Hearings
Hearing Type:
Open
Date & Time:
Wednesday, September 9, 2020 - 3:00pm
Location:
Dirksen SD-G50
Witnesses
Congressman
John F.
Tierney (Fmr.)
Member of the Public Interest Declassification Board
Acting Director
Gregory M.
Koch
Information Management Office (IMO)
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
Full Transcript
[Senate Hearing 116-496]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-496
OPEN HEARING: DECLASSIFICATION POLICY
AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2020
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
43-457 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Acting Chairman
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho RON WYDEN, Oregon
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ROY BLUNT, Missouri ANGUS KING, Maine
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KAMALA HARRIS, California
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MICHAEL BENNET, Colorado
BEN SASSE, Nebraska
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
----------
Chris Joyner, Staff Director
Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
SEPTEMBER 9, 2020
OPENING STATEMENTS
Page
Moran, Hon. Jerry, a U.S. Senator from Kansas.................... 1
Rubio, Hon. Marco, a U.S. Senator from Florida................... 3
Warner, Hon. Mark R., a U.S. Senator from Virginia............... 5
Wyden, Hon. Ron, a U.S. Senator from Oregon...................... 6
WITNESSES
Koch, Gregory M., Acting Director, Information Management Office,
Office of the Director of National Intelligence................ 7
Tierney (Fmr.), John F., Congressman, Member, Public Interest
Declassification Board......................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 32
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Responses of John F. Tierney (Fmr.) to Questions for the Record.. 38
Responses of Mr. Gregory M. Koch to Questions for the Record..... 52
OPEN HEARING: DECLASSIFICATION POLICY AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2020
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:15 p.m. in Room
G-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Marco Rubio (Acting
Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Rubio, Warner, Risch, Collins, Blunt,
Cornyn, Sasse, Feinstein, Wyden, Heinrich, and King.
Chairman Rubio. This hearing will come to order.
This afternoon, we're going to welcome Mr. Greg Koch from
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who, I
advise our members, we're having trouble getting linked in, but
hopefully we'll be able to resolve that here at some point.
Everyone knows we have a third vote here that's pending as
well.
Former Representative John Tierney from the Public Interest
Declassification Board will discuss declassification policy. In
particular, we'll be discussing striking a balance between
protecting our Nation's classified material and ensuring
historical documents can safely get their moment in the sun.
I'm prepared to defer my opening statement for the
following reasons. Senator Moran has the chair hearing at 3:30
and in-between has to go vote. If it's okay with both of you,
I'll just give my time to Senator Moran so he can open with
some comments since he's joined us here today on this issue.
And then, that way, he doesn't have to miss a vote and can
chair his important hearing at 3:30 where hopefully your WebEx
is working.
Vice Chairman Warner. Mr. Chairman, can I reserve some
special chit or favor from Jerry?
Chairman Rubio. Absolutely. You should take him for
everything he's got in that bag of chits.
So, Senator Moran, do you want to provide your comments so
you have plenty of time to vote and not miss your hearing?
STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It's a
real privilege to testify--to be in front of this Committee. I
hold the Intel Committee in high regard and recognize its
important role in securing the security of our citizens. And I
appreciate the consideration that you and Senator Warner
provided--and the timing.
Members of the Committee: Thank you very much for the
opportunity to advocate for declassification reform and for
having this open setting, Mr. Chairman. As you may be aware, I
am a sponsor, alongside a member of this Committee, Senator
Wyden, of Senate Bill 3733, the Declassification Reform Act.
Senator Wyden and I worked on this issue for a long time.
It is surprising to me that the end result is so
straightforward and relatively simple, but it is an attempt to
begin the process of modernizing declassification by
designating the director of National Intelligence as the
executive agent responsible for promoting programs, processes,
and systems related to declassification.
Though the bill itself rests within the jurisdiction of
another committee, this Committee has previously considered
this bill as an amendment offered by Senator Wyden to the
Intelligence Authorization Act. I appreciate the discussion of
this bill, which many of you have personally visited with me on
the floor and throughout the Capitol complex.
The conversations in today's hearing underscore recognition
that the process which guides our Nation's release of
declassified information are antiquated and are unable to keep
up with the overwhelming flood of digital data that is
classified on a daily basis.
Congress has been told repeatedly over the years that the
system is unsustainable. Last year, the Director of the
Information Security Oversight Office wrote to the President
that, ``The current framework is unsustainable and desperately
requires modernization.''
In 2016, the Public Interest Declassification Board
reported the classification system is, ``No longer able to
handle the current volume and forms of information, especially
given the exponential growth of digital information.''
Four years later, there's little evidence that the problem
is on a path to being solved. The current system holds on to
records that no longer require classification and its impacts
to taxpayers is estimated to be $18 billion per year. And it
denies public access to information that can be used to hold
the Government accountable.
As the Public Interest Declassification Board notes, the
overwhelmed system hurts us policymakers as well. Senator Wyden
approached me in late 2018 and asked me to join him in an
effort to craft legislation that would begin to address this
problem.
While I indicated my great regard for members of this
Committee, I am not one of them. And so, there might be a
question as why is this an interest to me. And certainly, the
ability to save taxpayer dollars is of interest to me. The
ability to be more transparent to the American public is of
interest to me. And the ability for us as policymakers to have
the necessary information available to us is important to me.
Protecting those taxpayers to the tune of billions that is
spent on classification and ensuring transparency from the
Federal Government and the ability to do that without
jeopardizing national security is a priority.
For well over a year, we've consulted with experts from the
Public Interest Declassification Board, Information Security
Oversight Office, the National Archives, other outside experts,
the officials from our Nation's intelligence agencies as well
as staff from this Intelligence Committee. We know technical
solutions, such as artificial intelligence and machine
learning, exist to facilitate bringing our system into the 21st
century. And we know individual agencies are taking steps with
some of this technology to address the issue, but more
coordinated effort that implements best practices is clearly
required.
The final product, the Declassification Reform Act, adopts
the key recommendation from the latest report issued in May by
the Public Interest Declassification Board. Senator Wyden and I
are not under the impression that naming an executive agent
will resolve every problem associated with classifying and
declassifying information, but we do believe appointing an
official with sufficient authority to implement changes across
the Federal Government is a really good first step.
From our consultations over the past year, we know that
there is resistance, and suggested improvements to the
Declassification Reform Act. And we also recognize there are
other ideas that can facilitate reform. I'm pleased today's
hearing will seek to flesh out our bill and other ideas to
address the problem of this magnitude.
Whatever the direction that this Committee determines to
move forward with reform, resources will be necessary to
implement it. As a member of the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee, please consider me an ally in this endeavor. I've
been pleased to join Senator Wyden in this effort and I'm
equally eager to work with the members of this Committee in
achieving declassification reform that is long overdue and yet
protects American citizens and our national security.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you, again, for having this open
hearing that allows me to testify. And I thank you and the
Committee members for their time and the opportunity to be here
today.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
FLORIDA
Chairman Rubio. Thank you, Senator Moran. And thank you for
being here. I'm going to sort of condense my opening statement
in the interest of time.
You know, the Congress established the Public Interest
Declassification Board to advise the Executive Branch on the
identification, the review, and the release of records. In May
2020, they released a report on reforming this process and it
recommended sweeping changes to the way that we declassify
records. And today, we're going to look to our witness, former
Congressman Tierney, to explain those recommendations.
Let me just say broadly, the Intelligence Community agrees
that reform is needed. The backlog of historical documents is
large. The system for moving documents to review is completely
outdated, and the standards, quite frankly, are sometimes
inconsistent throughout the national security establishment.
I am concerned, however, that the recommendations don't
align with the ODNI's current role, given that they have
neither the authority nor the expertise to serve as the leader
of the declassification enterprise for the entire government,
which is one of the issues that we've discussed in terms of
jurisdiction for this Committee. For example, they are not and
they should not be in a position at the ODNI to set the
declassification rules for the Department of Defense's war
plans or nuclear programs.
So, we look forward to talking to our witnesses about
ODNI's view of the declassification process and business
practices, including the prospects of achievable reform within
the context of the limits of the ODNI's authority. Separately,
I think the subject of this hearing allows us to emphasize a
related point, and that's the difference between a process of
responsible declassification of secrets that don't need to be
secret and selfish, irresponsible leaks.
The reason we classify things is not because you try to
keep things from people. It is because if it is revealed, you
will reveal how you learned about those things, and the people
or entities you're collecting on will realize that you have
accesses to information and cut you off from more important
information in the future. So, this is one of the main reasons
why things are kept secret.
That is, of course, balanced with the default position,
generally, of transparency from government. And it's necessary.
We need transparency in order to have accountability that our
system of government requires. So, it has to be balanced
between these two equities, protecting the safety and security
of the American people through our ability to learn valuable
information about adversaries and potential adversaries, with
the need of the American people for transparency on everything
the Government does.
I would say that those who--and by that, I'm actually very
proud of this Committee that by and large has been very
responsible in my 10 years on this Committee with the
information we come across. No matter where we fall on the
issues, I think it's fair to say this Committee has never been,
in my time on it, a source of these sorts of things.
But, there are those who do, outside of this Committee,
casually dismiss the responsibility of holding classified
information. Many of them have, frankly, either never sat
through a briefing or been read into billion-dollar programs
that if revealed, would leave our Nation blind and deaf to the
threats that we faced. They've never met and heard about the
brave men and women who risk their lives every single day to
prevent the next terrorist attack or to steal the plans for a
deadly new weapons system.
These are the secrets that Al-Qaeda, that China, that Iran,
that Russia, and others seek--and they would use that
information to do us harm. These secrets need to stay secret,
but not forever. An agreed-upon declassification process that
allows review of secret documents to be sure that those secrets
can be given their day in the sun without harming people or
programs or the American taxpayer. Done responsibly, that would
build trust between the American people and their government.
So, Mr. Koch and his colleagues make sure that that happens for
the Intelligence Community.
But, some are not willing to play by the rules,
unfortunately. People who have put their lives on the line to
give us information deserve better. And to see their hard won
secrets splashed across the pages of the New York Times or the
Washington Post just because a bureaucrat or a politician
wanted to score some cheap political point for their own
benefit.
Our Nation deserves better than that. Our people deserve
better than that. They pay taxes so their government can
provide for a common defense. And we spend those taxes on
technological breakthroughs, on brilliant mathematicians, and
clever computer scientists who could make 10 times their salary
by working somewhere else.
These people work for years to gain access to these
secrets, the secrets that keep us safe from a terrorist attack,
or from the next enormous hack from China or somewhere else, or
to stop an oligarch's plans to try to influence and steal an
election.
Then, they see that access evaporate when someone decides
that they are above that higher mission and that scoring a
political point is more important than protecting our country
and honoring our taxpayers. And then, the trust is destroyed,
those dollars dissolve as they never existed, our allies
suddenly consider us a security risk, and it is no
overstatement to say that people die.
From Edward Snowden to a politician who wants to be the
first to break news, we the American people suffer for their
selfish acts. And who benefits? Maybe the politicians snag a
few headlines for a few hours on an interview on cable news,
but the real winner ultimately is our adversaries.
All that said, I want to take a minute to thank the
professionals on whose shoulders these declassification
decisions rest. Our ODNI briefer, Mr. Koch, represents a very
small group of people who, in the last three years, has been a
vital partner for this Committee. We sought to reveal
information the right way, after working with the Intelligence
Community to ensure we were doing no harm.
All five volumes of the Russia report passed through his
shop for declassification review. And we greatly appreciate his
efforts, their efforts, to protect our secrets and yet ensure
the American people were able to see our work.
I also want to thank Senator Sasse for his perspective, as
an historian and an academic, and his leadership in ensuring
that declassification is done properly, while again protecting
our investment in our Intelligence Community.
Of course, the Vice Chairman, who has taken an interest in
this, and Senator Moran who was here today. And on this
Committee, especially Senator Wyden, who has been a leader,
perhaps the leader, on trying to reform. Not ``perhaps''--is
the leader on trying to reform the declassification process.
So, again, thank you, Senator Moran, for being here.
And let me just say, as a housekeeping item, we'll let
everyone know when the votes are coming and so forth. This is
our first experience with WebEx.
We are not, by nature, a very open-to-the-public kind of
Committee. So, we are struggling with that as well. But, we'll
do the best we can as we hope to work through some of these
technical glitches in the interim. So, I do ask everybody for
their patience. It has nothing to do with keeping something
secret or declassified, we promise that, on this one.
So, thank you. To the Vice Chairman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
VIRGINIA
Vice Chairman Warner. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And
let me thank my friend, Senator Moran, my friend, Senator
Wyden, for taking on this issue. I think it is extraordinarily
timely. I do hope we're going to get to hear from Congressman
Tierney and Mr. Koch. I've got a number of questions for him.
I know declassification is a bit more technical than some
of the issues that we grapple with, but it is fitting that we
should have an open session to discuss it.
I think we all would agree that today's declassification
system is broken. It's outdated, slow, bulky, costly, and
almost hopelessly inadequate for the digital age.
Agencies are using a fragmented, paper-based system that
lacks the resources, uniformity, and technology to keep pace
with the exploding volume of digital records. This leads to
errors, puts classified information at risk, and erodes
Americans' trust in the system.
A quarter of a century ago, a commission led by the late
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a former Member of this
Committee, found that while secrecy is important for security
operations, policy discussions, and weapons systems, and also
found that excessive secrecy has significant negative
consequences when the public cannot be engaged in informed
debate, which is extraordinarily timely now in terms of
election security. When policymakers are not fully informed and
government cannot be held accountable for its actions.
Furthermore, excessive classification saps resources needed
from protecting those secrets that truly must be kept. I agree
with the Chairman. Those secrets that are critical, they must
be kept and honored in, I think, a greater way.
But, my fear is in today's digital age, if anything, the
new solution seems much worse--the ease with which tens of
millions of new documents are classified every year. So, I'm
going to be anxious to hear from our witnesses on how the
declassification system is functioning. And I'm sure we'll have
questions.
And I want to, like the Chairman, recognize the very
important work of Senator Wyden, who, without his constant
persistence, I'm not sure we'd even be at this point.
I would like to now cede the balance of my time to Senator
Wyden for some opening comments as well.
STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Wyden. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. And I especially want to thank my co-sponsor, Senator
Moran, who I know is getting out the door, and also Chairman
Rubio. Open hearings are rare, and I very much appreciate him
doing this.
Let me start by saying that when our country's safety is at
stake, there is a very real need to classify documents
essential to protecting American lives. What there is no need
for is a dilapidated, out of control classification system that
costs taxpayers more than $18 billion a year and--get this,
colleagues--cannot even distinguish between what should and
should not be kept secret.
The classification system is so outdated and dysfunctional
that when it comes time to declassify a document, the agencies
that have to sign off don't even have the ability to
communicate about it securely online.
So, here's what happens, colleagues. Intelligence officials
have to print out the documents. They put them in a bag and
drive around from agency to agency. And if they get stuck in
traffic, they better bring a bag lunch.
Now, watching these intelligence officials march around
with their documents might make for a funny ``Saturday Night
Live'' skit, but it is an absurd waste of taxpayer money and
it's damaging to our national security and our democracy.
Documents that should not be classified are just piling up in
secret databases. The system is choking on itself and it's
getting worse each year as a flood of new information gets
classified digitally.
As the Chairman said, there is widespread consensus there
is a serious problem here. There's a widespread consensus that
modernizing the declassification system is the only solution.
There are lots of good ideas for how to do it. The only thing
missing is somebody to take responsibility and get it done.
So, that's what Senator Moran and I are doing: bipartisan
legislation that would implement the privacy board's
recommendations and direct the Director of National
Intelligence to take the leadership role. They're already
responsible for information management, information technology,
and the protection of sources and methods. The DNI is already
responsible for developing uniform policies within the
Intelligence Community across the Government. Solutions to this
longstanding problem are at hand.
One last point. And Chairman Rubio, I'd like just to make
sure that I impart this to you because I think you raised the
central concern that I've heard about, the Department of
Defense. The reform Senator Moran and I are urging does not put
the DNI in charge of deciding what DOD secrets are
declassified. It's about modernizing systems for declassifying
information that the Department of Defense and other agencies
have already determined are no longer classified.
So, I'm sure we're going to have a good discussion. Mr.
Chairman, again, thank you for your courtesy and the
opportunity to be here.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you. So, my understanding Mr. Koch is
on.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY M. KOCH, ACTING DIRECTOR, INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Koch. Acting Chairman Rubio, Vice Chairman Warner, and
Members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you
on this panel to present the Intelligence Community's
perspective on declassification reform.
I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss with you
declassification, one of the most important, often overlooked,
oversubscribed, and misunderstood areas of the information
security program. Today, I hope to give you a better
understanding of the current declassification landscape, share
an IC perspective on proposed government-wide reform, and
discuss the level of effort that real reform will require.
As the Committee is likely aware, the U.S. Government's
declassification review processes are not ideal for the digital
age and likely require significant change in order to keep pace
with the massive increase in digital information eligible for
declassification. With limited resources and subject matter
expertise dedicated solely to declassification review, a
relatively small workforce faces a daunting task in processing
requests from the massive repositories of records, which by
some estimates exceeded the equivalent of four million cubic
feet of paper in the IC alone.
Facing those kinds of numbers, Federal agencies undoubtedly
need and support classification reform.
Modernization must occur to meet the demands of the digital
age as well as support transparency to the public, while
simultaneously safeguarding national security information.
IC recognizes the critical importance of public interest in
our efforts to be transparent with the American people. As
such, the ODNI, in consultation with IC elements, works
diligently to support declassification and public release
requests for national intelligence information, not only from
the public but also from congressional committees and the
President, including, but not limited to, a large volume of
information related to Argentinian human rights abuses;
information relating to use of our surveillance authorities;
intelligence information related to Department of Justice
Inspector General investigations; and the five volumes of this
Committee's report on its Russian active measures
investigations.
In addition, ODNI facilitated an IC review for release of
national intelligence information on a wide range of topics,
including materials on the 50th anniversary of the Tet
Offensive. IC elements also continue to process thousands of
Freedom of Information Act, Mandatory Declassification Review,
and Privacy Act requests each year. The IC invests in and
continues to prioritize these efforts because they are
important to the public's understanding of the challenges
facing our Nation.
While the ODNI continues to work across the IC to improve
internal declassification processes and systems, larger
investments in people and technology are required to see real
change. In that vein, the IC appreciates the goals and
objectives of the Declassification Reform Act. However, an
initial review of the legislation surfaced multiple concerns.
First and foremost, any proposed reform must be consistent
with the IC's obligation to protect sources and methods and our
most sensitive classified information from unauthorized
disclosure. Reform efforts must also address the individual
departments and agencies, such as Departments of Defense and
Energy, which also have significant classification and
declassification equities.
Additionally, the required investment and wide sweeping
whole-of-government change envisioned by the PIDB report and
the legislation it informed requires more agency program
analysis to understand and account for all equities.
The IC agrees modernization is imperative and looks forward
to more discussion on capability, capacity, and the actual
price tag of accomplishing the intended objectives of the
proposed legislation.
A specific concern to the IC is the recommendation to make
the DNI the government-wide executive agent for
declassification, responsible for all policies and processes of
the U.S. Government. ODNI believes that such an approach takes
the ODNI well beyond its intended role. The DNI is a delegated
authority from the President to classify information as are
other agencies in accordance with Executive Order 13526--
Classified National Intelligence Information.
The DNI classification and declassification
responsibilities and competencies apply to intelligence and
intelligence-related information within the 17 agencies and
components that make up the IC, not to information located
throughout the entire Federal Government. As you know, the
DNI's authority generally does not extend beyond the IC.
A government-wide EA role for declassification is not only
resource intensive, it also supposes that one EA is responsible
for classification and that all information is treated the
same. That assumption is false and will likely lead to
unintended consequences.
Many agencies have delegated original classification
authorities specific to their holdings. The ODNI does not have
the capacity or the expertise to govern declassification of
information created, collected, classified, and held by the
entire Federal Government. As such, charging the ODNI with this
broader mandate would have negative consequences and distract
from our core mission of protecting its intelligence sources,
methods, and activities.
This expanded role for ODNI is also in conflict with, and
contrary to, the ODNI's constitution as a smaller integration
body, rather than a larger operational organization. The
proposed legislation describes an enormous endeavor to reform
declassification, and the likelihood of success cannot rest
with one lead agency. Any government structure must address the
equities of all of the owning government agencies who have
individual experience and inherent authority over their
classified information.
Consistent with the concerns outlined regarding the EA
role, we also believe the DNI is not well suited to chair a
committee overseeing government-wide declassification efforts.
While the ODNI would welcome further discussion on the proposed
creation of an Executive Committee on Declassification Programs
and Technology, the ODNI recommends the Committee also engage
with other federal agencies with longstanding declassification
programs, such as DOD, DOE, and State, on proposals for
declassification reform.
In the midst of discussion about declassification
governance reforms, we must not lose sight of the way the
declassification mission is changing fundamentally. As I
mentioned previously, the overall volume of information
requiring declassification review is growing exponentially as
agencies produce more and more digital information.
With such a flood of information production, the IC agrees
that investments in IT will be required to deal with the
growing volumes of information collected and produced in the
digital age, along with many years' worth of existing analog
and digital holdings that may hold valuable historical
insights.
There are opportunities to apply advanced technologies,
such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, to
augment declassification specialists. Incorporating new
technology would reduce some labor-intensive steps, support
consistency and referrals during the review process, and
possibly identify sensitive sources and methods.
However, it is important to note that technology is not a
panacea. Human expertise on information holdings and routinely
validating that technology will always be necessary.
Finally, coordination of declassification efforts
throughout the U.S. Government would require something that has
been exceedingly difficult to do, even within the much smaller
group of the IC: get all declassification stakeholders on the
same IT system, network, and platform so that coordination can
occur smoothly and securely.
Most agencies have their own individual IT systems.
Bringing these networks together beyond the level of exchanging
emails has proven to be a monumental task and requires
significant resources to deliver the proper secure environment.
An even greater level of effort will be needed to accomplish
similar goals throughout the U.S. Government.
While the ODNI continues to work diligently to address
timeliness and consistency in the review process, extending
that process beyond the IC without first creating the
infrastructure to support it simply wouldn't work.
The challenges to reform are immense, but ODNI agrees with
the PIDB that the need for reform cannot be ignored. While we
differ on the advisability, feasibility, and the obstacles to
making the DNI the EA for declassification, we look forward to
working with this Committee, the overall U.S. Government, and
the PIDB on ways in which the IC can contribute to meaningful
reforms.
Acting Chairman Rubio, Vice Chairman Warner, and Members of
this Committee, thank you for your time and attention on a very
important topic. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you.
Congressman Tierney.
STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN F. TIERNEY (FMR.) MEMBER OF THE
PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD
Mr. Tierney. Thank you Acting Chairman Rubio and Vice
Chairman Warner and also the Members of the Committee. I want
to thank you for the invitation to testify on the important but
mutually neglected issue of modernizing the Government's
national security classification and declassification system.
I'd also like to thank the Committee staff for their assistance
on making it possible for me to appear before the Committee by
video.
I'm speaking to you today as a member of the Public
Interest Declassification Board, or the PIDB, and my remarks
reflect the views of our members. Our staff previously provided
a much more detailed prepared statement to the Committee staff.
Congress recognized the critical importance of
declassification in our democracy and in our Nation's security
when it created the PIDB in 2000. It recognized the role the
PIDB can play and should play in improving the health of the
national security classification and declassification system by
making recommendations for reform.
We're gratified with Senators Moran and Wyden cosponsoring
and introducing The Declassification Reform Act of 2020. This
proposed legislation includes many of the recommendations for
our recent report to the President entitled, ``A Vision for the
Digital Age: Modernization of the United States Classification
and Declassification System.''
We're also grateful for the Congress passing and the
President signing legislation last year, permanently
authorizing the PIDB and looking forward to continuing our
advocacy on the imperative to modernize today's antiquated
classification and declassification systems.
We've written five reports to the President over the past
12 years. Each report documented challenges facing the
Government and recommended new policies to address them.
Modernization of the classification and declassification system
is an imperative. It is a necessity for our national security
and our democracy to operate effectively in the digital age.
Since issuing our first report in 2008, the Government has
made little progress. It has not invested nor integrated
information technology into classification and declassification
processes. We purposefully designed our most recent report to
serve as a roadmap for the Government to overcome collective
individual agency inaction, to harness uncoordinated efforts by
a few individual agencies, and to integrate them into a
Government-wide solution.
We stress the critical importance of sustained leadership
in driving change by having a senior-level executive agent
oversee implementation of reforms. We felt that an integrated,
federated-systems approach would ensure interoperability, allow
for effective use of advanced technologies, and lead to
solutions to declassifying large volumes of digital data.
Our recommendations align with the Administration's
information technology modernization and artificial
intelligence strategies, and its efforts to integrate IT across
agencies to improve performance and reduce cost. They align
with the DNI's 2019 national intelligence strategy to do things
differently. And the National Solarium's recommendation to
reform the United States Government's structure and operations
for cyberspace.
There's a widespread agreement that the declassification
system is at a breaking point. It simply cannot effectively
handle the volume of digital data generated every day. It
cannot handle the volume of records requiring declassification
review. Declassification processes remain much the same from
what they were when first developed in the Truman
Administration in an era when secrets were created on paper and
secured in safes. Without reform, it will be far worse in the
future.
I will share one example. In 2012, we learned that one
intelligence agency estimated it created approximately one
petabyte of classified data every 18 months. This is the
equivalent of approximately 1 trillion pieces of paper.
This agency estimated that using current manual
declassification review processes, it would take 2 million
employees one year to review this volume of information. This
is just one agency eight years ago. The problem has undoubtedly
grown exponentially since 2012.
Just as the declassification system was about to collapse,
over-classification is getting worse and harming current
government national security operations. Lieutenant General
James Dickinson, the President's nominee to lead the United
States Space Command, testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee that over-classification was making it more
difficult for us to support the warfighter.
In this example, over-classification not only effects
operations ambitions, but it can lead to costly duplication of
space systems, limit innovation, diminish private sector
support, and reduced development of new technologies on
projects that could aid U.S. space dominance.
Agencies must reevaluate the needs of their customers to
maximize their support. For example, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the NGA, created a Consolidated Security
Classification Guide it calls CoNGA. It is integrated into NGA
work processes, uses advance technology to automate
classification decisions, and ensures decisions align with
mission and customer needs.
Policy modernization, interagency integration, and
technology use are critical to the security of our Nation.
Technology, such as artificial intelligence and machine
learning, are revolutionizing operations. Specific tools and
technology solutions exist at agencies now. They can and must
be used to revolutionize the management of classified data.
Agency programs currently operate independently in a silo.
They are duplicative and they only focus on identifying and
reviewing their own equity information. Many lack the ability
to communicate securely with each other, including the National
Declassification Center. This leads to added cost and reduced
efficiencies as agencies duplicate processes.
We recommend an executive agent to oversee declassification
reform and integrate it into a federated system. First, the
executive agent has the authority to oversee implementation of
new policies and processes across the agencies, including
developing precise declassification guidance and metadata
standards that can be used across agencies.
The executive agent has authority to direct and organize
research into advanced technology solutions, ensure its
interoperability across the federated enterprise system, and
coordinate technological acquisition.
We believe the ODNI is strategically empowered to take on
the coordination role as executive agent. The ODNI has the
experience. It overcame bureaucratic roadblocks and integrated
the 17 organizations that comprise the Intelligence Community.
The ODNI is a proven leader in developing, implementing, and
managing technological solutions and acquisitions to support
missions and operations across agencies.
Implemented development and deployment of the Intelligence
Community information technology enterprise, ICITE, and it
manages the joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System.
The ODNI is a leader in overseeing and managing research in
advanced information technology, artificial intelligence, and
other machine-learning technologies. It can leverage expertise
of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency, National
Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, other
Intelligence Community agencies, and In-Q-Tel and other private
sector partners.
Lastly, the DNI has the stature to bring about change. The
2019 National Intelligence Strategy recognized the DNI's
leadership role in getting the Government to do things
differently by increasing integration and coordination,
bolstering innovation, and increasing transparency. We felt the
ODNI was the clear choice to serve as the executive agent.
ODNI's leadership in establishing a common IT architecture
can also provide opportunities to gain efficiencies, better
support missions, and increase cost savings by expanding the
common IT infrastructure, processes, and data strategy already
in place to improve classification and declassification.
We're at a precipice. The declassification system can no
longer keep pace with the volume of paper records created 25
years ago; and the exponential growth of digital data will
cause it to collapse without radical change. The impact of a
failure to reform the classification and declassification
system will be felt widely in our democracy and in our national
security.
We authorized five reports offering recommendations and
possible solutions to this challenge. However, they have not
yet led to a coordinated government effort to radically rethink
what classification and declassification mean in a digital age,
how it impacts our national security, and how it impacts our
democracy. Our board remains hopeful that change is coming.
The President signed Senate Bill 1790 last year. It
required the Department of Defense to report to the Congress on
its plan to integrate advance technologies into
declassification processes and what it is doing to reduce
declassification backlogs.
There is also unanimity among all stakeholders this system
will not work with digital age. I appreciate the ODNI
representative's statement that the system is outdated,
recognizing that there is a problem is a step forward.
We support Senator Moran's and Senator Wyden's recently
proposed legislation to modernize declassification and we're
grateful to this Committee for hosting a hearing on this issue.
These are also important steps forward.
There are important steps that will lead to reform. The
Government is already modernizing information technology
policies and practices. It is reforming acquisition policies
and practices for efficiency and reduced costs. It is
integrating the use of advanced technology across agencies to
address mission imperatives.
Adopting the recommendations in our vision report either
within the executive branch or through legislation are the next
steps. Appointing the DNI as the executive agent will bring
needed experience and expertise. It will facilitate development
of a federated systems approach across agencies. It will
facilitate the integration of advance information technology
into new classification and declassification processes.
Let me again express my appreciation to the Committee for
addressing this esoteric, yet critically important topic.
Modernizing the classification and declassification system is
important for our 21st century national security and it is
important for transparency and our democracy.
The time for action is now. The Government must move beyond
saying, ``it's too costly'' or saying, ``some other agency
should be responsible.'' Instead, the roadmap in our report
offers opportunities for reform. It offers possible solutions
for the Government to engage with stakeholders to truly address
this challenge, to identify solutions, and to implement them.
Thank you, again, for your interest and your support. I
look forward to answering your questions and continuing this
discussion.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you both for being here. The Vice
Chairman went to vote. I'm going to go as soon as he comes
back. Senator Feinstein is still getting ready.
So, Senator Blunt, you're next. Are you ready?
Senator Blunt. Yes, I am, Chairman. Thanks for letting me
go. I've got a couple of questions.
You know, clearly, as my former colleague, Congressman
Tierney, mentioned in his remarks, Congress has asked the ODNI
to come back with a plan on classification. We all believe that
we over-classify now. I think that's more likely than not the
default position. If you don't have a lot of time to think
about the thing you're classifying and decide there may be
something in there that possibly should be classified at a
higher level, it goes there. And it goes there for a long time.
So, I don't know how much of that we need to establish
here. We need to get back to where the classification is as
open as possible and available in the future as quickly as
possible.
I would say this is a question for Mr. Koch. You know the
Pentagon leaders themselves have been pressing pretty
aggressively for this. The secretary of the Air Force,
Secretary Barrett, General Hyten, Vice Chair of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, have pointed out how hard it is to make the
case publicly without access to information that is widely
available now, particularly the overhead architecture
information. So much of it is virtually available at the
commercial level, if not absolutely available at the commercial
level.
And to make the case for Space Command or to make the
case--. Senator Moran and I both serve on the Defense
Appropriating Committee. You know, his challenge is there are
things that that Committee needs to know that truly aren't at
the intel level but are at a level to where Members of Congress
should have more access to them than they have now.
So, I guess the question, Mr. Koch, is what kinds of things
would make it easier to explain the needs of Space Command and
other defense needs if they were classified at a level beyond
the likely current classification level?
Mr. Koch. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
Unfortunately, I don't think I can speak intelligently to what
Space Command and Space Force is doing. That's a DOD equity. I
can speak for the IC and what ODNI's doing.
But, if you're concerned about how agencies in the IC over-
classify things, I share that concern with you. And you have to
understand that we are collectively working on updating our
security classification guides to be more tailored for very
specific information.
So [Inaudible] are not [Inaudible] level when they--when
there's a question. We're preparing better training for our
workforce and I have utmost confidence that we will get to a
point where over-classification will not be an issue going
forward.
Senator Blunt. Well, I hope so. And I guess, again, part of
my question was that there is so much that's available at the
commercial level now and we wind up classifying government
documents that are widely available at almost the level we have
them in other ways. But, I think people are reluctant, if it's
a classified document, to use it and often don't have the time
to go somewhere else to find it.
So, a lot of people have, during the COVID period, really
figured out that there's lots of unclassified material that
they could access from home. Some agencies better prepared than
others to work in that unclassified space.
But, given your declassification background, what have you
done to assist the various IC agencies as to how they could use
more unclassified documents during the time that they were
working remotely? I think that also would be a question, Mr.
Koch, for you.
Mr. Koch. Senator, thank you. Thank you for the question.
To be honest, I have not been personally involved with that.
As you know the IC works at the classified level for the
vast majority of the time. So, not only during COVID, but pre-
COVID it's incredibly difficult for any officer in the IC to
work in an unclassified setting when they deal with classified
material. So even if I had been involved with that----
Senator Blunt. Are you telling you me you didn't have
people working from home in an unclassified setting during the
time that the headquarters was man down?
Mr. Koch. No, we have had people working from home but we
can't have them working on any kind of declassification
initiatives or requests.
Senator Blunt. I guess maybe I'm not making the case here
right. But the case says that a lot of people have found a way
to use declassified commercially available material that
allowed them to do most of what they were doing with the
classified material. And I guess your answer is you've given no
advice in that.
John Tierney, on the move toward more declassification from
your oversight, you're looking at that. What have you seen that
you're most encouraged about and what have you seen that you're
most concerned about as we try to get our hands around this
whole issue of over classifying.
Mr. Tierney. Senator, what we've seen is a lack of ability
to work across the agencies and find standards that can apply
for anybody on that. And I think that goes back in the form of
a lack of leadership. We're not asking that the ODNI actually
go in there and tell people what they're going to classify and
not classify. But we need somebody to make sure everybody is
working on updating those and to the extent that it even can be
uniform making sure that they are.
And I think what's probably most uncertain to us is that
there's no activity going on in that realm. Everybody seems to
just be saying well it's too expensive or it's too much for us
to do. When in fact somebody has got to do it if it's going to
be done at all and it is incredibly expensive to not have it
done, as Senator Warner indicated and also Senator Wyden. Some
$18-plus billion dollars a year are being spent and we're not
really on top of the issues here.
So I think that we need the leadership and we need a set of
standards that will take care of as much as can be done while
still leaving the individual agencies the ability to take care
of their own equities.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Congressman. Chairman, I'm out of
time. Thanks for the time.
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. I think as
Chairman Rubio indicated, we're going to do five-minute rounds.
I'll go. I think Senator Cornyn's up next. Then I understand
we're doing it this time by seniority. So you'll be right after
Senator Cornyn. It's Warner, Cornyn, Feinstein next.
Senator Cornyn. Gentlemen, there's lot of detail here but
if I could sort of pull us back to a 30,000-foot level or
above. I'm not really exactly sure there's a common
understanding about the problem we're trying to solve both
through the classification system and the declassification
system. I start from the premise that public information should
be available unless there is a good reason not to make it
available.
And I'm told that there are about four million people with
security clearances in the United States and it seems to me
that not only do we over-classify, but that it's so burdensome
to come up with a method of declassification that it just
simply--we need to sort of think over again what is the goal
here?
We all understand being consumers of classified
information--the importance of protecting things like sources
and methods. But just like under the Freedom of Information
Act, it's too easy for government officials to hide their
mistakes to prevent public scrutiny and accountability for
their actions on behalf of the taxpayer. And I wonder maybe I
could start with you, Mr. Tierney.
I'd like to get a little bit of your perspective and
feedback about how we should conceptualize the problem we're
trying to solve here. And how do we reconcile that with another
important law, which is the Freedom of Information Act and the
presumption of openness, along with pretty clear criteria that
are applied to keep it secret or keep it in the hands of the
Government rather than to make it available.
Do you think that's a fair contrast to make and should we
all be focused--should both systems be focused on the same
goal?
Mr. Tierney. Well that's a tough question Senator. I
appreciate your throwing it to my ballpark.
You know, I had some of the same frustrations when I was on
the Intelligence Committee in the House and on the Oversight
Committee with National Security--that you're never quite sure
that people are applying the proper standards to anything that
they're classifying. And sometimes you get the notion that they
might be classifying something for reasons of avoiding
embarrassment or just because they're not sure whether it
should be or not on that.
I don't have the magic bullet on that and I don't think
that our PIDB necessarily does either, except to say that it is
something that has to be done across agencies and that it needs
some leadership. Somebody has to take charge of saying this is
a problem and we're going to get a working group together,
which is one reason we have the executive committee working
with the executive agent in our recommendations to deal with
just this sort of a problem.
There's identifying what is the glitch that is over-
classifying things and what to do while setting standards that
will allow people to apply them readily so that we don't get
into that situation and make the clearness there. I think it'll
be a decision that the communities make working together and
that the Congress then will have to assess and make sure that
they think that they're appropriate, as with the Executive, on
that.
We don't have the magic bullet on how to tell right now--
how to classify one item and not classify another within the
equities of each individual agency. But nobody seems to be
doing it yet and nobody seems to be really pushing down on the
pedal to make sure that they do. And that's where the lack of
leadership comes in on that. Why I think it's so essential that
somebody lead the project.
Senator Cornyn. Well thank you for your answer. I wonder,
do you as a former Member of Congress, do you see this as a
legislative branch responsibility for identifying what
information's classified or not? Or exclusively an executive
branch decision?
Mr. Tierney. I think that the Congress has an oversight
role to play on that. I think that initially, particularly
within the Intelligence Community, it is an Executive situation
and that they have to be responsible for it. But I think that
the Congress has an oversight view to make sure that it isn't
overly broad and that it serves the underlying purpose of
making sure there's transparency and that the public does get
as a default mechanism those things which should not absolutely
be classified.
So while, again, the Executive can certainly take a lot of
leeway on that and be very active in making sure that this
moves forward, I don't think that Congress can abdicate its
responsibility of oversight to make sure that it's being done
properly and that classification does not continue to be over-
broad in its application.
Senator Cornyn. And again, Mr. Tierney, have you seen a
construct or a reform in this area with regard to the
classification system that you think is useful or something we
ought to--? Or that gets it right? Or is it just simply an
absence of proposals that would help us get our arms around
that?
Mr. Tierney. With respect to the classification versus
items that shouldn't be classified, I don't think that I've
seen a construct on that. I'd check with the other board
members to see if they have or not. But I do think that there's
a construct of having leadership in an agency that makes sure
people are moving toward that goal and meeting benchmarks.
And then working together to make sure there's as much
standard application as possible. And that's the ODNI itself
and the work that it did amongst the 17 agencies in the
Intelligence Community. And some of that, of course, reaches
outside the Intelligence Community where people have access to
some of that information and they need to know.
So, in that sense, there is a good example of how you can
provide the leadership and it can work across agencies and even
outside of the Intelligence Community is in the ODNI, the
actual construct of classification versus don't classify
something--I've not seen that prototype yet.
Senator Cornyn. Well thank you very much. Mr. Chairman.
I'll yield back.
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you. And there are five minutes
left on the vote if you've not voted on the last one.
Mr. Tierney, let me start with you and let me get both you
and Mr. Koch on this one. This Committee has wrestled for two
or three years on what I think is an analogous problem. And
that is security clearance reform.
We worked closely with the Administration. Took the backlog
on clearances down from over 700,000 to about 200,000. Still
waiting for an EO called the Trusted Workforce 2.0. But I guess
I'm interested in both the witnesses.
One is that there are the lessons learned from security
clearance reform--and you may not be as familiar. But I'd like
to have your comment there. And then what does a
declassification system look like in a digital era? Since we
obviously, I think, all agree that we're still kind of paper
based. Either one of the witnesses. I guess I'll start with Mr.
Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Okay. Well on the declassification in the
digital age it looks like, again, the need for there to be
technologies that are identified and methods of machine
learning. The architecture we put together to even to work on
that. And again, that's going to take somebody with experience
in doing that. The ODNI fits that bill in terms of this idea.
And I think it's going to be very important.
And could you remind me the first part of your question
Senator?
Vice Chairman Warner. The first part of my question was--
and you may not be as familiar with this part--but we worked
quite closely with the Administration on a security clearance
reform process. It's taken us three years but it seems like
there were at least some similarities in terms of type of
problem. And I don't know if you have observed any of that.
Mr. Tierney. No, I haven't. I'm not familiar with it
Senator, although I will note that I had a security clearance
serving on the Intelligence Committee in the House. But when I
went to work on this board they started the process and that
was what three years ago? And I'm proud to say that last week
they finished it. So if there's reform, it certainly has----
Vice Chairman Warner. So much for that reform playing out
in your case.
Mr. Tierney. [Inaudible]
Vice Chairman Warner. Mr. Koch, do you have any questions--
either analogy--to security clearance reform and what are the
metrics in a digital age?
Mr. Koch. Sure Senator. So first let me say I'm not an
expert at all in security classification reform. But the
processes for security clearance investigation and access to
classified information are fairly uniform. But when you're
talking about the classification declassification system
they're not. Because OCAs are delegated to departments and
agencies from the President. And each agency develops their own
security classification guides.
So federating that is not the same as dealing with security
EA processes and issues. On the digital front, I know that
there are multiple working groups at the national level
interagency level that are already dealing with these issues
and have been over the past few years. And we are continuing to
do that.
Hopefully, after COVID finishes, we can get back to doing
that business. But I will point out that the director of the
ISOO already has the authorities that the PIDB suggests the DNI
take over for declassification.
Specifically, the ISOO is directed by the President to
establish standards for classification/declassification marking
principles. And they should be the ones in our view that should
continue doing those things in this area and not just shift
those responsibilities to another agency.
Vice Chairman Warner. But when we're talking about a
digital era, though, isn't there almost an immediate bias
toward over-classification when you've got so much voluminous
digital product at this point? Is there any kind of guidepost
you'd give us on how you could stop that--that proclivity?
You've got so much data at this point, it's just easier to
declassify and sort--or easier to classify--then even try to
sort through.
Mr. Koch. Well, Senator, that's a hard question to answer.
There's just so much out there. When you have humans making
their own decisions on whether something should be classified
or not, they're basing their decision on their own experience
as well as following specific security classification guidance
on what should and should not be classified.
However, I do agree that we should get automation in this
area, which would definitely cut down the over-classification
issues that we have seen over the years. I know that there are
some efforts underway throughout the IC to come up with some
kind of program that can help automate as you're typing
something that is immediately recognize as classified or not
and therefore can mark a document for you so you don't have to
do it yourself.
I don't think that we're there yet, but we've definitely
made some progress in that area.
Vice Chairman Warner. I do think AI will be an important
tool. When Senator Rubio was making his opening comments he
singled out--in addition to Senator Wyden--he singled out one
of our newer Members as the philosopher-scholar. So maybe
Senator Sasse has got the answers. He's up next.
Senator Sasse. It's unfortunate that you begin with an
insult, but thank you Vice Chairman for chairing today.
Senator Wyden, thank you for your work on this, and Senator
Moran for your earlier statement. To the folks on the PIDB,
thanks for your work in an area that's really important. It
obviously sounds like a niche topic but I think it's incredibly
important.
I want to associate myself with comments from Members on
both sides of the aisle today about the risks of over-
classification, because it fosters public distrust. For all 15
of us who serve on this Committee, I really appreciate the work
of all the hard working men and women who often labor in the
shadows. And even their families don't always get to know what
they're going through and all the suffering and sacrifices that
they do.
We obviously value the classified product that we get on a
regular basis. But I would push back a tiny little bit, Mr.
Koch, against your last answer when you said people are making
decisions about classification based on their individual
histories and assessments. I think in addition they make
decisions based on the structural incentives in the system
where, if you over-classify something, there's no way you get
in trouble. If you under-classify something, you can get in
trouble.
So the easy move--this is not to say that the people doing
this work are lazy. It's that they're risk averse because all
humans are. The easy move is to over-classify when you can't
decide what to do. And so one of the things that I think, Mr.
Tierney, your group has done so much important work on is just
providing some simple ways for us to get our hands around it,
and for the broader public to understand what problem we're
dealing with.
And so one piece of your report talks about how we spend
about $18 billion a year on these classification/
declassification systems that aren't really working because we
have millions of pages of documents even from the Reagan
administration. And I say as a historian, not just as a regular
consumer of intelligence--as a historian, I think it's really
important for the public and for scholars to be able to get
access to all of this information.
And instead of even wrestling around the hard dividing-line
about what should or shouldn't still be declassified, I think
Mr. Tierney what your report showed was that millions of pages
of documents from the Reagan administration that should have
already been declassified have not been simply because they
require manual review. I think the bias for these older
documents should be toward an inertia of motion path toward
declassification.
And if a manual review is required, then these documents
don't get declassified. The incentives in the system are
rewarded to having over-classified. Historians and other
scholars can't get access to them. There's not enough scrutiny
and that fosters public distrust.
So Mr. Tierney, first of all thank you again for all of
your hard work in this space. But as you arrived at the
recommendation to make the ODNI--the DNI--the executive agent
for declassification, could you walk us through a little bit of
the process of how you landed there? What other alternatives
you considered and how you decided that the DNI is the best or
the least bad agent to be responsible here? That was directed
at Congressman Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much Senator.
Senator Sasse. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Look, a prioritization on declassification is
very important. I'm glad you brought that up. And the last
report we made, we recommended that the National
Declassification Center and the agencies of public discuss
which to be reviewed so that others essentially would have an
insight into what records the public or other agencies want to
see. And by the fall those records that has no interest in
seeing or very little interest in seeing. And that
prioritization would allow for a coordinated government-wide
approach to declassifying information based on the records most
sought and the most historical significance to the public.
So those things are certainly important; and for the bond
digital records in particular, the advanced technology would be
able to assist in that declassification effort. It is costly,
what's going on now. Some $18.5 billion are already being spent
on an annual basis on that and it is more than a little crazy
on that. There are 46 million pages in 2017 that were
declassified. And each page costs about $2.23 per page.
So we went through a process of recognizing just what the
expense was to the citizens and taxpayers and the need for our
prioritization. And we kept coming back to the notion that
there needed to be somebody driving the train. There had to be
some leadership here. Because everybody recognizes the problem.
Everybody will admit right away that it needs to have some
technology involved in it. Different infrastructure
architecturally. It needs to have action taken cooperatively
amongst agents as we see interoperability.
All of those things people agree to but nobody seems to
want to take the challenge on. We did at first look at the ISOO
group and decided whether or not that would be a group that
would be appropriate to take it. But unfortunately, ISOO is
only 18 people. And it has a huge responsibility to do many
other things that the executive orders have put on it. And I
just can tell you some of them.
It supports several executive orders including Executive
Order 13526, to classify national security information; 18-
12829, the National Industrial Security Program; 3549, to
classify National Security Information Program with State,
local, tribal, and private--and so on and so on. You get to see
the issue on that.
With only 18 people and its budget of $360 million this
year, is $40 million decreased over the past 5 years. So we
really couldn't, by a process of elimination, couldn't find an
agency that would have the power and the respect in the
community and that came from the ODNI's office.
They do command the respect and the authority that's going
to be needed for somebody to be able to say to the other
agencies: you need to address this problem. You need to focus
on it and get an answer. You need to work with us on
identifying technologies. You need to work with us on getting
answers about the machine learning. And then those agents--you
need somebody who's had experience doing it. We didn't have any
other organization that we were able to come across that had
the kind of experience that the ODNI had.
And even with the NGA--the Geospatial Agency--the work that
they've done in CoNGA, solved some of the problems that were
mentioned by you, Senators, earlier on that. But mostly looking
back on that, a process of elimination of other agencies not
having any experience, not having the authority perceived by
other people to do that. And those things were very important
and driven to us to say that this is what we need. We need
somebody that--move on.
Senator Sasse. Congressman, I'll cut in here just to say
thank you because we're at time, and I know that I need to give
the microphone back to the Chairman. But Mr. Chairman, I would
note for the record that I'm going to followup with a letter as
well, asking about how the pilot project is going with the
applied research lab at the University of Texas at Austin,
which is trying to figure out how to use artificial
intelligence and machine learning to expedite the
declassification process. But I'll do that by letter. Thank
you.
Chairman Rubio. Excellent. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. For
colleagues that have just joined us, I want to mention one
issue that the Chairman raised that I also did some research on
during the break. The reforms Senator Moran and I are urging do
not put the DNI in charge of deciding what DOD secrets are
declassified. The same principle is true of Department of
Energy secrets, State Department secrets; those agencies are
going to decide what they're going to declassify.
What our bill's about is modernizing the systems for
declassifying information that these agencies would use and
have already determined are no longer classified. So that's an
important issue, and I think we're going to have a dialogue on
this. So Senator Moran and I very much want to work to develop
a bipartisan coalition in this Committee to modernize the
bureaucracy and we've proposed an approach that we think makes
some sense.
So I'd like to start by having Mr. Tierney--because he's
got a chance to respond to Mr. Koch. I think it would be good
to have Mr. Tierney paint for the Committee a picture of the
declassification process five, 10 years from now--if this
Committee can't get that bipartisan coalition for reform. What
would be withheld from the American people simply because we
didn't get a bipartisan coalition to modernize the bureaucracy?
Congressman?
Mr. Tierney. Well, Senator, it certainly won't be a pretty
picture. I can tell you that. We don't know right now how many
classified documents agencies create. And we can't tell exactly
how big the problem is. But we do know that the figure
continues to grow exponentially. I cited one example in my
remarks. We also know the Government will be unable to
declassify any large volume of digital data that--. The
abilities just aren't there.
Here's an example of a body of records that has or will
have significant historical interest. The National Archives
receive all the Presidential records at the conclusion of each
Administration. It's an accession between one and two
terabytes, I'm sorry, of data in the 12-year span of the Ronald
Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.
The volume increased to four terabytes in the Clinton
administration, mostly emails and structured data. And the
archives received 80 terabytes from the George W. Bush
administration. Eight years later the National Archives
accessioned an astonishing 250 terabytes of data from the Obama
administration including a complex array of structured and
unstructured data.
So you just see how exponentially it grows in that one
single category. And you take that and you blow it out amongst
all the different agencies and aspects on that you get a
picture of how ugly it's going to be years down the road when
you don't have machine learning--you don't have the technology
involved, you don't have some sort of coordinated effort.
Senator Wyden. Now on the question of essentially how you
handle this, how important--and this was very important to
Senator Moran and I--is that declassification reform not be
stove piped in different parts of the U.S. Government.
Mr. Tierney. Well it's very important on that. How to
encapsulate that is difficult. I mean, you have so many
different agencies classifying. You have so many different
aspects of ways now that it's almost impossible for people to
do it. I mean there's one example of--it was mentioned
earlier--that when somebody may declassify a document that is
also involved with the equities of another agency. If you're
doing it manually then you have to get it from one point to
another.
If there's no ability to get it technologically one point
to another, it has to be physically brought from one place to
another or somebody has to come in and visit and review the
document in a secure setting to do it.
So it just gets completely out of control. And I think it
just moves on from there.
Senator Wyden. One last question if I might, Mr. Tierney.
So, Mr. Koch basically--and this is a common refrain--said
well let's look somewhere else to do this important job of
really cleaning up declassification. And he seems to think that
ISOO and NDC--the National Center--are able to play the role to
really bring about declassification reform. We were concerned
that these offices don't really have the kind of bureaucratic
heft--the kind of bureaucratic muscle--to actually get federal
agencies to integrate and modernize their declassification
systems. What's your take on that?
Mr. Tierney. My take is exactly that, Senator. You're
right. They can do it either way. You can say why did the DNI--
should serve as executive agency or I can come in and say why--
you know--the Information Security Oversight Office is not as
suited to serve. But if it comes right down to it, one is the
authority issue as you point out.
I've heard all wonderful things the people at ISOO do and I
want to thank them for all the work they do. They don't carry
the kind of authority and weight that the ODNI does when it
says something should be done or people should work together
and get it done by a certain time in a certain way.
And it's not equipped in that manner to serve. Also, as I
mentioned, it has a quite heavy workload for 18 staff people
and a budget that is shrinking instead of growing. The things
that it can't do, it doesn't have the technical expertise that
the ODNI has. It doesn't have access to the advanced technology
that is already in place at the Intelligence Community
agencies.
Unlike the ODNI, it doesn't have the experience of
developing or deploying or managing large multi-agency secure
cloud based enterprise systems like the ICITE system I
mentioned that is run by the ODNI.
Unlike ODNI, it does not have the experience managing a
secure communications network like JWICS. In fact, the National
Archives only has two JWICS terminals for the entire agency.
Unlike ODNI, it does not have the experience of focus on
protecting sources and methods, something the ODNI has
highlighted to us in 2018.
And one reason I would think ODNI would want to be taking
on this leadership role so it does have a good say in
protecting sources and methods and be able to do that.
And unlike the DNI, the director of ISOO does not have the
same stature and ability to corral those agencies that I
mentioned on their policies. And it probably would be in
conflict with their main oversight mission to boot.
So we've had discussions with Archives, leaders,
historians, researchers, civil societies, organizations,
records managers, or other agencies. We found that the National
Archives is not the appropriate organization to serve as
executive agent or to lead the reform of classification and
declassification.
And we have tried to have discussions on this with the
folks at the ODNI's office and we've not been successful to
date. But we're open to more discussions with them on that.
Because all the things I mentioned ISOO doesn't have, the ODNI
does have. And I'm not aware of another agency that has it to
the extent that the ODNI does.
Senator Wyden. Thank you. I'm well over my time. And Mr.
Chairman and Vice Chairman Warner, thank you both very much for
scheduling this hearing and giving Senator Moran and I this
opportunity.
Chairman Rubio. Important topic. I'm glad we were able to
get to it in an open setting.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Representative Tierney, welcome. And I want to thank not
only you, but your fellow Public Interest Declassification
Board members for your most recent report on modernizing and
reforming our declassification system. I really worry very much
about the stakes of inaction in this field. And as you
mentioned, a lack of reform means that we'll continue to spend
an outrageous amount of money--$18 billion or more per year on
a Fifties-era paper-based declassification system.
So Representative Tierney, while many say that
modernization is too costly, I think there is clearly a risk of
not making these kinds of investments now in a modernized
system that'll bring cost savings down the road. What
investments do you think are needed to modernize
declassification? And do you think that there is the potential
for actual cost savings in the future based on a more
streamlined technology dependent modernized system?
Mr. Tierney. Well thank you, Senator. Nice to see you again
as well. I do believe that and we--the Board--do believe that
there'll be significant savings on this. The estimate of $18-
and-a half-billion may actually underestimate the cost to the
American public at the present time. We need to evaluate those
costs and we obviously can't afford to continue on the way that
we're going.
We need to, I would say, get an information technology
architecture that is going to be somewhat costly. You need to
have a lot more machine learning and the research and ability
to do on that. There are some pilot programs out there, as
Senator Sasse mentioned, that we can learn from.
And those are going to be costly. But they're one-time
costs with a minimal sort of maintenance cost going forward,
versus this continually growing cost and the cost of not
getting the information out for use by this--, whether it's the
Space Command or other government agencies or access to the
public for their need to know and to Congress for its need to
know.
So with the cost both in dollars and ability to access this
information, it's huge. And while the outlay on these
technologies and machine learning aspects of everything may be
significant initially, I think over time there will be a big
cost saver on that and we'll get the information to people when
they need it both inside government and out.
Senator Heinrich. Congressman Tierney, one of the things
that I find ironic is that this is a committee that really
understands the utility of using machine learning, using
artificial intelligence, so that the same set of eyes doesn't
have to go over the same product over and over and over all day
long. Because humans don't do well in that environment. And so
weeding that down to a few documents that need to be looked at
is something that I think, almost in our entirety, we
understand the power of that to change how we evaluate
intelligence product.
How can we scale up those pilots that you mentioned in AI
and machine learning and begin to take the same, I guess, zeal
for utilizing those tools in declassification that you already
see in terms of analysis of other intelligence product?
Mr. Tierney. Well, we have the ability and experiences that
we have to date. And it sounds a little bit like a broken
record. Most of those are within the Intelligence Community in
fact. So we have to acknowledge those and learn from them and
build upon them. But then we have to do it in a coordinated
fashion so that we're not duplicating everything we do. We're
not doing the research twice; we're not giving the same
technology twice. And that we're making sure that when we do
get it that it's applicable and usable by everybody across the
way.
So that again takes leadership--and to be the right
person--to be able to say that this is what we're going to do.
At the end, this is the decision. Everybody's going to move,
march in that direction.
So we suggested the executive agent. We suggested the
executive committee for that. And I think those are the
important factors to take into consideration and to get those
types of things done in a way that makes sure you're not
duplicating cost and energy.
Senator Heinrich. The new Commander of Space Command
recently testified that over-classification is making it more
difficult for Space Command to support the warfighter.
Congressman Tierney, can you talk a little bit about how
over-classification affects operations and missions, not just
the public's right to know, but also very real day-to-day,
risk-laden scenarios?
Mr. Tierney. I can, Senator. I'm looking for some notes
that I have on that, because it was not just Lieutenant General
Dickinson that talked about that. It was also General Hyten,
who's the predecessor on that, and talked about the fact that
they were just duplicating things when they shouldn't and
didn't need to be doing that. It has a serious effect on it,
and I think those were the two best examples that we had. And
let's see if I can find that.
Well, General Hyten was talking about just the over-
classification of information within the Defense Department. In
his own--and I quote him--what he said was it was unbelievably
ridiculous. The officials, he said, like so many others who are
worried by classification's effect on operations, has an effect
there; has an effect on costs; has an effect on innovation and
the ability to partner with industry in the private sector. So
all those things were impacted.
So he worries about the over-classification limits, the
public's insight of the Government operation and programs and
especially the costly ones like the defense program. So all of
those things had to come in. Not just the dollar costs, but the
costs and operations, innovation, and the ability to partner
with private industries--impact our ability to carry on as a
government in all fields.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you. Senator King, are you on? Is he
still with us? Senator King?
Senator King. Okay. I come at this unburdened by a great
deal of knowledge. But one question, Mr. Tierney, is are we
swamped by declassification because we are trying to declassify
everything? Or what about a system that just said, we're just
going to work on the declassification of things that people ask
for? It seems to me that cuts the universe of declassification
down considerably. Or are we swamped even in terms of what
people are asking for? Do you see where I'm going here?
Mr. Tierney. I do see what you're saying and I agree. There
are certain statutes and executive orders that require that
things be declassified on timetables, and that can always be
adjusted when somebody takes a look at it. But I think you're
right on the money when you talk about prioritization.
It's one of the things we've said, that there has to be a
system put in place that, prioritizing what we need in the
government agencies in order to avoid all those costs that I
talked about--the inability to work in the private sector, the
innovation and all of that. And also when the public, be it
historians, Congress, or the public at a large, can take those
issues of what people want and put them at the top of the list.
Then work it down to those things least claimed for and then
the ones that aren't being sought at all.
Senator King. Well, and another idea along that same line
is to just say, everything is going to be declassified after
five years or 10 years or whatever, and that's the fallback.
And then the burden is on the agencies to reclassify if they
feel it's justified. In other words, it would be an automatic
declassification. And again, the burden would be on those who
did the classification in the first place to say, yes, we've
got to keep this classified. Or we'll just let it go along with
these other million pages.
Mr. Tierney. Well, I'll leave it to my friend at ODNI to
respond with what I think will be the obvious intelligence
reactions to that, in terms of, at present at least, the lack
of manpower and technology to actually make the kind of review
that it would require to see whether or not they should
continue with the declassification status they're at, or be
reduced or be released on that.
I know that we just went through the Kennedy pages, for
instance. It was 50 years after the incident on that. There was
a great deal of discussion with the FBI and the CIA as to what
would release sources and procedures and things of that nature
on that, and that was after that many years. So that was a
great way to do it. That would presume that everybody had the
ability to do it and protect what really needed to be
protected.
Senator King. Well, let me in my limited time--Mr. Koch,
you, not surprisingly, said, ``Not me. I don't want to be
asked.'' But if not the DNI, then who? My experience in
management is you need somebody who's responsible. My
management principle is one throat to choke.
And one of the problems with this whole issue is it's
scattered throughout the Government and there's nobody that can
be held accountable for backlogs and delays. So if you don't
think it should be the DNI, who do you think it ought to be?
Mr. Koch. Well, thank you, Senator, for the question.
So as I mentioned previously, the President has already
authorized both the ISOO and the NDC to coordinate across the
executive branch on all declassification activities. The NDC,
for example, has been given authority from the President to
streamline declassification processes, as well as to prioritize
what should and should not be reviewed by agencies.
I think that they should continue that process. And for
your awareness, we have been working in multiple national level
and interagency groups over the past few years to specifically
address that prioritization issue. So we can get down to
exactly what the American people really want to know, as
opposed to reviewing in some ways meaningless information that
no one cares about and our agency is spending so much time
reviewing in the first place.
Senator King. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I want to express my appreciation to Senator Wyden and
Senator Moran for leading on this issue, and thank you to you
and the Vice Chair for holding this hearing. I think it's an
important issue.
Chairman Rubio. Senator King, you look comfortable. There's
some people here saying that you have a brandy and a cigar that
we can't see that's not in sight of camera.
Senator King. I'm somewhere in the bowels of the Capitol,
but in an undisclosed location.
Chairman Rubio. I didn't see any smoke. I defended you,
just wanted you to know.
Senator King. Thank you.
Chairman Rubio. Thank you.
Is there anybody else online, or am I the last one? Okay,
so then I think a lot of the topics have been covered. I did
want to get to a couple things.
Congressman, if I could first just briefly ask you to
explain the methodology of the report, because I didn't
personally review it, but our staff looked at it again last
night. It's not outlined in the document.
I'm just curious, you know, who did you interview? What's
the data we gathered, and then how was that all incorporated in
the recommendations? It looked like a lot of work, so I'm just
curious.
Mr. Tierney. It was a tremendous amount of work, and a lot
of it, of course, was done with the help of our staff, which
has been tremendous on that. I would be happy to have us
respond to you with a longer list of who exactly we spoke to
and when, to try to give you a real good idea of what the
methodology [Inaudible].
Chairman Rubio. What I'm getting at with the question is--
you'll understand in a moment--is we're trying to sort of
understand what the reforms would cost. And I'll tell you why
I'm asking that, not because we shouldn't do it. But I think
from what you've heard here today, I think there's broad-based
support for the idea that the system we have in place now is
Byzantine and confederated and broken and it needs to be
modernized. And it needs to be brought in the 21st century and
fully utilize all of the technology that's now available to us.
It seems to me that there seems to be not much controversy
around the idea that there needs to be an executive agent,
someone who has ball control on this in terms of overseeing
strategy, implementing the plan, driving the investments. Where
I think sort of the debate on the topic is who's going to be
that agent who sort of runs it. And it would appear that in
order to design and implement and drive the investment, you
would need a pretty substantial investment above what we are
doing now, at least at the design phase, because there's a lot
of new pieces to move in.
And so I guess the question I'd have for Mr. Koch is given,
obviously, the resources you have now are not--I think the
answer to this question is going to be an easy yes--the
resources you have available now to you would not be enough to
drive this. It would require additional resources if, in fact,
you are tasked with this or your office was tasked with this
[Inaudible] given the personnel you have now?
Mr. Koch. Senator, yes. I would absolutely say yes, that's
correct.
Chairman Rubio. Because, Congressman, the estimate of
$18.39 billion for 2017, was that the cost for the current
system, and does it include the cost of evaluating the
documents for public release? Or do you know if that number
just reflected maintaining the current classified system?
Mr. Tierney. That is the current maintenance of the system,
the $18.5 billion on that. It does not take into account what
would be needed to give the ODNI in order to be able to do the
types of things that we've requested that they've done.
Just to broadly address some of your issue on it, we had
discussion with National Archives leaders. A lot of them you'll
see when we give you the information. Historians, researchers,
civil society organizations, the record managers at other
agencies. And obviously, we've met with the ODNI office and
others in the Intelligence Community, but we offered to meet
with them more once we hear their resistance on that; and we
still remain willing to do that.
And we were able to make the comparison why ISOO and the
National Declassification Center weren't the appropriate ones
for lack of experience, for lack of resources, for lack of
authority, and all of those things which the ODNI had. But we'd
be more than happy to go into that in more detail with them,
should we be able to effect a meeting with them.
Chairman Rubio. Okay, yes. No, and again, it's not because
it wouldn't be money or an investment worth spending. Just to
be clear, this is not a plug-and-play where we could just
use--. I mean no matter who gets this assignment, they're going
to need resources, especially at the front end, to sort of
implement it. Hopefully, at that point like anything else,
there's front-end investments and the maintenance on the back
end.
And just in terms of the notion that--and I guess, Mr.
Koch, I want to accurately represent what the ODNI's position
is on this recommendation. It's not that you're against a
reform or even against a notion of an executive agent. It is a
level of discomfort in particular with designing a system that
other agencies you don't have authorities over would have to
abide by. Even if you're not making the specific decisions,
you're designing a system they would have to live by.
Is that an accurate assessment of some of the angst or, I
guess, some of the resistance to this recommendation of the
ODNI being the executive agent?
Mr. Koch. Yes, Senator, that's correct.
But I think part of the point is just simply transferring
the authorities that already exist with both ISOO and NDC to
another agency just doesn't make sense. I mean, if the issue is
resources and money at both ISOO and NDC, why can't those
agencies be given the same type of resources that it's being
proposed for the DNI?
I don't think that we're actually suggesting that an EA is
needed, but we are agreeing that significant reform is
necessary in this area, and we have been working toward that in
multiple working groups across the executive branch.
Chairman Rubio. All right, yes, go ahead, Congressman.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
I think we covered that in fairly good ground, and I'll be
happy to do it again. But there are so many things that the
ODNI has that ISOO and the National Declassification Center
don't have, in terms of experience in developing and deploying
and managing multiagency cloud-based enterprise systems,
securing a communications network like JWICS, protecting
sources and methods. And the ISOO doesn't have that stature
that the ODNI has. It doesn't have the ability to corral
agencies.
It also has an oversight mission that it would be in direct
conflict with this. So it's not authorized by the President to
do this, nor is the National Declassification Center with those
types of authorities. So some executive agent will have to be
given it, and we just think it should be the one with the
experience and the authority and the capabilities that have
been exercised and shown to be so effective in other settings
with those outside the Intelligence Community, and some of them
worldwide.
Chairman Rubio. Yes, I think what it boils down to at this
point is--I think there's widespread agreement that it needs to
be reformed, and someone needs to be in charge of the reforms.
And really, the question we have to work through is who is that
right entity to be responsible for designing it, implementing
it, and then maintaining it on an ongoing basis. And then from
us here, in an internal perspective, there's obviously some
jurisdictional grounds, because if it touches on State
Department or DOD, then this Committee's probably not going to
be the sole place that will have oversight over it.
But look, it's a topic that I think, as you've seen, I
think there's strong bipartisan widespread support for
pursuing. And this report certainly, and the bill that's been
filed, certainly gives us a baseline upon which to work. And I
hope we fleshed out a little bit through this public hearing
today some of the remaining outstanding topics about where our
options are.
I want to thank both of you for being patient with us and
contributing today to this hearing. It's one we have been
trying to get on the books for a couple months, and I'm glad we
were able to do. And again, I thank you both for being willing
to come online and be with us as a part of this today.
There may be some followup questions that members might
send in writing. We would ask that if we have some of those, if
you would just help get us answered. Some people may not have
been able to come over today. But again, I want to thank both
of you for being a part of this and everyone who came.
And with that, our hearing is adjourned.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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