and declassifying. We may at some points disagree with their
standards, but in all cases we observe their standards and
recognize their ultimate authority to do so.
This hearing is being conducted under those same ground
rules, so that all the information that will be presented in
the joint staff report will have been previously declassified
by the appropriate agency and the witnesses, all of whom are
agents of those two agencies, plus one witness from the State
Department, are aware of the lines of demarcation between
classified and declassified as it relates to this subject
matter. So I believe that it is not only possible but highly
appropriate that we hold this hearing in public today so that
the American people can become better informed as to the events
leading up to September 11.
Ms. Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just want
to make one point in welcoming our witnesses and commending
once again Ms. Hill for her excellent work and that of the
staff.
I would reiterate some of what my Chairman, Mr. Goss, said,
I don't know if it was yesterday or the day before. We are all
committed to having as much information available to the public
as is possible, and the only limitations would be not to reveal
sources and methods, plans and intentions, and any matters that
we couldn't release because of Justice Department activity,
that we all value the work of the people at the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency and others
in law enforcement and intelligence-gathering, that they are
brave and courageous, and that something went wrong here and we
want to find out what it is, and that any information--just to
comment on what my distinguished vice chairman from the other
body said--that we would not be going down a path that would be
dangerous to our national security and reveal sources and
methods, plans and intentions, or jeopardize a prosecution, but
that we understand our responsibility for the safety of these
people and the importance of this information.
I think that we should feel quite comfortable proceeding
under the arrangement that is there, with all due respect to
the concerns, always legitimate, raised by my distinguished
colleague.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Graham. Thank you very much, Ms. Pelosi.
Ms. Hill.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hill follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT OF ELEANOR HILL, STAFF DIRECTOR, JOINT INQUIRY STAFF
Ms. Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. I am
pleased to be here again this morning, and this morning I have
a statement, as you have alluded to, that describes what our
review has found regarding what the government knew about the
hijackers prior to September 11, 2001.
I am going to summarize this in an oral statement, but I do
have and would offer for the record a full written statement
that, as the Chairman has mentioned, has been declassified
through again a long and arduous process with the working group
set up by the Intelligence Committee to declassify our work.
They have done so, and I would offer for the record a copy of
that statement, written statement, which is certified by the
lead member of that declassification group as being cleared for
public release and also certified separately by the Justice
Department representative as being cleared for public release
in terms of their concerns about ongoing litigation.
I would also mention that they have initialed; both of
those individuals have initialed each page of the written
statement indicating that in toto it is appropriate for public
release. So I would offer that for the record and then proceed
to offer a summarized version for the hearing.
[The certifications of declassification follow: The
initialed documents referred to were submitted for inclusion in
the Joint Inquiry Committee classified record.]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Hill. My testimony today will focus on the Intelligence
Community's knowledge prior to September 11, 2001, of the
hijackers, particularly three of the five individuals who
hijacked American Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon.
Later in this inquiry we will focus on the July 10, 2001,
electronic communication from the Phoenix field office of the
FBI to FBI headquarters and on the FBI's investigation prior to
September 11 of Zacarias Moussaoui.
While each of these areas is equally important, I do want
to emphasize the significance of these matters when viewed
collectively. The information regarding all three matters was
available in the same section at FBI headquarters in August
2001. The first and third matters were addressed in the DCI's
Counterterrorist Center at approximately the same time. In
neither unit did anyone see the potential collective
significance of the information, despite increasing concerns
throughout the summer of 2001 about an impending terrorist
attack.
In each of these areas there were missed opportunities by
the Intelligence Community. In each area there were indications
of larger systemic issues that, at least in part, drove those
missed opportunities. And finally, in each area, there were
individuals within the Intelligence Community who did recognize
the importance of what was potentially at stake and tried,
though ultimately without success, to get organizations within
the community to do the same.
Of particular interest to this inquiry is the extent to
which the Intelligence Community had any intelligence or law
enforcement information linking any of the suspected hijackers
to terrorism or to a terrorist group prior to the eleventh of
September. Today the Joint Inquiry staff has determined that
prior to September 11 the Intelligence Community possessed no
intelligence or law enforcement information that would have
linked 16 of the 19 hijackers to terrorism or terrorist groups.
The three remaining hijackers, all of whom were aboard American
Flight 77, did come to the attention of the community prior to
September 11.
The three hijackers in question are Khalid al-Mihdhar,
Nawaf al-Hazmi, and Nawaf's brother, Salim al-Hazmi. What
follows and what I'm going to present this morning is a
description of how the community developed information on these
individuals and when the Intelligence Community had, but
missed, opportunities both to deny them entry into the United
States, and, subsequently, to generate investigative and
surveillance action regarding their activities within the
United States.
At this stage we must also reiterate that this is only an
unclassified summary of our work to date regarding these
events. The staff is at this point continuing its review of
other information pertaining to the hijackers and some
information and areas under review remain classified. A
separate and more detailed classified statement will be
submitted for inclusion in the sealed record at a later point.
The story begins in December 1999 with the Intelligence
Community on heightened alert for possible terrorist activity
as the world prepared to celebrate the new millennium. A
meeting of individuals believed at the time to be associated
with Usama bin Ladin's terrorist network took place in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, from January 5 to January 8, 2000. Khalid al-
Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi were among those attending the
meeting, along with an individual later identified as Khallad
bin Atash, a key operative in Usama bin Ladin's network.
Although it was not known what was discussed at the Malaysia
meeting, the CIA believed it to be a gathering of al-Qa'ida
associates. Several of the individuals attending the meeting,
including al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, then proceeded to another
southeast Asian country.
By the time these individuals entered Malaysia, the CIA had
determined Khalid al-Mihdhar's full name, his passport number,
and his birth information. Significantly, it also knew that he
held a United States B1/B2 multiple-entry visa that had been
issued to him in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on April 7, 1999, and
would not expire until April 6, 2000.
Soon after these individuals departed Malaysia on January
8, 2001, the CIA also received indications that Nawaf's last
name might be al-Hazmi. Unbeknownst to the CIA, another arm of
the Intelligence Community, the National Security Agency, had
information associating Nawaf al-Hazmi with the bin Ladin
network. NSA did not immediately disseminate that information,
although it was in NSA's data base.
At this stage, Salim al-Hazmi was known to the rest of the
Intelligence Community as an associate of Khalid's and Nawaf's
and that he was possibly Nawaf's brother. Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf
al-Hazmi's names could have been, but were not, added at this
time to the State Department, INS, and U.S. Customs Service
watch lists denying individuals entry into the United States.
A CIA communication in early January 2000 states that al-
Mihdhar's travel documents, including his multiple-entry visa
for the United States, were shared with the FBI for further
investigation. We have interviewed the supervisor of the unit
in which this document was written, and that individual has no
independent recollection of the documents being sent to the
FBI. No one at the FBI recalls having received such documents
at the time. No confirmatory record of the transmittal of the
travel documents has yet been located at either the CIA or the
FBI.
In addition, while the Malaysia meeting was in progress, a
CIA employee sent an e-mail to a CIA colleague advising that he
had briefed two FBI agents about what the CIA had learned about
al-Mihdhar's activities. The CIA employee told us that he had
at the time been assigned to work at the FBI's Strategic
Information Operations Center to fix problems ``in
communicating between the CIA and the FBI.''
His e-mail, however, makes no mention of the CIA's
determination that al-Mihdhar held a U.S. multiple-entry visa.
The CIA employee noted in his e-mail that he told the second
FBI agent that ``this continues to be an [intelligence]
operation. Thus far a lot of suspicious activity has been
observed, but nothing that would indicate evidence of an
impending attack or criminal enterprise. Told''--and he refers
to the first FBI agent--``that as soon as something concrete is
developed leading us to the criminal arena or to known FBI
cases, we will immediately bring FBI into the loop, like''--and
he refers to the first FBI agent--``yesterday, the second FBI
agent stated that this was a fine approach and thanked me for
keeping him in the loop.''
The CIA employee told our staff that he does not recall
telling the FBI about al-Mihdhar's visa information and
potential travel to the United States. When interviewed by our
staff, neither FBI agent initially recalled discussions with
the CIA employee about al-Mihdhar. The first agent did locate
his own handwritten notes that indicated that he did speak with
the employee about Malaysia activities, probably in early
January 2000. The second agent knows the CIA employee but does
not recall learning about al-Mihdhar or the Malaysia meeting
until after September 11, 2001.
An e-mail from the second FBI agent to a superior at FBI
headquarters has been located that relates the basic facts of
the conversation with the CIA employee. The e-mail, however,
makes no mention of al-Mihdhar's visa information or possible
travel to the United States. It concludes with, ``CIA is
reporting relevant information as it becomes available.''
In early March 2000, CIA headquarters, including both the
CTC and the special bin Ladin unit, received information from
an overseas CIA station involved in the matter that Nawaf al-
Hazmi had entered the United States via Los Angeles
International Airport on January 15, 2000. No further
destination for Khalid al-Mihdhar was noted in the CIA cable.
The cable carrying the information was marked ``action
required, none, FYI.''
The following day, another overseas CIA station noted, in a
cable the to bin Ladin unit at CIA headquarters, that it had
``read with interest'' the March cable, ``particularly the
information that a member of this group traveled to the U.S.''
The CIA did not act on this information, nor did it consider
the possibility that, because Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-
Mihdhar had been together in Malaysia and continued on together
to another southeast Asian country that there was a possibility
that they would travel further together. In fact, al-Mihdhar,
who traveled with al-Hazmi, continued on with him to the United
States on January 15, 2000.
Again, at this point these two individuals could have been
added to the State Department's watch list for denying
individuals entry into the United States. Although they had
already entered the United States, the sharing of this
information with the FBI and appropriate law enforcement
authorities could have prompted investigative efforts to locate
these individuals and possibly surveil their activities within
the United States. Unfortunately, none of these things
happened.
The Joint Inquiry staff has interviewed the individual at
CIA headquarters who had direct responsibility for tracking the
movement of individuals at this meeting in Malaysia. That
person does not recall seeing the March message. In his
testimony before the Joint Inquiry on June 18, 2001, the
Director of Central Intelligence acknowledged that the CIA
should have acted to add these individuals to the State
Department's watch list in March 2000 and characterized this
omission as ``a mistake.''
During the course of our interviews we attempted to
identify the reasons why that mistake occurred. We were told
that there was, at the time, no formal system in place at the
CTC for watchlisting suspected terrorists with indications of
travel to the United States. CIA personnel also told us that
they received no formal training on watchlisting. One CIA
employee said they learned about the watchlisting process
through ``on-the-job training.'' Another CIA employee who had
been aware of al-Mihdhar's participation in the Malaysia
meeting, told us that prior to September 11, 2001, it was ``not
incumbent'' on CTC's special bin Ladin unit to watchlist such
individuals. Finally, a CTC employee who in 2000 handled the
cable traffic on the Malaysia meeting told us that the meeting
was not considered ``important'' relative to other
counterterrorist activities occurring at the time, and that
there were not enough people to handle CTC's workload at the
time.
As a result, informational cables such as the March 2000
message received less attention than action items. Several
other CIA employees told us that they typically did not have
time to even read informational cables.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Chairman, when will we recess for the
vote?
Chairman Graham. We have ten minutes left on the vote. Ms.
Hill, there is a vote on in the Senate and we're going to have
to leave. Is there a point that would be better in terms of
your presenting the story that you're going to reach in the
next five minutes?
Ms. Hill. If you would like to break, if you want to break,
we could break now or I can continue, however you want me to do
it.
Chairman Graham. The meeting will be suspended for such as
it takes the Members of the Senate to vote and return, and I
would urge expeditious return.
[Whereupon, from 10:35 a.m. until 11:22 a.m., the
Committees stood in recess.]
Chairman Goss [presiding]. Chairman Graham asked me to
proceed with the continuation of Ms. Hill's presentation to us
because of the urgency of some other scheduling matters that
some of our lead questioners have. I see Senator Levin has
returned, so in that case, Ms. Hill, would you continue,
please?
Ms. Hill. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
I'll continue right where I left off. The failure to
watchlist al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi or, at a minimum, to advise
the FBI of their travel to the United States is perhaps even
more puzzling because it occurred shortly after the peak of
Intelligence Community alertness to possible millennium-related
terrorist attacks.
In the fall of 1999 there was a debate within the community
about whether intelligence information that had been collected
earlier that year meant that bin Ladin's terrorist network
intended to carry out attacks in the midst of the celebrations
ushering in the new millennium. Intelligence information, along
with the arrest of Amhad Ressam at the U.S.-Canadian border,
prompted the U.S. Government and various foreign governments to
arrest, detain, and otherwise disrupt numerous individuals
associated with bin Ladin's network in various locations around
the world.
These disruptions occurred between December 1999 and
February 2000. Thus, the Malaysia meeting of January 5 through
8, 2000, and the March 2000 information that al-Hazmi had
entered the United States developed at a time when the
Intelligence Community had only recently confronted the real
possibility of a bin Ladin attack. However, it apparently was
still focused on the organization and aftermath of the previous
operations.
In interviews with the staff, a number of working level CIA
personnel who were following the Malaysia meeting and other
terrorist activities in the millennium time frame have
characterized the Malaysia meeting as just one of many
counterterrorist efforts occurring at the time. In contrast,
documents reviewed by the Joint Inquiry staff show that the
Malaysia meeting was deemed sufficiently important at the time
that it was included, along with several other counterterrorist
activities, in several briefings to the DCI in January 2000. We
were told, however, that the matter was ``dropped'' when the
CIA employee handling the matter moved on to other issues and,
as a result, no CIA officer was following the al-Mihdhar group
by the summer of 2000.
By March 2000 al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi had settled
into a residence in San Diego. In the course of their time in
San Diego they used their true names on a rental agreement, as
al-Mihdhar also did in obtaining a California motor vehicle
photo ID card. In May 2000 they took flight lessons in San
Diego but abandoned the effort.
On June 10, 2000, al-Mihdhar left the United States on a
Lufthansa flight from Los Angeles to Frankfort. Nawaf al-Hazmi
remained in the United States. On July 7, 2000, a week shy of
the expiration of the six-month visa to stay in the United
States, al-Hazmi applied to the INS for the extension to his
visa. He used on his INS application the LemonGrove, California
address for the residence that he shared with al-Mihdhar before the
latter's departure in early June 2000. The INS recorded receipt of the
extension request on July 27, 2000. The INS has advised the staff that
it assumes a receipt was generated and sent to al-Hazmi at the address
he listed. The INS does not have a record of a further extension
request by al-Hazmi, who remained in the United States illegally after
his initial extension expired in January 2001.
On October 12, 2000, two individuals with ties to bin Ladin
carried out an attack on the USS Cole. The Navy destroyer was
refueling in Aden, Yemen. In the course of its investigation of
the attack, the FBI developed information indicating that an
individual named Tawfiq Mahomed Saleh Atash, also known as
Khallad, had been a principal planner in the Cole bombing, and
that two other participants in the Cole conspiracy had
delivered money to Khallad at the time of the January 2000
Malaysia meeting. The FBI shared this information with the CIA,
and it prompted analysts at the CIA to take another look at the
January 2000 meeting in Malaysia.
In that process the CIA acquired information in January
2001 indicating that Khallad had attended the meeting in
Malaysia. This information was significant because it meant
that the other attendees, including al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-
Hazmi had been in direct contact with the key planner in bin
Ladin's network behind the Cole attack. However, CIA again
apparently did not act and did not add Khalid al-Mihdhar and
Nawaf al-Hazmi to the State Department's watchlist. At this
time, Khalid al-Mihdhar was abroad, while Nawaf al-Hazmi was
still in the United States.
In May 2001, personnel at the CIA provided an intelligence
operations specialist at FBI headquarters with photographs
taken in Malaysia, including one of al-Mihdhar. The CIA wanted
the FBI to review the photographs to determine whether an
individual in custody in connection with the Cole investigation
could be identified in the photographs. When interviewed, the
FBI intelligence operations specialist who received the
photographs told the staff that the CIA told her about al-
Mihdhar's meeting in Malaysia and travel to another southeast
Asian country but said nothing about his potential travel to
the United States. Nor did the CIA advise the FBI that the
photographs were from a meeting that it believed Khallad had
attended. Again, no action was taken to watchlist al-Mihdhar or
al-Hazmi.
On June 11, 2001, FBI headquarters representatives and CIA
representatives met with the New York FBI agents handling the
Cole investigation. The New York agents were shown but not
given copies of the photographs and were told they were taken
in Malaysia. When interviewed, one of the New York agents
recalled al-Mihdhar's name being mentioned. He also recalled
asking for more information on why the people in the
photographs were being followed and for access to that
information. The New York FBI agents were advised that they
could not be told why al-Mihdhar and the others were being
followed. An FBI headquarters representative told us in her
interview that the FBI was never given specific information
until it was provided after September 11, 2001.
The CIA analyst who attended the New York meeting
acknowledged to the Joint Inquiry staff that he had seen the
information regarding al-Mihdhar's U.S. visa and al-Hazmi's
travel to the United States, but he stated that he would not
share information outside of the CIA unless he had authority to
do so and unless that was the purpose of the meeting.
On June 13, 2001, Khalid al-Mihdhar obtained a new U.S.
visa in Jeddah using a different passport than the one he had
used to enter the United States on January 15, 2000. On his
application he checked ``no'' in response to the question of
whether he had ever been in the United States. On July 4, 2001,
al-Mihdhar reentered the United States.
On or about July 13, 2001, a CIA officer assigned to the
FBI, who I believe will testify this morning, accessed CIA's
electronic data base and located a CIA cable for which he had
been searching that contained information the CIA had acquired
in January 2001 indicating that Khallad had attended the
meeting in Malaysia. The presence of Khallad in Malaysia deeply
troubled the CIA officer, who immediately sent an e-mail from
FBI headquarters to the DCI's CTC saying of Khallad, ``this is
a major league killer who orchestrated the Cole attack and
possibly the Africa bombings.''
A review at the CIA of all prior cables concerning the
Malaysia meeting was launched, a task that fell to an FBI
analyst assigned to the CTC. On August 21, 2001, the FBI
analyst put together two key pieces of information. These were
the intelligence that the CIA had received in January 2000 that
al-Mihdhar had a multiple-entry visa to the United States and
the information the CIA had received in march 2000 that Nawaf
al-Hazmi had entered the United States on January 15, 2000.
Working with an INS representative assigned to the CTC, the
analyst obtained information that al-Mihdhar had entered the
United States on January 15, 2000 and had departed on June 10,
2000. Additional investigation revealed that al-Mihdhar had
reentered the country on July 4, 2001, with a visa that allowed
him to stay through August 22.
CIA suspicions were further aroused by the timing of al-
Mihdhar and al-Hazmi's arrival in Los Angeles, in the same
general time frame in which Algerian terrorist and bin Ladin
associate Ahmad Ressam was to have arrived in Los Angeles to
conduct terrorist operations.
On August 23, 2001, the CIA sent a cable to the State
Department, the INS, the Customs Service and the FBI requesting
that bin Ladin-related individuals al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi,
and two other individuals at the Malaysia meeting be
watchlisted immediately and denied entry into the United
States, ``due to their confirmed links to Egyptian Islamic
Jihad operatives and suspicious activities while traveling in
east Asia.'' Although the CIA believed al-Mihdhar was in the
United States, placing him on the watchlist would have enabled
authorities to detain him if he attempted to leave.
Meanwhile, the FBI headquarters bin Ladin unit sent to the
FBI's New York field office a draft document recommending the
opening of an intelligence investigation on al-Mihdhar to
determine if al-Mihdhar is still in the United States. It also
stated that al-Mihdhar's confirmed association with elements of
bin Ladin's terrorist network, including potential association
with two individuals involved in the attack on the USS Cole
``make him a risk to the national security of the United
States.''
The goal of the investigation was to locate al-Mihdhar and
determine his contacts and reasons for being in the country.
New York FBI agents told us that they tried to convince FBI
headquarters to open a criminal investigation in al-Mihdhar,
given the importance of the search and the limited resources
that were available to intelligence investigations. FBI
headquarters declined to do so because there was, in its view,
no way to connect al-Mihdhar to the ongoing Cole investigation
without using some intelligence information.
At the State Department, a visa revocation process was
begun immediately. Al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Khallad and the
other individual who had been at the Malaysia meeting were
added to the watchlist. The FBI contacted the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security at the State Department on August 27, 2001,
to obtain al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi's visa information. The
visa information revealed that on entering the U.S. al-Mihdhar
had indicated on his application that he would be staying at a
Marriott hotel in New York City. An FBI agent, working with a
Naval Criminal Investigative Service agent, determined on
September 5 that al-Mihdhar had not registered at any New York
area Marriott hotel.
On September 10, 2001, the New York FBI field office
prepared a request that the FBI office in Los Angeles check all
Sheraton hotels located in the L.A. area. The request also
asked that the Los Angeles field office check with United
Airlines and Lufthansa for travel andalias information, since
al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi had used those airlines. The Los Angeles FBI
office conducted the search after September 11, 2001, with negative
results.
In short, the CIA had obtained information identifying two
of the 19 hijackers, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, as suspected
terrorists carrying visas for travel to the United States as
long as 18 months prior to the time they were eventually
watchlisted. There were numerous opportunities during the
tracking of the two suspected terrorists when the CIA could
have alerted the FBI and other U.S. law enforcement authorities
to the probability that these individuals either were or would
soon be in the United States. That was not done. Nor were they
placed on watchlists denying them entry into the United States.
It is worth noting that the watchlists mentioned above are
aimed at denying named individuals from entering the United
States. Prior to September 11, 2001, these watchlists were not
used to screen individuals boarding domestic flights within the
United States. Thus, even though al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi had
been placed on watchlists two weeks prior to September 11, this
did not prevent them from boarding American Flight 77 on
September 11.
Beyond the watchlist issue, the story of al-Mihdhar and al-
Hazmi also graphically illustrates the gulf that apparently
existed, at least prior to September 11, between intelligence
and law enforcement counterterrorist efforts. There are a
number of factors that make effective integration of law
enforcement and intelligence investigations against terrorism
difficult. These include differences in experience, tactics,
objectives, legal authorities and concern for protecting
intelligence sources and methods.
For example, limitations on the flow of information to
criminal investigators from intelligence agencies can be
imposed to protect foreign intelligence sources and methods
from disclosure in a criminal prosecution. In the case of al-
Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, even the importance of the USS Cole
criminal investigation was evidently deemed insufficient to
justify the full sharing of relevant intelligence information
with the agents handling the criminal case.
An August 29, 2001, e-mail exchange between FBI
headquarters and an FBI agent in New York is illustrative. The
agent, who had been involved in the Cole criminal investigation
since the day of that attack, and who, I might add, is present
here today to testify, asked FBI headquarters to allow New York
to use the full criminal investigative resources available to
the FBI to find al-Mihdhar. Headquarters responded that its
national security law unit advised that this could not be done.
The headquarters response--and I will read it--is as follows:
``A criminal agent CANNOT be present at the interview. This
case in its entirety is based on intelligence. If at such time
as information is developed indicating the existence of a
substantial federal crime, that information will be passed over
the wall according to the proper procedures and turned over for
follow-up criminal investigation.'' I will refrain from reading
the agent's response in his e-mail because I believe he's here
today and he will read that to you himself, which is certainly
more appropriate than me reading it.
Within two weeks after the September 11 attacks, the FBI
prepared an analysis of bin Ladin's responsibility as part of
the State Department's development of a white paper that could
be shared with foreign governments. That analysis relied, at
least in part, on the connection between the attack on the USS
Cole and al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. ``Even at this early stage of
the investigation, the FBI has developed compelling evidence
which points to Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida as the
perpetrators of this attack. By way of illustration, at least
two of the hijackers met with a senior al-Qa'ida terrorist, the
same al-Qa'ida terrorist which reliable information
demonstrates orchestrated the attack on the USS Cole and who
was involved in the planning of the East Africa bombings.''
The two hijackers referred to were al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi,
the senior al-Qa'ida terrorist was Khallad. The place that they
met was Malaysia. Thus, the facts linking these two individuals
to Khallad and to bin Ladin formed the crux of the case made to
governments around the world after September 11 that bin Ladin
should be held accountable for those attacks.
In closing I would just say we have a few preliminary
conclusions, and they are as follows. September 11 hijackers
Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi came to the attention of
the Intelligence Community in early 2000 but entered the United
States unobserved soon after. The Intelligence Community
succeeded in determining that these bin Ladin operatives were
in Malaysia in January 2000 and in obtaining important
information about them. The system broke down, however, in
making the best use of that information and in ensuring that it
was effectively and fully shared with agencies like the FBI,
the State Department and the INS that could have acted on it to
either prevent them from entering the United States or surveil
them and uncover their activities while in the United States.
In addition, the FBI and CIA had responsibilities to
respond to the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole. Each had
information that the other needed to carry out those
responsibilities. But, at a key meeting in New York on June 11,
2001, the CIA did not provide to the FBI information about the
Malaysian meeting and its participants that could have assisted
the FBI in their investigation.
These events reflect misunderstandings that have developed
over the last several years about using information derived
from intelligence-gathering activities in criminal
investigations. The problems of communication between
organizations that are demonstrated by the al-Mihdhar/al-Hazmi
situation existed not only between the CIA and the FBI but also
within the FBI itself. Once it was determined in late August
2001 that Khalid al-Mihdhar was in the United States, the
search to determine his whereabouts was limited by U.S.
government policies and practices regarding the use of
intelligence information in FBI criminal investigations. This
limited the resources that were made available for the FBI to
conduct the search during a time in which al-Mihdhar and al-
Hazmi were purchasing their September 11 tickets and traveling
to their last rallying point.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes the statement. I would only
add one minor correction. I believe when I read it I noted that
Director Tenet had testified before these committees on June
18, 2001. That was an error. It should be June 18, 2002. So
that needs to be clear for the record.
Thank you.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Ms. Hill.
As I indicated earlier, at the conclusion of Ms. Hill's
staff presentation we're going to ask the room be cleared
briefly and then we will make necessary arrangements within the
room and resume with the three witnesses. I'd ask that all but
approved personnel leave the room.
[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken, the room was cleared,
a screen to protect the identity of two witnesses was set up,
the witnesses were brought in and seated, and the doors were
reopened for the public and press.]
Chairman Graham. I call the hearing to order.
Before we proceed with the witnesses, I will ask unanimous
consent for three actions--one, that the full declassified
staff statement that has just been presented by Ms. Hill be
placed in the record. Is there objection?
[No response.]
Chairman Graham. Two, that a classified staff statement be
placed in the classified portion of the record. Is there
objection?
[No response.]
Chairman Graham. And, third, that Chairman Goss and I,
acting jointly after consultation with Vice Chairman Shelby and
Ranking Member Pelosi, be authorized to place in an appropriate
place in the record classified and unclassified exhibits that
are designated for inclusion by the staff director of the Joint
Inquiry or any Member of the two Committees. Is there
objection?
[No response.]
Chairman Graham. Without objection, so ordered.
Due to the continuing sensitivity of their counterterrorism
responsibilities, two of our next witnesses will testify while
sitting behind an opaque screen. All cameras have been
relocated so as not to photograph these two witnesses. It is
our procedure to ask that all witnesses be sworn. Therefore, I
would ask if you would please stand and raise your right hand.
Senator Feinstein. No, don't make them stand.
Chairman Graham. I'm sorry. Our witnesses are taller than
our screen, so would the two identified witnesses please stand
and would the two non-identified witnesses please raise their
right hand?
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give
before the Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Rolince. I do.
CIA Officer. I do.
FBI Agent. I do.
Mr. Kojm. I do.
Chairman Graham. As we commence the witness testimony, I
would ask that all Members of the Committee refer to the two
unidentified witnesses as being either the CIA officer or the
FBI agent.
The two other witnesses will be Mr. Michael Rolince, FBI
Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Office, and
Chris Kojm, Deputy for Intelligence Policy and Coordination of
the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research. We
very much appreciate all of your participation in this
important hearing. The hearing has been reopened to the public
and the press.
Two of our witnesses, one from the CIA and one from the
FBI, will be shielded by the screen during their testimony.
Neither of these witnesses are to be addressed by name. This is
necessary because both are currently engaged in sensitive
counterterrorism activities. We have introduced the other two
open witnesses. I would ask that the witnesses be called upon
to make your oral statements in the following order--first the
CIA officer, second Mr. Rolince, third the FBI agent, and then
finally Mr. Kojm.
The CIA officer.
[The prepared statement of the CIA Officer follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT OF AN OFFICER OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CIA Officer. Mr. Chairman, Members and staff, I'm a senior
officer attached to the DCI's Counterterrorist Center,
currently assigned to the FBI.
From September 1998 until May 2001 as an operations manager
I was privileged to work alongside a group of extraordinary
officers from the CIA, the FBI, and other agencies who were and
remain committed to combating the threat posed by bin Ladin and
those he has inspired.
In May of 2001 I moved over to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, where I have since worked as a CIA detailee in
the Counterterrorism Division, a position in which I've also
focused on the bin Ladin menace.
I would like to read a short statement and then the written
version will be submitted for the record.
Chairman Graham. Thank you.
CIA Officer. Before we begin, I would like to observe that
even after ten months of incredible effort by the U.S. military
and others in Afghanistan and by the agencies you see
represented before you here today and others here and abroad,
al-Qa'ida remains poised to strike again. What we say in this
venue over the coming weeks will be closely followed by the
very people who are trying to destroy you, me, our families and
our way of life. I want to stress, speaking on behalf of those
still carrying the battle to al-Qa'ida inside Afghanistan and
out that we do not and cannot for the foreseeable future view
this group and its emulators and sympathizers as anything less
dangerous than they were at this time last year. While we have
an obligation to ensure that our flaws are identified and
corrected, we must also take great care that we not educate the
enemy while we are at it.
With those comments, I turn to the specific topic we have
been invited here to review. Your staff has laid out the basic
facts so I won't repeat them in detail. But I'd like to walk
through the most significant elements in summary form.
In late 1999 the U.S. counterterrorist community launched a
global effort aimed at disrupting terrorist operations we knew
were being planned for the millennium turnover and that we
suspected would carry over into the end of the Muslim month of
Ramadan, which was to occur in early January 2000. Dozens of
terrorists and terrorist support nodes were disrupted. Both CIA
and the FBI, as well as other members of the Intelligence
Community, surged large numbers of officers for this effort,
and they worked around the clock through roughly mid-January,
through 15 January 2000.
During that heightened alert the CIA and the FBI and other
members of the Intelligence Community were also working over
data they had shared relative to the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam
embassy bombings that had occurred in August 1998. In December
1999 this intelligence provided a kind of a tuning fork that
buzzed when two individuals reported planning and trip to Kuala
Lumpur were linked indirectly to a support element that we
suspected had played a role with the Africa bombers.
A CTC officer, noting the linkage, set in motion a complex
series of operations aimed at determining their identity, their
contacts and, ideally, what they were doing. The operation
succeeded in its first phase. Within a very short period of
time we learned the name of one of the travelers, Khalid al-
Mihdhar. We learned where they were staying and the names of
several of their local contacts. We were unable to complete the
second phase of the operation, however; we did not learn the
identities of the other participants in the meeting at the
time, and were unable to determine and still do not know what
they discussed during that meeting.
While the meeting was in process, via CIA officers detailed
to the FBI, the CTC kept the FBI advised of developments via
verbal briefings. As you know, for a number of years the FBI
has had agents and analysts working integrally with CTC,
including in the CTC's bin Ladin element. And CIA officers in
turn have also served in various components of the FBI,
including also in the bin Ladin unit at FBI headquarters.
Part of the job on either side, especially during moments
of crisis, is to provide verbal briefs on the fly before
shifting attention to the next facet of the crisis.
We prefer to document significant transfers of information
both to assure ourselves that it was passed and also to create
a detailed record for our own operations officers and analysts,
who at a later date draw on such data to do a variety of tasks.
In this case, CTC did not formally document to the FBI the
conversations between the CIA referents and the FBI supervisors
they briefed. CTC did note in a cable to the field that al-
Mihdhar's passport information had been passed to the FBI, but
to date we have been unable to confirm either passage or
receipt of the information, so we cannot say what the exact
details were that were passed.
As the operations unfolded, a piece of data that in
hindsight turned out to be critical revealed al-Mihdhar's
passport information and that he had earlier obtained a visa to
the United States. Under ideal conditions that passport data
should have been provided to the State Department's TIPOFF
program, which is designed to keep terrorists from entering the
U.S. from abroad. At this point both al-Mihdhar and his
companion, who would turn out to be another hijacker, Nawaf al-
Hazmi, had their visas.
Later, in early March 2000, long after the dust had settled
in Malaysia, information surfaced indicating that al-Mihdhar's
partner was named Nawaf al-Hazmi. In early March CIA also
received information indicating that al-Hazmi had booked a
flight that terminated in Los Angeles on 15 January 2000.
Again, the new information on al-Hazmi was not disseminated.
After the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, the al-
Mihdhar and al-Hazmi data resurfaced when the FBI learned that
an individual alleged to have been a key planner of the Cole
attack had been in southeast Asia at the same time as the
Malaysia meeting. This raised the possibility that the planner
of that Cole attack had been at the meeting. The person I'm
discussing was this person Khallad, who was mentioned in the
previous testimony. I at the time I wrote this I did not have
the full declassified version.
Seeking to develop more information on that hypothesis,
that Khallad had been at the meeting, and related to other
information linking some Cole operatives to possible unknown
contacts in Malaysia, the FBI and CIA sought to develop more
information about the other people at the meeting. Early in
2001 more intelligence was developed that strengthened the
hypothesis that this key planner had been one of the
participants in the January 2000 meeting with al-Mihdhar and
al-Hazmi. At the time, the focus was on the USS Cole
investigation and understanding what had occurred in Malaysia,
not on whether these individuals had been watchlisted.
In mid-summer 2001, although the presence of the key
planner in Malaysia had yet to be confirmed, while burrowing
through intelligence related to other terrorist activity in
Malaysia the data from January 2000 and January 2001 was put
together in a different way, and both the FBI and CIA began to
work to flesh out their understanding of all the people linked
to the key planner of the Cole attack, of all the people linked
to Khallad.
In the course of that work, in mid-August 2001 CIA and FBI
learned that al-Mihdhar had entered the U.S. in January 2000,
departed at a later date, and then reentered in July 2001. CTC
notified a number of agencies officially within a short time
and the FBI began an investigation to backtrack from al-
Mihdhar's immigration documents in an effort to find him. But
he had not registered at the hotels indicated on his forms and
time ran out before other venues could be searched.
How could these misses have occurred? I do not want to
speculate at any great length about this at this point, because
I really don't have a definitive answer. But I should try to
put the events into some kind of context. The events I've
summarized above took place in the context of a worldwide
campaign that also focused on people we knew were trying to
kill Americans. The CIA operators focused on the Malaysia
meeting while it occurred. When it was over, they focused on
other more urgent operations against threats, real or assessed.
Of the many people involved, no one detected that the data
generated by this operation, the Malaysia meeting, crossed a
reporting threshold or, if they did, they assumed that the
reporting requirement had been met elsewhere.
In a later session, officers who served in CTC after 9/11
will expand on the revisions and new training that have been
put into place to reduce the chances of this happening again.
There are new types of watchlists and new very low thresholds
for entering names onto them. They will be discussed by others
more familiar with the details and the protocols. What I will
say here is that, new procedures and training aside, they are
also the kinds of misses that happen when people, even very
competent, dedicated people such as the CIA officers and the
FBI agents and analysts involved in all aspects of this story
are simply overwhelmed.
The counterterrorism business often does not feature a
large team going after a single target but, rather, one or two
officers juggling multiple activities against many people,
simultaneously trying to make sense of what it means, which
target deserves priority attention, and balancing the interests
of multiple stations, liaison services and U.S. agencies. I
would like to say that we will get it right 100 percent of the
time, and in fact we're in a business here where we have to get
it right 100 percent of the time, because the enemy only has to
get it right once.
While I can't promise that we'll ever completely reach that
goal of perfection, I have no doubt that those working in
counterterrorism will never stop trying to get there. And I
will just add a little statement that's not in my prepared
statement. We appreciate the help.
Thank you.
Chairman Graham. Thank you.
Mr. Rolince.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rolince follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL ROLINCE, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE,
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Rolince. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I begin my prepared remarks, I would just like to
say for the record that I am honored and proud to follow an
individual with whom I've worked closely for the last several
years and who I consider to be one of the finest
counterterrorism experts in the world.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committees, I am pleased to
appear before you today to describe the FBI's role within the
Intelligence Community and our knowledge and actions from
approximately December 1999 through September 11, 2001. My
testimony will cover the knowledge of and actions taken by the
FBI prior to September 11, 2001, regarding Khalid al-Mihdhar
and Nawaf al-Hazmi, as well as information learned about them
after the attack. I will touch upon the issue of the FBI's
investigations of al-Mihdhar as an intelligence case versus a
criminal target. I will discuss the interaction between the FBI
and CIA as well as others in the intelligence and law
enforcement community. I would also like to provide an overview
of the makeup of the international jihad movement explain how
it encompasses many groups and organizations, to include bin
Ladin and the al-Qa'ida network.
As members of the Intelligence Community, we have been
asked to discuss the exchange and flow of information within
the community and its impact on the events leading up to
September 11. In that context, we've also been asked to discuss
specifically the investigative efforts into two of the
September 11 hijackers. The investigation into the activities
of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi illustrates with acute
clarity that considerable individual effort and collective
resources will not always result in a successful outcome.
Notwithstanding improvements over the last few years within the
Intelligence Community and exchange of personnel and
information, and despite the extensive work performed by many
individuals in the various Intelligence Community agencies in
the war on terrorism, the desired goal to protect our country
was not realized.
We have all learned that isolated events and unintentional
incidents of inaction cannot remain in a vacuum. Individually
and certainly collectively they have consequences.
Through a collaborative effort within the community, the
CIA received information that a meeting of individuals possibly
associated with Usama bin Ladin's terrorist network took place
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in early January 2000. Among those
attending the meeting were Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-
Hazmi, along with a key UBL operative, Khallad. At the time al-
Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were arriving in Malaysia, the CIA advised
the FBI of their interest in these individuals and indicated
they would keep the FBI advised of further developments, if
warranted.
In March 2000 the CIA received information concerning the
entry of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi into the United States. In
January 2001 the CIA obtained information which indicated a key
individual associated with the USS Cole bombing had also
attending the aforementioned Malaysia meeting. This was
important because it placed al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi in direct
contact with a key operative of UBL.
During the spring and summer of 2001 analytical personnel
from the CIA and FBI were working together to pursue avenues
into the bombing of the USS Cole. On August 23, 2001, the CIA
advised FBI HQ that on June 13, 2001, al-Mihdhar obtained a
U.S. visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, using a Saudi Arabian
passport, and provided his intended address as the Marriott
Hotel in New York City. His visa was valid until October 3,
2001.
The same day, the FBI received a copy of a CIA
communication to watchlist al-Mihdhar. This information was e-
mailed to FBI New York on August 24, 2001.
On August 24, 2001, FBI HQ received a copy of al-Mihdhar's
visa application from the United States Embassy in Saudi
indicating al-Mihdhar had sponsored his own travel to the
United States. The application listed al-Mihdhar's plans to
remain for one month, to depart August 4, 2001.
Subsequent information received from INS determined al-
Mihdhar had reentered the United States on July 4, 2001, on a
B1 visa, flying to New York City, and that he would stay at the
Marriott Hotel in New York. This information was immediately
relayed verbally to CIA and FBI in New York.
On August 27, 2001, headquarters verbally advised New York
of the information contained in the headquarters e-mail to FBI
New York on August 24, 2001, and further informed FBI in New
York that headquarters strongly suggested the initiation of a
full intelligence investigation to locate and fully identify
the individual. The FBI possessed no information relevant to
al-Mihdhar's possible involvement in a terrorist attack but
focused on al-Mihdhar because he had attended a meeting with a
key individual associated with the USS Cole bombing.
On August 28, 2001, a full briefing was provided to FBI New
York in order to initiate that full field investigation to
locate and identify al-Mihdhar.
On August 30, 2001, FBI agents contacted security for the
Marriott Corporation, which agreed to do a search of all guests
registered at Marriott hotels in the entire New York
metropolitan area. On September 5, 2001, they advised their
search for al-Mihdhar was negative.
On September 10, 2001, based upon previously-received
intelligence, a lead was sent to FBI Los Angeles to conduct a
similar search with the security office of Sheraton
Corporation. This lead was not covered until after the
September 11 attacks and was also negative.
As you are probably aware, there was a debate between
headquarters and FBI New York personnel on whether to open an
intelligence or criminal investigation on Khalid al-Mihdhar.
There are two important points to be made in response to this
issue. First, the decision to handle the al-Mihdhar
investigation as an intelligence investigation was made under
procedures which were designed to prevent terrorist acts.
Second, although it is not uncommon to open a parallel criminal
investigation, we did not have specific credible evidence of
criminal activity to do so.
The restrictions on intelligence agencies and foreign
services in the sharing of information within our agency
limited the free flow of that information. This contributed to
our inability to pull together related information. It was
frequently difficult to obtain the originating agency's
concurrence to pass the information to criminal investigators
even for lead purposes. In terrorism cases this became so
complex and convoluted that in some FBI field offices FBI
agents perceived walls where none actually existed. In fact,
one New York supervisor commented that ``so many walls had
created a maze'' which made it very difficult for the criminal
investigators.
Internally, the FBI adheres to the restrictions and caveats
placed on intelligence information by the originating agency or
foreign services. The need for these restrictions and caveats
to protect sources and methods of intelligence information is
obvious and needs no further explanation. Routinely
intelligence agencies evaluate their disseminable information
to determine whether protections beyond basic classification
are required. If caveats are required, such as originator
controlled or ORCON, the classified information remains under
the control of the originating agency. The FBI is prohibited
from disclosing information originally classified by another
agency without its authorization.
At times criminal investigators are also frustrated by wall
procedures imposed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court. In a class by itself, FISA information is controlled by
statute. Although the statute does not preclude the passing of
information to criminalinvestigators, there are restrictions on
the use of the information.
The FISA Court and Department of Justice have been cautious
through the years of permitting intelligence and criminal
investigators to become closely associated for fear their
cooperation would be interpreted as an attempt to circumvent
the criminal process. Accordingly, the FBI has been required to
maintain a certain degree of separation between intelligence
and criminal investigators. With the enactment of the PATRIOT
Act after September 11, it is much clearer that the sharing of
information is a government policy issue. Some procedures were
relaxed and the policy to share was codified. Post-PATRIOT Act,
the only sharing obstacles relate to the possibility of
prosecutorial control over the FISA process.
By Court order the FBI is prohibited from discussing a
substantive FISA issue with prosecutors unless the Department
of Justice Office of Intelligence Policy and Review is invited
to participate. The same requirement does not pertain to
contact between intelligence and criminal agents, although
criminal agents cannot control the FISA or the FISA process.
Mr. Chairman, the remainder of my statement as regards the
international jihad movement will be submitted for the record
in the interest of time. That concludes my oral remarks and I
will be happy to answer questions.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Mr. Rolince.
The FBI Agent.
[The prepared statement of the FBI Special Agent follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT OF A SPECIAL AGENT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
FBI Agent. Mr. Chairmen, Vice Chairman Shelby, Ranking
Member Pelosi, and members of the Committees, I am a Special
Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation assigned to the
New York field office. I appreciate your invitation to appear
before your committees today in connection with your Joint
Inquiry into the tragic events of September 11, 2001. I fully
understand the responsibility with which you have been charged.
I intend to cooperate with you and answer your questions to the
best of my ability.
I am speaking to you today as an individual agent. The
views I express, therefore, are my own, not necessarily those
of the FBI, though I believe that my concerns are shared by
many fellow agents. I hope by appearing here today that I might
in some small way assure that the men and women of the FBI and
others in the Intelligence Community have access to the
information necessary to carry out their sworn duty to protect
the people of the United States.
I have no wish in the remarks that follow to be critical of
any person. Whether they are at FBI headquarters or in the
field, FBI personnel work their hearts out to perform their
mission. I am before you today to address practices that
frustrate us all.
Much has been written about how the FBI does not share
information with local law enforcement agencies, but the
American people must realize that the FBI does not always have
access to the information itself, nor is all the information
the FBI possesses available to all of its agents. It is my
belief that the former problem is due to fear that the Bureau
may run ahead or mess up current or future operations of one of
our sister agencies, and the latter is primarily due to
decisions that have snowballed out of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act Court.
A concept known as ``the wall'' has been created within the
law enforcement and intelligence communities. From my
perspective, in the broadest sense the wall is an information
barrier placed between elements of an intelligence
investigation and those of a criminal investigation. In
theory--again same perspective--it is there to ensure that we,
the FBI, play by the rules in our attempts to gather evidence
in a criminal case and federal prosecution. I have tried to
write this statement knowing full well that its contents and my
testimony will be studied by the enemy. Along those lines, much
detail has been left out and, if I may humbly remind everyone,
questions regarding sources, other possible operations,
investigative methods in this forum should be approached with
extreme caution.
As an aside, may I say I firmly believe prevention is best
served by allowing the law enforcement community, federal and
local, to conduct sound, sometimes exigent investigations, with
access to all information that the U.S. government and liaison
governments possess. These investigations build sources,
evidence, connections and information and are not simply
reactive. I would like to assure the American people that in my
almost seven years in the Bureau the FBI has always been in the
prevention, if I may, game.
Before going further, I would like to offer a few words of
introduction so you are aware of the background that I bring to
the questions before the committee. Between 1985 and 1993 I
served in the military. After a brief stint in the private
sector, I joined the FBI in December 1995 and was assigned to
the New York field office's joint terrorism task force in July
1996. From July 1996 through October 1997 I served on the TWA
Flight 800 investigation. In October 1997 I was assigned to the
squad that had responsibilities for Taliban and Pakistan
matters. Following the East Africa embassy bombings in August
1998 I was part of the first team on the ground, spending a
cumulative total of over 30 weeks abroad investigating those
bombings. In early 1999 I joined the New York field office's
overall Usama bin Ladin case squad, which is responsible for
the overall investigation of UBL and al-Qa'ida.
Immediately after the attack on the USS Cole in Aden,
Yemen, on October 12, 2000, I was assigned as one of the case
agents who worked on that case, ADENBOM, until the attack on
September 11, 2001. Since then I have also worked on general
UBL matters and have been deployed 12 weeks overseas, working
alongside other Intelligence Community components. I mention
this fact because although there are issues about the sharing
of information with FBI investigators by the CIA, my experience
between the FBI and the Intelligence Community is that we have
worked successfully together.
The people of the United States should take great pride in
the service and sacrifice of the men and women of all the U.S.
agencies that are deployed overseas, many of whom I've had the
privilege of working with overseas.
Briefly, the wall and implied, interpreted, created or
assumed restrictions regarding it, prevented myself and other
FBI agents working a criminal case out of the New York field
office from obtaining information from the Intelligence
Community regarding Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi in a
meeting on June 11, 2001. At the time there was reason to
believe that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi had met with a suspect
connected to the attack against the USS Cole. The situation
came to a head during the fourth week of August 2001 when,
after it was learned al-Mihdhar was in the country, FBI HQ
representatives said that FBI New York was compelled to open an
intelligence case and that neither I nor any of the other
criminal case investigators assigned to track al-Qa'ida could
attempt to locate him.
This resulted in a series of e-mails between myself and the
FBI HQ analyst working the matter. In my e-mails I asked where
this new wall was defined. I wrote, on August 29, 2001,
``whatever has happened to this, someday someone will die and,
wall or not, the public will not understand why we were not
more effective in throwing every resource we had at certain
problems. Let's hope the National Security Law Unit will stand
behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest
threat to us now, UBL, is getting the most protection.'' I was
told in response that we at headquarters are all frustrated
with this issue. These are the rules. NSLU does not make them
up.
I hope, Messrs. Chairmen, that these proceedings are time
to break down the barriers and change the system which makes it
difficult for all of us, whether we work at FBI HQ or in the
field at the FBI or elsewhere, to have and be able to act on
information that we need to do our jobs. Personally, I do not
hold any U.S. government-affiliated individual or group of
individuals responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001.
I truly believe that, given a chance, any one of them would
give or sacrifice anything to have prevented what occurred.
Then and now I hold the system responsible. Information is
power in the system of intelligence and law enforcement. This
will never change, nor could or should it.
In addition to the wall, the system as it currently exists,
however, seduces some managers, agents, analysts and officers
into protecting turf and being the first to know and brief
those above. Often these sadly-mistaken individuals use the
wall described herein and others, real or imagined, to control
that information.
I myself still have two key questions today that I believe
are important for this Committee to answer. The detailed
answers to them will deserve and be afforded the scrutiny of a
nation and must stand the test of time and exhaustive
investigation. First, if the CIA passed information regarding
al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi to the FBI prior to that June 11, 2001,
meeting, in either January 2000 or January 2001, then why was
that information not passed, either by CIA or FBI headquarters
personnel immediately to the New York case agents, criminal or
intel investigating the murder of 17 sailors in Yemen when more
information was requested? A simple answer of ``the wall'' is
unacceptable.
Second, how and when did we, the CIA and the FBI, learn
that al-Mihdhar came into the country on either or both
occasions in January 2000 and/or in July 2001 and what did we
do with that information?
On September 11, 2001, I spent the morning on the streets
with other agents and the joint terrorism task forces personnel
around the World Trade Center providing whatever help we could.
I and several of my coworkers were within blocks when both
towers came down. Within minutes of the second strike on the
southern tower, we asked a senior fireman heading towards the
south tower what we could do. At the time he was getting out of
his fire truck, looking at the towers. By the grace of God, he
turned to us and replied that he did not know what we could do,
but that we were not going anywhere close to the buildings
without a respirator.
I do not know who he was, but I truly believe he saved our
lives. I also believe, based on the direction that he was
looking, towards the southern tower, that moments later he
entered that tower and perished in the attack.
It's taken a while for a response, but I believe that the
task before this Committee and in some small way my being here
today is what the brave fireman is telling us, all of us, what
we can do. If we do not change the system, if I may say again,
some day someone will die and, wall or not, the public will not
understand why we were not more effective in throwing every
resource we had at certain ``problems.''
Thank you for this opportunity and privilege of appearing
before you today. I would, of course, welcome your questions.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Kojm, have I come close to correctly pronouncing your
name?
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kojm follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER A. KOJM, DEPUTY FOR INTELLIGENCE
POLICY AND COORDINATION, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Kojm. Mr. Chairman, you have hit it exactly correctly.
Thank you.
Mr. Chairmen, Mr. Vice Chairman and Madam Ranking Member,
the Department of State is pleased to testify this morning
about the Intelligence and Research Bureau's TIPOFF program.
Chairman Graham. Mr. Kojm, could you bring your mike a
little bit closer?
Mr. Kojm. Let me begin, if I may, by discussing the
development and mission of the TIPOFF program. Each year the
United States welcomes millions of foreign visitors, but entry
into this country is a privilege for which foreigners must
qualify when they apply for a visa or arrive at a U.S. port of
entry. This screening is necessary to keep out undesirable
foreigners, certainly including those with terrorist
affiliations. This screening relies largely on visa and border
lookout systems maintained by the Department of State, INS, and
Customs.
TIPOFF was created in 1987 for the express purpose of using
biographic information drawn from intelligence products for
watchlisting purposes. In 1987 TIPOFF began keeping track of
suspected terrorists literally with a shoebox and 3 by 5 cards.
Since then the program has evolved into a sophisticated
interagency counterterrorism tool specifically designed to
enhance the security of our nation's borders.
TIPOFF's mission today is to protect the United States by
drawing upon diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement and
public source information to watchlist, detect and prevent
known or suspected terrorists and others from obtaining visas
or from entering our country. Because TIPOFF is part of the
Intelligence Community, it does not maintain records on U.S.
citizens and permanent resident aliens. When it is discovered
that the subject of a TIPOFF record is a U.S. citizen or a
legal permanent resident, the information is sent to the FBI,
which has jurisdiction over investigating such persons, and
that record is expunged from the TIPOFF system.
Now, the TIPOFF watchlist system works in the manner of
providing operational support to the Bureau of Consular Affairs
at the Department of State and to the U.S. Immigration and
Customs officers at ports of entry. TIPOFF accomplishes this by
making available declassified biographic information--name,
date and place of birth, nationality and passport number--drawn
from highly classified intelligence products or sensitive law
enforcement or diplomatic reports.
Consular officers abroad have online access to the Consular
Lookout and Support System or CLASS, as it's known, which
contains the unclassified names and other biographic data
supplied by TIPOFF, among other items. These officials are
required by law to check CLASS to determine if a visa applicant
has been watchlisted. If that check of a name produces a hit
against the applicant's name, the consular officer may not
issue the visa until the Department has responded to the
officer's electronic message requesting guidance as to whether
or not the applicant may be ineligible for a visa.
Back in Washington, the TIPOFF staff then makes the highly
classified information underlying the lookout entry available
to authorized consular and legal experts in the Department so
that they can make a reasoned determination as to whether the
U.S. Government has sufficient information available to deny
the suspected terrorist's visa request. TIPOFF follows a
similar process to assist INS in deciding if an alien should be
prevented from entering this country through border inspection
points.
Now the TIPOFF staff coordinates all hits upon names it has
placed in CLASS with the FBI and other agencies, alerting them
that a suspected terrorist has applied for a visa. In some
cases, this process has enabled the exploitation of operational
opportunities obtained through foreknowledge of pending
terrorist travel and has resulted in the surveillance or arrest
of suspects upon their entry into the country.
Most often, however, there is interagency agreement that
the applicant's visa should be denied on terrorism grounds. The
consular officer has ultimate authority in determining an
applicant's admissibility, but the consular officer will in
these cases rely heavily on the security advisory opinion
rendered by the Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs, which
is often a product of interagency consultation.
In some cases, the entry may indicate past terrorist
activity but no current threat, and a waiver of ineligibility
may be requested from the Attorney General, for example to
admit someone for important U.S. Government interests, such as
to facilitate peace negotiations. But in point of fact, in most
cases the person is denied.
From its inception in 1987 to September 2002 information
shared by the intelligence and law enforcement communities with
the TIPOFF program has enabled the Department of State to
detect and to deny visas to nearly 800 hijackers, hostage-
holders, assassins, bombers and other terrorists, or to
facilitate law enforcement action upon their arrival in the
United States.
Since the TIPOFF interface with INS and Customs began
during the Gulf war in 1991, INS has been able to intercept and
deny entry to or arrest an additional 290 terrorists from 82
countries at 84 different ports of entry.
The cooperation exhibited in the TIPOFF program has thus
been a joint success story for the diplomatic, law enforcement
and intelligence communities in enhancing the security of our
nation's borders.
Now, turning to the hijackers under discussion today, late
on August 23, 2001, after normal closing hours, the State
Department did receive a request to watchlist four bin Ladin-
related individuals in the TIPOFF data base, two of whom were
later identified as hijackers--Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-
Hazmi. The communication suggested that both al-Mihdhar and al-
Hazmi were in the United States on that date, August 23. The
communication included the information that al-Mihdhar and al-
Hazmi had arrived in the United States on January 15, 2000, at
Los Angeles airport and that al-Mihdhar had departed the United
States on June 10, 2000, but returned to the United States at
JFK in New York City on July 4, 2001.
There was no record that either al-Mihdhar or al-Hazmi had
thereafter departed the United States. There was no record of
the arrival and departure of the other two individuals
watchlisted.
On the morning of Friday, August 24, the TIPOFF staff saw
the report for the first time and created records on all four
of the suspected terrorists. TIPOFF watchlisted them in CLASS
and tagged the records for review by an INS officer later that
day. That afternoon, a TIPOFF staff member hand-carried the
report to the Bureau of Consular Affairs with a request that
they consider revoking the visas of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi.
The visa office in turn confirmed that both had in fact
received visas, as reported, and that another of the four
individuals cited in the communication had been denied visas
several times at different posts because consular officers
believed him to be an intending immigrant. The multiple denials
were not based on any information that he was a terrorist.
There was no consular record that the fourth person watchlisted
had ever applied for a visa.
No actions could be taken on al-Hazmi's visa because
records indicated that it had expired. The visa office revoked
al-Mihdhar's visa on Monday, August 27. It is important to note
and has already been stated here that the important derogatory
information in this communication was simultaneously provided
to other federal agencies.
TIPOFF was originally designed to help prevent precisely
what occurred on September 11. TIPOFF has
consistentlydemonstrated that, if it obtains information on which it
can take action to watchlist suspected terrorists, it has the
mechanisms in place to ensure those suspects can be detected as they
apply for visas or arrive at ports of entry. To that end, since
September 11, TIPOFF has been receiving information on terrorists from
all sources at a rate far greater than before the attacks.
The tremendous increase in TIPOFF's workload is largely a
function of the Intelligence Community's war footing that has
produced ever-increasing amounts of terrorist reporting, much
of which has been derived from documents retrieved in
Afghanistan, from numerous al-Qa'ida suspects captured by the
U.S. and other forces.
The CIA in particular is bringing information to TIPOFF's
attention, through use of the Visas Viper program reporting
channel, an adjunct of the TIPOFF program. The Visas Viper
program was started after the 1993 bombing of the World Trade
Center as a means of assuring the proper flow of information
concerning individuals linked to terrorist activities. About
34,000 of TIPOFF's nearly 80,000 records are now comprised
wholly or in part of data from the Visas Viper program.
TIPOFF is now the primary focal point for entering
Intelligence Community information on known or suspected
terrorists into CLASS, the consular lookout system. However,
TIPOFF is not adequately staffed to handle the increased
workload. The current small dedicated staff of TIPOFF come in
frequently after hours, nights, weekends, wee hours, in
response to operational requirements, particularly when TIPOFF
receives urgent inquiries from ports of entry where aliens are
arriving on a continuous basis.
Senior levels of the Department of State and the
Intelligence Community are in discussions about how to expand
TIPOFF to become a national lookout center. This would enable
TIPOFF to do all of the things it has successfully done to date
but, more importantly, also to interface with more agencies, to
do more, to do it better, and to do it faster.
I appreciate this opportunity to explain the TIPOFF program
and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, sir.
At the hearings of the Joint Inquiry we use a procedure in
which four lead questioners are identified, two from each
Committee. Each of the questioners will have 20 minutes to
present their questions and receive responses. The designated
lead questioners for today's hearing are Senator Levin,
Representative Burr, Senator Kyl, and Representative Peterson,
and they will question in that order.
After they have completed their questioning, we will
proceed to other Members of the Committees, five minutes each,
with additional rounds as necessary.
Senator Feinstein. Mr. Chairman, may I ask is there going
to be a lunch break. Some of us have----
Chairman Graham. It was our intention to break at 1:00 and
reconvene at 2:00.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Chairman Graham. Senator Levin.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I'm going to focus on the 18-month period starting in
January of 2000, but I want to spend a few minutes describing
the environment leading up to that date. Ms. Hill began her
very, very thorough and very thoroughly discouraging
presentation with the statement that the story begins in
December 1999 with the Intelligence Community on heightened
alert. I've prepared a chronology which I'll share with all of
the Members which is to summarize and go back before her
beginning of the story--in January of 1996 when the CIA created
a special unit to focus on bin Ladin; in February of 1998 when
bin Ladin issued a public fatwa authorizing and promoting
attacks on U.S. civilians anywhere in the world; May 1998 at a
press conference when bin Ladin says he's going to bring war to
America; in June 1998 when the Intelligence Community obtains
information from several sources that bin Ladin is considering
attacks in the U.S., including Washington and New York; August
1998 when the Intelligence Community obtains information that
an unidentified group from the Middle East are going to fly an
explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World
Trade Center; September 1998 when the Intelligence Community
obtains information that bin Ladin's next operation could
possibly involve flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into
a U.S. airport; October 1998, when the Intelligence Community
obtains information that al-Qa'ida was trying to establish an
operative cell within the United States; the fall of 1998, when
the Intelligence Community obtains information concerning a bin
Ladin plot involving aircraft in the New York and Washington
areas; and then, in December 1998, when, as we heard yesterday
or the day before, when DCI Tenet provided some written
guidance to presumably everybody in the CIA declaring that the
United States is at war with bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida. That's
December 1998, before the story begins.
In the spring of 1999, when the Intelligence Community
obtains information about a planned al-Qa'ida attack on a
United States government facility in Washington; August 1999,
when the Intelligence Community obtains information that bin
Ladin has decided to target for assassination the Secretary of
State and Secretary of Defense and the DCI; December 1999, when
Ahmed Ressam is arrested as he attempts to enter the United
States in the State of Washington from Canada with chemical and
detonator material and his intended target is Los Angeles
airport; December 1999, when the DCI communication to CIA
employees warns of a mounting threat of al-Qa'ida attack to
U.S. interests abroad and in the United States, urging them to
do whatever is necessary to disrupt bin Ladin's plans.
That's the background. That's what happens when in December
of 1999 the CIA gets information from its own sources that two
men--the men we're following, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi--are
coming to Malaysia. That is not rumors. That is confirmed by
the CIA's own people.
And then they come to Malaysia in January of 2000, and the
CIA, we know, monitored the al-Qa'ida members there, including
the two people at issue. They knew that these two people had,
at least in one case, already had a visa to go to the United
States. That information was not put into the watchlist. It was
not shared with the FBI. It knew that al-Mihdhar had a
multiple-entry visa, as a matter of fact, and knew of his ties
to al-Qa'ida. Two failures there--not placed on the watchlist,
not shared with the FBI.
Then, in March of 2000, the CIA found out that al-Hazmi had
entered the United States at Los Angeles International Airport
on January 15, not shared with the FBI, even though they knew
he entered the United States, not shared with the watchlist.
Then another event occurs in October of 2000. This is a
watershed event. This is the Cole being blown up. And by
January of 2001 the CIA knows that the Cole planner was at that
January 2000 meeting in Malaysia. They knew that a man named
Khallad had been the center of that attack and the planner and
that Khallad was at the January 2000 Malaysia meeting with the
two people we're talking about, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi.
CIA still did not place either individual on the watchlist,
still no notice of known visas--and I emphasize that--known
visas to the FBI. They may or may not have shared with the FBI
earlier that one of them had a passport, but in terms of visas
to enter the United States, and the fact that at least one had
entered the United States still CIA doesn't place names on
watchlists, still no notice to the FBI.
And now we have a direct link to the killers of Americans
on the USS Cole, a direct link between these two men--al-
Mihdhar and al-Hazmi--to the planner, Khallad, of the al-Qa'ida
attack on the USS Cole.
Now I want to proceed to the June 11, 2001, meeting,
because that's what I really want to focus on, and the events
after that. But that's a bit of the background and if I'm wrong
on any of that I would assume that our witnesses would correct
me.
On page nine, at the bottom, of Ms. Hill's report, it
stated the following: ``On June 11, 2001, FBI headquarters
representatives and CIA representatives met with the New York
FBI agents handling the Cole investigation. The New York agents
were shown but not given copies of the photographs and told
that they were taken in Malaysia. They weren't told that.
Still, information being withheld. This is after the Cole,
information withheld from the FBI.
One of the New York agents recalled that al-Mihdhar's name
was being mentioned. He also recalled asking for more
information on why the people in the photographs were being
followed. So we've got the FBI now asking the CIA why are you
following these folks? He recalled asking for more information
on why they were being followed and for access to that
information. The New York agents were advised they could not be
told why al-Mihdhar and the others were being followed.
This is truly unbelievable, I've got to tell you all. This
is extraordinary. This has got nothing to do with information
which can't cross a wall. This has to do with leads which are
not shared with the FBI--just simple leads, information which
is so critical.
Now an FBI headquarters representative told us in her
interview that the FBI was never given specific information
until it was provided after September 11, 2001, and here's
where I want to pick up with our witnesses. The CIA analyst who
attended the New York meeting acknowledged to the Joint Inquiry
staff that he had seen the information regarding al-Mihdhar's
U.S. visa and al-Hazmi's travel to the U.S. but he stated that
he would not share information outside of the CIA unless he had
authority to do so and unless that was the purpose of the
meeting.
Now, June 11, New York. Now we've got the FBI asking the
CIA would you tell us why you're following these two guys. And,
according to the CIA analyst to our staff, that information was
denied because no authority to do so unless that's the purpose
of the meeting.
So I'll ask our CIA officer, so far as you know, is our
staff report correct?
CIA Officer. The whole staff report?
Senator Levin. No, what I read to you.
CIA Officer. Could I just limit my comment to the June 11
meeting for right now?
Senator Levin. Just on that. Is that correct, what I just
read?
CIA Officer. First of all, I would distinguish between one
CIA officer saying I don't feel comfortable with sharing this
information with a particular FBI individual from the entire
corporate body of the CIA and its policy.
The second thing I would say is that the CIA officer----
Senator Levin. I just asked you if this happened.
CIA Officer. Not exactly that way.
Senator Levin. Then tell us how it happened.
CIA Officer. I wasn't there, but what I will say is that
when the CIA officer said I'm not going to give you, Mr. FBI
Agent, this information, he was in the company of an FBI
headquarters agent or analyst who had the information. The
information was in the hands of the FBI. It was a question--my
interpretation of this event, and I wasn't there, is that the
analyst was being conservative, and basically all I could do is
go into dangerous area of speculating what's in his head.
Senator Levin. I'd rather you not speculate. You weren't
there.
CIA Officer. I wasn't there, but this is important, because
he is there with FBI people and this was not CIA withholding
information from the FBI. There was something else at work here
that I'm not quite sure of, because we were in support of the
Cole investigation. That's why this exercise was called.
Senator Levin. I just want to move to the FBI agent, who I
believe was there.
FBI Agent. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Before you begin, I just want to say
something. You will never receive the public recognition that
you deserve for what you tried to do, for your e-mails, for
your efforts to break down the wall, real and imaginary, for
your efforts to break through bureaucracy. And if I have time I
want to ask you about what happened on 9/11.
But, in any event, I just want you to know that you deserve
that recognition. And I'm sorry it can't be public recognition.
Having said that and not knowing how you're going to answer,
you were at this meeting?
FBI Agent. Yes, sir. First off, I'd like to accept that,
but on behalf of all the agents that I work with.
Senator Levin. I knew you would do that. I expected no less
from you. You were at the meeting. Was that accurate, the staff
report?
FBI Agent. As best as I can recall, sir, I wouldn't be able
to add anything to your comments. From what I remember, that's
exactly how it occurred, and there's still some disagreement.
However, my belief of how events happened, to this day, are
that the analyst herself did not know all the information that
the CIA had at that time, and I know there are different
versions of that, so I don't want to speculate about that.
But my understanding of events today is that the analyst
did not have access to that information either, because we had
intelligence agents from the Bureau that were in the room at
the time and the rest of us criminal agents, even though we
were frustrated, could have walked out of the room and then
received that information.
Senator Levin. Did someone at the meeting say he could not
share information outside of the CIA unless he had authority to
do so or unless that was the purpose of the meeting? Do you
remember that?
FBI Agent. Not those exact words, but I was told that he
could not share that information with me and my agents at the
time and that that information would be attempted to be passed
in the following days, weeks or months.
Senator Levin. Do you know whether it was passed in the
succeeding days?
FBI Agent. No. In fact, I had several conversations with
the analyst after that because we would talk on other matters,
and almost every time I would ask her, what's the story with
the Mihdhar information and when is it going to get passed. Do
we have anything yet? When's it going to get passed? And each
time I was told that the information had not been passed yet.
And the sense I got from her, based on our conversations,
was that she was trying as hard as she could to get the
information passed, or at least the ability to tell us about
the information.
Senator Levin. Mr. Rolince, do you know whether or not the
FBI agents were told by the CIA officials at that meeting that
they could not know why the CIA was following al-Mihdhar and
the others that met in Malaysia? Do you know if that
information was passed at that time and, if not, why not?
Mr. Rolince. No, sir. I was not at the meeting. I have
talked extensively with our analyst that was there and, as my
colleague noted, she is of the position--I know your staff has
talked with her--that she in fact gave our New York agents
everything that she had.
Senator Levin. She said that she did give----
Mr. Rolince. In other words, what was passed at that
meeting----
Senator Levin. According to our staff report, he statedhe
could not share information outside of the CIA unless he had authority
to do so. Do you know if that's accurate or not?
Mr. Rolince. No, sir, I don't know if that's accurate.
Senator Levin. Okay. When you said ``she,'' that was an FBI
analyst. You don't know what the CIA analyst said at that
meeting.
Mr. Rolince. That's correct.
Senator Levin. Now we will move--and I have to rely on the
staff report as being accurate, that there was a denial of
information at that time--on to August 22. An FBI analyst
assigned to the Counterterrorist Center determined that al-
Hazmi and al-Mihdhar had entered the U.S. in January 2000 and
al-Mihdhar's reentry visa allowed him to stay until August 22,
2001. At that point they were watchlisted; is that correct, as
far as you know?
Mr. Rolince. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator Levin. That was when it happened.
I think we have to know precisely, and perhaps we have to
talk to the people other than the FBI agent who is here, who
confirms what our staff report says, to the best of his
knowledge. I think this is such an important question that if
there is any difference on this from the staff report we should
hear from the CIA. I would ask our CIA officer who is here to
take that request back and, if there is a difference that that
officer had recollection-wise as to what happened at that
meeting, whether or not she did in fact refuse to let the FBI
know in June of 2001 why the CIA was tracking these two men,
why they didn't say at that time that we knew that these two
men had visas to the United States. The FBI still didn't know
that. That still wasn't on the watchlist, as of June 2001.
Now this is 16 months after the CIA knew that these men had
visas to come to the United States, had entered the United
States. Still, according to our staff report, there is this
refusal on the part of the CIA to share this information. And
this is critically important information.
I think that we've got to have accountability in the
system, and that failure is massive. And if that information
should have been shared and should have been shared a lot
earlier and if watchlists should have been entered, if the FBI
should have been notified--which it seems to me it's clear all
that should have happened--then we've got to know who is
responsible for those failures. If we're really going to break
down walls, real and imaginary, we've got to have
accountability.
If I have one minute left, I'd like to ask our FBI agent to
tell us what happened on 9/11 as to what he tried to do and as
to a passenger list, I understand--if this is okay and
unclassified----
FBI Agent. No. We had come back from the buildings all in a
state of shock, and there was a briefing at that time by the
analysts at headquarters over who was actually on the manifest.
And when we heard the name Khalid al-Mihdhar, obviously I was
upset, made no bones about saying the fact that I was upset.
And I know the analyst was very upset also, so it wasn't just
necessarily on one side. But it was in the afternoon during our
conference call.
And I remember exclaiming that this is the same Khalid al-
Mihdhar that we had talked about for three months, and I
remember a supervisor at the time saying, and rightly so, that
they had done everything by the book with regards to at least
what the FBI could do based on current understanding of what
the laws were, but at the same point in time realizing how
ludicrous that statement sounded to me. It just didn't sit
well.
Senator Levin. I know of the information being sought,
there was no barrier to that information being shared, that
these persons were suspected of being terrorists, that could
have been shared with the FBI, and the fact that they were
suspected of being in the United States, that could have been
shared with the FBI. I don't know of any prohibition in law in
terms of messing up criminal investigations for that
information, just that information, not to have been shared.
The reason that June meeting is so critical--there are many
reasons why it's critical--but one of them is, Mr. Chairman,
that al-Mihdhar was out of the United States in June of 2001
and he came back in, as I understand it, in July of 2001. If
he'd been put on the watchlist then, at that June meeting, he
could not presumably have come back into the United States, and
I think that--you know, it's one thing to say that the dots
weren't connected, and they weren't, even when there was an
effort made to connect them at the June meeting. The effort to
connect the dots was frustrated.
It's another thing when the dots aren't even put into the
file, when the dots aren't put into the watchlist, and the
information isn't even shared. That's even preliminary to
connecting the dots, is simply to get the dots in place where
someone can connect them. We didn't even see that. So we've got
failure piled upon failure here, I believe. I hope there's
going to be some accountability and some answers where there so
far are none, but again I want to thank our witnesses, all of
them, and I want to thank Ms. Hill and her staff for an
extremely thorough report, which I hope will shake up some
things.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Congressman Burr.
Mr. Burr. I thank the Chair. Let me take the opportunity to
thank Senator Levin for a very thorough chronology. I think
it's safe to say that all of us will deal in the same time
frame, though we will choose specific areas hopefully to
highlight and to detail. The work of the inquiry staff is in
fact very detailed, but it's very helpful on many of these
issues if in fact we can get as succinct answers from you on
specific questions.
I'd like to personally start with the period December 1999,
when al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi are connected for the first time
with individuals suspected in the 1998 East Africa bombings.
It's this connection that suggests or exposes a plan to meet in
Malaysia with a group of unknown individuals. On January 5 and
6 of 2000, as we know, these individuals did meet in Malaysia,
photos were taken, numerous photos of the participants.
On January 8 al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi departed Malaysia.
After several days and additional stops, on around the 15th of
January their direction was the United States, both with valid
passports, both with approved visas.
Let me ask our CIA officer, were officials notified of al-
Mihdhar and al-Hazmi's plans to enter the United States?
CIA Officer. As I noted in my statement, the answer to that
is no. It's very difficult to understand what happened with
that cable when it came in. I don't know exactly why it was
missed. It would appear that it was missed.
Mr. Burr. The cable arrived what date?
CIA Officer. March 5.
Mr. Burr. What transpired between January and the
transmission of that cable in March, that 60-day period?
CIA Officer. Maybe I misunderstood your question, I'm
sorry.
Mr. Burr. You answered the question. This is a follow-up.
CIA Officer. Okay. In January they were the focus of the
operational activity until they left the country for another
country. I think it was the 8th when the sort of crowd broke
up, the 8th of January. And then there was more effort to find
out what they were doing next and to understand that. But I
can't deal too much in the detail between what happened between
that point and further on. We had the basic visa information on
Mihdhar and that wasn't passed. And the focus is still on
trying to find out what they were up to. When they arrived at
the next destination we were unable to mobilize what we needed
to mobilize.
Mr. Burr. At this time there was no attempt to put these
individuals on the watchlist, correct?
CIA Officer. That's right.
Mr. Burr. No discussion. To the best of your knowledge, was
the FBI ever notified?
CIA Officer. To the best of my knowledge, the intent was to
notify the FBI, and I believe the people involved in the
operation thought the FBI had been notified. Something
apparently was dropped somewhere and we don't know where that
was.
Mr. Burr. Was there any confusion over the connection of
al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi with individuals tied to the 1998 East
Africa bombing?
CIA Officer. The reason that we were curious about them was
that we were trying to understand their connection to the East
Africa bombing structure. We didn't know what it was.
Mr. Burr. Well, we knew there was a connection?
CIA Officer. We knew there was a connection, an impersonal
connection to the bombing structure, but--what you have is a
hypothesis. You have them connected to part of it, so we have
two first names and then we go off and we try and find out more
about them.
Mr. Burr. I realize that from the chronology that Senator
Levin had put together.
Let me ask this, though. Was there not an active
investigation still under way into the East Africa bombing?
CIA Officer. Yes.
Mr. Burr. So the fact that these individuals were connected
could have been and probably was pertinent to the current
investigation that was triggered in 1998 with the East Africa
bombing.
CIA Officer. Certainly. And I would submit that's why
thatinformation was documented saying it had been passed to the FBI,
and I can't explain why it was not. But the intent was to pass it.
Mr. Burr. Okay. So in March 2000 we have two individuals,
al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, with known connections to suspects of
the East Africa bombings that have now entered the United
States. They have been here for over two months. The FBI
doesn't know that they are in the country. These individuals
have not been added to the watchlist. Let me ask you, Mr.
Rolince, whose responsibility is it to track and/or find these
two?
Mr. Rolince. If we don't know that they are in the country,
sir?
Mr. Burr. Correct.
Mr. Rolince. If I understand your question----
Mr. Burr. It's an easy one.
Mr. Rolince. We would have liked to have had that
information. I accept the fact that someone thought that it was
passed. It would appear, based on what we know now, that
perhaps it wasn't. But essentially our counterparts at the CIA,
any number of different services, both law enforcement and
intelligence around the world with whom we work on a regular
basis, if given the opportunity, would track those people.
Mr. Burr. In the absence of the verification of transfer of
this information, the answer is nobody's in charge; is that
correct? If the FBI does not know, if that information is not
verified that it was transmitted to you, in fact you can't be
in charge of tracking these folks.
Mr. Rolince. I agree with that, Senator, but I would also
point out that on a regular sustained basis, because of my
interaction with the Agency over the years and having a deputy
from the Agency in my section, I don't want to discount the
effort that they make on a daily or regular routine basis to
track people that we, the FBI, are interested in.
Mr. Burr. And I realize that our focus here is on this one
instance and I think we all know that there are success
stories.
In June of 2000, al-Mihdhar departs the United States. He
applies for a new passport. He applies for a new visa into the
United States and he simply checks one box--I haven't had a
visa. Mr. Kojm, is it that simple to create new paperwork, new
documents, new official documents and to receive official entry
into the United States, just by checking that little box, I
haven't done this before?
Mr. Kojm. Congressman, that's a consular affairs question
and I would like to ask a colleague of mine from the Consular
Affairs Bureau to step up to the mike, if he can.
Mr. Burr. Very quickly, if we could.
Chairman Graham. Under our rules, I would like to ask if
the individual on whom you are now calling would please raise
his right hand. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will
give before the Committee will be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Beer. Yes, I do.
Mr. Burr. Would you step up to the microphone as quickly as
you can?
Mr. Beer. The question, sir?
Mr. Burr. The question was if this individual, in this case
al-Mihdhar, simply checks the box that says I've never applied
for a visa, yet he had, do we have a process to search and is
it likely that that search took place in this case?
STATEMENT OF RICHARD BEER, DIRECTOR, COORDINATION DIVISION,
VISA OFFICE, OFFICE OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Beer. Well, we have an automated process to search to
see if he had been denied a visa previously.
Mr. Burr. But if he had had a visa yet he checked, in this
particular case, in his application that he had never applied
for a visa, do we check for that?
Mr. Beer. At that time, no, there was no way to
instantaneously verify that.
Mr. Burr. So he created, with the same name, ultimately the
same birth date, a identical application. The only difference
was he checked--I have never had a visa--and a passport and a
new visa was processed for al-Mihdhar.
Mr. Beer. That's correct.
Mr. Burr. And in fact he came back into the country,
correct?
Mr. Beer. Yes.
Mr. Burr. If he'd been on the watchlist, what would have
happened?
Mr. Beer. When we ran the automatic name check at the time
we processed the application the officer would have been
advised by the results of that name check to defer all action
and refer the case to Washington.
Mr. Burr. How about when he left the United States? If he
was on the watchlist, would we have caught him leaving the
United States?
Mr. Beer. I don't believe so because the INS normally does
not check individuals upon departure from the United States.
Mr. Burr. To make things worse, in July of 2000 al-Hazmi
files an application for a visa extension. That extension is
for six months. He lists his real name. He lists his Lemon
Grove, California, address. And that extension is granted. Am I
correct?
Mr. Beer. I believe that would be the process. Of course
extensions of stay for individuals already in the United States
are the purview of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Mr. Burr. Would that extension have been approved if al-
Hazmi had been on the watchlist?
Mr. Beer. Certainly if INS had access to such information
at the time he adjudicated his request for an extension they
wouldn't have.
Mr. Burr. Did INS have access at that time to watchlist
information?
Mr. Beer. I don't believe so, but I can't say for sure. I
don't believe so, no.
Mr. Burr. The INS at this point in time did not have access
to check the watchlist individuals in determining visa
extensions?
Mr. Beer. Well, they had access to it at the ports of entry
when they are inspecting the individual for admission, but this
is a different process, not at the port of entry.
Mr. Burr. So an individual in the United States that's on
the watchlist could file for a visa extension and that
extension be granted. Is that what you're telling me?
Mr. Beer. Well, again the INS would have to provide the
definitive answer because they are the agency that handles
extensions of stay for individuals already in the United
States.
Mr. Burr. Let me just point out to the Committee and to the
Joint Inquiry staff that this is something that we need a more
thorough understanding. I hope that's not the case today. If it
was the case then, then we had a tremendous flaw in our system.
Let me accelerate ahead, if I could, to the Cole bombing in
October of 2000. Is it safe to say--to our FBI agent--this
begins an exhaustive investigation?
FBI Agent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burr. In January 2001 the photographs from the January
2000 Malaysia meeting were shown to an individual who was
frequented by the CIA and also by the FBI for their help. This
individual identified one of the people in the photograph as in
fact Khallad bin Attash, an individual that is now tied to
playing a large orchestrating role in the Cole bombing to the
FBI agent; is that correct?
FBI Agent. Sir, I don't know about those photographs. We
had two photographs of Khallad. One was a photograph that we
had derived from investigation, and I understand your concerns
and I can hear your voice trying to protect certain things
about this with regards to source information. But that
photograph, which was an identificationphotograph, was shown to
the source and he identified the individual as Khallad. But the two
photographs, the other two photographs were the photographs taken from
prior meetings----
Mr. Burr. You are in fact correct.
FBI Agent. I'm unaware of those photographs.
Mr. Burr. Let me ask our CIA officer if in fact that
identification was made.
CIA Officer. I don't believe this has been declassified,
sir, and I have a hard time talking about this in public. I'd
be happy to talk about it in closed session in detail.
Mr. Burr. I will trust that you are accurate on that.
CIA Officer. As I said in my statement--maybe I can help
with the answer a bit--as I said in my statement, we had
intelligence that supported the hypothesis. It was not a
confirmation; it supported the hypothesis. And in fact I would
prefer to answer the rest of it----
Mr. Burr. Is it factual that we now have a photograph, a
photograph that we know one of the individuals is Attash or an
individual who orchestrated, we think, the Cole bombings?
CIA Officer. That was a different photograph.
Mr. Burr. I realize that. We have photographs that show
Khallad bin Attash, as well as al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. Am I
correct that there's a photograph with all three?
CIA Officer. Yes.
Mr. Burr. Did any of these three go on the watchlist at
that time? Connections to the East Africa bombing by two of
them and connections to the Cole bombing by a third, did any of
the three go on the watchlist?
FBI Agent. From what occurred, there were actually--it
turns out, and I know my CIA colleague doesn't want to get into
it too much--there's a little bit of confusion. There were four
photographs that were taken out of a certain operation.
CIA Officer. Sir, this shouldn't be talked about in public.
I'm sorry, it should not be. We can't go there.
Mr. Burr. I will move on.
CIA Officer. I apologize, but we just can't.
Chairman Graham. Congressman, if need be we will arrange to
have further exploration of this in a closed session.
Mr. Burr. I thank the Chairman. I will move forward. I
think there is some confusion about specific photographs and
I'm certainly not trying to go to any that aren't already known
and part of in fact the Joint Inquiry investigation, but
because there is confusion, let me move forward for the
purposes of all the Members.
The fact is that at this period, though, we still have
three individuals that are targets of investigations or
connected to investigations that are not on a watchlist.
CIA Officer. That's correct.
Mr. Burr. Let me go to Mr. Kojm again. At this period,
between the bombing of the USS Cole but prior to September 11,
do you have any idea how many people went on the watchlist?
Mr. Kojm. I believe that information is in Ms. Hill's
statement and if it were passed to me I can provide that to
you.
Mr. Burr. While he's looking for that, let me move forward
to May 2001. I am told that the May 2001 meeting between the
CIA and the FBI where they shared photographs is in fact an
area we can go to. Would the CIA agent agree?
CIA Officer. Yes.
Mr. Burr. Thank you. Was there any discussion or questions
relating to al-Mihdhar or al-Hazmi at this meeting in May 2001
when these photographs were discussed? Let me ask Mr. Rolince
that.
Mr. Rolince. I don't have the substance of exactly what was
discussed in that meeting, so I don't know if al-Mihdhar and
al-Hazmi were in fact topics of that meeting or not.
Mr. Burr. Do we have anybody here that was a participant in
that meeting?
FBI Agent. To the best of my recollection I believe I
probably helped to organize the meeting. I don't remember if I
was there or not. But the purpose was to start going over the--
the FBI had some leads that they were interested in checking in
the course of the Cole investigation, and so the Mihdhar and
Hazmi thing resurfaced. And this was the beginning of the
discussion between the FBI and the CIA that led to sort of the
work between them to resurrect the file, which had been
dormant.
Mr. Burr. On June 11, 2001, the CIA went to the New York
office of the FBI and in fact passed on to New York agents, who
led the Cole investigation--am I correct?
FBI Agent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burr. Again, these photographs were shown and
discussed. The records shows that Mihdhar's name did come up,
yet we are unclear in the context that it came up. Can you help
to clarify that?
FBI Agent. Yes, sir. When these photos were shown to us we
had information at the time that one of our suspects had
actually traveled to the same region of the world that this
might have taken place, so we pressed the individuals there for
more information regarding the meeting. Usually what I've found
is coincidences don't occur too much in this job. Usually a lot
of time when things are the way they are, it's because that's
pretty much the way they are.
So we pressed them for information. Now the other agents in
the meeting recall--one agent does not recall the name being
given up in the big meeting--there were numerous sidebars that
happened. Regardless of that, at the end of that meeting--some
of them say it was just because I was able to get the name out
of the analyst, but at the end of that day we knew the name
Khalid al-Mihdhar but nothing else. The context of that meeting
was we continued to press them two or three times on
information regarding why were you looking at this guy. You
couldn't have been following everybody around the millennium.
What was the reason behind this?
And we were told that that information--as I recall, we
were told that that information could not be passed and that
they would try to do it in the days and weeks to come. That
meeting--I wouldn't say it was very contentious, but we
certainly were not very happy, the New York agents at the time
were not very happy that certain information couldn't be shared
with us.
Mr. Burr. Let me, in an effort to acknowledge to the Chair
that I see that my time has expired, with the indulgence of the
Chair if I could use the opportunity to cover several more
points without asking questions, it would be a very brief
thing.
On July 13 I think it was an important day because in fact
our CIA officer began to put some of the pieces together that
had bugged him, and that led to finding some of the lost cables
or the misfiled cables. That led to decisions, decisions that
did put people on watchlists, decisions that did begin the ball
rolling towards an all-out press by the Bureau to look for
individuals that for numerous reasons we had not been able to
raise to this profile at that time.
But yet in this period, even with the efforts, we
overlooked simple things like the fact that on the application
extension al-Hazmi had put his real California address, a
starting point that might have led us to his movement somewhere
else in the United States and potentially where he was in that
two-week period.
It's important that we remember that our CIA officer said,
in his testimony, that this had to do with the threshold for
entering names on the watchlist, and I think it's incredibly
important that everybody within the community, everybody who
has the ability to enter a name on the watchlist understand
what that threshold is. And if it's so damn high that what
we've looked at in this investigation doesn't trigger getting
over that wall and putting the name on it, then that may have
been the first mistake in this overall process.
Mr. Chairman, you have been very generous with your time. I
thank the witnesses for their willingness and I hope that the
other Members can get into more detail of the last several
months.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Congressman Burr, for excellent
questions.
Senator Kyl.
Senator Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The first thing I'd like to do is to thank the four
gentlemen, five now, who are at the dais, both for their work
on behalf of the American people and as representatives of the
three entities now for which they work. I'd like for them to
know how much we appreciate their work. I'd like to have them
pass it on to the agents and officers in the field. It is very
easy for people to be brilliant Monday morning quarterbacks
after the fact, when we've gone back and tried to piece
everything together, but when you are in the middle of a battle
it's not always easy.
Everyone agrees that mistakes were made, that things
weren't done that could have been done, and in fact some of you
have indicated that was a great frustration to you. I suggest
that, especially during the last decade, one of the reasons--
and it's our job really to ask the reasons why--there are at
least three or four reasons that our Committee has begun to
come up with.
Obviously everybody can make mistakes. I make about 400 a
day myself, and we will never change human nature. We will
always make mistakes. But are there systemic things that
resulted in more mistakes than should have ordinarily been
made.
And a couple of things that we've heard from these
witnesses here today point us in the right direction--one, a
lack of resources--I'll get into that in a moment--and, two,
risk aversion due to the creation of walls and
misunderstandings about authorities. And, Mr. Chairman, to a
large extent policymakers, including members of the United
States Congress and the Executive branch, are responsible for
both of those, and I'm going to get into that in a little bit
too. So I just want to put that in perspective.
But there are two preliminary things I'd like to comment
on. First, I want to note that I share Senator Shelby's
concerns about sensitive information being revealed in these
open hearings. Two of the witnesses have made the same point,
one saying that our testimony will be studied by our enemies.
And that's absolutely true. We are revealing in open session
today a lot of information about how we operate which will be
very useful to our enemies. That's not good and it's not
necessary.
Specifically with respect to the witnesses before us today,
they've all been interviewed by our staff and we've had
conversations with some of them as Members. The story has been
written. It was presented very nicely by the head of our staff
here today. So this hearing is for show. This isn't to obtain
information. Now there's a point at which it's important for us
to present the information that we've derived to the American
people, but it should be when we're all done. And it shouldn't
be in a setting in which the witnesses are having to be very
careful about what they say because they may say something
that's classified.
The second thing I'd like to say is that there's been an
implication that this Committee would be a lot more effective
if only the FBI and the Department of Justice and CIA and
others would just cooperate with us. Mr. Chairman, to some
extent there may be some validity in some of that, but the
other side of the story is that, as far as I know, they've been
very cooperative and to some extent I think we're overreaching.
Let me give you an example.
Reading through the clips of the Arizona Republic, my home
paper today, ``FBI Agent is Asked to Testify Publicly on
Phoenix Memo,'' and I quote the story in part. ``A joint House-
Senate Intelligence panel''--that's us--``is calling Phoenix-
based FBI agent Kenneth Williams to testify next Thursday for
the first time publicly about his July 2001 memorandum warning
that potential terrorists were attending U.S. flight schools.
Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham also says the
joint committee is intending to release its findings on exactly
what happened to that memo after it was sent to headquarters in
Washington. `The report is done,' said Graham in an interview
on Thursday.'' Going on down the story, ``Williams has already
testified behind closed doors to the Senate Judiciary
Committee.''
We already have all the information that we can possibly
get from Agent Williams. It is absolutely unnecessary to have
him testify publicly. And yet this Committee is making a show
out of it and the Department of Justice naturally is pushing
back against that. Here's a letter dated September 17 from a
representative of the Department of Justice to Chairmen Graham
and Goss, and I just read in part from the letter. ``Yesterday
the FBI learned that the Middle East television network al-
Jazeera recently broadcast the name and face of at least one
FBI employee, Kenneth Williams, whom the Committee seeks to
present as a witness at an open hearing next week. As you know,
Agent Williams has been interviewed by the JIC staff and has
provided a closed briefing to Members''--two of them, as a
matter of fact. ``Agent Williams recently asked that his
concerns be brought to the attention of the Committee. His
comments include concerns about the handling of his closed-door
appearance before the committees' joint inquiry.'' And here's
what he said: ``Reporters showed up at the front door of my
residence and my picture and personal information appeared in
the national news. I can only imagine that a public session
will result in even greater exposure. If the reporters could
locate my residence, so could al-Qa'ida or any other terrorist
organization.''
Then the letter proceeds. ``He also expressed concern for
the safety of himself and his family, saying, `I sincerely
believe that my appearance in a public session would be
detrimental to my personal safety and the safety of my family.'
Nonetheless, Agent Williams concludes by noting his willingness
to appear again before the Committees' Joint Inquiry in closed
session to cover any issues left unresolved or that are newly
developed since his last appearance.'' And he notes that and
says he'd love to return and answer any questions we might have
in closed hearing.
Part of this, in other words, is theater, and, Mr.
Chairman, I just can't express strongly enough that we're
asking these people to put their lives on the line and I think
we ought to be a little bit careful about throwing around
accusations that people are not cooperating with us when part
of the reason is for their own safety.
Moreover, any disputes we're having about what's in the
material that he produced, the so-called Phoenix memo, we know
everything we have to know about that memo--and when I say
``we,'' the public. The stuff that hasn't been declassified yet
nobody needs to know. It's names, dates, places that have no
bearing on the ultimate issue but are very important in the
intelligence context. So I want to make that point to make it
clear that there is a difference of opinion here about just
what this Committee ought to be doing publicly.
Now let me get to the questions. As I said, it seems to me
that there are two themes that derive from both our report and
the witnesses who have been here, namely that we didn't have
the resources to do what needed to be done and, secondly, there
was a lot of confusion about what our legal authority was. I
just now want to quote briefly from the testimony here, first
with respect to the resource issue.
This is the testimony of our CIA witness. ``What I will say
here is that new procedures and training aside, they are also
the kinds of misses''--the mistakes, in other words--``that
happen when people who are very competent, dedicated people,
such as CIA officers and FBI agents and analysts involved in
aspects of the story, are simply overwhelmed. The
counterterrorism business often does not feature a large team
going after a single target but, rather, one or two
officersjuggling multiple activities against many people
simultaneously, trying to make sense of what it means--which target
deserves priority attention and balancing the interests of multiple
stations, liaison services and other agencies.''
Mr. Kojm said, just to quote one statement, ``TIPOFF is now
the focal point for entering Intelligence Community information
on known or suspected terrorists into CLASS. However, TIPOFF is
not adequately staffed to deal with the increased workload.''
He talks about the small dedicated staff frequently coming in
after hours and nights and on weekends and so on.
In the testimony that was presented by our staff--and I'll
just mention a couple of these--there are numerous references
to the lack of resources. For example, ``there were not enough
people to handle CTC's workload at the time. As a result,
informational cables such as the March 2000 message''--which
was much the subject of our discussion here--``received less
attention than action items. Several other employees told us
that they typically did not even have time to read information
cables.''
Another: ``We were told that the matter was dropped because
the agent had to move on to other things.'' ``New York FBI
agents told us they tried to convince FBI headquarters to open
a criminal investigation on al-Mihdhar given the importance of
the search and the limited resources that were available to all
intelligence investigations.'' We're going to get into that
more in a little bit. I could go on and on.
Let me just ask the first question here because of a
comment that the CIA agent here made during his testimony. We
know that while we had some contact with these people while
they were in Malaysia that thereafter there was less contact. I
believe you testified, sir, that we were unable to mobilize
what we needed to mobilize to remain--that was your direct
quotation and I'll paraphrase--to remain in the kind of contact
that would have been useful with those people. Is that an
accurate statement of what you said?
CIA Officer. Yes.
Senator Kyl. Is that an example of having resources
stretched too thin to do the job that you would have liked to
have been able to do?
CIA Officer. Unfortunately, not that particular instance.
There was a separate reason for that. A larger part of the
community wasn't able--they were busy doing other things
related to terrorism. But I think----
Senator Kyl. Well, excuse me. When you're too busy to
attend to this because you're busy focused on other things it
suggests that you are prioritizing.
CIA Officer. I guess what I'm saying is it wasn't
necessarily the CIA's choice. It was not a U.S. choice.
Senator Kyl. Okay. I know where you're going with that. But
go ahead with the rest of what you wanted to say.
CIA Officer. That was it.
Senator Kyl. Okay. Well, let me just ask you a general
question, then, whether you found occasions in which the lack
of resources inhibited you from doing your job. Start with the
CIA agent.
CIA Officer. Yes. Thank you. I'm not going to make a
speech, I promise. The lack of resources is critical, and if I
could shift the context just a tiny bit, I made mention in my
testimony of ten months of pounding in Afghanistan and yet we
still regard al-Qa'ida as a threat. Before 11 September what
the United States Government basically had overseas offensively
were the resources of CIA, alongside the FBI in many cases, as
though al-Qa'ida were only an intelligence problem.
It's fairly clear that the Director's discussion about
declaring war on al-Qa'ida is not something that he's empowered
to do officially by the Constitution. That choice remains
elsewhere. Al-Qa'ida in fact had declared war on the United
States and nearly sank a billion dollar warship in the process
of doing that. What you had facing a vastly more effective al-
Qa'ida, in other words, were a few civilians who were, as I've
heard recently described, a platoon in a brigade-sized field
and doing the best they can. So yes, there was a lack of
resources.
Senator Kyl. Just to any of the other witnesses, I quoted
Mr. Kojm, who talked about his people being stretched pretty
thin. Do any of you want to comment on this issue of resources?
Mr. Rolince. Senator, I couldn't possibly let that pass. I
think, as my Agency colleague would attest, I spend a fair
amount of time at CTC and he spends a fair amount of time in
our headquarters. For a lot of different reasons, part of which
are competing priorities but a big part of which is in the year
2000 and 2001 the FBI was not allowed to hire to attrition. We
had more agents and manhours walking out the door than we had
coming in. And you don't have to do the math to figure out that
at some point in time that's going to have a deleterious effect
on all your criminal investigations as well as your
counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations.
The support people in particular who have worked these
attacks, and I think it's important to put into context not
just the past three and a half years, but we talked about the
Africa embassy bombings. If you start there, the same people
responsible for investigating the Africa embassy bombings and
then on to the deployment in Kosovo and the downing of Egypt
Air, neither of which were terrorism but got handed to us, you
work on up through the fall and the buildup to the millennium,
you have people who literally are, as someone told me, just
learned to work tired, and I saw it every single day.
I cannot pass up the opportunity to commend them and to
state for the record for us, the American people, how much
credit they deserve for this fight. They go months at a time
without time off, long nights, long weekends, holidays, et
cetera, without a single complaint by any of them.
You roll that on into the millennium event and it's another
month without time off, and this is pertinent to the discussion
today because there is a tremendous effort under way to try to
figure out whether or not Ahmed Ressam is tied to some other
network or is this the kind of problem we're going to have to
deal with in the future. And there's a hand-in-hand effort
between the Bureau and the Agency and others around the world
to try to figure that out.
We now know that that was going to coincide with a series
of attacks in Jordan and the attack on the USS The Sullivans
within a very short time frame, which would have stretched our
resources incredibly. But they are patient. This is what they
do for a living. But ten months later 17 sailors die when they
find the opportunity to attack the USS Cole.
So you have all of those investigations, then leading on up
into 9/11 being worked by an increasingly depleted supply of
analysts, officers, agents, and managers. There are fewer FBI
agents assigned on 9/11 worldwide to the terrorism problem than
there were the week of the Africa embassy bombings. The
Director has noted that. He's corrected that and we're going in
the right direction. But I just think it's important to put
that in context.
And if I could say one more thing, we talk about bin Ladin
and we move forward from the embassy bombings. Don't forget
about the people who died in ones and twos. Don't forget about
our soldiers, our airmen who died at Khobar Towers, the Marines
in the barracks bombing, Zack Hernandez, who died in Panama
because he was an American soldier. Don't forget about the
victims of 17 November that has gone on for decades with no
resolution until recently, or the Americans kidnapped by Abu
Sayyef and killed, and the Americans kidnapped by the FARC and
killed. In addition to all that, five of your seven state
sponsors counterintelligence responsibilities fall to that same
international terrorism operations section.
They're working tired, and they're doing a heck of a job.
Senator Kyl. I appreciate that very much. Very briefly, if
others on the panel would like to comment, because I do want to
go to the next subject. Go ahead.
FBI Agent. Yes, sir. From a field agent's perspective I
could probably talk for an hour on resources. The comment in
there is mainly due to the fact that criminal resources and
criminal agents, it's so manpower intensive, and with the
possibility of somebody being let go because you missed
something with regard to one of the trials, unfortunately our
managers, I can only try to comprehend their job. They try to
leverage our assets as best as they can. So most of the
manpower ends up falling on criminal agents as opposed to
intelligence.
Pragmatically, when I stressed that to headquarters, it was
just as a matter of being pragmatic. This is how I know it's
going to work just because of the fact that our intelligence
investigators were absolutely overworked--less weekends off
than I myself probably had in the last few years.
Senator Kyl. And this is one of the reasons some people
were trying to move the investigation into the criminal area
from the New York office on Mihdhar, because of the greater
resources in the criminal area than in the investigative area;
is that correct?
FBI Agent. Yes, sir. I would say a couple weeks later,
after everything happened and we had ramped up where thousands
of FBI agents all over the world were trying to find somebody,
I thought to myself--and I don't necessarily know how to do it,
but we've got to be able to get there--when we find out a
Khalid al-Mihdhar is in the country, intelligence, criminal or
whatever, we've got to be able to get to the level we were at
September 12, the afternoon of September 11. We've got to be
able to get there before September 11, not September 12.
Senator Kyl. Let me go right to this. I'm obviously not
going to be able to get into the second area that I wanted to,
but this is important. Mr. Rolince, I think this question is
for you because in your opening statement you talked about the
desire to go to a criminal investigation, but you said we did
not have specific credible evidence of criminal activity to do
so, and that's FBI information. But what about the CIA?
If the CIA had been able to convey to you the information
that they had, would that perhaps have sufficed to enable you
to begin a criminal investigation?
Mr. Rolince. I'm not necessarily sure that it would, sir,
only because in order to open that criminal investigation,
that, just as a counterintelligence investigation, is regulated
by Attorney General guidelines. And what we have, to the best
of my knowledge, is an individual, two individuals of great
interest to us at a meeting with another individual that you
tie to the Cole. Can you make the inference that they are tied
to it as well? Given what these people do for a living, you can
probably suppose that, but I'm not sure that suffices to be
specific and credible enough.
With that said, and in somewhat a disagreement with my
colleague, resources in the New York office are larger than the
resources anywhere else in the country, to include
counterintelligence resources, so it's a matter of----
Senator Kyl. Excuse me. But that was the headquarters for
the terrorist investigation, wasn't it?
Mr. Rolince. It's a matter of management, allotting
resources in accordance with the importance of the case. It's
as simple as that.
Senator Kyl. Believe me I'm not criticizing anybody for the
management of what they have, but, as my colleagues here on the
dais will attest, every time we go someplace and ask is there
anything else we can do for you, inevitably one of the things
is, well, we could at least use more help.
But was part of the problem here the fact that the CIA
information could not be given to the FBI because of the wall.
Your testimony is that these restrictions limited the free flow
of information. You couldn't even for lead purposes get that
information transferred over to you.
FBI Agent. Sir, if I could comment on that real quick,
because I was part of the conversation trying to get this
information downgraded, what we will do is--FBI agents wear
both hats, intel and criminal. Depending on what's given to us,
we try to do whatever we can, even when we're on the criminal
side, and we can go into more detail on that in a closed
committee hearing. But, with regard to that, what our attempt
would have been--and it might have been struck down, but even
if it had all gone through we might not have ever found Mihdhar
beforehand--was to go to the CIA, have this information
downgraded, take what we knew criminally from the Cole and go
to a judge and say, this is what we have, judge, can you help
us out here. We'll swear out what we know.
Senator Kyl. At least try, in other words.
FBI Agent. At least try to do it. And that was the main
impetus behind going to them or at least bringing up the
conversation of having certain information downgraded,
realizing that we were in an exigent circumstance and this
individual had come into the country.
Senator Kyl. Well, I'll just conclude by saying that we
need to get into this whole question of the risk aversion due
to the either real or imagined walls--I shouldn't say imagined,
but either proper understandings or misunderstandings about the
application of the laws under which both FBI and CIA operated
and the confusion and misunderstanding that resulted from that,
and perhaps in some cases the inability to pursue things that
might have been productive had they been pursued.
CIA Officer. Could I request a minute just to address this
one issue, because it's come up about four times just as the
light has gone red, and I'd really like to just address it for
a second for the process part of it.
The New York meeting--as I think it's become clear through
the Joint Inquiry staff, every place that something could have
gone wrong in this over a year and a half, it went wrong. All
the processes that had been put in place, all the safeguards,
everything else, they failed at every possible opportunity.
Nothing went right.
In this particular case--and that's one of the reasons why
they have an exchange program at the management level between
the FBI and CIA--is when there's an issue like this there are
usually procedures for getting the information cleared rapidly.
And as part of what was going on in the Cole investigation at
that time, there were some other information not pertaining to
photos, not pertaining specifically to Mihdhar and Hazmi, but
pertaining to Malaysia that the FBI was attempting to get
cleared to use in their interviews of various persons who could
help them with the Cole investigation.
And what the Agency was trying to do was to get that stuff
cleared, was to get it in a position where it could be used.
What we were also, I believe, trying to do through that summer
that culminated in kind of the rediscovery of the thing in July
was to stimulate the dialogue between the FBI and CIA on this
issue. Normally--and again nothing normal happened--but
normally what happens is, if it runs into a conversation block
where you have to stop, then you take steps to get it cleared
and then it moves on. So the reluctance to pass the information
was not a deliberate thing. It was, A, we didn't know if we
knew at the time. So all of the information that could have
been passed wasn't because we hadn't done it.
But also there was a movement the get it cleared to pass.
It just didn't complete.
Senator Kyl. Thank you.
CIA Officer. Thank you very much.
Chairman Graham. Our next questioner will beCongressman
Peterson, but, if I could, first, as a clock indicates we are working
through lunch and we will continue until we complete the questioning.
After Congressman Peterson has completed his 20 minutes as elite
questioner, the question order will be Senator DeWine, Mr. Reyes,
Senator Rockefeller, Senator Inhofe, Senator Wyden, Mr. Roemer, Mr.
Bishop, Senator Feinstein, Senator Mikulski, Mr. Bereuter, and Senator
Hatch.
I would like to make a couple of comments in reference to
the comments Senator Kyl has just made, first about the open
hearings. We have held ten closed sessions of the joint
committee. Our first open hearing was held on Wednesday of this
week and we have had now, with this hearing, three open
hearings. It is a matter of judgment as to whether it was wise
or not to have open hearings.
I believe that it is important and that it is a right of
the American people to know what their government is doing, and
those American people also include our colleagues, who have a
right to know and to assess the severity of the problems to
justify the reforms that I anticipate we are going to be
recommending. So in terms of achieving one of our primary
objectives, which is to reform the agencies where we have found
that such reform is called for, the greater degree of public
awareness and colleague understanding will enhance the
prospects of accomplishing that objective.
I also believe that democracy is a public enterprise. It is
not just gratuitously for theatrical purposes that most of the
things we do are in the public. We believe as a society that
the right to know of the public what their government is doing
is a fundamental right. There are clearly areas in which there
are other interests, including national security interests,
that will require some modification of that broad principle. We
are very sensitive to that. The statement that Ms. Hill
presented today was the product of several weeks of close
scrutiny by the agencies who had responsibility for classifying
the information that appeared in the original report, and so
the information that was presented today by Ms. Hill is
information that the agencies believe no longer justifies being
classified.
I will note that we have concurred with the final judgments
of the classifying agencies. Where we have disagreed we have
done so by respectfully noting those areas of disagreement but
still complying with the declassifying agencies' judgments.
As to the security of agents, we are following a practice
that has been used for many years in the United States Senate
where there are important witnesses who also have a variety of
security concerns, to do so in the manner that we are doing
today with our agent from the FBI and officer from the CIA, and
again this was done in consultation with the agencies and with
the two individuals involved.
I recognize that all of those points did not come down from
Moses with the tablets; they are matters of judgment, but we
are trying to be as sensitive as we can to the concerns and are
fully cognizant of the importance of all of our
responsibilities.
Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman, might I just make one quick
response, since you referred to my comments? No one disputes
the public's right to know. Our difference is merely one of how
and when. There will be a final report. It will be made public.
It will be as open as possible. We all agree with that. I hope
my comments about the how and the when were not misinterpreted.
Chairman Graham. Congressman Peterson.
Mr. Peterson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for your testimony and responses, and thank you for
what you are doing for the country. We appreciate the job
you're doing.
I'd like to first of all flesh out this watchlist issue a
little bit. As I understand it, being put in the watchlist once
you're in the United States really doesn't have much effect. Am
I correct?
Mr. Kojm. That is correct. The TIPOFF watchlist is for
visas and ports of entry. It's a border function.
Mr. Peterson. And even if you leave the country there
probably isn't any process to check at that point where it
would have picked up these folks?
Mr. Kojm. Not upon departure, no.
Mr. Peterson. And that hasn't changed. It's still the same
today as it was September 11?
Mr. Kojm. Well, I believe there are some revisions that are
in the works through the Immigration and Naturalization Service
for certain individuals who will be required to check in with
the INS on departure from the United States.
Mr. Peterson. I don't know if any of you would know this.
If somebody was put on the watchlist obviously at that time it
wasn't made available to the airlines, local police, because
some of these guys got stopped for speeding. Has any of that
changed? Has this watchlist information, is it now being made
available to the airlines, to local law enforcement so that
they are alerted if somebody tries to--somebody is in the
United States and they are traveling around and we know they
are bad guys, there is some way within the country that we can
pick them up and they don't either have to be coming in or
going out?
FBI Agent. To the best of my knowledge, just from an
investigative standpoint, without going too much into detail to
give away, there are some watchlists that are out there that
are being used to try to do what you're talking about. I don't
know how macro in concept it is or how interoperative it is
with other watchlists, but there are things like that that are
being utilized. And I would defer to my colleague from the FBI
that might know more about such things.
Mr. Peterson. Mr. Kojm apparently wants to say something.
Mr. Kojm. Two points to make. We do provide the
unclassified data elements from TIPOFF to the Foreign Terrorism
Tracking Task Force. That's an interagency group. INS and FBI
are playing key leadership roles in that task force. We do
provide that information to them.
In addition, we have provided now on a realtime basis,
through INTELINK, a top secret SCI connection, to five sister
Intelligence Community elements realtime information on
everything that is in our data base, and that does include the
FBI.
Mr. Peterson. Well, I want to get a little bit into this
whole issue of assembling this data and maybe focusing on what
we're doing with data bases and technology, but finally in the
summer of 2001 our witnesses from the CIA and FBI took action
to kind of pull all this stuff together. And once all the
available intelligence was gathered together, the reaction is
interesting and important.
When they see all the data together they realize that these
two guys are connected to the embassy bombings through a UBL
facility in Yemen, organized and attend a terrorist meeting in
Malaysia, are connected with the planner of the Cole bombings,
and have extended visas to the United States and entered the
United States after the Malaysia meeting. They realize at this
point that these two guys are dangerous and must be found.
It's at this point that the two suspects are placed on a
watchlist and the FBI is asked to search for them in the United
States. The obvious point is that a CIA officer and an FBI
analyst pre-9/11 see the threat of the situation exactly as we
do today, post-9/11. Their actions prove that. If only the
CIA's data management system had permitted everyone to see all
the data available, analysts and managers probably could have
perceived the need for action on Mihdhar and Hazmi long before
9/11.
So our focus today on this matter is not--my focus is not a
case of hindsight so much as trying to look at where we're
going and whether we're making some progress. To kind of set
the stage, I'd like to ask the CIA officer how hard it is or
was to find and assembleintelligence data on Mihdhar and Hazmi.
Was that an easy process?
CIA Officer. To reconstruct the file is not that difficult
an issue if one has the time and the people to do it. The
question--this is a difficult one to say just the right way but
I'm going to give it a shot because it's important. There was a
miss in January, there was a miss in March. We've acknowledged
that. What happened after that was, I think in part, a
function--stuff like that should normally emerge during the
course of a file review, if something provokes the file review.
Once that file review is provoked, the information is
readily recoverable. That's how I found what I found when I
found it kind of thing, but the story kind of emerged in dribs
and drabs because there was no one person who reconstructed the
whole file.
Mr. Peterson. And there were different people that saw this
stuff at different times----
CIA Officer. Right.
Mr. Peterson [continuing]. But it took quite a while before
anybody pulled this together.
CIA Officer. Right.
Mr. Peterson. So your current system, it seems to me that
you've got a system that sounds like it's antiquated. It's
still filed on a flat basis and it's not necessarily collated
together. There is now technology where you can build a data
file where anybody that looks at it all of this stuff is going
to come up. And if you would have had something like that,
somebody that wasn't even experienced, that if all of a sudden
something went off in their mind to trigger this would see this
because everything would pop up.
Are we moving in that direction? Is there going to be
better technology put in place both in the CIA and the FBI to
try to make sure something like this doesn't happen again in
the future?
CIA Officer. I'm not actually qualified to answer the
technology question. I'm sorry. I think others----
Mr. Peterson. But you work with it now. Has anything
changed from 9/11?
CIA Officer. I actually have no complaints about CTC's data
system right now.
Mr. Peterson. But you have to know how to go in there and
what to look for and you have to actually be looking for
something in order to----
CIA Officer. And you have to have a little bit of time to
do it, and you have to have a reason to do that instead of
something else. But the information is there. It's recoverable.
Mr. Peterson. And it was there for 18 months prior to 9/11.
CIA Officer. Right.
Mr. Peterson. And it took somebody who happened to remember
something, who just finally put this together on August 23 that
it seems to me didn't give us enough time by 9/11 to track
these guys down. If this would have all come together earlier,
we might have been able to track them down.
I guess my question is, why don't we have a system where
this guy's name is in there and everything that comes in on
this guy gets put into that file, so whoever accesses that name
it pops up and it shows all this stuff in one place so you
don't have to be a rocket scientist or you don't have to have
been following this stuff to understand that when you see all
this that this is a big problem?
CIA Officer. As I said, someone else will need to answer
that question.
Mr. Peterson. How about the FBI?
Mr. Rolince. I'm in total agreement with what you're saying
and where you're trying to go. It dawned on me over the years,
as we went from no relationship with the CIA to what I consider
to be one that I would brag about and do brag about, anywhere,
any time, but the exchange of personnel, which has done as much
as it has, only gets us so far. The information exchange I
think is the next piece.
The Bureau's technological woes are there. Our efforts to
correct that are certainly well known to all. What I would
personally like to see is an ability for analysts to exchange
information and get able to get on that system within the
operations center within the bin Ladin unit at headquarters,
and access information that's available to their agency
analytical counterparts.
I'd like to be able to e-mail my counterpart at the
Department of Justice. There are a lot of things I'd like to be
able to do. I think all of them are technologically practical.
It's a matter of, I think, putting the time and the energy and
the money and the smart people in the right direction. And I
believe we're doing that.
Mr. Peterson. Is that going on now?
Mr. Rolince. It's moving in that direction. I don't know
how long it's going to take us to get there.
Mr. Peterson. But as of today it's not too far from where
it was on 9/11, apparently. As somebody who uses the system,
it's not much different, is that what you're saying?
Mr. Rolince. As someone who uses the system, I would agree,
but in terms of the progress being made----
Mr. Peterson. There are probably some people working on
this trying to improve it.
Mr. Rolince. Yes, sir.
FBI Agent. Sir, if I may, in my experience just since
September 11 there's a technological barrier but there is also
still gatekeepers with regard to certain information. I'm not
naive enough to think that the FBI should be privy to every
ounce of information that is out there, but I try to think of
it in simplest forms. The first day at Quantico or second day
CIA handles world intelligence, the U.S. handles domestic
intelligence. In today's, for lack of a better term, global
village community, we've got to make sure that that domestic
intelligence and world intelligence is transparent, both
physically, technologically, and also in the mindsets of
certain individuals.
So I don't think it's just a technological solution.
Mr. Peterson. I understand what you are saying, and there
probably would be some resistance. But I know enough about
these data bases and computers to know that this system could
be put together and could be shared by all of you. You know,
we've been doing this for years, and you're not the only folks
in government that have this problem. The USDA has this problem
and all kinds of other people. I don't know how we fix it.
CIA Agent. If I could, just one more thing, Director
Mueller--I'm speaking now in my FBI hat, not in my CIA hat--has
said several times, has basically described the objectives that
he's taking the FBI toward, and I think it's critical to note
that part of that objective is to transform the way the FBI
handles its information, that part of its information that
other agencies would define as intelligence. Intelligence is
often collected as a by-product of investigations. And unless
it's bottled and capped and distributed it may not be used.
So the challenge this Director has taken on and is moving
the FBI toward is doing that with the FBI's own intelligence,
and that's a critical piece of the bilateral flow because
there's no reluctance, wall issues aside, there's no real
reluctance on the part of counterterrorism professionals on
either side to talk to each other about issues of common
concern.
Oftentimes what you have, though, is this giant anvil of
information going through the Cheerio of one person, and we've
got to change that part of it in the computer system. You're
absolutely right.
Mr. Peterson. That's something that computers could be a
huge help to get you sorted through.
I don't know if anybody can answer, but are you or are you
considering making some of this information available to
airlines, Mr. Rolince. This stuff on these bad guys, is that
somehow or another transmitted to the airlines so they have
some kind of a system that they pop up when they try to buy a
ticket?
Mr. Rolince. I'm aware that that possibility has been
discussed. How do you run the names of tens or hundreds of
thousands of travelers, be they international or domestic,
against the available data bases--be it a watchlist or your
files on whom you have information that might be of interest to
them in making the determination as to whether a person does or
doesn't get on. I know it's being talked about, sir. I'm not
sure exactly where it is in terms of actually happening.
CIA Officer. I shouldn't speak for homeland security, but I
know that that process is going on and that there are review
and coordination processes that do go on so the airlines do get
critical information, and they are improving that as they go.
Mr. Peterson. As I talked about before, we had all this
information out there and until somebody kind of remembered
something that pulled all this stuff together, we didn't really
realize what these guys--how bad these guys were and the threat
they were. My question is, how many other people like Mihdhar
and Hazmi are in the system? That's what concerns a lot of us.
Maybe you can't answer that, but are there other folks in
there and is there any way that we can get them?
CIA Officer. That's an issue that does preoccupy us quite a
lot and, as I said, we're doing the best we can to do that,
through a variety of different means.
I think the thing that also bothers us a great deal is that
other 16 were completely invisible, completely invisible. So
there's a dual challenge there as well.
Mr. Rolince. Congressman, if I could jump in for a second,
I was passed some information that goes to the heart of your
question. Apparently the TSA, the newly-formed agency,
maintains two lists--a no-fly list, which would be analogous to
our armed and dangerous warning, as well as a selectee list of
people that we have an interest in and we may wish to detain
for questioning--and we do have the ability to contribute both
names and information to both of those lists.
Mr. Peterson. Mr. Kojm, you were acting like you wanted to
say something.
Mr. Kojm. Yes, Congressman. You had asked about how many
names there are in the system. We have 80,000. We're adding
approximately 2,000 names each month.
In answer to Congressman Burr's question earlier, between
the Cole bombing and September 11 we added about 4,000 names.
And, as the staff report identifies, since September 11 our
work is up about 450 percent. So there are a lot of names out
there. We add them as best we can. We try to add them every
day. We don't meet the standard of same-day data entry, but we
aim to.
In relationship to the FAA, we do work with them and they
provide data that we put in our data base, and we do respond to
their telephone requests for name checks through Diplomatic
Security. So we're in contact with them, but we would certainly
concur with your observation that we need to have closer,
better electronic contacts with FAA and other domestic
agencies, and we are working with the homeland security people.
Thank you.
Mr. Peterson. Thank you. Mr. Rolince, could you clarify for
me how these cases are designated either criminal investigation
or criminal investigation? Mihdhar and Hazmi in 2001 are known
to be connected with people involved in the COLE and embassy
bombings, which would appear to make them proper objects of a
criminal investigation as potential material witnesses, but the
headquarters was adamant that a criminal investigation was not
warranted. Can you explain why? Was it simply because all the
data we had on Mihdhar and Hazmi at the time was from
intelligence sources or what was going on there?
Mr. Rolince. That is the core element of the decisionmaking
process, that the relevant information that came forward was in
fact all in an intelligence channel, and the meeting that these
individuals attended we did not have reporting on in terms of
exactly what was said or transcripts of what was said, so
although we certainly suspect, and rightfully so, that they
were probably engaged in past and future acts, criminal acts,
the information brought to us came essentially in total in the
intelligence channel, so an intelligence investigation was
opened.
You don't always have to have a parallel criminal
investigation. And both criminal and intel are monitored, are
regulated by the Attorney General guidelines. I think what's
important is, do you have the ability to check every record,
every source, DMV, local police, NCIC, past warrants, banks,
neighborhoods, et cetera, within an intelligence investigation
which mirrors what you can do in a criminal investigation, and
the answer is yes, you do.
Mr. Peterson. So I get a better sense, does that have a big
part of the decision about how this gets structured where this
comes from? Is that what you are saying? If it comes out of
intelligence, then that's likely to push it to an intelligence
investigation.
Mr. Rolince. It's likely, but if there is a logical reason
or specific articulable facts out there that would also
indicate participation in a criminal enterprise, then you go
for the parallel criminal investigation.
FBI Agent. If I may, sir, one point on that, because I was
part of the conversation that took place with regards to
opening a criminal or intelligence matter, not only did these
things restrict us on what we can do today, but the
possibilities of what might happen in the future also restrict
us. The example that was given to me that day on the telephone
was if we try to go criminally and we do not find this
individual, if in the future we try to go with intel a FISA
Court judge will say, hey, you struck out criminally; that's
why you're coming to me intel-wise. So not only do we have to
take a snapshot of what we look at now when we make these
decisions but management is trying to project ahead.
Let's say we subpoena everything and nothing is in there.
We can't find this individual. But we find him one day and we
want to open an intel investigation, we're prevented from doing
it because then the judge is going to say, you stuck out
criminally; that's why you're coming back intel-wise. So that's
just another thing that was used.
Mr. Peterson. Well, unfortunately I've heard that story
before in some other situations.
For you again, you wrote an e-mail that predicted that
people would die and the public would not understand why every
resource was not thrown at certain problems. What decisions
would the National Security Law Division make today, given the
same circumstances? In other words, have things changed over
there?
FBI Agent. I can't speculate. I know the walls have come
down with regards to FISA information and the snowball effect
that occurred after that. Where the wall used to be between
criminal investigators and intel investigators, it's back where
I personally believe it should be, which is between prosecutors
and the FBI. In addition to that, with regards to the FISA
information and direction of those FISAS with criminal
investigators. So I have seen firsthand that that wall has come
down and it's been a big help. That happened immediately
following.
My recommendations from an agent's perspective, field
agent's perspective, would be make sure those walls never go up
again with regards to sharing information between at least
different elements of an intel investigation and a criminal
investigation.
Mr. Peterson. Thank you. I thank the witnesses and I thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Congressman Peterson.
Senator DeWine. Senator, before you start, I'm going to
announce that as soon as Senate DeWine has finished his
questions, the next questioner will be Congressman Reyes, but
we are going to take a short break which will necessitate
clearing the room so that the screened witnesses can have some
mobility. So those of you who are going to have to leave, if
you might get prepared because we'd like to make this break as
short as possible.
Senator DeWine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just first say how much we admire all of you and
appreciate what you do for our country every day.
We've talked about a wall and, to our FBI agent, I hope
you're right. I hope that wall stays down, and I think we in
Congress have an obligation to monitor this and just make sure
that wall does in fact stay down. I believe that part of the
problem has been we really have two kinds of walls. One is a
wall that's there to protect foreign intelligence sources and
methods, and we all understand that. That has to be dealt with
on a practical basis by those of you who are the professionals
in the field. But other is a Congress-created law with the FISA
wall.
I will say quite candidly that for many, many years we did
not do our job in monitoring how that law was being interpreted
by the court and how that law was then being interpreted down
into the field. I think that's our responsibility. Mr.
Chairman, I think that we began to change it and improve it
with the PATRIOT Act. We came a long way with that. We now have
had a FISA Court opinion which I don't particularly agree with,
but at least it is a public opinion. And at least we can see
where the Court is going. And, of course, there has been an
appeal. I assume that the appellate decision will be public.
It will give us some guidance then to see where that court
is going so that we can make whatever changes we think need to
be made. So I think we have to follow what the Court is doing,
see how it's being interpreted and also see how it's being
implemented down into the field. And that's our obligation to
do. I think, Mr. Chairman, we can do that consistent with
national security concerns. It's our Committee's job; we ought
to do it.
Let me just ask a question to our CIA officer. You've had,
as all our witnesses have, great, great experience and great
background. It's clear that you are a real expert in
intelligence. You've had experience in the Counterterrorism
Center. You now have testified that you're a detailee to the
FBI, so you've seen it in a sense from both sides.
Again I know you don't want to get into this in great
detail in a public session, but do you have any guidance for us
in regard to the Counterterrorist Center? How are we doing?
What else do you need there? How is the interface between the
FBI and the CIA coming? Does that need any more improvement?
Just kind of give us, in the little time I have, a quick
snapshot, if you could.
CIA Officer. It's going to be quick because I've been away
from the Counterterrorist Center for quite some time now and
they've evolved revolutionary, in a revolutionary way since
I've left and certainly since September 11.
It's very difficult to talk about today's CTC in terms that
are relevant to before September 11, because it is so changed.
I don't know the details of all the changes. I think in terms
of any recommendations that might be made, it might be better
coming from somebody who is attached to it right now rather
than myself.
As far as the relationship between CIA and FBI, there is a
move afoot to exchange personnel between the two. That's
critical that that continue and expand.
Senator DeWine. Anybody else on counterterrorism? Any
thoughts? Want to jump in?
FBI Agent. I would say, just from my perspective, and
stories that I hear is that we have come a long way. I think we
need to go that much further, not only exchanging management
but also exchanging the field agents at some level and guard
against the fact that once an individual goes to the FBI or
vice versa that individual becomes beholden just to that
institution that they're going to, that they continue to be
able to flow the information back and forth inside a system of
checks and balances that allows that information to be shared
between both organizations.
The first step might have been management. Maybe the next
step is actual agents and officers from both sides being
exchanged.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Rolince.
Mr. Rolince. In other to do that, Senator--I totally agree
with my colleagues--it becomes a resource issue. I know in
talking to past chiefs of station, to include my friend Cofer,
who is here, we have to be where they are in terms of going
after the enemy. I know we'd like to all have officers and
agents in everyone else's field offices and stations. That's
not practical. But to begin to go down that road--I don't want
to speak for my colleagues but I certainly think I can--we need
more people.
Senator DeWine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you very much, Senator.
As previously indicated, we are now going to take a very
short break. I'd like to ask if those who were asked to leave
the room earlier, would they please exit again, and would Mr.
Wolfe tell me when the room is clear.
[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]
Chairman Graham. I call the meeting to order.
Congressman Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the opportunity and also would like to echo the sentiments of
my colleagues in appreciation of the work that you do for our
nation.
I'd also like to comment, Mr. Chairman, that I
wholeheartedly support open hearings. As I travel back to my
district, I know there's been great anticipation about at least
some component--two questions regarding 9/11. One is that we do
open hearings so the rest of the public knows the work that
we're doing, and the second thing is that there be a
commission, an independent commission, that would look at this
simultaneously or subsequently. So, for whatever it's worth,
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to do open hearings.
I've got a couple of venues that I'd like to pursue. First
of all, Mr. Rolince, do you agree with the FBI agent's
statement that you could not pursue a FISA order after you have
begun a criminal investigation? And the second part of that is,
couldn't the FBI just disclose the criminal investigation to
the FISA court and still ask for an order under FISA?
Mr. Rolince. The answer to your first question is I don't
agree that you could never do it. I agree entirely that
historically that has been a significant concern of the
Department of Justice and of FISA Court judges in particular,
and you've heard it said that there was a concern they were
circumventing the judicial process or going around the Fourth
Amendment. For the record, sir, I've been doing this 28 years,
and I can't cite a single example of an agent trying to
circumvent the process in order to get a FISA just so he or she
could get criminal information, and I would hope that that
would never happen.
To answer your second point, yes, you can do that. What
they want to know in total is the extent to which you had
conducted any prior criminal investigation, and those were some
of the errors cited that you heard referred to recently,
whether either through omission or a poor record check or
whatever there had been a prior criminal investigation or
perhaps a concurrent and that wasn't reported. And it needs to
be. It has to be so that the judge can make a decision based on
the totality of the facts that we bring forward.
But yes, if we had a criminal investigation of someone,
let's say for something totally unattached to a subsequent
intelligence investigation, we would make a strong argument,
especially if you had the probable cause for that FISA,
essentially that that was then and this is now. You would have
to make the argument that that criminal activity has nothing to
do with the intelligence information available to us and our
belief that we have probable cause to in fact obtain a FISA.
Mr. Reyes. Any comment?
FBI Agent. No, sir.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you. The other question I have is, why
couldn't the investigation of Mihdhar been folded under the
Cole criminal investigation? You know, one of the things that
to me makes sense is that it was suspected that he was an
associate of the lead planner of the Cole attack. Weren't
associates of Khallad investigated in the Cole investigation as
well?
FBI Agent. Sir, I believe with regard to--and I confuse
this all the time and it's taken me years--there's Khalid al-
Mihdhar and Khallad. Khallad is actually one of the individuals
that was the mastermind behind the Cole. Khalid al-Mihdhar is
one of the individuals that he was going in fact to meet,
unbeknownst to us at the time. So we didn't know that Khalid
al-Mihdhar was a mastermind behind the Cole. The only
information we had is that he might have been meeting with one
of the suspects of the Cole in a far east country, and opening
a criminal case against him we had to show that criminally.
There's two separate things I've learned, unfortunately, as
an agent, you might know something to be true but being able to
show it criminally, to open a criminal case and intel are two
separate matters. So I hope I answered your question with
regards to that.
Mr. Reyes. Yes. And only because my time is brief I want to
leave that and go to Mr. Kojm.
Can you tell us how the TIPOFF program is funded?
Mr. Kojm. Yes, Congressman. It's funded entirely by the
Bureau of Consular Affairs. In essence it's a service that INR
provides to the Consular Affairs Bureau and it's funded by
machine-readable visa fees.
Mr. Reyes. So the obvious question is, if it's an integral
part of this nation's ability to identify terrorist, why isn't
it part of the regular budget process so it can be done
adequately and successfully?
Mr. Kojm. Well, this is a question that we are wrestling
with, and the senior leadership in our building has addressed
this question as well. We are seeking to identify other sources
of funds for what we believe is becoming a national program.
Mr. Reyes. And where would the national data base be
located? In particular, I have advocated, and the Chairman
knows, advocated to consider the Intelligence Center, who
already does a lot of this and is well known nationally and
internationally for that capability.
Mr. Kojm. We have approached the Director of Central
Intelligence. We believe funds that he controls would be very
helpful in support of this intelligence function. We do believe
that it is proper to maintain TIPOFF's strong and close
connection in support of consular affairs even as it needs to
take on additional purposes for a national mission.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Congressman Roemer. And then the next
questioner will be Senator Feinstein.
Mr. Roemer. Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by thanking you
too for your expert sense of fairness and balance in conducting
these hearings. I just want to say that I think it is critical
from a perspective of the jurisdiction of this committee for us
to do our work. Much of it will take place in private, but some
of it should take place in public, and you have held off on the
public settings to get the right balance, to make sure that
delicate information is protected, and that sources and methods
are protected, and I think you have done an expert job on that
front. I hope we continue to have that balance and to have
public hearings so that the American people can get the
information so that they can feel more comfortable with access.
So thank you again for your balance in this.
Mr. Kojm, I come back to one of the most disturbing things
that I've heard today, and there have been a litany of
disturbing things. But one of the most disturbing for me is the
fact that a couple years ago you could be in America, you could
be on a watchlist, you could apply for a visa extension, and
get it. Is that true?
Mr. Kojm. Congressman, I'm going to ask my colleague,
Richard Beer, from Consular Affairs, to help you with that
question.
Mr. Beer. Again, to make the distinction, this application
from someone already in the United States to extend their stay
is----
Mr. Roemer. Is it true? I only have about four minutes. Is
it true that you could do that prior to September 11?
Mr. Beer. Yes.
Mr. Roemer. So you could be on a terrorist watchlist, you
could simply apply for extension, receive the extension and
stay in the United States for whatever your visa extension was
permitted.
Mr. Beer. Yes.
Mr. Roemer. Has that been corrected?
Mr. Beer. That I'm not prepared to answer. I don't know
what the Immigration Service is doing now in terms of checking
the watchlists.
Mr. Roemer. So a year and a few weeks after September 11 we
still cannot answer the question of whether or not that
deficiency has been addressed?
Mr. Beer. I can't answer that. The Immigration Service can
answer that.
Mr. Roemer. Can anyone in this room answer that? Well, I
would hope we would get an answer to that question very
quickly, and more so than an answer to that question, a way to
solve the problem so that one of the places for a terrorist to
be safe is not in the United States of America.
I want to ask our dedicated people here from th FBI and the
CIA--thank you again for coming today--to the CIA officer, I
want to ask, I've had concerns about not enough emphasis on
analysts. You and your good work at the CIA put some clues
together, I understand, in May of 2001, after the situation had
been missed for a while. You started a ball rolling.
It's my understanding that with the clues finally put
together in May of 2001 that was turned over to an analyst, who
then put it together by August of 2001. Is that correct?
CIA Officer. Not entirely. There was a small team probably
working this of separate people. There is an analyst. There is
also an FBI analyst detailed to CTC who is working on this.
Mr. Roemer. So there was an analyst from CIA and an analyst
from FBI?
CIA Officer. Within CTC, and then they were working with
their colleagues at the FBI.
Mr. Roemer. My question would be, sir, how many analysts
did we have working this in CIA, all together--the total number
of analysts in CTC in May of 2001?
CIA Officer. I don't have an answer for that. I was at the
FBI at the time. I would say roughly--again, as I said before
in my statement, what you don't have is a large team working a
single problem. Here you have people who are working multiple
problems coming together periodically to look at this.
Mr. Roemer. I understand. My question, though, is how many
analysts are working UBL in CIA and how many analysts are
working UBL at FBI? It is my understanding from a previous
hearing that there was one analyst at FBI working UBL full-
time; is that correct?
Mr. Rolince. If I can take that, Senator, that is not
correct.
Mr. Roemer. How many were there?
Mr. Rolince. Going back to the fall of 1999, when the
decision was made to create the Counterterrorism Division
separate from the old National Security Division, there was
also a decision taken to create an information resources
division. It was not necessarily popular, but the theory held
that if you wanted to do strategic intelligence we need to have
the majority, if not all, of the analysts in the FBI in one
division.
I understand that an analyst within that division was
working strategic intelligence. In the immediate aftermath of
the Africa bombings we created a bin Ladin unit, and it is
within that unit, the only unit at headquarters that is
responsible for one group and one group only, that initially
four, in addition to several investigational operational
specialists, work with the agent supervisors and the unit chief
in the UBL.
Could we use more? I think I made that case, and we
certainly could, and we would certainly hope for your support
on that.
Mr. Roemer. I know my time has expired and the Senator from
California has waited patiently for her turn, but, Mr.
Chairman, I would hope, since we've had a host of different
answers to this question over the last several days, that for
the record we could get with certainty how many full-time
analysts were working the UBL situation for the FBI, how many
for the CTC within CIA, and how that had changed over this
critical three-year period.
I thank the Chairman.
CIA Officer. I would just like to add to that that it's
also critical that we understand what we mean by an analyst,
because there are a lot of different functions these people
perform, depending on where they work. So some people are
analysts working in an operational capacity, some people are
analysts who write memos for the President, some people are
supporting operations. They are performing an analytic
function, but it's different. It is a very difficult question
to answer in general, and there are a lot of other people
working in the bin Ladin issue that are not analysts, who
perform a similar function in terms of operational guidance and
targeting and that kind of thing.
So it is a hard question to answer directly.
Mr. Kojm. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I did want to respond to
Congressman Roemer's previous question. I have at least a
partial answer. Every name in the TIPOFF data base and every
new name that is put into the data base is run against records
of visa holders, both current and expired. If any name is a
match, we initiate a revocation process. So if it's in our data
base and they are a visa holder and we believe they are here,
we provide that information to domestic law enforcement.
Chairman Graham. In reference to the question about
personnel, on June 18 of this year Senator Shelby asked
Director Tenet to provide numbers relative to the personnel
within the CIA committed to various functions, including the
Usama bin Ladin account. On August 28 the Joint Inquiry staff
reiterated that request for a detailed breakdown of personnel
who were focused full time on bin Ladin, those whose
responsibilities involved work on al-Qa'ida on a less than
full-time basis.
We have not yet received a response from the CIA on either
of those two requests, and I would particularly reference that
to the representatives of the CIA.
I have asked Ms. Hill if we could make the same request of
the FBI so that we will have comparable data from the two
agencies.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I think Congressman Roemer raised a good issue, and because
some of us worked on the Border Security and Visa Entry Reform
Act, we just pulled the law. As you know, there wasn't an
interoperable data base. The law provides that now there should
be one. Whether all the security data bases provided for in
this law are now operable is a question I'd like to ask.
Mr. Kojm. Senator, is that addressed to the Department?
Senator Feinstein. If you don't mind.
Mr. Kojm. I can answer that in part, and that is that we do
provide data to the Foreign Terrorism Tracking Task Force. We
began providing data on all of the unclassified elements of
every individual in the TIPOFF data base, so that is provided
to domestic law enforcement.
Moreover, we do provide----
Senator Feinstein. Is it provided to INS so that if an
individual asks for an extension on their visa and they are in
the watchlist that INS has that data at their fingertips now?
Mr. Kojm. INS would have access to that information through
the Foreign Terrorism Tracking Task Force in which INS is an
integral member. That is my understanding, Senator.
Senator Feinstein. I think we ought to check that one out.
Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to state publicly--and then I
wanted to ask the two agents a quick question--the one thing
that comes through to me very strongly from the staff report is
how easy it is for those who would do us harm to use our system
falsely, to game it to get into the country, and how much they
knew about our system.
You know, it's amazing to me that when the expedited access
program went into play in May of 2001 the very next month five
of the hijackers avoided a personal interview by using that
speedy access system in Saudi Arabia, which has been since, as
I understand it from the staff report, done away with.
They knew how to get multiple-entry visas. They knew how to
get a new passport to avoid saying where they traveled and how
often they traveled. Six of them knew they could go to a bank
and actually make up a social security number and that the bank
wouldn't check that number, which they did do and an FBI agent
came in, as a matter of fact, my subcommittee in Judiciary,
came in and testified to that.
So I think what we really need to know is that we've really
got to keep going over our systems and making recommendations
of how they can be strengthened to avoid just this kind of
thing.
I wanted to talk for just a moment with the two agents, if
I could, about the wall, because this is something that many of
us on Judiciary have been interested in. As you well know, it
involves FISA. In the PATRIOT Act we made a couple of
amendments. We changed ``primary purpose'' having to be from an
intelligence point of view to a ``significant purpose'' being
from an intelligence point of view. And we also enacted a
section which is called the New Coordination Provision that
provides for coordination in the law with law enforcement.
I want to just read to you a couple of the points and see
if you believe it covers what we need to cover. In other words,
the FISA Act is amended by adding federal officers who conduct
electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence
information under this title ``may consult with federal law
enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to investigate or
protect against actual or potential attack or other grave
hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power,
sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an
agent, clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence
service or network of a foreign power or by an agent, and
coordination authorized under other sections.''
So clearly there is a very clear consultation that is
permissible now under FISA between the Intelligence Community
and the so-called Title III law enforcement community.
My question to you--and I'm sure you've probably reviewed
this--is, do the agents for the most part that you come into
contact with believe that this is a significant improvement and
that that wall--you mentioned something about the wall being
broken down--is down sufficiently so that you're not hampered
when you have to perform one of these investigations?
FBI Agent. Yes, Senator. With regards to some walls, that
wall, it definitely has helped. I will submit to you that since
the enacting of the PATRIOT Act, which I requested a copy so I
had it in writing, I have read on more than one occasion to
some individual that was attempting to withhold information
from me, just what you just read right there. So old habits die
hard, I think, with regards to certain things. It has certainly
helped to this point.
With regard to the other wall that Senator DeWine had
mentioned earlier, I believe there are so many different types
of walls with regard to intelligence and criminal, but with
regards to the FISA specifically that one seems to have helped.
With regards to what Senator DeWine talked about, the other
wall, we still have to deal with that on pretty much a daily
basis.
Senator Feinstein. Because we just had a hearing in
Judiciary and the Justice Department, as you know, the FISA
Court, I think only for the second time in its history, had
just produced an opinion saying to the Justice Department,
where they tried to sort of entirely break down the wall in
terms of the application for a FISA process, that the
significant purpose test remains. And the Justice Department
apparently did not want it to remain. The FISA Court had an
unanimous opinion. That opinion is now on appeal.
Do you have a view on that subject?
FBI Agent. No, ma'am. I think there is some document that I
was handed within the last week that talks about that
specifically, and it's going to be circulated to the field, but
I don't have any knowledge of that.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Does the other agent have any
knowledge of that?
CIA Officer. I'm from the CIA and most of this is Greek.
Sorry, with all respect, I don't.
Senator Feinstein. Well, it still is, to some extent, with
me.
Mr. Rolince, do you have a view on that?
Mr. Rolince. Senator, let me start at the beginning and
move forward. I'm not a legal expert. As you know, Spike
Bowman, the Deputy General Counsel, will be with you next week
to walk through this. But unquestionably the concerns that my
colleague raised about the issue of opening criminal or intel
goes by the wayside with the PATRIOT Act, and it's probably one
of the most substantial positive changes that you could have
put into place to allow us to move information as quickly as we
possibly can in situations like that.
In addition to that, the change from a two-pronged test to
just relevancy in order for us to get national security
letters, pen registers, information like that, is also a help,
as are the expanded time frames for which the FISAS on both
United States persons and non-persons are in effect.
There is one area that we're still in debate on, and that's
our ability to use the roving. We're trying to work through
that. We would like in counterintelligence and counterterrorism
the exact same capabilities we have if we're working public
corruption or organized crime cases. I think there's still an
issue to be worked out there.
Finally, as regards the last piece, my understanding of it
is the degree to which criminal prosecutors will be able to
guide, direct, and manage the FISA process, and I think that is
part of what is still being adjudicated, if I have it right.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much. Thanks, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Shelby.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Mr. Chairman, I'll try to be brief.
The witnesses have endured a lot with us today and we
appreciate that.
I want to add the fact that the FBI agent and the CIA
officer, we appreciate what you are doing, and we want you to
continue to do that, but we should give you the tools and the
resources to complete the job. I think we understand that.
This is directed to the Bureau. As I understand it, al-
Mihdhar and al-Hazmi did not use aliases when they were in the
U.S. They lived in San Diego under their real names, signed
rental agreements, and one even obtained a California motor
vehicle photo ID card. According to your testimony, the CIA
told the FBI that it was interested in these two terrorists as
early as January 2000. In March the CIA apparently learned that
the terrorists had entered the United States.
If the FBI had known that these suspected terrorists were
in the U.S., would it have been difficult to track them down,
given that they were living entirely at that point in the open?
You recounted that after the CIA told you in August of 2001
that these two should be watchlisted, that the FBI tried to
locate them in New York and Los Angeles by searching for them
under their real names.
Did anyone at the Bureau think to use the Internet to
conduct a national search for them in local phone books and
other public records or commercial data bases? Further, if the
CIA had watchlisted these two terrorists in early 2000 and they
had been identified at the border or if the FBI had managed to
find them living openly as they were in San Diego, might you
have been able to conduct some surveillance or something of
them?
You know, I know a lot of this is hindsight, but as we look
back I think it's worth bringing up, especially to where they
lived in the open. They were living under their own names.
FBI Agent. Yes, Senator. I will say as part of that
conversation I talked to Congressman Reyes about, I was told
that my name specifically could not be on any paper regarding
al-Mihdhar or in the future we would lose that. But the night
of September 11, I submitted a request at that time to our
information center, technology center, and they came back
within hours with at least one address with regards to Khalid
al-Mihdhar in San Diego through public resources.
Now I will caution, saying that the names are unbelievable
dealing with sometimes, with just a name that it's difficult to
just take a name and run it back. But it turns out that what
came back with regards to that address was an accurate address
for him in San Diego. That was part of my concern voicing with
regards to intelligence agents and their case assigned, was
that it was probably going to be assigned, at least initially,
to not enough people. The guys that were trying to track them
down were busy with all the advance techniques at the time to
try to get a hold of them.
Vice Chairman Shelby. It goes to resources too, doesn't it?
FBI Agent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rolince. It is speculative as to exactly what would
have been done had we found him. Let me just put it in a
context. As of September----
Vice Chairman Shelby. Well, I put it in that context,
because I think it's fair to do that.
Mr. Rolince. I was interested to know just how many people
are out there that we are looking for, and I asked. Ironically,
as of September 1 there are 7,295 FBI fugitives, most of them
probably in this country, on whom we have process. Sort of a
sobering thought that there are in excess of 830,000 local,
state and federal subjects who are being looked for for various
number of crimes.
With that said, had we been able to find them, there would
have followed, I think, a pretty serious debate on exactly how
far do you take this. The reason that we put people into the
watchlists and data bases is, quite frankly, to keep them out.
So if now you find yourself in a position where a serious
terrorist is in the country, I'm speculating but I don't
believe we would have followed, monitored, covered, ad
infinitum. A point in time would have had to come where
probably seventh floor decision makers would have said, like we
did in recent cases of people who we have arrested coming into
this country, stop him, pick him up, question him.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Well, that's a judgment call and we
understand that. Sometimes it's the right thing to do.
Sometimes we find that you stop them and arrest them too fast.
One last comment, Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me.
Yesterday we had two former national security advisors, Mr.
Sandy Berger and Mr. Brent Scowcroft. M. Scowcroft is no
stranger to security knowledge of the world, but his statement
that concerned me but didn't shock me said--and I'll try and
paraphrase him; I hope it's verbatim--that basically the safest
place for a terrorist anywhere in the world is in the United
States of America, and that concerns us all, and it should
concern the CIA and the FBI and all the local people and the
citizens.
We know we have a challenge ahead of us, and we know we've
got to have you to meet that challenge. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think these have been very, very useful and serve, I
think, a variety of purposes, and I think that the two co-
chairmen of this committee have been extremely careful in
making sure that everything was cleared, that everybody was
secure. I think it's been quite flawless that way.
I think all Americans, all government officials, all people
who do public service and others who just might be well known
are at risk. When I was first confronted with this I wasn't
enthused about the idea of public hearings, but I have changed
a bit because I think that's one way one educates not only the
American people but, frankly, the Intelligence Community as a
whole, as well, as Chairman Graham said, our colleagues.
And the end process here is really to make it better and
more efficient for all of us so that there is less frustration
and so that we develop an ability to dialogue with each other,
that you are more confident the system is working which
protects and helps you and propels you forward in your work
rather than the walls and all the rest of it. So I'm glad of
these hearings and I congratulate Chairman Graham and Chairman
Goss.
My two questions are very simple. One is to you, Mr. Kojm.
You talked about, I think, a 455 percent increase in the TIPOFF
data base and the committee added some money for this program
for fiscal year 2003 in, I think, the intelligence
authorization bill. That doesn't mean it's happened yet.
In view of what you told us this morning, does that in fact
give you what you need? If you say 455 percent, people say wow.
It needs, however, in view of what you, Mr. Rolince, just said
in terms of 7,000 or 8,000 people at loose in this country, not
necessarily all terrorists but people that have committed
serious crimes, to be within a context. I need to have a sense
of satisfaction that if this money is forthcoming it will be
sufficient to your purposes.
Mr. Kojm. Senator, thank you very much for the question. I
hope it's not any misimpression that I left, but the nature of
the 455 percent really is the increase in our workload since
September 11. Our funding would be as follows. Prior to
September 11 the program was funded at roughly a little over $1
million a year. Obviously----
Senator Rockefeller. I've rather reversed the tasks, have I
not?
Mr. Kojm. The funds have increased some, but not
proportionate to the work. With the support of----
Senator Rockefeller. Well, let's talk about that, because
that makes my question much more important.
Mr. Kojm. Funding since 9/11 increased to slightly over $3
million, so it's a significant increase in a tiny program. But
it is not sufficient to the workload. At the worker level, we
would believe that funding ought to increase several-fold to
accomplish this task. Within the State Department, the source
of funding for TIPOFF heretofore has been machine-readable visa
fees. What has happened since September 11 is those fees are
going south and have decreased and the requirements for those
funds, because State is a player in homeland security,
particularly with Mexico and Canada, the funding requirements
are going north.
So this is why our senior leadership has been in contact
with the Director of Central Intelligence about a significant
increase in resources for what is a national intelligence
mission.
Senator Rockefeller. Any response?
Mr. Kojm. Yes. I think we can say there is considerable
interest and a favorable disposition, but to speak beyond that
I really can't, Senator.
Senator Rockefeller. Understood.
There was some discussion not only in Ms. Hill's excellent
report this morning but also among the five witnesses that are
before us, or at least four of them, about walls, lack of
communication. This is the essence of everything. It's the
whole concept of how so many of our national security agencies
have their own campuses. Senator Graham and I were talking and
we were talking about going abroad somewhere. Going abroad
could be visiting within a six-mile radius of the United States
Capitol, visiting sort of different cultures, different people
that speak different languages or don't speak to each other or
have bad histories or whatever.
A lot has been written about the NSA. The NSA is not famous
for sharing information. I just am interested in terms of
whether--I might ask that of our two gentlemen that I'm looking
at now. Have you had any problems with that from them, the
sharing of critical information?
FBI Agent. Before September 11, thrown into this whole FISA
question was the question of whether or not we could read
SIGINT. What happened was criminal investigators were
prevented, before 9/11--and again the only way I can describe
it in this short time period is a snowball event--that they
could not read any SIGINT because of the fact that some of the
information that was being fed to them and that they were
utilizing was FISA-derived information. The NSA had decided
that all information then, and since it's possible that some
criminal investigators might read FISA information, that all
criminal investigators cannot read any SIGINT whatsoever.
So prior to September 11, besides not being able to talk
about the information that we've already talked about here
today, no criminal investigator was able to read any SIGINT
information. And that was, in my personal opinion, way too high
of a wall with regards to that, because that was something that
we relied on from a perspective just to kind of point us in the
right direction, if you will, realizing at the same time we
knew, any criminal investigator six months out of Quantico
realizes you can never use that information in an affidavit or
a subpoena or anything like that at all. And that wall has come
down, but there is rumors that it might go back up with regards
to SIGINT information since a lot of it is derived or could be
derived from FISA.
So that is a part of the problem, too, and I think it is a
good thing, Senator, that you brought that up, because criminal
investigators need to be able to look at that information.
Senator Rockefeller. Since I'm not looking at the lights, I
don't know whether or not the red light is on.
Chairman Graham. It is, Senator, and it has been.
Senator Rockefeller. But I had such a good short question,
quite extraordinary.
Chairman Graham. Because we are compassionate, go ahead.
Senator Rockefeller. It really is short and it's to both of
you gentlemen. Is there a general sense in each of you that
what happened on 9/11, and whether or not this open hearing was
a happy or unhappy event, the fact that so much attention has
been focused, the fact that people are talking about
communication, walls and all kinds of things is important? You
know, NSA was No Such Agency for years and maybe some people
are beginning to learn about it.
Is there a sense that there's a brighter future out there,
or the ``overwhelming'' factor that one of you used, does that
predominate? Are you looking, do you think, at an improving
situation? Do you feel that the Congress and your superiors and
those that you work with are going to be able to do their work
better because of the attention post-9/11?
CIA Officer. I will basically just say that the comment
that I hear most often, without having a personal opinion about
resources at this point, but the comment I hear most often from
working level people on both sides of CIA and FBI involved
directly in the bin Ladin business is when, with a panic-
stricken look in their eyes, saying we're going to miss stuff.
We are missing stuff; we can't keep up.
So I believe the--I know that resources are being shifted
to meet this and they continue to be shifted. I know that
technology continues to be modified. And sort of the nightmare
scenario is that the modifications and the resources won't get
there in time. We also understand that we can't do this in five
minutes. We can't fix it in five minutes. But I will tell you
right now from the front lines that the feeling is one that
there is just too much information still to handle and not
enough people to do it.
Senator Rockefeller. So foreboding?
CIA Officer. Yes.
FBI Agent. I would say most field agents are still
frustrated. They realize we've come, with regards to FISA
issues that we've discussed, with the wall being re-set down,
that we've come a long way. But we also realize with the
magnitude of what happened September 11 and trying to prevent
that in the future we need to go further. We need to make sure
that all the walls that we talked about here today continue to
come down and that when information is compartmentalized that
somebody's accountable for that, why that reason is, to all
agencies, not just the FBI or CIA or anything.
So we have some sense that we have made some progress but,
Senator, in my estimation, just from being where I am, is that
we need to continue that and go a lot further.
Senator Rockefeller. I thank you and I thank both Chairmen
very much.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller.
I am going to have to leave. I am turning the chair over to
my colleague, Congressman Goss. I would like to express, as so
many of my colleagues have, our appreciation of your
participation but more so the long service that each of you
have given to the American people. We are deeply in your debt.
FBI Agent. Thank you.
CIA Officer. Thank you.
Mr. Rolince. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Graham. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I was able to add an amendment to the
intelligence authorization and I think you're aware of it,
those of you at State, to create a terrorist tracking system, a
terrorist tracking system. Particularly given what we heard
from Ms. Hill today, it seems to me just stupefying to hear
today that a year after 9/11 discussions are essentially only
under way. That's how it's constantly described--discussions
are under way. But here Ms. Hill today has outlined all of the
problems that were associated with some of the past failures.
In the intelligence authorization the leadership in this
Committee worked very closely with me so that we're trying to
do it in legislation. I think the question I would ask, Mr.
Kojm, is what is it going to take to actually get this done? I
mean, we've got the documented failures. We've got a bipartisan
effort in this Committee to be supportive of your agency and
others. I think I'd like to begin by having you all just give
me a sense of what it is going to take to actually get this
done?
Mr. Kojm. Senator, thank you for your question.
I think the short answer, with all due respect, Senator, is
funds. And the Department does not have them. Consular Affairs
has funded this program almost in its totality from the outset.
It does not have the funds to provide for this purpose. For
this reason, the senior leadership at the Department of State
is seeking funds from elsewhere, from the DCI. And we believe
that will be forthcoming. But beyond that I really can't speak
in detail.
Senator Wyden. I think that is a legitimate concern, but
when I heard Eleanor Hill this morning and I discussed it in
the past, I've not had cited as a primary reason for this a
lack of funds. I mean, what we heard this morning is that it
just seems like somehow the left hand isreluctant to share with
the right hand or they simply don't know about it. I'll be very
supportive of the request for additional funds, but I will tell you the
more I learn about this the more convinced I am that there are a set of
forces operating in the various agencies that have responsibilities
here in the law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
And I'm just committed to getting to the bottom of this so
it happens. You have a commitment on my part, and I know from
others, for the necessary financial support, but I didn't get
the sense, listening to Ms. Hill, that the central problem was
funds.
When you talk about a national lookout center, how would
that work and what agencies and levels of government ought to
have access to this information?
Mr. Kojm. Senator, thank you. I think to help in responding
to your question it's useful to just enumerate how tiny the
TIPOFF program is. We're talking about five federal employees,
six full-time contractors, three part-time contractors, and
some computer support people. It is a tiny program.
To fulfill the purpose that you have stated and which we
believe it needs to fulfill as well it needs to become a much
larger entity, and it needs to have representation from other
agencies. As my colleagues have spoken about how it's so
critically important for FBI and CIA to live and work with each
other, we believe as well that for a national watchlist center
to work effectively it would need representation from CIA, FBI,
NSA, Transportation Security Administration, FAA, Immigration
and Naturalization Service, Coast Guard, probably other
agencies that I haven't named.
Senator Wyden. How many more people do you think are needed
to do this right?
Mr. Kojm. It is a planning figure. If our current number is
eleven, it would be several times that number, probably less
than 100, but it would be considerably more than are now
present. I hope I've made clear in my testimony that this small
number of people cannot do 24 by 7 work. And that is one of the
initial requirements, that we need to have a 24 by 7 presence
rather than calling in people, as we do now, at every odd hour
to come in and handle a case.
Senator Wyden. With the passage of the legislation--and, as
you know, we consulted with a variety of agencies that you
mentioned--how soon could we get this in place, particularly if
the funds are forthcoming?
Mr. Kojm. Well, planning is under way. We do believe that
within a year, certainly within two, we can have a center that
we believe is equal to the task.
Senator Wyden. I hope so, because I know that when I went
home after we dealt with the authorization and people would ask
what was going on, I said I had worked very closely with my
colleagues on a terrorist tracking system, essentially
something that very much is structured along the lines of
TIPOFF. They say, good job, Ron. They say why do we need
something like that? Why wasn't something like that in place by
December 1, a few months after September. And it is very hard
to give an answer to that question, particularly when you
listen to some of the comments of Ms. Hill today, who basically
took sort of step by step how somehow some of these people who
could inflict such harm on this country somehow fell between
the cracks.
And you are forced to conclude that we just can't make the
wheels of government, with all of the inertia that seems to
accompany it so often, work very well. I want it understood
that I'm very much committed to your getting the resources that
you need. I hope that you will continue to work with us to try
to refine the legislation, because in effect our TIC system is
on all fours with what is now considered the TIPOFF program,
and I want to leave here this session with a sense of how on a
date certain we're going to have this expanded program in
place.
Because to hear Ms. Hill, to hear what we heard today, Ms.
Hill outlining all the problems, and then to juxtapose that
alongside the testimony, well, discussions are under way, I
just think we've got to work together and do better. And I'm
committed to making sure that the Congress gets you the tools
and you give us your sense of what it's going to take to get an
expanded program in place quickly.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss [presiding]. I wanted very much to thank the
United States Senate staff here and the joint staff who made
this work, and particularly our witnesses today. It's been
extremely helpful for several of our objectives. The staff has
inevitably given me a couple of sweep-up questions, which I
will try and get properly stated. Mr. Rolince, I think they are
probably both for you.
The first, and it had occurred to me myself as you were
talking: Is it ever possible to open a criminal investigation
on an individual if the only information comes from
intelligence?
Mr. Rolince. Yes, sir. If that intelligence information
touches on criminal activity, then it becomes incumbent upon us
to go back through the system to see--in fact, we do this with
the British all the time, to give you a classic example--go
back through the security services to see if they can't give
that same information to Scotland Yard or to the police so that
they can pass it to us in a criminal channel and we can open a
criminal investigation.
So yes, that is possible.
Chairman Goss. It is possible. It did appear from the way
the statements appeared today that it's a bit of a hindrance,
however, this whole problem that has been brought up before us.
One of the things that occurred to me, if I were a defense
attorney, I would be doing my darndest to try and predict that
my client really shouldn't be here because much of this is
coming from intelligence sources and it's not a criminal deal.
I can understand your problem. It sounds to me like that's
something we as a society and Congress perhaps as a lawmaking
body is going to have to deal with. Do you disagree with that?
Mr. Rolince. I don't disagree with it. I would tell you
from my past experience that, lawyer jokes aside, the
competence and quality of people within our organizations and
within many, many districts--and I would certainly highlight
the Southern District of New York and Eastern District of
Virginia--in past dealings are smart enough to get us through
those problems.
Chairman Goss. That is good. I think what we need to be
reassured is that if there is some piece of legislation that's
in the way or some regulation that's in the way that is causing
people who are out in the field who are testifying here today,
causing the frustrations we've heard expressed, that we need to
take the appropriate action. It would be fixable, in my view,
and should be fixed if it continues to be a problem.
Mr. Rolince. I appreciate that, Senator, and the legal
counsel division representation here and I'm sure next week we
will be happy to talk more on that subject.
Chairman Goss. Thank you. I will not hold it against you
that you called me a Senator. I am a mere Congressman.
Mr. Rolince. Sorry, Congressman. My apologies.
Chairman Goss. The second question also occurred to me but
it's a very good question. In the Cole investigation I think my
colleague Mr. Reyes asked this question about Khallad bin
Attash during the investigation. I think there may have been a
mistake with Khalid al-Mihdhar, and I just want to make sure I
understand this and understand the reasoning of it.
My guess is that it was known to the FBI in June 2001 that
Khalid al-Mihdhar was an associate of Khallad's. Is that
accurate?
FBI Agent. No, sir. Based on our knowledge, no, that was
not accurate. We had reason to believe that another suspect
that was traveling to deliver money to Khallad had actually met
with Khalid al-Mihdhar. We can go into that in detail in a
closed session. But as of thattime we did not. In fact, that's
the type of thing that we were absolutely looking for in that meeting.
That would have been a home run for us.
Chairman Goss. That was my assumption, and my thought was
that you actually had the association. Had you had the
association, you would not have run into all these problems in
that meeting; is that correct?
FBI Agent. Well, I don't know. I don't want to speculate,
but it would have kicked it up to the notch of certainly a
higher level and maybe allowed other avenues for us to pursue.
Chairman Goss. What I think our staff is trying to
understand is, as you are pursuing a particular case and in the
expansion of that case following it where it goes, are there
hindrances that need not be there once you've got the green
light to start down that case every time a new name comes in.
FBI Agent. With regards to certain information, just from
my standpoint as a case agent, yes, there are hindrances. Some
of them are there for very good reasons. What we need help is
just making sure that the criminal agents are aware of all U.S.
Government information that is out there regarding the people
that they're trying to pursue criminally and through intel
investigations within the Bureau, if that answers your
question.
CIA Officer. Could I contribute two cents from the CIA
side?
Chairman Goss. Of course.
CIA Officer. And having observed this from the FBI side as
well. First, in the order of events I don't believe it was
rediscovered because it had been lost in kind of the file that
Khallad was suspected to have been at that meeting. I think
that was not in anybody's head who was up at this meeting in
New York. That didn't resurface again until later. Had it
resurfaced, it would have immediately been passed to the
Bureau.
And in general, speaking as somebody who has been doing
this kind of work for a long time, working with the FBI on
terrorism cases, I arguably should probably know better, but in
general what happens is that when a CIA CTC person deals with
the FBI on a terrorism issue, they don't distinguish between
criminal and non. They just say you're my FBI counterpart;
here's the information. Or they pass it formally.
So I would just again caution that there's a difference
between--that there's not a CIA policy so much that I'm aware
of to refrain from passing to certain parts of the FBI
information in general unless it's specifically noted right
there and there's a clearance process. But when you're doing
operational coordination, I know in the Cole bombing nobody
ever stopped to ask, excuse me, are you a criminal, we can't
give this to you. It was very much, you know, this is the Cole
bombing and how can we help.
So what happens at one meeting, maybe we should just be a
little cautious about generalizing to practice I guess is what
I'm trying to say. Thank you.
Chairman Goss. Well, I think that's a very good
observation. I think there may be a general observation that's
more relevant, and that is there probably is a greater
difference in the Washington area. In the headquarters area
these distinctions are made with greater attention to detail
than they are in the field, where you're really doing the
urgent and necessary work in a very different climate, which we
understand. I'm trying to make sure that not only is the
cooperation in the field working but that we are not creating
any impediments to that cooperation back home, because I think
we all understand there is a healthy friction between the field
and headquarters.
CIA Officer. And I do have to say this and I'm violating my
own common sense by going too far, I think, but I will say it.
The key area to look at here, having watched the amount of pain
that my colleagues in the FBI go through on this subject, is
the FISA process. Without being an expert in the detail, that
is the key domestic pain issue that I see at FBI headquarters.
Chairman Goss. Well, you've noticed Congress has taken a
cut at that already and we didn't get it exactly right the
first time, apparently. The courts are suggesting some things.
So this is not a closed book by any means. But I think we share
the frustration and agree with the observation.
I had a question for Mr. Kojm, and that is basically this.
Even if we had watchlists that had the right criteria that
stopped a lot of these people trying to come in legally, would
we then have solved the problem of would-be terrorists or
others coming into the country illegally?
Mr. Kojm. Mr. Chairman, the answer I think is clear. We
would not. It clearly would be helpful to have comprehensive
data bases with excellent information and low thresholds for
inclusion of information, but if you enter the country
illegally you would not be captured in any way, shape or form
by such a process.
Chairman Goss. And then you would have to break a law,
presumably, to come to the attention of the law enforcement
authorities.
Mr. Kojm. That's my impression.
Chairman Goss. Since we don't have any intelligence
activity in this country, that seems to be where we are, which
is a very interesting question for us to ponder as we go
forward.
The last question I had I wanted to state in a cultural
way. We've heard a whole list of reasons why the system doesn't
work up to the expectations we all had to prevent a 9/11, and
there's quite a number of them. They're all justifiable in
terms of what things can go wrong, do go wrong. I think the
most impressive to me is the continuous statement about how
overwhelmed our people are, don't have time to do their job--
it's not just resources; it's time as well--that the
regulations sometimes, the death of common sense actually did
happen--it died. The guy in New York who wrote that book was
right that the regulations go haywire on us.
The culture is another area that I'm very concerned about.
I know that there are many who feel that the culture of the
Intelligence Community is compartmentation and need to know,
and that in its own way seems to run directly counter to
coordination and sharing information. On the other hand, I well
understand in law enforcement prosecutions are a great way to
get career advancement--successful prosecutions. So we've got a
cultural problem to deal with too, and we don't want to take
the esprit away from anybody on the one hand, but we've got to
work better efficiencies on the other.
Assigning priorities to resources is an incomplete skill
and science, it seems, and I know quite often that agencies
don't get the same satisfaction out of OMB that they'd like to
get, and we on the Hill have different points of view sometimes
about both what the agencies and OMB think. The management
decisions we find unevenness in management and in some cases
brilliant management, in some cases not so brilliant, failing
to recognize changed times and changed threats.
Communications requirements, which go beyond culture into
technology, secure communications and personnel exchanges we've
talked about. All of these things are fixable and all of these
things need to be fixed for America, who it's our mission to
provide the greatest amount of security for. And for you folks
doing the work, I want to assure you the whole purpose of these
9/11 joint investigations for us is, to the greatest degree
possible, find out what we can do better so we can fix it. That
is not going to be done in one set of hearings. It is going to
take continuous time. So do not feel that when we put the gavel
down to close this hearing that that's the end of this. It is
going to go forward, because until we finish the process of
making the fixes we haven't done our job.
I want to thank you very much for your part in that today.
If there's no further comment, we will call this session
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the Joint Inquiry hearing
adjourned.]
JOINT COMMITTEE HEARING ON THE FBI'S HANDLING OF THE PHOENIX ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATION AND OF THE INVESTIGATION OF ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI PRIOR TO
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002
U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in
Room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Porter
Goss, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, presiding.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence members present:
Senators Graham, Shelby, Levin, Rockefeller, Feinstein, Bayh,
Edwards, Mikulski, Kyl, Inhofe, Hatch, Roberts, and DeWine.
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence members
present: Representatives Goss, Bereuter, Castle, Boehlert,
Gibbons, Hoekstra, Burr, Chambliss, Pelosi, Harman, Roemer,
Boswell, Peterson, and Cramer.
Chairman Goss. I call to order the joint inquiry of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence.
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. This is the fourth open
hearing by our committees as they conduct their joint inquiry
into the Intelligence Community's performance regarding the
September 11 attacks. The committee has also held 10 closed
hearings.
Today's hearing will be in several parts. First, the
committees will hear from Eleanor Hill, staff director of our
joint inquiry, who will present a staff statement on this
portion of our inquiry.
We will then ask the press and the public to leave the room
while we prepare it for our next panel of witnesses. I will
explain the purpose of doing so after the room is reopened for
the testimony of that panel.
It is our intention to conduct as much as we can of today's
hearing in open session so that the full Congress and the
public will have the benefit of the testimony presented here.
In the event it is necessary to take up some other matters
in closed session, the committees will act under the applicable
House and Senate rules to complete the hearings in closed
session.
Is Ms. Hill here? Thank you.
The Moussaoui investigation and the Phoenix communication,
the subject of today's discussions, each raise significant
questions in their own right. However, for several reasons we
have decided to approach the two issues in one hearing.
Both the Moussaoui investigation and the Phoenix
communication were handled by the same unit in the FBI
headquarters. Both matters came to FBI headquarters attention
in the summer of 2001, at a time when the Intelligence
Community faced an increasing number of reports of imminent al-
Qa'ida attacks against U.S. interests.
At this hearing, we want to explore whether the FBI's
investigation of Mr. Moussaoui in the summer of 2001 was
focused only on investigating a potential specific crime
concerning him, or whether the FBI also worked to identify any
linkages between or among separate investigations.
Finally, we are interested in whether anyone at FBI
headquarters connected Mr. Moussaoui, the Phoenix
communication, the possible presence of a Kahlid al-Mihdhar and
Nawaf al-Hazmi in the United States, and the flood of warning
about possible terrorist attacks during the summer of 2001.
Members will recall we had an extensive discussion on Mr. Al-
Mihdhar and Mr. Al-Hazmi last week in our public hearings.
I am now going to ask my colleagues for their opening
remarks. I start with Chairman Graham of the Senate.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Chairman Goss.
I would like to say how pleased I am with the progress of
our public hearings, how grateful I am for the outstanding work
that has been done by the special investigation staff under the
able leadership of Eleanor Hill. The staff's work has
contributed to a significant expansion of knowledge of
knowledge of the tragic events of September 11 by the public,
by the Congress, and especially by the members of the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees.
We are, without a doubt, better positioned as we look ahead
to the third and what I consider to be the most important
responsibility of this joint inquiry, recommending and
advocating the reforms that will be necessary to allow our
Intelligence Community to detect, deter and disrupt future
terrorist plots against our citizens.
I would like to take a few moments at this fourth public
hearing to address an issue about which there has been
considerable public comment and some confusion. That is the
question of the continued classification of the identities of
recipients of key intelligence documents.
As Ms. Hill told us last week, there has been objection to
the public identification of which documents were received by
the President. I would like to make several points.
One, the joint inquiry committee has possession of these
documents or the information upon which the documents were
predicated. The committee also has knowledge of which documents
were distributed to whom, including which were distributed to
the President.
Two, the documents themselves have been declassified in
whole or in part. What has not been declassified are the
specifics of what documents were shared with the person who
held the office of the Presidency.
Three, this policy is being applied to all Presidential
communications in all administrations. The policy is
applicable, as an example, to the documents that were or were
not presented to President Reagan, to President Bush, to
President Clinton and to the current President Bush. In other
words, the exception being claimed is not peculiar to this
President but applied consistently to all occupants of the Oval
Office.
Four, we are continuing to pursue this matter with the
National Security Council and the Director of Central
Intelligence. We are encouraging the National Security Council
and the Director of Central Intelligence to either rescind this
prohibition or to provide a written statement of policy and
rationale which will be understood and accepted by the American
people and Members of Congress as worthy of this restriction.
To date, that written statement of rationale has not been
provided.
It is my position that this material should be
declassified. I believe that there should be a presumption that
this information is important to the public's understanding of
and confidence in the management of the Federal Government. All
of us are privileged to serve in public office. We are
accountable to the public. It is also essential to the accuracy
and completeness of the historical records in this important
chapter of our Nation's history.
So today, Mr. Chairman, I urge the National Security
Council and the DCI to reconsider or to provide us with the
rationale for a continuation of this policy of non-
declassification.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Chairman Graham.
I now turn to the ranking member, Ms. Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, want to join you and Chairman Graham in commending
Eleanor Hill on the Senate side here, Eleanor Hill, for her
excellent work and that of the staff.
I proceed very cautiously with my next statement because I
take it very seriously, and I don't want it to be
misunderstood. But I want to express strongly my opposition to
the continued refusal of the administration to declassify which
senior government officials received certain information
referred to by Ms. Eleanor Hill in her public statement on
September 18.
In my judgment, the information at issue meets none of the
criteria for proper classification. The disclosure of the
information would not affect national security. The DCI's
apparent unwillingness to declassify this information is a
grave mistake, which will undoubtedly further weaken public
confidence in the entire classification system.
Far too much information is classified, even though it
might meet classification standards. To classify for the wrong
reasons when security is not at stake, when nothing of
substance is really at stake, undermines the willingness of the
American people to put their faith and trust in their
government. Especially at this time in our history, that is not
an outcome which anyone should want.
The committees have procedures to challenge this decision.
I know that our distinguished chairman has asked the DCI and
the NSC to reconsider their decision. I am saying, Mr.
Chairman, that it is time to consider seriously using the
procedures these committees have to challenge the decision.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Thank you very much, Ms. Pelosi.
I would just add that I expect a timely answer; and I will
share the answer I get, of course, with the members of this
joint panel.
The Vice Chairman, I now turn to Senator Shelby.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Mr. Chairman, I will not have a
written statement, but I would like to associate myself with
the remarks of Senator Graham and Congresswoman Pelosi
regarding this information. I think that we need it. I think
there is no reason to keep it from the public and go from
there.
You know, as Senator Graham said, we already have the
substance of it in our possession. It is just a question of
moving forward. Thank you.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Senator Shelby.
Today's interim statement of the joint inquiry staff will
address the FBI investigations of Zacarias Moussaoui and the
FBI's handling of the Phoenix electronic communication as it is
called.
With respect to the Moussaoui investigation, because of the
pending prosecution, Ms. Hill's statement and the testimony of
the witnesses will be limited to the FBI's investigation of Mr.
Moussaoui prior to September 11, 2001; and I believe Ms. Hill
is going to have some recent information on the limits of how
far we can go today in her opening statement.
Ms. Hill, before I ask you to proceed, I will ask unanimous
consent that the full opening session staff statement for this
portion of the inquiry be placed in the record, that a staff
statement containing classified materials and any other matters
not made public at this time be placed in a classified or
otherwise nonpublic portion of the record, and that Chairman
Graham and I, acting jointly after consultation with Ranking
Member Pelosi and Vice Chairman Shelby, be authorized to place
in an appropriate place in the record classified and
unclassified exhibits that are designated for inclusion by the
staff director of the joint inquiry or any member of the two
committees.
Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Senator Kyl.
Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection, but I would
like the record to note that the matter that the four of you
just spoke to is not a matter that has been discussed by the
full membership of the committee. Therefore, at least I, for
one, am in no position to judge whether the requests that you
have made are warranted or not; and I think the record should
reflect the fact that that, therefore, is a request of the four
Chairmen and Vice Chairman, not of the membership of the
committee as a whole, at least if and until we are ever in a
committee session where we can discuss that.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Senator Kyl. Point noted, and I
will assure you that Senator Graham's remarks about getting
something in writing is an effort so that we would have a base
document that we could all share and deliberate over.
Mr. Roemer. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. Chairman, based on the bipartisan remarks that we have
heard from the so-called big four, who have all voiced concern
about the administration's failure to declassify this, is it
your intention on the House side, Mr. Chairman, to engage this
process before the full committee, a debate and a vote on the
declassification in the Intelligence Committee before it would
proceed to the House under Rule 10?
Chairman Goss. I believe that I have an understanding of
the membership that there is a consensus at this point that we
should see if there is a reasonable justification to keep this
material from the public.
If there is not, I think we will understand that we are
going to get the material to the public.
Mr. Roemer. So it is my understanding then, with that
answer, if the Administration responds to you in the negative,
saying that they stand by their initial decision to keep this
classified, then you would bring this before the full
Intelligence Committee----
Chairman Goss. Oh, yes.
Mr. Roemer (continuing). For discussion and debate and
possibly a vote?
Chairman Goss. It will certainly come to the Committee,
either in separate form of the House and Senate or jointly or
both.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I strongly agree with
that. Thank you.
Chairman Goss. Thank you.
Any further parliamentary inquiries?
There being none, we will proceed.
Good morning, Ms. Hill. We welcome you.
Ms. Hill. Good morning.
Chairman Goss. The floor is yours.
[The prepared staff statement follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT OF ELEANOR HILL, STAFF DIRECTOR, JOINT INQUIRY STAFF
Ms. Hill. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committees, at our last
hearing last week we discussed information that the
Intelligence Community had available prior to September 11,
2001, regarding the September 11 hijackers.
Today, as the Chairman has alluded to, I will discuss two
additional topics: First, the July 10, 2001, electronic
communication, or EC, from the FBI's Phoenix field office to
FBI headquarters, also known as the Phoenix memo or in this
statement as the Phoenix EC; and the investigation prior to
September 11, 2001, of Zacarias Moussaoui. As mentioned last
week, I want to again emphasize the significance of these
areas, not just individually but also, perhaps more
importantly, when viewed collectively.
Information regarding all three areas was available in the
same section at the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
headquarters in late August, 2001. Two of these areas were
addressed in the Director of Central Intelligence's
Counterterrorism Center at approximately the same time. Yet no
one, apparently, saw the potential collective significance of
the information, despite the increasing concerns throughout the
summer of 2001 about an impending terrorist attack.
I am first going to discuss the Phoenix electronic
communication.
The FBI's special agent in Phoenix, who I am told will be
here testifying later this morning, who wrote the EC, told the
joint inquiry staff that he first became concerned about
aviation-related terrorism in the early 1990s. He was working
on two cases in which Libyans with suspected terrorist ties
were working for U.S. aviation companies.
In addition, several bin Ladin operatives had lived and
traveled to the Phoenix area in the past, including a bin Ladin
lieutenant convicted for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings.
The Phoenix agent believes that that individual established an
Usama bin Ladin support network in Arizona while he was living
there and that this network is still in place.
In writing the EC, the Phoenix agent said he never imagined
terrorists using airplanes as was done on September 11. His
primary concern was that Islamic extremists studying everything
from aviation security to flying could be learning how to
hijack or destroy aircraft and to evade airport security.
In April of 2000, the agent interviewed the individual who
was to become the subject of the Phoenix EC. When he normally
interviews young foreign nationals, he told us that they
usually tend to be at least somewhat intimidated in their first
contact with an FBI agent. By contrast, this individual told
the agent directly that he considered the U.S. Government and
the U.S. military legitimate targets of Islam. In looking
around the individual's apartment, the agent noticed a poster
of bin Ladin and another poster of wounded Chechnyan mujahedin
fighters. He was also concerned by the fact that this
individual was from a poor Middle Eastern country and had been
studying a non-aviation-related subject prior to his arrival in
the United States.
Another incident increased the agent's suspicion about
Middle Eastern flight students in the Phoenix area. During a
physical surveillance of the subject of the Phoenix EC, the
agent determined that he was using a vehicle registered to
another individual. In 1999, the owner of the car and an
associate of his were detained for trying to gain access to the
cockpit of a commercial airliner on a domestic flight. They
were released after an investigation. The FBI closed the case,
and the two were not prosecuted.
A year later, the individual's name was added to the State
Department's watch list after intelligence information was
received indicating that he may have gotten explosive and car
bomb training in Afghanistan.
In August, 2001, that same individual applied for a visa to
reenter the United States and, as a result of the watch
listing, was denied entry.
In May, 2001, the Phoenix agent became increasingly
concerned by the number of individuals of potential
investigative interest enrolled in aviation training. At that
point, he began to draft the EC, which focuses on 10
individuals who were the subjects of FBI investigations. Not
all were in flight training. Several were aeronautical
engineering students, and one was studying international
aviation security.
One of the individuals under investigation was the primary
focus of the Phoenix EC. That individual was a member of the
al-Muhajiroun, whose spiritual leader was a strong supporter of
bin Ladin and who had issued a number of fatwas against the
United States, one mentioning airports as a possible target.
The subject of the Phoenix investigation was taking
aviation-related security courses. As a member of the al-
Muhajiroun, he was organizing anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli
rallies and calling for Jihad.
The investigation of this individual led to the opening of
investigations on six of his associates also involved in
aviation training.
We asked the Phoenix agent whether he had received any
intelligence from FBI headquarters or from other Intelligence
Community agencies that contributed to the suspicions he raised
in the EC. According to the agent, the Phoenix office did not
receive FBI, Intelligence Community or foreign intelligence
service products on a regular basis. He told us that he
believes that, prior to September 11, 2001, the FBI was not
running counterterrorism as a national level program. He often
has felt that he is ``out on an island'' in Phoenix.
He said that, prior to headquarters downsizing, the FBI
used to do a better job of disseminating intelligence products
to the field. He does not believe that sufficient resources are
devoted to counterterrorism, even though it is officially a
Tier 1 program. In his words, counterterrorism and
counterintelligence have always been considered ``the bastard
stepchild'' of the FBI, because these programs do not generate
the statistics that other programs do.
The Phoenix EC requested that FBI headquarters consider
implementing four recommendations: One, headquarters should
accumulate a list of civil aviation university colleges around
the country; two, FBI officers should establish liaison with
those schools; three, headquarters should discuss the Phoenix
theories with the Intelligence Community; and, four,
headquarters should consider seeking authority to obtain visa
information on individuals seeking to attend flight schools.
On July 30, 2001, an intelligence assistant in the Radical
Fundamentalist Unit, or RFU, at FBI headquarters assigned the
lead on the Phoenix EC to an intelligence operations
specialist. The RFU IOS, in turn, contacted an IOS,
intelligence operations specialist, in the Usama bin Ladin Unit
to effect a transfer.
The UBLU IOS then consulted two other operations
specialists, intelligence operations specialists, in her unit.
Their discussions centered on the legality of the visa
information proposal and whether it raised profiling issues.
On August 7, 2001, the EC was forwarded to an intelligence
analyst in the Portland office stating that the document
``basically puts forth a theory on individuals being directed
to come here to study aviation and their ties to extremists.
Nothing concrete or whatever, but some very interesting
coincidences. I thought it would be interesting to you,
considering some of the stuff you were coming up with in PD,
Portland. Let me know if anything strikes you.''
The Portland analyst has said that she had spoken to the
IOS at the Usama bin Ladin Unit on several occasions about the
aviation-related ties of terrorist subjects in the Portland and
Seattle areas. She did not take action on the communication or
disseminate it any further, as it was only sent to her for
informational purposes.
On August 7, 2001, both IOSs decided that the lead should
be closed. In the electronic system, the RFU IOS noted that the
lead was, ``covered, consulted with UBLU, no action at this
time, will reconvene on this issue.''
The UBLU IOS maintains that she fully intended to return to
the project once she had time to do additional research but
that September 11 occurred and she had not yet had an
opportunity to do so.
Both IOSs also said that they considered assigning the
Phoenix project to a headquarters analytic unit but decided
against it. In an interview with the supervisory agent in the
UBLU, the staff was told that the EC should have been assigned
to an analytic unit, because it was a long-term, labor-
intensive suggestion and that analytic units would have more
time to devote to it than the operational units.
The chiefs of both the RFU and the UBLU informed the staff
that they did not see the Phoenix communication prior to
September 11. Moreover, neither remembers even hearing about
the flight school issue until after September 11.
The manner in which FBI headquarters handled the Phoenix EC
provides a valuable window into the FBI's operational
environment prior to September 11 and illustrates several
procedural weaknesses that have been recognized and are
currently being addressed.
The manner in which the EC was handled demonstrated how
strategic analysis took a back seat to operational priorities
prior to September 11. That many in the U.S. Government
believed an attack of some type was imminent in the summer of
2001 apparently only served to further de-emphasize strategic
analysis.
For example, the IOS handling the Phoenix EC was primarily
concerned with an individual in the EC who was connected to
individuals arrested overseas. The IOS paid less attention to
the flight school theories. For his part, the RFU chief said he
was seeing about 100 pieces of mail daily and could not keep
up. His solution was to assign the review of intelligence
reports to his IOS.
Even the analytic unit responsible for strategic analysis
was largely producing tactical products to satisfy the
operational section. In fact, there was no requirement to
handle projects with nationwide impact, such as Phoenix, any
different than any other project. This now has been changed.
Any lead of the types such as Phoenix presented must now be
raised to the section chief level.
The handling of the Phoenix EC also exposed information-
sharing problems between FBI headquarters elements. A number of
analysts commented that the UBLU and the RFU frequently do not
share information with the international terrorism analytic
unit. Had the project been transferred to the analytic unit,
the capability to conduct strategic analysis on al-Qa'ida was
limited, because five of the unit's analysts had transferred
into operational units.
The handling of the Phoenix EC also illustrates the extent
to which technological limitations affect information flow at
the FBI. A number of individuals who were addressees on the EC
stated that they did not see it prior to September 11. The
FBI's electronic system is not designed to ensure that all
addressees on a communication actually receive it.
Furthermore, the system is capable of recognizing units
only if they are precisely designated in the lead section.
Otherwise, a unit would not receive the communication. In fact,
the electronic system was considered so unreliable that many
FBI personnel, both at the field offices and at headquarters,
used e-mail instead.
Several FBI personnel interviewed conceded that it was
possible that routine leads on which there was no direct
communication were falling through the cracks. The joint
inquiry staff has been informed that the FBI recently
determined that there are 68,000 outstanding and unassigned
leads assigned to the counterterrorism division dating back to
1995.
Since many FBI personnel have not been using the electronic
system for these purposes, it is difficult to know how many of
these leads have actually been completed. We are told that the
counterterrorism division's management is currently looking
into this situation.
FBI officials have noted, both in public statements and in
Congressional testimony, that the September 11 hijackers did
not associate with anyone of investigative interest. However,
there is some evidence that hijacker Hani Hanjour, who was
unknown to the Intelligence Community and law enforcement
agencies prior to September 11, 2001, was an associate of an
individual mentioned in the Phoenix EC. This individual had
been engaged in flight training in the United States, and the
FBI believed that he was possibly a radical fundamentalist.
The FBI believes that as early as 1997 Hanjour and the
individual named in the Phoenix EC trained together at a flight
school in Arizona. Several instructors at the flight school say
that they were associates, and one thinks that they may have
carpooled together. The FBI has confirmed at least five
occasions when the Phoenix subject and Hanjour were at the
flight school on the same day.
On one occasion in 1999, the flight school logs indicate
that Hanjour and this individual used the same plane. According
to the flight instructor, the individual mentioned in the EC
was there as observer. The rules of the school were such that
for this individual to observe, Hanjour would have had to
approve of his presence in the aircraft.
Another individual informed the FBI that this individual
named in the EC and Hanjour knew each other both from flight
training and through a religious center in Arizona.
The FBI's evidence linking the two in the summer of 2001 is
not as strong.
The FBI has located records from the flight school in
Phoenix indicating that on one day in June, 2001, Hanjour and
several other individuals signed up to use the Cessna
simulator. The next day, the two individuals who signed up with
Hanjour the previous day came to the facility with the
individual mentioned in the Phoenix EC.
Another employee of the flight school has placed Hanjour
and the individual together during that time frame, although
she was not completely confident in her identification. The FBI
attempted to investigate this individual in May of 2001, but
discovered that he was out of the country. The FBI was
apparently unaware that he had returned to the United States
soon after and may have been associating with Hanjour and
several other Islamic extremists.
A Phoenix agent told the staff that, had the individual
been in the country in May of 2001, they would have opened an
investigation. However, the Phoenix office generally did not
open investigations on individuals who they believed had
permanently left the United States.
The Phoenix office also did not notify the INS, State
Department, or the CIA of their interest in this individual.
No one can say whether the FBI would have developed an
investigative interest in Hanjour had they opened an
investigation on the individual mentioned in the Phoenix EC
prior to September 11. If the hijackers were in fact
associating with individuals of investigative interest, there
are more significant questions as to whether or not they should
have come to the FBI's attention prior to the attacks. These
associations continued to raise questions about the FBI's
knowledge and understanding of the radical fundamentalist
network in the United States prior to September 11.
The Phoenix EC was not the first occasion that the FBI had
been concerned about terrorist groups sending individuals to
the United States for aviation study. Neither the individual
involved in drafting the Phoenix EC nor the FBI personnel who
worked on it at headquarters were aware of this broader
context.
In March, 1983, the INS published a rule in the Federal
Register terminating the non-immigrant status of Libyan
nationals or individuals acting on behalf of Libyan entities
engaged in aviation ornuclear-related education. The INS turned
to the FBI for assistance in locating any such individuals.
In May of 1983, FBI headquarters sent a ``priority''
communication to all field offices asking them for assistance
in complying with the INS request. The joint inquiry staff has
not been able to locate all of the relevant records, so it is
not clear how many students the FBI located and deported.
In 1998, the chief pilot of the FBI's Oklahoma City field
office contacted an agent on the counterterrorism squad to
inform him that he had observed large numbers of Middle Eastern
males at Oklahoma flight schools. An intraoffice communication
to the counterterrorism squad noted the chief pilot's concern
that the aviation education might be related to planned
terrorist activity and his speculation that light planes would
be an ideal means of spreading chemical or biological agents.
The communication was sent to the office's weapons of mass
destruction control file. It appears to have been for
informational purposes only. There is no indication that any
follow-up action was either requested or conducted.
The FBI also received reporting in 1998 that a terrorist
organization might be planning to bring students to the United
States for training at flight schools.
The FBI was aware that individuals connected to the
organization had performed surveillance and security tests at
U.S. airports and made comments suggesting an intention to
target civil aviation. There is no indication that the
organization actually followed through on their plans.
In 1999, reporting was received that yet another terrorist
organization was planning to send students to the United States
for aviation training. The purpose of this training was
unknown, but the terrorist organization leaders viewed the
requirement as being ``particularly important,'' and were
reported to have approved an open-ended amount of funding to
ensure its success.
In response, an operational unit in the counterterrorism
section at FBI headquarters sent a communication to 24 field
offices asking them to pay close attention to Islamic students
in their area from the target country who were engaged in
aviation training.
The communication requested that field offices ``task
sources, coordinate with the INS, and conduct other logical
inquiries in an effort to develop an intelligence baseline''
regarding this terrorist group's use of students.
To date, we have found no indication that the FBI field
offices conducted any investigation after receiving the
communication.
In November of 1999, the FBI sent a letter to INS
explaining the intelligence and requesting a database search
for individuals studying in the United States from the target
country. According to interviews, the INS never provided any
information in response to the request.
The project was subsequently assigned to the international
terrorism analytic unit at FBI headquarters. The analyst
assigned to the project determined that there were 75 academic
institutions offering flight education in the United States and
an additional 1,000 flight schools.
In November, 2000, the analyst sent a communication to the
FBI field offices informing them that no information was
uncovered concerning this terrorist group's recruitment of
students studying aviation and stated that ``further
investigation by FBI field offices is deemed imprudent'' by FBI
headquarters.
The former unit chief of the operational unit involved in
this project told the joint inquiry staff that he was not
surprised by the apparent lack of vigorous investigative action
by the field offices. In his opinion, the field offices did not
like to undertake difficult, labor-intensive projects like this
with a high risk of failure. He told us that the FBI's culture
often prevented headquarters from forcing field offices to take
investigative action that they were unwilling to take.
The Phoenix EC was also sent to two investigators in the
FBI's New York field office who specialized in Usama bin Ladin
cases. They were asked to ``read and clear'' but were not asked
to take any follow-up action.
A joint inquiry staff audit of electronic records shows
that at least three people in New York saw the EC prior to
September 11. It does not appear to have received much
attention or elicited much concern. Two of the three do not
recall the communication prior to September 11. The third
remembered reading it but said it did not resonate with him
because he found it speculative.
The New York agents stated that they were well aware that
Middle Eastern men frequently came to the United States for
flight training. A communication noting that Middle Eastern men
with ties to bin Ladin were receiving flight training in the
United States would not necessarily be considered particularly
alarming because New York personnel knew that individuals
connected to al-Qa'ida had previously received flight training
in the United States.
In fact, one of these individuals trained at the Airman
flight school in Norman, Oklahoma, the same place where
Zacarias Moussaoui trained prior to his arrival in Minnesota.
Mohammed Atta and another of the hijackers visited this same
flight school but decided not to enroll there. The commonly
held view at the FBI prior to September 11 was that bin Ladin
needed pilots to operate aircraft he had purchased in the
United States to move men and material.
Mr. Chairman, I also will now turn to the investigation by
the FBI of Zacarias Moussaoui.
Zacarias Moussaoui also first came to the attention of the
FBI during the summer of 2001----
Chairman Goss. Ms. Hill, may I interrupt for a moment,
please?
Ms. Hill. Yes.
Chairman Goss. We are advised that there is a vote on in
the Senate. I yield to Senator Graham.
Chairman Graham. Ms. Hill, would this be an appropriate
place to break for the members of the Senate to be able to make
this vote?
Ms. Hill. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think so, because I am about
to start on the Moussaoui case.
Chairman Graham. Then I would recommend to our Senate
members that we vote and return as expeditiously as possible.
Chairman Goss. Because we want all members to hear the
opening presentation and the opening statements of the
witnesses we will have later, we will be in recess until the
return of the Senate.
Ms. Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Recess.]
Chairman Goss. The Committee will please come back to order
and we will continue the hearing which has been suspended for
the vote of the Senate. I note that two of the big four are
back.
I also would like to with great pride take a moment of
privilege and introduce to our colleagues on both sides the
leadership tomorrow from southwest Florida. We have about 25 of
the students and seniors who are up here with the Congressional
Classroom who are observing this hearing for a while this
morning, and these folks worked hard to get here. They will be
here for a week following Members around, learning about the
Executive branch and so forth. It is an excellent idea, and I
urge other colleagues to consider it. It is the most rewarding
thing I think I do as a Member of Congress to have the
privilege of hosting these folks and following up with them. We
have been doing it for 14 years, and many of them have gone on
to be great leaders. So it is a useful thing.
If any other of the Members have similar groups here, we
will be glad to recognize them as we go along.
Returning to the business at hand, Ms. Hill.
Ms. Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Zacarias Moussaoui also
first came to the attention of the FBI during the summer of
2001, at a time when the Intelligence Community was detecting
numerous indicators of an impending terrorist attack against
U.S. interests. Moussaoui has been indicted and faces a
criminal trial this fall. Among other things, Moussaoui has
been charged with Federal charges of conspiracy to commit
aircraft piracy ``with the result that thousands of people died
on September 11, 2001.''
In order to avoid affecting the course of that proceeding,
the Joint Inquiry Staff has limited the amount of detail in
this presentation while attempting to provide a general
understanding of the facts of the investigation, and I want to
take just a moment to update the members of the committees on
where we are regarding the limitations on what we can say about
the Moussaoui case vis-a-vis the criminal trial that is pending
in Alexandria.
We had been working very closely with the Justice
Department, and this is not a classification issue. This was
over and above the review of the statement because of
classification issues. We have been working very closely with
the Justice Department to ensure that in no way we prejudice
Mr. Moussaoui's right to a fair trial in the criminal case, and
as of last Friday, the Justice Department--I believe it was
last Friday--the Justice Department had filed a motion with
Judge Brinkema, who is presiding over the criminal case, to
clarify what the FBI witnesses who will be here this morning
when I finish to testify can and cannot say in their testimony
about the Moussaoui case.
And the concern was that under the local rule 57 in the
Federal Court in Virginia they would be prohibited from talking
about some very broad categories of information, including--and
I will just mention a few--obviously anything that would
comment on Mr. Moussaoui's guilt or innocence, anything that
would reveal what trial witnesses would be testifying to,
statements of witnesses and also anything relating to
statements of the defendant himself, Mr. Moussaoui.
The Justice Department had asked the court to clarify to
what degree that would limit the witnesses' ability to answer
questions, and basically had asked that the court clarify those
limitations so that we would know how to proceed this morning.
The joint committees responded and did file a written
response in the court on Monday, which was yesterday, and we
had assumed--we were trying to be cautious in proceeding by
deleting a lot of the material in this statement that pertained
to Moussaoui's statements, or witness statements.
Last night, late in the day, we received a written order
from Judge Brinkema, who had ruled on the Justice Department
motion and our response, and I will read it to you--it is only
a three-page order. It was signed by her yesterday, but the
important and pertinent part of it is the statement which
responds to what witnesses can and cannot say in these hearings
about the Moussaoui case, The joint inquiry made clear in its
August 5th, 2002 letter to the Assistant Attorney General for
the criminal division the limited parameters of the inquiry and
has reiterated in its reply that the committees will not ask
witnesses to comment about the merits of the case.''
Indeed, the questions are expected to focus on--and this is
quoting from our motion--``what government officials heard,
observed, reasoned, recommended and acted on or did not act on
prior to September 11.'' The committees are not interested in
``expressions of current judgment from government witnesses
about the defendant's guilt or innocence or the government's
plans for presenting its case.''
And this is the pertinent part. The judge ruled, ``given
the ground rules articulated by the joint inquiry, FBI
personnel should have no difficulty responding to Congress's
questions without violating local rule 57 or any other order of
this court. Accordingly, the renewed expedited motion for
clarification is denied.''
So Judge Brinkema, as of last night, has, I think, made it
clear that the witnesses are free to answer questions about--a
quote from her order--``what government officials heard,
observed, reasoned, recommended and acted on or did not act on
prior to September 11.''
Obviously--and she mentions this in the order, and we had
represented to her--we are not asking the witnesses to come and
testify on whether or not they believe Mr. Moussaoui is
innocent or guilty or on the merits of the criminal case or
plans for presenting evidence in the criminal case, but to the
extent we can go into what people knew or heard or did prior to
the 11th without talking about the merits of the case, I
believe the judge has pretty clearly stated that that is
permissible and would not violate the local rule.
My only other caveat is that our statement included more
detail which was taken out before this order was entered, and
so we will probably, at a later date, now go back and try for
the record to reinsert some of the detail that was in here,
consulting with the Department of Justice on that.
Mr. Chambliss. Mr. Chairman, could we get a copy of the
judge's order disseminated to all members before we begin an
examination?
Chairman Goss. I believe in fact there was some effort to
get them in the book. I am not sure it is the full order. Is
there a tab?
Ms. Hill. I believe it is----
Mr. Chambliss. In the book.
Chairman Goss. This just came in. I believe most of the
books were updated.
Ms. Hill. It is only a three-page order, and, Mr. Chairman,
I would also ask that we make this part of the record, the
judge's order.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, when the material is
reinserted and then put in the record, could Ms. Hill give us a
copy of the reinsertion, highlighting the material which has
been reinserted which was not in her report which she is
presenting today.
Chairman Goss. The answer to that, Senator, is yes. In
fact, the principals have discussed a way to do that this
morning and make sure everybody understands what has been of
particular interest to us which we are now free to highlight
again.
Ms. Hill. All right. With that caveat, I will proceed to
read the highlights of the statement.
Our review of the FBI's investigation to date has
identified three issues in particular to which I will draw
Members' attention--the differences in the way the FBI field
offices and headquarters components analyzed and perceived the
danger posed by the facts uncovered during the FBI's
investigation of Moussaoui prior to September 11; the tools
available to the FBI under the Constitution and laws of the
United States to investigate that danger, notably, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, and whether FBI personnel
were well organized and informed about the availability of
those tools; and whether the substance, clarity and urgency of
the threat warning provided by the FBI to other parts of the
Intelligence Community corresponded to the danger that had been
identified.
The FBI's focus at the time Moussaoui was taken into
custody appears to the staff to have been almost entirely on
investigating specific crimes and not on identifying linkages
between separate investigations or on sharing information with
other U.S. Government agencies with counterterrorist
responsibilities. No one at FBI headquarters apparently
connected Moussaoui, the Phoenix memo, the possible presence of
Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi in the United States and
the flood of warnings about possible terrorist attacks during
the summer of 2001.
The staff has determined that Moussaoui contacted the
Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma on September 29, 2000
and expressed interest in taking lessons to fly a small Cessna
aircraft. On February 23, he entered the United States at
Chicago's O'Hare Airport, traveling on a French passport that
allowed him to stay in the United States with a visa for 90
days. On February 26, he began flight lessons at Airman Flight
School. On August 11, 2001, Moussaoui and his roommate, Hussein
al-Attas, arrived in Egan, Minnesota and checked into a hotel.
Moussaoui began class at Pan Am Flight School there on August
13, 2001.
While Airman Flight School provided flight lessons in
piloting Cessnas and similar small aircraft, Pan Am Flight
School provided ground training and access to a Boeing 747
flight simulator used by professional pilots. Most of Pan Am's
students are either newly-hired airline pilots who use the
flight simulator for initial training or are active airline
pilots who use the equipment for an update or a refresher
training.
Although anyone can sign up for lessons at Pan Am, the
typical student has a pilot's license, is employed by an
airline and hasseveral thousand flight hours. Moussaoui had
none of these qualifications.
Based on concerns expressed by a private citizen, the FBI's
Minneapolis field office opened an international terrorism
investigation of Moussaoui on August 15, 2001. Agents of the
INS share space and worked closely with the FBI in Minneapolis
and were able to immediately determine that Moussaoui had been
authorized to stay in the United States only until May 22.
Thus, Moussaoui was out of status at the time, August, that the
FBI began investigating him.
On the same day, the Minneapolis field office learned about
Moussaoui, it asked both the CIA and the FBI's legal attache in
Paris for any information they had or could get on Moussaoui.
They also informed FBI headquarters of the investigation. The
supervisory agent in Minneapolis told the joint inquiry staff
that FBI headquarters had suggested that Moussaoui be put under
surveillance but that Minneapolis did not have enough agents to
do that. The Minneapolis agents also believed that it was more
important to prevent Moussaoui from getting any additional
flight training.
After Moussaoui's detention, the Minneapolis supervisory
agent called the office's legal counsel and asked if there was
any way to search Moussaoui's possessions without his consent.
He was told he had to obtain a search warrant. Over the ensuing
days, the Minneapolis agents considered several alternatives,
including trying to obtain a criminal search warrant, seeking a
search warrant under FISA and deporting Moussaoui to France
after arranging for French authorities to search his
possessions and share their findings with the FBI.
On Saturday, August 18, Minneapolis sent a detailed
memorandum to FBI headquarters. That memorandum described the
Moussaoui investigation and stated that it believed that
Moussaoui posed a threat. The joint inquiry staff has been told
that FBI headquarters advised against trying to obtain a
criminal search warrant, as that might prejudice any subsequent
efforts to try to get a search warrant under FISA.
Under FISA, a search warrant could be obtained if they
could show there was probable cause to believe Moussaoui was an
agent of a foreign power and either engaged in terrorism or was
preparing to engage in terrorism.
FBI headquarters was concerned that if a criminal warrant
was denied and then the agents tried to get a warrant under
FISA, the court would think the agents were trying to use
authority for an intelligence investigation to pursue a
criminal case. Minneapolis also wanted to notify the criminal
division about Moussaoui through the local U.S. attorney's
office, believing it was obligated to do so under Attorney
General guidelines that require notification where there is
``reasonable indication'' of a felony. FBI headquarters advised
Minneapolis that they did not have enough evidence to warrant
notifying the criminal division.
The FBI case agent in Minneapolis had become increasingly
frustrated with what he perceived as a lack of assistance from
the radical fundamentalist unit, RFU, at FBI headquarters. He
had had previous conflicts with the RFU over FISA issues and
believed headquarters was not being responsive to the threat
Minneapolis had identified.
The Minneapolis case agent contacted an FBI official who
was detailed to the CTC. The Minneapolis agent shared the
details of the Moussaoui case with him and provided the names
of associates that had been connected to Moussaoui. The
Minneapolis case agent has told the staff that he was looking
for any information that CTC could provide that would
strengthen the case linking Moussaoui to international
terrorism.
On August 21, 2001, the case agent sent an e-mail to the
supervisory special agent in the RFU who was handling this
matter, urging that the United States Secret Service in
Washington, DC. be apprised of the threat potential there
indicated by the evidence. The RFU agent to whom the e-mail was
addressed said that he told the Minneapolis agent that he was
working on a notification to the entire Intelligence Community,
including the Secret Service about the threat presented by
Moussaoui.
The RFU's supervisory agent sent a teletype on September 4,
2001 recounting the FBI's interviews of Moussaoui and al-Attas
and other information it had obtained in the meantime. The
teletype, however, did not place Moussaoui's actions in the
context of the increased level of terrorist threats during the
summer of 2001, nor did it provide its recipients with any
analysis of Moussaoui's actions or plans or information about
what type of threat he may have presented.
On Wednesday, August 22, the legal attache's office in
Paris provided its report. That report began a series of
discussions between Minneapolis and the RFU at headquarters
focusing on whether a specific group of Chechen rebels were a
recognized foreign power, one that was on the State
Department's list of terrorist groups and for which the FISA
court had previously granted orders.
The RFU agent believes that the Chechen rebels were not a
recognized foreign power, and that even if Moussaoui were to be
linked to them, the FBI could not obtain a search warrant under
FISA. Thus, the RFU agent told the Minneapolis agents that they
needed to somehow connect Moussaoui to al-Qa'ida, which he
believed was a recognized foreign power.
Unfortunately, this dialogue was based on a
misunderstanding of FISA. The FBI's deputy general counsel told
the joint inquiry staff that the term ``recognized foreign
power'' has no meaning under FISA and that the FBI can obtain a
search warrant under FISA for an agent of any international
terrorist group, including the Chechen rebels. But because of
this misunderstanding, Minneapolis spent the better part of
three weeks trying to connect the Chechen group to al-Qa'ida.
Ultimately, the RFU agent agreed to submit the Minneapolis FISA
request to the attorneys and the FBI's national security law
unit for a review.
The FBI attorneys advised the RFU agent that the evidence
was insufficient to link Moussaoui to a foreign power.
Attorneys told our staff that if they had been aware of the
Phoenix memo, they would have forwarded the FISA request to the
Justice Department's Office of Intelligence Policy Review. They
reasoned that the particulars of the Phoenix memo changed the
context of the Moussaoui investigation and made a stronger case
for the FISA warrant. None of them saw the Phoenix memo before
September 11.
Two FBI agents assigned to the Oklahoma City field office's
international terrorism squad visited Airman Flight School in
Norman, Oklahoma regarding Moussaoui on August 23. In September
of 1999, one of those agents had been assigned a lead to visit
the same flight school concerning another individual who had
been identified as bin Ladin's personal pilot and who had
received flight training at Airman. Although the agent told us
that he thought that this lead had been the most significant
information he had seen in Oklahoma City, the agent did not
remember the lead when he returned to the flight school two
years later to ask questions about Moussaoui. He said that he
should have connected the two visits, but that he did not have
the time to do so.
During a conversation on August 27, 2001, the RFU unit at
headquarters told the Minneapolis supervisor that the
supervisor was getting people ``spun up'' over Moussaoui.
According to his notes and his statement to the joint inquiry
staff, the supervisor replied that he was trying to get people
at FBI headquarters spun up because he was trying to make sure
that Moussaoui ``did not take control of a plane and fly it
into the World Trade Center.''
The Minneapolis agent said that the headquarter's agent
told him, ``That is not going to happen. We don't know he is a
terrorist. You don't have enough to show he is a terrorist. You
have a guy interested in this type of aircraft. That is it.''
The headquarter's agent does not remember this exchange.The
Minneapolis supervisor told the staff that he had no reason to believe
that Moussaoui was planning an attack on the World Trade Center. He was
merely trying to get headquarter's attention.
On August 28, 2001 after reviewing the request for a search
warrant, the RFU agent edited it and returned the request to
Minneapolis for comment. The RFU agent says that it was not
unusual for headquarter's agents to make changes to field
submissions, in addition to changes made by the NSLU and OIPR.
The major substantive change that was made but was the removal
of information about connections between the Chechen rebel and
al-Qa'ida.
After the edit was complete, the RFU agent briefed the FBI
deputy general counsel. The deputy general counsel told the
joint inquiry staff that he agreed with the RFU agent that
there was insufficient information to show that Moussaoui was
an agent of a foreign power. After that briefing, the RFU agent
told Minneapolis that the information was even less sufficient
than he had previously thought, because Moussaoui would
actually have to be shown to be a part of a movement or an
organization.
After concluding that there was insufficient information to
show that Moussaoui was an agent of any foreign power, the
FBI's focus shifted to arranging for Moussaoui's planned
deportation to France on September 17. Although the FBI was no
longer considering a search warrant under FISA, no one
revisited the idea of attempting to obtain a criminal search
warrant, even though the reason for not attempting to obtain a
criminal search warrant, the concern that it would prejudice a
request under FISA, no longer existed.
On Thursday, September 4, 2001, FBI headquarters sent a
teletype to the Intelligence Community and other U.S.
Government agencies, including the FAA, providing information
about the Moussaoui investigation. The teletype noted that
Moussaoui was being held in custody but did not describe any
particular threat that the FBI thought he posed, for example,
whether he might be connected to a larger plot. The teletype
also did not recommend that the addressees take any action or
look for any additional indicators of a terrorist attack, nor
did it provide any analysis of a possible hijacking threat or
provide any specific warnings.
The following day, the Minneapolis case agent hand-carried
the teletype to two employees of the FAA's Bloomington,
Minnesota office, and orally briefed them on the status of the
investigation. The two FAA employees told our staff that the
FBI agent did not convey any sense of urgency about the
teletype and did not ask them to take any specific action
regarding Moussaoui. He just wanted to be sure the FAA had
received the cable.
The final preparations for Moussaoui's deportation were
under way when the September 11 attacks occurred.
And I want to just add, in conclusion, a few comments. The
staff has described three series of events pertaining to al-
Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, the Phoenix EC and Zacarias Moussaoui,
each of which raises significant questions in their own right.
In the wake of the September 11 attack, they also illustrate
the danger of seeing events in isolation from each other. In
our view, taken together, they clearly demonstrate how our
counterterrorist efforts must be based on comprehensive and
current understanding of the overall context in which terrorist
networks like al-Qa'ida operate.
During last week's hearing, we focused on the story
involving al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi and the problems which it
illustrated about the use of information derived from
intelligence-gathering activities in criminal investigations.
This morning I want to comment on the two matters we
discussed in today's testimony. The second matter, the Phoenix
EC, also illustrates the Intelligence Community's strength and
weaknesses. An FBI agent perceived amidst a perfusion of cases
that terrorists could use the well-developed system of flight
training education in the United States to prepare an attack
against us. The field agent understood that it was necessary to
go beyond individual cases and to undertake an empirical
analysis broader than the geographic limits of a single field
office. The idea was submitted to FBI headquarters, where, for
a variety of reasons, it generated almost no interest.
First, no one gleaned from the FBI's own records that
others at the Bureau had previously expressed concerns about
possible terrorists at U.S. flight education institutions.
Second, anticipating future threats has not been a significant
part of the FBI's general approach to its work. Third, the
highest levels of the Intelligence Community have not
communicated effectively to their personnel the critical
importance of analyzing information in light of the growing
awareness of an impending terrorist attack in the summer of
2001.
Finally, FBI management did not perceive it would be useful
to simply alert others at the FBI to the danger that one of its
field offices had perceived. As for the third matter, one can
see in the pre-September 11 handling of the case of Zacarias
Moussaoui a myopic focus within both the FBI and the DCI's CTC
on the case at hand. An FBI field agent and his supervisor saw
a potential threat, were concerned about the possibility of a
larger plot to target airlines and reported their concerns to
FBI headquarters.
The Moussaoui information was also shared with the DCI's
CTC, but neither FBI headquarters nor the DCI's CTC linked this
information to warnings emanating from the CTC in the summer of
2001 about an impending terrorist attack, nor did they see a
possible connection to information available on August 23, 2001
that bin Ladin operatives had entered the United States. The
same unit at FBI headquarters also had the Phoenix EC, but
still did not sound any alarm bells.
No one will ever know whether a greater focus on the
connection between these events would have led to the
unraveling of the September 11 plot, but clearly it might have
drawn greater attention to the possibility of a terrorist
attack within the United States, generated a heightened state
of alert regarding such attacks and prompted more aggressive
investigation and intelligence gathering regarding the
information that our government did possess prior to September
11.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement this morning.
Thank you.
Chairman Goss. Thank you very much, Ms. Hill. The Members
are well advised that the full statement is in their book under
tab 2 as well, and it is certainly worth reading closely more
than once.
At this time I want to advise Members that, to accommodate
other matters, we will recess for a luncheon break between
12:30 and 2:00 today--more or less those times. We will try to
break the questioning off at a reasonable time very close to
12:30, and ask Members please to be back here at 2:00. I know
there will be a lot of questions.
Additionally, I didn't want to take a chance on up-staging
the Chairman from the Senate side, so it is my pleasure to
introduce the former First Lady of Florida and the forever
First Lady of Chairman Graham, Adele Graham, who is with us
today and their daughter Susan.
We are going to give them a quiz on this at the end of the
day and find out how we did. Thank you very much for being with
us, Adele.
At this time, I ask unanimous consent that the hearing
stand in recess at the call of the Chair and request that the
press, the public and any other unauthorized persons leave the
room so that it may be prepared for our next panel.
Due to sensitivities related to the responsibilities at the
FBI, our three witnesses today will testify while sitting
behind an opaque screen. All cameras will have to be relocated
so as to show photography only from the audience side of the
screen. Before the press leaves, I request that the room be
arranged and cameras located in a manner that the witnesses
cannot be seen by the public or press.
What I have basically just said is we are going to clear
the room, put the screen in place and bring the witnesses in,
and then we will be very happy to readmit our guests. And Mrs.
Graham, I apologize for welcoming you and then asking you to
leave. So we will be suspended until the room is right, and I
ask everybody's cooperation.
[Recess.]
Chairman Goss. The screen works extremely well. I cannot
see around it. Are we prepared to continue?
Thank you. The hearing of the Joint Inquiry is now called
back to order. I would now like to introduce our next panel and
describe the circumstances of this portion of our hearing. Our
three witnesses are all from the FBI and will remain shielded
by the screen. None of these witnesses will be addressed by
name but should be referred to by their job titles which we
have just gone through. There is a Phoenix FBI agent, an FBI
headquarters supervisor and a Minneapolis FBI agent.
The committees have agreed to limit their public exposure
as much as possible due to their roles in sensitive matters and
the extraordinary work they do protecting our country.
Each of our committees has adopted a supplemental rule for
this joint inquiry that all witnesses shall be sworn. I will
ask the witnesses to raise their right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Goss. Let the record so indicate.
I have been advised that if Mr. Bowman and Mr. Rolince
intend to answer any questions, they will also have to be
sworn. Will you please raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Goss. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Are there any other representatives of the FBI today who
would wish to be publicly identified at this time? Not that we
know of. Thank you, then.
I think we have had enough explanation about the rules
here, so I am going to bypass this. If there are any further
people that we need to have testify, we will need to advise
them that they will have to be sworn in as well.
The prepared statements of the witnesses will be placed in
the record of these proceedings. I will now call on our
witnesses for their prepared testimony, which I direct Members
to the books. You will find it there as well. And I will start
with the Phoenix FBI agent, who will be followed by the
headquarters FBI supervisor, who will be followed by the
Minneapolis field agent. Gentlemen, we welcome you. Please
proceed.
TESTIMONY OF AN FBI PHOENIX AGENT
FBI Phoenix Agent. Thank you. Messieurs Chairman, members
of the committee, let me begin by saying I am aware that
Congress has the responsibility, duty and obligation to oversee
and critique the performance of the Nation's intelligence
services. I greatly respect your responsibilities in this
regard and believe your inquiry will result in changes to our
intelligence services that will make them better and stronger.
I do, however, take exception and have problems with the manner
in which classified information and the identities of FBI
special agents have been exposed to the public.
Terrorism cases such as the investigation that led to my
authoring of the July 10, 2001 electronic communication are
typically classified secret in their entirety. Various
intelligence sources and methods are utilized while conducting
these sensitive investigations. FBI special agents assigned to
work these matters involve themselves on a daily basis with
Islamic extremist elements representing various terrorist
organizations. The very nature of these cases involve
individuals who do not like the United States or what the
United States represents, thus making them a threat to the
national security and a threat to the individual special
agents.
Special agents are constantly attempting to recruit human
sources of information to penetrate the terrorist cells that
operate in the United States and overseas. Human sources are
absolutely necessary in order to obtain the intelligence needed
to identify, penetrate and neutralize the terrorist threat. The
recruitment of these sources takes a great deal of time and
effort in order to build a degree of trust between the special
agent and the source. Good human sources are few and far
between. The FBI and the United States government need to
protect these sources in order to encourage others to assist us
in the war on terrorism.
During May of 2002, this year, I willingly testified before
various closed House and Senate committees. I was graciously
treated by members of these committees. However, I was
astounded and very disappointed that my identity and the
classified information I provided was immediately made
available to the national and international news media. My
photograph was plastered all over print and television media.
Reporters from all over the world called my office and my
residence attempting to get a statement from me. The media
quickly identified through publicly-available records where I
lived and showed up at the front door of my residence.
On one occasion, a reporter from an internationally known
news magazine confronted my 12-year-old son while he was taking
out the trash and tried to elicit information from him. This
incident caused my son great distress and made me very angry.
The media also identified where my mother and father live and
attempted to get a statement from them. In short, a circus
atmosphere was created by the unnecessary release of my
identity and the classified information I provided to Congress.
Finally, I have been informed that a documentary appeared
on the Al-Jazeera news network within the past couple of weeks
concerning the events surrounding September 11, 2001. Several
al-Qa'ida leaders were interviewed. My name and photograph was
also included in this documentary. While the exact contents of
what was discussed concerning me are currently unknown, I am
particularly concerned knowing this network is broadcasting my
name and image throughout the Middle East.
As a result of the above, despite my longstanding practice
of not discussing the details of my job with my family due to
its classified nature, I had to explain to my family and close
friends what was happening. I explained to them that I did
nothing wrong and was not solely responsible for the horrific
events that took place on September 11, 2001. As you can
imagine, the stress upon my family and myself was tremendous
and continues until this day.
On a professional level, the public exposure of my identity
and the information I provided in closed testimony resulted in
me having to close valued human intelligence sources who were
targeting against the subject of the July 10, 2001 electronic
communication. These individuals took great personal risks to
their physical security to provide the United States Government
with information on this subject. I promised them a
confidential relationship with the United States Government,
which was broken when my identity and the information they had
provided was made public and it appeared all over the world.
The United States Government let these individuals down.
Various Members of the House and Senate have publicly stressed
the need for the United States Intelligence Community to
develop morehuman sources to penetrate the various terrorist
organizations who want to cause harm to our country and our national
interests abroad. Congress will make this task very difficult if they
do not take seriously the classified nature of the intelligence work.
The protection of intelligence agents, human intelligence sources and
technical sources should be protected at all costs.
I believe that the unnecessary disclosure of my identity
has put the safety of my family and myself at risk. I ask
myself, what are senior members of al-Qa'ida thinking when they
see my image in the media. If I were in their position, I would
be thinking that there must be a source who has penetrated the
organization. I believe that al-Qa'ida would consider me a
terrorist target and would want to kill me. Just as I believe
Congress has the duty and responsibility and obligation to
oversee and critique the Nation's intelligence services, they
have an equally important responsibility to protect the
identities of the Nation's intelligence agents who are
diligently trying to protect the Nation on a daily basis. I
feel in this regard Congress has personally failed me as an FBI
special agent and as an American.
A Member of Congress a couple months ago invoked
whistleblower protection for me without my asking for it. I do
not consider myself a whistleblower. I don't feel nor have I
ever felt threatened or been mistreated by FBI headquarters
executive management. On the contrary, FBI headquarters
executive management has been very supportive of me. While I
appreciate the Member's concern for my wellbeing, I believe his
concerns, as well-intentioned as I am sure they were, were
misdirected. Greater emphasis should have been placed on
protecting my identity and the information I provided during
closed sessions. I am not afraid of the FBI, but I am very
concerned about al-Qa'ida and what they may want to do to me
and my family. Sadly, I can thank the United States Congress
for my current situation.
The horrible events of September 11, 2001 have forever
changed the way we as a Nation view things. Did the Nation's
intelligence services fail the Nation prior to September 11? I
believe they did. Can they do things better? You bet they can,
once Congress gives the intelligence services the tools and
resources to accomplish the mission.
These hearings are extremely important. Congress, during
these hearings, should be very careful not to divulge the
identities of the Nation's intelligence officers, sources and
methods used in collecting the intelligence information, as
well as the information itself. The Nation is at war, and
Congress has the responsibility, duty, and obligation to
protect this type of information.
This concludes my prepared statement, and I would be
willing to take any questions.
Chairman Goss. Thank you very much. We are going to have
the testimony from your colleagues as well, and then we will go
into our questioning mode.
The gentleman from FBI headquarters.
[The prepared statement of the FBI Headquarters Agent
follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
TESTIMONY OF AN FBI HEADQUARTERS AGENT
FBI Headquarters Agent. Mr. Chairman, members of the
committees, I am pleased to appear before you today. Mr.
Chairman, I have been a special agent with the FBI for more
than 15 years. Of these more than 15 years, approximately 13
have been dedicated to the FBI's counterterrorism mission as a
field agent, FBI headquarters line supervisor, a field division
joint terrorism task force supervisor and as an FBI
headquarters counterterrorism unit chief.
It was in the capacity of unit chief that I was serving on
that most tragic day for our Nation, September 11, 2001, having
returned to FBI headquarters from the field about three months
previously. It was my group that handled the Zacarias Moussaoui
matter and through which the Phoenix EC passed.
Mr. Chairman, I must note that there is an ongoing capital
prosecution in the eastern district of Virginia against
Zacarias Moussaoui, with defendant's jury scheduled to be
selected beginning in December 2002. Because of this, and as an
employee of the Department of Justice, I am bound by local rule
57, which prohibits prejudicial pretrial publicity to protect
the constitutional trial rights of criminal defendants.
Therefore, I may be unable to answer some of your questions
in an open session, but I am prepared to answer all of your
questions in a closed session.
Mr. Chairman, within the course of these hearings, this
committee has heard the frustrations of FBI field agents in
their efforts to conduct their duties and responsibilities on
behalf of the American people. Having served as a field agent
and a field supervisor, I know of their sense of frustration as
posed by rules and regulations, national security law, and the
sense of being held in check by Washington.
As an FBI headquarters unit supervisor and unit chief, I am
also aware of FBI headquarters's role in supporting and
coordinating terrorism investigations and the necessity of
Washington's oversight to ensure compliance with existing
policies and law.
I have also witnessed first hand a dedicated group of
counterterrorism professionals that have been routinely
overwhelmed by large caseloads and continual crisis management.
They also confront the daily frustrations posed by limited
resources, especially within our analytical ranks, and
inadequate technology, which hampers their ability to
communicate within FBI headquarters, with our 56 field
divisions and 44 legal attaches around the world, as well as
with other elements of the law enforcement and intelligence
community.
Since September 11, 2001, our Director has already made
many changes within the FBI to address these systemic problems.
These reforms must continue.
Mr. Chairman, throughout my career I have found all of the
FBI's counterterrorism personnel, agents, analysts and other
professional support to be a highly dedicated, highly competent
group of professionals. They will continue to serve on the
front lines of this war against international terrorists. I am
now prepared to answer your questions.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, very much.
And now, sir, the agent from Minneapolis.
[The prepared statement of the FBI Minneapolis Agent
follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
TESTIMONY OF AN FBI MINNEAPOLIS AGENT
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Thank you.
Messieurs Chairman, members of the committees, I appreciate
your invitation to appear before your committees today in
connection with your joint inquiry into the tragic events of
September 11, 2001. I fully understand the responsibility with
which you have been charged.
From July, 2001 through October, 2001, I was assigned as
the Acting Supervisory Special Agent for the Minneapolis field
office's Counterterrorism Squad, which included the Joint
Terrorism Task Force.
I was acting in that capacity on August 15, 2001, when the
Minneapolis field office opened an intelligence investigation
predicated upon the receipt of information concerning the
suspicious activities of Zacarias Moussaoui. I continued to
supervise this matter beyond September 11, 2001.
From the time of receipt of the initial information and
continuing after September 11, Minneapolis aggressively pursued
the investigation of Moussaoui, resulting in the collection of
a significant amount of information of investigative interest.
The investigation was a coordinated effort involving
Minneapolis, FBI headquarters, FBI field offices and legal
attaches, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and other
members of the United States Intelligence Community.
Based upon conversations between Minneapolis and FBI
headquarters, the decision was made to continue working the
matter as an intelligence versus a criminal investigation. This
was based upon the understanding that, if Minneapolis pursued
this as an intelligence matter, Minneapolis still had the
option of opening a parallel criminal case. If it was pursued
as a criminal matter, we would not have the option of using
certain intelligence-gathering techniques, such as those
available under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
During the approximately three weeks preceding September
11, 2001, and following those events, Minneapolis communicated
extensively with FBI headquarters via FBI written
communications, telephone calls, and e-mails. The purpose of
these conversations was to attempt to obtain FISA search
warrants for Moussaoui's personal effects and his residence and
to discuss other case-related logistics.
The Minneapolis field office experienced great frustration
during the investigation and while navigating the FISA process.
Some of the frustration can be attributed to the FISA law, some
of the frustration can be attributed to FBI headquarters, and
some may be attributed to the circumstances of this case.
Attorney General Ashcroft and Director Mueller have initiated
procedures to address some of the frustrations within the FBI,
the frustrations that Minneapolis experienced concerning the
application of the FISA statute.
I would reiterate that, as you know, there is an ongoing
capital prosecution in the Eastern District of Virginia against
Zacarias Moussaoui. I am also bound by Local Rule 57 and
therefore may be unable to answer some of your questions in an
open session. I would be happy and I am prepared to answer all
of your questions in a closed session.
What has been lost in the media and in this inquiry process
is that it is the same FBI which has been extremely criticized
since September 11, 2001, that is responsible for the
investigation which led to the indictment of Zacarias
Moussaoui.
The FBI is, of course, subject to human factors and
limitations, and we are occasionally hamstrung by legal
constraints, both real and imagined. FBI personnel, both in the
field and at FBI headquarters, were committed to preventing
acts of terrorism prior to September 11, 2001. We continue to
be committed to that mission today. Thank you.
Chairman Goss. Thank you very much.
Our procedure for the joint inquiry is that we have agreed
that questioning is going to be led off by four members who
have been preselected, two from each committee, who will have
20 minutes each.
The designated lead questioners for today's hearings are
Representative Castle, Senator Edwards, Representative Cramer,
and Senator Hatch, in that order; and after they have completed
their questioning, we will proceed to the other members of each
committee for 5 minutes each with additional rounds as
necessary.
For Members' information, after the lead questioners and
the leadership, the order of arrival was Senator DeWine,
Senator Levin, Representative Roemer, Representative Peterson,
Representative Gibbons, Senator Mikulski, Senator Inhofe,
Senator Kyl, Representative Bereuter, Senator Feinstein,
Senator Rockefeller, Representative Harman, Representative
Reyes, Representative Hoekstra, Representative Boehlert,
Representative Burr, Representative Chambliss, Senator Bayh,
Senator Wyden, and Representative Boswell; and so you can
conduct yourselves accordingly.
It is our intent to now go to Representative Castle. He
will have his 20 minutes, and at the end of that we will recess
for lunch.
Representative Castle.
Mr. Castle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for all of the titles.
Before I start, let me just say to the Phoenix agent that I
listened to your testimony concerning the issues of personal
security, et cetera. We all obviously sympathize with that, and
Congress obviously has to do its job responsibly.
Let me turn to the Moussaoui issues first, if I may. My
opening question will be for the Minneapolis agent and the
headquarters supervisor; and the question is simple but, we
think, important. What priority did this matter receive in each
of your respective offices? If we can start with the
Minneapolis agent first.
FBI Minneapolis Agent. On August 15, once we received the
information about Mr. Moussaoui, we initiated the intelligence
case; and we worked extremely hard. This was the number one
priority on the squad that I was assigned to until and through
September 11, 2001. This was our full court press. We had some
other collateral cases, of course, and we didn't neglect those.
However, this was the brightest burning case.
Mr. Castle. Thank you.
Headquarters supervisor.
FBI Headquarters Agent. From a headquarters perspective,
the second that we were made aware of this within the unit that
did in fact handle that matter, it became a priority. It was a
priority of the unit. Clearly we saw this as being of great
importance. We saw that his activities were very suspicious,
and we also made it a priority.
Mr. Castle. For the Minneapolis agent, you told our staff
on August 21 you talked with another agent in Minneapolis who
said that if you didn't make any progress with the agent who
was handling the case at headquarters you should consider going
to the section chief or assistant section chief at
headquarters. Why didn't you do that?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. I contacted my immediate supervisor,
who was an Assistant Special Agent in Charge, acting as the
Special Agent in Charge of the Minneapolis office. I advised
him of the players in the chain, up to and including the Deputy
Assistant Director for Counterterrorism. And once I encountered
problems at the first line level at FBI headquarters, I went to
my ASAC again and requested that he start moving things up the
chain. It was appropriate for him to handle matters at his
level in the organization, much more appropriate than it was
for me to move those things forward.
So I took these concerns to my immediate supervisor,
requested that he take the information further; and as to why
it wasn't taken any further, I am sorry, sir, I don't know.
Mr. Castle. Thank you.
Our staff has been told, continuing with you, that there
have been several prior incidents in which Minneapolis found
itself at odds with the FBI headquarters on FISA issues. Can
you describe them?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. No, sir, I cannot. I was installed
as the acting supervisor of this squad in July of 2001; and I
only had some very, very brief anecdotal information from cases
prior to this, nothing in specific. And, quite frankly, I
didn't focus on the past problems that we had had. I was much
more inclined to focus on the problem that was facing us.
Mr. Castle. Does the FBI headquarters agent have any
helpful information with respect to that question?
FBI Headquarters Agent. As I stated in my testimony, sir, I
had arrived at headquarters about three months prior to
September 11. I am not aware of specific issues. I think in the
post-9/11, 2001, environment I did become somewhat aware of
those, but to be able to testify to those facts would be very
difficult of----
Mr. Castle. To be clear, your answers are you don't know
the information so you cannot give it to us, rather than you
are not willing to give it to us?
FBI Headquarters Agent. That is correct. I do not have that
detail.
Mr. Castle. To both of you, do you think that prior
disciplinary actions involving agents making erroneous
applications to the FISA court made agents reluctant to file
FISA applications? You can start with the Minneapolis agent,
perhaps.
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Yes, sir, I do believe that.
In one of the telephone conversations I had with a
supervisory agent at the Radical Fundamentalist Unit, those
points were made to me about the history with the FISA court;
and the position of that supervisor was that he wanted to
ensure that at the time we presented everything to the FISA
court every I was dotted, every T was crossed, that we were
absolutely certain the information we were presenting was
accurate.
My position and my response was that this case was fast
breaking, information was coming in on a daily basis, sometimes
several times a day, and that it was my position that we should
present the information we had to the FISA court on an emergent
basis, as quickly as possible, with the caveat that this is a
breaking investigation. Information will be relayed to the FISA
court as it becomes available, if it changes materially, the
information that is presented to the FISA court.
My inclination was to push this forward as quickly as we
could. I do believe that there was a chilling effect.
Mr. Castle. And the headquarters agent?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I don't believe so. The supervisor
that handled that particular FISA request was a very
experienced supervisor. He had brought dozens of FISAs before
the court in the past.
Yes, he was aware of some of the past problems with regard
to the FISA court and some of the issues that had developed
there. But, significantly--and I think this needs to be made
very clear--is that in April, 2001, new procedures had been put
in place within FBI headquarters. They are now known as the
Woods Procedures. Those Woods Procedures require that the field
verify facts within a FISA application before the agent goes
and takes those matters before the court and swears as the
affiant to the FISA request.
I think that that has greatly helped the sense of these
agents going in with fact, as opposed to possibly getting
tripped up.
Mr. Castle. Thank you.
For the Minneapolis agent, in your interview with the joint
inquiry staff, you criticize the Radical Fundamentalist Unit
for removing information that connected the Chechen rebels to
Usama bin Ladin. What was your basis for that criticism?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. The information as it was presented
back to me by the Radical Fundamentalist Unit was that specific
paragraph which was included in our application for the FISA,
or our letterhead memorandum that requested the FISA,
referenced what we believe to be the connection that we needed
to establish between Mr. Moussaoui and a foreign power. And
if--specifically, the FISA law required that we show Mr.
Moussaoui was connected to a foreign power. That would be
relevant information. That would be information that is
required by the statute to prove the allegations, to obtain the
warrant.
And it was my position at the time and it remains so today
that had that information not been made available to the
national security law unit, the lawyers who were to review the
FISA, it would have never proceeded beyond their unit. It is
statutorily required. If you fail to meet the statutory burden,
then, of course, it is not going to go further. And in my frame
of reference I believe that there was a chilling effect because
of the prior incidents with the FISA court. I believed at the
time that there was a possibility that the case was being
undersold and that this was redacted--this information was
redacted because there was this chilling effect.
Mr. Castle. For the headquarters supervisor, on August 18
of 2001, the Minneapolis field office sent a 26-page memo to
headquarters describing the Moussaoui investigation. What was
your reaction to the memo?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I did read the memo. Obviously, it
was very alarming to us. I think it is very important to state
that those red flags were seen by FBI headquarters, and we
viewed it as a--very much a priority matter.
Mr. Castle. Did you perceive from that that Moussaoui was a
significant threat, or because he was in custody he was not a
significant threat at that time?
FBI Headquarters Agent. Clearly, he was in custody. No
question about that. But we did see this as a priority matter.
We realized that we wanted to get into his belongings. We saw
the computer and his personal belongings as possibly holding
very pertinent information, and we moved in a manner to try to
attempt to gain a FISA search warrant.
Mr. Castle. Let me switch back to the Minneapolis agent.
Considering Moussaoui was in custody, what threat do you think
he posed?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. The staff characterized the focus of
the Minneapolis investigation and the FBI investigation as on
specific criminal acts, and I take exception to that
characterization because our position always was we needed to
get into that notebook computer, we needed to get into those
individual handwritten notes to determine if there were other
coconspirators that were identified, if there were battle plans
that existed that we didn't know, and if there was other
intelligence that could be exploited and linked to other cases
that were ongoing both in the Minneapolis office and elsewhere.
So we were sensitive to the fact that this could have been
a much larger conspiracy, and we were not satisfied that having
Mr. Moussaoui in custody dampened the possibility of a
terrorist attack.
Mr. Castle. Let me go along that line of questioning for a
minute.
On August 21 of 2001, an agent on your squad sent an e-mail
to the supervisory special agent in the Radical Fundamentalist
Unit at headquarters saying it is imperative that the U.S.
Secret Service be apprised of this threat potential indicated
by the evidence contained in the EC. If he sees an aircraft
flying from Heathrow to New York City, it will have the fuel on
board to reach DC.
Do you know why that agent sent the e-mail asking that the
Secret Service be notified?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Yes. We discussed it on the squad
before he sent the e-mail. And it was our contention,
initially, and the focus of our investigative hypothesis, that
this was a larger issue that was speaking to the potential
hijacking or commandeering of an aircraft. There were some
pieces of information that were developed during the course of
the investigation which led us to believe that that was the
ultimate end and had JFK airport in New York City been the
intended destination from an international flight with an
aircraft of the type, a 747-400, there would be enough fuel
reserve to hit the Nation's Capitol; and that is what the
context was.
Mr. Castle. I may, if time allows, return to you for
questioning, but I want to turn to the Phoenix agent for some
questions at this time. Let me start with this.
In your interview with the joint inquiry staff, you
mentioned that you did not often see intelligence reports
either from FBI headquarters or from other agencies and you
often felt ``out on an island'' from an intelligence
perspective in Phoenix. Can you comment on your previous
statements--on those statements?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes. Concerning my feeling of being out
on an island, I noticed--I have been doing this work for
approximately 13 years, and I--several years ago, there was a
significant downsizing of our people at FBI headquarters, to
include analysts and supervisors.
Several years ago, many years ago, we used to get regular
intelligence products put out by the Terrorist Research and
Analytical Center--TRAC, I believe the acronym was--that would
give us the MOs, if you will, of what different terrorist
organizations may be up to in the United States around the
country. It was informative for someone like myself, sitting
out in Phoenix, on what was taking place elsewhere in the
country.
I have noticed a decline in that type of product being put
out to the field. So my comment, relative to being out on an
island, involved that.
Mr. Castle. Well, let me go on then, for both you and the
headquarters supervisor. How important do you think it is for
agents working counterterrorism to be kept abreast of national
and international developments in their program, and was the
FBI running counterterrorism as a national level program prior
to September 11, in your opinion?
Start with the Phoenix agent.
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes. I believe my statements--I read
that. I believe my statements that it was not being taken and
put on a national level was taken out of context. I believe my
management at Phoenix was not looking at it as a national
priority, due to other priorities that they were looking at,
such as the war on drugs.
On a national level, I do believe that they took it as a
Tier 1 program and a national priority. But I also believe that
it is a resource issue. The people at FBI headquarters are
working day in, day out, very hard, probably putting in some of
the longest hours in the Bureau dealing with threats coming in
from all over the world to U.S. interests in the United States
and abroad; and I believe they do not have enough people to get
these type of intelligence products out to us, such as myself
out in the middle of the desert in Arizona, to know what is
going on around the world and within the continental United
States.
Mr. Castle. To the headquarters agent.
FBI Headquarters Agent. Could you repeat the question, sir?
Mr. Castle. Sure. How important do you think it is for
agents working counterterrorism to be kept abreast of national
and international developments in the program, and was the FBI
running counterterrorism at a national level program prior to
9/11? And having heard the answer of the Phoenix agent, it is
not a question of saying something is a priority, but, you
know, were the necessary personnel and expenditures put into
place to make sure that it was a priority?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I can probably answer this question
from both the field perspective, having just gone back to the
headquarters about three months before 9/11, and also from
headquarters.
Clearly, counterterrorism needs to be run as a national
type program. That does require the resources within FBI
headquarters to do that. We need the analysts to be able to
pull together this information to put it into forms that are
discernible to the field and to get that information out there.
Clearly, from a strategic analytical viewpoint, our
resources have been lacking. No question about it. I think when
you want to look at systemic problems, which I know this
committee is looking at, I think clearly you are going to be
focused in on strategic analysis and you are going to be
focused in on technology; and to run a national program you
have to have both.
Mr. Castle. Thank you.
For the Phoenix agent again, in your interview with joint
inquiry staff, you stated that you thought that the FBI should
have separate career tracks for CT and CI agents. Can you
elaborate on those, counterterrorism and counterintelligence?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes. In my opinion--this is just my
opinion--I believe that there have been competing interests
over the years between the criminal side of the house and the
counterintelligence/counterterrorism side of the house; and I
believe that we are always competing with--when I say ``we,''
the counterintelligence/counterterrorism side of the house--
with the criminal side of the house for resources, surveillance
resources, support resources, agent resources assigned to work
these matters in the field.
Prior to 9/11, I have had many examples where I may need
surveillance support on a suspected terrorist and would request
that support, and that support would be diverted to the
southern borders to cover a load of cocaine or marijuana that
was coming across the border.
So I am of the belief that we should have separate
entities, and we shouldn't be competing with each other within
our own house for the resources needed to do both jobs if we
are going to be continued to be tasked to do both jobs.
Mr. Castle. Well, for the Phoenix agent and the
headquarters supervisor, have things dramatically changed since
9/11, from your perspective?
FBI Phoenix Agent. I believe that they have but not to the
extent to which I want to see it, personally. I believe that we
need many more resources directed to the protection of the
national security.
You know, in these hearings that I participated before, and
this current one, we keep talking about counterterrorism, which
as well we should. But we cannot forget counterintelligence. We
cannot forget about the hostile intelligence services that are
out there that want to steal our weapons technology, our
company's proprietary information, and things of that nature.
So we have to be looking at that as well; and with the limited
agents that you have employed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, it is tough to do all of the criminal things you
want to us to do, and the counterintelligence and
counterterrorism responsibilities that you have tasked us to
undertake.
Mr. Castle. And for the headquarters?
FBI Headquarters Agent. Clearly, September was a wake-up
call. From a headquarters perspective, I will speak to--the
resources have already grown tremendously. We have now the
ability to draw on resources within the Counterterrorism
Division that were just not available before September 11,
2001. For example, we have now an entire group of people
looking at nothing but terrorism financing, and that financing
can clearly give us leads from an operational standpoint on
going after individuals. That resource was never available. We
have tremendously beefed up our analytical ranks. That needs to
continue. We need to get good, trained people in and keep them.
So from a big picture look, yeah, we are going in the right
direction. We have to keep this ship on course. This is too
important to walk away from.
Mr. Castle. For both of you, the joint inquiry staff has
been informed that, prior to September 11, 2001, many field
offices were not unloading communications to the FBI's
Automated Case System. In addition, the Automated Case System
is allegedly notoriously difficult to search. What effect did
the problems with the Automated Case System have on the FBI's
counterterrorism efforts prior to September 11?
FBI Phoenix Agent. From my perspective, sir, I don't have
much faith in the automatic case system. I don't like it. I
don't like relying on it myself.
As far as documents getting uploaded, the way we work
things internally, myself as an agent that would prepare a
communication would send it through the supervisory ranks to
get approved, and then it would get sent to what we call rotor.
Mr. Castle. If the system worked correctly, would you have
faith in it and would you use it? I mean, is it something that
you think should work correctly?
FBI Phoenix Agent. It is something that definitely should
work.
Mr. Castle. Your comment then is based on the fact that you
don't think it is working?
FBI Phoenix Agent. I personally do not, and many of my
colleagues don't have confidence in the system as well.
But to address your questions with information being
uploaded, internally, I would prepare a communication. I send
it to my supervisory Special Agent to review. He or she will
initial it and then it will be sent to what we call a rotor,
which is a file clerk, who will be responsible for uploading
that document into the system.
Now the reason why that is important, and I've got to bring
this up, is because we are severely understaffed with the
support side of the house in the FBI and the field, and a
particular rotor could be sitting on a couple of hundred
documents a day that haven't been uploaded into the system
because he or she has been tasked to do too much.
Some of these people get pulled away from their job to
perform collateral duties such as answering telephones,
escorting visitors into the office. In the meantime, these
documents sit in piles on desks next to the computers waiting
to get uploaded.
Mr. Castle. The time is up. But I would like to get the
answer, if we could, from the FBI headquarters.
FBI Headquarters Agent. I would echo these same sentiments.
I think people at headquarters find the ACS system to be
unfriendly, unreliable. It is just been a--it has been
nonworkable. It has led to a lot of problems in terms of the
fact that we have not used it within headquarters properly
because it can't be counted on.
As a result, even though a couple of years ago I believe
there was a directive that went out to the field telling them
to stop sending hard copies to headquarters because they should
be retrieved electronically, it was well known, both in the
field and at headquarters, that you wouldn't get the
communication or there was a good chance that you weren't going
to get it. As such, the field would routinely still send hard
copy.
Mr. Castle. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Governor Castle.
We will now excuse our public guests and ask the press and
others to clear the room before we excuse our witnesses. We
will reconvene at 2 o'clock--I think exactly at 2, Senator
Edwards, if that is convenient. At 2 o'clock we will start
again, and Senator Edwards will be the lead questioner.
[Whereupon, the Committees recessed, to reconvene at 2:00
p.m., the same day.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
Chairman Goss. Okay. The committee will be in order.
The room is right, and we appreciate everybody's
cooperation. This is a public session, but we are protecting
the identity of our three witnesses.
I would say that there are two gentlemen who are not behind
the screen--I think members are familiar with them--that have
already been sworn. Mr. Bowman is the Deputy General Counsel of
the FBI. Welcome him again. And Mr. Rolince is I think known to
the committee as the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI's
Washington field office. We have had the pleasure of meeting
with him previously.
Senator Edwards, your 20 minutes, sir.
Senator Edwards. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank all of the witnesses for
being here today and for what you have done and for your
testimony.
I want to start with Moussaoui. So I will start with the
Minneapolis agent, if I can, and then later I have some
questions about the Phoenix EC and the Phoenix memo.
What I would like to do is go back in time to August of
2001 and go through what you were thinking; and what you were
being told from people in Washington. I took from the earlier
testimony that you gave that you considered this a high
priority. Fair?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Yes, sir.
Senator Edwards. And an issue around which a lot of people
in your office were focused and concerned, fair?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Yes, sir.
Senator Edwards. You indicated earlier that, besides
concern about Moussaoui himself, you were also concerned about
the possibility that--at that point I assume it was just a
possibility--that he was part of a bigger plan, part of a
conspiracy, and that there was a possibility that there were
plans, or I think you used the term battle plans that were
under way. Is that fair?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Yes, sir.
Senator Edwards. So you were, at that time, when Moussaoui
was in custody, thinking to yourself, you and your colleagues,
that one of the reasons we need this FISA warrant and we need
to see what is on his computer, what these various documents
show, is because of the possibility that this guy is involved
in something bigger and very dangerous, even though we have him
in custody, correct?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. That is also fair. Yes, sir.
Senator Edwards. Now, the documents themselves and the
computer, what--I assume that you had these within your control
in some place, is that correct?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. They were within the control of the
INS, yes.
Senator Edwards. They were under the control of the
government?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Yes.
Senator Edwards. So what you were thinking at the time is,
I think this is a very dangerous man. I have great concerns
about him. There is a possibility, at least, that he is
involved in a bigger plan, a bigger conspiracy, that could be
very dangerous to us and to our country. There is information
contained possibly within his computer, possibly within his
documents, that might tell us whether that is actually true or
not; is that fair?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. That is fair, yes.
Senator Edwards. Which is one of the reasons that you made
it such a high priority to try to get a FISA warrant, correct?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. That is correct.
Senator Edwards. Okay. And obviously you were being
aggressive, which I assume is how you were trained and what you
felt you should do under the circumstances?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Yes, sir.
Senator Edwards. Okay. Now, when you went to get the FISA
warrant, when you got the response from headquarters and from
the legal experts at headquarters, were you being told that in
order to get a FISA warrant it was necessary that you have
evidence, information, linking Moussaoui to a known terrorist
organization, i.e., one listed by the State Department, one
recognized by the FISA court? Is that something that you
understood you had to get in order to get the FISA warrant?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Yes. We believed that we needed to
identify a--and the term that was thrown around was
``recognized foreign power.'' And so that was our operational
theory. Yes.
Senator Edwards. So once you requested the FISA warrant in
what you considered, I think you just said earlier, was a
rapidly developing situation, you wanted to move quickly.
Once you made the request and you got the response, the
response said to you, I have got to make a link between--in
order to get a FISA, I have got a make a link between Moussaoui
and a recognized terrorist organization, as opposed to just any
group of people, any organization engaged in terrorist
activities; is that fair?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Yes.
Senator Edwards. Okay. Mr. Bowman, that was not the law in
August of 2001, was it, what the agent just said?
Mr. Bowman. No, sir. That was not the law.
Senator Edwards. So he was being told by headquarters, I
assume was your contact, correct?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Yes, sir.
Senator Edwards. He was being told that he had to make a
link between Moussaoui and a recognized terrorist organization,
either by the State Department or by the FISA court, when in
fact, all that had to be shown in order to meet that part of
the test was that there was a link between Moussaoui and, for
example, in this case the Chechans, correct?
Mr. Bowman. Between Moussaoui and some organized terrorist
group in this case. Yes, sir.
Senator Edwards. The people who were giving them this
description of the law, which was wrong at the time, are those
people who worked for you?
Mr. Bowman. No, sir.
Senator Edwards. Okay. The people who were giving him, the
agent, advice about the law that was wrong--and, I might add,
this is to the agent--the result of that was you spent a
significant period of time trying to make a link that in fact
the law doesn't require you now know, correct?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. That is correct.
Senator Edwards. The people who gave him that advice, can
you tell me--I don't know--I don't mean by name, but can you
tell me what department they worked in?
Mr. Bowman. I don't have any personal knowledge of that,
Senator. The information which came to me had nothing to do
with a recognized foreign power. There was straight facts that
came to me. I assume that it came out of the terrorism
division, but I don't have any personal knowledge.
Senator Edwards. Okay. So that we get this straight--this
is directed to the agent--you had what you considered an
emergent situation, was the way you described it, a potential
very serious threat to the country, the possibility of a
conspiracy, the possibility of--you talked earlier about
airplanes and the fuel capacity of airplanes, and I think you
mentioned the possibility of a plane being able to reach
Washington, DC.
Obviously, you were very focused on this potentially--and,
in fairness, it was only potential at that point--potentially
dangeroussituation. You made a request, hoping to get a quick
response. You were told something that we now know is wrong about the
law, and you spent some period of time running around trying to--what
is basically a wild goose chase--trying to establish something that the
law did not require, you now know. Is that correct?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. That is true to a point. We--the
staff has characterized that we spent up to three weeks just
trying to make this definitive link to a recognized terrorist
organization. In fact, during that three weeks, the entire
investigation was evolving. We weren't solely focused on making
that one link. We were focused on making the connection between
Mr. Moussaoui and the Chechen rebels and then also making the
connection between the Chechen rebels and al-Qa'ida.
So, in general terms, yes, we were focused on looking at
making a definitive link to a recognized foreign power.
However, there were a couple of steps in there and a couple of
collateral activities that spoke to the ultimate end.
Senator Edwards. But you were--in fairness, you were
spending significant time trying to make this link that we know
that the law did not require. Fair?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Yes, sir. That is absolutely true.
Senator Edwards. And you were thinking, I know that this
may not be something, and this information is all sitting in
the possession of the government, and you are just trying to
get to it so you can open it and look at it and figure out what
it is you need to do with it. Is that fair?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. That is true.
Senator Edwards. It turns out that when--and this is
information from the public indictment, and please don't
comment on anything that any of you would consider outside of
the realm of what is in the public information. But we now know
that sitting in the briefcase, in the computer, in the
information that was in the government's possession in August
that you were not able to get access to--and one of the things
you spent your time doing was chasing this legal requirement
that in fact was not there--in these documents--and this is
from the indictment--were letters indicating that Moussaoui is
a marketing consultant in the United States for In Focus Tech.
Now, In Focus Tech, I think this committee has determined
in our public information, is a Malaysian company. Yazzad Sufat
is the president of the company, and his name also I think
appeared in the documents. He was known to the CIA as the owner
of the Malaysian condominium in which the al-Qa'ida meeting was
held in January of 2000, before the time, of course, that we
are talking about, over a year before. This was attended by two
other hijackers. That was a meeting that others I believe have
talked about and have already testified to.
A name trace would show that Sufat--a name trace from the
FBI--a name trace request from the FBI to the CIA would have
produced the information and provided a link between Moussaoui
and two of what turned out to be the hijackers, a little less I
guess than a month later.
Another piece of information in the indictment is that a
notebook--again, these are the documents that are in the
government's possession but you can't get to--a notebook
listing German telephone numbers and the name of Ahad Zebet,
which is a name used by Ramzi Binalshibh, who was recently
arrested in Pakistan, I believe the press has reported, as a
key conspirator in the September 11 attacks. And he, along with
three other people, three of the hijackers, were part of the
terrorist cell that was formed in Germany in 1998.
And we could go on and on. The bottom line is this. There
was--it appears at least from the public information there were
significant data in that stuff that you were trying to get to--
his computer and his papers--that would have been useful in
your effort to determine whether there was a bigger conspiracy,
whether this man you had in custody had contact with others,
other known terrorists, others with terrorist connections, and
whether there were battle plans being undertaken. But that was
not something you were able to do before September 11, is that
correct?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. We were not able to access the
information that we had in our possession prior to September
11, that is correct.
Senator Edwards. Okay. Now, I would like to, if I can,
focus on the Phoenix agent, on the Phoenix EC. Let me go
through a group of facts and just get you to respond, if you
can.
There have been some public indications from the FBI that
there was no connection of any kind between your memo and the
hijackers or the people who were involved in the September 11
attacks.
I am going to go through a series of things.
The FBI I think now believes--I am not going to call him by
name because his name is classified--that one of the
individuals mentioned in your memo was in fact an associate of
Hani Hanjour, who was the pilot of Flight 77, the hijacking
pilot of Flight 77, that there was significant information that
Hanjour and this person had ongoing association during the time
from 1997 through the year 2000, including information from
flight school records and witness statements.
This individual, I believe, at the time you wanted to start
an investigation on him you determined that--which was May or
June, I have forgotten the exact date--you determined that he
was out of the country. Is that correct?
FBI Phoenix Agent. That is correct.
Senator Edwards. But he came back. We now know he came back
in the country shortly thereafter, during the summer of 2001.
Is that correct?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes.
Senator Edwards. Okay. During the summer, there is also
some information that he was training at the same facility that
Hanjour was training in Phoenix, is that correct?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Senator, this is still a pending
investigative lead that could lead to a prosecution.
Senator Edwards. Fair enough. You don't need to say any
more. But, let me ask you this--and, again, just don't comment
on it if it is not appropriate. But the fact that this
individual who you wanted to investigate but who was out of the
country, and then we now know came back in the summer of 2001,
and particularly given his experience level as a pilot and that
he was signing up for Cessna low-level flight training and
there is information that he was there with some others,
including Hanjour, during the summer of 2001 who were engaged
in flight training, let me just ask you a broad question
without going through the details, which I know you want to
keep classified.
Is it possible that this person who we are talking about
who is listed in your memo, is it possible that he was there in
the summer of 2001 for the--after he came back into the country
for the purpose of either helping with the training of Hanjour,
identifying whether Hanjour was qualified to do what was done
on September 11? Is that a possibility?
FBI Phoenix Agent. It is a possibility. It is an
investigative theory that we are looking into.
Senator Edwards. Okay. Is it possible that he was looking
at not just Hanjour but some of the others that he was
associated with during that summer as the more experienced
pilot to, for lack of a better term, ``screen'' who might be
capable of carrying out the September 11 plans out of that
group?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes. That is possible as well.
Senator Edwards. Okay. There have been statements--I won't
read them. Some of them have been in response to questions by
me and others from the FBI in May of this year indicating that
therewas no connection of any kind between--well, actually,
before I get to that, let me go back.
When this man who you wanted to investigate and who we now
have these various connections with was out of the country and
he came back in, did you know he came back in?
FBI Phoenix Agent. I didn't. I didn't.
Senator Edwards. Okay. When you all discovered that this
person who you were concerned about and wanted to investigate
was outside of the country, did you notify anybody who might
have identified him coming back in, the State Department, the
INS, any of the other government agencies who may have known
that he was coming back into the country?
FBI Phoenix Agent. No, we didn't, Senator. And the reason
for that, if I can follow up on that, is because when we first
became aware of the individual prior to September 11, he was
out of the country. At that time, we did not routinely open up
cases on individuals on--who were out of the country.
In this particular situation, it would have been an
intelligence type of investigation and a preliminary inquiry,
which would have given us 90 days to see if the individual was
involved in terror activity. So inasmuch as he was out of the
country, the practice at that time was not to open up a case.
So, therefore, to answer your question, there would be no--
we wouldn't be putting him into a TIPOFF system or any other
type of border crossing system to see if this person was coming
back into the country.
Senator Edwards. But to put all of that back into context
of what was happening at the time when you were involved and
you were, as the other agent was, very aggressively pursuing
these leads, this was one of a number of individuals that you
wanted to investigate, and he--you have determined that he left
the country. We now know he came back in. None of the people
who would have been responsible for identifying him coming back
in knew that they needed to look for him, is that fair, aside
from you and the FBI office?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes. That would be correct.
Senator Edwards. Okay. And there is at least a theory, to
use your words, there is at least a theory that this man may
have been the person responsible for helping train Hani Hanjour
and/or screen which of these pilots were capable of carrying
out the attack, we know that now, correct?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Post-9/11.
Senator Edwards. Correct. Yes.
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes.
Senator Edwards. The policy that existed at that time for
not notifying the other government agencies about somebody like
this who you were concerned about and wanted to conduct an
investigation on, has that changed since 9/11?
FBI Phoenix Agent. I can speak for the Phoenix division.
Yes. I mean, if we had a situation like this today, we would be
looking and opening up an investigation on the individual in
question here.
But, prior to that, we had enough people that were residing
in the United States, residing in the Phoenix area that we
needed to open up cases on. Prior to 9/11, we just did not open
up cases on individuals that we had determined had left the
country.
And, again, keep in mind with the Attorney General
Guidelines, so on and so forth, that govern those type of
investigations that we can get into more detail in closed
hearings, this individual would have been characterized as
nothing more than a preliminary inquiry because he looked
interesting, okay, due to some information that we received
from other sources and methods.
So there is no stating that even if we had a full--even if
we had an investigation, initiated an investigation on him
prior to 9/11, that we would have been able to go any further
than the preliminary inquiry stage.
Senator Edwards. If you had known, which you didn't, that
this individual had come back into the country, would you have
been monitoring him in the summer of 2001?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes. We would have been very interested
in his presence back in the United States.
Senator Edwards. And if you had been monitoring what he was
doing in the summer of 2001, the things that you have now
determined were going on in the summer of 2001, post-9/11 which
you indicated, some of those things presumably you would have
observed and seen?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Not necessarily. And the reason being,
again, I would like to reiterate, it would be a preliminary
inquiry, and I would be limited underneath the Attorney General
Guidelines what I could do to investigate that individual.
Okay? And that doesn't mean that I would be able to find the
things that I think that you are getting at about this guy
during that preliminary inquiry stage.
Senator Edwards. I was going to ask you about monitoring.
Knowing what you knew about him at the time that you wrote your
memo, is that something you would have wanted to do, monitor
his whereabouts, monitor his interaction with others? We now
know that included interaction with Hanjour.
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes, it would been something I wanted to
do.
Senator Edwards. Okay. And if you had that authority and
had been able to do that, you presumably would have seen some
of these things that went on in the summer of 2001?
FBI Phoenix Agent. It is a possibility. Yes.
Chairman Goss. Senator.
Senator Edwards. I see that my time is up, Mr. Chairman. I
thank the witnesses very much. And I thank the chair.
Chairman Goss. I thank the Senator for very good questions.
Mr. Cramer.
Mr. Cramer. Thank the Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses that are here today. We have
two field agents here, headquarters agent, a lawyer and a
supervisor as well, as I understand it.
I want to pick back up on where my colleague, Mr. Castle,
was when he left his question time. I want to talk about the
resources that you had available to you and, practically
speaking, how you used those resources. Then I want to ask you
to walk me through, even though to a certain extent you have
done that already, certain ways you communicated.
For example, and I will start with the Phoenix agent here
if I could, when you sent your memo, your EC to headquarters,
how many different people--I don't want names--but how many
different people did you send that memo to?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Six individuals at headquarters.
Mr. Cramer. And the way your communications system works,
do you know if all of those received the memo?
FBI Phoenix Agent. I personally do not know if they all
received it, the way the system works.
Mr. Cramer. Did you hear from any of those individuals?
FBI Phoenix Agent. No.
Mr. Cramer. All right. Do you determine yourself in the
field office whether--who you send it to? In other words, is
that called uploading? You decide who to send it to?
FBI Phoenix Agent. I decide who to put on the attention
line of my communications, yes.
Mr. Cramer. And you can block as well? You can decide to
send it to only one person and not to share it with other
individuals as well?
FBI Phoenix Agent. No, that is not my intention. If I put
somebody on there that I want it to go to, I want it to get to
that person and only those persons. So I am not--you know, I
don't try to block anybody from getting anything.
Mr. Cramer. All right. And did you expect to hear from
those six individuals?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Well, this is a question that I have
been asked before. I sent this communication as a routine
electronic communication, because there was no immediate action
required on it. There was no terrorist threat information
contained in the electronic communication, and I just wanted to
send it to them for their consideration.
Prior to my sending it, though, I did contact a senior FBI
analyst, and I said, hey, these are my concerns, my suspicions.
Who do you think I--who do you recommend I send this to? And
this particular analyst gave me the names of the individuals
who are listed on the EC.
Mr. Cramer. Now if I could come to the headquarters agent
now. Could I ask you to--you came into this particular unit
when?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I came into this unit in
approximately mid-May of 2001.
Mr. Cramer. But you have 15 years of experience.
FBI Headquarters Agent. That's correct.
Mr. Cramer. In the field and headquarters as well?
FBI Headquarters Agent. That's correct.
Mr. Cramer. Could you comment in some detail on the state
of technology as you found it there at headquarters?
FBI Headquarters Agent. If I can, I will go back. When an
EC is set from the field to headquarters, it is--a lead is sent
to a particular unit at headquarters. It will not be sent to an
individual. The attention line is, once the communication gets
into the building, theoretically it would be brought to the
attention of those people, but in terms of it serving as an
electronic means of providing it to them, that does not work
that way.
Mr. Cramer. All right. Then who determines, once it comes
into the building--our concern is--and we have had an excellent
summary from Eleanor Hill of the staff before you were made
available to us today. As you know, we have had prior
opportunities to get into these matters. But what I am
concerned about is the culture at FBI and how you communicate,
why certain people get certain messages. Is that a resource
problem? Does resource mean people? Does resource mean
technology? What does it mean?
As I observe it from the summaries I have had available to
me, the communication in this case, the EC from the Phoenix
agent, went to the weakest link at headquarters, and then a
person there determines where it goes from there.
FBI Headquarters Agent. It did not necessarily go to the
weakest link. The way it would take place within headquarters
is that the lead would arrive there. It would be given to a
particular person as a lead. It would be sent to an individual.
In this case, it was sent to the IOS, an intelligence
operations specialist. Those are the people that do the work.
That is where the rubber meet it is road in terms of
headquarters handling a specific lead sent from the field.
Mr. Cramer. All right. And then you are in the RFU unit,
right?
FBI Headquarters Agent. That's correct.
Mr. Cramer. And that is an operational unit?
FBI Headquarters Agent. That's correct. The RFU is an
operational unit.
Mr. Cramer. And the UBL unit----
FBI Headquarters Agent. Is a second operational unit.
Mr. Cramer. All right. And then the analysis unit is a
separate unit, correct?
FBI Headquarters Agent. The operational units have what we
would call intelligence--I am sorry--investigation operations
specialists. Those are tactical analysts. Those are analysts
that work specific case issues. They are the people that handle
leads that headquarters needs to handle. They are the people
that write the FISA packages. They are the people who are
moving specific cases forward.
Apart from those IOSs, you have a second group of analysts
known as intelligence research specialists. Those are IRSs.
They are not within the operational groups. They are in a
separate--at the time, pre-9/11, they were in a separate
division. Those are the people that would be expected to do
strategic type analysis.
Mr. Cramer. And how was the information routed to those
individuals before 9/11, before we have reviewed what happened
and what we could do differently?
FBI Headquarters Agent. The field could--could have sent it
directly to the IRSs. They could have sent it directly to the
division that was responsible for strategic analysis, or in
this case--and in the case of Phoenix as I remember it and I
see it--is that the lead was set for the operational group, the
Counterterrorism Division, into the operational units within
the Counterterrorism Division. And then it would have been for
those IOSs or for the supervisors to recognize that there might
be a need for strategic analysis and then to move it to the
strategic analytical group. That could be done electronically
by reproducing another electronic communication, in setting a
specific lead for the strategic analyst, or it could have been
done via an e-mail or a telephone call and just walking a hard
copy to them.
Mr. Cramer. All right. In the case of the Phoenix EC, your
EC, the IOS, who decides which IOS gets that memo? Or how is
that decided? What is the process?
FBI Headquarters Agent. It is done based on area of
responsibility. So if a particular analyst is responsible for a
particular field division or a particular subject matter, then
the individual who is going into the computer would recognize
that this particular IOS has responsibilities for this program
area. Or it might be a case number. It might be that all
Phoenix communications are handled by this particular IOS. So
that lead would then have been sent to the particular analyst
that was responsible for the case or the program matter. So the
attention line is not necessarily significant.
It could be that the wrong person was put on the attention
line, in which case the individual setting that lead would have
moved it to the proper IOS.
Mr. Cramer. Well, our information is that the--in this
case, the EC was assigned to a particular IOS because that was
the first name on the list.
FBI Headquarters Agent. I think that she also--why exactly
it was set to her, I am not exactly sure, but I think it was
also that she had some of the program responsibilities that was
addressed within that EC.
Mr. Cramer. If we could, back to the Phoenix agent, then.
Your EC as well went to the UBL unit, and you never heard from
them. Is that correct?
FBI Phoenix Agent. That's correct.
Senator, if I can make a point--or, sir. The reason why I
went to the UBL unit and the RFU unit is because of the nature
of the subject under investigation. We couldn't put him into a
particular category. So the division that I made after
conferring with the person I contacted at headquarters was let
us send it to both units, the Usama bin Ladin unit and the
Radical Fundamentalism Unit.
Mr. Cramer. And were your aware prior to 9/11 that
headquarters had closed the lead and that they were not taking
any additional actions at the time based on your communication?
FBI Phoenix Agent. No, I was not.
FBI Headquarters Agent. If I could speak to that, the lead
is not stated as closed. The lead is stated that they will
reconvene on this matter at a later time. Those operational
specialists handled the immediate actionable items that were
before them, and then what they wanted to do was to reflect to
Phoenix division--in my mind, what they wanted to do was to
reflect to Phoenix division that they had received the lead and
that they were looking at it, they were aware of it, and they
were going to act on it at a later date.
Mr. Cramer. All right. The New York agents interviewed
stated that the Phoenix EC did not resonate with them and that
they found it speculative. Why do you think that is? Why don't
you think they took seriously a memo like this? Was that
because they were the leading counterterrorism office and
Phoenix was more or less an island, as you have stated it, out
there?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Sir, I can't speak for why my colleagues
thought the way they did when they received that. I don't know
why they did. I have seen other reasons why they claim they
didn't want to take action on it, to include that they had seen
other people coming in for training for Usama bin Ladin. I
wished they would have taken a look at it, because it would
have been nice to know.
Mr. Cramer. But you--to this day, you don't know why?
FBI Phoenix Agent. No, I don't.
Mr. Cramer. How about Headquarters?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I am sorry. I do not know why.
Mr. Cramer. And this is for Phoenix as well as
Headquarters, we are made aware now of an astounding summary of
information about terrorist groups--reports of terrorist groups
that were planning to use airplanes as weapons. Did any of--
were those reports available to you in Phoenix? Were you aware
of those? Is that partially why you responded to write this
summary of information, that you were trying to pass up the
line that was ignored?
FBI Phoenix Agent. I wasn't aware of all of the situations
that you discuss, sir. I did have an interest in Islamic
extremists using or attacking the civil aviation industry due
to prior and previous investigations I had worked, if that
answers your question.
Mr. Cramer. All right. And to the Headquarters agent, did
you see or hear about the Phoenix EC prior to 9/11? Did you
yourself have any experience with that?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I have no recollection of ever
reading that communication. I did not get--it was not brought
to my attention before 9/11; and when it was brought to my
attention post 9/11, that was the first time that I really
tuned in on it.
Mr. Cramer. But you were one of the six listed that the
memo was addressed to, is that correct?
FBI Headquarters Agent. My name was on the attention line.
Mr. Cramer. All right. And how to date would that be
handled differently?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I am not sure if that would be
handled differently today in terms of a name appearing on an
attention line. I can tell you that, based on my position, that
my name is on hundreds, if not thousands, of documents in that
building that will probably not be brought to my attention.
Mr. Cramer. All right. If I could, I would like to get you
to comment about technology and this process, because we are
talking about communication. We are talking about names of
people in a system that responds to that, and I want to know
how the technology figures into that.
I understand from the Headquarters agent, from a summary of
information about your statements in the past, that you found
the technology inadequate, that you found it not very useful.
Would you give me more specifics and tell me how you think that
has affected the way communication occurs, if it has affected
that?
FBI Headquarters Agent. The computers--the systems in our
building are very cumbersome. I have heard from talking to
analysts, for example, that on a given day you can search a
name of a subject within ACS and get a set of results. The next
day--or a second analyst could go into the system and request
the same information and get a completely different set of
results. I cannot explain that. My experience comes primarily
from what I am told by the supervisors and the analysts that
work for me.
Another very significant piece that really needs to be
brought to the attention of this committee is that the
Counterterrorism Division within FBI is a part of the
Intelligence Community. The counterterrorism community, the
Intelligence Community, primarily works in a classification
level at a TS level, or, in the case of CIA, will frequently
put HUMINT on communications. Our systems do not go to that
level of classification. Our computer system is only at a
Secret level.
So communications coming into our building from NSA, from
CIA cannot be integrated into our existing databases. So if an
analyst is working, say, on a subject in Phoenix division and
they run that person's name through our databases, they will
not retrieve information on that person that other agencies may
also have. It is required of them to get up, walk over to a
different set of--or a different computer that has access to a
different database and search that name in that database; and
the two databases will never come together and be integrated.
So it is a setup for failure in terms of keeping a
strategic picture of what we are up against.
Mr. Cramer. Well, I happen to be on the Appropriations
Committee as well, and I am on the Commerce, Justice, State
Appropriations Subcommittee, and we listen to the FBI every
year, and we--I am an old prosecutor, and I want to give you
the tools that you need in order to do the job that we want you
to do. But we ask every year, what do you need in terms of
technology? Is this a money issue? Is it just a technology
overload issue? Is the agency so subdivided that you are having
a hard time getting a handle on that?
And, honestly, I can't read between the lines as to how--
now, this may not be something for you to answer here today,
but I am trying to understand from the user point of view of
what technology you have, what you don't have and how that
might play into this. The Trilogy system that you made
reference to, is it anticipated that that will help reorganize,
to a certain extent, the way communications occur?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I do not have the expertise to
speak to that.
Mr. Cramer. All right. Now, if I could, because time is
limited, we talked--or it was brought up earlier that there are
68,000 outstanding or unassigned counterterrorism leads in the
FBI's electronic Automated Case System. And that that dates
back to 1995. Are we making any progress? What are we doing to
improve that? That to me sounds intolerable.
FBI Headquarters Agent. I have tried to take that on in
terms of looking at that problem from both the UBL and the RFU
unit standpoint. We are getting through that system now.
I think we need to make it very clear, though, because
there is 68,000 leads outstanding on that point, that does not
mean that those leads were not handled. Frequently what has
happened is you have a duplication of a lead. For example, a
lead will be set for FBI Headquarters to both the
Counterterrorism Division and the UBL unit. Well, the
operational unit that would cover that lead is the UBL unit.
They would maybe clear that lead out, but it would remain in
the system from the Counterterrorism Division's lead bucket. So
even though the lead is shown in the computer as not covered by
the Counterterrorism Division, it is covered by the operational
unit. So there is a lot of duplication in that. That is one.
Two is, as I have said in my earlier testimony, is that the
system is very cumbersome, and people unfortunately have just
become very frustrated with it, to the point where they have
somewhat----
Mr. Cramer. They have no confidence in it? They are working
around it, is what it sounds like to me.
FBI Headquarters Agent. That is exactly the case, sir.
Mr. Cramer. And I would assume that leads are falling
through the cracks.
FBI Headquarters Agent. We hope not.
What will frequently happen, for example, is even though a
field division sends a lead to Headquarters and ACS, they are
also e-mailing that communication to the particular FBI
Headquarters SSA. So they are getting it and working on it via
the e-mail but not necessarily within the ACS system.
Mr. Cramer. My time is almost up, but I do want to work in
one more question, and this is on the Moussaoui investigation.
You said at Headquarters that this was a priority and that you
considered Moussaoui to be a threat. Did you alert other field
offices to the matter in order to determine whether there were
similar cases in other field offices?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I can tell you that a September 4
teletype was written from Headquarters. It was sent to two FBI
field divisions, and it was sent to elements of the
Intelligence Community. It was not sent to numerous other field
divisions, and that is just the nature of how the FBI operated
in a pre-9/11 environment, namely that we were investigation-
driven.
The investigation was in Minneapolis. It was in Oklahoma
City. As leads developed that would have included other field
divisions, then it would have opened, and we would have started
to move the investigation out to other divisions. But in a pre-
9/11 environment, we were clearly an investigation-driven
agency, and unless a particular field division needed to see
it, they would not.
Mr. Cramer. Which has to change.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Cramer.
Senator Hatch, the floor is yours for 20 minutes.
Senator Hatch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to direct some questions to Mr. Bowman and Mr.
Rolince, and of course if any of you would care to comment,
just raise your hands. I would be happy to have you do it.
In the wake of the September 11 incident, Attorney General
Ashcroft worked closely with Congress to formulate--help
formulate the PATRIOT Act which has provided the law
enforcement community with necessary tools and resources that I
feel were long overdue. Among other things, the Act enhanced
the ability of law enforcement and intelligence authorities to
share information and coordinate their antiterrorism efforts.
The Act has updated our laws relating to the electronic
surveillance.
We know now that e-mail, cellular telephones and the
Internet were the principal tools used by the terrorists to
coordinate their deadly attacks. The sad fact, however, is that
the bulk of the proposals that were incorporated into the
PATRIOT Act had been requested by the Department of Justice for
years but had languished in Congress because we were unable to
muster the collective political will to enact them into law.
Now I am concerned that there are additional necessary
legislative reforms that we here in Congress should be doing
everything in our power to make into law.
Now, Mr. Bowman and Mr. Rolince, I am very interested in
your views on these subjects. Senators Kyl and Schumer have
identified a problem with FISA, the so-called lone wolf problem
that I agree is a serious problem and needs to be addressed. We
held a hearing on July 31, 2002, to examine this issue, and I
certainly hope and expect this legislation would become law
this year, because it does enjoy bipartisan support, and it
would be helpful to you. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Bowman. Yes, sir. I do agree with that. On July 31, I
testified on that very matter and submitted testimony which
explained why the lone wolf has become a modern issue in
terrorism. Senators Feinstein, Kyl and DeWine and I had quite a
dialogue on it on July 31.
The bottom line to it is, sir, there is testimony before
your committee and in written testimony that you can look in--I
would be happy to repeat any of it, but I don't want to waste
your time. I think that it is numbers-wise a huge problem at
the moment but is certainly a problem we have seen growing over
the last few years.
Senator Hatch. Mr. Rolince.
Mr. Rolince. Thank you, Senator.
If I could address that from an operational standpoint,
this has been recognized for the better part of a year, year
and a half, and we specifically had unit chiefs such as the one
before you and a prior UBL unit chief bring over the former
head of OIPR and all of her attorneys to address the problem.
Because what we were doing was putting agents in a position to
try to fit people into a group that they didn't--in which they
did not necessarily belong.
The last thing that any of us ever want to see happen is
people standing in front of a FISA court judge and raise their
right hand and swear to facts that they either do not believe
are true or are being cancelled, are not sufficient, which goes
back to the Moussaoui issue, agent of a foreign power, not just
the foreign power, could you prove him to be an agent?
So when Senators Kyl and Schumer--in my personal view, they
hit the nail right on the head. That is exactly one of the
things that we need to be looking at.
Senator Hatch. In addition, I believe there are other
reforms we in Congress need to enact to assist law enforcement
and the Intelligence Community in their efforts to combat
terrorism. For example, although the PATRIOT Act enhanced the
ability of Federal law enforcement and intelligence authorities
to share information with one another, I understand the
statutory constraints on the authority of Federal officials to
share information with their State and local counterparts
remain and that these constraints apply to information obtained
through grand jury investigations, wiretaps, FISAs, as well as
educational records, visa and consumer information.
Now it seems to me that in order to succeed in this war on
terrorism it is critical that we have close cooperation in and
between State and local and Federal officials as well as--and,
in your view, do existing laws limit your ability to share
important information with State and local authorities?
Mr. Bowman. I think there is a--there are some limitations
here, Senator, which are important. The amendments to the
FISA--or to the PATRIOT Act on grand jury in Title III
information runs to Federal officers, which was a great help.
And I don't want to diminish what a significant change that was
for us, but it does not allow us to get that kind of
information to the 650,000 State and local authorities that are
out there.
The rules are slightly different, depending on what type of
information you are talking about. FISA information is not
included in that kind of a restriction. There are some other
restrictions that go into it.
One of the things that the Attorney General has been
looking into and developing a process for is the procedures
under which we can get classified information to State and
locals to help them with their eyes on target.
Senator Hatch. Don't similar limitations and restrictions
apply to the information you are permitted to share with your
international counterparts----
Mr. Bowman. Yes, sir.
Senator Hatch [continuing]. Who are cooperating and
assisting our national efforts to combat terrorism?
Mr. Bowman. Yes, sir. There are some limitations there. The
same limitations apply for the grand jury in Title III
information. There are some speed bumps on other things, FISA,
for example, to share with--if it is a U.S. person, at least,
we have--to share with a foreign power, we have to get the
permission of the Attorney General. We have to make sure that
they agree to protect the information that we give them and so
forth.
Senator Hatch. Okay. Another concern I have relates to
administrative subpoenas. Isn't it the case that the Federal
law enforcement officials currently have the authority to issue
administrative subpoenas to investigate cases involving Federal
health offenses, child abuse and child pornography, all of
which are important and very appropriate? However, I have to
say that you don't have the same authority with respect to
terrorism investigations. Now doesn't it make sense to expand
this authority to terrorism cases as well if you are going to
have that authority for health care offenses, child abuse and
child pornography?
Mr. Rolince. Absolutely. The answer is absolutely, Senator.
We have just locally--here in the Washington field office
is a great example--moved to entire squads to go after criminal
enterprises. They are supervised by individuals who formerly
ran violent crime bank robbery squads and drug squads.
The first thing they came to me--the first request they
brought forward was that we try to move down the road to get an
administrative subpoena, simply because it is faster and it is
more efficient.
An Assistant Special Agent in Charge of a field office can
and does sign those on a regular basis for the kinds of crimes
you just described. Yet to get that same kind of information
within a counterterrorism/counterintelligence investigation,
you can't get it. But you can get a grand jury subpoena or
national security letter, both of which, although effective,
are less efficient. We can get it much more quickly with
administrative subpoena, and we certainly would like that.
Senator Hatch. Well, as one of the prime authors of the
PATRIOT Act, I am not finding fault with the PATRIOT Act. What
I am trying to point out is we wish we could have done better
for you and that these matters should have been done, but
sometimes we get involved in some of the politics around here
rather than doing what is best for the American people.
Since September 11, there has been a growing concern about
the risk of a serious cyberattack, particularly one against our
infrastructure, which could have devastating consequences. Now,
although the PATRIOT Act included several important provisions
to improve our Nation's cybersecurity, in my view it did not go
far enough.
Just last week I offered an amendment to the homeland
security bill which, among other things, would give
communications providers and law enforcement greater
flexibility when dealing with emergency situations where there
is a risk of serious bodily injury or death. Specifically, the
amendment creates a good-faith exception that would allow
communications providers to disclose communications to a
government entity such as a hospital or a law enforcement
agency in an emergency situation involving the danger of death
or serious bodily harm.
It seems to me that if somebody wants to bomb on elementary
school but does not mention when such an attack will occur, a
communications provider should be able to disclose that
information immediately and not worry about whether the danger
is imminent.
In such a case, where a communications provider believes in
good faith that the emergency exists, don't we want the
provider to act quickly without the fear of liability?
Mr. Bowman. Yes, Senator. I think that is a very important
point. As we all know now, there has been an extremely large
number of Internet communications which have been relevant to
the terrorism investigations. We have been working closely with
ISPs all over the country, the big and the small, and there
have been any number of the ISPs who have been bending over
backwards trying to find ways to help us within the law, and it
is obvious in some cases that they feel very constrained on
what they can do. It is also obvious that they are trying very
hard to do the right thing, and I think your proposal would go
a long ways towards eliminating the fears that they have in
trying to do the right thing.
Senator Hatch. And in protecting the American people.
Mr. Bowman. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Hatch. Well, the bottom line is that I believe, in
addition to examining what intelligence failures occurred
leading up to 9/11, we in Congress need to do all we can in our
power to give our law enforcement and intelligence agents the
tools and resources that they need to protect us from further
terrorist attack, and I hope that that is part of this review
process. I hope the Congress will act expeditiously to enact
these very important reforms.
But let me just shift here for a minute. The staff's
statement details chronological intelligence reporting of
foreign nationals with Middle Eastern terrorist ties seeking
aviation training in the United States. I think I have counted
at least 12 or 13 bits of information, classified information
indicating that our law enforcement and intelligence
communities had some idea about the possibility of using
aviation or planes. The reports go back to the early 1980s even
during the Reagan administration and continue right up to the
present time.
Now, as the staff has taken note, this suspicious activity
spurred FBI headquarters in 1999 to request 24 field offices to
scrutinize Islamic students from an unidentified target country
who were engaged in aviation training in these offices'
jurisdictions. The FBI's international terrorism analytic unit,
in coordination with the INS, was to consolidate the
information obtained by the field offices. However, the project
was never continued, because the field offices did not follow
through.
Mr. Chairman, I think this was one of the most serious and
disturbing sections of the staff report; and I compliment the
joint inquiry staff for bringing these facts to light. I think
there is a lot of blame that can go around to people, and some
of it might rest here in Congress.
One of the justifications set forth as to why the field
offices neglected their duties relates to the Buckley
amendment. Now it is my understanding that, prior to the
enactment of the PATRIOT Act, the Buckley amendment limited the
disclosure of educational records to third parties. Under the
PATRIOT Act, the Attorney General or his designee may now seek
access to educational records that are relevant to an
authorized investigation or a prosecution of a terrorism-
related offense or an act of domestic or international
terrorism. But it is most unfortunate if this legal requirement
impeded law enforcement's efforts to complete this critical
project.
Now, Mr. Rolince or Mr. Bowman, in your view, did the state
of the law in 1999 indeed make it difficult for field offices
to complete this critical mission, and that is before the
PATRIOT Act came into being?
Mr. Rolince. Senator, I think the answer to your question
goes in a lot of different directions, both to resources and to
our inability to effectively carry out our duties.
The Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act and the
Buckley amendment certainly stood out there and regulated--
passed by, I believe, your predecessors back in about 1974--the
kinds of information that the FBI could in fact get from a
college campus. And the reason it is important is, if you look
into the numbers--and you don't hear much dialogue about what
happens if you follow up with the Phoenix EC.
There are, according to the numbers provided to me by the
FAA, 108 flight centers analogous to Embry-Riddle University in
this country that are accredited and for which we would have to
get a grand jury subpoena to go beyond the name and the address
of the student, and you would only get the address if that was
a matter of public record. There are 1,675 flight centers.
There are in excess of 69,000 certified ground instructors and
in excess of 82,000 certified flight instructors in this
country. That, in fact, is the universe.
I have been to the local law enforcement on the college
campuses and asked them, quite frankly, if we came and knocked
on your door asking about individuals on whom we did not have
pending investigations, what would the response have been,
assuming you can get past the profile issue? And I will assume
that somebody smart could have written something that would
have been accepted by everyone.
And they basically said to me, you will get the name and
address, and if you want more, you will have to come back with
a Federal grand jury subpoena because of that law and that
amendment.
I then asked three separate Attorney General-convened joint
terrorism task forces around the country in different regions--
in Denver, in Washington, D.C. and in Atlanta--just to the
attorneys in attendance, how many of you would be willing to
give a Federal grand jury subpoena to an FBI agent to access
records of an individual on whom we do not have an
investigation? In all three sessions, among hundreds of people,
one hand went up.
So the practicality and the reality of implementing the
Phoenix recommendations are, quite simply, if you shut down the
entire bin Ladin program lock, stock and barrel, shut it down,
touch base with each of those individuals that I talked about,
assume you get wholesale cooperation, they give you everything
they have, the mathematics works out to it is a 17-month
project.
Senator Hatch. Well, let me mention one other thing. The
Phoenix memo includes suspicions of terrorist activity that
were based in part on ethnicity. Now, while some may disagree,
it seems to me that a general fear of being accused of improper
racial profiling may have had a chilling effect and caused law
enforcement agents in this instance, or perhaps in others, to
be reticent in their investigations.Indeed, I understand that
the intelligence operations specialists who reviewed the Phoenix memo
expressed such concerns.
Now, haven't similar concerns been voiced within the FBI
and other contexts as well? And if you want to answer that.
Mr. Rolince. I think you only need to go back to the
Millennium to get a sense of how the FBI would have reacted if
we pushed that out the front door. There was a proposal on the
table to interview every subject of every full and pending--
every full and every preliminary inquiry investigation within
the UBL program once Ressam came across the border and we were
concerned about follow-on events for the Y2K. That met with
overwhelming resistance by the SACs in the field for a lot of
different reasons, one of which is we would be hounded
unmercifully over the profiling issue, and we pared it back to
a listing of individuals and cases and circumstances that
everyone could in fact agree with.
Now, the reality is, if you read the communication, it
doesn't suggest profiling. It, in fact, suggests going out and
trying to gather a list of everybody from anywhere that is
coming in to take that training. Practically speaking, that
would not--that would not be practical. At some point, you have
to hone it probably to the 60 or so countries that are
identified as having an al-Qa'ida presence. But at some point
in time if you come down to Middle Eastern males between the
ages of 21 and 41 and if you can define it as those who went to
the camps or not, some would call that a profile. I wouldn't
disagree.
Senator Hatch. Well, and that has been working against us
in this particular case, that you are unable to watch males
between those age groups, Middle Eastern males.
Mr. Rolince. If you go back to the Marine Corps barracks
bombing, up through the annex, the embassy, Khobar Towers, Dar
al Salaam, Nairobi, there is a consistency and certain traits.
And I know we are struggling with this whole issue of profiling
or common characteristics, call it what you will, but those are
the facts.
Senator Hatch. Well, legislation introduced by others in
this Congress proposes to ban racial profiling and prohibit law
enforcement agencies from relying to any degree on race,
ethnicity or national origin. Now, do any of you share my
concern that such so-called racial profiling legislation could
affect the FBI's ability to vigorously pursue leads which are
based, at least in part, on ethnicity, and do you deny that
that was definitely a part of the problem here in these cases?
Mr. Bowman. Yes, sir. I think you are absolutely right. If
that legislation were passed and I were asked for legal advice
on what to do, I would have to follow the legislation, as would
the special agents.
Senator Hatch. No matter what the----
Mr. Bowman. No matter what would happen----
Senator Hatch [continuing]. As a result in this country.
Mr. Bowman. And you hear it today. Our agents are extremely
cognizant of the law, and they are very concerned about not
going beyond it, and the laws that are passed are the ones they
are going to follow.
Senator Hatch. And they were, in these cases.
Mr. Bowman. Yes, sir.
Senator Hatch. And these arose in these cases, and they
were afraid to go out and do anything about it, and they were
reticent about it.
Mr. Bowman. That is absolutely correct, and the issue still
persists.
Senator Hatch. In May of this year, Attorney General
Ashcroft announced revised investigative guidelines that are
intended to enable the FBI to take a more proactive approach to
prevent and detect terrorism and other crimes before they
occur. Among other things, the new guidelines permit agents to
engage in online research on the Internet to employ commercial
data mining services when necessary to investigate terrorists
and to access public places that are open to citizens.
Now isn't it the case that, prior to these guideline
revisions, agents were restricted from surfing the Internet to
determine whether there are sites that address subjects such as
how to manufacturer explosives?
Let me just add one other--my time is about up, so let me
add one other part to this. Weren't FBI agents who investigated
the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearle forced to obtain
information from the Wall Street Journal employees who were
able to gather information using a relatively simple data
mining service, because the existing guidelines restricted the
agents from gathering such information? And under the old
guidelines, weren't there situations where the FBI was hindered
in its ability to pursue legitimate investigations because of
the fear of investigating criminals at this time occurring
under the guise of political and religious activity?
So, without revealing any sensitive law enforcement
information, can you provide some examples of why it is
necessary for agents to enter public places or events for
intelligence and investigative purposes and why you should be
able to surf the Internet and why you should be able to
overcome some of these limitations?
Mr. Bowman. I think you have hit the nail on the head for
much of this, Senator. The reasons for some of those
restrictions are historical. They go back to events of the
1960s and 1970s. The restrictions which were put on back in the
1970s were intended to try to prevent abuses in the future.
They focused on events and processes that have long since been
changed.
The fact of the matter is, everybody in the world knows
what the weaknesses of our system are as far as being able to
penetrate it, as far as being able to take advantage of it, to
whether it is for terrorists or criminal purposes, and if we
cannot put the agents where the action is, then we are never
going to be able to fully investigate many situations.
The fact is, we do have to put agents in open spaces. We do
have to put them where we expect to find terrorists and
criminals.
Senator Hatch. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Graham.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This first question is for all three of the panelists. To
your knowledge, did anyone in the FBI, either at field or
headquarters level, see the interrelationship between the
Moussaoui case, the Phoenix communication, the possible
presence of Mihdhar and Hazmi in the United States and the
flood of warnings about possible attacks against U.S. interests
in the United States, potentially using airplanes as weapons of
mass destruction? All of that was happening in the spring and
summer of 2001. Did anybody see the interconnections of those
events?
FBI Headquarters Agent. Senator, I will address that from
the headquarters standpoint first; and the answer to that is
no. The connection was not made. And I think that goes to a
number of issues, one being that just the volume of information
that is consistently being acted upon at both the headquarters
and the field level, the consistent threats that are varied in
nature, everything from cars and boats and everything else that
we consistently see. The volume of work that is handled by the
people on a day-in-and-day-out basis, it is just--it is
extremely difficult for individuals to keep these matters
connected and to see everything and to make these connections
in their head.
Again, I think that speaks to two key issues that I tried
to emphasize here today of a systemic nature, and that is a
lack of analytical resources and technology. I think in the
case in which you just stated in terms of making these
correlations and connections, our weaknesses in both those
areas need to be fixed.
Chairman Graham. Do either of the two agents have any
comments on that question?
Yes, Mr. Rolince.
Mr. Rolince. As we noted in a prior hearing, Senator, I
think it is critical that we keep this in the context of what
was going on at the time; and, yes, the staff report, which was
very thorough, talked to a number of different instances
wherein the use of an airplane or commandeering an airplane
was, in fact, mentioned.
I had an analyst go back to January 1 of 2001 and pull up
the threats disseminated within the FBI's website up through
September 10 at the Secret level. Two hundred sixteen different
threats, six of which mention airports, airlines. Three percent
of what came in at the Secret level in 2001 went to that issue.
What my colleague I think is saying I think we all agree
with, is that we literally have every possible kind of threat
you can imagine coming in day in and day out, and when the next
attack comes, I have no doubt that we are going to be able to
go back into the body of threat information, find indicators
that talk to it with some degree of specificity.
Chairman Graham. My second question is, assuming that this
may not be commercial airlines, it may be cargo containers on
maritime vessels or other forms of threats, that living in the
environment of a large volume of information and the necessity
to try to glean from that what is most important and relevant,
have there been any changes in the personnel, the technology,
the investigative approach of which in your opinion would have
changed the answer that you just gave if the circumstance were
today and not the spring and summer of 2001?
FBI Headquarters Agent. Would you like me to--from the
headquarters perspective, I think that the Director is clearly
moving in the right direction on that, and namely that the
analysts are coming on board to begin to look at these issues I
think that that strategic analytical group is beginning to get
their arms around issues similar to what you are suggesting. I
think that the technology problems, though, quite frankly, they
are still there. I don't think they are any better. Again, the
analytical resources are coming together, but the technology
being still a major gap.
Chairman Graham. Any other comments on that question?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Pelosi.
Ms. Pelosi. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would
like to yield my five minutes to the distinguished gentleman
from Minnesota at the time he comes up in the questions
process. Being a pilot and, as I say, close to this issue in
Minnesota, I want Mr. Peterson to have my five minutes at that
time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Ms. Pelosi.
Senator Shelby.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to direct my questions to the FBI agent at
headquarters. We have gone through this before, but when FBI
Minneapolis contacted headquarters on the FISA, for a FISA,
what date was that, if you recall?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I think--to the best of my
recollection, I think we are looking around August 21.
Vice Chairman Shelby. And what was your concern again
regarding their request for a FISA at that time?
FBI Headquarters Agent. We didn't have concern that they
had a need for a FISA. There was clearly in our minds a need to
get into that computer and get to those belongings--and his
belongings.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Didn't they have to have some kind of
search warrant, a FISA, a criminal search warrant to get into
it?
FBI Headquarters Agent. They could have--the theme that
quickly materialized was one of a tactical-type decision,
whether to go towards a criminal search warrant or whether to
go to a FISA search warrant.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Did you advise them what to do?
FBI Headquarters Agent. We put our heads together within
the operational unit and came up with what we believed to be
the proper way to go after that.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Were you the head of the unit?
FBI Headquarters Agent. Yes, I was.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Okay. Go ahead, sir.
FBI Headquarters Agent. I think it was the collective
opinion of myself and the supervisor who was handling that case
that we did not see a probable cause for obtaining a criminal
warrant. But, obviously, we are not attorneys; and I don't
believe that the supervisor that was handling this matter in
particular was an attorney. So we elevated that up to the
national security law unit within headquarters, and we asked
that the Minneapolis division bring it back to their own chief
division counsel to try to do a collaborative-type effort to
make the best decision.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Excuse me. What kind of time frame
are you talking about as you kicked it upstairs and then kicked
it back to the FBI headquarters in Minneapolis?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I think it was a fairly quick
movement. I would say within a day we had pretty much----
Vice Chairman Shelby. A day, you call that a quick
movement, something that is of that importance?
FBI Headquarters Agent. In terms of getting the answers and
in getting the people to put their heads together, I think it
moved pretty quickly.
Vice Chairman Shelby. So the answer was no on the FISA, is
that correct?
FBI Headquarters Agent. No, that is not correct.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Well, correct the record, then.
FBI Headquarters Agent. The decision that we came to in the
operational unit and within NSLU, if I could speak for them, is
that FISA was the way to proceed, and I think that was
substantiated by the CDC in Minneapolis, also.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Okay. Did the FBI Minneapolis then
proceed under the FISA and come back to you for clearance or
whatever you do--permission--under a FISA?
FBI Headquarters Agent. Right. In terms of the strategy
that was employed, we moved forward to attempt to acquire a
FISA search warrant.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Okay. Did you present--did the
Justice Department on your recommendation present an
application for a FISA to the FISA court?
FBI Headquarters Agent. No application was presented to the
Department of Justice.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Why not?
FBI Headquarters Agent. A decision was made that the
probable cause standards of FISA were not met.
Vice Chairman Shelby. And when you say a decision was made
and you were in charge, was that ultimately your decision?
FBI Headquarters Agent. It is a collaborative effort with
the national security law unit.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Did you notify then Minneapolis of
some problems they might have had with the FISA application?
FBI Headquarters Agent. It was voiced to Minneapolis that
we were having problems with the foreign power issue of the
FISA application. And I think it is important to note that the
FISA process never really ends. You know, we were looking at
that FISA process continually right up until September 10, but
obviously there came a time when we started to move towards a
deportation.
Vice Chairman Shelby. But the clock was ticking all this--
this started in August, and on September the 10 you were still
fooling around with it--or maybe fooling around is not the
proper word. You were still grappling with it, is that correct,
the FBI headquarters?
FBI Headquarters Agent. It is not uncommon to grapple with
the FISA----
Vice Chairman Shelby. Were you still grappling with it?
FBI Headquarters Agent. Yes. We were still trying to get to
the foreign power issue.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Okay. What happened on the morning of
the 11 September? Did Minneapolis FBI contact you,
headquarters, again for a FISA or a criminal warrant after the
Trade Towers were hit?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I was contacted by an individual in
Minneapolis division who asked that they be allowed to go
forward and attempt to acquire a criminal warrant.
Vice Chairman Shelby. A criminal warrant against Moussaoui
or a warrant to search the laptop?
FBI Headquarters Agent. To search both the laptop and his
other belongings.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Did you turn that down?
FBI Headquarters Agent. No.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Did you approve it?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I told Minneapolis in no uncertain
terms they should go forward immediately.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Well, we have been told that--and I
don't know if this is correct or not, that FBI headquarters
turned it down--turned the application again for a search
warrant down on the morning of the eleventh after the Trade
Towers were hit and a Federal judge in Minneapolis issued the
necessary warrant to search the laptop. Is that right?
FBI Headquarters Agent. That is not accurate.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Well, explain what is accurate.
FBI Headquarters Agent. I will, if I could.
Minneapolis--I received a phone call almost immediately,
9:50 in the morning or whatever, from an Assistant Special
Agent in charge of Minneapolis who I knew, and he said to me,
we would like to go forward with that. I said, absolutely, go
forward. At that point in my mind, you know, all bets were off.
Vice Chairman Shelby. And this is the morning of the
eleventh you are speaking of?
FBI Headquarters Agent. That's correct. At that point
Minneapolis went forward and approached the U.S. Attorney's
Office in Minneapolis and acquired the search warrant and, you
know, obviously significant probable cause was added to their
warrant in the fact that three airplanes had smashed into
buildings and a fourth airplane that was hijacked had crashed
in Pennsylvania.
Vice Chairman Shelby. I know my time is up, but could you
just briefly tell us what was found in the laptop? Can you do
that?
Chairman Goss. I think that is----
Vice Chairman Shelby. Is that----
Chairman Goss. Mr. Nahmias, you want to give us guidance on
that?
Mr. Nahmias. I think the concern is that since that
happened after September 11--or on September 11 and deals with
evidence in the criminal case, we----
Chairman Goss. We won't go that, then.
Vice Chairman Shelby. I will hold that for a special
hearing.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me thank all five of you for your service
to our country. We appreciate it very, very much.
A number of things that have come out of this hearing today
reinforced some things I think we probably already knew, but
let me just mention a couple.
One is that we have saddled the FBI with a communications
system that is broken. No corporation in this country would
tolerate it. It is shameful, and from your testimony it appears
that we still have a long, long, long way to go to fix it. That
certainly has to be the top priority of this Congress and a top
priority of the FBI. It is unfair to you. It is unfair to the
country.
Second, testimony has reinforced how difficult it is I
think for the FBI to, when it has to, get out of the case mode.
I started my career as a county prosecutor. I have some
familiarity with this area, as many on this committee do. You
are trying to make a case. You are focused on whether you have
the evidence to make the case.
You know, when the Phoenix memo came in, it seems it
clearly had new information. It mentions some things that in
hindsight look very, very tantalizing, very, very interesting.
It is a product, I will say, obviously of a Phoenix agent with
some very imaginative, creative, good work, good analysis--the
type of thing that needs to be done and needs to be rewarded in
our system.
Your field office didn't seem to think, however, that it
added very much to what it already knew, and I suspect that was
because they were looking at it as a case. Did this help them
make a case? But they failed to see, obviously, the big
picture.
And the question to the three of you, is it ever feasible
to really expect the FBI agents, who have been trained
historically to look at cases, to look at things from an
intelligence point of view? Can the FBI really do preventive
intelligence?
Let me start with the Phoenix agent.
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes, I think we can. I think we have
demonstrated that since our very inception, I believe. I will
just point to the examples during the Cold War, the FBI's
counterintelligence division during the Cold War and the
effectiveness we had against the Soviets----
Senator DeWine. Do you disagree with the premise, then?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes, I do disagree with the premise. I
think we need more resources, more analysts, more support
persons to attack this problem. I personally feel--it is my
opinion that we cannot do everything that we are mandated to
do, both criminally and from an intelligence point of view, and
do it all well.
Senator DeWine. Good point.
FBI headquarters?
FBI Headquarters Agent. Clearly, I think that we are up for
the commission. I will echo my colleague's sentiments. I think
it comes down to redirecting resources. I think clearly
analysis is going to be a big piece of it, and then a bigger
piece is training, and the training issue is one that
headquarters has to grab the bull by the horns right now and
get our people trained to look at these issues from a national
perspective, from a strategic perspective.
Senator DeWine. And the Minneapolis agent.
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Sir, I think we are absolutely up to
the task. The type of people that are recruited into the FBI
are people that are multifaceted and people that look beyond
just what is happening in their own backyard. As evidenced by
the way we attacked the problem in Minneapolis, we were
interested in exploiting the information that we had in the
government's possession, because we thought it might speak to
either a larger conspiracy or ongoing cases that were already
proceeding in other divisions in the FBI. We were clearly
focused on the bigger picture and were not with this myopic
look at a single case or a single criminal act.
So, absolutely, we are up to the task; and I think that is
going on in field divisions right now. I think it can happen to
a greater degree and much more effectively, but the type of
people that are working these cases are the people that have
clearly an international focus.
Senator DeWine. Well, I think your testimony has been very
helpful today. I think your answers just a moment ago, all
three of you, are very helpful. You have listed a number of
things that, frankly, fall outside of your responsibility, that
go to things such as resources, that go back to our
responsibilities, and I hope Congress will heed your advice.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I have two requests of our chairmen before I ask my
questions. One is, I would request that there be a redaction
and then a release publicly of both the Phoenix memo and the
Minneapolis documents. I have made a request many, many months
ago, back in May or June, for the public release after
redaction to protect sources and methods. The letter I get back
from the FBI was that they hope to do this at some point in the
not-too-distant future. It is still not done. It is an
essential part of our investigation, I believe, that the
documents with proper redaction be released publicly. Without
that, accountability is less likely. So I would ask the Chairs
to take that under consideration.
Secondly, I would like to highlight a portion in the staff
reportthis morning on page 23 where, near the bottom of that
page, it says that a CIA officer detailed at FBI headquarters learned
of the Moussaoui investigation from CTC in the third week of August.
The officer was alarmed about Moussaoui for several reasons. Those
reasons are stunning quotes, if I can put it that way, from documents
which I can't see any reason should not be released, and I would hope
that the Chairs and the Vice Chairs would get together and see whether
or not we can get the disclosure of those quotes.
This was at a time when the CIA stations were advised of
the known facts about Moussaoui. All I can tell you is that the
references in the report are to specific decisions, findings
made by that officer, which are directly relevant to this
investigation, into the events of 9/11. So I would ask that our
Chairs would consider that request as well.
Chairman Goss. That request has already, in fact, been
made. It is a work in process. I am not sure how it is going to
come out. But you will be advised.
Senator Levin. The first one as well?
Chairman Goss. Yes, sir. Both of those.
Senator Levin. Now the questions. This would be for our
headquarters agent. The Phoenix FBI agent recommended that FBI
headquarters ``should discuss the concerns raised by the agent
in the Phoenix memorandum with other elements of the U.S.
Intelligence Community, and task the community for any
information that supports Phoenix suspicions.''
I gather that was not done, is that correct? And if so why
not, briefly?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I have learned, obviously post 9/
11, of some of the actions that were taken both by the field
and by the analysts. In fact, it is my understanding that our
Phoenix division had, in fact, discussed a number of the
subjects, in fact, maybe all of them, and maybe my colleague
could complete on this also with the CIA. And at a couple of
meetings the issues of--the issue of the infiltration of the
airline industry by terrorist subjects was discussed.
Senator Levin. So therefore, are you saying that FBI
headquarters, specifically your unit, did, in fact, discuss the
concerns raised by the agent with the Intelligence Community?
Is that what you are saying, that you acted on that request?
FBI Headquarters Agent. No, I am not.
Senator Levin. Why did you not act on that request?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I can't answer that except to speak
to what I learned post 9/11.
Senator Levin. All right. Well, that doesn't then answer
the question.
You don't know why you didn't act on that request at the
time, is that the answer to the question?
FBI Headquarters Agent. That is correct.
Senator Levin. Now, the next question then relates to the
Minneapolis issue. In the case of Phoenix, you have an agent
who requests specifically that his concerns be shared with the
Intelligence Community. You did not act on that request,
inexplicably. Now we have got another similar situation in
Minneapolis.
But here, apparently the Minneapolis division did notify
the CIA's counterterrorist center, the CTC, and according to
Ms. Rowley, was, in her words, chastised for making the direct
notification without the approval of the FBI.
Now, let me ask our Minneapolis agent. Do you know if that
statement of Ms. Rowley is true?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. That is true, sir.
Senator Levin. All right. This to me goes to the heart of--
--
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Excuse me, if I may qualify that a
little bit. It is true to a point. The word ``chastised'' is
perhaps a little prejudicial here. I did receive a
communication from a supervisor at FBI headquarters that
indicated his preference would be that we contact FBI
headquarters to coordinate any intelligence sharing with CIA
headquarters.
He indicated to me that the information flowed better when
they were communicating headquarters to headquarters. I know
that has been a longstanding preference of FBI headquarters.
Senator Levin. Did you or she consider that to be a
reprimand of sorts, a correction of a previous action?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. It seemed to me to be a direction of
FBI headquarters to cease and desist.
FBI Headquarters Agent. I would like to speak to that if I
could.
Senator Levin. I am out of time.
Chairman Goss. You are out of time. I would yield you an
additional minute because you took a minute on administrative
matters which are a benefit to all of us. So if you would like
the additional minute, it is your choice, sir.
Senator Levin. If you can do that in 30 seconds, that will
give me 30 seconds for my last question.
FBI Headquarters Agent. I can. Namely, the supervisor who
was handling that matter is the person who is going to be the
affiant on the FISA. That individual has to be aware of
everything that is going on in that case.
And communications cannot be kind of going around him. The
reality of it is, is things do work much better when they go
through headquarters. There was no effort to hinder in any
manner communications between CIA and FBI.
In fact, I can tell you from firsthand experience with my
conversations with CIA, and with our FBI representative at CIA
during that time frame, that there was exceptional flow of
information back and forth.
Senator Levin. This is a very quick question. It is one
thing where there is reticence on the part of agents where
there are legal barriers to take certain actions. But, where
there are no barriers, that is where we get into trouble, it
seems to me. That is where I have difficulty understanding the
failures to act.
One of the great failures here had to do with the FISA
warrant, what is the standard for getting a FISA warrant, and
the so-called foreign power provision, which you viewed or were
told was a barrier, erroneously, by the legal division at FBI.
Apparently it was established by Senator Edwards it was
erroneous.
Now, my question is this: I read the law. The legal advice
is clearly erroneous. You don't have to have a foreign power,
you have a foreign terrorist group. That is enough for a FISA
warrant under the law as it existed.
FBI Headquarters Agent. A foreign power with regard to a
FISA in a terrorism case would be a terrorist organization.
Senator Levin. Exactly right. The terrorist organization is
enough. Yet, this was not pursued because you were told that
you had to prove that there was a foreign power connection.
FBI Headquarters Agent. No, that is not true.
Senator Levin. If that is not correct, fine, I will let
Senator Edward's Q and A answer that.
My question is this: Apparently there was an acknowledgment
that there was a misinterpretation of the law. Okay. How many
FISA requests were denied based on that misinterpretation of
law, in addition to the one that we are talking about here?
That is a very specific, numerical question. How many requests
were not approved based on the misinterpretation which was
acknowledged or explored by Senator Edwards?
Mr. Bowman. May I briefly answer that, if I may, Mr.
Chairman? I don't know of any other instance in which something
like this came up. But I don't think, Senator, that Senator
Edwards' questions got quite to what you were focused on there.
The fact of the matter is that the agent of a foreign power is
something that is not defined in the statute, but is addressed
in the legislative history, which we have to follow, because
that is where we get an explanation of it.
An agent of a foreign power in the legislative history
describes a knowing member of a group or organization, and puts
an onus on the government to prove that there is a nexus which
exists between that individual and the organization which would
make it likely that that individual would do the bidding of the
foreign power. That is the stretch that we weren't able to get
to.
Mr. Rolince. Mr. Chairman, I think that is absolutely
essential, because there seems to be a disconnect between
whether or not we did not get the FISA because we could not
connect him to a foreign power.
We did not get the FISA because the decision came out, in
consultation with OGC, that we could not plead him as an agent
of that foreign power.
Senator Levin. If I could put in the record the definitions
of foreign power in 50 U.S. Code Section 1801(A). And foreign
power is defined as, including in Subsection 4, a group engaged
in international terrorism, or activities in preparation
therefore.
Mr. Rolince. No disagreement, but we have to prove that he
is an agent of that foreign power.
Senator Levin. Of that group?
Mr. Rolince. Right. That is where we were lacking, that he
was an agent of that group.
FBI Headquarters Agent. If I could, this is a very
significant issue, and one that we should probably take up a
closed session. And it needs to be explored, because this is a
problem that we are going to face many times now in the future.
And this issue of how to get at these so-called lone wolves
needs to be addressed.
Chairman Goss. Thank you very much. We will do that. And we
have in plain text up here what Senator Levin has just held up,
it is in our briefing books. We are reading it obviously as
layman, not as operatives in the field, or people having to
deal with it. Obviously this needs more dialogue. We will
arrange to have it in a freer atmosphere for those of us who
have to deal with this stuff. I think your suggestion is
excellent.
We will proceed now to Mr. Roemer.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want
to, first of all, thank and also commend particularly the
agents from Phoenix and Minneapolis.
As we look back on the horrors of September 11, we find
that going back to Minneapolis and Phoenix, there were, in
fact, field agents out there that found clues that could have
brought more attention to these matters, that pieced together
important ingredients and evidence in the case, that may
significantly help us down the lines. So I want to thank you
for your hard work and your successful work in some ways.
Given your experience in the field, given your assessment
of the threat, given your knowledge of where al-Qa'ida may
operate successfully in this country--first of all, the Phoenix
agent--how likely is it that we are going to be hit again? And
when do you think that may take place?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Well, this would be purely speculation.
Mr. Roemer. That is all I am asking.
FBI Phoenix Agent. I believe that, first of all, that the
watershed event for the international terrorism community took
place on February 26, 1993. And I wish we had these type of
hearings back then to address that threat, because I believe
that that was the first page of a new chapter in American
history. I believe that the enemy is here, is ingrained in our
communities and is willing to strike again.
I just--I couldn't tell you when. I believe that we are
making some headway and having some success with disrupting his
activities in the country as is evidenced with what took place
a couple of days ago in Buffalo and elsewhere around the
country.
But, to give you a time frame----
Mr. Roemer. On a scale of 1 to 10, Phoenix Agent, how
likely do you think a hit from some of these terrorist groups
might be, 10 being very likely?
FBI Phoenix Agent. I would say it would be low right now. I
would say 1, because of our offensive efforts post 9/11.
Mr. Roemer. That is in country or from outside?
FBI Phoenix Agent. I can only speak for inside of country.
Mr. Roemer. Minneapolis agent.
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Sir, I am unfortunately not prepared
to answer your question, because circumstances concerning my
assignment have changed significantly since my involvement in
this case. I don't have current information or access to the
current information because of my present assignment. And for
me to speculate would be completely out of scope.
Mr. Roemer. I appreciate your honesty, and I appreciate the
hard work that you did prior to this.
Coming back to the Phoenix agent, I want to say that from
our testimony from Eleanor Hill, she quotes New York FBI
personnel who found your Phoenix memo ``speculative but not
necessarily significant.''
I, on the opposite hand, find it significant, because it
was speculative. You almost laid out the case for a strategic
analyst that, piecing together different threat assessments and
different clues coming in, that this might well happen at some
point in the future, but that it could be happening in other
places in the country.
We are told that five intelligence research specialists,
strategic analysts were transferred from the analytical unit to
the operational unit, and in the opinion of one of the
interviewees in the strategic analytical capability, the FBI
against al-Qa'ida, that it was ``gutted.''
Do you have any comment on the state of the strategic
analysts prior to 9/11?
FBI Phoenix Agent. I don't have any information concerning
what took place at headquarters in terms of the downsizing and
transferring of people. But, as I testified earlier, we in the
field, I in particular, I can speak to myself, saw a decreased
amount of analytical material that came out of headquarters
that could assist somebody like myself in Arizona.
Mr. Roemer. I hope that we are dealing with that, both from
a training and a resource capability now and looking into the
future as well, too.
Finally, FBI headquarters agent, you said in response to a
question from Mr. Cramer that your name was on the Phoenix memo
to headquarters, but you did not recall seeing it. Is that
correct?
FBI Headquarters Agent. That is accurate. I do not believe
I ever saw that communication. In fact, I think your
investigators for this committee that have been investigating
this matter have confirmed that the best they could.
Mr. Roemer. I am not so much going to try to grill on
whether or not you recall seeing it, not reading it or passing
it on. What you said afterwards concerns me about the system a
little bit more.
You said that you still do not see some things with your
name on it, sometimes that could amount into the hundreds of
memos or documents going through FBI headquarters. So if there
is another Phoenix-type memo coming through, you may not see
it.
And maybe there are three or four other names on that memo,
but I want to be reassured that three or four of those people,
including you, would see it this time and be able to act on it.
Are we going to fix the system so that those four or five names
or six names in this instance--however many were on it--that
they are seeing it, reading it, and responding to the field
offices.
FBI Headquarters Agent. That is a fix that comes with
technology and resources.
Mr. Roemer. So it is not fixed?
FBI Headquarters Agent. It is not fixed. I think this has
to be clear, nor do I need to see everything on--as an
individual, I cannot possibly see and consume every piece of
paper. Unfortunately, there is a culture in the FBI where names
go on attention lines. That is not necessarily necessary. I
think it needs to be focused on program responsibilities or
cases, and field division responsibilities.
Just because of my position, they tend to put my name on
that communication. I myself do not necessarily need to see it
nor could I possibly take on all of those pieces of
communication with my name on it.
Mr. Roemer. I would just hope they take your name off it,
and the people that would have their name on it would be
reading it and responding to it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Mr. Roemer. Mr. Peterson, you
have ten minutes, sir.
Mr. Peterson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Ms.
Pelosi for her kindness in giving us some time. We in Minnesota
are probably, as you expect, probably a little more focused on
what we are talking about today than other places. And I wanted
to commend theagent from Minneapolis and all of the other
people. We are proud of the work that you do. And you folks did a great
amount of work, and a very good piece of work on this issue. I want to
thank all of you for what you do for your country.
Now, having said that, I want to bring up a couple of
things that keep coming up. I want to try to sort through this
sequence a little bit.
I just heard this again today, and I wanted for the
Minneapolis FBI agent to clarify this, that someone brought up
to me during the break, that the flight school had called the
FBI office in Minneapolis two or three times before they got a
response. This has been printed before, and as I understand it,
that is not the case. Are you familiar with what happened
during that?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. I am not at all aware of any prior
telephone calls. I have heard that also in the past. We have
been unable to confirm that in Minneapolis. I can tell you the
first call was August 15. That happened about 1 o'clock in the
afternoon. And immediately following that call, the agent hung
up the phone, came into my office and the intelligence case was
opened.
Mr. Peterson. That is--I just wanted to get that on the
record. That is the way I understood it.
Also in Ms. Hill's statement today, she says that the
supervisory agent in Minneapolis told the joint inquiry staff
that the FBI headquarters had suggested that Moussaoui be put
under surveillance, but the Minneapolis office didn't have
enough agents to do that.
It wasn't too long after this all happened that he was
arrested because he was an INS violation. But is that true? Was
there a decision made to where they couldn't put him under
surveillance because there weren't enough people? And that
raises a question of how much of a priority this was in some
people's minds.
FBI Minneapolis Agent. That statement is partially true.
The decision on whether or not we were going to put Mr.
Moussaoui under surveillance rested with me. And I made the
decision that he was going to be arrested because we had a
violation. The INS was participating as a member, a full member
of our joint terrorism task force.
My background in the criminal arena suggests that when a
violation occurs and you can stop further or potential criminal
activity, you act on that.
So that is exactly what I instructed the agents to do. If
we had the possibility of arresting him, we were going to
arrest him. If we needed to surveil him, we certainly could
have instituted a surveillance plan.
Mr. Peterson. That was not an issue?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. It was not appropriate to do in this
case.
Mr. Peterson. Now, on this whole issue of trying to get at
his computer and his effects, I understand that initially you
were looking for a criminal search warrant. Is that----
FBI Minneapolis Agent. The initial telephone call I made to
the radical fundamentalist unit was to request a notification
to the Department of Justice's Office of Intelligence Policy
Review to grant us concurrence to walk across the street to the
United States Attorney's office and discuss the possibility of
a criminal warrant. That was not to say that we were committed
to getting a criminal warrant, because as the FBI headquarters
agent has mentioned, the feeling of FBI headquarters was we had
not yet reached the threshold of probable cause to obtain a
criminal warrant.
I don't disagree with that assessment. And when the
information came to light that we would be better instituted to
pursue the FISA warrant, because it granted us greater options
or a larger number of options in the future, it was very clear
that that was the right decision, was to pursue it as a FISA
matter. That is the way we went.
Mr. Peterson. Now, there was some concern that if you went
through the criminal process and were turned down, that it
would jeopardize your FISA request too, as I understand it?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Peterson. We got some indication that this--I guess
this was asked earlier--that there was some kind of adversary
relationship between Minneapolis and headquarters, that there
had been some issues before in these areas, and apparently both
of you gentlemen weren't there long enough to be aware of that.
Mr. Rolince, do you know that? Would that have been a
factor in all of this? And we also have the reprimand of
Colleen Rowley talked about. Was there some kind of problem
between Minneapolis and headquarters that affected this?
Mr. Rolince. No. It absolutely should not have been a
factor. If there had been a prior disagreement between the
supervisor at my colleague's unit and any agent in Minneapolis,
it certainly had not been raised with management within the
international terrorism operations section prior to that.
So I would take it to mean that, if there were some issue,
it wasn't significant, because nobody brought it to anyone's
attention to do anything about it.
The second part of your question. I think it is important
to understand that you don't want 11,000 agents in the FBI
picking up the phone calling back to CIA or INS or State
Department or any other headquarters in Washington with their
leads. There is a rational, logical reason why leads come into
headquarters. There is a headquarters-to-headquarters dialogue.
And the answer goes back out. In this instance, at that time,
there was a memorandum of understanding between the FBI and the
CIA that that is exactly how we would handle inquires from the
field. That is more effective. It is more efficient. And it is
the way our counterparts in Washington want it to work.
Mr. Peterson. There is also some information that the
headquarters didn't think that the people in Minneapolis
understood the FISA process, and the people in Minneapolis were
very frustrated, I think, in the way this whole--they really
were frantic to try to get at this stuff. How are people in the
field trained on FISA? Are they only trained at Quantico, or do
they get updated on court decisions and legal changes? Now, do
you--an agent in the field, are you trained on this at all?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. I had received no training on the
FISA process prior to this incident. I--my background had been
as a domestic terrorism investigator. I had received some
fairly extensive training on the Attorney General Guidelines
and matters related to domestic terrorism.
FISA problems, or the FISA Act is not often, if ever,
invoked in domestic terrorism measures. So personally, I had
not had any. However, there were other agents on my squad, the
agent who was assigned as the case agent in this matter and an
agent who was assigned to the parallel criminal case, post
September 11, who had received some in-service training from
Quantico, in addition to the on-the-job training and training
from the supervisor that preceded me, in how to handle the FISA
matters.
So there was an understanding of the FISA process in
Minneapolis by the specific case agent as evidenced by the fact
that this case agent had a couple of prior FISAs, and had been
through the process before.
FBI Phoenix Agent. Sir, if I can address that issue as
well, I have been working counterterrorism matters for
approximately 13 years. During the course of my career I have
been to several in-services at Quantico that give us updated
training on the FISA process--how to put together the packages,
what is needed to make them successful.
Most recently I was at a FISA in-service just right after
9/11 where we addressed some FISA issues as well. So I have had
the benefit of having that training. And the training is
available and has been put on by our national security law
unit.
Mr. Peterson. I know there was a lot of frustration in the
Minneapolis office. I stopped by there shortly after 9/11 and
so forth.
Was there ever any attempt by anybody in Minneapolis to go
above the radical fundamentalist unit, to try to jump over them
and try to get somebody at a higher level to listen to what you
were talking about?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. I took the information, as I
mentioned earlier, to my immediate supervisor, who was an
assistant special agent in charge. He also happened to be
acting as the special agent in charge of the office.
So there were some internal concerns, or really some
demographic things that were happening within the Minneapolis
office at the time that this matter was under way.
We did not have a Special Agent in charge of the office. So
we had an acting special agent in charge acting in his stead or
her stead. We did not have a full-time supervisor on this
squad. I was acting as the supervisor in the absence of someone
who had recently been promoted. So the networks that are
established by those management personnel that are normally in
those key positions would definitely have come to play or could
have come to play had the circumstances been a little bit
different.
When I took the information up to my assistant Special
Agent in charge, I provided him with a list of the names of the
people who were supervising the radical fundamentalist unit,
and in fact the people who were supervising the international
terrorism operations section.
And I--I am prepared to speak to you today as to why those
telephone calls were not made. I requested that they would be
made.
FBI Headquarters Agent. If I could add to that also, as the
chief of the unit at the time, I want to be very clear,
probably in my own defense here, that I was not made aware of
the issues in terms of Minneapolis's frustration with regard to
this process. I think that clearly there was some
miscommunication. I think some of the frustration was driven by
that miscommunication. And obviously in hindsight, I very much
would have wanted a phone call, and unfortunately that did not
take place.
Mr. Rolince. If I could take 30 seconds on that, I think it
is critical to understand that on a regular basis field offices
around the country, SACs visit the office, they are on the fax,
they are on the fax, they are on the phone, they are on the e-
mail. It is a regular occurrence to lobby for your FISA, to get
it moved up in terms of priority or to make an appointment with
OIPR, to debate the issues and the merits of your FISA.
That is something as you look for things you can do better,
we, clearly in the FBI, are looking for things that we can do
better, in encouraging that dialogue. That is certainly one of
them. We should not have chief division counsels who are
peripheral to an issue where you are desperate.
The chief division counsel in all 56 field offices--and
this is a problem we have identified from years ago--needs to
be a player within the FISA realm. Their forte, their expertise
for years has been Title III. There has been a reluctance to
jump on and get educated and be part of this process. Instead,
they defer to NSLU, which overburdens the people at
headquarters. So it is something that the Bureau has
recognized, we need to continually promote, and it has to
happen in order to make a more effective system.
Mr. Peterson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Mr. Peterson. I appreciate it.
Before I go to Senator Mikulski, it has been brought to my
attention that we have two other distinguished visitors;
Senator Shelby's wife, Annette, and my wife Mariel are here.
And we welcome them also and appreciate your patience with us.
Senator Mikulski.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First,
to the men testifying, and really to the men and women that you
represent, know that I believe, as this United States Senator,
I have tremendous respect for you.
And I have tremendous respect for what you do every day.
While the rest of us are eating Thanksgiving dinner or are
opening Christmas presents, you are out there in the field, and
you have missed many a family event, and all of the things that
we know go into it. And I believe from just the testimony that
we have heard, that the agents in the field and the field
offices were really doing their job.
And to the Phoenix agent, your rebuke of Congress is well
taken. I accept the validity of that rebuke. I am not one of
the ones who wagged on you or made you public or whatever. But
I think that statement was well taken. And for this committee
to have effective oversight, and to expect the cooperation of
the agencies, we need to make sure that we protect you, while
we are asking you to protect us.
So I think that statement of yours was very well presented.
It was presented in an excellent, forthright way. And I
appreciate it.
FBI Phoenix Agent. Thank you.
Senator Mikulski. I want to go to really solutions. Much of
our inquiry has been kind of looking back. I would like to look
ahead. And with three men who had incredible responsibility
during this time, and who I am sure have agonized day after
day, memo after memo what could have been done differently, I
would like to ask you to share with the committee what you
think would be the top three things you think the Congress
should do, or your agency should do, to really improve our
situation and to make sure that these kind of gaps and so on
would never happen again.
And if you could just go down the line, because I was
looking at the issue of a smoking gun. There isn't a smoking
gun. Are there systemic issues? Yes. So if we look at the
systemic issues, then what are the solutions?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Speaking for Phoenix, the top three
things that I would like to see. And number one is the most
imperative, is the additional resources applied throughout the
Intelligence Community with our analytical capability. There
should be one place established where raw intelligence from the
field, both from overseas and within the United States, from
all of the different intelligence agencies that are out there
collecting gets dumped and analyzed and looked at and raw
material put into a--analytical product and gets disseminated
to the officers in the field.
The second thing is the need for more investigators here in
the United States within the FBI. We talk about this in our
squad areas every day. We cannot continue to do the number of
things that we are charged with doing with the number of agents
we have. 11,000 agents, when you think about it, for a country
of close to 300 million is amazing. When you look at cities
like New York who have 35,000-plus police officers trying to
protect their citizens, certainly I think we need more agents
to do the job.
And third is, we need to increase our technical
capabilities, our information flow. I mean, in direct reference
to my memorandum, we should have a capability to wash and then
rewash visa applicants through the U.S. Intelligence Community
databases to see if anybody that is applying for visas to come
into this country are known to the U.S. Intelligence Community
as being involved with terrorist organizations. And not to
mention, as we have heard, time and again today, better
information technology for us in the FBI so we can communicate
with each other more effectively.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you. Would the agent who handled
Moussaoui go next, and then we will wind up with headquarters.
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Ma'am, I would reiterate a lot of
the things that he said. Technology is certainly something I
think that we have languished well behind the business
community. It was mentioned that no business in America would
operate with a system like we have. I would argue that very few
private citizens in America would be satisfied with the system
that we are operating with.
Technology clearly is of high, high priority on my list.
The resources, to include the analytical resources, be it
training of those analysts, and the recruitment and retention
of personnel really at all ranks of the FBI, that would
probably be my second point.
And finally is the training issue itself. We have a
tremendous number of agents who are very, very capable in the
disciplines that they are already trained in. However, a lot of
them, since September 11, 2001, have now been transferred to an
arena that they have never been exposed to before, or the
initial training that they had fell short of things that were
occurring in--or the world as it was prior to September 11,
2001, or really no real sensitivity to the issues that are
related to counterterrorism.
So additional in-service training and training of the
agents who have been reassigned in addition to the agents who
are already assigned to this type of mission really needs to be
a priority.
Senator Mikulski. My time is almost up, but they will let
me finish.
FBI Headquarters Agent. From a headquarters standpoint, I
am going to go back to my two main themes as what I see as
systemic problems. And clearly they have been hit on. The
technology, number one. The FBI is a member of the Intelligence
Community. We have to be able to communicate with them. We have
to be able to have databases that can be integrated with them,
and rightnow we do not. It is a major problem. It is a major
problem for our analysts.
Number two, analytical resources at headquarters. You have
heard this throughout today's testimony. From a tactical
standpoint, we have outstanding tactical analysts that do a
phenomenal job day in and day out. Unfortunately, from a
strategic analytical standpoint, the resources are woefully
inadequate.
Finally, from a real operational standpoint, I think we
need to have a hard look at foreign students in our
universities. And I can't get into more than that in this
setting. But I think it is an issue that we need to address in
a closed session.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you. My time is up. But thank you
very much.
Chairman Goss. That is an issue that has come to the
attention of the appropriate oversight committees. I am sure it
will continue to be.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That
is an issue that we did have hearings on in the Technology and
Terrorism Subcommittee of the Judiciary. And as a matter of
fact, part of the Visa Reform and Border Security Act deals
with tightening the myriad of loopholes that exist in the
foreign student program. If you have any other recommendations,
I, for one, as the Chair of that subcommittee, would love to
have them, because we are going to be holding an oversight on
progress with respect to terrorism in that area.
But I wanted to ask you, Mr. Bowman, if I might, this
question: Just quickly following up on Senator Levin's
question, as I understand it, then, the FBI's national security
lawyers essentially used the wrong standard of designated
group, ergo Chechen, not on the list, ergo not designated,
rather than any group, and some three weeks was taken in that
endeavor.
Then I think Senator Levin asked the question: Well, how
much other FISA requests went through the same thing? Is the
answer there was no other FISA--this was the only FISA request
that happened to encounter that kind of false standard?
Mr. Bowman. Two different parts of your question, Senator.
First of all, no one in the national security law arena said
that the Chechens were not a power that could be--that could
qualify as a foreign power under the FISA statute.
The issue that came to us was whether there was any foreign
power to which you could attach Moussaoui. And we did not see
that.
The second part of your question was whether there are
others who have been given an erroneous standard, whether there
were other FISAs that did not come to us because there was an
erroneous standard. I don't know what I don't know.
This is the only time that I have heard that advice was
actually given that you don't have--you don't have a foreign
power, because there isn't a recognized one. That is certainly
not what we train them to.
Senator Feinstein. Just a suggestion. It might be well to
take a look and see if there are others. It would be
interesting to know.
I wanted to make an observation and see if the agents
couldn't comment on the observation. The Phoenix memo
essentially happened during the month of July. I remember that
month very well, because we in the Senate were having hearings.
The intelligence, so-called chatter was at a high.
The anticipation was that the United States was going to
experience either here or abroad on our interests or our people
some kind of attack. There was a real sense of alert. And I
think other members of the committee shared this sense as well.
And I think it was well known out there.
Now, into this comes this memo--and I have read it several
times--which is thorough, which is well documented, which
contains good investigative leads. Additionally, from an
intelligence perspective, UBL and that organization had been--
we learned--on the front burner, the highest administrative
priority since about 1999.
And yet the memo, which went up the procedures to then at
least five different people, it didn't apparently strike
anybody with any sense of urgency to take another look. Despite
what everybody says, I find that interesting.
And my question to you is, other than a strategic analytic
unit, which I understand from the Phoenix agent is a
substantial lacking in the FBI today, other than that, did you
have any strong feeling, because you have said you felt like
you were kind of an isolated person in Phoenix, to just get it
on the desk of the FBI Director, get it to somewhere else,
because you had done a lot of work on this memo.
This wasn't just, you know, off the cuff. This was a
substantial research, a lot of expertise, there was a lot of
history and a lot of names, and various pilots names and that
kind of thing that were mentioned.
So is FBI protocol such that if you have within yourself as
an agent a real belief that I have something important, and it
doesn't get a response, can't you simply go above that chain of
command and get it on the desk of the heads of the agencies?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Well, Senator, to answer your question,
I refer you back to the communication. I sent it in routine.
The reason why I sent it in routine was because I did not see
any, at that time, any immediate action required. There was no
immediate threat information required in there. Basically what
I wanted was an analytical product. I wanted this discussed
with the Intelligence Community. I wanted to see if my hunches
were correct.
But, I am also a realist. I understand that the people at
FBI headquarters are terribly overworked and understaffed, and
they have been for years. And at the time that I am sending
this in, having worked this stuff for 13 years, and watched the
unit in action over these years, I knew that this was going to
be at the bottom of the pile, so to speak, because they were
dealing with real-time threats, real-time issues trying to
render fugitives back to the United States from overseas for
justice. And again it is a resource issue.
Senator Feinstein. Did you know of the intelligence that
was circulating? Did you know that Usama bin Ladin and al-
Qa'ida were in the high priority intelligence in the
administration?
FBI Phoenix Agent. I knew that they were, ma'am. I had just
gotten back to work in international terrorism. I had been
detailed for several months to work an arson investigation in
the Phoenix area, a multi task force arson investigation that
involved the destruction and burning down of numerous homes in
high-dollar areas in the Phoenix metro area. We believed at the
time that these were taking place, that they can be eco-
terrorists. I was the senior counterterrorism agent assigned to
the squad, and my command made a decision to assign me to work
on that matter.
After spending approximately six months on that--I worked
that from June 2000, roughly to, or excuse me, December of 2000
through May/June of 2001--I got back to work on my
international terrorism cases.
And so I wasn't in the loop on all of the chatter that you
refer to concerning the intelligence chatter and whatnot. But,
after getting back into the case and recognizing the things
that I point out in the communication, that is what led me to
write it and send it up the food chain.
Chairman Goss. Thank you.
Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I echo
Barbara Mikulski's statements about all of you. You work hard
and the Nation appreciates it.
We all make mistakes, we are all overwhelmed. But when you
are overwhelmed, the consequences are greater than when we are
overwhelmed. And so I want to start off by asking a question to
the Minneapolis agent.
The FBI was suggesting that Moussaoui be put under
surveillance. That is what you told the Joint Inquiry staff.
But, you said in your own testimony that you didn't have enough
agents, didn't have enough people.
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Well, that is partially true. We
would have made those people available had we thought that was
a viable option.
Senator Rockefeller. Right. I am getting to that.
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Okay.
Senator Rockfeller. I had assumed, until you spoke just a
moment ago, that you were an FBI criminal investigator. And I
am sorry I didn't know that most of your career has been spent
in working with terrorism. So Moussaoui had a French passport
problem. And I am trying to figure out how it works through
your mind that a French passport expiration problem means that
we need to pursue him in terms of holding him to account for
that, as opposed to a surveillance problem where he has already
been attached and identified with wanting to fly large
airplanes with which he has no previous experience.
He, therefore, has been identified potentially as a
terrorist. Why wouldn't surveillance rise clearly as the
priority that you would choose?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. The reason that I made the decision
that I did, and I will just take it back one step. I have spent
most of my career in the criminal arena, not in
counterterrorism. My counterterrorism experience was about the
last year prior to my assignment in this capacity that brings
me before you today.
What we were attempting to do--the information that we
obtained initially to open up the intelligence case was that
this person was particularly suspicious. There was no specific
allegation of any criminal activity.
But, as we developed the case, we found out, first of all,
he had this visa waiver pilot program violation. He was in the
United States longer than he should have been, which gave us
the opportunity to arrest him and arrest his behavior, because
I didn't want him to get any additional time on a flight
simulator that would allow him to have the knowledge that we
could no longer take back from him to operate an aircraft.
This provided us the opportunity to freeze the situation as
it was going on right there, prevent him from gaining the
knowledge that he could use at some point in the future. And if
ultimately we determined all we could do, after interviewing
him and doing some other investigative steps, if all we could
do was deport him, then we would be sensitized to the fact that
he was interested in doing something else and he could be put
in the TIPOFF System. He would be put in--the appropriate
notifications could have been made if he attempted to reenter
the United States.
But our focus was on preventing him getting the knowledge
that he would have needed.
Senator Rockefeller. Preventing him from getting the
specific knowledge which he was engaged in acquiring, but there
was a larger background that was apparently there. And I think
it is almost like a nub-hub question that I am asking. How do
you make that judgment, that somebody has done something which
is illegal, therefore I am going to pursue my FBI lawyer
criminal investigation, or that there is a hint here of
something broader, and rather than just prevent him from being
able to go back to that flight school, you are going to venture
out of your very good mold on this and say that we better watch
this person in a variety of ways and put him under
surveillance.
FBI Minneapolis Agent. I think it is important to remember,
at least for me, it is important to remember, the circumstances
that were present prior to September 11.
We had no real incidents of airplane hijacking that had
happened domestically within the preceding decade. We now have
a different perspective that it is very, very difficult to go
back and forget and not acknowledge. But again, I speak to my
criminal background in saying if a violation has occurred and
we can take further steps to stop what could speak to a
continued violation, we will act.
And those were the circumstances under which I made that
decision.
Chairman Goss. Thank you.
Senator Rockefeller. My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Goss. Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have got a couple of
areas that I want to question in, but I also would like to
associate myself with the comments made by members of this
committee in thanking you for your work on behalf of this
country. We all appreciate that very much.
There are a couple of things that I want to pursue. First
of all, when we talk about the testimony here, and when Ms.
Hill talks about the CIA officer that was detailed to FBI
headquarters learned about the Moussaoui investigation, and
talked about the issue of whether or not the Chechen rebels
were a recognized foreign power or not, and all of that
context, I would like to know from the FBI headquarters agent
what lessons learned have we come away with on this?
In other words, is the FBI putting together a new program
to train, perhaps in concert with the General Counsel's office,
to clear up these kinds of issues, make recommendations for
clearing up legislatively some of the areas that need to be
clearly redefined or further defined? Is the FBI working on a
comprehensive package to do that?
FBI Headquarters Agent. We have raised this issue of the
foreign power and specifically the fact of how Moussaoui
somewhat alludes the present legislation. I know Mr. Bowman
testified in open session before Senate Judiciary on this. I
think it is an issue that the FBI clearly recognizes is a
significant, significant problem with regard to individuals
that we can't fit into that specific foreign power issue. That
needs to be explored more.
Mr. Reyes. So is your answer that, yes, the FBI is working
on a comprehensive lessons-learned package, or what is the FBI
doing?
FBI Headquarters Agent. Are you saying--is the question in
terms of a legal fix?
Mr. Reyes. All of the above. All of the things that we have
learned so far from--we now know that the FBI is stuck in a
technology void in terms of communications, and analysis and
all of those things.
My question is, are we in a mode of lessons learned and
moving forward, have a checklist of, okay, by such and such a
time we are going to make this proposal for this equipment, for
this capability, those kinds of--because we are hearing the
field agents frantic----
FBI Headquarters Agent. I am just not in a position to
answer that. I think that is clearly a question for the
Director.
Mr. Reyes. So from your level nothing.
FBI Headquarters Agent. No, there is clearly reform under
way. We have already addressed getting analytical resources in
the door. That is going forward. Clearly, we are trying to
improve our means of communication with CIA and others. I don't
want to indicate in any manner, though, that it was bad. I
think the relationship with CIA has been excellent in the last
few years. And I am speaking as a person who has been in this
program for 13 years.
It has been very good. Could it be better? Yes, it could be
better. I think that technology will fix some of that.
Mr. Reyes. All right. For the Phoenix agent, you stated
that the 1999 incident aboard the U.S. domestic flight
increased your suspicions about aviation-related terrorism. Can
you elaborate on the incident and why you thought it was
significant?
FBI Phoenix Agent. On November 19, 1999, two individuals
that originated their flight from the Phoenix metropolitan area
were acting suspiciously on an America West Airlines flight
bound for Washington, D.C.
The plane put down in Columbus, Ohio, because the flight
attendants suspected or observed one of the individuals play
with the cockpit door of the plane while it was in flight. The
individuals were detained at Columbus, interviewed by the
Columbus, Ohio Police Department, FBI Cincinnati, and
subsequently released after their interviews and they were
allowed to proceed on their trip.
They were heading to Washington to attend a conference that
was being put on with the--or by the Saudi Arabian Royal--well,
the embassy.
The individuals, within a day or two of them being
released, in conjunction with the Council for American Islamic
Relations in Washington, made a statement accusing the police
department, the FBI, and America West Airlines of racially
profiling them. And they actually were broadcast on CNN and
other TV news networks around the country. I can't get into the
specifics concerning one of those--or either of those
individuals. Both are pending intelligence investigations.
Mr. Reyes. But the upshot----
FBI Phoenix Agent. I can address further details on both of
these guys in a closed hearing.
Mr. Reyes. But the upshot of that was--did anybodypursue an
investigation or drop the----
FBI Phoenix Agent. Post 9/11, in a post-9/11 world, I went
back and looked at that as possibly being some sort of dry run.
It is currently under investigation. And, again, I can get into
specific details on that in a closed hearing.
Mr. Reyes. Okay. And the last thing I want to say, very
quickly is, if it was significant, you didn't include it in
your communication. What --
FBI Phoenix Agent. Good question. You know, I can't account
for why I didn't include that in there. I wasn't--that is a
good question. I can't answer that, sir.
Mr. Reyes. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Mr. Chambliss.
Mr. Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, again, let me
associate myself with Senator Mikulski's remarks over there.
You folks do an unbelievable job in spite of what did happened
on September 11. We don't tell you enough how much we
appreciate you.
Also, my subcommittee, as you know, did a report dated July
17 that was somewhat critical of some of the acts of the FBI.
And I want to tell you that it was given--the criticism was
given in a vein that we were glad it was accepted in. That was
in a positive way. And I appreciate the reaction of Director
Mueller and the Bureau with respect to the criticisms that were
made in there. It appears that changes are being made in a
positive way. I am very glad to see that.
My question initially is directed to you, the Minneapolis
Agent. I want to pick up where Senator Rockefeller left off
there, because I am a little puzzled by this too.
The mindset of the FBI at that point in time is where our
criticism and our report was directed. And that is that the
mindset was more of an investigate-and-prosecute mindset versus
a disrupt and interrupt.
If this was such a priority matter, and I hear from you as
well as the headquarters agent that that was the case, the
Moussaoui case was a matter of very much priority, I don't
understand why your reaction would have been, if we can arrest
him on what was really a fairly minor violation, why you would
do that as opposed to putting him under surveillance in hopes
that you might pick up on something down the road. That seems
to be a much better action to have taken.
I realize it is easier for me to sit here today and say
that. But I am just wondering why that would have been your
mindset at that time. And let me ask the follow-on or, in your
answer, if you would just address this. If that situation would
occur today, has the mindset at the FBI changed to more of a
disrupt and interrupt as opposed to an investigate and
prosecute, so that your reaction might have been different
today with respect to the Moussaoui incident, regarding whether
or not to arrest him or whether to put him under surveillance?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Well, respectfully, sir, I believe
that the policy that we took that day or the practice that we
took that day to arrest him was designed to disrupt and
interrupt any further actions that he could do in furtherance
of his plan. And that was why the decision was made.
It was not--the focus was never to arrest him merely to
prosecute him or deport him from the country on the visa waiver
violation; it was to arrest the activity that was--the
suspicious activity that was reported to us by the flight
school and to allow us the time, while he was in administrative
detention, to further develop any additional information we
could about what plan he was up to.
But it was--my thinking was in the mode of interrupting and
disrupting what I thought was a potential plot, based on the
very, very limited information that we had prior to making that
decision. And the information we had was prior to really going
too far into the case.
Mr. Chambliss. To headquarters agent, is there ever any
situation where, when you receive information like the Phoenix
EC, where you have got--in my State, for example, we've got 159
counties. We've got headquarters, FBI headquarters in Atlanta,
and we've got several field offices out there. But really you
don't have the manpower to go into all 159 counties and check
every flight school. Is there such a relationship between the
FBI and local law enforcement officials like the 159 sheriffs
in Georgia where you could have simply called on those sheriffs
to go check flight schools?
And I am asking this more for the future as opposed to what
happened there. But is there some kind of relationship there
that you all have with those folks that you could get that kind
of assistance?
FBI Headquarters Agent. Speaking from my time in the field
and having run a terrorism task force in the field fairly
recently, that is what you strive for. The supervisors in the
field, working with their management and also with the agents
on the squad, they are looking to build those relationships.
And, yeah, we do want that to be available to us. And I think
clearly the Director has made that perfectly clear.
We want to rely and work with the locals and to be able to
react much quicker in the future on terrorism type matters
utilizing that resource.
Mr. Chambliss. Well, I would hope that to be the case. And
I am not getting very positive feedback from my local law
enforcement officials about an improvement in the relationship
with the FBI. But I hope there is a real effort that is being
made there to make sure that that relationship is doing nothing
but getting strengthened and that the sharing of information
between the FBI and our local law enforcement officials is
getting better and better.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Mr. Chambliss.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was just
telling Senator DeWine I was going to associate myself with his
very wise remarks and that of Senator Mikulski. As Congressman
Chambliss has indicated, as usual, she has hit the nail on the
head.
And I also want to associate with the previous remarks at
the last couple of hearings by Senator Kyl, who has expressed
concern about procedure at public hearings, a lack of focus on
the very challenges that have been prioritized, I think so
well, by Senator Mikulski, but I am not going to get into that
today.
All of you witnesses have stated, and I wrote this down
when Senator Mikulski said, all right, let's quit looking in
the past and playing gotcha, and let's look in the future in
terms of not problems but challenges, what do you need? And you
responded that you have a tremendous need for some kind of an
all-source analytical center, which I think is understandable.
You addressed the technology gap within the FBI as compared to
our other intelligence community agencies.
You emphasize the training, retention and recruiting--we
should have it in reverse order--of analysts and certainly need
better analytical resources.
So I think we all agree you need strategic analytical
ability and better predictive warning analysis. But, my
question is, is that your mission? Most of the questions you
are getting are very specific--what did you know, when did you
know it, what relationship did this have to 9/11--are what I
call the gotcha questions. I am not trying to perjure them--
well, I am a little bit, but we will leave that alone.
But you didn't have that mission. And my question is, now
who has the responsibility in terms of a foreign threat? Is
that the FBI? Is that the CIA? Is that the DIA? Certainly it is
the DIA in Afghanistan. Certainly a foreign threat is still
CIA. We will have those people in a public hearing as of
Thursday.
I don't know if you would like to answer that in terms of
your specific mission. How do we coordinate and find out who is
really responsible in terms of specific mission for the
analytical capability that we should have? And that may be
above your pay grade and mine.
FBI Headquarters Agent. Mr. Rolince, maybe you want to take
a shot at that one.
Mr. Rolince. I think the mission has expanded, and I think
that goes to the heart of the resource. I am not going to keep
pounding on that, because I think everybody has it, but the FBI
still believes that we can, will and should be the primary
responders to acts of terrorism directed against this country,
either internally or in terms of our ability to deploy
overseas--Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Khobar Towers and the whole
litany. We want to continue to do that, and we would hope that
the American people and the Congress would have the confidence
in our ability to do that.
In terms of the document exploitation that you talk about
in Afghanistan, that mission has not changed. We view that as
force protection, followed by immediate threat to this country,
followed by whatever intelligence we glean from within that
system.
And I would just like to make a point that I don't think
has been made, which should be made for the record. Prevention
is not a new job, one for the FBI. Not only is every mission
statement led with prevention, but I would submit now that we
know about what the Ramzi Yousefs of this world do, the 14 we
have indicted in Khobar Towers, the original World Trade Center
bombers, those convicted in the Africa Embassy bombings, those
are clear-cut law enforcement acts of prevention. Those people
were going to kill Americans. There is no doubt in our mind.
Look what Ramzi Yousef's plan was.
If we don't continue to pursue and aggressively utilize the
law enforcement tool, being able to apprehend, render, try and
convict these individuals, we lose a big part of prevention,
and we would like to stay in the business.
Senator Roberts. I think you should stay in the business.
I have another question that is in reference to the Catch-
22 that I think you face and that everybody faces when they get
questions from a committee like this with what I will refer to
again as a ``gotcha question,'' either by a leak or by specific
information that leads to a question more especially in a
public hearing or even a classified hearing. There will be some
specific piece of information that is rather incendiary that
will lead to a headline. You can't really respond, because if
you respond in full context, pointing out that there is no
relevance in regards to a smoking gun on 9/11, which seems to
be the effort or at least the insinuation, you can't do that,
because it is classified and you will reveal a source. And you
simply are stuck.
We have been trying to figure out how on earth that could
be presented in a way that would be nonclassified, and so about
every second foggy night we have something like in the
Washington Post that came out a day ahead of the interim report
that was issued--no, it was on the hijacking report issued by
the professional staff. I was in Kansas, and I didn't get a
copy of this. My staff didn't get a copy of this, but it was in
the Washington Post the day before, and about every--as I say,
about every Tuesday or every Thursday, we have one of these.
How is your morale situation at the FBI when this comes out
again and again and again and you can't respond and yet we are
trying to--it is like when you have a fire department. You call
the fire department. The house is on fire. We are arguing as to
whether the truck made the wrong turn or tied the hose to the
wrong fireplug, and we are having an investigation when there
is a fire. You are fighting a damn war. How is your particular,
real situation down there?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I would like to speak to that, if I
could. I think it is--these agencies--the FBI, the CIA--the
fuel of these agencies is morale; and, unfortunately, we have
been fairly demoralized in the course of a lot of the reporting
that has gone out there and our inability to fight back, for
lack of a better word.
Again--I think I said it in my testimony--the Bureau has
some of the best analysts in the community. Unfortunately, they
are tactical analysts and not strategic analysts.
I think the Bureau agents are the hardest-working people
out there. That needs to be said. It needs to be recognized.
September 11 was an incredibly tragic event, but it wasn't
based on laziness. It was based on inadequate resources, and I
think my colleague summed it up in saying that we need to stay
in this business. We can do this job. Just give us the tools we
need.
Senator Roberts. Well, my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
I would point out a year ago last July there was a
hearing--Senator Shelby, Senator Stevens, Senator Warner and
our appropriate ranking members--where we invited 46 Federal
agencies in and said, are you ready? This is before 9/11. What
is your mission? What do you really do? And who is in charge?
Everybody said they were in charge. Now that is 80 Federal
agencies. We had at that time in the Senate 14 subcommittees
and committees that allegedly had jurisdiction. Now between the
House and Senate, it is 88. You talk about a need for
streamlining and cooperation and some degree of direction. It
is the United States Congress, it seems to me, that bears part
of this responsibility.
I don't speak for other Members. I apologize to you. I
think you are doing a great job, and I think some of this has
been tremendously unnecessary and counterproductive. And you
tell your people down there, there are some people on the
Intelligence Committee that do believe in you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Graham.
Chairman Graham. Well, I want to associate myself with the
last remarks of Senator Roberts. There certainly is tremendous
recognition by the members of this committee of the importance
of your responsibility and the professionalism with which it is
discharged, and I don't want this hearing, which has focused on
some specific events, to distort that broader appreciation.
In that regard, let me just ask a question. I am speaking
particularly to the Phoenix and Minneapolis agents. You
performed with a personal standard of exceptional vision and
aggressiveness and creativity. Have you received any rewards or
recognition to date for your service in this particular issue?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Well, sir, I don't expect that. I get
paid by the American people to do this job, and I view it as
part of my job. I get a salary, and that is reward enough, and
it is reward enough to work for the agency. Now, that may sound
cliche or hokey, but I sincerely believe that. I am doing my
job, and I really don't believe I need any additional, extra
recognition for doing it.
FBI Minneapolis Agent. I agree with those remarks, and part
of the reward that we are reaping, I believe, is the
opportunity to come here and tell you our story and tell you
where we think the intelligence is broken down and what the
United States Congress can do to perhaps help us do our
mission. Were it not for this forum, I wouldn't have that
opportunity, and so we don't need any sort of monetary
recognition, any sort of pat on the back. We are, in fact,
doing the job that we signed on to do, and we appreciate the
opportunity to do it.
Chairman Graham. Well, I admire your modesty, but I am a
believer that one of the things that motivates people is
recognition and reward for beyond-the-call-of-duty performance,
and I would suggest that you and others of your colleagues who
might not be as well known as the two of you have in fact
performed in such a manner and there ought to be some method by
which that is recognized and therefore presented as a role
model of conduct for others to aspire to.
In the staff memo relative to Phoenix, there is this
sentence: ``The Phoenix SA believes that el Hage established an
Usama bin Ladin support network in Arizona while he was living
there and that this network is still in place.'' To the Phoenix
agent, do you agree with that sentence?
FBI Phoenix Agent. When I made that comment, Senator, it is
speculative, and I base it on historical investigation, some of
which I can't get involved in in this open session, and I would
prefer to address it in a closed session.
Chairman Graham. Well, the Chair may be announcing our
desire to have such a closed session, and I would just alert
that I will be pursuing that question should we do so.
All right. On the issue of the Minneapolis office going
directly to the CIA or other intelligence agencies requesting
assistance or providing information, Mr. Rolince, you indicated
that there was good reason for not encouraging that kind of
behavior. But in the context of the Phoenix memo where one of
the specific requests made by the agent was ``headquarters
should discuss the Phoenix theories with the Intelligence
Community,'' that was one of the items that was not followed,
one of the recommendations not followed. Wouldn't that create a
sense in the field that if they believe the situation is
sufficiently urgent that they might have to take the situation
into their hands and go directly to an intelligence agency?
Mr. Rolince. If they had asked at headquarters, can we
raise this issue with CTC--in fact, the person that it was
raised with was an FBI agent, ironically--and were turned down,
then I would have no objection whatsoever of them moving it and
escalating it.
Chairman Graham. Is the ``them'' in this case the Phoenix
or the Minneapolis----
Mr. Rolince. Minneapolis. But I wouldn't take the Phoenix
EC--one example of something that should have been done, and I
will be perfectly honest with you. One of the great
frustrations in that, it talks about airlines--we have FAA
people in the unit; it talks about intelligence--we have CIA
people; it talks about visas--there are State Department people
and Immigration people in that unit. That information should
have been shared, if only for FYI purposes, with all those
people at our headquarters. And it wasn't done, and it should
have been done.
Chairman Graham. It was indicated that the example of the
FISA issue, where there was confusion as to the legal standard,
that it may have been that Moussaoui was a singular exception.
No other examples come to mind. Are there any other examples
that come to mind analogous to the Phoenix communique where
they made a specific request that information be shared with
intelligence when that request was not adhered to?
Mr. Rolince. In the three and a half years I was there, I
can think of none. I think part of the reason for that is what
did not happen there was the dialogue, the travel back, the e-
mails, the phone calls, the coordinating meetings with OIPR
that are done on a regular basis day in and day out.
So what we generally do precludes that kind of instance
from happening; and had perhaps those dialogues, visits, et
cetera, taken place, we could have gotten to the heart of the
issue, which was is it ``agent of a foreign power'' or is it
``foreign power'' that we are stumbling over here. But at the
end of the day, we did bring back every single person from
Minneapolis relevant to the situation, the Office of General
Counsel and the substantive unit. We spent six hours, went
through every single line of every single e-mail, and then I
turned to my colleague and said, what do you think, and the
Deputy General Counsel said, it is not there.
Chairman Graham. And what date was that meeting?
Mr. Rolince. Last week of November, first week of--I am
sorry. Last week of October, first week of November. I have
seen two different dates. It is either the 30th or the 1st.
Chairman Graham. This is 2001?
Mr. Rolince. This is post 9/11, 2001, yes.
Chairman Graham. Senator Shelby.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do want to take a minute, as others, and say publicly
that I, too, appreciate what the Bureau has done historically
and in recent times, but to overlook some of the other problems
which are deep, deep problems, not just in the Bureau but in
the Intelligence Community, all the agencies, we would be less
than candid in this hearing. We would be less than honest with
the American people. There are a lot of things that are right
with the Bureau, but there are a lot of things that are wrong,
I believe, and I think a lot of people share that, and I
believe most of the American people share that.
We want to support the Bureau. We should first support you
with resources, and there has been a shortfall in certain
areas. We have talked about that.
We should support agents like the special agent and others
in Phoenix that had the foresight to put together the Phoenix
memo, which was never acted upon. We should support the agents
out of the Minneapolis office, one who is seated here with us
today. And we will.
But we should never support problems and people who are
risk averse or people who do not train their people well with
analytical skills in the Bureau or anywhere else or do not
train them to share information. I think we are cheating the
American people. We are cheating the security of the future.
With that in mind, I will tell you, this is my eighth year
and final year on the committee, three more months, I suppose.
I think the FBI is very important in the role you do, and I
want to personally commend you, sir, and also the woman lawyer
who came down, Ms. Riley, for her candor in dealing with the
Moussaoui case.
To the FBI agent from Phoenix, when you sent the
information, what we call the Phoenix memo, to headquarters,
did you ever check on that memo? Did you ever call yourself or
send a message to see what happened to all that work you did?
FBI Phoenix Agent. No, I did not.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Why didn't you?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Because I was in the middle of the
investigation itself, and that was just one portion of it.
Vice Chairman Shelby. You were into the investigation
yourself in Phoenix. Now, this was before the eleventh. I am
speaking of the eleventh of September.
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Was your memo dated July 10?
FBI Phoenix Agent. July 10, 2001.
Vice Chairman Shelby. So from July 10 to September 11 and I
suppose up to now, you never checked with FBI headquarters to
see if they acted on your memo regarding your concern about the
flight school?
FBI Phoenix Agent. No, I didn't, Senator; and the reason
being is I sent it in routine, and generally a routine
communication----
Vice Chairman Shelby. You thought it was routine, but it
wasn't. It turned out not to be routine.
FBI Phoenix Agent. Well, hindsight, sir, is always 20/20.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Well, that is why we learn, though,
from post mortems, don't we?
FBI Phoenix Agent. I understand, but I sent it routine, and
generally when you send a routine communication in, you are
giving the receiver 90 days to look at your product. And at the
end of 90 days if I hadn't heard anything, I would have been
picking up the phone saying, hey, did you get it, you know,
querying ACS to see if somebody acted upon it. But, again, the
pre-9/11----
Vice Chairman Shelby. Excuse me. I just have so much time.
Did you think it was not important? Is that what routine means?
FBI Phoenix Agent. No. It is----
Vice Chairman Shelby. Okay. What do you mean by routine?
How do you define it?
FBI Phoenix Agent. That there was no direct threat
information in there. I didn't have any information in there
saying a bomb was going to go off at X hour.
Vice Chairman Shelby. No specificity, though?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes.
Vice Chairman Shelby. But concern?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Concern, yes.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Okay. To the agent from Minneapolis,
I believe this question was asked earlier. When you made the
arrest, you know, you had reason to believe that a law had been
broken, an immigration law or something?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Is that correct? Did you consider
putting the agent under surveillance and elected not to for
lack of resources or other things?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. No, sir. It was not for a lack of
resources.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Was it just your judgment that that
was the thing to do?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Yes, sir. My judgment was to attempt
to interrupt this.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Okay. Prior to that date when you
arrested him and after you had the inquiry regarding the flight
school in Minneapolis, had you known or had you been informed
that there had been threats out there starting in 1995 with the
Filipino situation, where there was evidence that people could
use--would use airplanes as weapons? Did you know that?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. I did not know that at the time,
sir.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Did you know about the French
apprehending, I believe, someone that was from Algiers, a
French Algerian citizen that was going to try to crash a
plane--hijacked into the Eifel Tower, using that as a weapon?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. I did not know that, sir.
Vice Chairman Shelby. You didn't know any of that?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. That's correct.
Vice Chairman Shelby. So without any background on that,
you arrested the man based on your best judgment. Is that
correct?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Shelby. I know my time is up, but one last
question. The FISA situation, very important. Were any of you
trained when you were going through the FBI school at Quantico
regarding the specificity that was required for FISAs or later?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. No, sir, I was not during initial
training.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Were you, sir, from Phoenix?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Not during initial agent training.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Were you later trained?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes, sir. I have been through many in-
services regarding FISA.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Is the FISA training now at Quantico
part of the curriculum? And if not, why not, sir, the FBI
headquarters?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I know that we are having a very
serious look at the training at Quantico. The present
leadership in the Counterterrorism Division, he has taken it
upon himself to personally look at that issue real hard, has
directed Quantico to provide all the necessary training
required of new agents, supervisors, all the way up the food
chain.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Lastly, would you agree that there
has been confusion in the FBI ranks to what the requirements or
the criteria for FISA was?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I think that it is a tough issue. I
think we rely on our national security law unit for guidance,
and I don't think that confusion exists in the national
security law unit.
Vice Chairman Shelby. It didn't exist on September 11 or
before then?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I do not believe so, no.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Goss. Okay. Thank you.
There is light at the end of the tunnel, and it is going
very bright. There are a couple of administrative matters, and
a couple of members who had to leave asked me to do some sweep-
up questions. Frankly, they have been pretty well taken care of
by Senator Shelby and Senator Graham.
I had a couple of observations I would like to make
briefly.
The first question was to the headquarters supervisor. You
have people sitting on either side of you who brought forward
to you, presumably one dot at one time, two dots that could
have been connected by you, and the question was were you able
to connect those dots and take them outside of their individual
case areas and see there was something bigger here? And if not,
is there some procedural change or systemic change or some
other way that that kind of thing can be accelerated in the
future?
FBI Headquarters Agent. I think the connecting the dots
issue, we could what-if it to death. I think, clearly, the
connected dots issue comes down to analytical resources and
technology. I don't think one individual could keep this all in
his head, could not possibly be aware of it, all the various
threats that were out there, all of the ongoing investigations.
It is just impossible for any individual to deal with that. So
I think, in terms of the future, I think it goes right to the
systemic problems that this committee is fully aware of,
sufficient strategic analysts and technology fixes.
Chairman Goss. And a certainty that all this material will
flow to those resources?
FBI Headquarters Agent. Absolutely. And that is multiagency
in nature, not just the Bureau.
Chairman Goss. Absolutely. I think it is multiagency, and I
think it is multilevel government these days, too. That is
another subject of the vertical integration down to the local
and State level as well, which I think is a factor. Do you
disagree with that?
FBI Headquarters Agent. No, I do not.
Chairman Goss. Another question I had from Mr. Boehlert. He
had two. The first was--and I think it has been answered--the
routine aspect of the memo from Phoenix was primarily because
of no immediate urgency, I take it. It was a matter of concern,
but routineness connotes this is not an urgency, not an
immediate matter. This is a matter that deserves deliberation
but in the normal course of events. Is that your assessment?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes, sir.
Chairman Goss. Is that a fair description?
FBI Phoenix Agent. Yes, it is.
Chairman Goss. There was nothing in your background or any
other dots that you could connect at the time that raised
anything beyond the level of routine. You created an innovative
approach. You did something others had not done, but you did
not think it had any further urgency than just this is where it
is looking at?
FBI Phoenix Agent. That's correct.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, sir.
With regard to the Moussaoui matter--and if this is getting
into an area that we shouldn't go, Mr. Nahmias, please say so--
Mr. Boehlert wanted to know why, if it was understood that Mr.
Moussaoui was out of status, he wasn't deported in mid-August.
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Because we were working with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and had one of their
agents assigned to our task force, we had a little more
latitude in what we could do, given the circumstances of the
case. As we came to understand it, there was no mandate by the
INS for immediate deportation. There was the opportunity to do
so, but there was no mandate, and they agreed to defer
deportation while we conducted our investigation to determine
whether or not this was part of a larger conspiracy or whether
or not this was a single actor who was just up to some sort of
curious activity.
Chairman Goss. Well, I think that is a very good answer. It
is one I would have encouraged. I am looking at it from the
intelligence point of view. As long as there is no immediate
danger from this guy if he is under some kind of surveillance,
it seems to me that the right thing to do is to determine
whether or not he is going to lead you somewhere and the right
kind of investigative technique. If he has already broken a
law, however, and is a threat, then it seems to me that some
kind of enforcement ought to take place. I am glad that those
calculations seem to go on. Have I described that accurately?
FBI Minneapolis Agent. Absolutely.
Chairman Goss. Thank you.
On the administrative side--Mr. Nahmias, you should listen
to this--I understand that the press has given us a number of
requests for the staff statement that we originally had, which
we suppressed till we got this matter sorted out. Now that we
have different instructions from the court on what we can and
cannot do, staff will be going through the appropriate vetting
procedures with the Department of Justice and the prosecution
and so forth to make sure that the statement is okay. The press
needs to be advised that these are normal vetting procedures,
and we will therefore not have that material for them today.
The next issue is administrative. The committee will
convene again at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday this week to hear
testimony in open session from a senior FBI and a senior CIA
counterterrorist official, one each.
It is the intent at this time to consider a closed session
in the afternoon, witnesses being available, and it appears
some of those witnesses may be before us now. We will ask staff
to work that out to see if we can accommodate your schedules,
because, as you have heard, some of the questions and indeed
some of your answers have suggested that we go into closed
session.
I tend to believe, following up on the gentleman dealing
with the Moussaoui matter, that there is an opportunity there,
and it is worth the time, because I feel there is a very good
learning curve for us on what your problems are in closed
session if we get into these details. So if you can be
available, I think it will be helpful.
The last thing I wanted to say--I do want to associate
myself with Senator Roberts' remarks, and I feel that in a
particular way. I say that as a person who has been looking
very closely at world events andtrying to understand your
capabilities to deal with threats and the nature of threats in our
country for eight years, and I will tell you I didn't do any better on
September 11, 2001, than anybody else.
So I have a little concern about how clear hindsight
actually is when we get into some of these things, when we tend
to focus back, because we, of course, have the advantage of
knowing what happened. Now we can figure out what went wrong.
That is a very different circumstance. So I accept Senator
Roberts' remarks.
I want to go back to the gentleman who was representing the
Phoenix matter here. And I am quoting from your statement and
your concern about your publicity, and I believe your statement
is: I believe al-Qa'ida would consider me a terrorist target
and want to kill me. I accept that, and that adds a lot of
extra burden I think on us up here who have a responsibility to
deal with these things properly. But I need to also tell you
something that we all have to understand in this country, in my
view, is that just being American is enough for al-Qa'ida to
kill you. I don't think we understand that lesson yet in this
country. I think it is up to all of us here to make sure that
we, A, understand it here and, B, never let it happen; and we
want to join you in that fight.
I think your words--and I am quoting you--``I feel in this
regard Congress has personally failed me as an FBI special
agent and as an American.'' That is an extraordinarily harsh
indictment. I think that is very understandable from your
position, and certainly it is something that we take to heart.
I think it is an area that calls for further consideration down
the road, and I believe it will get it in a follow-on of some
type to this commission's work.
I am relatively sure that there will be a follow-on, and I
think a strong reason for that follow-on is exactly the
oversight of Congress, how did Congress do in its oversight
responsibilities, because that is a big function that we have.
So I think that that statement that you have made is not
going to go unnoticed, not only by this group, because we
certainly have noticed it, but by the next group to come. And I
think it is a very important observation of how Congress can do
its advocacy and oversight as wisely as possible on behalf of
the American people and all of the things we are trying to do.
The last point I wanted to make was with regard to the
supervisor's statement, which is to me a very chilling
statement. I have also witnessed firsthand a dedicated group of
counterterrorism professionals that have been routinely
overwhelmed with large caseloads on a continual crisis
management. They also confront the daily frustrations posed by
limited resources, especially within our analytical ranks and
inadequate technology. That is just about everything. So if we
haven't gotten the message up here and your leadership hasn't
got the message that we have got these kinds of problems, then
we have a disconnect that needs attention, and I urge you to do
everything you can with your leadership--and I include the
gentlemen outside the screen as well--to make sure the needs
are known.
I have heard so many times the frustration of--the scream
of OMB and so forth and that we can't really tell you what we
want. We do this with the Defense Department, with the generals
and the admirals who would like to tell us what they can but
can only tell us what they are allowed to tell us. It doesn't
do us any good if we don't understand the problem.
You are helping us to understand the problem. I urge you to
make your case to leadership, for them to make their case to
OMB so we all get on the same track and have a greater
capability.
Having said all that, I thank you very much. You are great
Americans, and God bless you all. We are adjourned.
Now, before you move, the room has to be cleared. I want to
thank all our guests and visitors and press for being here.
They will clear the room, and then we will be finished.
[Whereupon, at 5:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
JOINT COMMITTEE HEARING ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSES TO ISSUES RAISED IN OPEN
HEARINGS IN REVIEW OF THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2002
House of Representatives, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Porter
Goss, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, presiding.
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence members
present: Representatives Goss, Castle, Boehlert, Gibbons,
Hoekstra, Burr, Pelosi, Harman, Roemer, Reyes, and Peterson.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence members present:
Senators Graham, Levin, Rockefeller, Feinstein, Durbin, Bayh,
Mikulski, Shelby, Kyl, Roberts and DeWine.
Chairman Goss. The Joint Inquiry hearing will come to
order, please. This is a joint inquiry of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence. I'm advised that Chairman Graham
will be here shortly.
This is the fifth open hearing by our Committees as they
conduct their joint inquiry into the Intelligence Community
performance regarding the September 11 attacks. The Committees
have also held ten closed hearings.
Our witnesses this morning will be Cofer Black, former
Chief of CIA's Counterterrorist Center, and Dale Watson, former
Executive Assistant Director of the FBI's Counterintelligence
and Counterterrorism Division. Gentlemen, welcome. We're
pleased you came up this morning. Each has been asked to
address the evolution of his agency's response to the growing
international terrorist threat and how his agency assessed the
nature of possible attacks against the United States and U.S.
interests.
Before swearing in these witnesses there is one brief
business matter I'm advised of. On June 18 the Committees heard
in testimony in closed session from the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Director of the National Security Agency
about what the Intelligence Community now knows about the
September 11 plot. We then asked the Directors to declassify
their testimony to the extent consistent with national
security.
The Director of the FBI has submitted his declassified
statement for the record. I ask unanimous consent that the
declassified June 18 statement of the FBI Director now be made
part of the open record of these proceedings. Is there
objection?
[No response.]
Chairman Goss. Hearing none, it so ordered.
[The declassified statement of Director Mueller follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Goss. If there's any question that either witness
determines would be best answered by other than CIA or FBI
personnel who are present, we would welcome being informed of
that.
Our goal is to have the best possible information. So that
we don't need to interrupt the flow of questioning by
administering oaths to other personnel who are called upon to
speak, would anyone who might be called upon to speak now
identify himself or herself for the record and take the oath
together with Mr. Black and Watson? And, Mr. Black and Mr.
Watson, do you have anybody with you particularly you
anticipate will be assisting you?
Mr. Black. No, sir.
Chairman Goss. The answer being no in both cases, is there
anybody else from either agency that is intending to speak?
Seeing none, each of our Committees has adopted a
supplemental rule for this joint inquiry that all witnesses
shall be sworn. I'll ask our witnesses to rise at this time and
raise your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before
these Committees will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Black. I do.
Mr. Watson. I do.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, gentlemen.
The full prepared statements of the witnesses will be
placed in the record of these proceedings. I'll now call on Mr.
Black first and then Mr. Watson, as I understand that was the
selected order.
Mr. Watson. That's agreeable.
Chairman Goss. Mr. Black, welcome. The floor is yours, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Black follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT OF COFER BLACK, FORMER CHIEF, DCI'S COUNTERTERRORIST
CENTER, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Black. Thank you very much. Can you hear me, Mr.
Chairman?
Chairman Goss. I can hear you very well.
Mr. Black. Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be here. I'd like
to express my appreciation to you and to the Committee offering
me a screen to protect my identity and to enhance my security.
Good security is always a very good idea. And if this were
normal circumstances I would accept your offer.
The work of this Committee and this hearing is just too
important. I don't want to be just a voice behind a screen.
When I speak, I think the American people need to look into my
face. And I want to look the American people in the eye.
My name is Cofer Black. I'm a case officer of the
Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. I
served as the Director of the Counterterrorism Center from the
29th of July 1999 until May 2002.
Mr. Chairman, I hope that these proceedings provide the
relatives and the loved ones of those lost in the horrific act
of 9/11 the information that they're seeking. But we are
meeting here today because of the loss of over 3,000 innocents.
We provided strategic warning. Our intense efforts were unable
to provide tactical warning on 9/11. We all share a profound
and horrible sense of loss.
Everything we do in this global war and the very real risks
that we take have only one objective, and that's to defend
America and to defend innocents. In this long fight, my CIA
colleagues operating with me in Khartoum, Sudan, in 1995
preempted preparations of Usama bin Ladin's thugs to kill me.
Six years later, Usama bin Ladin and his al-Qa'ida are the
killers of 9/11. You need to appreciate fully three factors.
There were choices made for us. These choices were made for the
Central Intelligence Agency and they were made for the
Counterterrorism Center. These involve the numbers of people,
money and operational flexibility.
I'd like to talk about people for a minute. Before 9/11,
the CIA Counterterrorism Center had as many people as maybe
three Army infantry companies. Three infantry companies can be
expected to cover a front of a few kilometers. Our
Counterterrorism Center is responsible for the entire world and
all the terrorist threats. It was not only al-Qa'ida that we
engaged. Until 9/11, Hizbollah had killed more Americans than
any other terrorist group. Hizbollah is also our responsibility
as are all the others. We work through the Directorate of
Operations, which is deployed overseas.
The head of the Operations Directorate will tell you, Mr.
Chairman, that at the end of the 1990s, he had 25 percent less
covert operations officers than he had at the beginning.
The Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, did all
that he could to help us out. We, of all his interests, had the
highest priority. Prior to my arrival there had been a
substantial increase in our personnel. We still struggled.
While all the other operating components were being cut, the
Counterterrorism Center received what small increases were
available.
My second point, cash. This is what we use to pay for
operations. At the beginning of each of my three fiscal years
as chief, the Counterterrorism Center had enough money to
purchase about two modern jet fighter aircraft. When I became
the chief in 1999, I had a fiscal reality. We had less money to
support operations than we had the year before. As a result, I
cut all of my subordinate units, except for one, more than 30
percent. We survived because of the Director of Central
Intelligence's support and the supplemental fundings that we
received.
My third point, operational flexibility. This is a very
highly classified area, but I have to say that all you need to
know is that there was a before 9/11 and there was an after 9/
11. After 9/11 the gloves come off. Nearly 3,000 al-Qa'ida and
their supporters have been arrested or detained.
In Afghanistan the al-Qa'ida who refused to surrender have
been killed. The hunt is on. At your hearing last Friday my
colleague, referred to only as CIA Officer behind the screen,
was a witness before you and spoke. I think the significant
point that he raised was an unprepared remark saying that he
was overwhelmed. He was overwhelmed by limitless work and he
was overwhelmed by a lack of resources. Perhaps now we can say
why he said this instinctively.
However, even a fully staffed and supported intelligence
effort will not provide comprehensive, 100 percent defense. We
must constantly intensify our offensive while at the same time
supporting law enforcement and its work.
I'll leave you again with the three points--resources,
people, operational flexibility.
I'd like to talk a little bit about working with the FBI.
Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned that your hearings last week
left you with a substantial misunderstanding about
communications between the CIA and the FBI regarding
investigation of the attack on the USS Cole. In that case we
were supporting the FBI's investigation. The two agencies
wanted to find out who killed our sailors and bring these
terrorists to justice.
We are an intelligence organization. We are in the business
of collecting and providing intelligence. We are not in the
business of withholding intelligence information. I want to be
clear that FBI agents and analysts had access to information we
acquired about the Cole attack. For example, we ran a joint
operation with the FBI to determine if a Cole suspect was in a
Kuala Lumpur surveillance photo. Joint means together.
The FBI had access to the information from the beginning.
Our records establish that. The special agents from the FBI's
New York field office who were investigating the USS Cole
attack reviewed the information about the Kuala Lumpur photo in
late January 2001. I also want to be clear that, according to
the CTC analyst who attended the June 2001 FBI/CIA meeting in
New York City, the FBI analyst brought the photos to New York
and showed them to the FBI.
I want to repeat that. An FBI analyst brought the photos to
New York. Furthermore, the CIA analyst was not permitted to
provide all of the information FBI criminal investigators
wanted because of laws and rules against contaminating criminal
investigators with intelligence information. My statement for
the record will provide more details about Kuala Lumpur.
We learned of some of al-Qa'ida's plots in time to provide
the warning that law enforcement and intelligence services
needed to stop them. Examples of many of the successful
operations would include: 1998, plans to attack the U.S.
Embassy in Tirana, Albania, were thwarted when we identified
the plotters. 1999-2000 millennium plot. Al-Qa'ida efforts to
blow up hotels and other terrorist sites in Jordan would have
resulted in hundreds of casualties. Our global effort was the
largest operation in the history of counterterrorism.
2000, Ramadan threat, defeated. Summer, 2001 threat, this
also included planned attacks on U.S. Embassies in Yemen and
France, saved lives. In addition, we rendered scores of
terrorists to law enforcement.
Mr. Chairman, it would be my greatest wish to bring
classified holdings of our successes and use them in an open
format. There are sources to protect, there are methods to
protect and there are foreign relationships to protect. The
complete list of our successes was reported in closed session
to oversight committees. We're happy to meet with you at any
time and I must leave it at that.
How do we get successes? The men and women of the
Counterterrorism Center and those in the CIA who work
counterterrorism are the finest Americans this country can
produce. They are smart. They are quick. They are patriotic.
They are loyal. They are brave and they are hardworking--14,16,
18, 24-hours a day, six, seven days a week, week after week,
month after month for the entire time that I was there.
Our people fought with what we provided them and turned
back defeat. Leading up to 9/11, CTC conducted intense
intelligence war measured by constant threats, emerging,
engaged and defeated. We were also the first on the ground in
Afghanistan before the month of September of 2001 was out.
We're able to support the military and their success.
I would like to take this opportunity, because these days
you never can really tell who is going to speak for the people
that do their best and do the work. I want to thank all the
people in the Intelligence Community and in law enforcement and
in CIA, those that do counterterrorism, and particularly, in
the CIA case, our field personnel.
Now, I want to speak to each man and woman in the
Counterterrorist Center. I want their families, their neighbors
and the American people to hear this. I was proud of them when
I led them. I'm proud of them now, and I will be proud of them
as long as I live.
Mr. Chairman, I'll submit the remainder of my statement for
your record. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Black, for, I
think, a very compelling and obviously heartfelt bit of
testimony, which I think helps us all understand a little
better just what does go on behind the veil that we don't see.
I appreciate that.
Mr. Watson.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Watson follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT OF DALE WATSON, FORMER ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr.Watson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to also say that I'm honored to be here this
morning. I'm very honored to be next to my friend and
colleague, Cofer Black. On behalf of the men and women of the
FBI, we certainly extend our sympathy and our prayers to the
victims of this horrible act on 9/11, as well as to all
American victims that have been victimized by terrorism over
the years, as well as our foreign citizens overseas.
What I thought I would do this morning with you, since I
have my prepared statement that's introduced, is to hit some
highlights of some areas not specifically covered in that
statement but some issues that need to be talked about this
morning.
And the first is I'd like to talk briefly, real briefly,
and most of you Senators and intelligence committee members
have heard some of this before, but I think it's worth bringing
up, what the FBI was doing in counterterrorism since 1996.
I would also like to briefly discuss the relationship that
we've had with the CIA over the years, particularly since 1996.
Thirdly, discuss briefly the budget request, particularly the
budget years 2000, 2001, and 2002. This is not a budget
hearing, but there's some numbers that need to be put out so
you clearly understand where we were coming from in the
process. And, then, lastly, make some general observations
about some perceptions that I think need to be clarified for
the record. Were we doing everything we could on the aircraft
or civil aviation threats? Was the FBI assuring the
Administration that an Al-Qa'ida could not attack us inside the
United States? I'd like to clarify those points.
And then, thirdly, talk about the concept of being reactive
and proactive and how that has become popular post-9/11 and
that we were certainly making headway in the proactive area
long before 9/11. And I think you need to hear those
statements. And, as well as Cofer, about the dedication of the
men and women of the FBI.
Let's start off with the history real briefly and I will
not go into a lot of detail about this. Starting in 1993 with
the World Trade Center, I think everyone's realized the first
World Trade Center killed six U.S. citizens. The 1993 followed
that up with the attempt to bomb landmarks in New York City.
The whole list of terrorist cases that we focused on as the
FBI, along with all the other matters in counterterrorism that
were going on--the Manila air plot in 1994, the Oklahoma City
matter in 1995 where 168 of our citizens were killed inside the
United States as a result of a domestic terrorist group,
OPMSANG in November of 1995 in Saudi Arabia, which killed five
American military personnel. June '96, Khobar towers, wherein
19 U.S. Air Force personnel were killed. Following up with
that, in 1998 we had the East African bombings where 12 U.S.
citizens were killed, followed up by the millennium threat
where Ressam was arrested coming across the border in the State
of Washington prior to the millennium, where we charged him and
other individuals in New York City. October of '00 the USS Cole
resulted in the death of 17 U.S. sailors, and, then, most
importantly, 9/11.
To take you back where we were with the counterterrorism
program at the time, way back when in 1993 and prior to that,
it was a high profile program within the FBI but had very few
people working it. We had less when I was in the--working
counterterrorism in 1991, we had less than 50 people total in
the section, which was responsible for all of
counterterrorism--domestic, international, as well as special
events.
Over a period of time, as you well know, and particularly
starting in 1996 with the 1996 anti-terrorism effective death
penalty, here's what the FBI was doing. And, sometimes we get
lost in the shuffle here looking at what we've done since 9/11
as opposed to prior to 1996.
Over a period of time we've expanded the Legat programs and
we started out with a small number of Legat programs. I think
the number was 16. We're now up to 44. Opening new Legat
programs since 1996 was a clear indication of our focus on
counterterrorism and the problems we were having. Those Legat
offices were not opened in areas where the major concern was in
organized crime or drugs. They were opened in Tel Aviv and
Riyadh and Islamabad, Cairo, and I could go with the list.
So, it was a clear focus by us understanding the expanded
jurisdiction, which the congressional passed legislation for
expanding our jurisdiction of about U.S. citizens and Americans
being attacked overseas, that clearly we recognized the need to
have a closer and stronger and a larger presence overseas, not
in any way responsible or trying to do what the CIA does, but
to look at it from a law enforcement perspective.
In addition to that, we expanded our JTTFs inside the
United States. And I'm happy to report that at present we have
over 56. Prior to 9/11 we had 34 on the books and those are law
enforcement people assigned to FBI field offices along with our
federal partners. I think there's been a lot of discussion
about the JTTF's. I think you understand that. What that does
for us is not only incorporate the information sharing that we
need, but it's also a force multiplier for the agents and the
number of people working counterterrorism within the United
States, a very worthwhile and beneficial program.
Since '96 we've expanded and improved our threat warning
system. And without saying much further about that, I think you
understand that we have the ability to electronically
communicate with our federal, state and local partners on
threat information instantaneously. We established a
counterterrorism center at FBI headquarters. And basically what
that was was bringing in 19 federal partners actually working
within the FBI headquarters to look at counterterrorism cases
and try to figure out what we're trying to do and where we're
going.
We expanded our SIOC operations in order to be able to
cover more and bring in more partners during a time of crisis.
And we improved our relationship with the CIA. Being the first
deputy chief over at the counterterrorism center in 1996, it
was an exchange program that you've all heard about before and
it's proved very beneficial and very helpful to us.
After the East Africa bombings we expanded the five rapid
deployment teams, teams that were formed in our field offices
to be able to rapidly deploy in an overseas environment in
order to investigate and bring responsible individuals for
those acts to justice.
One of the main points, though, I need to tell you about
is, starting in 1998 the light basically came on for us as to
what we were trying to do in counterterrorism. I came to the
conclusion, being promoted to deputy assistant director in
charge of counterterrorism, that if you looked across the board
and you go back and you look specifically at counterterrorism
issues, you realize that from a starting point that one, we
will never be able to stop all acts of terrorists.
We could have 100,000 FBI agents and the CIA could have
10,000 more DO officers and our probability of stopping every
act of terrorism is probably not going to happen. And once you
realize and take that concept for what it is, then you have to
ask yourself what does that leave you. Do you throw your hands
up and you say well, we'll just wait and react to somebody
bombing us or killing American citizens and we'll have the FBI
investigate it and will tell us post-event who the people were
that were responsible for doing that.
Well, the answer is, that's not the answer. And the answer,
if you look at it from a strategic standpoint, and we started
doing that in 1998, what you come up with is the idea that if
you can't prevent all acts, then you better be at the highest
capacity that you can possibly be. This led us into strategic
thinking about what does that mean for our 56 field offices?
What does that mean for the FBI at FBI headquarters? And
through a long process called maximum capability by '05, Max
Cap 5, we started down that road to look at it and to say that
the FBI does a tremendous job in the area of investigations
after a crime has been committed.
We put 1,000 agents or more in East Africa. Oklahoma City,
we mobilized probably 35 different operation centers throughout
the country. But, if you look at it from a logical standpoint,
those things will never get you in the prevention business.
They will tell you who did it and how they did it, but it's
always post event.
So, we started out in a process of trying to develop our
capability in our field offices and understanding what the
threat is over the horizon. And it's the hardest thing ever
tried to do in a bureaucracy as large as ours. We have great
people, but great people sometimes have an understanding that
change is very disruptive and change is hard.
So we started in '98 to look at this. And the only way we
could do it was to look at how capable our field offices were.
And if our field offices were not capable of responding,
investigating, doing everything they can, to include resources,
technology, then we would be vulnerable for attack again at the
level inside the United States.
In addition to looking at our field offices, and we started
a specific process to do that with several reports coming back
to me that evaluated where we were in all our field offices and
what capabilities they had and had a very simple color system,
red, yellow and green, that we were able to take that.
But, it's not fair to just evaluate our field offices. We
also looked internally within ourselves at FBI headquarters.
And we looked at how well are we doing in the intelligence
business of sharing information, obtaining information,
processing information, and what does intelligence mean. And
intelligence to law enforcement is different than intelligence
to the CIA. And how do you process intelligence? And our
thinking of intelligence was tell us what's happened in post
cases. And that's never going to get you into the prevention
business if you continue to look post. So we evaluated
ourselves and said we needed great help in the intelligence
arena.
The third area we looked at at headquarters on the criteria
was the technology piece. And I think you've all been briefed
on those areas of concern. And we realized we were well short
of what we needed in technology, the ability to share
information and pass information back and forth electronically,
not only with our federal partners, but with our state and
local partners as well.
And then fourth we looked internally and evaluated
ourselves internally, not on reactive stuff but on being
proactive on the liaison side. How well we're sharing
information, what are our relationships with our foreign
partners, what are our relationships with our federal partners?
And there were areas of improvement that we needed in all those
areas.
And once you identify what your capabilities are and have a
standard to be able to measure it and say we're at this
percentage and this is where we need to go, it helps you
formulate budget requests. It helps you formulate what you need
in technology. It helps you to formulate exactly from a
national program of what you're trying to do.
In 1998 we declared Usama bin Ladin the number one priority
and the al-Qa'ida organization within the FBI. In early spring
of '99 he was placed on our top ten list. And, so, we hear
things all the time that the FBI wasn't focused on
counterterrorism.
In addition, to that in November 1999, at no one's request
but an internal review by the FBI, we created the
counterterrorism division in addition to that, with our
investigative services division. And so we were singularly
focused on that and trying to run a national program and being
able to raise our capability in order to prevent acts of
terrorism as the number one thing.
We will never ever move away from being reactive. We
understand that. And that's what people want to talk about most
of the time is how's that case going in East Africa, or how's
the USS Cole investigation going? But, if you step back and
look at it strategically you need to have people thinking
beyond the horizon and that's very difficult for all of us. And
it's particularly difficult for law enforcement people. And
it's very easy post-event to figure how the kidnapping
occurred. I won't say it's very easy, but you have a lot more
leads post-9/11 as to how they did this, as opposed to prior to
9/11. And there were red flags in the ocean out there. There
were a lot of red flags prior to 9/11.
And once 9/11 occurred it's real easy to go back and pick
out the red flag in the ocean of red flags and say you should
have done this or you should have seen this. And a threat to
aviation is certainly one of the areas that we receive threat
reporting on. It was not the only area. They had threats to
malls, threats to power plants, threats to assassination;
across the board, we had threats coming in every day.
And if something happened today concerning a small boat
attacking somewhere in one of our harbors in the U.S., we'd
probably have information about that. So it's a mass of
information and it's a sea of threats. And it's like working
against a maze. And if you know where the end point of a maze
is, it's certainly easier to work your way back to the starting
point than being trying to go through the maze and sort out all
the red flags.
I'm not defensive whatsoever. I encourage you look back
look. I encourage people to ask us questions and said why
didn't you do this or why didn't you do that? But the men and
women of the FBI that were working this in conjunction with
Cofer's folks were working full-time. We were not sitting on
our hands. We were not asleep over there thinking that well,
this can't possibly happen inside the United States. We were
aware of that.
Just a couple of other quick points I need to make. We also
realized prior to 9/11 that information sharing with our state
and locals is a key piece. We have 600,000 law enforcement
people in the United States, and as result of October of '00 we
initiated a pilot project in St. Louis where we would actually
load, hopefully if we get all the kinks worked out, federal
information, as well as all state and local information in
order to electronically be able to use that information to
connect the smallest dots in the terrorism program.
An individual stopped in St. Louis County might be the key
to unraveling a terrorist plot, and that requires time and
effort and technology to do that. It's not a technology issue,
but it's a project that needs to be done. Post-9/11 we
initiated a similar project in San Diego. We also have one
going in the Northwest with three states--Oregon, Washington
and Idaho. We do not have all the correct answers on those
projects yet. But as we continue to work our information
sharing will get better.
Just a couple of other key points over a period of time
since the early '90s is the renditions. The renditions are key
in law enforcement, but at the same time it is a very difficult
task to render people back to the United States. We were
successful in Shirasaki coming out of Nepal and several key
East African fugitives that were able to get out, working not
only with the CIA but the State Department, as well as our DOD.
The key point here is the FBI was a law enforcement effort,
trying to investigate, bring to justice under our rules, our
Constitution, crimes that were committed against American
citizens. And a key point to remember in this war in terrorism,
and particularly al-Qa'ida and Usama bin Liden, is the fact
that sometimes the idea that not only is it law enforcement
issue, it is also a national security issue. We can lock up 15
people for bombing us in East Africa. We can indict and charge
individuals in the USS Cole or we can indict and charge
individuals in whatever terrorist act that goes on, but this
will not stop this.
This is a national security issue. And I'm not advocating
passing the mantle from law enforcement into a national
security issue, but as, Senator Shelby, you well remember on a
briefing that we had with you, me and the Director of the FBI,
where we talked about a very sensitive matter where we were
close to getting indictment, former Senator Kerrey from
Nebraska said--turned to my Director and said I'd really like
to thank you for this effort that the FBI's put into this. But
actually this is a national security issue. This matter should
be taken to the Administration and taken to DOD because we're
never going to stop it just solely through the law enforcement
side.
And, so, that's a key point I think we should remember and
talk about. The other things that, real briefly, are the
resources and budget. This is not in any way a criticism. This
is not any way a reflection upon what we were trying to do and
what we ended up getting or an excuse of what happened about 9/
11. But I would turn your attention to our request, the FBI
Director's request in the '00 budget. I'm not going to talk
about what made it actually up here, the numbers, but I can
tell you what I, head of the Counterterrorism Division,
requested. And I'll be real brief about this and I only have a
couple of more points.
In '00 the FBI requested 180 agents and 680 for support in
the '00 budget. What comes out the other end approved by
Congress is five support people. In the '01 budget we asked for
30 agents, 397 support people. And what comes out the other end
is 0-0. In the '02 budget we asked for 203 agents, 104 support,
and what comes out the other end is 8 agents and 56 support
people.
If you add those figures up for just three years you come
up with close to 2,000 individuals that we asked for, a
breakdown of that of about 430 agents and 1,482 support people.
And what we got on the other end was 69. That begs the question
and I'm not here to answer that question, is would this have
made a difference prior to 9/11? Would we be here talking about
the Phoenix memo or something else if the identification and
the recognition of the resources we needed?
And I know Congress had other issues. And I'm a realist. We
had other programs going. We had a drug program. We had a gang
problem. But yet at the same time it comes down to resources.
And what we asked for and what we received was the figures.
Does that explain why--and we can discuss these figures--
why we only had one strategic analyst looking at UBL? Does it
explain the number of people that we had working UBL? I'll
leave that for further discussion.
Mr. Chairman, I think Congress recognized the need that we
needed resources because in the '02 supplemental, right after
9/11, we received 297 agents and 823 support people. I'll leave
that at that.
The last area, in closing, is we've heard some talk, some
perceptions that we didn't do enough about the airlines
threats. And I think I've covered that. The airlines threats
were out there, as well as the mall threats, as well as the
suicide bomber in 1997, as you recall, that attempted to go
into the New York subway and blow himself up, as well as other
things. Continued, continued, you know, repeated threats that
we received in working with the Agency.
I'm not here to say that there were not clues or red flags
that we should have picked on. But it is a sea of red flags.
The other thing is that there's a perception that we, the FBI,
never briefed the Administration that al-Qa'ida could attack us
in the United States. I will tell you that perception is
absolutely incorrect. If you looked at just the fact that we
had been attacked in the World Trade Center in '93, if you
looked at Oklahoma City, if you looked at the Ressam individual
who was going to set off a bomb in LAX, you understand clearly
that we were vulnerable in the United States.
Looking at the pattern before 9/11, of all the pattern, I
was convinced we were going to be attacked. As a matter of
fact, we had a discussion with the Director about this prior
to, long before September 11 about pre-positioning people
overseas, FBI agents. And I was convinced at that time that the
probability of an attack against us was great, but I was also,
the majority of my thought process was that it would be
overseas. But we had never at any time told anyone that we
could not be attacked inside the United States.
The last two points is it continues to be that we're all
reactive. And if you've heard some of this, and I'll be glad to
explain this more, we were moving in the right direction in
being proactive. We were trying to look over the horizon. We
will always be reactive because of the crimes we do, but we
also have people that look and think about where is the next
threat and how's it coming and what we should do about it.
And, in closing, I guess the best thing is that somehow or
another people think that we were asleep at the switch. We have
dedicated men and women. We have individuals, field agents,
support people, professional staff that have absolutely worked
themselves almost to death over this problem. And just as Cofer
said, I'm extremely proud of those individuals. And I'm
extremely proud of what the work ofthe FBI has done since the
early '90s in the counterterrorism program. And we don't do everything
always right. But, in the realm of counterterrorism that's a judgment
that we're based up or evaluated on.
I've used this analogy before. We're like a soccer
goalkeeper. We can block 99 shots and no one wants to talk
about any of those. And the only thing anyone wants to talk
about is the one that gets through. And I understand that. I'm
not asking for sympathy on that, but I'm telling you what
reality is. And so our folks are very dedicated and work very
hard about this.
The last point is somehow or another word's out that
somehow that the FBI and CIA conspired or had information prior
to 9/11 that could have prevented this and that we were not
interested in pursuing that. I can't tell you how I wish we
could have prevented this. I worry about. And over the period
of time, even prior to
9/11, it was always the thought process of what have we missed,
what are we doing that we need to do better. But I'm not
responsible for the individuals, the 19 individuals that got on
those planes and the al-Qa'ida organization that pulled this
plan off.
However, I think it's important to remember that we did the
best we absolutely could with the resources we had. I wish we
would have had technology that could have instantaneously
evaluated all the documents. I wished we had had 150 analysts
assigned to FBI headquarters. We didn't. But we did the best we
could. And that's not being defensive at all, Mr. Chairman;
that's being very honest with you.
I thank you for this opportunity. I'll be glad to answer
any questions you might have.
Chairman Goss. Thank you, Mr. Watson. That also was
compelling testimony and very helpful to us.
Our procedure is now that we assign 20 minutes each to pre-
selected, designated lead questioners and for today's hearings
our questioners are Representative Gibbons, Senator Durbin,
Representative Reyes, and Senator DeWine, in that order. And
after they've completed their questioning then we'll proceed
with the list of the other members using the Senate system,
which is in front of me.
The order of arrival we have is Representative Peterson,
Representative Roemer, Senator Levin, Representative Hoekstra,
Senator Bayh, Representative Castle, Senator Feinstein, Senator
Roberts, Representative Boehlert, Representative Harman,
Representative Burr, Senator Mikulski.
What is going to happen, I am advised, is the House is
going to have a series of votes starting about 11:00 and so I
would suggest that we can probably get in Mr. Gibbons'
questions before that and if you can continue in that case
while we go over there we can keep the questioning going.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Mr. Gibbons, the floor is yours, sir, for 20 minutes.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very, very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate this opportunity and I do want to welcome our
witnesses this morning, Mr. Watson and Mr. Black. Thank you for
being here before this Committee to enlighten us. And also
thank you for your service to our country.
Not often, I'm sure, do you hear people tell you thank you
enough for what you do and the commitment that you've got. I
want to say at the outset of this hearing that I believe that
your experience, your dedication and the time you've spent in
the jobs that you've held, both in CIA and the FBI, in
counterterrorism have made you the proper witnesses to be here.
I think your knowledge level and experience bring what we need
to hear on this Committee. And we look forward to that.
Let me say that the purpose of this hearing and the purpose
of my questioning is to identify the systemic problems at the
foundation of our Intelligence Community. This is not a finger-
pointing exercise and this certainly is not a witch-hunt. This
problem is larger than any one individual and it's what we are
out to do, is to find solutions to making sure that tomorrow's
attacks and tomorrow's problems are solved today.
The issue before us is whether we had not just the right
people or the number of people but whether we had the right
skill sets and whether we had the right operational attitude in
some of our agencies to allow us to get to the critical
information that would be necessary to fight this.
May I say to both of you that if I do probe or ask a
question that requires a consideration of national security for
clearance, please note the question and we will be happy to
receive your answer in the closed session that we have this
afternoon.
Mr. Black, I would like to start with you, if I may. And,
again, welcome to our Committee. And let me say that you've
always been a staunch advocate before our Committee. This is my
sixth year on the Intelligence Committee and I can say to those
watching that you have come before our Committee time and time
again as a staunch reporter of terrorist activities, what this
country was facing, what we needed to do. My question would be,
was there an articulation of your interest in the terrorist
activity and the needs of our agencies dealing with terrorism
communicated to superiors and how was that received?
Mr. Black. Well, my superiors, of course, are the Director
of Operations, Jim Pavitt, and the Director of Central
Intelligence, George Tenet. And I would tell you, sir, that
there is one person who has been more frenetic in his actions
and more concerned about counterterrorism than I, and that's
the Director of Central Intelligence. My leadership certainly
understood the threat. They were consumed with it. They were
fixated on it. They attempted to allocate resources. As I
recall from my statement, I did say that we were the first
among equals, the entity not to be cut. I think that from a
resource pie we certainly got our share and a bit more.
I think the concern was that this is a long war. My
Director declared it, declared the intelligence war in 1998. He
took them very seriously. We hire people against it. We train
for it. But I think the issue before you for your consideration
would be this is going to be a long struggle. And it's
certainly going to see a lot of us out in terms of longevity.
We need to build a base so that we can move forward without
people like Mr. Watson's special agents getting burned out or
our personnel running on empty year after year. This is no way
to run a system, sir.
If you're going to fight, you want to get the right number
of troops. And so more is not necessarily the only answer, but
certainly more is required. But, I think we also have to look
for the resource base to move forward. Thank you.
Mr. Gibbons. So what you're telling our Committee is that
your advocacy of the threat posed by the terrorists was
communicated to your leadership in a need for more resources in
the application of the war against terrorism beginning in 1998.
Mr. Black. I actually came to this job in 1999. But----
Mr. Gibbons. Beginning in 1999.
Mr. Black [continuing]. The answer to that is yes, they
were certainly aware of my concerns. They were as equally
concerned and, being by their side, their actions conformed to
their concerns.
Mr. Gibbons. Now you also mentioned that budget reductions
in 1999 saw or forced an approximate 30 percent cut in Agency
operations. This is in opposition to what we're hearing in
terms of the rise in the advocacy of the threat. Can you
explain why administrative cuts were requested to the Agency
when there was an increase in the level of threat knowledge?
Mr. Black. Well, I'm only going to speak for the
Counterterrorism Center. But I will tell you that the
Counterterrorism Center essentially was able to perform at the
level or was resourced at the level that we achieved as a
result of supplemental funding. The one-year monies I thought
were for, in terms of the mission, again as I statedin my
testimony, was relatively modest. That appeared to be how we conduct
affairs in the government. We are the recipients of this type of
action, sir.
Mr. Gibbons. Let me go back to something you've indicated,
that during your time as the head of the CTC, chief of the DCI
portion for CTC, personnel numbers. Oftentimes we hear that you
had the equivalent of three infantry companies on the line
fighting this war. My question to you is, did the numbers of
people you had have the right skill mix with regard to language
capability, with regard to operational capability and skills
needed to be able to gather the appropriate information?
Mr. Black. I think that we had a very good skill mix. We
hire towards this. We emphasize those attributes that are going
to be effective overseas. That's what we do.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, let me ask the question then. Did you
have the right numbers of people that could speak Arabic,
Pashtu, Urdu, Farsi?
Mr. Black. You always need more speakers in those
languages. We have gone out of our way, increasingly over the
time, to specifically target these types of individuals with
these language skills. In fact, I can tell you that the
Counterterrorism Center even advanced through the appropriate
offices its own hiring campaign where we advertise in
newspapers specifically looking for people interested in
counterterrorism and that had the right language
qualifications.
Mr. Gibbons. Okay. Many times in our intelligence gathering
overseas we often use liaison type operations. When is it
essential to use liaison operations? And when is it or when
should we use efforts for unilateral type operations?
Mr. Black. I appreciate that question. It's a very
important one. This is a global war and we are involved in
essentially intelligence combat. When you go to war it's
usually a good idea to have as many allies on your side as you
can. There's a commonality of interest here. Most countries are
against terrorism and we in the CIA have developed a
constellation of allies that certainly, as I speak right now,
is extremely effective. When you need to do it yourself is when
there is no friend to help you, there is no alternative besides
taking high-risk actions on your own.
I must say we conduct the normal business of intelligence
operations at all times, but counterterrorism is a little
special in that we all need to cooperate, and we do. But,
there's no reluctance to, as you say, unilateral operations.
This is what I do for a living. And there is no hesitation
certainly under the leadership of this Director. We launch very
quickly whenever it's appropriate.
Mr. Gibbons. Do you feel there was an under-reliance on
unilateral operations between the periods of 1999 and 2001?
Mr. Black. No, I do not. I believe that with the resource
base that we had that we maximized our operational product with
exactly how we did it, which was a good mix, an appropriate mix
at the right time.
Mr. Gibbons. So you don't believe that we could have used
more unilateral operations in that time period?
Mr. Black. Well, we could absolutely. We would need the
people to do them.
Mr. Gibbons. So the issue was then we go back to if you had
the people with the right skill mix to gather that information
and to do those operations.
Mr. Black. Yes, sir. If you had the right number of people
with the right skill mix.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, that's the issue.
Mr. Black. Yes, sir. There you go.
Mr. Gibbons. That's the bottom foundation issues. No matter
how many people we have, we've got to have the right skill mix,
whether it's language skills. And I'll ask you again do you
feel that we had the right number of language-skilled people to
conduct the right kind of operations in a war against
terrorism?
Mr. Black. We always need more. My opening testimony stated
that we need additional personnel to be as effective as
possible overseas.
Mr. Gibbons. So I guess the answer is, no, we didn't have
the right numbers of language-skilled people. We needed more.
Mr. Black. Yes, correct.
Mr. Gibbons. Okay.
Mr. Watson, I want to turn the question to you in the time
I have. Do you feel that the FBI was overly focused on
gathering information for prosecution purposes rather than
focusing on terrorism prevention prior to 2001?
Mr. Watson. I think, as I've indicated, in 1998 that the
light really came on for me personally, as well as an
organization that we were going to be involved in the
collection of evidence. We were going to be involved in
investigating post events. But we also realized in 1998 the
need to be proactive. And there's a blending of that. And
that's a cultural change within the FBI. And in order to figure
that out that's why it was so important to be able to evaluate
and have an understanding of exactly where you were.
So the answer to your question is 1998--starting in '98--
and this was a very difficult process because of what we had
always done. And then you try to talk to individuals or even
outside the Bureau about well, what do we think might happen
across the horizon. And you look at the cyber arena, and I'm
trying to answer your question very specifically.
We looked at that in '98 because NIPC, the National
Infrastructure Protection Center, was under the
counterterrorism program at the time. What in the world are we
going to do to try to get to where we need to be by '05 in just
the cyber arena? And people started thinking about it and I
started thinking it, that if we don't do it we'll be here in
'05 and we won't be able to figure out cyber issues and they'll
probably be no crime or no criminal act committed that doesn't
involve cyber.
So, to answer your question, heavy, heavy on the collection
of evidence and investigative side. But starting in '98 it was
very clear to me that you had to have a vision and you had to
look beyond cases. And if we were just running out and
investigating cases, that's all we would ever be doing. And so
some smart people got together and we decided what is the
threat and how do we address it.
Mr. Gibbons. Let me ask both of you to answer this question
because I think it's clear that both of you have definite and
distinct approaches to counterterrorism in America. I would ask
each of you to identify how you measure success in your fields
with regard to what you've done since 1999 or '98, whenever you
came to those. What are your success measurements and
benchmarks that you established to allow you to identify
whether what you were doing was correct?
Mr. Watson. Do you want to go first or you want me--who?
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Watson, if you want to go first, that's
fine.
Mr. Watson. Okay. That is a very fair question and I'll be
happy to answer that. I think in order to evaluate the
counterterrorism program with the FBI and if you look at prior
to '98 and even post-'98 you had to have very specific
criteria. And if you rely upon the number of arrests, number of
convictions, or the number of acts of terrorism prevented, I
think you might get a faulty representation of how well you're
doing.
And so the idea was, starting in 1998, was to see how well
and at what criteria. So we developed specific criteria to
measure and evaluate ourselves at every field office. And it
was no longer acceptable for a special agent in charge to be
assigned to some field office that had worked drugs all his
life who is now responsible for counterterrorism in a certain
state or area. He needs help with that or she needs help. So
wedeveloped specific measurable criteria to say this is what we want
you to do in Little Rock, or whatever city it was, and we're going to
measure that. And I'm going to hold you accountable for that action.
And this is where, when you put all that together, is a
huge management success to be able to say exactly where you
were in the process and exactly what resources for the first
time we needed and what were the technology problems. And do
all our field offices have enough analysts? And you measure
that and we measured that through a series of reports every six
months provided to the Director.
Did that answer your specific question?
Mr. Gibbons. Yes.
Mr. Black.
Mr. Black. Sir, essentially in my business you're looking
at a global counterterrorism program. There are a lot of
criterias of success or measurements towards success. There are
things such as the number and the quality of foreign
relationships that you have overseas, the number and quality of
assets that are providing you insightful counterterrorist
information, also the support and development measurements, the
selection of appropriate officers, as you mentioned before, of
language criteria, the training given and assignment to
specific regions to maximize the qualities and skills of that
officer against specific targets.
In the end, it is my personal view that a programmatical
approach is a good one in counterterrorism because this fight's
going to be long. It's going to be very difficult. It's going
to consume the time of a lot of our officers, as well as
resources and be looking at relationships. You're looking at
your own people conducting these operations, as well as the
product, which is the reporting from assets to be analyzed by
analysts and the end result objective, which is very difficult,
but which we do achieve and we attempt to achieve always, is to
develop that tactical detailed intelligence so that can be
passed over to law enforcement or other intelligence services
so that we can preempt and disrupt specific attacks and save
lives.
Mr. Watson. Congressman, may I add just one other thought
that I would like to, referring to your question? I think
Senator Shelby and Congressman Goss are good examples. I'll use
both of you in this. I mean when I would come up and appear
before you I think the question would be for the FBI, Mr.
Watson, what's your budget and the numbers were so and so.
Well, last year how many acts of terrorism did you prevent?
What did we get with that money? And my mind would race real
rapidly. We had the case in Sacramento. We had the guy down in
Tampa, Florida. Well, if we cut your budget in half, would we
get half that many? If we doubled your budget would we get
double the number of preventions?
And the answer is no. The answer is you have to be working
at the highest capability, the maximum things that the FBI
could do. So the measurement is how well are you doing on the
capacity? And if you're there, then that's all you can do. But
if you're not there, that's the measure of standard in a
counterterrorism program. It has not anything to do--well, it
does, and I don't want to downgrade that--by a specific number
of statistics. And we've long been driven by statistics. It's
being able to project and it's being able to understand what
you're capacities are. And we were hurting. We were hurting in
the areas of training and analysts, those things. I just wanted
to make that point.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you.
Mr. Black, I want to go back to something you indicated.
The product of your measurement was reporting, increased
reporting as part of that product. It seems to me that there
was a dramatic rise in the number of reports that were
presented to the Agency from the field with regard to terrorism
over this period of time.
My question is, do you feel that the threshold of reporting
was low enough or so low that it presented you with a flood of
information that could not be properly analyzed, it could not
be properly disseminated to the Intelligence Community, that
would have been able to be verified and substantiated and
corroborated because of the sort of frantic pace that we were
under to get information and any information that we could? Did
that have that effect--in other words, preventing it from being
properly analyzed, properly disseminated and distributed to our
Intelligence Community?
Mr. Black. We're obviously in the business of collecting
intelligence and disseminating intelligence. When we collect
intelligence information that is new and it's considered at the
time to be accurate, then that is passed along, with the
appropriate review and processing, and that would go to our
analysts. I seem to always return or come back to the same
thing, and that is that the people are the most important part
of all of this. All the intelligence we collect is reviewed and
processed. It is disseminated. We're not going to be in the
business of withholding intelligence information from a
validated customer. There is a little secrecy involved in this,
but if it is caveated, if we feel and essentially think it's
necessarily completely true, we may say that.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Chairman, I see that my time has expired.
I want to thank you for the opportunity.
Chairman Graham [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Gibbons.
Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Chairman Graham, and I
want to thank our two witnesses for joining us today. And let
me say by way of preface to these remarks that, as I'm sure you
would not question the commitment of Congress, the House and
the Senate to the security of the United States, we certainly
don't question your individual commitment nor the commitment of
the fine men and women who work in your agencies. You are truly
on the front line of protecting this great nation. And many of
your colleagues risk their lives every single day in that
pursuit.
We should never minimize that, nor ignore it in any of
these hearings. And I think we should make a point of saying
that the purpose of this joint inquiry is not only to raise
questions about your agencies and the Intelligence Community
and the law enforcement community across America, but to raise
questions about Congress itself and what we did or failed to do
that might have had an impact on September 11, 2001. Some of
these will be hard and embarrassing questions, but they have to
be asked and answered.
At times judgments are made, and in retrospect they might
not have been proper. The same can be said of Congress as can
be said of your agencies. And I think it's those judgments that
we are exploring in the course of these hearings. So I hope
with that caveat and with that understanding that you'll bear
with me as I ask a few questions that will try to get into some
detail about issues which still remain unresolved in my own
mind.
There's so much of this that we are discussing that is
subjective--decisions made by men and women at a given time in
history based on information they had before them, based on
what they believe to be a threat to the United States and what
they believe we should do to respond. There are some things,
though, that are objective and I think we should start there.
Because I think, Mr. Black, that's where your testimony
started.
And the objective element here relates to the number of
personnel who were dedicated to the war against al-Qa'ida, a
war declared in December of 1998 by DCI George Tenet. In a
closed hearing on September 12, 2002, Mr. Black, you testified
about not having enough people in CTC. In a public hearing on
September 20 we heard from a CIA officer who talked about,
``misses that happen when people, even very competent,
dedicated people, are simply overwhelmed'' by their workload.
Then, shortly thereafter, a press release was issued by the
Central Intelligence Agency. This press release of September
19, 2002,really raised a question as to whether or not the
Joint Inquiry was correct in saying that the CIA was inadequately
staffed to meet this challenge. I guess the nature of my first question
to you relates to these staffing levels.
And I'd like it if you could clarify this point, if you
can. First, did you, Mr. Black, play any role in the
preparation of that September 19, 2002 press release by the
CIA?
Mr. Black. No, I did not. You know, press business is not
my affair.
Senator Durbin. So, you weren't called on to provide
information about facts or experiences that related to their--
--
Mr. Black. I believe that information came from the
Counterterrorism Center. As I did testify, I left the
Counterterrorism Center in May. And there's a new chief and I
am confident that this information came from there.
Senator Durbin. Let me ask you this. The CIA press
statement indicates that prior to September 11, 2001, there
were 115 analysts throughout the CIA working terrorism-related
issues. You said before our Committee earlier that the CTC
didn't have enough people. I really have to ask you which
version we should stand by.
Mr. Black. Right.
Senator Durbin. Your conclusion or the conclusion to the
CIA press release?
Mr. Black. Unfortunately, in my view, probably both. There
is a difference between the analysts that are assigned within
the CTC, as well as analysts that are outside CTC and other
components in the CIA that do provide analytical support. If
you're looking at things such as specific terrorist equipment
or sort of regional analysis of terrorist trends, things like
that, these personnel spend a considerable amount of their time
on counterterrorism issues.
So I will say this is a dangerous area. Counterterrorism,
as a center, does specifically and only counterterrorism.
There's a tremendous amount of support to this effort that
comes from outside. And we work, generally, through others.
Senator Durbin. The CIA press statement referenced 115
analysts. Is it fair for me to conclude from what you've just
said that that does not mean full-time analysts dedicated to
this war against al-Qa'ida?
Mr. Black. I have not read the press release. And we use
analysts in a lot of different ways. I would have to check and
look at the numbers. I'm not familiar with it. We have--our
analytical personnel do a lot of things. They do operational
support. They do targeting. They do only analytical work. So I
would have to check and I'd have to take that for the record
and get back to you.
Senator Durbin. Thank you. I wish you would. And also, the
CIA press statement says that the CIA's special UBL unit tasked
and directed 200 agency offices worldwide to work the
counterterrorism target. The same question applies. How many of
these were really full-time dedicated people working on it? How
many of them may have been tasked to do only part of their work
related to UBL? So if you would be kind enough to provide that
information as well.
You also raised in your opening statement a question about
cash resources. And I read it carefully, just having been given
it this morning, but I read it carefully. And it indicated, I
think, some serious problems that you face when you became
chief in 1999 which resulted in an effort to cut subordinate
units except one at least 30 percent. Let me ask you this
question.
This Committee prepared the fiscal year 2002 authorization
bill last summer, in 2001, prior to September 11, 2001. We were
told that the CIA had excess money for counterterrorism left
over from the supplemental appropriation. The CIA explained
that they did not intend to spend that money in fiscal year
2002 but wanted to hold it for use at some future time. Are you
able to testify as to whether or not there was excess money
unspent on counterterrorism during that period of time before
September 11, 2001?
Mr. Black. No. Frankly, I don't recall. This is a very
complex issue that's three years. Generally, if there is money
at the end of the year it becomes an issue of what to do with
it. I do not recall ever having excess funds that I was--of
which I had control that was excess. We were generally always
looking for more money to keep our machine going.
Senator Durbin. Thank you for that.
Let me address, if I can, the issue that's been raised
about the cooperation between your two agencies, the CIA and
the FBI. One of the questions relates to this now famous June
11, 2001 meeting, which you've made reference to, Mr. Black, in
your testimony. And you allowed as to how the FBI presented
photos at that meeting for the CIA to consider.
The Joint Inquiry staff statement noted that a CIA analyst
who attended that meeting of CIA and FBI personnel would not
share information with the FBI unless he was specifically
authorized to do so, when, in fact, that was the purpose of the
meeting, to share information. Why wouldn't a CIA analyst be
more forthcoming with information of value to the FBI? Is this
analyst's attitude typical of personnel at your agency or the
relationship with the FBI?
Mr. Black. It could not be--first of all, I don't believe
this happened. The CIA is in the business of collecting and
disseminating intelligence. And, in this case, the CIA analyst
had been briefed that it was the laws and regulations of the
land that prevented this information being passed over to a
criminal Bureau agent. I'd have to defer to Mr. Watson on the
difference between intelligence and criminal matters inside the
FBI. But, the guidance, as I understand it, comes from the FBI.
Senator Durbin. I need you to clarify your answer. First
you said you didn't believe it happened. And, second, you
believed that if it happened it was because of laws and rules
that prohibited the exchange of information. Which conclusion
are you giving us?
Mr. Black. What I'm saying is that the CIA analyst from CTC
was told that, by the FBI, was told that this was an
intelligence matter and that the criminal people should not be
tainted by this because there could be prosecution involved.
Senator Durbin. That certainly raises, I think, an
interesting policy question which we have circled so many times
in the course of this Joint Inquiry about whether existing
laws, policies or, let me just say, the culture of different
agencies creates obstacles to the sharing of information
necessary for national security.
Mr. Watson, one of the things that came to our attention
with the arrest of Mr. Moussaoui in Minneapolis was the
statement by the FBI agent that because of her frustration in
dealing with FBI headquarters she decided to take a bold, and
somewhat dangerous, move by suggesting that the CIA be
contacted directly so that information could be found about
Moussaoui's background to justify arrest and detainment. Are
you aware of that statement by the FBI agent that's been given
to this Committee?
Mr. WATSON. I know this is pending prosecution, so I'll be
very limited. But I'll try my best to answer that question.
What you have in a situation like that, without being
absolutely specific about it, is that this relationship with
the CIA that we have is top-down driven. There are always--and
it doesn't matter what program you're looking at--there are
always bumps in the road. But the value is that you can get it
to the top. And there's confusion about what can be shared and
what can't be shared, what's taken out for FISA or what's
developed in a criminal case.
I'm not sure that everybody understands all those rules.
But if it's a hindrance, they certainly have the opportunity to
raise that up the highest levels of the FBI. And if someone
would have told me that or ifsomeone would have called Cofer
about any of these problems, particularly the Moussaoui deal or
whatever, then those matters would have been resolved.
Now I don't know if that was your specific question about
Moussaoui or not, but I'll come back on that.
Senator Durbin. I understand what you're saying.
Mr. Watson. Okay.
Senator Durbin. And frankly that is the solution. It has to
start at the top.
Mr. Watson. That's right and if it's not top-driven, it's
not going to work.
Senator Durbin. But the most important element is that it
reaches the bottom so that the agent in the district office
understands what his or her authority is and how far they can
go in cooperation with other agencies.
Mr. Watson. But if you look at, though, post-98 and what we
were trying to do in building capacity, one of the criteria for
the Minneapolis office is do you meet with your NR-counterparts
on a regular basis. Do you have a working group with all your
federal folks about counterterrorism? And so if there's an
inference there, oh, who are these people in Minnesota from the
CIA, that's their problem and that's a performance issue that
has to be addressed from my perspective. And that's what we're
trying to do.
Senator Durbin. Thank you. Let me move from staff
performance to the performance of technology. I have paid close
attention now for over a year to what I consider to be the sad
state of technology in your agency. I don't know who has to
shoulder the responsibility for the current state of affairs,
but it is a fact. And testimony that we received here as well
as in the Judiciary Committee suggests that information
technology is primitive in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
It is improving because of the TRILOGY project and others.
But let me ask you specifically, Mr. Watson, if we can
overcome any cultural obstacles to sharing information, how
close are we to the point where we actually have computers in
communication?
I mean we have received testimony, for example, at a
hearing on Tuesday, the FBI confirmed that there are currently
68,000 outstanding unassigned counterterrorism-related leads at
the FBI dating back to 1995. How much of this is attributable
to the current state of the FBI's information technology? And
let me also add at the same hearing an agent stated that due to
technological limitations there are probably, in his words,
hundreds of communications with his name on it that he's never
seen.
Tell me how bad is it and how much of an obstacle is this
to really winning this war on terrorism?
Mr. Watson. I think that's a fair question. And I think
some of those numbers there are a little distorted. I probably
need to clarify that. From a technological standpoint, I'm not
a technocrat. What I am is an operator. And we have been very
specific about what technology we need to fight the war on
terrorism. I can't address exactly, you know, do we need this
type of device or technology? I think we're moving in that
direction. Do we have that capability? We recognize we did not
have that capability way back even before 1998.
Senator Durbin. Do you currently have the capability?
Mr. Watson. To do what?
Senator Durbin. To deal with terrorism with the most modern
information technology available.
Mr. Watson. With the most modern, the answer is no.
Senator Durbin. And how far away is the FBI from having at
its beck and call the information technology resources which
will make us effective in dealing with law enforcement in the
war on terrorism?
Mr. Watson. If you're asking me for a timeline for the
TRILOGY project, I do not know the answer to that. I know
money's been appropriated for it. I know we're moving as fast
as we can in that direction. Is it a problem for us? Has it
been? You're absolutely right.
Senator Durbin. I can tell you that before the Judiciary
Committee the person who is in charge of this now tells us that
she is hopeful that by mid-2004 we will reach that point. That,
I think, is a sobering analysis of the lack of progress at your
agency. And I have tried mightily, even in the Department of
Homeland Security bill currently pending on the floor, to make
this a higher priority. Once we have the right culture, once we
have the dedicated men and women, for goodness sakes, they need
the weapons in their arsenal to fight. And the FBI now has one
hand tied behind its back, and it's using primitive equipment.
Let me at least ask you a question related to the same
thing. When the FBI receives new names during the course of a
terrorism investigation, its standard practice is to run the
names through your database to determine whether there's any
information about the individual. Arabic names are often
spelled many different ways in English. I've seen that in the
press. Given the state of the FBI's information system, what
kind of problems does this present for the FBI in the war on
terrorism?
Mr. Watson. The spelling of the names and the ability to
run data in there? A good answer to that is to say do we have
an analytical software on top of our ACS database. The answer
is no. Is that technology available off the shelf? Yes, it is.
You know, and I'm not smart enough on the TRILOGY issue to talk
about that. But our information-sharing project in St. Louis is
exactly that.
We take all the Illinois State Police records. We take all
the St. Louis Police records. We take our data and load it in
there. And then if we have a bit of information that says
tattoo on left arm it can immediately read those documents and
it's not a point and click system where you get a 1,000
documents Xeroxed back where you have to go look at them. It
analyzes those documents. It is a tremendous weapon and I hope
we get there.
And I hope we get there before '04.
Senator Durbin. It's a weapon that is available from most
computer stores?
Mr. Watson. I should not have said, probably, that it's off
the shelf stuff. But, I know what we're trying to utilize in
St. Louis and I don't know the security aspects of how to
protect that. I mean they are probably reasons why you can't
walk down to some technology place and buy that and put it on
the FBI's equipment. I understand that.
But I'm saying, though, that is a tremendous weapon that
will be, particularly with the information sharing to the state
and locals and the 600,000 locals.
Senator Durbin. I just want to be as candid about this.
Mr. Watson. I do too.
Senator Durbin. This is an issue--and I thank you for your
candor. This is an issue which has been raised repeatedly by
myself and others to the highest levels of this government, and
still the answer is so unsatisfying--to be told that there is
computer technology available in most computer stores across
America that is not available in the premier law enforcement
agency in America to search databases for names of dangerous
would-be terrorists. And I won't dwell on it because it isn't
your particular responsibility.
Mr. Watson. Well, I'm glad that you're frustrated by it,
but from an operational standpoint, I'm doubly frustrated by
that.
Senator Durbin. Well, let me ask you if I can, to--let me
just conclude by saying I think it is fair to say that if you
can't search for the information within your agency----
Mr. Watson. Well, we can. We can search for our
information.
Senator Durbin. We were told that word search in the FBI
computer system requires eight screens today, eight screens
before you can search.
Mr. Watson. I don't know who told you that, but if you're
talking about being able to search ACS, we can do that. We have
that capability and we can link words up with that. We don't
have the ability for it to read all the documents and say six
foot one man, Abu whatever and spelling of that or John Smith
in Birmingham, Alabama.
Senator Durbin. Or flight training school. If you're
looking for----
Mr. Watson. We have some capability of word association now
currently, but it's not where we need to be.
Senator Durbin. I agree.
Mr. Watson. We should be able to say flight training
schools and we should be able to say I-94s. I mean, you're
right. We're talking about the same thing.
Senator Durbin. I'm not going to quarrel with that. Let me
ask you then----
Mr. Watson. No.
Senator Durbin. About questions raised by General Scowcroft
and Mr. Berger about some of the priorities within the FBI in
terms of what is viewed as good performance in the FBI and what
is not. And I think those questions kind of go to some of the
earlier observations you made as to whether or not when it
comes to evaluating the work of the FBI whether or not, as
General Scowcroft told us, that the best FBI agents do criminal
investigations, not terrorism. Was that a mindset or is that a
mindset within the agency today?
Mr. Watson. And he was basing that upon what?
Senator Durbin. Basing it on his experience.
Mr. Watson. I think you might could draw that association
20 years ago. Counterterrorism work is extremely difficult. It
is not easy. General criminal investigative work is a lot
less--I need to probably be careful with my words here, is
probably not easier, what's the word I'm looking for, Michael?
Easier. Man, I talked around in a circle on that one.
Is it somebody that culturally--in the 1960s and '70s we
hired people through the--even into the '80s--to come into the
FBI and the image was that was chasing bank robbers in
Tuscaloosa, Alabama or solving a kidnapping or working white
collar crime or whatever. Yes, that's why we need to look at
the skill sets of agents.
I take exception to the fact that somebody says that the
better agents are working criminal matters. Those are difficult
cases. You have to be extremely organized and you have to be,
particularly in counterterrorism and counterintelligence field,
to outthink your opponent. And it's easy to react on criminal
matters.
Someone calls up, the bank's been robbed. Someone calls and
says that somebody scammed me out of $100,000, as opposed to
where will al-Qa'ida attack us next. And I take exception to
that statement and I take exception with the understanding that
he's probably looking years past. That's not the case. The men
and women we have in the FBI working counterterrorism are the
absolute best we have.
Senator Durbin. I think that's a very fair conclusion on
your part, too, that it is more difficult to be analytical in
perspective in terms of the threat than to deal with the
specific crimes that have traditionally been assigned to the
FBI.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graham. Thank you, Senator Durbin.
Our House colleagues are still in a series of votes. So our
next questioner will be Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first thank Mr. Black and Mr. Watson for your
service to this country, and please convey to people back at
headquarters and the field our thanks. You both articulated
very well the pride that you have in your men and women, and we
have that same pride. If you can convey that to them, we would
appreciate it very much.
To Mr. Watson, let me say a special thanks to you for your
many years of service as you begin your retirement. We
certainly wish you well.
I know that to our witnesses today and the witnesses that
we've had during these hearings, to them and to you, this
committee must look like 37 Monday morning quarterbacks. And we
all know how much players and coaches dislike Monday morning
quarterbacking. But I guess to some extent that is the nature
of inquiries such as this.
In my 20 minutes today I want to focus on the future.
Because, as we all know, no amount of Monday morning
quarterbacking will change the tragedy of September 11. I think
it's only useful to look at past mistakes so that we can learn
from them, so that we can take steps to prevent a future
September 11.
What has been unspoken, Mr. Chairman, members of the
Committee, what has been unspoken in this room throughout these
public hearings is this. Whatever intelligence failure there
was was a failure not just of the intelligence agencies, not
just of the FBI, but also a failure of Congress and a failure
of Presidents. There's been a failure to prioritize. It's been
a failure to have enough vision. It's been a failure of
resources.
In the 1970s many public hearings were held and I happen to
believe there were some good reforms that were made, but I also
happen to believe that there was a chilling impact made on our
intelligence operations. And the value of covert operations and
the value of good human intelligence was certainly de-
emphasized. At the end of the Cold War, the peace dividend,
that term was used. That peace dividend was taken out of the
hide not only of the defense of this country but also out of
our intelligence agencies. And sometimes we forget that.
We simply did not understand the new world that we lived
in. We didn't understand that the world that we were living in
was just as dangerous as what we all grew up in. We grew up in
the Cold War. The enemy was communism, the Soviet Union. We
understood it. We fought it. We won. We didn't understand that
there were other enemies out there. We understood it, but we
just didn't, I guess, react.
We didn't understand the need for covert action, the need
for human intelligence. They were just as important now as they
had ever been. I guess in a sense we thought that the long
twilight struggle that John Kennedy talked about was over. But
the danger to freedom does, in fact, continue. It is out there.
We simply did not provide the resources. I have gone back.
I've gone back to 1990, 1988 and looked at the budget figures.
And I'm not going to talk about those budget figures in
specifics today obviously. But simply what you find when you
looked at what the President proposed and what Congress did,
what was enacted into law, you find that frankly there is
enough blame to go around for both Congress and the President,
the Presidents. None of us really got it. You know, we just
didn't provide the resources.
Let me ask, if I could, Mr. Watson, you talked about
resources. Let me ask actually both of you, both Mr. Watson and
Mr. Black, a specific question and that is how much bigger
should the counterterrorism units be if we're serious about
providing defense. Mr. Watson's made a very good point; there
are no guarantees. We understand that. We can't guarantee we're
going to stop every terrorist attack. But, we've grown. We've
reacted. But if we look at this the way we ought to be looking
at it in Congress and the way your departments, agencies should
be looking at it, where should we be two years from now, five
years from now? What kind of growth should we expect to see?
Mr. Black.
Mr. Black. Yes, sir. The key point, at least from my
agency's end, is that I need to underscore that it is more than
just the Counterterrorism Center. The Counterterrorism Center
essentially is a resource provider. We provide expertise. We
provide people with special languages, special skills. When the
going gets tough, we get called in, things like that.
We operate essentially through others, through the
Operations Directorate and our field stations. So the answer
actually is that we need to increase the base for the long
haul. We need more resources for the Operations Directorate
upon which CTC can achieve its objectives. I would say
everything at that--just me personally talking, I'd say the
organization could easily absorb a 100 percent increase in
terms of personnel and resources.
Senator DeWine. Where you are today.
Mr. Black. Where we are today. And that should not be--I
know you're very interested in this, sir, but that should not
necessarily be considered the end. That is a good beginning and
that's an absorption rate and that could take us for the next
three to five years.
Senator DeWine. I think your point is very interesting. And
you've made this point to me in private before, that we're not
just talking about the Counterterrorism Center itself, that you
have to operate with support around the world.
You've also made the point to me, Mr. Black--and I won't
belabor it--that you cannot increase your spending without
increasing what surrounds you, but also vice versa.
Mr. Black. Also. We are dependent on each other, us being
the smaller partner.
Senator DeWine. So when we examine your budget we need to
keep that in mind?
Mr. Black. If you would, sir, that would be good.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Watson, do you want to comment on that
at all? I know you don't like to get into a lot of speculation.
Mr. Watson. Sure, Senator. Something in your introduction
though I would like to reflect back on real quick. And I think
a lot of times we lose sight of the fact. During this period of
time if you look at it and we used to talk about it, Mike
Rolince and I used to talk about this, is that we're pushing a
program where we get up and actually admit that more Americans
were probably, you know, murdered in Chicago than killed as a
result of terrorist acts against Americans. And so, that
perspective is a lot of where we were in the process. Because
the political will was we've got gang problems here in D.C. and
in Detroit, I mean whatever that situation is.
So no one really looked at this and they looked at the
numbers and I in no way want to talk that the numbers aren't
important of the number of Americans killed. But if you look at
the numbers compared to what else was going on, there was
nobody sitting there saying, holy smokes, when someone attacks
and kills 3,000 Americans the gloves come off and that's it.
But, let me go back to your----
Senator DeWine. Both your agencies have big priorities.
Mr. Watson. Yes.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Black has other priorities at his
agency and there are other priorities.
Mr. Watson. All right. Let me answer your question real
quick. A typical bureaucratic answer is we need a thousand
times more than what we have. I think the answer to your
specific question is where do we need to be in two years. I
think it's an accountability piece that you should hold our
organization accountable for. And when it's time for budget to
say we need 150 analysts we should articulate to you what
they're going to be doing and we need an additional 400, rather
than the normal process of saying we need 400 agents. And
there's nothing wrong with that.
What we need to do is look beyond the horizon over the next
two to three years out, to include the cyber arena.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Black, talk to me a little bit about
the strategic long-term thinkers and what that ratio should be
to the tactical side. Analysts, I'm talking about.
Mr. Black. We have under-invested in the strategic only
because we've had such near-term threats. The trend is always
towards the tactical. We need to put additional resources;
units have been established doing this now. The tactical is
where the lives are saved. And it is not necessarily a commonly
accepted, but strategic analysis does not--is not the
compelling entity that gets you to saving lives. I would say a
good ratio to be worked towards with increased resources would
be something in the ratio like one to four, one to five.
Senator DeWine. Is that where we are today?
Mr. Black. No. The ratio is greatly imbalanced. We are
something like one to eight, something like that.
Senator DeWine. All right. Let me ask both of you. The
impression that I think the public would get and people
watching this would get or listening to this or reading about
these hearings, would be that there were a lot of facts out
there. And this investigation has brought all those facts
together, things going on here, things going on there.
And the impression is that if they had all been brought
together by the Intelligence Community, by the FBI, if they had
been brought in together into one place and one person had
looked at them that September 11 could have been prevented. And
I want to know if you can address that perception, whether that
is, in your opinion, based on what we now know, whether that is
true or not.
Mr. Black.
Mr. Black. That is a question, certainly, that we all need
to look at very closely.
Senator DeWine. If it can be answered.
Mr. Black. It's difficult. We always try to--it's very
popular to use the term connect the dots. It means a lot of
things to a lot of different people. The object here is to get
the tactical warning. And tactical warning is very difficult.
Tactical warning requires specific details. Analysis can give
you strategic warning. It is specific intelligence information
that is actionable for my colleague in the FBI so he can do
something about it, take specific action.
The strategic is essentially related to infrastructure
support, if you want to put more emphasis on the protection of
containers or an aircraft or trucks. I think the emphasis on
strategic will continue, but I would say that the tactical is
where the lives are saved, sir.
Senator DeWine. But what should the public take away from
this? That is the perception out there. I wanted your opinion
about it. Reasonable minds can differ. I'm curious to know what
yours is.
Mr. Watson. That's a difficult question. And I come out on
the side with the status of the resources we had at the time
and the technology we had at the time and the ability to
analyze and process information, I come out tactically we
couldn't have prevented it.
Senator DeWine. Is there one place----
Mr. Watson. Now----
Senator DeWine. Go ahead.
Mr. Watson. I'm sorry, Senator.
Senator DeWine. No, no, you finish.
Mr. Watson. If we had 10,000 analysts I might come out a
different way in this thinking. But again, as I mentioned
earlier, looking specifically, hindsight 20/20, after an event
it's pretty easy to draw the lines. It's pretty easy to say you
guys should have done this. But if you're looking in a sea of
red flags of 1,000 things--and I hope that answers your
question.
Senator DeWine. Thank you very much.
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir.
Senator DeWine. As you both know, Senator Kyl and Senator
Schumer have proposed a modification of the FISA law to allow
surveillance of terrorists who are not explicitly connected to
a foreign group. I very much support that fix. I think it is
the correct thing to do. I'd like to know if either one of you
have looked at that.
Mr. Watson. I fully support that idea.
Senator DeWine. All right.
Mr. Black. Absolutely.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Black, have you looked at it or not.
I'm sorry.
Mr. Black. I support it, the little that I know of it. I've
not made a detailed study of it.
Senator DeWine. Thank you very much.
We've heard testimony this week, Mr. Watson, from our joint
investigation committee that during the months prior to
September 9, the counterterrorism section at the FBI
headquarters sent out a request to 24 field offices asking them
to investigate information that headquarters had received about
a terrorist organization which was planning to send students to
the U.S. for aviation training. But the request received little
or no action.
Further, the joint investigation committee found that such
a lack of--or the staff found that such a lack of response was
not uncommon because the field offices have a great deal of
control over what they do and often ignore headquarters'
requests. I want to know if you could comment on that. Is that
true? And, if so, what are we doing to assert more control with
regard to national priorities such as terrorism?
Mr. Watson. Specifically if you're referring to what's
been, I'm sure, testified up here before about the specific
facts of that request that came in, my answer is that is I'm
glad the agent sent it in. But if you look at what he was
saying in that information, there was nothing in therethat
would have caused us to open a specific case and go after that specific
group of individuals at that time.
And the idea that someone says that the field ignores
headquarters, that's not totally accurate. There is
requirements that the field report to headquarters. They have
reporting requirements. We have reporting requirements to the
Department of Justice. Where the office of origin is gives a
lot of latitude to that office. But if it's a counterterrorism
matter it also has a lot of focus from FBI headquarters.
Granted, a stolen car ring case is totally different and if
it's in Knoxville, Knoxville can handle that. But a
counterterrorism case in Little Rock requires input from
headquarters. And I don't know--that's where we come out with
that.
Senator DeWine. We heard testimony last week from Secretary
Armitage and Secretary Wolfowitz that both of them believe one
of the biggest problems with our intelligence analysis is that
the agencies strive for consensus and don't always encourage
dissemination of dissident views.
Mr. Black, do you agree with that or not? Do you have a
comment on that?
Mr. Black. I think in theory it's, of course, a concern. We
work towards that. We do have a system in place which we
developed where we encourage innovative thinking. We use red
teams. And when analysis cannot be coordinated and is
compelling, that lack of coordination is so indicated. So I
think we have a reasonable balance at this point. I looked to
the Counterterrorism Center where we have a lot of new analysts
coming onboard there and we absolutely encourage unusual
analysis, unusual out-of-the-box thinking. So I think if
anything we're heading in a good direct in that area.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Watson, any comment?
Mr. Watson. We don't produce a lot of analytical reports.
So----
Senator DeWine. Should you be producing more?
Mr. Watson. Yes, we should, absolutely. Should we have
reports officers out in the field offices, you know,
absolutely.
Senator DeWine. I mean isn't that part of the problem, that
we're still understandably in a case mode and that, you know,
the long-term analysis, even the short-term analysis sometimes
no one's got time to do it.
Mr. Watson. That's correct.
Senator DeWine. It's not a priority.
Mr. Watson. I think it's a priority. I think we're getting
to there in the priorities.
Senator DeWine. We're getting there.
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir.
Senator DeWine. Okay. All right.
Mr. Watson. Remember, this is a large bureaucracy and it's
hard to steer the ship in a different way.
Senator DeWine. Right. We just want to make sure we're
moving in that direction.
My last question. Gentlemen, we hear a lot of discussion
since September 11 about sharing of information, not just
between agencies of the federal government but down to the
local level. How do we deal with the conflicting tug and pull
of wanting to share information, get back information, being
able to allow people in the field to access that while at the
same time keeping the secrecy that you need to keep? We have,
you know, hundreds of thousands of law enforcement agencies in
this country who do a great job and who are out there and who
are our eyes and ears and who are the first ones on the scene.
How do we do that? And is one of the ways we do it with more
sophisticated technology?
Let me just say with what Mr. Durbin said, before you
answer that, you know, I have been a proponent for more
technology at the FBI. You know, it is shameful where we are.
The position we have put you in, Mr. Watson, is wrong. The
position the FBI is in is wrong. It's wrong for the agents. And
I'm not satisfied with where we are going.
You can answer my question.
Mr. Watson. The information-sharing piece is very
important. And let me just briefly discuss how we're trying to
do it in St. Louis. There is a need in any information-sharing
for the local police to understand what--they all want to get
into the fight us in counterterrorism and help the U.S.
Government. You hear that all the time. The probability of
something coming up at a local police department that might
prevent an act of terrorism is probably a very small percentage
but at the same time probably the most important thing that
needs to be reported and retrieved.
And what we basically designed starting back in '00 with
the information-sharing, particularly through the International
Association of Chiefs of Police is to have this data warehouse.
And the way, not the way you get around it, but the way you
access it is through the JTTFs. And the JTTFs have officers,
police officers, from state and local jurisdictions there that
have security clearances. And you can design technology so that
there are different levels of information that you can ping
into.
But, the key to information-sharing is everyone loading up
into that warehouse. And there are 1,000 reasons that you can
be talked out of not doing that. Well, how dare you to think
that some police officer might have access to FBI information.
Well, how dare we not give him access to that if he stopped
somebody that's at an apartment complex that has some interest
in us that we would have no way to knowing about that.
And then the last piece, the most critical piece, is you've
got to have the technology to be able to analyze that and read
that and not be a point and click system.
Senator DeWine. Well, let me thank both of you very much,
Mr. Black, Mr. Watson, for your service to our country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gibbons [presiding]. Thank you, Senator DeWine.
I'll turn to Representative Reyes for 20 minutes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, I, too, appreciate the hard work that both
the CIA and the FBI do on behalf of our nation. And I know from
firsthand experience, first as a border patrol agent and then
as a chief of sectors along the U.S.-Mexican border, I always
prioritize working with my colleagues, in particular the FBI,
and the CIA on a more infrequent basis. But we always
considered that we were tentacles of intelligence out there. If
I had 1,000 agents out there, there were 1,000 potential eyes
and ears for the Intelligence Community. And so I was always
happy to do that.
I want to start off my questions by asking both of you an
opinion. And that is does the way that Congress conducts its
oversight hearings, in your opinion, does that make a
difference? Our ability to do oversight, is that something that
you feel is beneficial?
I have my own opinion; that's why I'm asking you.
Mr. Black. Well, I certainly have enjoyed and welcomed the
opportunity to address oversight committees, but particularly
in closed sessions. I must say the reason that I'm here, truly,
is to represent my people who have worked so hard and try and
give a face to the Central Intelligence Agency's
counterterrorism effort.
My own personal observation would be that in this
interaction that we could achieve the resources that we're
looking for. And I believe that when we've met on this subject
before--and I know, Congressman, you've come out and had access
to a lot of the things that we do--I think that is very
informative to both sides, where you get to have a closer
appreciation from your oversight committee role into what I do,
which is classified hard things. So I think this interaction
can be very good. In our case it certainly has been.
Mr. Reyes. Mr. Watson.
Mr. Watson. I think the oversight is appropriate. We
welcome that, believe it or not. I've been up here a lot. Some
sessions are a lot easier than other sessions. But at the same
time I think there's an obligation on our part for us to
explain to you what's going on because, let's face it, I mean
resources and budget and you're representatives of the American
people. You need to understand what we're doing and try to do.
I welcome that. And I have no problem with that even in times
when it becomes in closed sessions, not as comfortable as other
times. But, that's okay.
Mr. Reyes. The reason I ask that question is because I was,
particularly as a field chief, at times frustrated because more
often than not we didn't get the opportunity to testify about
issues that we thought Congress needed to know, including
resources, staffing plans and those kinds of things that are--
you know, they're the bread and butter of our ability to carry
out our mission, regardless of what that is, whether it's
monitoring the border or doing intelligence work or
prosecutions or whatever that is.
So, in that context, let me ask, when the declaration of
war back in 1998 was issued against Usama bin Ladin as the
number one target, it seems to me, based on my experience as a
field chief, there are two things that are critical that you
do. First of all, you've got to understand what the challenge
is and how you can meet it with the resources that you have.
But secondly and most importantly is understanding the
challenge and recognizing what it is that the director or the
commissioner or whoever is prioritizing the issue for you, is
what do you need to make sure that you are successful in
carrying out that mission or that task.
So my question is, first and foremost, in your respective
agencies did we, in your opinion, understand the scope of the
challenge of going to war against Usama bin Ladin and what he
was capable of doing against this country?
And secondly, did you put a plan in place to carry out
that? And, more importantly--and Mr. Watson, you talked about
the request for additional positions and funds for the agency
that came to Congress--was there a comprehensive staffing plan
put together that we can look at that says here is the
declaration of war, here is what we have and how we will carry
that out based on what we have now and here is what we need. Is
there such a document that we can have?
Mr. Watson. The declaration of war was issued by the DCI.
We were well aware of the threat posed by Usama bin Ladin and
al-Qa'ida in 1998. As a matter of fact, he was indicted in
November of 1998 for his crimes. From December '98 forward,
that was the number one priority for the counterterrorism
program in the FBI. That crossed many fronts. One is where is
he and working with our colleagues and maybe--and I don't want
to go into this, I mean we actively pursued with our colleagues
from the Agency and probably more so with the Agency, what are
we going to do about this. And so that's going on.
Mr. Reyes. So there is a plan?
Mr. Watson. Yes.
Mr. Reyes. There's a plan that we can see that you
developed when the declaration was issued? Because I asked the
staff if anything had been----
Mr. Watson. No, I don't think--I'm sorry.
Mr. Reyes. Well, because I asked the staff did we, across
all the pages of information that they've reviewed, and they
inform me that they had not seen anything like that. That's why
I'm asking.
Mr. Watson. Did we have a war plan, a five-paragraph ops
order issued on Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida? Absolutely, we
did not at that time.
Mr. Reyes. If not, why not? It seems to me like if you're
going to issue up a directive----
Mr. Watson. It was the number one priority that was
addressed through each field office through discussions with
the SAC in relationship to their annual report that they sent
in and in our guidance that we gave back as to what we were
trying to do with al-Qa'ida. There were other priorities as
well. I mean it was one----
Mr. Reyes. And I understand that.
Mr. Watson. All right. Yes.
To answer your question specifically, can I give you a
document, here's what we're going to do, those types of issues
came up in the Director's report as to exactly specifically
what we were going to try to accomplish in the next 120 days or
the next 180 days across the board, Usama bin Ladin, al-Qa'ida,
PIJ, Hamas, you know, those sort of things. That's where that
is found.
Mr. Reyes. And what about the second part? Did we identify
resources that were going to be needed in order to be
successful in carrying out this mission or this tactic?
Mr. Watson. Specifically directed at that mission, probably
not broken down that way. Specifically directed at raising the
capability of each of our field offices of what we needed to
get there? Absolutely.
Mr. Reyes. But, given----
Mr. Watson. And budget formula--I'm sorry.
Mr. Reyes. But that was given all the priorities that
you've mentioned, so nothing was actually put together that
would zero in? Again what I'm trying to get at is making sure
that we understood the potential threat that Usama bin Ladin
meant to this country and, therefore, the priority of making
him the number one target. And I believe you said he was put on
the top 10 list.
Mr. Watson. Yes, in the spring of '99. I'm not dancing
around on your question, but to understand and to know what the
threat was, absolutely. Did we have a flip chart that shows
exactly this week this is what we're going to do, next week, we
were working in that--you know, toward a specific document like
that. We don't have a specific war document. That's the answer
to your question. But, we had plans.
Mr. Reyes. Okay.
Mr. Black.
Mr. Black. After 1998, with the declaration of war from the
Director, we certainly carried Usama bin Ladin and his al-
Qa'ida organization as our number one priority threat. We did
indeed develop plans. It is indeed a document. And it is indeed
very classified. But it was comprehensive, exacting and it was
a global engagement strategy.
Mr. Reyes. And by being very classified it's not available
for us to review or is it?
Mr. Black. It's classified before the oversight committee.
I believe you're on the oversight committee.
Mr. Reyes. Right.
Mr. Black. Yes, sir.
Mr. Reyes. Okay. And earlier or last week we had General
Scowcroft, who testified before the committee that said that
the safest place in the world for a terrorist was to be in the
United States. And one of the FBI witnesses supported that by
saying that we know that terrorists are among us and they're
poised to strike, and that, in his opinion, we hadn't yet
devised a--and I think he specifically said we don't yet have
the best system designed to ferret them out.
What do we have today, both from the FBI and also,
auxiliary to that, support from the CIA to identify those that
are here and to ferret them out? I don't want specifics. I just
want to know what kind of plans we have either to come up with
a system or----
Mr. Watson. Let me comment on that statement. We have a
Constitution here and our form of government is the freest in
the world. And if you're talking about a safe harbor for
people, we have a safe harbor here for justice and fairness. Do
we want to become a country or become a society that ignores
that?
And so I think--I mean it's easy to generalize and make
statements like that. But it's also we're vulnerable because of
our freedoms. And I don't think any of us ever want to change
those freedoms of what we represent, not only inside the United
States but to the world.
What we were doing to identify those people is very clearly
when we have specific information that we can open a case on,
we do that and we try to identify that, working with the CIA,
working with pocket litter, working with document exploitation,
working with individuals arrested. And arrested becomes a
prevention because they provide information that you wouldn't
get anywhere else.
And a good example of that is the individual Wadi al-Haj
that was convicted in the East Africa bombings, a U.S. citizen
who wouldn't tell us anything until he was later prosecuted and
was facing the bar of justice.
So I think there's a blend here between the intelligence
work and the law enforcement work. As to how do we get those
people out, it's a difficult process. It's not something the
FBI can do by itself. And the process here and the threat is of
those individuals that have gone through those training camps
since 1996 that have scattered around the world, where are
those people. Are they living in Texas? Are they living in
Montana? I don't know the answer to that. But that's why we
have to join forces and try to identify those people.
Mr. Reyes. Okay. But, putting it in context, Director
Muellerhas told the joint committee that the FBI's number one
priority is now prevention of terrorist attacks. So obviously the issue
here transfers from prosecution to prevention. At this point, what is
the FBI doing to----
Mr. Watson. Prevent it?
Mr. Reyes. Yes, have this change in strategy or this change
in direction.
Mr. Watson. That's a fair question.
Mr. Reyes. In the context of what you said.
Mr. Watson. I'm sorry?
Mr. Reyes. In the context of what you said.
Mr. Watson. Okay. I think that's a fair question and that
what we're doing is any threat information or any thread of
information that comes in, regardless. If it's an address or if
it's a phone number overseas that pertains to the United
States, it's run down absolutely fast as we can, as quick as we
can. Don't lose sight of the fact that prosecutions are an aid
in preventions.
And so, are we abandoning prosecution? Absolutely not. But
prevention is the number one priority. And prevention might
mean that we take individuals and charge them with credit card
fraud as opposed to the only way that we can deal with them. Or
take them if they're out of status and they're illegal
immigrants, take them off and arrest them or charge them for
being out of status. That would be, in fact, a prevention.
Mr. Reyes. Can we assume that somebody in the FBI is
working on a plan that will tie this change in strategy that
will come to Congress with this is the challenge that we're
facing, these are the things that we want to accomplish and
this is what we need in order to accomplish that? Is that being
worked on now?
Mr. Watson. That's absolutely right. But remember also that
we were moving toward prevention in '98. And so this whole
process has been started. And certainly we can do that.
Mr. Reyes. Yes, and I would--and, you know, I say this with
all due respect----
Mr. Watson. Sure.
Mr. Reyes [continuing]. Based on my experience when we were
tasked by the commissioner of what resources it would take to
control the border or to manage the border, we were all charged
with coming up with staffing surveys that we had to justify at
what level we could expect to maintain control. And without
that, frankly, coming to Congress asking for more people and
more money, it's not going to happen, especially in an
environment like there is today. So that's why I'm pursuing
this line of questions.
Mr. Watson. Yes, and I think that was Senator DeWine's
point for budget justification. Absolutely.
Mr. Reyes. Mr. Black, again getting back to the global plan
that you were talking about that you developed against Usama
bin Ladin, as part of that plan was there an assessment made of
the plan's potential for success to either capture or eliminate
Usama bin Ladin? And also, in following up with what I was
discussing with Mr. Watson, is a component of that plan
additional resources--in other words, identifying the challenge
and telling either the Director or Congress in order for us to
be successful here, these are the additional resources that
we'll need by way of support from Congress. Is that part of
that, those two things?
Mr. Black. Yes. What I'd like to do on this is that--I've
already stated that this particular plan is available to you.
Because of the classified nature of it, I would suggest that at
your soonest convenience that this be provided to you as a
member of the oversight committee and hopefully it'll answer
your questions.
Mr. Reyes. Is there an assessment in there of the potential
success upon implementation of the plan?
Mr. Black. There are various aspects of the plan. And the
plan is essentially a global effort. So--I don't have the plan
in front of me, so I don't know which aspect and geographical
area and function.
Mr. Reyes. Okay. How about does a component of that also
address resources, additional resources to be able to
successfully carry out that plan?
Mr. Black. I believe I recall as of a few years ago, I
believe it did. I believe it did. I'm not absolutely sure
because I don't have it in front of me.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
Mr. Watson, one other issue that I'm curious about. And I'm
curious about it because the comment was made in prior
testimony by one of the FBI agents that in the context of the
requests for FISA authorization that come up here to
headquarters that it was my impression, based on his testimony,
that you have these requests come up to headquarters. And then
there's, to some extent, some lobbying going on to rise the
individual FISAs from different offices up to the top of the
ladder in order to be considered.
So, given the fact that we have seen that al-Qa'ida can
carry out very well-coordinated attacks against this country
and it's not beyond the realm of possibility that
simultaneously they could be planning operations in the
northeast, the southeast, the northwest, the midwest, wherever,
is there an analytical component that looks at these FISA
requests that would connect those kinds of threats, number one?
And number two, in that system that evaluates the FISAs, I
want to make sure that we're not in a situation where one is
considered at the expense of others. So can you describe what
takes place when a FISA request comes up here?
Mr. Watson. There are a large number of FISA requests that
are processed through FBI headquarters. Once a month, a meeting
is held with OIPR, the Department of Justice office that
handles and processes those requests that eventually get to the
judge with an FBI agent. Those are prioritized, they are
discussed, which priority first in the FISA process, which one.
If Detroit comes in with one--and I'll make this up--that
involves FARC or 17 November or whatever, one of the 30
terrorist organizations on the list, and the same time Kansas
City has a request for al-Qa'ida, those things are prioritized.
And they're prioritized on the basis of what our priorities are
within the division. But you also have to understand that on
emergency basis those FISAs can be approved within a very short
period of time, probably less than two hours. Michael? Two
hours that we run FISAs on emergency basis.
Mr. Reyes. So was it a fair statement to make that there is
some effort or lobby to get your FISA up based on what the
priority is for that prospective--or is there somebody looking
at the whole----
Mr. Watson. They're prioritized by the section chief in
conjunction with OGC, who understands what our priorities are
in the counterterrorism arena. And so if you have limited
resources, unless it's an emergency and those go through. If
you have limited resources within the prioritization, that's
where they end up.
Mr. Reyes. All right.
Mr. Watson. They're prioritized. And so, you know, the JRA
or Tamil Tigers, you know, I mean, not saying they're not
important.
Mr. Reyes. But there is somebody that's looking at the big
picture----
Mr. Watson. Yes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Reyes [continuing]. When those things come in?
Mr. Watson. That's the process.
Mr. Reyes. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Reyes.
We've completed the original designated questioning round.
We'll turn now to those Members who have questions, with each
Member limited to five minutes each. And we will proceed in the
order of their arrival here. I'd like to turn now to Senator
Shelby.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.Chairman.
Five minutes is not a lot.
Mr. Watson, Mr. Black, I want to join the chorus that I
appreciate what you've done and what you will do. Mr. Watson
and I go back a while. He referenced my home state. He spent
some time there as a young FBI agent. He even mentioned my home
town of Tuscaloosa, Alabama. He knows a lot about that area. He
knows a lot of those agents. I was a U.S. magistrate before he
got here.
I'm a little older, you know, Dale. But, to both of you, we
do appreciate what you do. And we appreciate the CIA and the
FBI. What we're trying to do is find out how we can help you to
function better and if you put it in that context, with more
funds, with maybe more oversight, but not micromanagement.
Mr. Watson, a few questions first to you. You said the
light--and I believe this is the phrase--the light came on for
me in 1998. Why didn't the light come on in 1993? When did you
go and become head of the terrorism section of the FBI?
Mr. Watson. In the section, it's 1997.
Vice Chairman Shelby. '97. So, you were not there in '93.
Mr. Watson. In '93, I was----
Vice Chairman Shelby. Well, you were at the FBI, but you
were not the head?
Mr. Watson. Yes. I was within the Iranian unit at the time.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Watson. And then left and went to Kansas City in '94.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Yes, sir. But what's troubling to me
and perhaps others is we had the first hit on the World Trade
Tower in '93.
Mr. Watson. Right.
Vice Chairman Shelby. You were involved, all of you were--
--
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Shelby [continuing]. In the investigation.
And then, in, was it '96, we had the Prince Sultan Barracks
were hit. And then the Khobar Towers. We worked with you on
that at that time.
Mr. Watson. That's right.
Vice Chairman Shelby. And then in '98 our embassies were
hit simultaneously in Tanzania and Kenya.
Mr. Watson. Right.
Vice Chairman Shelby. You worked on that.
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Shelby. And then, in late 2000, the USS
Cole----
Mr. Watson. October----
Vice Chairman Shelby [continuing]. Which my colleague,
Senator Roberts, has spent a lot of time on and all of us have,
too. So it was '98, you'd been in your present job as the head
of that, what, a few months?
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir. A year and a half.
Vice Chairman Shelby. So you became aware this was a
serious, serious----
Mr. Watson. No, sir. That's not what the light came on
about.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Okay. Tell us. Explain it to me.
Mr. Watson. Okay. I'll be glad to and I hope--I'm sorry if
you were confused about it.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Okay.
Mr. Watson. What the light came on was----
Vice Chairman Shelby. No, they were your words.
Mr. Watson. Maybe my words without the proper explanation.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Watson. What came on as a light came on to me was that
we were very reactive. And it was clear that the FBI was being
very reactive. It had nothing to do with was Usama bin Ladin a
threat or was Hizbollah a threat. We all knew that. We were all
working in that.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Okay.
Mr. Watson. But our mentality was pointed at being very
reactive. And the crucial piece was I came to realize that we
probably will never stop all acts of terrorists. And the only
way we could look at this and feel good about ourselves, if
that's a right term to use, is to raise our capacity. That's
what I meant when the light came on.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Okay.
Mr. Watson. Not the fact that there were threats out there.
Vice Chairman Shelby. My colleague just a few minutes ago,
I believe he used the phrase--I'm trying to dig it out--scope.
I think he used the scope of the challenge presented by the
terrorists. Was that really comprehended by the FBI and the CIA
at that time? Because I think that is a very, very good
question he's asked. Was the scope of the terrorist threat
appreciated early on or prior to September the 11?
Mr. Watson. Absolutely. And there were a few people that
got it, so to speak. We knew within the FBI and particularly
Mike Rollins, the section chief that worked for me, we knew
exactly what the scope of the problem was. And if you talked to
the folks at the CIA, they knew exactly what the scope of the
problem was. And if you talked to representatives up at the
NSC, they understood what the scope of the problem was. If
there was a breakdown, it's not with those three individuals.
But if there was a breakdown, it was where we were at, U.S.
Government-wise, policy-wise, will of the American people. Did
they understand the scope? Did you, you know, I mean, that's--
I'll leave it at that.
Vice Chairman Shelby. If the FBI understood the scope and
the CIA understood the scope, did everybody else understood the
scope of what the terrorists presented as a threat and what we
were up against? Is that what you're saying?
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir. Well, I don't want to speak for the
Agency. But that was my impression. They understood it clearly.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Quickly, Mr. Watson, my time's up,
but could you describe your role either here or you can do it
in a closed session if you prefer, in the internal FBI debates
over whether to share FISA-obtained information with the CIA
and other agencies? Did you support such sharing or oppose it?
Mr. Watson. I fully supported that position. And as a
matter of fact----
Vice Chairman Shelby. What was your role in that? Do you
have a central role?
Mr. Watson. If you're talking about a specific incident, we
need to talk about that in closed session.
Vice Chairman Shelby. In closed session.
Mr. Watson. If you're talking generically, we had a pilot--
--
Vice Chairman Shelby. Speak generically first.
Mr. Watson. Okay.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Then we'll get into specifics later.
Mr. Watson. We had a pilot project probably back to 1999
and I think that's the right time where we were offering raw
FISA data to CIA folks to come in and look at because they
could probably mine intelligence bits of information out.
Vice Chairman Shelby. Sure.
Mr. Watson. There was a lot of resistance from that.
Vice Chairman Shelby. But it's very important that you
share that with them, was it?
Mr. Watson. Yes. Oh, absolutely. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Shelby. All right.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Peterson.
Mr. Peterson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I want to talk about the hijackers a little.
When did it become known that the Sunni extremist terrorists
were possibly going to hijack planes and use them as missiles?
Do you remember when that became known?
Mr. Black. For me? This is a subject that goes back a long
way. You'd need exactly a specific example of, you know, which
particular group was involved. I mean, it goes back I can
recall 1994.
Mr. Peterson. And did the FBI or the CIA ever warn the
commercial aviation section about this specific threat?
Mr. Black. About the aviation threat?
Mr. Peterson. Airplanes being used as missiles.
Mr. Black. Hijacking of aircraft and the potential for, in
the time frame, yes.
Mr. Peterson. They were, the commercial aviation section
was warned?
Mr. Black. Yes.
Mr. Peterson. Was it in a forum where they would have been
able to actually do something about it, where they could change
their security practices?
Mr. Black. We disseminate----
Mr. Peterson. Apparently they didn't.
Mr. Black. Well, we disseminate, we collect intelligence,
we analyze it and we disseminate it. And the actions that they
wish to take obviously are their responsibility.
Mr. Peterson. So you think it was of sufficient alarm that
they should have taken some action?
Mr. Black. I think there was significant--they have to
analyze it according to their own criteria.
Mr. Peterson. On this--following up on Congress Reyes on
this FISA situation in Minneapolis, you say that this group
meets once a month, this OIPR----
Mr. Watson. This is a headquarters prioritization of all
the FISAs.
Mr. Peterson. So some of these sit around for a month
before they actually get considered to the point where they can
get past this process?
Mr. Watson. It all depends, Congressman, on the priority of
what you're talking about on a FISA. If you're talking about--
--
Mr. Peterson. Apparently the one in Minneapolis maybe never
even got to that point.
Mr. Watson. Well, I'd be glad to discuss that with you
probably in closed session.
Mr. Peterson. Okay. And apparently you testified that when
you came in that you were making a priority of adding staff
into the field offices to try to beef up this area. And when
the Minneapolis agent was here Friday, I think he said that the
Minneapolis office had a couple of positions open and that
there were folks in that, acting in those open positions. And
that was one of the reasons why they were having problems
there, from what I can remember him saying. So if you were
beefing up this situation, you know, why was the situation like
that in Minneapolis? Why were those positions open?
Mr. Watson. Probably through a process of career
development, those slots were--I'm not sure exactly which
positions you're talking about. But those routinely--not
routinely occur, but occur within the Bureau. If you look at it
from strategically Minneapolis had an opening and maybe Houston
was evaluated by us as being very vulnerable. And the list of
priorities that I considered, I would consider what I
considered where the threat was most vulnerable to try to fix
first.
During my deposition, I was asked about an Omaha EC where
Omaha said they were desperate to get two agents to work--or
three agents to work counterterrorism. At the same time, you
had a big vacancy in Los Angeles or you had a vacancy in New
York. Where, in the scheme of things, do you fit that out? I'm
not downgrading Omaha, but it was an effective and efficient
way to determine where you're going to put your resources in
and what priority.
Mr. Peterson. So what was going on then at the time in
Minneapolis, they had these openings, but there was probably
other areas that----
Mr. Watson. I don't know specifically about those openings.
Mr. Peterson. It gets back to this whole resources issue.
Is that part of the reason why this happens because there
wasn't enough resources?
Mr. Watson. I don't know what the agent testified to. But
if he was talking about an acting SAC in a period of time
between, that's fairly normal when a vacancy occurs. It
doesn't, you know----
Mr. Peterson. I think it was more than just one position
that was in an acting capacity, if I recall. And I think it did
have some impact on what they were trying to do there.
Mr. Watson. I will only say that--okay, we can probably
talk about that.
Mr. Peterson. Yes. I think it had some impact on, you know,
how many people knew how this whole FISA thing worked.
Mr. Watson. That is absolutely correct. And if you deal
with one FISA in your career, if you deal with 500, you
certainly have a better understanding.
Mr. Peterson. Yes. I guess my time is out, but maybe we can
talk about the training process in this FISA, too, because I
still have some questions about that.
Mr. Watson. That's fine. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Peterson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Peterson.
Mr. Roemer.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank Mr. Black and Mr. Watson both for their
testimony and their service.
My question comes back to trying to change the culture in
your respective organizations. Mr. Black, in your testimony you
used some interesting words. You said after September 11, and I
quote, ``the gloves came off and the hunt was on''. Was it
extremely difficult to do the hunt and take the gloves off even
after the DCI had declared war and even after Usama bin Ladin
had declared war on us?
Mr. Black. I think there was an evolutionary or escalatory
approach to the issue key to the intelligence that was acquired
and driven. You know, one can recall that Usama bin Ladin
essentially came into the '90s as a financier and, in some
areas, a doer of good works that required very close study to
be able to concretely identify that he was a supporter of
terrorists, a financier of terrorists. By the mid '90s, he
became more active and then, as we know, shortly after that
went to Afghanistan.
So what I would say is yes, that the approach kept pace
with the common view at the time that was driven by the
intelligence. And as it was not perhaps preemptive, but it was
certainly keeping up with the pace of the status of this guy as
a threat to the United States.
Mr. Roemer. Let me ask you a question of resources. And I
want to keep trying to come back to this. The hunt for Usama
bin Ladin keeps getting escalated, as you said, but the gloves
don't come off until after September 11. The resource issue is
one that you considered to be an important one in your
testimony. You say you're overwhelmed. The CTC budget, although
we can't talk about numbers, roughly triples during the 1990s.
And I just want to know, with regard to resources, you must
have felt a great deal of frustration with this. You get a
bigger budget, but you still feel like you don't have enough
personnel fighting an elusive target. Did you say to the CIA
Director at that point, did you e-mail him, did you call him on
the phone and say to him, we need more resources? And do you
have records of this saying to Mr. Tenet, we're overwhelmed, we
have to get more resources and more money here, even though
this budget's tripled?
Mr. Black. When you find yourself in a situation of
essentially intelligence war, I'm sorry if I smiled about the
idea of documenting because there's not much time to document
in that sense. Communication is informal and verbal because
things are moving so quickly at such a high pace. I would say
that without equivocation the Director and I were together on
these issues. He had an appreciation of our needs. From the
resources he had available to him, he gave us as much as he
could and, as I indicated in my testimony, that we were able to
make it through the years because of his intervention and
provision of funds and lobbying for us.
Mr. Roemer. So he tried to fight for as many of these funds
and that is maybe one of the reasons why you got a tripling in
the CTC budget. Did you go to the White House and OMB and say,
we need more, we're not getting enough, this is not enough for
us? Were they aware that you wanted more resources and more
money?
Mr. Black. Well, I report through the Director and Ibelieve
you may be inviting him to testify. I'm the chief of the
Counterterrorism Center, you know. And I should speak to that level of
authority and position. I made my superiors aware and they were as
helpful as possible.
Mr. Roemer. And so you're unaware of the chain above that?
Mr. Black. Well, the chain, I just feel----
Mr. Roemer. My question, Mr. Black, is, did you ever go to
Mr. Tenet and say, I asked you for resources, when are you
going to find out from the White House or OMB about these
requests?
Mr. Black. Resources and requests for resources were
actively considered. And what I can say is that I personally
requested and lobbied for the funds that I thought I needed.
You have to understand that, compared to most people, that I
was very much in the forefront because I was the closest to the
problem. So it did require an aspect of interaction in trying
to advance, the funds actually should go to this area as
opposed to the other.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Roemer.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me welcome our
two witnesses.
I want to go back to some of the testimony here of Mr.
Black where you acknowledged, as has Mr. Tenet, that the CIA
fell short, using your words, in not informing the Department
of State that you had identified two al-Qa'ida men. And these
were the two, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, who were hijackers on
Flight 77. These were two people you had identified back in
January of 2000 and in March of 2000.
There's another problem here besides failing to notify the
State Department and that was failure to notify the FBI. The
FBI says that it did not know of key bits of information--that
a visa had been issued to one of them and that the other one
had actually entered the United States--until August, 2001. So
there was not just a failure to notify the State Department to
get these folks on the watchlist, but the CIA was aware of the
fact that one of them had a multiple entry visa and the other
one had actually entered the country in March.
And by the way, this is nothing to do with intelligence
information and nothing to do with not crossing a line between
criminal investigation and intelligence investigation. This was
public information.
This was a visa had been issued and somebody had traveled
actually to the United States. My question is this. Why was the
FBI not notified by the CIA of those two critical facts about
two people that the CIA had identified as terrorists until
August, 2001?
Mr. Black. Because of the nature of our work being very
fast paced, there was communication and there was communication
between the CIA officers and the Counterterrorism Center and
individuals in the FBI, particularly a CIA officer assigned to
the FBI. There were phone conversations, e-mails, things like
that. And in particular the lapse that we're referring to is to
do the extra work of submitting a formal report to the State
Department into their lookout system, TIPOFF, so that action
can be taken.
There was communication. I think you have a very good
point. We have admitted to the lapses of not submitting a
report in a form that would be actionable. But there was
communication. But there's also an incredible amount of work.
Senator Levin. Yes. You made a point, though, about the
lack of communication. You say there was communication. I want
to focus on those two specific, critical facts. Are you saying
that the CIA did communicate to the FBI that those two people
that you suspected as being terrorists had a multiple entry
visa into the United States and had entered the United States?
Are you saying that in that communication, that general word
you're using, that those two facts were communicated orally to
the FBI? Is that what you're saying?
Mr. Black. What I'm saying is the identities, the names of
the individuals.
Senator Levin. No. No.
Mr. Black. But the issue of the visa is problematic.
Senator Levin. All right.
Mr. Black. We have no evidence that that piece of
information was communicated.
Senator Levin. And that's critical information. Now to the
FBI. The FBI is at the Counterterrorism Center?
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. And so when the Counterterrorism Center is
informed of this information, why is that not automatically,
then, known to the FBI? We're trying to connect dots here,
folks. The Counterterrorism Center is one place where the dots
are supposed to be connected. And now I want to press the FBI.
Since you're at the Counterterrorism Center, and since that
information, I believe, went to the Counterterrorism Center,
why, then, wasn't the FBI put on notice that two terrorists
identified in early 2000 as terrorists, because they had been
at those critical meetings in Kuala Lumpur, why then, was that
not enough notice, just being at the CTC, for the FBI to then
say, whoops, wait a minute, these guys have visas to the United
States, this guy entered the United States? Why weren't you put
on notice? How can you say you didn't know about this until
August, 2001?
Mr. Watson. I don't know the answer to that, Senator. And
there's a volume of information that flows through every day.
And I'm not sure where the FBI agents were at the time that
might have had access to that cable or not. It might have come
in from the other division of the CIA. So I can't defend or say
that they saw it and didn't report it. I will say, though,
without a doubt, I know that if the Agency had it, there was no
plot, no thought by anybody at the CIA not to tell us.
Senator Levin. Well, wait a minute. There was a decision by
the CIA not to tell you back in June of 2001. They were sitting
there at a meeting and the decision was made at that meeting in
New York not to tell the FBI about it. That was a CIA decision,
for reasons that totally mystify me because this is not
criminal investigation versus intelligence. This isn't blurring
a line, violating rules and regulations. This has got nothing
to do with that. This is public visa information. This is
public travel information, commercial travel information.
I understand the rules and regulations about not blurring
the line between criminal investigation and intelligence
because you don't want to mess up your criminal investigation.
But that is not the type of information that the CIA--that
we're talking about here and that the CIA did not share at that
June meeting. But I want to press the FBI.
Mr. Black. Sir, could I just say one thing?
Senator Levin. Sure.
Mr. Black. As we understand it, sir, the CIA analyst was
not permitted to provide all of the information FBI criminal
investigators wanted because of laws and rules against
contaminating criminal investigators with intelligence
information.
Senator Levin. I understand that.
Mr. Black. Okay. That's what I'm saying.
Senator Levin. But you're saying you could have put it and
should have put it on the watch list up at the State
Department. This isn't polluting criminal investigation. This
is stuff that should have gone on the watchlist by your own
acknowledgment. This is a visa. That's public information. This
is commercial travel. That is public information. There is no
pollution of criminal investigation whatsoever, under any
regulation, by simply the CIA telling the FBI, hey, watch these
folks. We have identified these folks as terrorists. These
folks have entered the United States. That's all you have to
tell them.
You don't have to go into sources, methods. You don't have
to talk about wiretaps. You don't have to talk about anything,
just that these folks identified by us have now entered the
United States. That's all we're talking about. There's no
violation of any rule, any regulation that I know of by simply
telling the FBI that.
And I think you acknowledge that when you say we should
have notified the State Department to put them on a watchlist.
That makes it the kind of information which is and should have
been available to the FBI.
My time is up. If the Chairman wants to give them time to
comment, that would be up to the Chairman. I would welcome it,
but I can't press that any further with that red light on.
Mr. Gibbons. Certainly if your answers are brief in
response, we would like you to respond.
Mr. Black. In my view, I think we're talking about two
separate things. On the one hand, we're talking about the New
York meeting between the CIA and the FBI. And on the other,
we're talking about the watchlisting issue. Yes, the whole
purpose of the system is to provide this type of information to
the Department of State. There's no question about that.
Mr. Gibbons. And Senator Levin, if we have additional time
at the end, we'll certainly allow you to ask some more.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Hoekstra.
Mr. Hoekstra. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I want to
follow up a little bit on what Mr. Reyes and what Mr. Roemer
were talking about, exactly what the process is here for
planning. You're planning a war against al-Qa'ida and
terrorism.
Mr. Black, you've said that that plan was put in writing
and we have access to review that and we'll do that. I'm
assuming it outlines the requirements that you feel that you
need to conduct this war effectively, outlining personnel
requirements, resource requirements and perhaps also a review
of what you may or may not be able to do because of legal
requirements or executive orders and those types of things.
You then go through a process where, you know, the budget
requests come to Congress. We pass a budget. Mr. Tenet then
comes back and says, you know, Mr. Black, here's your
resources. Here's what we've got for you. And then what happens
at that point that you go back to George and say, I can't do my
job with this? And, you know, these are the risks that we are
going to encounter.
Mr. Black. The essence of counterterrorism is--or the
problem of counterterrorism is the harder you work and the more
effective you are, the more work you create for yourself.
Mr. Hoekstra. Right.
Mr. Black. So you're in a constant state of requiring more
and more to keep up with the problem. And the better you are,
you know, the more agents you have, the more reports you
produce, the more people you have overseas, the more work is
generated, the more success you have. So there is essentially
inherent in this kind of business a constant state of a
relationship between the subordinate and a superior, me going
to the Director and say, you know, this is all we're doing and
we've created this opportunity over here.
And then this has to be weighed, not only, first within the
counterterrorism mission, you also have to think about things
like Hizbollah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the whole
rest of it. So you have that going on. And that has to be, if
it goes outside of that process, then you have to be
coordinated with the Director and the Director of Operations in
terms of other specific areas that are of key interest. But
again, counterterrorism was always the highest priority.
Mr. Hoekstra. Yes. But the question that, I think, that
maybe Mr. Roemer and I have is at the end of the day, you know,
we along with the President are the ones that determine exactly
under what constraints you're going to be operating under. And,
you know, how do we get that information more clearly or more
accurately or perhaps in a more timely basis that says, you
know, I'm sorry, you haven't resourced enough or you haven't
put in place the proper frame work for us to do the job
effectively. As a result of that, we're not going to be able to
win this war on terrorism. We're fighting skirmishes. We're
going to be--you know, we are very, very vulnerable and we're
opened up to these kind of risks.
Mr. Black. I think communication, certainly between the
senior intelligence officers and members of the oversight
committee is key. I must say that, you know, in the last two
years, I have been before the oversight committee with, I
think, regularity. I think the Congressman has validated that.
My need for resources, the need, at least, certainly was
conveyed almost every time I came.
Mr. Hoekstra. Mr. Watson, I'm a little concerned about what
the planning process may be at the FBI in that, you know, if
there's not that plan in place as to--or you said that there's
not a written plan in place.
Mr. Watson. A war plan?
Mr. Hoekstra. Yes.
Mr. Watson. I think that's an--well, I know that's an
accurate statement. We have priorities, though, that we
establish. And the number one priority was al-Qa'ida and UBL.
That is clearly articulated.
Mr. Hoekstra. It's a number one priority, but I don't know
what--if that doesn't translate into specific allocations of
resources, specific allocations of personnel and those types of
things, I mean, I don't know what it means if you had a number
one priority.
Mr. Watson. True. Yes.
Mr. Hoekstra. Do you have three number ones and the war on
terrorism became number four, you know, the fourth number one
priority?
Mr. Watson. It's very helpful for the counterterrorism
program to be a national program and say--let me see if I can
explain this. At the field level, what do you want Little Rock
to do with limited counterterrorism resources?
Mr. Hoekstra. Right.
Mr. Watson. And if they have somebody that's on, you know,
a group that's number 30 on the list of priorities, it's a
prioritization. And so those priorities are set by us. And we
say this is what the priorities are. That also equates to what
we request through the budget cycle and the planning process of
what we need.
What do we need to do to address, resource wise, at
headquarters for al-Qa'ida? We need more analysts. We need more
agents. We need better technology. We need, you know, the
intelligence piece, reports writers, et cetera.
I don't want to mislead anybody by saying we didn't
understand that process. I thought the question was do you have
a five-paragraph op order against al-Qa'ida and the war that
was declared on them in '98. The answer to that was no. But did
we understand what the threat was? Did we know what we were
trying to do? Yes, it was and it drove the budget request as
part of the budget request for counterterrorism.
It also--the budget request included domestic terrorism
issues. We had the winter Olympics coming, for instance. We had
the problem out in Seattle with the World Bank and IMF and, I
mean, resources drains like that. So the aggregate budget was
incorporated all the numbers.
Mr. Hoekstra. Mr. Black--I'm sorry. I guess my time's up.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Witnesses, thank you.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Hoekstra.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Mr. Black, Mr. Watson, I only have five
minutes. Bear with me. I have an observation and one question.
My observation is crosscurrent with some of my colleagues
on this committee and the process that has been adopted by the
Joint Inquiry staff and basically acquiesced to by the
leadership of this Committee. I have not acquiesced to it. My
concern and frustration is that, while unintended, one of the
results of this investigation has been to demoralize our
Intelligence Community. These are the people, as you have
pointed out, whose job it is to detect and deter terrorist acts
against our citizens.
The Catch-22 of this process, it seems to me, is that in an
attempt to learn our deficiencies, what went wrong prior to 9/
11, and to fix it and to provide the public transparency
through public hearings, not to mention the unfortunate leaks
that we have seen, we have been the source, if not the
instigator of what I call ``gotcha'' charges and also
``gotcha'' headlines. These new and specific insinuations and
charges are media incendiary. They're controversial and they're
political. We have seen a media frenzy as a result and
increasing frustration and concern and anger on the part of the
American people. Where was the smoking gun?
I say this knowing that mistakes were made. Hindsight is
20/20. We have an obligation for oversight and to ask the tough
questions. I still believe the USS Cole is a microcosm of
thechallenges that we face and I don't think that was handled right.
But my point is if we are all to assess responsibility, if not blame,
that responsibility should not be selective. The responsibility for 9/
11 also lies with the Congress, past and current policymakers and, yes,
more comprehensive reporting by the nation's press.
Yet our process here is to pose questions to you that I
define as pejorative in nature. Your only choice and response
is the old ``while I'' answer. While I agree with you, sir,
while I think we needed more resources, while I think we needed
more analytical ability, let me point out that. You're in a
Catch-22. You cannot provide any answers in full context to
show there has been no smoking gun because the full context is
classified unless it's leaked. And should it be made public, it
would compromise sources and endanger lives.
My preference, shared by some on this Committee, not a
majority obviously, was not to stage public hearings until the
investigation of the Joint Inquiry staff was complete and then
report, then go public. But here we are. My question is the
same I had from Monday's behind-the-scene witnesses. We are at
war. The work of those in the Intelligence Community is crucial
to the safety of our American people. One of the problems we
face is risk aversion. I worry about the morale and the esprit
de corps of our intel community.
Before I ask you to say how is your morale and how you're
feeling about this and what is the morale at the community, the
question referred to you earlier, Mr. Black, was from the Joint
Inquiry staff briefing book. Now you remember the question. I
think it was asked by Senator Durbin and I certainly don't mean
to be pointing any fingers at him. A book, by the way, that was
provided to this Member as of this morning which is standard
operating procedure. Had I wanted it earlier, I would have had
to have gone to the Chairman for permission to speak to the
staff, which is a little unique for this Member in terms of the
Senate and serving on any committee.
You've heard the questions. Let me tell you the rest of the
story. After the question, there is a suggestion, if not an
instruction, to members. And it is, ``Mr. Black will probably
dissemble on this point and simply say that the press statement
is accurate insofar as the total number,'' et cetera, et
cetera. Next question and then there's some instruction. ``Mr.
Black will probably dissemble on this point, too.'' I have a
definition of ``dissemble'' from the dictionary. It says to
hide under a false appearance, to put on the appearance of, to
simulate, to put on a false appearance, conceal facts,
intentions or feelings under some pretense.
You're almost on trial, sir. You're almost on trial. I have
to apologize, you know, for that and for this book. You have my
apologies. It's only me. I'm not speaking for the rest of the
Committee for the intended consequences of what I believe is an
inspector general runaway train. I don't like it. And for me, I
want to apologize, Senator Pat Roberts, to your people in the
FBI and the CIA, which I think is, I won't call it shameful,
but it's damn close. How is the morale down at your place?
Mr. Black. Senator, you really made my day. This is so
unfortunate. There is no one that I know that does
counterterrorism that would dissemble to a representative of
the American people. I've got to tell you something's getting
out of hand here. I work for the American people. I'm a big
boy. Let me tell you, I'm responsible for my people. And why do
you think I came in here starting with, you know, pride for my
people? Things happen. People die in war. No one regrets it
more than us. But dissemble, mislead our people? No. It's like
living a nightmare. What's going on here? I better stop. Thank
you.
Senator Roberts. Mr. Watson.
Mr. Watson. I think it's been a long process since 9/11 and
the fingerpointing and looking at we should have done this or
you should have done that. And the responsibility of that
clearly rests with myself. And, you know, I don't duck any of
those issues or those questions. Individuals that work down in
those sections and the agents out in the field that work these
problems are absolutely the best we have. They should be
supported. And it's a disappointment.
Senator Roberts. I thank you both. I think with the red
light on I've probably said enough.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, or at least I think
thank you.
It's somewhat difficult to follow Senator Roberts because I
think it's safe to say that there was not full agreement among
members of the course that we're currently on. But the fact is
that we've got the task to do it now and for that reason you're
here today.
Let me move to a section that we've already covered to some
degree. And that's the notification that went from either
agency specifically to the aviation world about the potential
threat. Let me for the purposes of your answer ask you to
separate the FAA from the commercial airline industry and ask
you was the alert that went out, to one or to both, the alert
that went out within the entire community about an imminent
threat? Or was there a specific communication, either written
or verbal, that went out to the FAA and commercial airlines
that was targeted specifically because of the fear of a
commercial aircraft being used as a delivery system?
Mr. Watson, let me turn to you first.
Mr. Watson. I don't know the answer to that question
specifically, Congressman. I can't tell you if there was a
circular that went to the commercial side or what notification.
I'll be glad to get back and try to answer that question.
Mr. Burr. I would appreciate it.
Mr. Watson. Okay. Maybe we can have it by this afternoon
closed session.
Mr. Burr. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Black, anything that
might have emanated from the Agency?
Mr. Black. Sir, I'd like to help you out on this, too. And
I certainly do remember there were alerts and notifications
going out. They have dates. And I think they certainly were
pretty descriptive. I just don't want to answer the question
right now because I don't have all the facts available to me.
What I will do is I'll promise you we'll get the information
and get back to you.
Mr. Burr. I appreciate that.
Mr. Black. I don't want to misspeak here.
Mr. Burr. I appreciate that and I recognize that you can't
be the wealth of 100 percent of what transpired. I think it's
very important that we separate for the purposes of the answer
the FAA and the commercial airline industry specifically. If,
in fact, this was an alert that went to the FAA but then was
not disseminated to the airlines themselves, who, at the time,
were primarily responsible for the security within the
airports, I think that's an important aspect that we need to
know.
Mr. Black. Okay.
Mr. Burr. By the same token, we would like to make sure
that our system today for notification, heaven forbid that we
were to have to put one out today, that if we had a similar
situation where we believed there was a higher likelihood of a
particular means of delivering the threat and that was a
commercial airliner, that in fact there might be a different
alert that went to the FAA than went to general communities
specifying why they should read it and act on it more quickly.
Let me, Mr. Watson, if I could, turn to you and ask you, in
hindsight, on or about August 23 we put everything together as
it related to al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi being in the United
States. And the FBI began a process to find these individuals.
Using hindsight as a tool, did we respond at that time like we
should have? Or would you haveresponded differently looking
back at it--i.e., did we put the correct number of people, did we put
the right people, did we exhaust every possibility in what was a very
short period of time, what ended up being a little over two weeks, to
locate these individuals?
Mr. Watson. That can be a short answer or a long answer.
And I think the short answer is I don't have a problem with
what we did after August 23. If you recall, on the I-94 he
lists his name on the I-94. He lists his sponsor as himself. He
lists his occupation as fisherman. And he lists his place of
staying as the Marriott, New York City. And there were 17 of
those--long gone from the Marriott in New York City, long gone
if you want to take this and think this through, long gone from
California.
Mr. Burr. Let me ask you, if I could because I've just got
a couple seconds left.
Mr. Watson. Okay. Sure.
Mr. Burr. I understand that the focus was on al-Mihdhar.
Was there an effort on al-Hazmi to try to locate him? Because,
in fact, he had an address that was in a phone book, though it
wasn't current. He had an address that was the same under his
own name on a visa extension that during the period he's in the
country was granted. Was all the focus on al-Mihdhar and not on
al-Hazmi?
Mr. Watson. It was on both, absolutely on both. And if you
recall, though, and I know your time's up and I'll be real
short with the answer, long gone out of California. Yes, he was
in the phone book. Yes, he got a loan. And there are a lot of
clues there, but he's not in California on August 23.
Mr. Burr. I thank both of you for your willingness.
The Chair has been very gracious. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Burr.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. I have five
minutes. I have five questions, so I'll try and move quickly
and I'd be grateful to you if you could do the same.
Mr. Black, most of these questions are for you. As you
stated, you were the head of CTC until, I think, about four
months ago.
Mr. Black. Yes, sir.
Senator Bayh. And in your prepared testimony, you had
indicated that before 9/11 of last year Hizbollah had really
been perceived as probably the greatest terrorist threat. The
question I have for you is could you give us the--as of the
date that you left CTC, can you give us the hierarchy of
priorities? I assume al-Qa'ida was number one by that point.
Mr. Black. Yes, sir. I have to apologize if I misspoke. I
didn't mean it like that. I said--I was trying to convey the
sense that there was not only al-Qa'ida. There was Hizbollah.
And up until 9/11, Hizbollah had killed more Americans.
Senator Bayh. Correct.
Mr. Black. So I'm not saying that they were----
Senator Bayh. So as of the date you left, it would have
been al-Qa'ida, presumably, would have been number one?
Mr. Black. Al-Qa'ida would have been first. This is a list
of particularly--what I'd rather do is give you the criteria.
Essentially, it makes it easier. The highest criteria for us
are terrorist groups that say they want to kill us, have the
capability to kill and have killed us. So essentially, if you
look at that, that would be the highest. The greatest threat to
the United States would be like al-Qa'ida.
Senator Bayh. Let me cut to the chase.
Mr. Black. Please.
Senator Bayh. I was sort of laying a predicate there. As of
May when you left, where would Iraq have been on the priority
list of terrorist threats to our country?
Mr. Black. That's a good question, but it's sort of the
wrong shop. That is a state sponsor of terrorism. I deal with
the outgrowth of that. I don't specifically address countries.
Senator Bayh. Well, we're now in the business of trying to
analyze the nexus between state sponsorship and other terrorist
organizations. But in any event, with other questions, I'll
just move on. That obviously is a question of some moment.
Mr. Black. Yes, it is. And I don't think it would be a good
idea, certainly, for me to address that here.
Senator Bayh. The question of the use of lethal force, we
can't get into that in any detail here. But, as you know,
there's a prohibition against that. Occasionally, the chief
executive of the country can authorize certain activities that
don't involve that but might involve that. The lawyers get
involved, et cetera, et cetera, and understandably there's a
reluctance on the part of your former shop to read too much
into those kind of things.
Is it your opinion that we should revisit the policy and
consider revoking the prohibition against the use of lethal
force?
Mr. Black. In my view?
Senator Bayh. Yes.
Mr. Black. Yes.
Senator Bayh. Mr. Black, you mentioned during your
testimony, you mentioned at least one occurrence where laws and
results against contaminating criminal investigation with
intelligence information sort of hampered the cooperation
between yourselves and the FBI.
Could you give us a list or, if not a list, at least your
top examples of the laws and the rules that you think we should
take a look at to perhaps improve, to make your job and the job
of the FBI easier in terms of discharging your duties in terms
of protecting the country?
Mr. Black. I'm unprepared to answer that question. I will
have to research it and get back to you.
Senator Bayh. Well, I would appreciate it if you would,
because obviously looking forward we want to examine those
things that you view or your colleagues in the FBI view as
impediments and look for ways that we can address those
impediments to better accomplish the mission that we all share
here. So if you would do that, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Black. Yes, sir. I will certainly do that.
Senator Bayh. My next question deals with--and I think Mr.
Watson has addressed this and I apologize, Mr. Black, if you
have addressed this as well. One of the big picture issues we
have to address is not only whether we should have some
systemic changes in terms of the management of intelligence
globally but whether we should follow the British example and
the example of other countries in terms of having a separate
domestic intelligence capability.
I think that Mr. Watson spoke that things have changed, in
his view, since the '70s and the '80s. It's a little bit
different now. Do you have an opinion about that, whether we
should adopt the British model, the Israeli model, some others,
or whether we should try and work within the current structure
to meet that responsibility?
Mr. Black. I would have to look at it in some detail for a
definitive answer. One could go either way. But the FBI is
positioned with exceptionally good people and they can certain
do this job. What it requires is a different set of training,
different sort of mindset, and I'm sure they're up to it and it
can be done. If they can't, then of course there's a problem,
but I have ever confidence that they can.
It requires looking at problems in a different way. As
opposed to law enforcement, it is intelligence collection and
operations.
Senator Bayh. That's one of the big picture questions that
we have to answer.
I'm down to my last question, if I can sneak one in here.
It's been my impression since joining the Committee that we're
still suffering the after-effects of the '60s and the '70s and
really a withdrawal from many areas of human intelligence, at
least in the aggressive sense, abroad. We're attempting to
reconstitute that, but aren't quite where we need to be yet.
And as a result of that, we're more reliant upon some of our
allies who have the right assets in the right places.
Mr. Black, how long, if I'm correct--first of all, am I
correct? And if so, how long will we be overly reliant upon
others for that kind of capability? How long will it take us to
reconstitute our human intelligence resources so that we can be
more independent in terms of protecting our country?
Mr. Black. Well, I think we are independent. I think it's a
combination of two, sir.
Senator Bayh. Or have the assets that we really need.
Mr. Black. Have the assets that we really need is a
function of resources and people. We have to put the trainers
in place. We have to put the right kind of people here. We have
to do much, much more--I hate to say this; this won't sound
very clever--of what we're doing already. Then we get the
people out there and produce. I don't want to minimize the
relationship with others.
Senator Bayh. Well, my last comment was--and again, thank
you for the Chair's forbearance--if given a blank check, how
long would it take?
Mr. Black. A blank check. It would be speculation, sir, I
can give--you know, it depends what type of comprehensive
defense you're looking for. There'll never be 100 percent. So
you can give me everything and I can't get 100 percent. It
would go down something from there. It would be speculative.
Senator Bayh. Thank you.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Senator.
Mr. Black, Mr. Watson, thank you for your presence here
today. We've kept you what must have seemed like an eternity.
It's been three hours and we appreciate that. Your testimony
has been very helpful and very enlightening, not only just to
the Committee but to those of us that have been able to listen
and watch what's gone on.
I do have an announcement to make at the request of the
Chairmen. The Committee will meet this afternoon in S-407.
That's upstairs in the Capitol, and it will be a closed session
starting at 2:00 p.m. We will also, once again, return to this
room Tuesday, October 1, at 10:00 a.m. and we will return to an
open session.
With that, this meeting has been adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:04 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]