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[Senate Hearing 108-588]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-588
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
of the
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
__________
SECOND SESSION
__________
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
__________
FEBRUARY 24, 2004
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
95-393 WASHINGTON : 206
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Vice Chairman
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah CARL LEVIN, Michigan
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri RON WYDEN, Oregon
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine EVAN BAYH, Indiana
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
BILL FRIST, Tennessee, Ex Officio
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, Ex Officio
------
Bill Duhnke, Staff Director
Andrew E. Johnson, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held in Washington, D.C., February 24, 2004.............. 1
Statement of:
Jacoby, Vice Admiral Lowell E., USN, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency........................................ 49
Mueller, Hon. Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation.............................................. 38
Tenet, Hon. George J., Director, Central Intelligence Agency. 5
HEARING ON CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE
UNITED STATES
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Pat
Roberts, (Chairman of the Committee), presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Roberts, Dewine, Bond,
Lott, Snowe, Hagel, Chambliss, Warner, Rockefeller, Levin,
Feinstein, Durbin, Bayh, and Mikulski.
Chairman Roberts. The Committee will come to order.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence today meets in
open session to conduct the public segment of its annual
worldwide threat hearing. It has become the practice of the
Committee to begin its annual oversight of the U.S.
Intelligence Community with a public hearing so that our
members and the public will have the benefit of the
Intelligence Community's best assessment of the current and
projected national security threats to the United States.
Our witnesses today are the Director of Central
Intelligence, Mr. George Tenet; the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Robert Mueller; and the Director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby.
The Committee thanks all of our distinguished witnesses for
being here.
The witnesses have been asked to provide a comprehensive,
unclassified assessment of the nature and extent of the current
and projected national security threats to the United States.
The witnesses have also been asked to highlight the significant
developments in these areas that have occurred since this
Committee's last worldwide threat hearing last February.
Obviously, this past year has been extremely eventful.
While we have made significant progress on the war on terror
and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, other threats remain and new threats do continue
to emerge.
Saddam Hussein's reign of terror has rightfully been put to
an end, yet peace and stability in Iraq are still threatened by
continued attacks. Libya has renounced its weapons of mass
destruction programs and permitted inspections that are
international, while other nations, such as Iran, Syria and
North Korea, refuse to dismantle ongoing weapons programs.
Non-state purveyors of WMD technologies, such as A.Q. Khan,
have been identified, yet expansion of these deadly weapons
remains one of the greatest threats to our national security.
Although it did not get much press attention, the
President's February 11 speech at the National Defense
University announced new measures to counter the threat of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The President
called for the modernization of these laws, the restriction on
sales of nuclear technology and efforts to secure and destroy
nuclear materials. Taken together with the Proliferation
Security Initiative announced in May, I think it is fair to say
that the President has suggested a solid plan to reduce the
threat of these dangerous weapons.
The recent revelations about A.Q. Khan's illicit sale of
nuclear weapons technology does demonstrate clearly how
accurate and credible intelligence can be used to advance our
fight against the expansion of these weapons.
Our Intelligence Community is not perfect. They are not
capable of carrying the entire burden, nor should we ask them
to. As the President has pointed out, it is going to take an
international commitment to effectively deal with both WMD
expansion and international terrorists.
While terrorists from the al-Qa'ida and other like-minded
groups are on the run, they continue to target our U.S.
interests at home and abroad. And in our own hemisphere,
despite past U.S. efforts, the impoverished nation of Haiti is
again descending into civil strife.
In short, despite our hard-fought victories, the world
remains a very dangerous place. This morning, the Committee
will explore these threats and others in an unclassified
setting. This afternoon, we will conduct a closed session to
discuss any matters that are classified.
Now, before we turn to our witnesses, I would like to point
out that for the last eight months, this Committee has been
engaged in a comprehensive review of the intelligence
underlying the Intelligence Community's assessments regarding
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and its ties to terrorist
groups. We have recently begun the process of reviewing the
draft language for what will be the first of at least two
reports.
In October of last year, Director Tenet asked for an
opportunity to appear before our Committee before we completed
our work. He will have that opportunity next Thursday in a
closed session of the Committee. I anticipate that it will be
the first in a number of appearances as the Committee does
finalize its reports and begins to consider the recommendations
for change.
With this in mind, I would like to suggest to all members
that this is a hearing on the current global threat. There will
be many opportunities in the coming weeks for Committee members
to receive testimony and question any number of witnesses about
the prewar intelligence in regard to Iraq. We have invited our
witnesses here today to address the current threats and so I am
suggesting that members please keep their questions focused on
that topic.
Before turning to Director Tenet for his testimony, I turn
to Senator Rockefeller for his opening statement.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. And I join you in welcoming our witnesses today.
There were, I thought, to be four, but INR, evidently, was not
able to work it out, I think due to a late invitation which is,
I think, noteworthy, but not worth an opening statement.
Chairman Roberts. Senator, would you yield on that point?
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Of course.
Chairman Roberts. We have asked INR to come. We asked them
previously to come. They felt that the testimony by the DCI
would cover their responsibilities. They have an acting
director.
When we asked them again to come just a few days ago,
knowing of some interest in the press about that, they
indicated that they would prefer not to appear and said, again,
that the DCI would cover their responsibilities. It is not any
situation where they were not asked to come.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Well, I'll let that statement
stand for the Chairman, who I greatly respect.
The question I'm wrestling with this morning is whether, in
fact, we are as a country and as a people safer today than we
were when the three of you were here a year ago. We fought a
war against a viciousdictator, but bringing security to Iraq
remains elusive and we're paying a very high price in blood and
resources.
We're also paying a high price in world public opinion,
which is important, not just for its own sake but in order to
obtain the cooperation necessary to achieve greater security. I
worry that rapidly-declining support for the U.S. could further
undermine stability in the Middle East and stimulate the
recruitment of a new generation of anti-American jihadists.
Clearly, we have enjoyed progress in broadening the
international coalition against terrorism and we have seriously
disrupted al-Qa'ida's structure and operations, though they are
certainly by no means inactive for the future.
But the underlying strategic concerns, in terms of regional
demographics, economic opportunity, education, ideologies,
still appear to be moving generally in the wrong direction,
according to this Senator, in most of the developing world.
Rapid population growth and uneven economic development in the
Third World are straining the fabric of many nations. Add that
to the AIDS crisis, and much of sub-Saharan African seems to
teeter on the verge of anarchy, much as we are seeing in Haiti
today. Liberia avoided a complete collapse last year; I'm not
quite sure how, whether it was us or the Nigerians or some
combination thereof, or whether we may simply have postponed
the inevitable by not addressing that.
The situation in Latin America, while not as dire, except
for the case of Colombia, is very worrisome. Many Latin
American countries are unable to keep pace with globalization
and there is a growing disparity, as everywhere, between rich
and poor.
While we're focused on the Middle East today, the potential
for violence and the strengthening of radical movements in
other regions seems to be increasing. Economic and political
desperation, combined with increasing resentment of U.S.
economic might, our cultural influence, military supremacy,
make us the target of much of the world's anger; we know that.
That anger spills over to leaders who cooperate with the
United States, adding to the instability in some of the most
dangerous regions of this world. People are angry at us and
they're angry at their leaders for following along with us or
they're angry at their leaders just because they're angry at
their leaders because they're not doing anything to help them.
Whatever the combination, it doesn't bode well. These are
not immediate, but they are growing threats that I think we
need to be addressing. And I fear that we are not addressing
them, and that we cannot--and I hope our witnesses will respond
to this--our intelligence and military are structured in a way
which I'm not sure of their capacity to expand with experienced
personnel much farther or in time to deal with what we're going
to have to deal with.
Our intelligence, law enforcement agencies are doing a good
job of capturing al-Qa'ida operatives and disrupting terrorist
plots. The Intelligence Community did a commendable job, in my
view, in supporting our troops in the invasion of Iraq. But our
success in supporting tactical operations is of little value if
we fundamentally misread strategic threats and challenges.
And I close by forming it this way. It now appears that
Iran has had a much more advanced WMD capability and much
closer links to dangerous terrorists than Saddam Hussein ever
did. But our credibility has suffered because we have not found
WMD in Iraq, and I fear we now will find it much harder to
build international consensus, support to deal with Iran,
should that be necessary, and other countries of such concern,
for example, North Korea.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and I thank
the Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Warner. Members will have six
minutes.
I beg your pardon. It might be certainly more acceptable to
give the Director his opportunity to make his testimony first
along with Mr. Mueller and Admiral Jacoby before we turn to
Senator Warner, although I'm sure he could entertain us for at
least 30 minutes. [Laughter.]
I would now recognize the DCI, Mr. George Tenet.
[The prepared statement of Director Tenet follows:]
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GEORGE J. TENET, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
Director Tenet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last year I described a national security environment that
was significantly more complex than at any time during my
tenure as Director of Central Intelligence. The world I'll
discuss today is equally, if not more, complicated and fraught
with dangers for American interests, but one that also holds
opportunities for positive change.
I want to begin with terrorism, with a stark bottom line.
The al-Qa'ida leadership structure we charted after September
11th is seriously damaged, but the group remains as committed
as ever to attacking the American homeland. As we continue to
battle against al-Qa'ida, we must overcome a movement--a global
movement infected by al-Qa'ida's radical agenda.
In the battle, we're moving forward in our knowledge of the
enemy, his plans and capabilities, and what we've learned
continues to validate my deepest concern that this enemy
remains intent on obtaining and using catastrophic weapons.
Military and intelligence operations, as you both have noted,
by the United States and its allies overseas have degraded the
group. Local al-Qa'ida cells are forced to make their own
decisions because of disarray in the central leadership.
Al-Qa'ida depends on leaders who not only direct attacks,
but who carry on the day-to-day tasks that support operations.
Over the past 18 months, we have killed or captured key al-
Qa'ida leaders in every significant operational area--
logistics, planning, finance, training--and have eroded the key
pillars of their organization, such as the leadership in
Pakistani urban areas and operational cells in the al-Qa'ida
heartland of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
The list of associates on page two, many of you know--
Khalid Shaykh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, Hasan Ghul, Hambali and
others. We are creating large and growing gaps in al-Qa'ida's
hierarchy, and unquestionably bringing these key operators to
ground disrupted plots that would otherwise have killed
Americans.
Meanwhile, al-Qa'ida central continues to lose operational
safe havens, and bin Laden has gone deeper underground. Al-
Qa'ida's finances have been squeezed, and we're receiving a
broad array of help from our coalition partners who have been
central to our efforts against al-Qa'ida.
Since the May 12 bombings, the Saudi government has shown
an important commitment to fighting al-Qa'ida in the Kingdom,
and Saudi officers have paid with their lives. There's great
cooperation in the rest of the Arab world. President Musharraf
remains a courageous and indispensable ally who has become the
target of assassins for the help he's given us. Our European
partners are working closely with us to unravel and disrupt
networks of terrorists planning chemical and biological and
conventional attacks in Europe.
So there are notable strides, but don't misunderstand me:
I'm not suggesting al-Qa'ida is defeated. It is not. We're
still at war. This is a learning organization that remains
committed to attacking the United States, its friends and its
allies.
Successive blows to the central leadership have transformed
the organization into a loose collection of regional networks
that operate more autonomously. These regional components have
demonstrated their operational prowess in Morocco, Kenya,
Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other countries, and al-Qa'ida
seeks to influence these regional networks with operational
training, communications and money. For example, we know that
Khalid Shaykh Mohammed sent $50,000 to Hambali in Southeast
Asia to further his operations.
You should not take the fact that these attacks occurred
abroad to mean that the threat to the U.S. homeland has waned.
As al-Qa'ida and associated groups undertook these attacks
overseas, detainees consistently talk about the importance the
groups still attach to striking the main enemy, the United
States.
Across the operational spectrum--air, maritime, special
weapons--we have time and again uncovered plots that are
chilling. On aircraft plots alone, we have uncovered new plans
to recruit pilots and to evade new security measures in
Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Europe.
Even catastrophic attacks on the scale of 9/11 remain
within al-Qa'ida's reach. Make no mistake: These plots are
hatched abroad but they target U.S. soil and those of our
allies.
So far, I've talked to you about al-Qa'ida, but it's not
the limit of the terrorists threat worldwide. They've infected
others with its ideology, which depicts the United States as
Islam's greatest foe. The steady growth of Usama bin Laden's
anti-American sentiment through the wider Sunni extremist
movement and the broad dissemination of al-Qa'ida's destructive
expertise ensure that a serious threat will remain for the
foreseeable future with or without al-Qa'ida in the picture.
Even so, as al-Qa'ida reels from our blows, other extremist
groups within the movement it influenced have become the next
wave of terrorist threat. Dozens of such groups exist. I've
identified the Zarqawi network, the Ansar al-Islam network in
Iraq, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan.
Mr. Chairman, with regard to CBRN, acquiring these kinds of
weapons we know remains a religious obligation in bin Laden's
eyes, and al-Qa'ida and more than two dozen other terrorist
groups are pursuing CBRN materials. We particularly see a
heightened risk of poison attacks. Contemplated delivery
methods to date have been simple, but this may change as non-
al-Qa'ida groups share information on more sophisticated
methods and tactics.
Over the last year, we've also seen an increase in the
threat of more sophisticated chemical, biological, radiological
and nuclear weapons. For this reason, we take very seriously
the threat of a CBRN attack. Extremists have widely
disseminated assembly instructions for an improvised chemical
weapon, using common materials that could cause a large number
of causalities in a crowded and closed area.
Although gaps in our understanding remain, we see al-
Qa'ida's program to produce anthrax as one of the most
immediate terrorist CBRN threats that we are likely to face.
Al-Qa'ida continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining a
nuclear capability. It remains interested in dirty bombs.
Terrorist documents contain accurate views of how such weapons
would be used.
Mr. Chairman, I want to turn to Iraq for a detailed
discussion. We're making significant strides against the
insurgency and terrorism, but former regime elements and
foreign jihadists continue to pose a serious threat to Iraq's
new institutions and to our own forces. At the same time,
sovereignty will be turned over to an interim government in
Iraq on July 1, although the structure and mechanism for
determining this remain unresolved.
The emerging Iraqi leadership will face many pressing
issues, among them organizing national elections, integrating
the Sunni minority into the political mainstream, managing
Kurdish autonomy in a federal structure and the determining
role of Islam in an Iraqi state.
Meanwhile, Mr. Chairman, the important work of the Iraqi
Survey Group in the hunt for the Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction continues. We must explore every avenue in our
quest to understand Iraq's programs of concern for the
possibility that materials, weapons or expertise might fall
into the hands of insurgents, foreign states or terrorists. And
as you know, we will talk about this subject at length next
week.
Despite progress in Iraq, the overall security picture
continues to concern me. Saddam is in prison and the coalition
has killed or apprehended all but 10 of his 54 key cronies, and
Iraqis are taking an increasing role in their own defense, with
many now serving in various new police, military and security
forces.
The violence continues. The daily average number of attacks
on U.S. and coalition military forces has dropped from its
November peak, but is similar to that of August. And many other
insurgent and terrorist attacks undermine the stability by
striking at those--seeking to intimidate those Iraqis willing
to work with the coalition. The insurgency that we face in Iraq
comprises multiple groups with different motivations, but with
the same goal--driving the U.S. and our coalition partners from
Iraq.
Saddam's capture was a psychological blow that took some of
the less committed Ba'athists out of the fight. But a hard core
of regime elements, Ba'ath Party officials, military,
intelligence and security officers are still organizing and
carrying out attacks. Intelligence has given us a good
understanding of the insurgency at the local level, and this
information is behind the host of successful raids you've read
about in the newspapers.
U.S. military and intelligence community efforts to round
up former regime figures have disrupted some insurgent plans to
carry out additional anti-coalition attacks. But we know these
Ba'athist cells are intentionally decentralized to avoid easy
penetration and to prevent the rollup of whole networks. Arms,
funding and military experience remain readily available.
The situation as I've described it, Mr. Chairman, both our
victories and our challenges, indicates that we have damaged
but not yet defeated the insurgents.
The security situation is further complicated by the
involvement of terrorists, including Ansar al-Islam and al
Zarqawi and foreign jihadists coming to Iraq to wage jihad.
Their goal is clear: They intend to inspire an Islamic
extremist insurgency that would threaten coalition forces and
put a halt to the long-term process of building democratic
institutions. They hope for a Taliban-like enclave in Iraq's
Sunni heartland that could be a jihadist safe haven.
Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish extremist group, is waging a
terrorist campaign against the coalition presence and
cooperative Iraqis in a bid to inspire jihad and create an
Islamic state. Some extremists even go further. In a recent
letter, terrorist plotter Abu Mus'ab Zarqawi outlined a
strategy to foster sectarian civil war in Iraq aimed at
inciting the Shia.
Stopping the foreign extremists from turning Iraq into
their most important jihad yet rests in part on preventing
loosely connected extremists from coalescing into a cohesive
terrorist organization. We're having some success in this
regard, and we're keeping an eye on the convergence between
jihadists and former regime elements. And at this point, we've
seen very few signs of such cooperation at the tactical or
local level.
Ultimately, the Iraqi people themselves must provide the
fundamental solutions. As you well know, the insurgents are
incessantly and violently targeting Iraqi police and security
forces precisely because they fear the prospect of Iraqis
securing their own interests. Success depends on broadening the
role of local security forces. It goes beyond numbers. It means
continuing the work already under way, fixing equipment
shortages, training and ensuring pay.
It's hard to overestimate the importance of greater
security for Iraqis, particularly as we turn to the momentous
political events slated for 2004. The real test will begin soon
after the transfer of sovereignty. We'll see the extent to
which the new Iraqi leaders embody the concepts such as
pluralism, compromise and the rule of law.
Iraqi Arabs and many Kurds possess a strong Iraqi identity
forged over 80 years of history and especially during the
nearly decade-long war with Iran. Unfortunately, Saddam's
divide and rule policy and his favorite treatment of the Sunni
minority aggravated tensions to the point where the key
governance in Iraq today is managing these competing sectional
interests. And you know them, Mr. Chairman--Shia, Kurds and
Sunnis.
I should qualify that no society--surely not Iraq's complex
tapestry--is so simple as to be captured in three categories,
and this is an important point. In reality, Iraqi society is
filled with more cleavages and more connections than a simple
topology can suggest. We seldom hear about the strong tribal
alliances that have long existed between Sunnis and Shia or the
religious commonalities between Sunni, Kurd and Arab
communities or the moderate secularism that spans Iraqi groups.
We tend to identify and stress the tensions that rend
communities apart, but opportunities also exist for these
groups to work together for common ends. The social and
political interplay is further complicated by Iran, especially
in the south, where Tehran pursues its own interests and hopes
to maximize its influence among Iraqi Shia after the 1st of
July.
The most immediate political challenge for the Iraqis is to
choose their transitional government that will rule their
country while they write their permanent constitution. The Shia
cleric, the Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sistani, has made this
election process the centerpiece of his effort to ensure that
Iraqis will decide their own future and choose the first
sovereign post-Saddam government. He favors direct elections as
the way to produce a legitimate accountable government.
Sistani's religious pronouncements show that, above all, he
wants Iraq to be independent of foreign powers. Moreover, his
praise of free elections and his theology reflect, in our
reading, a clear-cut opposition to theocracy Iranian style.
The Sunnis--just to talk a bit about the Sunnis because
they're important--they've been disaffected and deposed as the
ruling class, but some are beginning to recognize that
boycotting the emerging political process will weaken their
community. Their political isolation, I believe, is breaking
down in parts of the Sunni triangle where Sunni Arabs have
begun to engage the coalition and assume local leadership
roles.
And in the past three months, we have also seen the
founding of national-level Sunni umbrella organizations to deal
with the coalition and the governing council on questions like
Sunni participation in choosing the transitional government.
This is a good development, Mr. Chairman.
The question of federalism is an issue that will have to be
resolved. To make a federal arrangement stick, Kurdish and Arab
leaders will need to explain convincingly that the federal
structure benefits all Iraqis and not just Kurds. And even so,
a host of difficult issues--control over oil and security being
perhaps the most significant--may provoke tension between
Kurdish and central Iraqi authorities.
Mr. Chairman, I want to talk a bit about economic
reconstruction. It's true that the rebuilding will go on for
years and that the Saddam regime left in its wake a devastated
and antiquated underfunded infrastructure. But the
reconstruction process and Iraq's own considerable assets--its
natural resources and its educated populace--should enable the
Iraqis to see important improvement in 2004.
Over the next few years, they'll open more hospitals and
build more roads than anyone born under Saddam has ever
witnessed.
The recovery of Iraqi oil production will help. Production
is on track to approach three million barrels a day by the end
of the year. Iraq hasn't produced this much oil since 1991. And
by next year, revenues from oil exports should cover the cost
of basic government operations and contribute several billion
dollars toward reconstruction.
Much more needs to be done, however. Key public services,
such as water and sewage and transportation, will have
difficulty meeting prewar levels by July and won't meet the
higher target of Iraqi total demand, although work is going on
in all these areas.
Mr. Chairman, let me shift to proliferation. We're watching
countries of proliferation concern choose different paths as
they calculate the risks versus gains of pursuing weapons of
mass destruction.
Libya is taking steps toward strategic disarmament. North
Korea is trying to leverage its nuclear program into at least a
bargaining chip and also international legitimacy and
influence. And Iran is exposing some programs while trying to
preserve others.
I'll start with Libya, which appears to be moving toward
strategic disarmament. For years, Gadhafi has been an
international pariah. In May of 2003, he made a strategic
decision and reached out through British intelligence with an
offer to abandon his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.
That launched nine months of delicate negotiations, where we
moved the Libyans from a stated willingness to renounce WMD to
an explicit and public commitment to expose and dismantle their
WMD programs.
The leverage here was intelligence. Our picture of Libya's
WMD programs allowed CIA officers and their British colleagues
to press the Libyans on the right questions, to expose
inconsistencies and to convince them that holding back was
counterproductive. We repeatedly surprised them with the depth
of our knowledge. For example, U.S. and British intelligence
officers secretly traveled to Libya and asked to inspect
Libya's ballistic missile programs. Libyan officials at first
failed to declare key facilities, but our intelligence
convinced them to disclose several dozen facilities, including
their deployed Scud B sites and their secret North Korean-
assisted Scud C production line.
When we were tipped to the imminent shipment of centrifuge
parts to Libya in October, we arranged to have cargo seized,
showing the Libyans that we had penetrated their most sensitive
procurement network.
By the end of the visit, the Libyans admitted to having a
nuclear program and having bought uranium hexaflouride feed
material for gas centrifuge enrichment, admitted to having
nuclear weapons designs, acknowledged having about 25 tons of
sulphur mustard CW agent, provided access to their deployed
Scud B forces and revealed indigenous missile design work in
cooperation with North Korea on Scud Cs.
From the very outset of negotiations, Gadhafi requested the
participation of international organizations to help certify
Libya's compliance.
In contrast to Libya, North Korea is trying to leverage its
nuclear programs into international legitimacy and bargaining
power, announcing its withdrawal from the NPT, Nonproliferation
Treaty, and openly proclaiming that it has a nuclear deterrent.
Since December of 2002, Pyongyang has announced its withdrawal
from the Nonproliferation Treaty and expelled IAEA inspectors.
Last year Pyongyang claimed to have finished reprocessing the
8,000 fuel rods that had been sealed by the United States and
North Korean technicians and stored under IAEA monitoring since
1994.
The intelligence community judged that in the mid-nineties
North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons.
The 8,000 rods that the North Koreans claim to have reprocessed
into plutonium metal would provide enough plutonium for several
more. We also believe Pyongyang is pursuing a production-scale
uranium enrichment program based on technology provided by A.Q.
Khan, which would give the North Koreans an alternative route
to nuclear weapons.
Mr. Chairman, my statement goes on to talk a bit about
North Korea, but let me talk about Iran, the third country.
Iran is taking a different path, acknowledging work on a
covert nuclear fuel cycle while trying to preserve its WMD
options. I'll start with the good news. Tehran acknowledges
more than a decade of covert nuclear activity and agreed to
open itself up to an enhanced inspection regime. Iran, for the
first time, acknowledged many of its nuclear fuel cycle
development activities, including a large-scale gas centrifuge
uranium enrichment effort.
Iran claims its centrifuge program is designed to produce
low enriched uranium to support Iran's civil nuclear program.
This is permitted under the Nonproliferation Treaty, but here's
the downside: The same technology can be used to build a
military program as well. The difference between producing low
enriched uranium and weapons-capable, high enriched uranium is
only a matter of time and intent, not technology. It would be a
significant challenge for intelligence to confidently assess
whether this red line has been crossed.
Mr. Chairman, we go on to talk about A.Q. Khan. And I've
talked about that and you know more about that.
The bottom-line issue on proliferation for us is, in
support, we have a lot of public success, but proliferators
hiding among legitimate businesses and countries hiding their
WMD programs inside legitimate dual-use industries combine to
make private entrepreneurs dealing in lethal goods one of the
most difficult and challenging intelligence channels that we
face. The dual challenge is especially applicable to countries
hiding biological and chemical warfare programs.
Mr. Chairman, with regard to ballistic significant missile
programs, one point. China continues an aggressive missile
modernization program that will improve its ability to conduct
a wide range of military actions against Taiwan supported by
both cruise and ballistic missiles. Expected technical
improvements will give Beijing a more accurate and lethal
force. China is also moving ahead on its first generation of
ballistic missiles.
My statement talks about Syria.
And in the final part of the proliferation section, Mr.
Chairman, we have to remain alert to the vulnerability of
Russian WMD materials and technology to theft or diversion.
We are concerned about the continued eagerness of Russia's
cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace and
nuclear industries to raise funds via exports and transfers,
which makes Russian expertise an attractive target for
countries and groups seeking WMD and missile-related
assistance.
Mr. Chairman, we've talked about North Korea. You obviously
all are aware of the difficult internal situation there and the
way they've ruled by intimidation and fear, and the accumulated
effect of years of deprivation and repression.
With regard to China, let me say a number of things. China
continues to emerge as a great power and expand its profile in
regional and international politics. It is also true that the
Chinese have cooperated with us on terrorism and have been
willing to host and facilitate multilateral dialogue on the
North Korean nuclear problem, in contrast to an approach where
they ignored these problems years ago.
They're making progress in asserting their influence in
East Asia, largely on the basis of their economy.
That said, China's neighbors still harbor suspicions about
Beijing's long-term intentions. They generally favor a
sustained U.S. military presence in the region as an insurance
against potential Chinese aggression.
Our greatest concern remains China's military build-up
which continues to accelerate. Last year, Beijing reached new
benchmarks in its production or acquisition from Russia of
missiles, submarines and other naval combatants and advanced
fighter aircraft.
China is also downsizing and restructuring its military
forces with an eye toward enhancing its capabilities for the
modern battlefield.
Mr. Chairman, I'm going to do perhaps just one more thing:
talk about Iran. Afghanistan is important. Perhaps we can talk
about that in the Q&As.
Iran. I think this is very important. Our view and my view
is with the victory of hardliners in the elections last
weekend, government-led reform has received a serious blow.
Greater repression is the likely result. With the waning of
top-down reform efforts, reformers will probably turn to the
grassroots, working with NGOs and labor groups to rebuild
popular support and keep the flame alive.
The strengthening of authoritarian rule will make breaking
out of old foreign policy patterns more difficult.
The concerns I voiced last year are unabated. The current
setback is the latest in a series of contests in which
authoritarian rule has prevailed over reformist challengers.
The reformists, President Khatami in particular, are in no
small part to blame. Their refusal to back bold promises with
equally bold actions exhausted their initially enthusiastic
popular support. When the new Majlis convenes in June, the
Iranian government will be even more firmly controlled by the
forces of authoritarianism. In the recent election, clerical
authorities disqualified more than 2,500 candidates--mostly
reformists--and returned control of the legislature to the
hardliners. The new Majlis will focus on economic reform with
little or no attention to political liberalization.
Although greater repression is likely to be the most
immediate consequence, this will only further deepen the
discontent with clerical rule, which is now discredited and
publicly criticized as never before. In the past year, several
unprecedented open letters, including one signed by nearly half
the parliament, were published calling for an end to the
clergy's absolute rule.
Mr. Chairman, finally, let me just say something about
Colombia, and I will end there.
In this hemisphere, it's important to pay attention to
President Uribe. President Uribe is making great strides
militarily and economically. Colombia's military is making
steady progress against illegal armed groups, particularly
around Bogota. Last year, the army decimated several FARC
military units. In the last two months, Colombian officials
have apprehended the two most senior FARC leaders ever
captured.
Foreign and domestic investors are taking note. Last year
the growth rate of 3.5 percent was the highest in the past five
years. Some of Uribe's hardest work remains ahead. The military
has successfully cleared much of the insurgent-held territory,
but the next stage of Uribe's clear-and-hold strategy is
securing the gains thus far. That entails building state
presence--schools, police stations, medical clinics, roads,
bridges and social infrastructure--where it has scarcely
existed before.
Mr. Chairman, I will stop there.
Senator Rockefeller, I will say, if you go to the back part
of my statement, in the last couple of pages, you'll see the
kind of implications you drew from stateless zones, disease and
hunger, their implications for terrorism, and how we at least
think about these things, because they are very important.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. We thank the Director, and we move now to
Director Mueller.
[The prepared statement of Director Mueller follows:]
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, DIRECTOR,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Director Mueller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator
Rockefeller and members of the Committee, for this opportunity
to discuss the world threats facing this nation and how the FBI
has adapted to meet these emerging threats.
I'm going to touch on some of the successes of the past 12
months, but at the outset I would like to say that none of
these successes would have been possible without the
extraordinary efforts of our partners in the Intelligence
Community, and most particularly in state and local law
enforcement, as well as with the help of our counterparts
around the world.
Also at the outset, I should mention that the Muslim-
American, Iraqi-American and Arab-American communities in the
United States have contributed a great deal to our success, and
on behalf of the FBI, I would like to thank these communities
for their assistance and for their ongoing commitment to
preventing acts of terrorism.
In 2003, the United States and its allies made considerable
advances toward defeating the al-Qa'ida network around the
world. And since this Committee's worldwide threat hearing last
year, the efforts of the FBI, along with our state and local
law enforcement partners--the efforts to identify terrorists
and to dismantle terrorist networks have yielded major
successes.
In Cincinnati, an al-Qa'ida operative was charged with
providing material support to terrorists.
In Baltimore, a resident was identified as an al-Qa'ida
operative with direct associations to now detained senior al-
Qa'ida operative Tawfiq bin Attash and Khalid Shaykh Mohammed.
In Tampa, the United States leader of the Palestine Islamic
Jihad and three of his lieutenants were arrested under the RICO
statute for their participation in a conspiracy that
contributed to the deaths of two United States citizens in
Israel.
In Newark, three individuals, including an illegal arms
dealer, were indicted for their role in attempting to smuggle a
shoulder-fired missile into the United States.
And in Minneapolis, an individual who trained in
Afghanistan and provided funds to associates in Pakistan was
recently arrested and charged with conspiring to provide
material support to al-Qa'ida.
Mr. Chairman, it is important to note that we attribute
these and other recent successes to our close coordination and
information sharing with other members of the intelligence
community, with our overseas partners, and with state and local
law enforcement officials, many of whom participate in our 84
Joint Terrorism Task Forces.
As you know, the Joint Terrorism Task Forces team up FBI
agents with police officers, members of the Intelligence
Community, Homeland Security and other federal partners to
coordinate counterterrorism investigations and to share
information. The Joint Terrorism Task Forces have played a
central role in virtually every terrorism investigation,
prevention or interdiction within the United States over the
past year.
Our current abilities to coordinate with our partners and
develop actionable intelligence to prevent terrorist attacks
are a direct result of our efforts to transform the FBI to meet
our counterterrorism mission. And while I am going to discuss
this transformation, first I would like to spend a few moments
discussing what we see as the greatest threats facing the
United States.
As Mr. Tenet has indicated, the greatest threat remains
international terrorism, specifically Sunni extremists,
including al-Qa'ida. While our successes to date are dramatic,
we face an enemy that is determined, an enemy that is
resilient, an enemy that is patient, an enemy whose ultimate
goal is destruction of the United States. Al-Qa'ida's
flexibility and adaptability continue to make them dangerous
and unpredictable. The enemy still has the capability to strike
in the United States and to strike United States citizens
abroad with little or no warning.
Al-Qa'ida is committed to damaging the United States
economy and United States prestige, and will attack any target
that will accomplish these goals.
There are strong indications that al-Qa'ida will revisit
missed targets until they succeed, such as they did with the
World Trade Center. And the list of missed targets now includes
both the White House as well as the Capitol. In addition, our
transportation systems across the country, particularly the
subways and bridges in major cities, as well as airlines, have
been a continual focus of al-Qa'ida targeting.
We, too, remain concerned about al-Qa'ida's efforts to
acquire weapons of mass destruction. The discovery of ricin in
Europe, al-Qa'ida's clear interest in a range of chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, and its desire to
attack the United States at equal or greater levels than 9/11
highlight the need for continued vigilance in this regard.
Finally, al-Qa'ida retains a cadre of supporters within the
United States which extends across the country. Indeed, al-
Qa'ida appears to recognize the operational advantage it can
derive from recruiting United States citizens. And while the
bulk of al-Qa'ida supporters in the United States are engaged
in fundraising, recruitment and logistics, there have been
cases--some of which I've mentioned previously--there have been
cases of those apparently involved in operational planning.
While al-Qa'ida and like-minded groups remain at the
forefront of the war on terror, other groups, such as
Hizbollah, Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, warrant equal
vigilance due to their ongoing capability to launch terrorist
attacks within the United States. Historically, however, these
groups have limited their militant activities to Israeli
targets and have focused on fundraising, recruitment and
procurement as their main activities in the United States.
The FBI disrupted several significant Hizbollah cells over
the last year. In Charlotte, North Carolina, an individual was
sentenced to 155 years in jail for conspiring to provide
material support to Hizbollah. In Detroit, Michigan, 11
individuals, some of whom have admitted ties to Hizbollah, were
charged with bank fraud, cigarette smuggling and RICO offenses.
These arrests were the result of a long-term investigation of
criminal enterprises associated with Hizbollah.
Mr. Chairman, although the impact of terrorism is more
immediate and more highly visible, espionage and foreign
intelligence activities are no less threats to the United
States national security.
Given our country's stature as the leading political,
military, economic and scientific power, foreign intelligence
services will continue to recruit sources to penetrate the
United States Intelligence Community and the United States
government. They will continue to target our national economic
interests and our research and development base. They will
continue to attempt to assert political influence through
perception management operations.
The loss of sensitive, classified and proprietary
information critical to United States interests can hamper our
ability to conduct international relations, can threaten our
military and diminish our technological base, as well as our
economic competitiveness.
Mr. Chairman, I should also mention that the FBI is
expanding our efforts to address the rapidly growing cyber
threat as it relates to both terrorism and national security.
The number of individuals and groups with the ability to use
computers for illegal, harmful and possibly devastating
purposes is on the rise. We are particularly concerned about
terrorists and state actors wishing to exploit vulnerabilities
in United States systems and networks.
The FBI has a division dedicated to combating cyber crime
and cyber-terrorism and we are committed to identifying and
neutralizing those individuals or groups that illegally access
computer systems, spread malicious code, and support terrorist
or state-sponsored computer operations.
Over the past year, Mr. Chairman, the men and women of the
FBI have continued to implement a plan that fundamentally
transforms our organization to enhance our ability to predict
and to prevent terrorism. As you know, we took the first steps
toward this transformation in the days and weeks following the
9/11 attacks and we established a new set of priorities that
govern the allocation of manpower and resources in every FBI
program and in every FBI office.
Counterterrorism is our overriding priority and every
terrorism lead is addressed, even if it requires a diversion of
resources from other priorities. Since September 11, we have
centralized management of our counterterrorism,
counterintelligence and cyber programs to eliminate stovepiping
of information, to coordinate operations, to conduct liaison
with other agencies and governments, and to be accountable for
the overall development and success of our efforts in these
areas.
Our operational divisions at headquarters have analyzed the
threat environment and devised national strategies to address
the most critical threats and are implementing these strategies
in every field office. We have also reallocated resources in
accordance with these new priorities. For example, we have
increased a number of agents assigned to counterterrorism from
roughly 1,300 to 2,300 and hired over 400 analysts.
Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces have grown from 35 to 84.
Prior to September 11 we had a little over 900 agents and
police officers serving on our task forces. We now have over
3,300 serving on those task forces.
And to enhance our translation capabilities, we increased
the number of linguists with skills in critical languages from
555 to over 1,200.
Mr. Chairman, over the past year we also have made
substantial progress in implementing the next key step in our
transformation, and that is the FBI's intelligence program. The
FBI has always been among the world's best collectors of
information. For a variety of historical reasons, the Bureau
did not have a formal infrastructure to exploit that
information fully for its intelligence value.
While individual FBI agents have always capably analyzed
the evidence in their particular cases and then used that
analysis to guide their investigations, the FBI has in the
past, but not across the board, implemented an overall effort
to analyze intelligence and then strategically direct
intelligence collection.
Today, an enterprise-wide intelligence program is
absolutely essential. The threats to the homeland are not
contained by geographic boundaries and often do not fall neatly
into investigative program categories. Consequently, threat
information has relationships and applicability that crosses
both internal and external organizational boundaries.
Counterterrorism efforts must incorporate elements and
contribute toward counterintelligence, cyber and criminal
programs. And in order to respond to this changing threat
environment, we are building our capabilities to fuse, analyze
and disseminate our related intelligence and to create
collection requirements based on our analysis of
theintelligence gaps about our adversaries.
We have an Office of Intelligence within the FBI which
establishes and executes standards for recruiting, hiring,
training and developing the intelligence analytical workforce
and to ensure that analysts are assigned to operational and
field divisions based on intelligence priorities.
We have established a new position of Executive Assistant
Director for Intelligence, joining the other three Executive
Assistant Directors in the top tier of FBI management, and we
recruited Maureen Baginski, an intelligence expert with 25
years of experience in the intelligence community, to serve in
this position. She's responsible for managing the national
analytical program and for institutionalizing intelligence
processes in all areas of FBI operations. Among her
responsibilities are those for managing the establishment of
the formal requirements process that will identify and resolve
those intelligence gaps, allowing us to fill those gaps through
collection strategies.
Finally, in order to ensure that the FBI-wide collection
plans and directives are incorporated into our field
activities, all field offices have established a Field
Intelligence Group, and each of those groups is the
intelligence component in the field office responsible for the
management, execution and coordination of the intelligence
functions.
For our intelligence program to succeed, we must continue
to build and strengthen our intelligence workforce. Our efforts
to recruit, hire and train agents and analysts with
intelligence experience began shortly after September 11. And
now we are also taking steps to enhance the stature of
intelligence and analysis within the FBI and to provide career
incentives for specialization in these areas. To ensure that
our intelligence mission is carried out, we are revising our
field office and program inspections and agent and management
evaluations to make it clear that developing and disseminating
intelligence is the job of every office and agent.
Mr. Chairman, my prepared statement provides additional
details about the many enhancements to our intelligence
programs, including increased training, targeted hiring,
creation of the College of Analytical Studies, establishment of
career tracks for agents who will devote their careers to
intelligence, and improvements to our information technology.
In the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude at
this point. And again, I will be happy to answer any questions
the Committee may have. Thank you for the opportunity to give
this statement.
Chairman Roberts. And we thank you, Director Mueller.
Admiral, would you please proceed?
[The prepared statement of Admiral Jacoby follows:]
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STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL LOWELL E. JACOBY, U.S. NAVY,
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Admiral Jacoby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
Committee. I appreciate this Committee's strong sustained
support for defense intelligence and its men and women who are
deployed around the world.
Last year I testified that defense intelligence was at war
on a global scale. That war has intensified. Defense
intelligence professionals, active duty military, reserves and
civilians are providing the knowledge and skills essential to
defeating enemies in Iraq, Afghanistan and the global war on
terrorism.
In Iraq, the security situation varies by region. The north
and the south remain comparably quiet. Attacks in central Iraq
account for the vast majority of incidents and center in Sunni-
dominated areas, especially west of Baghdad, around Mosul and
along the Baghdad-Tikrit corridor, areas that were home to many
former military and security members. I believe former regime
elements led by Ba'ath Party remnants are responsible for the
majority of anti-coalition attacks.
That said, it appears much of the Sunni population has not
decided whether to back the coalition or support the
insurgents. The key factors in this decision are stability and
a future that presents viable alternatives to the Ba'athists or
Islamists.
Foreign fighters, to include al-Qa'ida, are a continuing
threat. They have perpetrated some of the most significant
attacks and may be behind others, such as suicide attacks that
caused high casualties. They are motivated by Arab nationalism,
extremist religious ideology and opposition to U.S. policies
and beliefs. Left unchecked, Iraq has the potential to serve as
a training ground for the next generation of terrorists.
Mr. Chairman, I returned from Iraq ten days ago. At this
point, I would like to recognize the exemplary work of the
Iraqi Survey Group. DIA and defense intelligence personnel,
intelligence community experts, counterparts from U.S. agencies
and contractors and coalition members are analyzing new
information, pursuing leads, inspecting and searching
facilities and combing through, sorting and exploiting tens of
thousands of documents in a dangerous and austere environment.
Forming and managing this mix of professionals has taken
considerable effort, not just DIA people, but by our national
and coalition partners as well. The ISG and those who provide
support for their efforts are to be commended for their
dedicated efforts as the ISG pursues a full accounting of Iraqi
WMD programs, counterterrorism in Iraq and the fate of Captain
Scott Speicher.
Turning to Afghanistan, last spring's attacks by opposition
groups reached the highest level since the collapse of the
Taliban government in December of 2001. Although activity has
subsided somewhat, attacks continue. The Taliban insurgency
that continues to target humanitarian assistance and
reconstruction organizations is a serious threat. Some of those
organizations have suspended operations. They play a key role
in bringing stability and progress to this troubled nation.
Additionally, President Karzai remains critical to
stability in Afghanistan. As a Pashtun, he is the only
individual capable of maintaining the trust of that ethnic
group while maintaining support of other minorities.
Notable progress has been achieved in the global war on
terrorism. We have shrunk operating environments for al-Qa'ida
and other terrorist groups, captured al-Qa'ida senior
coordinators and disrupted operations. Nevertheless, al-Qa'ida
remains the greatest threat to our homeland and our overseas
presence.
Al-Qa'ida continues to demonstrate it's adaptable and
capable. While al-Qa'ida's planning has become more
decentralized and shifted to softer targets, they continue
attacks, most recently in Istanbul and Riyadh, enjoy
considerable support in the Islamic world. Al-Qa'ida and other
terrorist groups remain interested in acquiring chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Hijackings and
man-portable missile attacks against civilian aircraft remain
of considerable concern.
A number of factors virtually assure a terrorist threat for
years to come. Despite recent reforms, terrorist organizations
draw from societies with poor or failing economies, ineffective
governments and inadequate education systems. Demographic
bubbles or youth bubbles further burden governments and
economies. For instance, if we look at the percentage of
population under 15 years of age, 43 percent of Saudi Arabians,
41 percent of Iraqis, 39 percent of Pakistanis, 34 percent of
Egyptians, 33 percent of Algerians and 29 percent of Iranians
fall into this group.
I'm also concerned over ungoverned spaces, areas where
governments do not or cannot exercise effective control. Such
spaces offer terrorist organizations sanctuary.
I remain concerned about the Islamic world. Many of our
partners successfully weathered domestic stresses during
Operation Iraqi Freedom; however challenges to their stability
and their continued support for the war on terrorism remain.
Islamic and Arab populations are increasingly opposed to U.S.
policies. The loss of a key leader could quickly change
government support for U.S. and coalition operations.
For example, President Musharraf was recently the target of
two sophisticated assassination attempts. His support for the
global war on terrorism, Afghan policy, restrictions on
Kashmiri militants and attempts to improve relations with India
are all important initiatives that have increased his
vulnerability.
Despite some positive developments, such as recent events
in Libya, the trends with respect to proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and missiles remain troublesome. North
Korea's reactivation of the Yongbyon nuclear facility and
revelations over Iranian nuclear enrichment reinforce concerns.
Other states continue to develop biological and chemical
weapons capabilities and improve their ballistic and cruise
missiles. Proliferation of WMD and missile-related technologies
continues and new supply networks challenge counter-
proliferation efforts.
With respect to China and Russia, China continues to
develop or import modern weapons. China's Liberation Army
acquisition priorities includes surface combatants and
submarines, air defense, modern fighter aircraft, ballistic and
anti-ship cruise missiles, space and counter-space systems and
modern ground equipment.
Domestic political events in Taipei are the principal
determinant of short-term stability in the Taiwan Straits.
Beijing is monitoring developments in advance of next month's
presidential elections and referendum, ever concerned about a
Taiwan declaration of independence. Beijing will not tolerate
the island's independence and will use military force,
regardless of the costs or risks. However, we see no indication
of preparations for large-scale military exercises or other
military activity to influence Taiwan voters at this stage.
After nearly a decade of declining activity, the Russian
military is beginning to exercise its forces in mission areas
tied to deterrence, global reach and rapid reaction. Moscow is
attempting to reclaim great power status. Its military spending
has increased in real terms in the past four years in line with
its improving economy.
In closing, defense intelligence is working hard to improve
the processes, techniques and capabilities necessary to counter
the current threats and emerging security challenges and to
take advantage of opportunities. Our global commitments have
stressed our people and our capabilities. Nonetheless, I am
confident we will continue to supply our decisionmakers with
the knowledge necessary for success.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. We thank all three of you for your
testimony.
I would say to members that we are providing six minutes
for each member, and then if there is time and desire for a
second round that will also be the case.
Let me indicate that there has been considerable interest
in the Committee holding a hearing in reference to the
recommendations made by the 9/11 investigation by the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees as of the last session of
Congress on the recommendations and reforms that were listed in
that document. That, of course, went to the independent
commission, which is now the 9/11 commission. And so we will
have a hearing on those recommendations.
And it would be the hope of the Chairman that when we
finally conclude or that we do conclude the inquiry and we make
the inquiry public after redaction, when we have a public
hearing, that we come up with the conclusion and also some
recommendations in regards to a positive effect to address some
of the systemic challenges we face in the Intelligence
Community.
I know that in an even-numbered year where we have
adjectives and adverbs that are somewhat unique, as opposed to
an odd-number year, it may be difficult to leapfrog that and to
get into conclusions and recommendations, but that would be the
hope of the Chair.
Both of you have indicated that attacks on coalition forces
and on the newly-created Iraqi security forces have continued
at a steady pace. That's certainly not a secret to any
American. Events have shown us that the sophistication of those
attacks has increased. There is no sign that the people behind
the attacks plan to stop. In fact, it appears that the
opposition has hoped to block or derail any moves toward a
transition of governing authority.
I would address this question to the DCI and to the DIA
Director. First, is this working?
Second, will coalition forces and Iraqi security forces be
capable of identifying and also eliminating the main body of
the oppositionists and the foreign fighters?
And third, in your opinion, what are the most important
factors that will determine whether Iraqi Sunnis and Shia will,
in the long term, side with forces of peace and stability
rather than continue or accelerate opposition to the new
government order in Iraq?
And I would ask Mr. Tenet if he would respond.
Director Tenet. You asked a number of questions, Mr.
Chairman.
First, the transition to sovereignty and a functioning
state is exactly what the insurgents and the jihadists oppose
the most. It's the biggest threat to them over the long term.
Now, in terms of how we're doing against these, I think
that we would say that, over time, both we and the military,
particularly at local levels, have very good knowledge of these
networks, both in terms of the insurgency and the jihadists.
And we're making progress.
Security is linked to economics and politics in an
integrated manner. Security is very, very important.
The fact that Sunnis are beginning to engage in a political
process, form umbrella organizations, the fact that Ayatollah
Sistani is meeting with Sunni notables, the fact that tribal
elements that constitute Sunnis and Shias are beginning to talk
about a political process is a healthy thing.
Clearly, economic developments, particularly in the Sunni
heartland, dealing with unemployment, taking young men off the
street, putting them in a job--all of these things work in a
process interlinked together that makes progress. It's hard.
We're better than we were 90 days ago. The fact that there is a
dialogue between Sunnis and Shias and Kurds, as much ferment as
it creates, is a positive sign that must end up in Iraqi
sovereignty.
And the key, ultimately, is--if John Abizaid were here, he
would say the key is we need to transition from U.S. forces
being up front, to Iraqis, through police forces, civil defense
battalions taking the action to be seen as protecting
themselves.
One final word about the foreign jihadists: Success here
for them, they understand that Iraq is a very difficult
operating environment, even while they operate against us.
Iraqis are turning them in in bigger numbers. They're talking
to us about them. They don't belong there.
As this political process matures, I think we're going to
be better off, but it will be hard and slow and every day you
will not have the kind of progress that you want, but we're
moving in the right direction.
Chairman Roberts. Admiral.
Admiral Jacoby. Mr. Chairman, I agree with the DCI that
certainly the factors are stability and an economic and
political situation that shows a brighter future than the past
or present. I also believe thattheir efforts are making
progress, partly by the fact that people are coming forward and
providing more information against the former regime elements or the
foreign fighters.
But I think one of the more demonstrable factors for
progress is the fact that the police are now a very clear
target of attack in an anti-stability kind of an approach and
police recruits are still lining up in large numbers to be
trained and join the force.
And so I think that there are a number of elements there
that talk about progress, and the focus, as the DCI said, needs
to be on that evolving situation and the set of institutions
that need to be in place in order to provide that environment
for people to see that they are part of the future.
Chairman Roberts. Let me ask a question in regards to Dr.
Duelfer who, obviously, is in charge of the Iraq Survey Group.
In talking to him before he took on that assignment, he
indicated--and I think Dr. Kay indicated--that there was
something close to 17,000 boxes of documents that had not been
exploited.
My concern is, do we have the translation capability? And
the indication from some was that it would take a year to
finally work through all the exploitation of those documents to
try to make rhyme or reason in regards to the WMD question.
Do your agencies have sufficient translation resources to
meet your current mission requirements? Have we been able to
plus that up I think is the word we use in the Intelligence
Community?
Admiral Jacoby. Mr. Chairman, your numbers are about
right--in other words, the 17,000 boxes and about a year's
worth of time. The translation capabilities are in place. We
are at a target of 24-hour operations for linguists and
translators working those documents. And we do have the funding
available to pay for the 24-hour operations.
One of the things I would point out, though, is the bulk
numbers of boxes are not necessarily indicative of the effort.
It is a very targeted kind of effort. In many cases, we know
where those documents came from, and so there's a triage on the
front end that prioritizes their efforts. And so the areas
where we would logically find WMD materials move to the front
of the line and so the backlog and the timeline is far shorter
for those more profitable areas of exploration.
Chairman Roberts. My time is expired. I apologize to my
colleagues, but I note that the Director would like to say
something.
Director Tenet. Mr. Chairman, in terms of Arab linguists,
let me just note that ISG in total has about 320 Arab
linguists. About 220 of those are sitting in the docex facility
doing this work. So in terms of--it's a fairly formidable
capability that Admiral Jacoby has assembled.
Admiral Jacoby. With more personnel coming onboard this
month.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Warner. Oh, I beg your pardon.
The second time around, I apologize to the distinguished Vice
Chairman who is now kicking me severely underneath the dais.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Rockefeller.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Jacoby, we didn't get the other two testimonies
until--I didn't have them till this morning, but I did have
yours. And once again, I have to say, like I did last year, I
thought it was absolutely superb in its scope and what you had
to say.
What you just did say, however, raises a question in my
mind. You're talking about reading of documents and the
availability of translators--you know, the necessary Arabic
speakers, et cetera, of different dialects to do that. It's a
very different matter when you're going through documents than
it is when you're dealing with human intelligence, with assets,
with the capacity to do all the other things that have to be
done, frankly, many of which will probably turn out to be more
important.
And so my question would be not just to you, but also to
Director Tenet, because I noticed when I mentioned this point
about being stretched thin, that the Director nodded his head a
little bit.
It's my impression, in just doing some unclassified
reading, that with the switches that are being made in Baghdad
and elsewhere, that there are a lot of rather junior people
coming in, a lot of retired people being lured back into the
service and that the Arabic question remains huge for your
purposes.
Director Tenet. Sir, I would, say that, obviously, language
capabilities is something we're working on very hard. I mean,
we've tripled the number of Arabic speakers in the last three
years and we won't go into foreign language programs here.
But the point is I think there was a newspaper story that
was recently written about Baghdad and Pakistan and it was----
Chairman Roberts. George, can you pull that microphone
right up?
Director Tenet. The truth is that you're asking a
priorities question, and here's the way we're working the
priority question. The war on terrorism absolutely has to be
unaffected by what we do on anything else. So that's covered
and Iraq has now created a very large drain of people and
resources.
The issue is not in terms of Iraq, or in terms of the war
on terrorism, or in terms of proliferation, or let's say
another country that we care about a great deal. The issue for
us will be global coverage against other issues, where the
truth is we are moving people against the highest priorities.
And there are issues we're going to have to deal with very,
very smartly.
You say we're bringing a lot of older people back. Well,
we've had a designated reserve cadre now going back four or
five years; that number's been constant as we bring, as you
know, more people into the clandestine service and the
analytical workforce to match youth and inexperience. And we're
just going to have to do it this way and balance our priorities
carefully.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you.
This is for the Director and for the Admiral. I mentioned
that the United States--we basically invaded Iraq as a reason
because of our concern about the presence of weapons of mass
destruction and also the question of links to al-Qa'ida and
other terrorist organizations.
It now appears, at least to this Senator, that Iran
actually had closer links to dangerous terrorist organizations,
such as Hizbollah and al-Qa'ida, as well as much more advanced
WMD capabilities, than Iraq did. So how would you compare, the
two of you, the threat posed by Iran today with the threat of
Iraq WMD and links to terrorism that you described to this
Committee last year at this time? Is Iran a grave and gathering
threat?
Director Tenet. Well, sir, I think that we've documented
year in and year out the Iranian ballistic missile program and
what they've acquired from the Russians and the deployment of
the Shahab-3 and the development and deployment of longer-range
missiles. And certainly, in classified closed testimony we've
talked to you over the years about our concerns about their
nuclear program.
With regard to the Hizbollah relationship, that's not new.
We've talked about Iranian support for Hizbollah for years.
I think, you know, there are two different sets of issues
involved in terms of what policy responses people might choose.
And they are very, very different in this regard. So it's an
apples and oranges on a gathering situation where there was a
great deal of concern about in terms of what we didn't know,
what we were deceived and denied about. And so there was a high
probability impact in terms of what was being denied to us that
caused us a great deal of concern.
In the Iranian case, I think there's been steady work and
understanding of the Iranian phenomenon, both on the nuclear
and the ballistic missile side, and in the classified context
that we've talked to you over the years on chemical and
biological weapons as well, that Iranposes problems, to be
sure, things that we've talked to you about consistently year in and
year out. What you do about them and what policy solutions you choose
is up to you and others to decide.
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, I believe the same in terms of the
capabilities discussion.
I think one thing that's more crystal clear to us this
year, although it would have been projected last year, is the
hardliners and reformists situation. I think it's very clear
coming out of the elections that the reform movement has lost
momentum, lost steam. And so we need to be putting the
capabilities discussion in the context of continued hardline
leadership.
Director Tenet. Senator Rockefeller, can I make just one
other point on this?
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Yes, because I would like it--I
have two seconds left.
Director Tenet. I'm sorry.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Simply because it seems to me
you're both avoiding the obvious question that I'm asking: What
it looks like today, what it looked like a year ago, what would
you do? You say, ``Well, let's slough it off to the
policymakers.'' That's a little harder argument to make these
days than it was before.
Director Tenet. Well, sir, I would say that what we're
doing with Iran today--and you've got an IAEA relationship,
that's a positive thing. I think we need to work through that,
in terms of since they've opened up and are giving us data, and
they're complying. That's an important way to get at their
nuclear program.
There's a difference in terms of the two societies. If
you're going to look, you know, Iran has a society that had two
elections, had a reform movement, has a political dialogue, has
a certain amount of openness to it. So when you contemplate the
fact that 63 percent of the Iranian population was born after
1979, with a new generation, it's a complicating issue in terms
of how you juxtapose that kind of a society that's trying to
reform. And while the reformers may be in tough shape, we don't
want to dissuade them from picking up and continuing what,
obviously, is a discredited clerical rule, when they may go
forward in the future. There's a difference between a very
closed society and an open society with a political dialogue.
So there are very big differences, notwithstanding advances
on nuclear issues and on support for terrorism that we've
documented for years.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Warner, I've recognized you
twice. The third time's the charm.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much. I've been waiting
patiently.
I wish to commend you all on your statements, gentlemen. I
think they were strong, positive statements reflecting within
the Executive branch the strongest of support for your
individual and collective endeavors on the war against
terrorism.
We have as a nation, nevertheless, suffered some degree of
loss of credibility. It's debatable. I think it's going to be
recoverable in the end, but in the meantime, has this in any
way affected your ability to make contacts within nations other
than the traditional governmental contact with your
counterparts? Has the support of your counterparts been
noticeably lessened? And has your ability to make your own
independent contacts with other sources of intelligence
lessened in any way?
We'll start with you, Director.
Director Tenet. No, sir. I would say that if we look at an
example, whether it's the war on terrorism or contacts with our
foreign counterparts on proliferation, no, sir, nobody has
changed their attitude toward us. People are as cooperative as
they've been. We're working toward a common framework. Many of
our colleagues saw it the same way we did. And so, no, I see no
diminution in the willingness of people who work with us in
intelligence channels to get our job done.
Senator Warner. So the professionals have stayed out of the
fray of the political exchanges, particularly with some of the
nations in Europe, and you feel that your contacts with those
counterpart agencies are as strong as ever?
Director Tenet. Sir, notwithstanding political
differences----
Senator Warner. Yes.
Director Tenet [continuing]. Our relationship with our
European colleagues is very, very strong. And even in cases
where there are very big differences politically, terrorism
is--for example, we have very big differences of view with the
French on policy issues, for example, but on terrorism
excellent cooperation across the board.
Senator Warner. I think that's reassuring.
Director Mueller.
Director Mueller. I would agree. Over the last couple of
weeks, I've had opportunities to meet with counterparts from
France, Germany. Yesterday I met with the German Interior
Minister. Our relationships have been excellent with him over
the last couple of years. They are still superb with our
counterparts in Germany and France. Our relationships could not
be better, regardless of what else happens.
Admiral Jacoby. Senator Warner, my counterparts, if
anything, are coming forward with more offers of cooperation
and more opportunities as we seek them out, so, no sir, no
problems.
Senator Warner. Director Tenet, the Armed Services
Committee had the opportunity to hear from Dr. Kay. And I've
also had a long discussion with General Dayton and Dr. Duelfer
before he departed.
Can you assure this Committee that particularly your agency
and that of the Department of Defense are giving the strongest
of support to continuing the search for weapons of mass
destruction under the Iraq Survey Group?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir, I was out in Baghdad last week
and I can tell you that it's as strong as ever and there's a
very good reason----
Senator Warner. Of resources and people and the like?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir, that was absolutely the case.
There was a lot of work going on out there. They're doing a
great job. I had the pleasure to meet with them and talk to
them. They're generating a lot of leads. They're working on a
lot of issues and cooperation is very good.
Senator Warner. Director Mueller, under your jurisdiction
comes the seaports of America. We're very proud to have a very
large one in my state. I didn't hear in your opening statement
any particular emphasis on working with the local authorities
and other agencies of the government in giving us the maximum
protection for those ports which particularly are highly
vulnerable to terrorist attack.
Director Mueller. Senator, I would tell you, wherever we
have a seaport that is a potential target, our Joint Terrorism
Task Forces work exceptionally closely with our counterparts at
the federal level but also at the state and local level. In
some cases--I'm not certain--actually I think in Virginia
Beach, particularly in that area, there have been extraordinary
measures. By extraordinary I mean measures above and beyond
just the Joint Terrorism Task Force----
Senator Warner. I'm acquainted with that.
Director Mueller [continuing]. That are taken to assure the
protection of those seaports. So we have the basic level, the
Joint Terrorism Task Force, but in many of our areas we have
enhanced cooperative efforts.
Senator Warner. Good.
Admiral Jacoby, with reference to Haiti, it's a rapidly
transitioning event there. What is the probability that this
country couldonce again experience the exodus from that nation
seeking refuge on our shores in the event that the instability
progresses at a rate that it's now, I think, just about on the brink of
capitulation? Would you give us a more in-depth survey about Haiti and
the problems of the boat people again?
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, the northern half of the country
basically now has been--police posts and other government
facilities have been abandoned.
We're watching closely for any preparations for exodus,
sir. And I can report to you at this point that we have not
seen that, nor any typical signals, in terms of moving of boats
and so forth in the northern part of the country. We haven't
seen that yet. But it is certainly a concern and it's a focus
of attention.
Senator Warner. Director Tenet, the conflict between Israel
and the Palestinian people continues to, I think, fuel a lot of
discontent in that area of the world, including far reaches
into the situations in Iraq, Syria and otherwise. To what
extent can you assure this Committee that your agency is doing
everything it can to work toward the success for the program
laid down by our President, the road to peace?
Director Tenet. Well, sir, we're obviously and have been
intimately involved in the past, but I must honestly tell you
that we need two partners to come together to give us the
ability to do much. And right now we do not have two parties of
equal mind or capability or will.
So quite frankly, we're watching this from a very important
intelligence-gathering dimension, maintaining our contacts with
both sides. But in truth, we need the Palestinian Authority to
step up. We need people to come to the table to work with us to
exert a willingness. We've laid down specific reform plans for
those services, their consolidation under a single leadership,
a minister of interior who reports independently to a prime
minister. We need more help in this regard to really get back
to the point where we did the work we did in 1998, 1999, 2000.
We're not there right now, Senator.
Senator Warner. Well, that's a frank assessment. And I wish
to commend you personally for the manner in which you've met
the challenges here recently, Director Tenet. They've been
quite significant.
Let's move, then, to Syria. I thought we'd have more
emphasis on that situation because the tentacles of that nation
are very disturbing as it relates to our situation in Iraq and,
to some extent, Iran. Could you expand on that?
Director Tenet. Sir, I'd like to talk about Syria more
extensively in closed session, if I could.
Senator Warner. All right.
Director Tenet. Obviously, the border between Syria and
Iraq is something that concerns me.
But I've got some things I'd prefer to talk about in closed
session. And, obviously, there are proliferation matters here,
there are matters about the continuing harboring of Palestinian
rejectionist groups whose public relations outfits may have
been shut down but the operations haven't been shut down. So
there's a whole slew of issues to talk about here.
Senator Warner. In Afghanistan, there are many positive
signs, but one that concerns us greatly is the continuing
proliferation of the drug trade and the dollars that flow from
it, which are fueling many of the activities in opposition to
the coalition forces' effort to bring about a greater degree of
democracy. It seems to me that that is not receiving the proper
level of attention. Could you comment on that?
Director Tenet. Sir, I'd say the following: It is an
important issue. More important, we need to get the
southeastern provinces along the Pakistani border and that
security situation under control.
While Admiral Jacoby referred to the fact that we are
concerned about Taliban suicide attacks and attacks on soft
targets, it is also true that the Taliban cannot operate
against us in set military maneuvers because of what we do back
to them.
So we've got to sort of get reconstruction moving in the
right direction. President Karzai, we have to be in the
position where he offsets what people produce from narcotics
with alternative programs. We have to clarify the security
situation.
And the sequence, sir, I would say, we've got to get there
and do more, but we've got to have a sequence here that makes
sense that results in the government spreading out broader, he
extending his influence onto that border, with us in a better
way and then we've got to get to narcotics. It's just a
sequencing issue that we have to pay attention to.
Senator Warner. Close out on Usama bin Laden: Has there
been any lessening, in your opinion, of the efforts by our
nation and other nations to capture him or otherwise to
determine his whereabouts? Because that remains a very
important issue to the American people, and there's so much
criticism that Iraq has drained off that emphasis. I do not
find that to be the case. I hope you can assure us that is not
the case.
Director Tenet. No lessening of the effort, sir.
Senator Warner. Admiral.
Admiral Jacoby. No lessening, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Let me ask Director Tenet first about the
unsettled military and political situation in Iraq which is
directly threatening our troops on a daily basis, threatens
regional stability and American security.
Press reports state that CIA officers in Iraq are warning
that the country may be on a path to civil war. My question is
this: Would the transfer of sovereignty by June 30, if there's
no consensus on the procedures of governing between the
transfer of sovereignty and the holding of direct elections,
would that transfer of sovereignty be destabilizing?
Director Tenet. Sir, obviously, this is an issue that
they're all working on right now that I don't have enough
transparency into. It's between the U.N. special envoy and
Ambassador Bremer.
Senator Levin. I'm asking you for an intelligence
assessment.
Director Tenet. Yes, sir. I think it's important to have a
continuum and those agreements lashed up. I do think that
moving to some transfer of sovereignty in the long term, with
an idea for when elections may occur, how a transitional law,
whatever body is elected, all of which has to be known and laid
out in a program--and I think that will actually work to our
benefit.
Senator Levin. And if there is no such agreement before the
transfer of sovereignty, then what?
Director Tenet. Well, sir, at this moment, the civil war
scenario, it's obviously something we watch very carefully.
But given what I said in my statement about what I see as
the increasing coming out of Sunnis, their interaction with
Shias, I think Iraqis understand, particularly with the kind of
jihadists targeting against Shias that's been exposed, this is
not a road they want to go down.
Senator Levin. There have been a number of compliments to
Dr. Kay here today and before. Do you agree with Dr. Kay's,
your chief weapon inspector, statement that the consensus
opinion is that the two trailers that were found were not
intended for the production of biological weapons? Do you agree
with him?
Director Tenet. No, sir, there is no consensus on that
question.
Senator Levin. What is your opinion?
Director Tenet. Well, sir, we have two bodies----
Senator Levin. And what is your opinion?
Director Tenet. At this moment, I'm sitting right in
themiddle of a big debate. I have analysts in my building who still
believe that they were for BW trailers. I have Defense Intelligence
Agency analysts who have posited another theory. And the community has
not--we don't have enough data, and we haven't wrestled it to the
ground yet.
Senator Levin. Vice President Cheney just a few weeks ago
said the following, that those trailers were, in fact, part of
the biological weapons program and that he deems them
conclusive evidence that Saddam, in fact, had programs for
weapons of mass destruction. Do you agree with Vice President
Cheney?
Director Tenet. Well, sir, I talked to the Vice President
after my Georgetown speech. I don't think he was aware of where
we were in terms of the community's disagreement on this. I've
talked to him subsequent to that. I've explained the
disagreements. I've told him that there's one side that thinks
one thing and one side that thinks another thing. So, in
fairness to him, I think he was going off of an older judgment
that was embodied in a paper.
Senator Levin. Was that older judgment the one that is
still on your Web site?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Why is it still on your Web site?
Director Tenet. Sir, we just keep adding. We had a piece of
paper at a moment in time. We've added David Kay's piece of
paper. I've put my Georgetown speech on it. For transparency
and giving people a sense of where we are at any moment in
time, I think it's a good thing.
Senator Levin. What is the Intelligence Community's
assessment of whether or not 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta met
with Ahmed al-Ani, an alleged Iraq intelligence officer in Iraq
in April of 2001?
What is your assessment?
Director Tenet. Sir, I know you have a paper up here that
outlines all that for you. It's a classified paper. My
recollection is we can't prove that one way or another. Is that
correct?
Senator Levin. The Washington Post says that the CIA has
always doubted that it took place. Is that correct?
Director Tenet. We have not gathered enough evidence to
conclude that it happened, sir. That's just where we are
analytically in the----
Senator Levin. It's not correct, then, that you doubt that
it took place?
Director Tenet. Sir, I don't know that it took place. I
can't say that it did.
Senator Levin. All right.
Last November, the Weekly Standard published excerpts from
an alleged classified document that was prepared under
Secretary of Defense Feith's leadership. It was dated October
27, 2003. This document was sent to the Senate Intelligence
Committee. It alleged an operational relationship between Iraq
and the al-Qa'ida terrorist organization. It's become quite a
cause celebre.
Did the Department of Defense consult with the CIA before
sending that document to the Senate Intelligence Committee?
Director Tenet. Can I just check, sir? I don't know myself.
Senator Levin, I have to take it for the record. There's no
precise knowledge sitting behind me at this point.
Senator Levin. Relative to the uranium allegation, the
allegation that Iraq was seeking uranium in Africa, you took
personal responsibility for the error----
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin [continuing]. In the State of the Union
address----
Director Tenet. I did.
Senator Levin [continuing]. Even though you had apparently
personally urged the NSC Deputy Director, Stephen Hadley, not
to make that claim a few months earlier.
And my question to you is this: A week before the State of
the Union address, President Bush submitted an unclassified
report to Congress on January 20, 2003. In that document, he
said that Iraq had failed to explain its ``attempts to acquire
uranium.'' So it's not just that that statement was made in the
State of the Union message; it was made in a very visible
public way in a report to Congress, which the President was
required to file pursuant to the legislation authorizing him to
proceed to war.
My question to you is whether or not the CIA cleared that
January 20 document.
Director Tenet. Sir, I do not know and I'll take it for the
record and get back to you.
Senator Levin. Are you familiar with the document?
Director Tenet. Personally, no.
Senator Levin. Thank you. My time is up.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony and time this
morning.
Director Tenet, I want to refer in your testimony to the
specific area that you addressed regarding economic development
in Iraq. And if I may read from your testimony, you noted: ``By
next year revenues from oil exports should cover the cost of
basic government operations and contribute several billion
dollars toward reconstruction. It is essential, however, that
the Iraq-Turkey pipeline be reopened and oil facilities be well
protected from insurgent sabotage.''
My questions are these. First, this is a----
Director Tenet. I'm sorry, sir. What page are you on? I
apologize.
Senator Hagel. I'm working off of page 10 on the draft.
It's a draft. I don't know where it is in yours.
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Senator Hagel. My first question is, this is the first time
I have seen in writing from any Administration officials
reference to ``contributing several billion dollars toward
reconstruction.'' The Foreign Relations Committee, other
committees that I sit on and I'm aware of up here have not had
the opportunity to explore that reconstruction possibility. In
fact, we have been told that, most likely, the oil revenues
would cover just operating costs. Now you're saying that it
would add several billion dollars.
I want to address that as well as that you rightly
appropriately note that that's contingent upon the Iraq-Turkey
pipeline reopening and the security of those facilities. If you
could also address where we are on the reopening of the
pipeline, what are we doing to address your very important and
significant point that these oil revenues are absolutely
contingent upon the two factors.
Director Tenet. Sir, on the where we are on the pipeline,
I'll just have to come back to you. I have an expert here who I
know knows this and we did believe when we wrote this that it
would have a contributing effect toward reconstruction. That's
at least our analytical judgment. Now, if we're off by that,
we'll come back but I don't think we have a different view.
I can't take you much farther than what I've said, sir.
Senator Hagel. Okay. Director Tenet that's fine and you'll
provide then answers for the record on all the points.
Also, I noted in your testimony on a couple of occasions,
you referenced--I believe this is from your statement--
``managing Kurdish autonomy in a federal structure.'' I then
assume that means that the accepted position of the
Administration is that, in fact, Kurdistan is going to be an
autonomous region.
Director Tenet. Sir, actually, that's all being negotiated
on the ground in terms of what those provisions are going to
look like,how much decentralized authority and control the
Kurds may or may not have. And at this moment, it is an issue, and I
posit it as an issue, but Jerry Bremer and the people on the ground are
working on this right now. So I just raise it as something that is out
there that has to be dealt with and I don't know where the process will
end.
Senator Hagel. So, as far as you know, that decision has
not been made that, in fact, Kurdistan will be an autonomous
part of a federal system.
Director Tenet. I think this is a product of very fluid
discussions and negotiations on the ground. All I do is raise
the issue and say this is something that has to be dealt with.
And I can't really posit where they are today.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
On Afghanistan, picking up on a question that Chairman
Warner addressed, the doubling of opium production--which is
not good news for any of us, doubling of opium production last
year--what's your analysis of elections? And I would also be
interested in Admiral Jacoby's answering this question as well.
Director Tenet. Well, sir, the first thing I would say is
that the loya jurga that was recently concluded was very
successful by anybody's account. Karzai did extremely well.
Fahim Khan, his Vice President, is backing him strongly. That's
important from the Panjshiri concept, from that context, to
make sure that there's unity between two communities of
different stripes even if there's--I don't know--there's been
some reporting that suggests there might be slippage in the
election process because of mechanical issues.
One of the other things that I say in my statement is while
warlords are something that Karzai has to deal with, they
appear disunited. He appears to have a good strategy to think
about dealing with them.
And as these PRT teams--these reconstruction teams that
NATO gets in the country--starts to get out and extend the writ
of the government through assistance, it's going to make this
all better. So reconstruction--we have to keep our eye on the
reconstruction ball and move it forward.
Karzai appears to be the most popular man in the country,
and we'll see. But what's come out of this loya jurga process
is the most hope for this country in many, many years.
Senator Hagel. I've gotten--and I do want to get your
comments, Admiral Jacoby--but I've gotten as recently as two
days ago assessments from people on the ground and officials
who know about what's going on over there--very significant
reports of intimidation, which I know you have factored into
your thinking on this, especially with intelligence--and if you
want to go deeper into that this afternoon----
Director Tenet. If we're talking about Taliban-based
intimidation----
Senator Hagel. As well as other intimidation to hold people
back.
Director Tenet. The shift in strategy is away from set
pieces in fighting us to going after NGOs, softer targets and
suicide operations. So this is an issue that we have to deal
with, because this is the most effective way for them to
operate against us and thwart this change. Particularly in the
southeastern provinces, the concern is that this kind of
activity wedge its way up into Kabul. Now you're talking about
singletons who can do things.
So this is something we're very mindful of. This tension
exists. There's no doubt about it. I don't want anybody walking
out of here thinking Afghanistan is totally safe. It's in a
heck of a lot better place than it was. But the Taliban
remnants operating over the Pakistani border into Afghanistan,
back and forth, is still an issue that we are dealing with
quite hard.
Senator Hagel. I even received reports regarding the north
on this, as well.
But, Admiral Jacoby, would you----
Admiral Jacoby: I second what the DCI just said, that last
part being the key part from our standpoint; the ability to
establish that stability and keep the reconstruction efforts on
track is absolutely the key from our standpoint.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Snowe.
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome all of our witnesses here today.
Director Tenet, you mentioned in your speech at Georgetown
that the analysts never said there was an imminent threat with
respect to Iraq. In the National Security Strategy that was
issued back on September 17, 2002, the President outlined his
strategy of preemption, and noted that, ``When the threat is
imminent, the nation has the right to conduct preemptive
operations.''
Obviously, from the President to the Vice President to
Secretary Powell and so on, words such as ``grave threat,'' ``a
danger that is grave and growing,'' ``a serious and mounting
threat,'' ``continuing threat''--if it wasn't an imminent
threat in your mind, how would you have characterized or
assessed the threat at that point in time?
Director Tenet. I would have characterized it as something
that was grave and gathering, something that we were quite
worried about--quite worried about the nature of surprise.
One of the second key judgments we've said in our National
Intelligence Estimate is that we are very worried about what we
don't know, not on the short side, but our concern was that,
through deception and denial, there was much that we did not
know.
And given the history of deception and what the U.N. didn't
find and his pattern of activity, our concern was that these
programs--in fact, we state quite clearly in our estimate--
these programs have gotten bigger, that he has chemical and
biological weapons.
So that the risk calculus, I think, that you carry forward
to a policymaker who then has to think about all this is: Can I
be surprised? I have been surprised previously. What do you
want to do about it?
Senator Snowe. And so you would agree with the
characterizations that were made by the President, the Vice
President, Secretary Powell, in that respect, but not with the
National Security Strategy that was issued in September 17, the
basis of preemption?
Director Tenet. I've just characterized, Senator Snowe,
characterized what I think and how I was thinking about this at
the time. I haven't parsed everybody's words and I don't want
to do that.
Senator Snowe. Well, no, because you made a very explicit
statement on that and obviously I think it sends, you know, a
mixed message. I was going back and reviewing exactly who said
what when and I think that is important for all of us to put it
in context. And I notice that the National Security Strategy
did include the basis for a preemptive action was an imminent
threat. So we're talking about either parsing words, nuances,
what's immediate as opposed to imminent.
Director Tenet. Or where are you going to be surprised and
how soon are you going to know, and when you're surprised, are
your options limited for what you may want to do about it?
And that's always, I think--I don't want to go over into
the policymaker's venue here, but I think from our perspective
one of the things we have always worried about--and the history
matters here. Surprised in 1991 about a nuclear weapon,
consistently surprised about what he didn't--well, not
surprised, but fully knowledgeable about things that he never,
as UNSCOM left in 1998, fully documenting things they could not
document.
And then we had things like procurement activities that
caused us concern that were clearly intended to deceive and
deny, reconstruction of dual-use facilities that caused us
concerns, and we'll talkabout this next week when we talk about
it in closed session, but there were clear evolutions based on things
that people were quite worried about, notwithstanding the fact it
wasn't all perfect and we always obviously know we're looking at the
tradecraft now, but there's a historical context here of how we've
thought about this fellow that goes back eight or nine years and that's
the context we tried to bring to it.
Senator Snowe. Now, I understand that. But in terms of
policymakers, that makes it extraordinarily difficult. When you
start nuancing words--and you were right in saying, you know,
intelligence is an inexact science; I think we all agree with
that. Therefore, calibrating the threat in the types of words
that are used become ever more important under that scenario.
Director Tenet. Yes, ma'am, but I will also say that, you
know, whether it stands up or it doesn't stand up over the
course of time is something we're going to look at quite
carefully.
When you look at the key judgments and what we said, we
said he had chemical and biological weapons. We said that with
high confidence. We talked about mobile production facilities.
We ascribed confidence levels. But we said things quite
assertively in our key judgments that caused the policymaker to
have and look at this thing in a way that he or she had to
assess risk.
Those are just the facts as we know them today. We can go
back and, of course, we will and look at all of this work. And
make judgments about did we word everything carefully, did we
have the right context and everything. That's appropriate. We
need to go do that as professionals.
But that's the context.
Senator Snowe. I'm just wondering then, would you think
that we then took this action on Iraq on a lesser standard than
imminent?
Director Tenet. Well, I don't want to go back--see, now
we're into a realm of what all the policymakers were thinking
about this. And I don't want to go back and parse their words.
But I think what we looked at--for example, there was a
question raised with me when we talked about this once before
where the question was raised: Isn't Kim Jong Il a more
immediate threat than Saddam Hussein is? And my answer at the
time was Kim Jong Il's progress in the developing of these
weapons have left us with little option to deal with him in a
very complicated environment.
If you go back and look--for example, let's just look at
where we are today, for purposes of the argument. If you go
back and look at--just look at, I know to date we didn't find
chemical and biological weapons. Look at the ballistic missile
program and in fact we were dead on in terms of where that was
going.
So let's posit for example that, as David Kay did in his
interim report, that if he had seed stocks, he could quickly
surge to produce biological weapons with a ballistic missile.
Now, what do you do about that? Do you do something about
it now or do you wait for it to get more difficult? And that's
the conundrum we faced our policymakers with.
They made a choice. We're looking, obviously care a great
deal about how right and how wrong we were. I've said it's
either going to be all right or all wrong. And we've never been
on the ground like this before to figure it out,
notwithstanding the fact that we're going to find places, to be
sure, where we could have done a better job in our own
tradecraft in assessing some of this. But that's the real
conundrum people were left with.
Senator Snowe. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Chambliss?
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Tenet, there's a media story out this morning
that's generated a lot of emotion in folks and it's the one----
Director Tenet. On my part, too, Senator.
Senator Chambliss [continuing]. One relative to a name that
was supposedly provided to the CIA by the Germans on one of the
individuals who I believe flew into the south tower.
Director Tenet. Sir, what I'd like to do in open session is
say to you, first, go back to page 186 of the Joint
Intelligence Committee Open Study and then go back and look at
your classified report, what you did with the House
Intelligence Committee and the JIC inquiry--go back and look at
page 186, and then go look at the classified piece of paper in
your classified report.
And then what I will tell you is, in 1999, the Germans gave
us a name, Marwan--that's it--and a phone number. And we didn't
sit on our hands and I'm not going to go through the rest of it
in open session. They didn't give us a first and a last name
until after 9/11, with then additional data. And let me just
leave it there.
But I would urge you go back and look at your unclassified
and classified report, because that's as far as I want to go
here.
Senator Chambliss. Well, you've confirmed what my sources
have indicated to me, and that is that this was really
piecemeal, kind of, information that was given to us. Prior to
9/11, we did not have, as this media report indicates, the name
of an individual and the telephone number of an individual and
asked by the Germans to follow that individual. Is that a fair
statement?
Director Tenet. Sir, sir, I'm going to be careful in open
session.
You got a name, named Joe, and here's the phone number--
Joe's phone number, no last name. And we did some things to go
find out some things, okay. We can give this all to you, okay.
We never conclusively got there because we didn't have enough,
but we didn't sit around.
But I would urge you to go look at your classified page on
this. Take a look at it. That's all I want to say in open
session.
Senator Chambliss. Director Mueller, I was pleased to hear
you talk about your Office of Intelligence that you've created.
And with reference to that, you talked about the increase in
translators that you have and the increase in analysts. Now,
have you moved those people in there? Do you feel comfortable
with where you are from a resource standpoint with regard to
operating this Office of Intelligence from a intelligence
gathering, translating and analyzing standpoint from a real-
time perspective?
Director Mueller. Let me say the '04 budget, once it was
passed, gave us substantial additional resources that we are
bringing on board this year. We made some requests also in the
'05 budget. It is an ongoing process.
I wouldn't say we're where we want to be at this point, but
we've made substantial strides. And the monies accorded to us
by Congress and the Administration will, by the end of this
year, give us the cadre of analysts that will bring us a great
deal closer to our goal.
Senator Chambliss. And as you and Director Tenet and
Admiral Jacoby know, I have been very focused on this issue of
information sharing. And with relevance to this Office of
Intelligence, what is your relationship with CIA and DIA as
well as NSA relative to sharing of that information back and
forth with that office?
Director Mueller. There was one part of the previous
question I didn't answer and that was with regard to linguists.
There are certain dialects we still have problems with, but we
have doubled, if not tripled, our linguists in a number of the
Middle Eastern languages. So we're on the way to success there.
In terms of information sharing, the Office of
Intelligence, under Maureen Baginski, is an element of it. But
the information sharing is at all levels of our organization. I
get briefed at 7:15 in the morning. I get a briefing at 5
o'clock. And at those briefings, I have individuals from the
CIA, DHS, sitting in in my briefings. I have an FBI senior
supervisorsitting in at George's meetings.
We have had over the last couple of years what the 9/11
commission has called ``transnational intelligence
operations.'' That is where we have operations that may have
come to the attention of the Agency overseas which have
tendrils within the United States. And we have put together
teams to address them and done it exceptionally successfully.
The exchange of information from the top down to the ranks
between our two organizations is far better than it was before
September 11, and is truly remarkable.
The advent of the TTIC, the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center, and some other mechanisms that allow our analysts to
sit together and share information from our various databases
has also contributed to that sharing of information.
I'm not certain--I can say we're not where we ultimately
want to be. There are things that we are still doing, in terms
of communications with other agencies, communications with
state and local, but we've made substantial strides.
And I might let George add to that from his perspective, if
you give me that opportunity.
Director Tenet. I think that the power of the integration,
Senator Chambliss, particularly in TTIC, where now you're going
to have 14 databases--there are FBI criminal files, there are
CIA operational traffic, in addition to data from all other
places--coming together in one place for purposes of doing
threat analysis is an unprecedented development.
Now, to be sure, we have a long way to go to achieve
everything we want to achieve, but from where we were in
setting up this organization to where we are today, and then
when you look at what we're doing across the community,
particularly with FBI and the Intelligence Community, I think,
you know, Senator Rockefeller asked the question, ``Are we
safer today?'' Yes, we are, in this regard, because of the
advances that we've made. You know, you can't protect against
everything but we're in much better shape than we've ever been.
Senator Chambliss. Are those computers talking to each
other as well as people talking to each other?
Director Mueller. There are communications systems that are
talking to each other, yes.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tenet, I'm going to follow up on what Senator Snowe
began. Of the key judgments in the unclassified version of the
NIE, I want to read three and then I want to ask you what your
judgment is today about these three.
The first is that ``Baghdad has chemical and biological
weapons.'' That's right at the top. The second is, ``Baghdad
has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents,
probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin and VX.'' And the
third is, ``All key aspects--R&D, production and
weaponization--of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and
most elements are larger and more advanced than they were
before the Gulf War.''
What is your view of these judgments today?
Director Tenet. Yes, ma'am. I want to go back to what I
said at Georgetown because I did give provisional judgments in
that speech on each of these.
Senator Feinstein. No, I'm asking for your view--the
Intelligence Community's view today. Are these in the hands of
someone else? Were they nonexistent then? Are they hidden? What
is your best judgment today?
Director Tenet. Well, I have to tell you I don't want to
guess, but I think that we are still looking with ISG on the
ground.
Let me give you an example. When David Kay first came back,
he came back and told us about clandestine BW research
facilities, controlled by the Iraqi Intelligence Service, that
we didn't know anything about. Now the question for us is: What
does that mean? Are there production facilities that the IIS
controlled? And the truth is, we're still working through
people and documents. And at this point, I tried, in the speech
I gave, to convey where I thought we were.
But what we will do when Charlie Duelfer raises his hand
and says that's about as much as we can do, we have to write
another National Intelligence Estimate that will take all of
this data on board, inform them about what we found and ask our
analysts to say, what would you say today on the basis of all
the data that you have at your disposal?
We have not yet said take the initial October 30 report--or
whenever he was here--and said rack and stack these against
your judgments--what would this have done if you'd known about
all of these BW finds; what would this have done to your
judgments at the time? We simply haven't done that yet.
Senator Feinstein. Well, I'm one for whom this is very
difficult, because there are very positive judgments made in
this report and we all know what the result has been. And, you
know, people voted to authorize use of force based on what we
read in these reports.
And I think when we send our military out and find nothing
and then Dr. Kay goes over and finds nothing, for the
Intelligence Community, I guess you believe something's going
to materialize. In terms of weaponization and deployment and
then finding nothing, it's a pretty bitter pill to swallow with
respect to the value of intelligence, particularly in a
preemptive war.
Director Tenet. Well, Senator Feinstein, we're going to
talk about this more next week. I'm now looking at all of this,
as you are looking at all of this. As a professional, I care
about whether we're right or wrong, how we did our tradecraft,
what we believe.
Analysts sat down, and the three individuals, primarily our
National Intelligence Officer, who wrote this have been doing
this for a very long time. They believe what they wrote. They
didn't do it cavalierly, and they didn't do it frivolously and
they believe they had a connective logic and a tissue to get
them to their judgments.
So I believe you have to keep working and looking. I
believe you have to know whether this material may have slipped
over a border or fallen into somebody's hands or may be used by
insurgents against us at some point. We have a responsibility
to keep doing this. And we really didn't take charge of this
until July. We're spending a lot of money, and we've got a lot
of people doing it. But from a professional perspective, we
darn well better know, one way or another, and be damn honest
about it at the end of the day because we have that
responsibility. And that's how we feel about it.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. I'd like to continue that
this afternoon.
Director Mueller, good morning.
Director Mueller. Good morning.
Senator Feinstein. The PATRIOT Act gave your agency new
authorities, both as a law enforcement agency and an
intelligence agency. I'd like you, just briefly, to outline how
you're using these authorities, particularly those which help
you work as part of the Intelligence Community, such as
information sharing, and if you could identify any gaps that
remain that need strengthening.
Director Mueller. Let me start with the principal benefit
of the PATRIOT Act to our efforts to protect against another 9/
11 has been the breaking down of walls between the Intelligence
Community and the law enforcement community.
Not all of the breaking down of those walls is attributable
to the PATRIOT Act. Some of it is attributable to the decisions
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court. Now, prior
to September 11, the exchange of information between the
Intelligence Community and thelaw enforcement community was
inhibited by statutes and by court rulings and the like. The PATRIOT
Act has broken down those walls. Now, the law enforcement community can
share intelligence with the Intelligence Community. Since 9/11 and
thanks in part to the PATRIOT Act, the Intelligence Community can share
intelligence with the law enforcement community.
Our biggest threat in the United States is, as Mr. Tenet
pointed out, from groups from overseas who plot overseas, who
plan overseas, who finance from overseas and then send
operatives into the United States to carry out an attack.
In order to be successful against these groups, we have to
share the information. We have to share the information from
whence it may come, and whether it comes from the intelligence
side from the Agency or DIA, and be able to have the
decisionmakers, the policymakers have in front of them the
information from the Intelligence Community, as well as that
which we may have developed in the law enforcement community in
the United States. And the PATRIOT Act has assisted us in doing
that and has made us safer.
There are other relatively minor provisions of the PATRIOT
Act that we can discuss at a later date, but that is the
principal benefit of the PATRIOT Act.
There are certain other issues that were not addressed in
the PATRIOT Act. We have the lone terrorist, not affiliated
necessarily with a foreign government or a foreign
organization, that remains a threat and which we need some
legislation on. That legislation is pending. But that is
basically an overall view of the PATRIOT Act and I think one of
the principal pieces of legislation that we are seeking.
There is one other area, I will tell you, that has been
discussed. And that is the issue of subpoenas and our ability
to get information swiftly in a terrorist investigation. Now,
quite often we are compelled to use national security letters,
which are letters that we give to a telephone company, a credit
card company, where we need information relating to a terrorist
investigation.
And these national security letters have nothing behind
them. There is no judicial process. And all too often we find
that there are companies that just say, we'll get to it when we
want to get to it. It's down at the bottom of the line. And our
concern is often this information, whether it be a telephone
toll or financial information or credit card information, is
too important to have under that scenario.
So one of the things that is being addressed is our request
for administrative subpoena authority, which we currently have
when it comes to addressing narcotics traffickers, for
instance. And so the argument is if we have that authority for
narcotics cases--drug cases--doesn't it make some sense to have
comparable authority when it comes to terrorist cases.
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much. My time is up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank
the witnesses for appearing today and for your service to our
country.
Director Tenet, it is rare when speculation comes face to
face with facts, but that's what has happened in Iraq. The
speculation and supposition that led up to our invasion now
must face the certainties and near certainties that we have
uncovered after spending ten months or more on the ground in
Iraq.
In the words of Dr. Kay, ``It turns out we were all
wrong,'' wrong, I might say, in looking in retrospect, about
the nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, their
numbers, their location, their threat. It is now declassified.
I mean, we're as specific as saying: Here are the most likely
sites you will find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. And
Dr. Kay has said there was nothing there.
We were wrong about the al-Qa'ida connection, which was
alleged before our invasion of Iraq. We were wrong in
speculating about the Iraqi reaction to our invasion, the
flowers in the gun muzzles and things that just didn't happen.
We were wrong about the nature, the complexity, the timetable
and the cost about rebuilding Iraq.
There are only two possible conclusions that I think we can
reach. And if you have a third, please let me know. One is our
intelligence operations failed in a historic way in accurately
assessing the threat in Iraq and what would happen after we
deposed Saddam Hussein or, secondly, that our political leaders
misled the American people in the build-up to the war. That is
a very grave assertion, particularly in a democracy.
If the government misleads the governed in something as
basic and grave as war and the sacrifice of American life,
there can be no more serious charge made in a democracy.
Now I've read your Georgetown speech. And I've tried to
compare it and to figure out which side we come down on here,
whether or not those who assert that intelligence failed that
led to these wrong conclusions or those assert that
intelligence didn't fail, the politicians just misstated what
we told them. Let me go to two specifics. You say on page six
of your Georgetown speech, basically, we didn't find chemical
or biological weapons.
Director Tenet. Yes.
Senator Durbin. All right, I'll give you that. We've gone
to the identified locations, we found nothing, we've come up
empty. On September 19, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld told the
Senate Armed Services Committee, ``We should be just as
concerned about the immediate threat from biological weapons;
Iraq has these weapons.'' Now, that directly contradicts what
you said at Georgetown. You said that we haven't found these
weapons, we don't have these weapons. Secretary Rumsfeld said
that Iraq has these weapons. And then you said in the
Georgetown speech: The Intelligence Community ``never said
there was an imminent threat.''
September 28, 2002, President Bush, in his radio address,
``The danger to our country is grave and it is growing. The
Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, is
rebuilding the facilities to make more and, according to the
British government, could launch a biological or chemical
attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order is given.''
We can't have it both ways. If you were accurate in the
information you gave to this government, then how in the world
can we justify these quotes from the highest elected officials
in our land before this war?
Director Tenet. Senator, you've raised a bunch of issues
and I'd like to----
Senator Durbin. Please.
Director Tenet [continuing]. Try and walk through some of
them with you. First of all, I've now worked in two
Administrations: Democrat and Republican. I've looked at
statements about Iraq going back 10 years, so I'm not going to
go to people's statements. I'm going to focus on the
intelligence and what we said and what we didn't say and how we
believed it.
First of all, I would say to you is it's true at my
Georgetown speech, if you go back and look at Dr. Kay's interim
report, he said we haven't found weapons. Obviously, I said we
haven't found weapons. Obviously we said we judged that he has
chemical and biological weapons. We also said very clearly in
the National Intelligence Estimate that in the BW arena it's
bigger than it was during the Gulf War. I also argued for
patience. I also argued that it is incumbent upon us to work
through this to find out whether we were all right and all
wrong, because we know on the missile side that we were
generally right on the mark. We did better against the UAV
programs. We know that he maintained clandestine BW research
facilities.
If you go back and read David Kay's interim report, the
punch line of course was: We haven't found weapons. And after
being in Baghdad last week and talking to the men and women of
ISG, they continue to have leads, they continue to have people
come to them. And for the purpose of understanding as
professionals whether we were right or wrong, and how we did
this, we need to find out.
Senator Durbin. May I ask you this question: If we are
going to subscribe to a policy of preemption, then we have to
prepare ourselves to invade countries before it is clear that
they're an imminent threat. And the only way you reach that
conclusion is from intelligence. Now we look at the body of
information gathered by our intelligence agencies leading up to
the invasion of Iraq, and with hindsight we say we missed the
mark.
How can you build a policy of preemption on intelligence if
we were so wrong in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq? We
will all concede Saddam Hussein is a bad man, and I'm glad he's
out of power. But many more arguments were made to the American
people to justify this invasion. And it turns out that the bulk
of them were just plain wrong--either bad intelligence or
misleading the people.
How can we fight a war on terrorism or have a policy of
preemption based on what we have just lived through in Iraq?
Director Tenet. Well, sir, you're fighting a war on
terrorism very successfully because of intelligence. You got a
country called Libya to disarm because of intelligence. You got
A.Q. Khan, who I said last year in my public testimony was the
biggest purveyor of nuclear weapons that we had to worry
about--although I didn't name him--and we've dismantled that
network because of intelligence.
We understand that the North Koreans were pursuing an
alternative route to an nuclear weapon using highly enriched
uranium because of intelligence.
Now, we're not perfect, but we're pretty damn good at what
we do. And we care as much as you do about Iraq and whether we
were right or wrong. And we're going to work through it in a
way where we tell the truth as to whether we were right or
wrong.
But at the end of the day, we followed this for eight,
nine, 10 years. We had deep concerns about the history, the
deceit, what he didn't give the U.N. And, as I said in my
Georgetown speech, we worked hard after 1998 to resuscitate
sources, and the record was mixed, and we made judgments on a
narrower band of data. This is a tough business.
Senator Durbin. Mr. Tenet, I'm out of time, here. And I'll
just say this: At some point, we have to reconcile the things
that you've said and the things that were said publicly by the
Administration. And where they are in conflict, someone has to
be held accountable. And I don't know if it'll be done today;
not likely. I don't know if it'll be done by this Committee; I
hope so. But at some day, in this open form of government, we
have to reconcile this clear conflict.
Chairman Roberts. Has the gentleman finished?
Let's see. I can assure the gentleman, as the Chairman of
this Committee, that we will continue the thorough job that we
have done and that as soon as we can work with the intelligence
agencies in regard to issuing a public report, we will do so.
And that commitment has been ongoing from the first.
I'm also interested in the various quotes by Members of
Congress a year ago, 18 months ago, two years ago, in the
previous administration, many of which were more declarative,
more aggressive and more specific than what the Directors
indicated or anybody in the Administration.
So this is a widespread or this is a wide net out here, in
regards to the so-called use of intelligence. That will all be
dealt with, and it will all be made public. I'd like to yield
now to the distinguished Vice Chairman for any additional
questions he might have.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have
two.
And I apologize, but this is important to me. I started out
my statement today just simply by saying that I'm wrestling,
trying to decide whether the world is safer today than it was
when we met a year ago.
Director Tenet, you said that cross-information,
information-sharing is a lot better. Of course, that's one
piece. That is not a complicated question. You, all three, deal
in different ways with that matter every day. It's either, I
think, a yes or it's a no, not for the purposes of securing an
answer from you but for the purposes of, as a nation, facing up
to the truth and what, therefore, how therefore, we're able to
lead our people and influence our people into doing what is
going to be necessary to do to make sure that we are safer in
the event that we are not.
So my first question is, I would repeat the question: Are
we safer today in this country than we were when we met a year
ago? I'd ask all three of you, briefly. I think it's a one-word
answer.
Director Tenet. Yes. I'll start with yes.
Director Mueller. Yes.
Admiral Jacoby. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Okay. Director Tenet, have you
read Admiral Jacoby's testimony?
Director Tenet. I have not had a chance.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Okay. In it, he says, ``Support
for America has dropped in most of the Muslim world. Favorable
ratings in Morocco,''--this won't go on long--``favorable
ratings in Morocco declined from 77 percent in 2000 to 27
percent in the spring; and in Jordan, from 25 percent in 2002,
to 1 percent in May of 2003. In Saudi, expressing confidence in
the United States, they dropped from 63 percent in May of 2002,
to 11 percent in October of 2003.''
Now, you have just answered that the world is a safer
place, all three of you, and with one word. Would you agree
that there is some conflict that we need to be thinking about
seriously in a bipartisan fashion, professionally, as people
who deal with intelligence and care about and love our country,
with the fact that these enormous declines of support give hint
to the creation, as two of you have put in your testimony, the
creation of a world of increased jihadist activity.
And, as you indicated, Director Tenet, at the end of your
testimony you addressed this whole question of poverty and all
that. You did it very well, as you always do, Admiral. And the
whole question of more fertile breeding grounds for radical
political Islam is very much on us.
Now, these are impacts which don't necessarily change your
answers because they have not all yet happened. But if they are
in the process of happening--people are becoming radicalized,
want to kill Americans more, wherever that might be, or those
who support Americans--how does that differentiate or separate
itself from a world being more safe?
Director Tenet. The way you differentiate it, Senator, is,
for example, let's pick a place like Morocco. See, part of this
is what people think of us, and part of this is what people are
doing inside their own governments to reform their governments.
Look at a place like Morocco, where they're committed to
greater economic reform, opening the society to women. You look
at a place like Jordan in terms of recently signing a free
trade agreement, the kind of educational and economic
opportunities the King is trying to bring to the country.
So all of this, yes, we are outlining for you this movement
that I'm talking about that you have to go conquer, half of
this--or defeat--or bring people from alienation to believe
that the society that they live in offers them educational
opportunities and a way out and, therefore, not make them
recruitable. But it's the process of reforming some of these
societies, their movement to change their own internal dynamic.
I mean, what's interesting in the Middle East is we are
sometimes--polling data's interesting--but we are sometimes
themanifestation of their feelings about their own society and their
own government and the fact that there is governments who are aligned
with us.
So there's an equal push on our part to look at all these
people and say, you've got to get on with the process of
reform. You've got to get on with the process of economic
opportunity. And this is a dynamic process.
And somehow, there isn't an American who's going to counter
a Salafist message worth anything. Somehow people also within
those societies are going to have to counter those messages
clerically and with their acts and their deeds, because what
we're doing in the war on terrorism is quite tactical.
We know how to run them down. We know how to build better
mousetraps. We know how to bring things together. We're just
chasing many people all the time. And we're doing it better and
better all the time.
But the back-end strategic help for us is not solely--
certainly not an intelligence issue, but something that we warn
and talk to you about in our papers, to get people to
understand that somebody has to get at the business of
attacking this phenomenon.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. And I would agree with that. I
would also suggest that for every two or three or four or five
countries that you can name, I can name about 20 where things
are going in precisely the opposite direction.
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. And I'm raising this question
not to try to score points, to put you on the point, but to say
we have to be honest with ourselves as professionals who deal
in this field in that we know that these--in Saudi Arabia, good
luck. They're making some changes. How long?
Indonesia--you just go around the world. And we are
deceiving our people if we don't let them know how tough a
fight this is going to be. And I think that is what I wanted to
hear from you. And I think that you've done it in conventional
ways, but not in ways that----
Director Tenet. Well, sir, I think in my statement, I mean,
I apologize here. I didn't mean to interrupt you. But I think
in my statement when I tried to give you the sense, because
we're talking to the American people here, I know it's great
that we've done great work against the central al-Qa'ida
leadership, but there's a very important concept. We are still
at war against a movement that we're going to have to get
after.
And just because we've been successful at preempting and
stopping an enormous amount of loss of life here and around the
world, there's still an enormous amount of sacrifice required
if we're going to stay at this. People who say that this is
exaggerated don't look at the same world that I look at. And
there's going to be an enormous amount of continued focus and
attention required on this issue. It's not going away any time
soon.
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, if I could, that was exactly the
reason that I put it in my testimony. This is about the
potential, it's about the long-term, it's about the kinds of
things that we need to, as an Intelligence Community, put our
attention and resources and skill mix against because I think
you asked the question over the last year. What I'm trying to
lay out in the testimony is the environment that exists and the
activity by nation states and other movements to deal with this
issue. And we're in this for the long haul. And it's a major
issue, sir.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a
couple of questions also.
Director Tenet, I want to go back to Senator Durbin's
point, because I think it is a valid point and it's certainly
been the object of where most of the criticism with reference
to Iraq has been directed.
Now, after the Gulf War in '92, we know that he possessed
weapons of mass destruction. We knew at that point in time that
he had used those weapons of mass destruction. We have
interrogated individuals, we've made the searches throughout
Iraq, and we have not found either evidence of destruction or
disposal of the weapons that we knew he had following the Gulf
War, nor have we found evidence of possession of weapons of
mass destruction that may have been manufactured in the
interim, 10-year, 12-year period, whatever.
Now, with your experience in the Intelligence Community,
can you draw any conclusions from those two relative to what
may have happened to either the original weapons that he
possessed or weapons that may have been manufactured subsequent
to the Gulf War?
Director Tenet. Sir, look, there are three or four things
we have to--one, when you're talking about the kind of
magnitude of things you're looking it, you're looking at things
where you're talking about particularly BW capability; it fits
in people's garages. So we're not looking at big bulk things
that you're going to find quite easily.
Did some of the stuff go over borders? I don't know. Some
people have posited that it went here or went there. I don't
know the answer to that question.
Am I surprised that, for example, given the fact that we
warned our military to be prepared to deal with chemical
weapons, that we haven't found chemical weapons, yes, I am
surprised, because we certainly believed that he would use
those weapons if the regime was at risk. That's what we
posited--regime risk and the warning to our military. You know,
this is a great mystery to me.
And one of the things we have to do quite professionally is
look at this and try to figure out what happened here. And
we'll find out. We may have come to different judgments. All
I'm saying is, this Intelligence Community and the people that
did this work didn't have any outcome in mind. They did it
honestly. This is what they believed. And you're going to look
through it, and we're going to look through it. And we're going
to find things that--we're going to find warts. For sure, we're
going to find things that we think could have been done better.
At the end of the day, we're going to have to ask ourselves
the question of do you think they made reasonable judgments,
and do you think they could have come to different conclusions?
And we need a little bit of time and patience to figure all
that out.
I wish I could tell you I knew the answer to your question.
I don't.
Senator Chambliss. Is that part of what the investigative
team that's still within Iraq is looking for?
Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
Senator Chambliss. You're going to wish you'd never given
that speech in Georgetown by the time we finish dissecting it.
[Laughter.]
But in that speech you made the quote on an issue that we
have talked about over and over again. And that is, you said
that we did not have enough of our own human intelligence. We
had difficulty penetrating the Iraqi regime with human sources.
Now, we've talked about this in private sessions, but what
can you tell us today for the American public to be able to
understand were the difficulties, number one, in penetrating
the Iraqi regime and what efforts did you make to penetrate
that regime?
Director Tenet. Well, sir, after 1998 when we lost the
U.N., we obviously realized that because of our intimacy and
involvement with the U.N.--which has since been blown in public
and everybody knows it--when we were on the ground, we
recognized that we had to reconstitute our own unilateral
capability. It's an effort that Charlie Allen, who you know,
launched on my behalf as the Associate Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence.
And here's the bottom line on the HUMINT side. Yes, we
recruited a number of people that are all on the periphery. His
scientists and the people that you cared about never came out.
We never got access to them in a way that would have been
beneficial. And essentially, we didn't have our own, kind of,
unilateral access that we would have all liked--not because of
a lack of effort, but because of how he ran this target, how
closely he controlled this society.
But at the end of the day, my judgment was we didn't have
enough of our own. So let's not make any excuses and get on
with it. And we had other HUMINT and we had liaison reporting
and we had defector reporting, all of which is--some of which
was very interesting and compelling to us. As much as we used
that kind of data in terrorism or other issues, we don't
dismiss people; we vetted it. Some of it, we're finding today,
there were discrepancies, and such is the nature of this
business.
Go look at what happened in the pre-war run-up and take a
look at the quality of HUMINT and support to the military. You
know, this is excellent across the board. And General Franks
would say so and General Abizaid would say so. Different
environment, different tactics, different strategy, and that's
where we are, sir.
And you know, as I know, when I said in the speech we're
rebuilding our HUMINT capability, it by no means means that
we're there yet. I mean, we went through, as I said--you know,
when I first became Deputy Director, there were 12 people being
trained. Nobody looked at recruiting. Nobody looked at the
infrastructure. Nobody much cared about it, as near as I can
tell.
And we've come all the way back to put ourselves in a very
healthy situation that we're going to need another five years
of creativity and support to really get the country back to
where it needs to be. There's no simple shortcut here.
Senator Chambliss. And what date in time was that when you
became Assistant Director?
Director Tenet. 1995, I think, sir--1996, some time. It's
been so long.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thank you.
I'd like to ask both Director Mueller and Director Tenet
about a concern I have. And that is that we have as our goal
the integration of various agencies and cooperation of these
agencies. In fact, we created the Department of Homeland
Security in an effort to integrate and coordinate at a higher
level. And now, in his January State of the Union address, the
President announced the establishment of the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center to coordinate threat information among FBI,
CIA, and Department of Homeland Security, merge, and analyze
information collected domestically and abroad.
In September of 2003, the President issued a directive
creating the Terrorist Screening Center, which has a mandate to
develop and maintain, to the extent permitted by law, the most
accurate and current information possible about individuals
known or suspected of being involved in terrorism.
The Terrorist Threat Integration Center is in the CIA. The
Terrorist Screening Center is out of the FBI.
And I asked Director Ridge the other day, Secretary Ridge,
did you lose the battle at the table? Weren't you supposed to
be the coordinating group? When they gave out stove pipes, did
you lose? Were you gone that day? Tell me, how are you working
to coordinate what apparently, or to most people on the
outside, you'd think would all be together in one place that is
now in separate agencies?
Director Mueller. Well, let me start if I could, and make
an initial distinction between collection and the analysis
function. There are people that say one big integrated agency
is what we want. With integration, you therefore will have the
pulling together of all these dots that everybody's looking
for. But when it comes to collection within the United States,
traditionally and for very good reasons, the FBI has been a
collector. When it's overseas, it has been the CIA.
When you take a subject matter such as terrorism, which
requires the bringing together of the information that has been
collected by the CIA and collected by the FBI, because it's a
transnational intelligence challenge, there has to be a
mechanism both on the operational side as well as on the
analytical side to pull it together.
And what the Terrorist Threat Integration Center does, on
the analytical side, is take the information from both of our
agencies and analyze it, not collect but analyze it with access
to all of our databases so that you can do a search.
Currently, within the various databases by the persons we
have assigned from the various agencies, including the
Department of Homeland Security, if you've got a subject, you
want to do an analytical product, you want to analyze a threat,
you have access to all the intelligence information that has
been gathered by the various agencies.
When it comes to the other agency that you mentioned, the
Terrorist Screening Center, the purpose of the screening center
was two-fold. First of all, it is to take the various lists
that were in a variety of different components and assure that
you have a list that has names on it that have been vetted with
properly being on that list, because things happen if you are
on that list. And so it's a put-together list of those that
have an association with terrorism.
But the second part of it also is when somebody comes in
through the border or somebody comes to our attention, there
has to be follow-up on it. In the United States, it is the
joint terrorism task forces that are responsible for doing the
follow-up on a person who is on that list.
Senator Durbin. That suggests what we hope will be
achieved; and that is the coordination of different agencies
and the coordination of this information.
Now, Director Mueller, your inspector general's audit at
the end of December was troubling--and I'm sure you read it--
when he talked about what he found at the FBI. He said the
FBI's efforts--and this is on the FBI's efforts to improve
sharing of intelligence and information--and he stated, ``The
process for disseminating intelligence was ad hoc and
communicated orally from manager to staff. One CIA detailee
characterized the informal process as disorganized, noting that
information does not flow smoothly within the FBI, let alone
externally. In the eight months the CIA detailee had been at
the FBI, the detailee said, `Information goes into a black hole
when it comes into this building.' ''
Director Mueller. Well, a couple of things about that.
Senator, I'd like to go back. Number one, it was done some time
ago, and we've made tremendous changes since then.
Senator Durbin. This is a report of December 2003.
Director Mueller. I know, but the work that went into that
report was done some time ago.
But I think that is perhaps--and I'd like to go and look at
the report because I don't have it in front of me. But I don't
think that is an accurate description of where we are. We are
not where we want to be, but we are well on the way there in
terms of integrating intelligence and information within the
FBI, as well as in our efforts to disseminate it throughout the
Intelligence Community.
We did not have, prior to September 11, something called a
reports officer. We have put out, since September 11, to the
Intelligence Community in excess, I think, of 2,000 reports
now. They're not only reports that go out throughout the
Intelligence Community, but also reports that are used
internally within the FBI.
I would take exception to that portion of the report that
you have read. I think we've made tremendous strides. As I've
indicated before in answer to previous questions, we have the
Office of Intelligence. I have Maureen Baginski, who has come
over from the NSA, as the headof the Office of Intelligence to
make certain that we increase our ability to share the information
within the FBI, but also without or outside the FBI.
I don't think that is a fair characterization.
Senator Durbin. Would you be kind enough to respond, then,
if you would, in writing to that report from your inspector
general?
Director Mueller. Absolutely.
Senator Durbin. Thank you.
Chairman Roberts. Admiral Jacoby, you and your analysts
have done, I think, an outstanding job in keeping myself and
this Committee informed of our ongoing efforts to find out what
happened to Captain Scott Speicher. I want to thank you for
that.
Could you give us an update on the current status of this
effort in terms of trying to ascertain his fate?
Admiral Jacoby. Yes, Mr. Chairman. First, I looked at the
most recent notification that came to Congress and it is still
basically up to date. There are a relatively small number of
active leads still being pursued by the ISG in Iraq. There's
still some forensic work being done by FBI laboratories on the
beam with the initials on it and some other materials which
have been brought back. And we don't have a final report from
them.
It remains an active case. As I have promised you all the
way through, our assumption is that we will continue to look
for Captain Speicher as if he is alive until such time that we
find out otherwise. And that's where we are, sir.
Chairman Roberts. I truly appreciate that. I think it's not
only on his behalf, but for every man and woman who wears the
uniform.
Director Mueller, in a speech in New York, December 19,
2002, you stated, ``Worldwide we have prevented as many as 100
terrorist attacks or plots including a number here in the
U.S.'' In the year since you made that statement, or years now,
how do you assess the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland?
Has it simply increased or diminished or we're doing a lot
better? You know, where are we?
Director Mueller. Well again, this goes back to Senator
Rockefeller's question of are we safer today than we were a
year ago or two years ago?
Chairman Roberts. But has the threat increased or
diminished or changed?
Director Mueller. I think the threat has changed because of
the taking away of the sanctuary of Afghanistan, because of the
taking away of a number of their principal leaders. I think the
threat has changed to the extent that it is much more
fragmented. It is fragmented throughout the world. And we
cannot look at a relatively organized structure, hierarchy,
within al-Qa'ida and expect that to be the nucleus of the
planning for future attacks.
What we can anticipate is that various groups around the
world with a desire to kill Americans, whether it be overseas
or within the United States, may be planning, may be going to
persons who were loosely or perhaps even closely affiliated
with al-Qa'ida for the technical training on the explosives or
the financing, but are basically random players throughout the
world.
And it is a changed threat, in my mind, to the United
States, no less of a threat than we had perhaps a year ago,
perhaps a more significant threat. But we are safer because of
the actions that have been taken against al-Qa'ida and the
actions that have been taken by Homeland Security, by the FBI
and by the CIA and by others within the United States.
Chairman Roberts. Director Tenet, I'm going to paraphrase,
since everybody else seems to be or has a penchant of quoting
things in the press. Basically I'm paraphrasing from Chairman
Goss of the House Intelligence Committee in statements that he
has made or allegedly made--I'll call him up and apologize
later. In regards to 1998 on, upwards to Iraqi Freedom and the
kickoff of that, one of the things that the Chairman indicated
was everybody said we should have connected the dots, we should
have done better in regards to the NIE. But he indicated that
there were not many dots to connect.
And you had, sort of, alluded to that in regard to our
collection assets, in regard to HUMINT, in regard to MASINT, in
regard to SIGINT, that we had to go back in and reconstruct
from '98 on what UNSCOM was doing. And I'm extremely concerned
about that, given the priority that Iraq had received by all of
our national security experts.
Could you, sort of, comment on that, in regard to whether
or not Chairman Goss pretty well nailed it on the head?
Director Tenet. Well, I don't know, since I'm testifying in
front of him this afternoon, I don't know that I want to take
him on in open session. Let me go back, Senator, for the record
and give you my view of it, Okay?
Because it's that internal access that was most important.
Obviously, you've got imagery, and you've got signals
intelligence, which were important to us. But it's the internal
access piece that I think is the piece that created the
greatest perturbation in our coverage here and our knowledge.
So let me come to you for the record and give you my sense of
it.
Chairman Roberts. I appreciate that. I'm going to ask you
one other question, and then I know you want to go to lunch.
Has the Intelligence Community noted any increase or any
diminution of Cuba's support to terrorism since September 11,
2001?
And the second part of it is, what is the likelihood that
the resumption of U.S. trade with Cuba could hasten the
economic and political reform in Cuba?
Director Tenet. I'd respectfully take those for the record,
sir.
Chairman Roberts. All right. Thank you for coming. The
hearing is closed.
[Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]